Under Fulgencio Batista a rightist repressive regime controlled Cuba for decades. American trade flourished, and each year corporations profited immensely. While only a handful lived an opulent life style, the vast majority remained poverty-stricken, uneducated, and deprived of health care. In 1959, Fidel Castro organized a successful coup. With the help of Raul Castro and Che Guevera, the country's industries were nationalized. For the first time social and economic programs, to benefit the population as a whole, were introduced.

CIA involvement in Cuba dates back earlier than the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Since the overthrow of Batista, CIA sponsored attacks against Cuba began almost immediately. In October 1959 planes based in Florida ran strafing and bombing sorties in Cuba. At least three American pilots were killed in crashes, and two others were captured. However, the State Department acknowledged that only one American plane crashed, and that its flight was not authorized by the White House.

In December, the CIA initiated attacks against Cuban targets by land. Anything to damage the Cuban economy and morale was targeted. Oil refineries, chemical plants, railroad bridges, and sugar cane fields and refineries were sabotaged. There were pirate attacks on Cuban fishing boats and merchant ships, Soviet ships docked in Cuban ports, Soviet military camps, and hotels which housed Soviets and Eastern Europeans.

The first signs of deteriorating relations between the Cuba and the United States occurred in March 1960 when the Eisenhower administration revoked an export license for the sale of helicopters to Castro. By March 1960, it became official that Eisenhower sought to overthrow the Castro government in favor of a regime which was "more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the United States," and that this had to be accomplished "in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of United States intervention." As part of CIA Operation Mongoose, a team of anti- Castro Cubans blew up a factory, and 400 civilians were killed.

In June, American aid to the Castro government was canceled. Two months later the quota for Cuban sugar was slashed, and consequently Castro nationalized all of Cuba's sugar on October 14. Political relations between Cuba and the United States quickly plummeted, and Castro withdrew half of his embassy personnel from Washington D.C. Then the United States severed all relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961.

Air power was essential to overthrowing the Cuban government, so Director Dulles approved the acquisition of Southern Air Transport for $307,506.10. The planes flew recruits to Guatemala for military training. Soon, the funding of the operations jumped to $1.8 million which was roughly twice of what was originally allocated.

In August 1960, Eisenhower approved Operation Pluto which first provided for the training of anti-Castro Cubans. Eisenhower authorized $13 million to pay for the operation. This began as a plan to infiltrate only a few dozen insurgents into Cuban jungles. On September 28 the CIA attempted to carry out "arms packs" drops for about 100 guerrillas. However, the CIA plane missed their mark by seven miles, and the supplies landed near a dam and were immediately recovered by Cuban troops.

Also during the summer of 1960, Cubans were being trained in Guatemala. The CIA station chief in Guatemala City reported that the agency needed to bring in prostitutes to pacify the Cuban recruits. In January 1961, a New York Times story broke, and it was reported that the CIA was training an exile army in Guatemala.

In the 1960 Presidential campaign Kennedy accused Eisenhower of threatening the security of the United States by allowing an "iron curtain" only 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Yet in April, even the White House admitted that most Cubans had a favorable opinion in regard to Castro. Only 7 per cent of Cubans expressed concerns about communism and only 2 per cent objected to the fact that Castro did not allow free elections.

After the inauguration of Kennedy in early 1961 the White House continued its terrorist policy of economic warfare against Cuba. The CIA devised JMARC, their plan for an invasion of Cuba, and Operation Pluto was revised to become a major invasion to include several hundred insurgents making a beachhead landing and covered by air support. The CIA knew that a small invading army of about 1,000 men could not overwhelm the Cuban military comprised of approximately 200,000 people. At first the plan was not to defeat Castro but to scare him out of office, similar to what the CIA had done to Arbenz in Guatemala seven years earlier.

A few isolated attacks in Cuba commenced in early 1961. On February 19, an American plane crashed while flying over an oil refinery in Matanzas province. On March 4, an explosion on the French ship La Coubre in Havana Harbor killed and injured over 100 people. Castro blamed the bombing on the United States; the Kennedy administration refuted the charges. A week later Castro expropriated the first three sugar plantations.

By early spring, the decision was made to invade Cuba. In May, the CIA recruited Cuban emigres primarily in the Miami area as well as experienced pilots, and the agency sent them to Fort Trax, Guatemala for training. Meanwhile the CIA flew missions over Cuba, and planes dropped supplies to anti-Castro guerrillas as well as propaganda leaflets. However, air-drops rarely found their designated targets. The CIA blamed the Cuban pilots who in turn became resentful of the CIA as were the guerrillas who needed the supplies. Additionally, Castro's G-2 intelligence agency began to infiltrate the guerrilla groups in the mountains. American agents also infiltrated Cuba from Miami in speedboats, but Castro's police were alerted and soon intercepted them.

By the summer of 1961, a large portion of the CIA plan had been decided upon. The CIA estimated that 2,500 anti-Castro Cubans were active on the island and that another 20,000 Cubans were sympathetic to a CIA invasion. Furthermore, the agency believed that 25 percent of the Cuban population would support an American-sponsored invasion. The CIA planners ultimately decided on the beachhead at Zapata swamp which was near the Bay of Pigs. However, this was relatively close to Castro's army in Havana, and the marshes would prevent the invaders from quickly establishing themselves in safe places. Furthermore, the Escambray Mountains were 50 miles away, and this would prevent the forces from seeking refuge in the hills. The plan called for landing troops and seizing a 40 mile long area including the Bay of Pigs, while American planes would fly in paratroopers several miles inland to contain Castro's forces. The CIA also hoped that the invaders could hold the beachhead for three days, and then they would be joined by over 500 anti-Castro guerrillas.

The CIA's objective was to destroy FAR, the Cuban air force which consisted of six B-26 bombers, four T-33 jet trainers, and perhaps as many as four British Sea Fury fighters. The Cuban planes were based in both Havana and Santiago. The CIA hoped to make it appear as if the attacks were carried out by Cuban pilots who had defected in FAR planes. However, the CIA planned the actual attack to be carried out by six American planes -- painted so as to make them appear as if they were FAR jets. The initial goal of the CIA was to strike six Cuban airfields. Subsequently, the number of bases was cut in half to three.

The land invasion was set for April 17, 1961. Two days before, American planes attacked and destroyed half of FAR. But the CIA attempted to make it appear as if Cuban B-26 bombers had conducted the air strikes. So the CIA flew in some bombers with FAR markings to a Miami airfield. The ex-Cuban pilot of one of the planes told the American media that he and other Cubans who had defected from FAR had carried out the mission.

Photographers snapped pictures of the B-26 bomber. Soon afterwards, an irate Castro lodged a complaint with the United Nations, claiming that the attacks had been carried out by the United States. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson denied American complicity and showed the photographs of the jets with FAR markings. But some important details were overlooked by the CIA in planning the covert operation. In scrutinizing the photographs, it was discovered that the machine guns of the bomber were taped and could not have been fired. In addition the nose assembly of the B-26 was different than that of Castro's bombers which had a plastic noses in which bombardiers could operate. Finally, it became very suspicious that such a coordinated attack on different the Cuban air force could be carried out simultaneously and successfully by a handful of disaffected Cubans. The CIA and President Kennedy were caught. Kennedy wanted to postpone the land invasion, but it was too late.

Landing ships hit the beach on April 15 at 6:30 am. Part of the plan was to divert attention away from the Bay of Pigs and convince Castro that an attack was being launched at another location which was 30 miles east of Guantanamo Bay. But the mission failed. One hundred and sixty-eight members of Brigade 2506 attempted to land on the beachhead at the Bay of Pigs, but they immediately encountered several problems:

1. At the last moment Kennedy authorized air strikes from Nicaragua. However, many of the Cuban pilots refused to fly.

2. Other air cover failed to materialize. In planning the invasion, the CIA forgot to calculate the one hour time zone difference between Nicaragua and Cuba. Navy jets still sat on the decks of carriers when the first wave of B-26 bombers flew over the beaches. Two were shot down.

3. The landing was seriously flawed because the beach turned out to be rocky and the seas were high.

4. The attack was carried out by American planes which successfully destroyed half of FAR. But the CIA attempted to make it appear as if Cuban B-26 bombers had conducted the air strikes. So the CIA flew in some bombers with FAR markings to a Miami airfield. The ex- Cuban pilot of one of the planes told the American media that he and other Cubans who had defected from FAR had carried out the mission.

5. American intelligence had told Brigade 2506 that they would meet no resistance. However, one hundred militia guarded at Giron and in that vicinity. After the air strikes just two days before, Castro was alerted to an imminent land attack, and consequently the Cuban army along with tanks was prepared for the encounter.

6. Four ships and two landing craft landed at the resort of Giron, also called Blue Beach. But the CIA had failed to detect reefs which made the landing difficult. Some of the landing craft were destroyed by the reefs, and the tide began to fall which made unloading difficult and at times impossible. Cuban planes sank the Houston and Rio Escondido. A communications van went down with one of the ships, making it impossible for hours for the different battalions to speak with one another.

7. Another landing zone was at Playa Larga also known as Red Beach. The battalion at Playa Larga and was in a much better to position to secure the area and to advance to the north. Because of the communications failure, they never received no orders to do so.

8. The CIA also estimated that 3,000 to 5,000 guerrillas as well as large numbers of Cubans would link up with members of Brigade 2506. But a mere 50 Cubans hooked up with the invading brigade.

Months later, the Green Board investigated the botched invasion at the Bay of Pigs. The board placed little or no blame on the CIA. The board refused to blame the CIA's intelligence for the debacle. Little or nothing was said about the poor planning which was conducted for only two days; about the CIA's failure to detect dangerous reefs and to report on the conditions of the tide; and about the CIA's prediction that there would be no Cuban resistance. The report stated, "We do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat."

Hurt by the American trade embargo in place since January 1961, Castro proposed trading the Bay of Pigs prisoners for medicines, tractors, and spare parts. However, the missile crisis further dampened United States-Cuban relations, and negotiations were placed on the back burner. After the missile crisis subsided in October 1962, talks were once again renewed. Earlier, attorney James Donovan had engineered a plan to swap Soviet spy Rudolf Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. Now Donovan negotiated with the Cubans. The United States agreed to provide $53 million worth of medicines, medical equipment, and baby food in exchange for the anti-Castro troops captured at the Bay of Pigs.

On December 22, 1962, 1,179 members of Brigade 2506 -- including 20 CIA agents -- were returned to the United States. At that time the CIA provided Donovan with a scuba diving suit to present to Castro. The diving suit was impregnated with a fungus to cause a chronic skin disease, and tubercule bacillus was placed in the breathing apparatus. Even though Donovan was unaware of the CIA's plot against Castro, the attorney replaced the tampered diving apparatus with a suit that he had bought himself.

OPERATION MONGOOSE. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the showdown over the Soviet missiles, covert operations against Cuba slowly diminished. Yet the Kennedy administration -- in conjunction with the Pentagon and CIA -- set up Operation Mongoose to continue to attempt to overthrow Castro. Only 128 ex-Cubans volunteered to participate in Operation Mongoose actions against Castro from early 1964 to mid-1965. Nearly 3,000 ex-Cubans had been trained by the United States, but only 61 continued in the American military. As a result the program to recruit and train anti-Castro Cubans was terminated in November 1965.

However, the CIA still instigated occasional attacks against the Cuban government until 1965. Then the CIA's attention was drawn to Vietnam where the escalation of the war first began as a result of the Tonkin incident in August 1964. By 1965 approximately 500,000 American troops were in Southeast Asia. Slowly, the Florida CIA offices began to shut down. Even though the CIA ceased to be a factor in waging attacks against Cuba, paramilitary groups consisting of exiled Cubans began to emerge. The paramilitary groups did their own recruiting, trained the recruits, and raised money to fund their covert operations.

After the Bay of Pigs debacle, Kennedy was ready "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." This meant that he was not going to merely suggest legislation or issue an executive order to reform the agency. His apparent goal was to destroy the CIA. The president also stated publicly that no segment of the armed forces would participate again in an invasion of Cuba. He had supported Operation Mongoose only as a low profile covert program, even though he privately had favored the removal of Castro.

Kennedy proposed a three point emergency program to control the CIA. He fired most of the agency's high level officials and set up the Cuban study group to investigate the weaknesses of the CIA. Additionally, the president reduced the powers and jurisdiction of the agency and established strict limits as to its future operations. National Security Memoranda 55, 56, and 57 eliminated the ability of the CIA to wage war. The agency no longer was permitted to initiate any operation which required more firepower than the use of handguns.

Kennedy was faced with growing opposition among those in the CIA. CIA-sponsored military bases in southern Florida were not closed down. The CIA continued to organize, fund, and equip Cuban exiles, as it pushed for a military invasion of Cuba even before the detection of Soviet missiles on the island. In September the CIA stated that "the main purpose of the present (Soviet) military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the communist regime there against what the Cubans and Soviets conceived to be a danger that the United States may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it." The next month this was confirmed by both the State and Defense Departments.

Kennedy's primary adversary was General Edward Lansdale, the CIA's liaison to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Then he moved on to become the chief of operations for implementing plans to destabilize Cuba. In October 1961, he CIA decided to send ten commando teams to Cuba to engage in sabotage. By the time the administration was informed, three teams had already been dispatched. The White House was furious and shortly afterwards Operation Mongoose was abolished.

Nevertheless, covert operations never did stop. Lansdale later shifted his attention to Southeast Asia and became the architect of the "strategic hamlet" concept in Vietnam where over a million Vietnamese farmers and workers were imprisoned.

"The Americans have surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they will learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointed at you; we'dbe doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine."

- Nikita Khrushchev

In 1969 and 197,0 the CIA attempted another measure to disrupt the Cuban economy. CIA planes flew over Cuban territory and seeded rain clouds with crystals in an attempt to cause severe storms and devastate sugar cane fields. The next year, the CIA administered a virus which contaminated Cuban exiles with swine disease virus African swine disease. When an epidemic broke out two months later in Cuba, 500,000 pigs were destroyed to avert a worldwide epidemic. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, this was the largest outbreak of an epidemic in the Western Hemisphere. In 1981, dengue fever swept across Cuba, and 300,000 cases were reported. This epidemic led to the death of 158 Cubans. Later a CIA declassified report stated that the United States Army was breeding mosquitos of the type which transmitted this same disease in 1958. In 1984 a Cuban exile testified in a New York federal court that he had engaged in covert chemical warfare activities to contaminate the Cuban economy.

The American presence in Guantanamo Bay was deeply disturbing to Castro. It had been an American military base since the invasion of Cuba in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In August 1962, a ship bound for the Soviet Union with 14,135 bags of sugar arrived in a San Juan, Puerto Rican port for repairs. The CIA successfully contaminated the sugar. A CIA official later stated that "there was lots of sugar being sent into Cuba, and we are putting a lot of contaminants in it." Also in 1962, a Canadian agricultural adviser to the Castro government was paid $5,000 by the CIA to infect Cuban turkeys with a virus which caused the fatal Newcastle disease. The adviser later claimed that he kept the money but did not administer the virus.

In 1969 and 1970, the CIA attempted another measure to disrupt the Cuban economy. CIA planes flew over Cuban territory and seeded rain clouds with crystals in an attempt to cause severe storms and devastate sugar cane fields. The next year, the CIA administered a virus which contaminated Cuban exiles with swine disease virus African swine disease. When an epidemic broke out two months later in Cuba, 500,000 pigs were destroyed to avert a worldwide epidemic. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, this was the largest outbreak of an epidemic in the Western Hemisphere. In 1981, dengue fever swept across Cuba, and 300,000 cases were reported. This epidemic led to the death of 158 Cubans. Later a CIA declassified report stated that the United States Army was breeding mosquitos of the type which transmitted this same disease in 1958. In 1984 a Cuban exile testified in a New York federal court that he had engaged in covert chemical warfare activities to contaminate the Cuban economy.

KENNEDY AND JOHNSON'S RELATIONS WITH CASTRO.In August 1999, Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, a research group at George Washington University, obtained a series of formerly classified 1960s documents on American-Cuban relations. Kornbluh released the documents in Cigar Aficionado. They showed that on February 12, 1964 -- just prior to the 1964 campaign -- Castro sent a verbal message through Lisa Howard of ABC News to Lyndon Johnson who was stationed in Havana. Howard relayed the message to United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.

The documents indicated that John Kennedy had placed high priority on a normal relationship with Cuba. In mid-November 1963, Castro was preparing to send instructions to his United Nations ambassador on a proposed agenda for official talks between Castro and an American emissary. Kennedy sent word to top aides that he was prepared to decide on next steps once the agenda was received. The date was November 19, 1963, three days before Kennedy's assassination.

Obviously, Castro wanted to keep this window of opportunity open with the United States after Kennedy's assassination. Castro told Howard less than three months later that he was eager for Johnson to prevail in the election. Castro invited Johnson to take "hostile action" against Cuba if it would be to his political benefit. The Cuban leader urged Johnson to continue an American-Cuban dialogue that Kennedy had initiated in the months before his assassination. Castro asked Howard: "Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly desire his election to the presidency in November ... though that appears assured. .... Seriously, I have observed how Republicans use Cuba as a weapon against the Democrats. So tell President Johnson to let me know what I can do."

Castro suggested that his offer remain secret unless it could be successfully used against conservative Republicans such as Barry Goldwater who won his party's nomination several months later. Castro said: "If the president feels it necessary during the campaign to make bellicose statements about Cuba or even to take hostile action, if he will inform me unofficially that a specific action is required because of domestic political considerations, I shall understand and not take any serious retaliatory action."

In June 1964, Castro proposed in an interview "extensive discussions of the issues dividing" Cuba and the United States. There were other contacts by Castro but the initiative stopped by the end of 1964.

Kornbluh did not have any evidence which suggested how Johnson reacted to the message. However, just weeks later a White House memo on March 4 rejected a State Department recommendation that Cuba would have to sever relations with the Soviet Union before the United States would normalize relations with Castro. The memo read: "We don't want to present Castro with a condition that he obviously cannot fulfill. We should start thinking along more flexible lines. The president, himself, is very interested in this one."

CIA ASSASSINATION PLOTS AGAINST CASTRO. Over a span of three decades the CIA was involved in a minimum of eight assassination attempts against Castro. Undoubtedly, the number of plots to kill the Cuban leader was considerably higher. In 1975, Castro gave Senator George McGovern a list which mentioned 30 different attempts on his life. Most of the plots involved the mafia and Cuban counter-revolutionaries who worked in close conjunction with the CIA. Originally, all of the schemes, except for one assassination plot, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally. Then the CIA pursued a more aggressive avenue in attempting to remove Castro from power.

The first CIA orchestrated assassination attempt was planned shortly after the 1959 Cuban revolution. Allan Robert Nye landed his plane near Havana and, armed with a high powered rifle, waited at a hotel near the Presidential Palace for Castro to arrive at his office. However, he was spotted and arrested before Castro arrived. A month later in March, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a former commander in Batista's death squads, contacted the CIA. Again the agency suggested a plot whereby Castro could be killed near his palace. CIA agents clandestinely contacted the gambling syndicate in Havana and got their approval. A month later, Rolando Masferrer, a former leader of Batista's death squads, met with CIA officials and mobsters in Miami to discuss other methods to carry out an assassination.

In December 1959, Colonel J.C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, sent a memo to Director Allen Dulles. King stated that in order to overthrow the Cuban government, Castro would have to be murdered. Meanwhile in Havana the CIA maintained a strong presence in its embassy. 20 operatives worked out of the American embassy and were able to make contacts with right wing sympathizers. The Anti-communist Workers' Militia (MAO) consisted of many anti-Castro workers who had moved on to Miami. Some of their officials proposed to CIA agent Robert Van Horn that Castro could be assassinated when he visited his Miramar. Two embassy agents then formed a commando group which was to carry out the murder attempt. This proposal was never accepted by the CIA. The attack was delayed until November 1960, but by this time members of MAO had been arrested by the Cuban government.

Operation Botin consisted of a plan of using psychological warfare using subversive radio stations and pamphlets. Materials were dropped along the Cuban coastline in plastic bags with straws inside to keep them afloat. The propaganda called on Cubans to assassinate Castro as well as other top leaders. A bounty of $150,000 was offered for Castro; $125,000 for Raul Castro; $120,000 for Che Guevara; and $100,000 for the president of the republic.

According to a document which was declassified in July 1997, CIA Director Dulles met with Hollywood mobster Johnny Roselli and his friend, Frank Sinatra in August 1960. Roselli immediately brought in Chicago gang leader Sam Giacana as well as Santos Trafficante who had overseen drug operations in Havana. The Cuban capital had been the key transfer point for large quantities of heroin which were produced by New York mafia leader Lucky Luciano and by Corsican syndicates in Marseilles. Luciano's closest confidant, Meyer Lansky, had offered to pay $1 million for Castro's life immediately after the 1959 revolution when Havana's gambling and drug operations were shut down.

According to a CIA memo, the mobsters were offered $150,000 "as a payment to be made on the completion of the operation." According to CIA operant Robert Maheu who hired Giacana, the mob insisted on doing the job for free. Former CIA director of security wrote that senior agency officials had approved the plot in August 1960. The CIA recommended a gangland style hit using machine-guns. However, Giacana suggested a poison pill which would be dropped into Castro's food or drink. The TSD laboratory at CIA headquarters devised six lethal botulinum pills which were concealed in a pencil as well as poisoned cigar, and they were delivered to Roselli. In February 1961 Trafficante took the pills to Havana and gave them to Jorge Orta, an official on Castro's executive staff and someone who owed gambling debts to the mobsters. However, Orta reneged in his promise to carry out the assassination.

In September 1960, the CIA planned to murder Castro when he visited the United Nations in New York City. In January 1961 and in early 1962, the CIA supplied lethal pills to gambling syndicate members. The pan was to dissolve the lethal pills in water, but the plot was aborted and the pills were recovered. In the second assassination attempt, the pills were passed on by mafia leaders to a Cuban exile in Florida who in turn sent them into Cuba in May. A team of three men were dispatched to attempt the assassination, but it also was aborted. The CIA attempted to put thallium salt into Castro's food and cigars so that his beard would fall out. In 1961, there was yet another attempt to poison his food with LSD just prior to a speech he was to deliver.

The CIA also plotted to contaminate the air of the radio studio where Castro broadcasted his speeches. The CIA's Sidney Gottlieb devised a plan to use an aerosol form of LSD and other "psychic energizers" which would circulate throughout the room. Another plot involved poisoning Castro's cigars. Gottlieb also developed these lethal drugs in his CIA laboratory. The poisoned cigars were given to CIA agent Jack Esterline, but this assassination was also foiled when the agency could not devise a way to get the cigar box delivered to Castro.

In 1960, the CIA devised a scheme to place thallium salts, disguised as foot powder, on Castro's night table in hopes that he would place the lethal powder in his shoes. When this chemical came in contact with Castro's body, his beard would fall out, and the correct dosage would also produce paralysis. None of these plans was ever carried out.

In April 1961, Roselli met with CIA agents and suggested another plan of using lethal pills to murder Castro. Roselli asked the agency for $50,000 and said that Manuel Antonio de Varona, a friend of Trafficante and the leader of the Anti-Castro Democratic Revolutionary Front, had agreed to master-mind the plan. Verona and Trafficante became friends after being introduced by Edward Moss, a Washington D.C. political fund-raiser and lobbyist for exiled Cubans. Varona was given botulinum pills who passed them on to a waitress in a restaurant which Castro had frequented. According to the CIA, this plot was never carried out because Castro stopped eating at that particular restaurant.

The CIA targeted Castro through the Executive Action Capability program after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Code-named ZR-RIFLE, the operation was headed by William Harvey, a former FBI agent. In the same year, Giacana contacted detective Robert Maheu to investigate his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire of the McGuire Sisters singing group. Giacana believed that she was having a relationship with Dan Rowan of Rowan and Martin. Giacana told the CIA that he would help in an assassination attempt against Castro in return for the agency's assistance in bugging Rowan's hotel room. When a maid discovered the bugging device, Las Vegas police were called, and the matter was turned over to the FBI which wanted to bring charges against Giacana. Ultimately, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was informed of the plan, and charges were dropped against Giacana.

In 1963, the CIA agreed on a plan to construct a plastic "seashell" and then to rig it with an explosive device. It would be placed in an area where Castro frequently scuba-dived. Hopefully, when Castro handled the sea-shell, it would explode. The CIA needed to construct a spectacular looking seashell which would capture Castro's attention. However, the CIA did not have a mini-submarine with a capability of traveling to a beach area where Castro usually scuba dived. The CIA plotted to provide Castro with a "contaminated" scuba-diving suit which would produce a disabling disease known as Madura foot. At the same time, Desmond Fitzgerald planned to have James Donovan, who had negotiated with Castro's team to gain the release of captured Bay of Pigs prisoners, deliver expensive scuba diving equipment to the Cuban leader. The CIA's Gottlieb treated the inside lining with Madura fungus and implanted tubercle bacilli in the rubber. The CIA also planned to construct replicas of clams and rig them with explosives. The "clams" would be dropped into an area which Castro frequented and would explode upon contact. None of these three plots was carried out.

In early 1963, there was a meeting at the State Department at which the assassination of Castro was discussed. At the meeting were members of the Special Group Augmented along with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. A hit team actually landed in Cuba with pills to be used in the assassination attempt.

On November 22, 1963, Fitzgerald gave anti-Castro Cuban Rolando Cubela was given a deadly pen to be used in the assassination attempt. Cubela had been a commander in Castro's army and was arrested in 1966 for his part in the assassination conspiracy. The pen was rigged with Blackleaf-40, a deadly insecticide and was comprised of 40 percent nicotine sulfate. This assassination attempt was aborted.

In the 1970s, a group of Cuban exiles formed Omega 7 which was headquartered in Union City, New Jersey. Even though the amount of terrorism against Cuba decreased, Omega 7 continued acts of violence against Cuba and the Soviet Union with the financial backing of the CIA. There were bombings at the Soviet United Nations headquarters as well as at its embassy in Washington, D.C; at the Cuban United Nations Mission; on a Soviet ship docked in New Jersey; and at Aeroflot headquarters offices in the United States. Omega 7 was responsible for a bombing which occurred at the Lincoln Center when a Cuban ballet group was performing in 1976. The same year 73 Cubans, including a world championship fencing team, were killed when a bomb exploded aboard a Cuban Airlines plane.

When Castro was out of the country, the CIA planned assassination attempts. In 1971, the CIA conspired with Antonio Veciana to murder Castro while he was visiting Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. In 1976. the CIA designed a plot against Castro on his departure for Angola to attend the inauguration ceremony of the first national socialistic government. In 1989, a third plot was later revealed. Castro traveled to Venezuela to attend the presidential inauguration. Because of security measures, these plots failed.

PUTTING THE SQUEEZE ON CUBA. Under the Carter administration this same belligerent attitude was directed at the Cubans. Carter condoned the hijacking of Cuban ships in violation of international law. In the 1980s President Reagan refused to negotiate with the Castro government to discuss the reestablishment of diplomatic ties. Instead, Reagan imposed more sanctions against the Cubans. President Bush continued his predecessor's hard line policy against Castro. Bush used the Cuban Democracy Act to prevent any American corporations overseas, particularly those located in European countries, from exporting any products to Cuba. If they entered any Cuban ports, the White House ordered that they be seized when they returned to an American port.

Despite this strangulation policy by the United States, the World Health Organization in 1980 concluded that "there is no question that Cuba has the best health statistics in Latin America." In addition, the UNICEF report stated that Cuba has the lowest mortality rate in the world, and that "Cuba is the only country on par with developed nations." In 1990 Cuba still had the highest per capita increase in gross social product -- wages and social benefits -- of any economy in Latin America, almost double that of its closest rival. The average Cuban continues to have better housing, education, food, and health care than any other Latin American nation.

By the late 1990s, Cuba had taken great strides in making diplomatic breakthroughs against decades of American efforts to isolate the island. Whereas every Western hemispheric nation except Canada and Mexico had severed its ties with the Castro government in the 1960s, all the Latin American countries with the exception of El Salvador and Costa Rica had resumed ties with Cuba by the 1990s.

Yet the United States continued its embargo on trade and tourism even though it had failed to achieve its stated goal of bringing down the Castro government. In 1992, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act whereby American-owned and American-controlled subsidiaries located abroad were prohibited from doing business with Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 further tightened the American embargo by allowing United States citizens to file lawsuits against foreign companies which purchased formerly American-owned property which had been confiscated by the Cuban government. Helms-Burton had an adverse affect on the United States in its relations with these countries.

In 1998, the Pope traveled to Havana and urged the United States to "change, change, change" its hostile posture. Additionally, the Pentagon concluded in May of that year that Cuba "does not pose a significant military threat to the United States or to other countries in the region." Thus, this eliminated the national security argument for the embargo. Also, the emergence of Americans for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba, a business group led by wealthy and conservative businessmen in the areas of commerce and finance, brought a powerful lobby to the capital.

By the end of 1998, the United States was one of a few nations to continue its crusade of continuing to pressure the Castro government. Nearly all America's allies denounced United States laws which also extended parts of its trade embargo to American-owned companies which do business with Cuba. In addition the United Nations Human Rights Commission voted down a United States-backed measure to condemn Cuba. Finally, the European Union threatened to sue the United States at the World Trade Organization.

In early 1999, the Clinton administration had an opportunity to break with the hostility of the past, and the White House made overtures to ease the economic embargo against Castro. Perceiving a grandiose economic windfall for American businesses, the Republicans proposed the establishment of a National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to re-evaluate American policy towards Cuba. The commission would also look at the recommendations by a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force on Cuba. Twenty-four Republicans, led by Senator John Warner of Virginia, wrote Clinton, proposing such a commission which was also endorsed by former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and Lawrence Eagleburger. Warner said, "More and more Americans are becoming concerned about the far-reaching effects of our policy on United States interests and the Cuban people."

Additionally, the report of the CFR’s task force -- a diverse group of strategists which included members of Senator Jesse Helms's staff -- echoed the need to re-evaluate American foreign policy towards Cuba. The CFR came up with a set of recommendations which could be enacted under the Helms-Burton law. These included the lifting the 38 year old economic blockade on private American investments in Cuba in the areas of travel services, news gathering, activities related to distribution of humanitarian assistance and in cultural work like art, movies and music. The CFR also recommended the sale of food and medicine to Cuba; a provision for tax cuts for Cuban-Americans who sent financial aid to families on the island; and the establishment of cooperation between American and Cuban armed forces "to reduce tensions, promote mutual confidence-building measures and to lay the basis for the improvement of relations" in the future.

However, Clinton rejected an opportunity to engage in a national dialogue about Cuba, not to mention an international dialogue with the Cuban government. The American president capitulated to the far right anti-Castro lobby, and the president made only a token gesture to improve American-Cuban relations. Clinton said that he "would provide the people of Cuba with hope in their struggle" against Castro. He also agreed, under pressure from Vice President Gore and Florida Senator Bob Graham, to abandon the commission. Right wing Cubans in Miami began referring to the Warner proposal as "the Gore Commission," inferring that they would make it a domestic political issue. Additionally, Graham reportedly warned Clinton that the commission would be "a disaster" for Gore's hopes of winning Florida in the 2000 presidential election.

Thus, Clinton stood alone in holding steadfast on an economic embargo that was already opposed by a coalition of 143 countries which voted to condemn it at the United Nations. In addition a number of organizations and groups continued to castigate the United States for continuing its economic squeeze on Castro. These included the Vatican, longshoremen in Louisiana, rice producers in Iowa, corporations like Radisson and Ingersoll-Rand, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the United States Catholic Conference, the United Auto Workers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and Pastors for Peace and the Rainbow Coalition.

In 1996, several leading American companies banded together to found USA*Engage, an organization with the goal of lobbying Washington to lift sanctions. Since that time, 670 American companies joined USA*Engage to give it more influence over American foreign policy.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, American corporations won a series of victories in Washington, eliminating the sanctions that had limited their overseas operations. In May 2000, the House Republican leadership agreed to ease the American trade embargo against Cuba by allowing some American food and medicine to be sold there. It was the first sign that the Cuba embargo, which has been in effect since 1962, could eventually be lifted. This bill also provided for the termination of sanctions on food and medicine to Libya, Iran, and Sudan.

On June 19, the Supreme Court ruled that states and cities may not boycott companies that do business in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. That decision was the first time the court had imposed limits on sanctions by state and local governments, which began to spread in the 1980s as part of the grass-roots movement against South Africa's apartheid regime. On May 24 the House voted to make permanent China's normal trading rights in the United States, thus ending the annual battles over Beijing's trade status that had been a heated issue every year since 1990. In June the Clinton administration announced it was lifting economic sanctions against North Korea that have been on the books since the early 1950s.

A major break-through occurred in June 2000 when House Republicans proposed allowing the direct sales of American food to Cuba. The agreement barred both the federal government and American banks from financing food sales. Less than a week later, the Senate attached the bill to a military construction bill.

According to the New York Times (June 28, 2000), Republican Congressman George Nethercutt of Washington said that the agreement was a "huge breakthrough for our farmers." He added that Cuba could finance its purchases of American food through other countries. But the White House was wary of the deal, because it also required congressional approval before a president could impose future embargoes on food and medicine to other countries.

White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said, "We are not opposed to allowing things like food and medicine to go to Cuba, as long as it is for the benefit of the people and not the benefit of the Castro government. We do have concerns, on what I call an institutional basis, based on the limits that it puts on presidential prerogatives."

The World Policy Institute has estimated that the United States could commercially export more than $400 million in food and agricultural products to Cuba.

Claiming that he was making a moral statement, President George W. Bush called for stronger sanctions on Cuba in July 2001. He ordered for stricter enforcement of the American trade embargo and greater support to dissidents on the communist island. He also asked the Treasury Department to do more to ensure that American tourism in Cuba, banned by law, was not occurring as a result of pro-democracy cultural exchanges. He asked the Treasury Department to provide more funds to its Office of Foreign Assets Control to hire additional personnel to monitor travel to Cuba, trade, and the limited amounts of money that Cuban- Americans were allowed to send home to their families. Finally, the president promised to increase American aid to Cuba's dissidents, although he failed to specify the amount. (Cbc.ca, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, July 14, 2001)

Bush moved to suspend a law that would let Americans sue people using American property confiscated after Castro took power. The legislation, enacted in 1996, gave the president authority to waive or enforce the provision at six-month intervals. Bush's decision suspended for six more months the Title III provision in the 1996 Helms-Burton law that allowed any American whose property was seized in Cuba after 1959 to sue anyone who uses the property. The State Department listed 5,911 American firms and citizens whose property was nationalized without compensation by the Cuban government, mostly in the 1960s. (New York Times, July 17, 2001)

DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH CUBA. At a time when Cuba was working to reach rapprochement with the United States, the Bush administration suddenly took a harsher stance against the Castro government. Several White House officials advocated an unyielding hostility toward Cuba and the maintenance, if not strengthening, of a trade embargo that existed for four decades.

The policy being promoted by people like Otto Reich, a Cuban exile who was the State Department’s top policy maker for Latin America, was increasingly placing the administration at odds with farmers, business executives, and a growing number of members of Congress -- including many Republicans -- who hade been pushing for trade with Cuba. But the hard line was supported by many Cuban-Americans. (New York Times, April 17, 2002)

BRANDING CUBA A “TERRORIST STATE” -- BUSH’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN. In an effort to brand Cuba a “terrorist state,” the State Department issued an “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism” on May 21, 2002. The Bush administration hyped up Castro’s trip to Iran in 2001, claiming he said “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each another, can bring America to its knees.” (Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2002)

To the contrary, after analyzing Castro’s remarks in Teheran, it turned out that he never made those comments. In fact, Castro consistently denounced terrorism since September 11, calling for its “total eradication.” He immediately condemned the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and he expressed solidarity with the American people and offered to cooperate with all governments in the defeat of terrorism.

Cuba also signed all 12 United Nations counter-terrorism conventions and in early 2002 offered to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States providing for joint efforts against terrorism.

The United States abruptly declined Havana’s gesture to cooperate in the war against terrorism. And furthermore, the State Department refused the offer but simultaneously complained that Cuba would not cooperate.

The May 21 report also mentioned Niall Connolly, one of three members of the Irish Republican Army arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing explosives to the FARC guerrilla group. It noted that he lived a number of years in Cuba

But according to the Cubans, Connolly had left Cuba and returned to Ireland some time earlier. Subsequently, he turned up in Colombia. But there was no evidence that linked his activities in Colombia to Cuba.

The State Department also suggested that Cuba might have harbored members of a Chilean terrorist group because it had twice denied Chilean extradition requests, claiming that the wanted persons were not in Cuba. But the State Department refused to mention that this had been thoroughly investigated by the Chilean government, which had sent two Chilean senators to Havana in February.

The report also complained that Cuba was harboring some members of the separatist Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). There were a few Basques living in Cuba, but Cuba was not “harboring” them. Most arrived years before as the result of an agreement with the then-government of Felipe Gonzalez in Spain, which asked the Cubans to take them. A few other Basques subsequently traveled to Cuba, and it was true that the Spanish government did not consider the Gonzalez agreement still operative. But that government never asked for the extradition of a single Basque. In April, the head of the Basque regional government paid a state visit to Cuba, something he would probably not have done if he thought Cuba was “harboring Basque terrorists.”

Finally, the State Department raised the issue of American fugitives in Cuba. But there was no evidence that any are engaged in terrorist activities or any other activities against the United States. Furthermore, there are Cuban fugitives in the United States, several of them terrorists with extensive FBI files. (Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2002)