CHAPTER 21

CHAPTER 21

 

LOSING IN LATIN AMERICA

 

As a presidential candidate in 2000, George W. Bush said in Miami, “Should I become president, I will look South (to Latin America), not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency.” (www.Braziliausembassycom, April 25, 2000)

When he first became president, Bush promised that the United States’ relationship with the region, Mexico in particular, was a top priority. Yet even though one of the most important bilateral relationships the United States had in the world was with Mexico.

During the Bush administration, several democratically-elected governments in Latin America chose left-leaning presidents. Cuba was the one country that defied the Bush administration which retaliated with sanctions that hurt both Americans and Cubans.

1. COLOMBIA. Colombia had been at war with itself for 40 years while the government had fought thousands of rebels in four main leftist guerilla groups. The rightist government had alternately fought or supported approximately 500 self-defense and paramilitary groups.

In early 2001, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) reported that Colombia failed to meet a single human rights condition required by the aid package. The report strongly recommended that the United States neither certify nor waive Colombia’s compliance with the conditions. The organizations noted that the human rights situation in Colombia had deteriorated since the White House waived all but one human rights condition in August 2000. They also argued that the Colombian government was farther from meeting the conditions set by Congress than it was less than a year before. Human Rights Watch (January 2001) reported on human rights violations by the Colombian government.

The goal of the American military was to cut off the supply of cocaine. To accomplish that, the United States needed to train soldiers in counterinsurgency tactics against armed guerrillas who protected coca-growing peasants. But such military attacks -- especially from helicopters -- increased the level of violence for ordinary citizens. Aerial fumigation of coca fields frequently destroyed edible crops as well, leaving peasants without a secure food supply. Peasants had little choice: either flee and join the displaced or else take up arms with rebel forces.

To have a real impact on the traffic in drugs, the United States needed to wage a war against the giant narco-agriculturalists and the paramilitary forces that protect them. But this was not part of “Plan Colombia.” The battle was against those who wanted land reform, not those who already owned huge coca plantations. The struggle was also to secure access to oil and gas, which the United States regarded as vital to this country’s national interest. Powell also lacked an exit strategy. The goal of the Colombian army was to destroy farmers’ coca fields and to defeat guerrilla forces, both of which could move deeper into the rain forests.

After September 11, the Bush administration provided machine guns, helicopters, and military advisers to Colombia in its fight against anti-government terrorists, but there was no known al Qaeda presence there.

Despite United States-backed efforts to eradicate cocaine production in Colombia, the drug trade continued to flourish inside a vast southern region that was ceded to the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) since 1998 as an incentive for peace talks. In that year, the area’s economy quickly turned from cattle ranching to coca farming. By 2002, with the return of government troops, farmers who had become dependent on illegal crops were fearful about the future. (Los Angeles Times, February 27, 2002)

In other parts of Colombia, the United States funneled in millions of dollars to President Andres Pastrana’s regime to fight the drug war, by providing equipment to Colombia’s military, training the country’s soldiers, and spraying pesticide over illegal crops.

2. CUBA. Just as ex-President Jimmy Cater was launching a human rights mission to Cuba, Bush announced that Cuba -- along with Syria and Libya – to his “axis of evil.” The president claimed these nations were promoting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. The list went beyond the three nations that Bush said in his State of the Union address “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” (Boston Globe, May 7, 2002)

Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that Cuba, in particular, was a threat to the United States that “often has been underplayed” despite its proximity to American soil. Contrary to Clinton-era assessments of Cuba as a dwindling security threat, Bolton called the island nation a haven for terrorists and said it also has a biological warfare research program, putting it on par with the most menacing global threats. Bolton noted that Bush had named three nations in his State of the Union address -- Iraq, North Korea, and Iran -- as the “axis of evil.” But he said the United States also must focus on the Cuban, Libyan, and Syrian regimes to stop the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. (Boston Globe, May 7, 2002)

Bolton did not name specific Cuban weapons programs threatening the United States. He said that confidential intelligence formed the basis of his assessment. He said, “We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state sponsors of terror.” Fidel Castro “has repeatedly denounced the United States war on terrorism. He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives.” (Boston Globe, May 7, 2002) Bolton declared that Libya and Syria had continued their efforts to build arsenals of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, according to United States and other intelligence. All three, Bolton said, “are pursuing or ... have the potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or have the capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations.” (Boston Globe, May 7, 2002)

After consulting Bush administration officials, ex-president Jimmy Carter traveled to Cuba for five days in May, meeting with Havana officials that included Fidel Castro. It marked the first time since the 1959 revolution that an American president visited Cuba.

But just two days before Carter departed , John Bolton -- Bush’ undersecretary of State for arms control -- delivered a well-publicized speech to the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington and asserted, “The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. … Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states.” Bolton also said that Cuba “has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort (and has) provided dual-use technology to other rogue states.” (Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2002)

The Heritage Foundation’s Latin America specialist, Stephen Johnson, accused Carter of being “the perfect foil” for a move in Congress to ease America's economic embargo of the Caribbean island: “The former president has a gullible streak and, like the Sunday school teacher he often resembles, looks for the best in some of the world’s worst leaders.”

A few days later while in Cuba, Carter challenged the Bush administration to prove their charges that Cuba has developed biological weapons technology and shared it with such renegade states as Iran. Carter even suggested that Bush administration officials misled either him or the American people about those allegations.

After visiting Cuba’s biotechnology research center, Carter said, “In preparation for this unprecedented visit, I requested, and we all received, intense briefings from the State Department, the intelligence agencies of my country, and high officials in the White House ... for them to share with us any concerns that my government had about possible terrorist activities that were supported by Cuba. … There were absolutely no such allegations made or questions raised. I asked them specifically on more than one occasion: ‘Is there any evidence that Cuba has been involved in sharing any information to any other country on Earth that could be used for terrorist purposes? And the answer from our experts on intelligence was, ‘No’ ” (Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2002)

Carter also referred to Bolton’s speech, calling it “maybe not coincidentally.” Then Secretary of State Colin Powell attempted to temper Bolton’s brash comments. “We didn’t say that (Cuba) actually had some weapons, but it has the capacity and the capability to conduct such research.” Powell said that Bolton’s words were “not a new statement” but one that had been made before. (Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2002)

In the wake of Carter’s visit to Cuba, Bush administration officials needed to justify the Helms-Burton trade embargo against Cuba, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said, “Trade with Cuba doesn't benefit the people of Cuba. It’s used to prop up an oppressive regime.”

Robert Dallek, a presidential historian at Boston University, maintained that Bush’s hard-line approach against Cuba was purely political. Dallek said, “For the Bush administration to end the embargo would jeopardize his brother’s (Governor Jeb Bush’s) election.” Dallek noted that most Cuban-American voters in Florida favored the trade embargo. (New York Times, May 16, 2002)

A week after Carter’s trip to Cuba, Bush announced his hard-line approach. The American president issued an ultimatum. He would lift the embargo, but only upon the condition that Castro would submit to a list of tough new American preconditions for a “new government that is fully democratic.” These included: Allow opposition parties to speak freely and organize; allow independent trade unions; free all political prisoners; allow human rights organizations to visit Cuba to ensure that the conditions for free elections are being created; allow outside observers to monitor 2003 elections; and discriminatory practices against Cuban workers. (Washington Post, May 20, 2002)

It was clear that Bush was insensitive to Cuba’s increased poverty. He tried to cushion is stance with a token gesture, proposing direct mail service to and from Cuba. Speaking in Spanish at times, Bush said Cuba’s legacy of freedom “has been insulted by a tyrant who used brutal methods to enforce a bankrupt vision.” He said the vision “has been debased by a relic from a different era,” who has turned Cuba “into a prison.” (Washington Post, May 20, 2002)

In an effort to brand Cuba a “terrorist state,” the State Department issued an “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism” on May 21, 2002. The Bush administration hyped up Castro’s trip to Iran in 2001, claiming he said “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each another, can bring America to its knees.” (Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2002)

To the contrary, after analyzing Castro’s remarks in Teheran, it turned out that he never made those comments. In fact, Castro consistently denounced terrorism since September 11, calling for its “total eradication.” He immediately condemned the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and he expressed solidarity with the American people and offered to cooperate with all governments in the defeat of terrorism.

Cuba also signed all 12 United Nations counter-terrorism conventions and in early 2002 offered to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States providing for joint efforts against terrorism.

The United States abruptly declined Havana’s gesture to cooperate in the war against terrorism. And furthermore, the State Department refused the offer but simultaneously complained that Cuba would not cooperate.

The May 21 report also mentioned Niall Connolly, one of three members of the Irish Republican Army arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing explosives to the FARC guerrilla group. It noted that he lived a number of years in Cuba.

But according to the Cubans, Connolly had left Cuba and returned to Ireland some time earlier. Subsequently, he turned up in Colombia. But there was no evidence that linked his activities in Colombia to Cuba.

The State Department also suggested that Cuba might have harbored members of a Chilean terrorist group because it had twice denied Chilean extradition requests, claiming that the wanted persons were not in Cuba. But the State Department refused to mention that this had been thoroughly investigated by the Chilean government, which had sent two Chilean senators to Havana in February.

The report also complained that Cuba was harboring some members of the separatist Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). There were a few Basques living in Cuba, but Cuba was not “harboring” them. Most arrived years before as the result of an agreement with the then-government of Felipe Gonzalez in Spain, which asked the Cubans to take them. A few other Basques subsequently traveled to Cuba, and it was true that the Spanish government did not consider the Gonzalez agreement still operative. But that government never asked for the extradition of a single Basque. In April, the head of the Basque regional government paid a state visit to Cuba, something he would probably not have done if he thought Cuba was “harboring Basque terrorists.”

Finally, the State Department raised the issue of American fugitives in Cuba. But there was no evidence that any are engaged in terrorist activities or any other activities against the United States. Furthermore, there are Cuban fugitives in the United States, several of them terrorists with extensive FBI files. (Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2002)

3. VENEZUELA. In 1998 -- two years before Bush took office -- Hugo Chavez was elected president with 60 percent of the national vote. He campaigned on populist and social issues such as the redistribution of land, making him highly unpopular with the country’s business class. (Counterpunch, April 15, 2002)

Chavez was elected freely, fairly, and constitutionally. Twice elected by the largest margins in the country’s history, Chavez , who had led a failed coup attempt in 1992, was temporarily ousted by military officials in the midst of a general strike in April 2002. The strike was jointly organized by the country’s business establishment and the corrupt, corporatist bureaucracy of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV).

Approximately 16 people were killed April 11, 2002 as pro- and anti-government demonstrators clashed in the streets near the Miraflores presidential palace. The march picked up strength as it approached the palace, with an estimated 50,000 joining the protesters. Tens of thousands of Chavez’s supporters, meanwhile, sought to block the demonstrators from reaching their goal. Several of the people killed were among those defending the palace, including the driver of Chavez’s vice president, Diosdado Cabello.

Witnesses attributed the deaths to an exchange of fire between the Presidential Guard and elements of the Metropolitan Police, loyal to Caracas Mayor Alfredo Peña, a Chavez opponent whom Washington has openly groomed to take on the president, inviting him to meetings with the State Department and the International Monetary Fund.

The Venezuelan establishment, senior military officials, the media and the United States State Department all seized on the deaths to proclaim that Chavez had ordered a “massacre,” violating the constitution and justifying his ouster. General Efrian Vazquez called the killings an “assault” on the society and declared that the overthrow of Chavez was “not a coup.” He called it a “position of solidarity with the entire Venezuelan people.” (The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

Admiral Hector Ramirez, the chief of the Venezuelan navy, read a statement on the CNN news network declaring: “We cannot accept a tyrant in the presidency. His remaining threatens the country with disintegration. We direct military personnel of all ranks to join forces with us and make a new Venezuela a reality.” (The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

The same military that had expressed horror over the shootings at the anti-Chavez demonstrations unleashed troops against people who took to the streets in protests and looting, largely in the poorer, western part of the city. Dozens of bodies brought to local hospitals, and hundreds of wounded. (The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

At the same time, the junta launched a manhunt for Chavez supporters, both government officials and left-nationalist activists who had formed “Bolivarian Defense Committees” in recent months, as it became increasingly clear that a coup was likely. Some took refuge in the Cuban embassy, which was quickly surrounded by a mob of several hundred anti-Chavez activists. Electricity and water to the building were cut off as the crowd, backed by security forces, threatened to storm it. (The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

Carmona ordered officials dismissed by Chavez from the state oil company, PDVSA, restored to their posts and sacked those whom the president appointed. The change in management in this key sector of the economy was the issue that provoked the strike organized jointly by the CTV bureaucracy and the business establishment. Among those restored to their posts was General Guaicaipuro Lameda, one of the first military officers to publicly denounce Chavez. (The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

According to an audio tape, Chavez ordered troops and tanks into Caracas’ streets April 11 to confront a massive opposition demonstration that ended in bloodshed. In the tape, released by the Venezuelan media, Chavez was heard ordering the activation of “Plan Avila,” a state security emergency plan, to contain about 200,000 civilians who marched on the presidential palace to demand that he resign. “I order you to start Plan Avila. The first move we must make is to send the Ayala Battalion,” Chavez told an unidentified officer via radio. (Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2002)

Business leaders angered at Chavez’s handling of the oil industry, organized a large strike. The strike turned into an open street protest marching toward the presidential palace. The local media, operated by the business elite, apparently continued to lambaste Chavez on television, causing him to temporarily halt all private broadcasting in Venezuela in fears of it causing panic and violent revolt. (Counterpunch, April 15, 2002)

The strike led to clashes that resulted in 16 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The media quickly reported that Chavez supporters fired into the crowds of demonstrators. The Western media was quick to follow. The Bush Administration claimed that Chavez shut down the media to stifle opposition and then ordered those loyal to him to fire into the crowd of protestors. (Counterpunch, April 15, 2002)

The State Department supported the violent military coup, expressing their regret that Chavez did not “act with restraint and show full respect for the peaceful expression of political opinion.” However, the State Department failed to mention the number of dead Venezuelans was also made up of Chavez supporters. Sympathizers of the president were killed, along with the Vice President Diosdado Cabello’s personal driver, shot in the face. (Counterpunch, April 15, 2002)

The CIA likely was involved in the coup. Members of Venezuela’s diverse opposition had been visiting the United States Embassy for weeks prior to the coup. They hoped to enlist United States help in toppling Chavez. The visitors included active and retired members of the military, media leaders, and opposition politicians. (Washington Post, April 13, 2002; William Blum, Killing Hope)

Of all the 13 OPEC countries from which the United States imports oil, Venezuela ranked number four. Each day, Venezuela exported 1.183 million barrels of oil to the United States. The United States needed Venezuela – but Venezuela did not need the United States.

Venezuela was the third-largest supplier of petroleum to the United States, accounting for 15 percent of the American supply. It had played a substantial role in reinvigorating OPEC, resulting in a rise in oil prices. Traditionally, the United States relied on Venezuela to ignore OPEC quotas, helping to keep oil prices low.

A 2002 coup failed primarily because Chavez retained considerable support in the country. The military belatedly realized that the provisional government it had installed severely overreached in a misguided attempt to dismantle the elected legislature and dismiss the supreme court. Consequently, Chavez was reinstalled in the presidential palace April 14, two days after being abducted by elements of the military.

Every democratic nation of the Western Hemisphere denounced the attempted coup against Chavez except the United States. The Bush administration lost little time in hailing the coup.

Then the Bush administration was hit with a bombshell when it was revealed that White House officials had met with anti-government forces five months before. It had all the earmarks of a coup made in the United States. In November 2001, the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Agency held a joint conference to discuss “the problem of Venezuela,” and shortly thereafter Washington announced that it would “put Venezuela in diplomatic isolation.” (New York Times, April 17, 2002; The World Socialist Web Site, April 15, 2002)

Bush administration officials gave conflicting accounts of what the United States told those opponents of Chavez about acceptable ways of ousting him. One senior official involved in the discussions insisted that the Venezuelans use constitutional means, like a referendum, to effect an overthrow. He said, “They (anti-Chavez elements) came here to complain. Our message was very clear: there are constitutional processes. We did not even wink at anyone.” (New York Times, April 17, 2002)

But a Defense Department official who was involved in the development of policy toward Venezuela said the administration’s message was not that direct. He said, “We were not discouraging people. We were sending informal, subtle signals that we don’t like this guy. We didn’t say, ‘No, don’t you dare,’ and we weren't advocates saying, ‘Here’s some arms; we’ll help you overthrow this guy.’ We were not doing that.” (New York Times, April 17, 2002)

While every Latin American nation urged Chavez’s restoration to power, the White House initially blamed the coup attempt on the president’s own actions. National Security adviser, Condoleezza Rice incredibly cautioned the restored president to “respect constitutional processes” after Chavez betrayed every democratic principle. White House spokesman Ari Fleisher predicted “the situation will be one of tranquility and democracy” following the seizure of power by military commanders. (New York Times, April 15, 2002)

But then the embarrassed Bush administration scrambled to explain why it failed to denounce the coup immediately. Fleischer attempted to quietly change his position. He called on Chavez to heed the message of his opponents and reach out to “all the democratic forces in Venezuela. The people of Venezuela have sent a clear message to President Chávez that they want both democracy and reform. The Chávez administration has an opportunity to respond to this message by correcting its course and governing in a fully democratic manner.” (Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2002)

Beginning in early 2005, the CIA named Venezuela as one of the “Top Five Unstable Countries” in Latin America and increased its intelligence personnel within the country by fifty percent. (Global Research, August 20, 2006)

In 2005 and 2006, the Venezuelan Government apprehended and expelled four United States officials engaged in espionage activities. Two were military attachés, Captain John Correa and Lieutenant Humberto Rodriguez. They were charged with actively recruiting members of the Venezuelan armed forces to provide strategic and secret information about internal Venezuelan affairs to the United States government. (USA Today, February 2, 2006)

Chavez said he had evidence the naval attache met with a group of Venezuelan officers to drum up support for a coup attempt modeled after the 1989 United Statesmilitary invasion of Panama that deposed leader Manuel Noriega. (USA Today, February 2, 2006)

Chavez responded by warning that he could cut off oil exports to the United States if Washington goes “over the line” in what he has said were attempts to destabilize Venezuela. (CNN, February 18, 2006)

Beginning in early 2005, the CIA named Venezuela as one of the “Top Five Unstable Countries” in Latin America and increased its intelligence personnel within the country by fifty percent. (Global Research, August 20, 2006) In 2005 and 2006, the Venezuelan Government apprehended and expelled four United States officials engaged in espionage activities. Two were military attachés, Captain John Correa and Lieutenant Humberto Rodriguez. They were charged with actively recruiting members of the Venezuelan armed forces to provide strategic and secret information about internal Venezuelan affairs to the United States government. (USA Today, February 2, 2006)

Chavez said he had evidence the naval attache met with a group of Venezuelan officers to drum up support for a coup attempt modeled after the 1989 United Statesmilitary invasion of Panama that deposed leader Manuel Noriega. (USA Today, February 2, 2006)

The Bush administration continued to bash Chavez despite the United States being an importer of Venezuelan oil. In February 2006, Secretary of State Rice chastised Venezuela as posing “one of the biggest problems” in the region and that its ties to Cuba were “particularly dangerous” to democracy in Latin America. (CNN, February 18, 2006)

Chavez responded by warning that he could cut off oil exports to the United States if Washington goes “over the line” in what he has said were attempts to destabilize Venezuela. (CNN, February 18, 2006)

In 2006, Chávez charged that the Bush administration covertly funded millions of dollars through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to undermine the Venezuela government. Chávez said that funds were provided by the USAID through its Office of Transition Initiatives. The Venezuela government claimed that the United States made $80 million available for groups seeking to bring about change in Cuba. (London’s The Guardian, August 30, 2006)

The Office of Transition Initiatives supervised more than $26 million in grants to groups in Venezuela since 2002. The funding included:

$47,459 for a “democratic leadership campaign”

$37,614 for citizen meetings to discuss a “shared vision” for society

$56,124 to analyze Venezuela’s new constitution (London’s The Guardian, August 30, 2006)

After it was announced that Fidel Castro was undergoing surgery in 2006, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte created a new special CIA mission to oversee intelligence activities in Venezuela and Cuba. Negroponte appointed Patrick Maher as Acting Mission Manager of the division. (Global Research, August 20, 2006)

4. CHILE. In Chile, socialist Michelle Bachelet, who headed a center-left coalition, won in a January 2006 run-off against conservative billionaire businessman Sebastian Pinera. She became the first democratically-elected woman president in Chile. Bachelet promised to maintain the country’s free market policies and to improve public education and create more jobs. (Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 2006)

5. BOLIVIA. During his 2005 campaign, President Evo Morales the leader of street protests that brought down two governments promised to renationalize gas fields held by international investors and to end the United States policy to eradicate coca. (Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 2006)

A former coca grower, Morales was elected to a five-year term in 2005. He took office in January 2006. A fierce critic of United States policies, Morales helped lead violent street uprisings that toppled two predecessors. (CBS, January 22, 2006)

Morales vowed to end discrimination against the country’s Indian majority and to lift the nation’s poor out of misery. Morales said he would use profits from abundant national gas reserves. He vowed in his inaugural speech that his socialist government would reshape Bolivia, as he lashed out at free market economic prescriptions, calling them a failure in attempts to end chronic poverty. (CBS, January 22, 2006)

As part of a more nationalistic and leftist agenda, Morales said he would move ahead with plans to consolidate control over Bolivia’s abundant natural gas reserves and also convene a constitutional assembly to answer Indian demands for a greater share in power at all levels of society. (CBS, January 22, 2006)

6. NICARAGUA. In the 2001 elections, the PLC and its allies won 52 seats, the FSLN won 37 seats, and the Conservative Party one seat. In addition, ex-president Arnoldo Alemán assumed a seat, as did runner-up Daniel Ortega.

During the 2002 legislative term, Alemán would have served as President of the National Assembly. However, he and other members of his family were charged with corruption in December 2002, and on December 7, 2003, he was sentenced to a 20-year prison term for a string of crimes including money laundering, embezzlement, and corruption. (Politics of Nicaragua, Wikipedia Encyclopedia)

Since 1995 -- after 16 years of conservative government -- Ortega regained power in Nicaragua. He won the 2006 elections with 38 percent of the votes ahead of his conservative rival Eduardo Montealegre. As he did in the 1980w, Ortega introduced education and economic reforms -- to a country that had been exploited by its elite. 9BBC, November 8, 2006)

Immediately, the Bush administration warned that Ortega could lose United States aid. Ortega was inaugurated in January 2007.