Mexican Cartels and Their IntegrationMexican Cartels and Their Integration into Mexican Socio-Political Culture by Chris Eskridge University of Nebraska

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Organized Crime: Myth, Power, Profit, October 1999, Lausanne, Switzerland. The author wishes to thank Brandon Paeper, Brittawni Olson, Ann Marie Lambert, Denise Olson and Pat O'Day for their help, assistance and insight.

Table of Contents Abstract Background Introduction to the Drug Cartels and The Drug Wars The Mexican Drug Cartels Today The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels The Mexican Political Scene: An Historical Perspective The Mexican Political Scene: A Contemporary Perspective Institutionalized Corruption Certification Impact of the Drug Trade on the Mexican and American Economies The New Markets Stopping Them Conclusion: The Future The Unanswered Questions Post Script Endnotes References ABSTRACT

Mexican Cartels and Their Integration into Mexican Socio-Political Culture

This page examines the entities known generally as the Mexican drug cartels, explores the current state of political affairs in Mexico, and looks to the possible future activities of these organizations. Operating in a country with weak democratic traditions and a fragile economy that is highly dependent upon the drug trade and external funding, they pose a present and continuing threat, and will surely not disappear any time soon. Rather, they seem to be deeply imbedded in the current Mexican socio-political, economic scene. The Mexican cartels have emerged as formidable enemies and have the potential of seriously challenging the very sovereignty of the Mexican state. Their impact is felt in the United States as well, with many U.S. officials now calling them the premier challenge facing U.S. law enforcement in the 21st century. The American drug fighting certification program is examined, as are other ways of responding to the cartel threat. Unless substantive efforts are undertaken on both sides of the border, the Mexican cartels will continue to grow in strength and influence.

BACKGROUND The United Mexican States (EUM) consists of 31 states and a federal district. The nation encompasses 756,000 square miles and has a population of nearly 100,000,000. The capital, Mexico City, lays claim to being the largest city in the world. Seventy percent of the citizenry live in urban areas. Though blessed with abundant natural resources, a bountiful agricultural production capability and more billionaires than any nation in the world outside the United States, nearly half of the citizens live in poverty, with fully one-fourth living in extreme poverty. Though strides have been made in the past decade, Mexican physical infrastructure and medical facilities can both still be classified as underdeveloped.

For the past 70 years, the country has been ruled by a quasi-elected President who serves one, six-year term, and a two house legislative body. The upper house, the Senate, consists of 64 individuals (2 from each state and the federal district) elected to one, six-year term. The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, consists of 500 individuals elected to one, three-year term. Though legally permitted to initiate revenue measures and pass the budget, the legislative body has generally not done so and has evolved to a point today where it is has relatively little political clout. The 31 states also have very little political power.

Though the Constitution of 1917 divided power between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, in practice the country is perhaps more accurately classified as an autocratic party-state system. For the past 70 years, all major political officials have come from one political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI. Only in the past few years has the PRI experienced any challenge of consequence, most particularly being the 2000 Presidential victory of PRI-opposition leader Vicente Fox.(1) Despite several euphoric eulogies from the press subsequent to that election, the PRI is alive and well, and will most surely mount a comeback, as evidenced by its recent victory in the Tabasco gubernatorial elections (AFP, 10/18/00)

The key "player" in the de-facto Mexican political scene is the president. Mexican presidents have successfully strengthened their office over the course of the last 70 years and now enjoy tremendous power. There are few legitimate internal checks and balances to Mexican presidential power at present. Among other functions, they select their successors to the Office of President, approve legislative and state gubernatorial candidates (de-facto appointments), select the attorney general, select high-ranking military officials, select supreme court justices, select the head of the PRI Central Executive Committee (the de-facto ruling body of Mexico), and regularly by-pass the legislature and issue executive decrees or orders ("reglamentos") that have the effect of law.

As noted above, the Mexican political system has evolved into a benevolent autocratic model; interestingly a form of government that appeared, at least in 1887, to be rather attractive to future United States President Woodrow Wilson, as outlined in his famous essay, "The Study of Administration," (Wilson, 1887).

There is nothing particularly sacrosanct regarding representative, checks and balances democracy. Western civilization has moved in this direction, but the benevolent autocratic model may be the next phase in the evolution of political sovereignty. As Amin (1997) would argue, Mexico, as well as any other nation, should be allowed to "negotiate the terms of its interdependence" with the rest of the world. Echoing much the same sentiment, Samuelson (1999) has argued that we in America cannot "refashion the rest of the world in our image," and that it is the height of arrogance to suggest otherwise. By the same token, it must be noted that the nature of the autocratic party-state governmental arrangement in Mexico and the socio-economic culture in which it operates, taken in toto, lends itself to systematic corruption and infiltration by organized crime interests. It is this writer's perspective that the contemporary Mexican socio-economic political fabric suffers not just from an infiltration, but from a saturation of organized crime interests.

INTRODUCTION TO THE DRUG CARTELS AND THE DRUG WARS Endless and eternal is their name. The drug wars in the Americas continue, with nothing even resembling a denouement on the horizon. After experiencing some success in its fight against the Medellin and Cali cartels of Colombia, American law enforcement and military officials began to focus their efforts on the Mexican drug cartels in the mid-1990s. The bells and whistles were brought out, Congressional Committees examined the issues, and numerous public relations statements were released by the Clinton Administration. Consider the following statement made in 1997 by Thomas Constantine, then Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): "These sophisticated drug syndicate groups from Mexico have eclipsed organized crime groups from Colombia as the premier law enforcement threat facing the United States." (Constantine, 1997)

The efforts proved to be far too little and too late. Despite American law enforcement undertakings through the mid-1990s, the Mexican cartels managed to consolidate their power bases, gained some control over the media, co-opted government officials at every level on a wholesale basis, and even killed a number of local and national government leaders.

Governments have notoriously short attention spans. Despite the in-roads made by the Mexican cartels and the 1997 decision by the Clinton Administration to focus on them, American law enforcement attention has now (late 2000) been diverted to Colombia and to what the Clinton Administration deems a more pressing problem. Two left-wing terrorist groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), have picked up the drug trade gavel dropped by the Colombian cartels, and are now running the show. With perhaps as much as a $600 million a year income, these two narco-terrorist groups, some 20,000 strong, pose a legitimate external threat to the sovereignty of Colombia. These groups have accumulated more than $5.3 billion in the past eight years, primarily through the drug trade ($2.3 billion), but also via kidnaping ($1.8 billion) and extortion ($1.2 billion) (Criminal Organizations, May 1999). They are better armed than the Colombian military, and appear ready to take on the government in full-pitch battles (Hammer and Isikoff, 8/9/99). They may in fact be adhering to the tactical terrorist philosophies of Frantz Fanon (1982) and Carlos Marighella (1985), a philosophy that proved successful in the overthrow of Cuba some 40 years ago. In response, the Colombian government has launched "Plan Colombia," a $7.5 billion effort to take out the drug traffickers and restore order to this beleaguered nation. The matter has become more convoluted due to the recent emergence of a powerful right-wing entity, the Self-Defense Force. This group formed as a response to the Colombian government's inability to successfully deal with the left-wing entities. Run by Carlos Castano, this vigilante group has turned to taxing cocaine and heroin producers, shippers and distributors to generate the revenue necessary to finance its military operations. Some experts suggest the Self Defense Force now ironically generates more revenue from the drug business than does FARC and ELN combined (Frontline, 4/20/00). It will be most difficult to wean the Self Defense Force from this new-found wealth, and they paradoxically loom on the horizon as a threat to the sovereign government of Colombia from the political right.

American aid has poured into that beleaguered nation to the tune of $250 million this year, ranking it third behind Egypt and Israel. There are currently more than 200 U.S. military personnel and 100 federal law enforcement agents stationed in Colombia. The U.S. National Drug Control Policy Director Barry McCaffrey visited Colombia during the summer of 2000, and committed to additional $500 million per year aid package, bringing the total U.S. government support of "Plan Colombia" to $1.3 billion. The end result of this new drug war is that the Mexican drug problem has now been placed on the proverbial back burner. President Fox has continued to seek American cooperation/assistance in the drug wars, but sensing its lowered priority in the Ameican political agenda, he has turned his attention southward and called for a unified Latin American effort to deal with the trafficking. While currently little more than a call for action, he seems determined to cobble together some type of unified Meso-American anti-drug initiative. Interestingly, he seems to be working most closely with Colombian President Pastrana in developing a solid political base for the notion (Associated Press, 10/9/00).

THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS TODAY While there is little hard data and many conflicting "authoritative" estimates, it appears that as much as 90 percent of the cocaine, 80 percent of the foreign-grown marijuana, 70 percent of the heroin, and 80 percent of the raw methamphetamine ingredients consumed in the United States enters by land from Mexico. For a period of time, the Colombians supplied the bulk of the drugs to the Mexicans, who then trans-shipped those products primarily into the United States. The Mexicans began by-passing the Colombians and going directly to Bolivian and Peruvian suppliers during the summer of 1997. Many have continued to move in that fashion, but the Colombians have now returned as the Mexican cartel's primary supplier of heroin and cocaine.

There are probably a dozen Mexican syndicates that are involved in the drug trade. The six primary Mexican syndicates with international capabilities currently operating are as follows(2):

1. The Gulf (or Matamoros) Cartel - This cartel was run by Juan Garcia-Abrego, but he was captured in January of 1996 and convicted in Texas in October of that year.(3) This was the strongest of the border-based cartels until his arrest. Oscar Malherve emerged as the next leader of this cartel, and due to his Juarez Cartel connections, seemed poised to move the Gulf Cartel back into a position of prominence, but he was arrested in 1997 and remains behind bars as of this writing. It is thought that the Gulf cartel is now run by Oziel Cardenas Guillen. The Gulf Cartel is based in south Texas (Brownsville and Laredo) and northeastern Mexico (Tamaulipas) and controls the gulf region, as its name implies. Abrego and company had been transshipping as much as 1/3 of all the cocaine used in the United States, but that number has dropped a bit of late. They have a brand name on their product - "Rolex," suggesting a high grade of cocaine. Money came in so fast and furious that the Gulf Cartel leadership literally did not know what to do with it. Foolishly, Abrego placed $1.3 billion into an American bank checking account, which only served to bring him to the immediate attention of American law enforcement officials.(4) He was allegedly worth around $15 billion at the time of his arrest. He owned hotels, real estate and an air taxi service in Texas, and even more extensive holdings in Mexico including newspapers, hotels, construction firms, lumber companies, moving businesses, ranches, real estate (Reuters, 9/29/96). He was tied to Raul Salinas, the brother of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas (president from 1988-1994) (Reuters, 1996). As of this writing, Cardenas is making significant strides in re-establishing this cartel as a major player once again.

2. The Juarez Cartel - This cartel was run by a former Mexican federal police commander, Rafael Aguilar, and Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Fuentes died in June of 1997 while undergoing plastic surgery. Leadership of this cartel is currently being contested, but Adado' brother Vicente seems now to have gained control. This syndicate has historically controlled the middle area of the Mexican/United States border. There were two factions to this group, but they came together under Fuentes, who by 1997 was grossing as much as $200 million a week. Under Fuentes, the Juarez Cartel rose to dominance in Mexico. They were smuggling four times as much cocaine as the other cartels combined (Larmer 3/10/97). When Fuentes passed away, the cartel probably had $25 billion in assets hidden away. Fuentes was also expanding into methamphetamines and money laundering ventures at the time of his death. The late September 1999 arrest by U.S. officials of 93 persons associated with this cartel, as well as the seizure of $25 million in cash and assets and the loss of 12.5 tons of cocaine and 2.1 tons of marijuana will surely set this cartel back.

3. The Tijuana Cartel - This cartel is run by the four Felix-Arellano brothers, wanted for the brutal 1993 murder of Catholic Cardinal Juan Jesus Ocampo (Reuters, 5/25/93). In early 1998, they combined forces with the strong central Mexican group, the Sonora Cartel run by the Caro Quintero family of Guadalajara, and formed a new organization they call, "The Federation" (AFP, 2/16/98). The Sonora Cartel was founded by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, who although imprisoned, appears to still be a major player in the new formed Federation, in part because he is the uncle of the Felix-Arellano brothers. Gallardo has long been known for advocating cooperation between the cartels. This group now has the potential to be the most powerful of the Mexican cartels.

4. The Herrera family - In some ways, this is not really a cartel per se, but an old time Mexican mafia family akin to the Camorra of Naples or the Black mobs of the eastern United States. They have many operations in Mexico itself. Herrera family representatives have also operated in New York, Boston, Louisville, Philadelphia, Dallas and Oklahoma City, with Chicago serving as their primary American hub. One estimate places over 1,000 Herrera family cocaine and heroin dealers in the United States (AFP, 12/6/97). This organization is based in the city of Durango in the state of Durango, and is really a confederation of roughly six families. They are enmeshed in the local socio-economic, political scene, and the family basically controls the state. As Abadinsky (2000:257) has pointed out, "the Herrera's did not buy off the power structure in Durango - they are the power structure." Members of this syndicate are generally all tied by blood and/or marriage, and as a result, the group has been almost impossible to infiltrate. The family head gives to the poor, plays the role of loving community godfather at many funerals and weddings, builds water and sewer systems, puts in street lights, builds hospitals. They supply America with so-called "Mexican mud" (brown heroin), and have done so since at least the mid-1940s. Opium is grown in the state of Durango, which explains to a large degree why they got into and stayed in that business. For a while, the Herrera's were running Colombian cocaine into the United States for the Medellin and then the Cali Cartels. They have now apparently opted out of the current cocaine battles and seem to want to just deal in their "Mexican mud" trade and be left alone. To a great degree, the "Mexican mud" market is a different market than the "China white" market. The other syndicates generally do not contend with the Herrera clan. The Herrera's are just too well enmeshed in Durango, the poppies are grown there, and the family is too well connected. The family has in essence established a vertical monopoly in the areas of production and distribution.

5. The Hank family - A second family syndicate, the Hank Family, has been emerging of late as a powerful player in the drug trade. A recent U.S. government report stated that the Hank family has been so closely linked to drug trafficking that they are now seen as a serious threat to the United States (AFP, 6/2/99). This group is headed by Carlos Hank Gonzalez who is best known for his expansive and profitable transportation, construction, and financial empires in Mexico. He has also been said to hold significant influential power within the PRI. Carlos Hank Gonzalez and his two eldest sons, Carlos Hank Rhon and Jorge Hank Rhon, have been the target of a American investigation since 1997. The Hank Corporation, known as "Guapo Hank", has purchased or maintained control over several American banks, investment firms, transportation companies and real estate properties, and is involved in the gambling industry. Hank Gonzalez is a former mayor of Mexico City and held two separate cabinet posts under former President Carlos Salinas. It is alleged that his eldest son, Carlos Hank Rhon, launders drug money and had been closely associated with Amado Carillo Fuentes - the late head of the Juarez Cartel (AFP, 6/2/99). Carlos Hank Rhon has also been associated with Raul Salinas, the former president's brother, who was himself linked to drug trafficking and was ultimately convicted of the murder of one of his brother's political rivals. Jorge Hank Rhon, the younger of the two sons, lives in the northern border town of Tijuana and is a close associate of the Felix-Arellano brothers, the leaders of The Federation. Jorge is less discrete in his criminality than either his older brother or his father and has earned the reputation of being "ruthless, dangerous, and prone to violence against his enemies" (AFP, 6/2/99). Mexican Foreign Minister Rosario Green has rejected the accusations laid against the Hank family and has called such allegations nothing more than pure defamation laid against Mexico's top officials and business men. A far more likely scenario is that the Hank family may well have aligned themselves with The Federation, bringing a significant amount of resources and connections to an already extremely powerful entity.

6. The Mexican Military - While not recognized for many years in the academic community, the Mexican military has been heavily involved in the marijuana trade for decades. Recent works have begun to surface which speak to this issues (Morris, 1991; Nadelmann, 1993), though many are in Spanish. A recent article by O'Day (2000) is one of the first comprehensive pieces written in English that addresses this topic. As O'Day points out, the drug of choice of the Mexican military is now and has been for years, marijuana. Seeing an opportunity to carve out a literal monopoly, the Mexican military got into the marijuana transport business as the American demand for marijuana increased in the 1970s. Bulky and possessing a penetrating pungent odor that is virtually impossible to mask, the movement of marijuana presents very different transport dynamics than does either heroin or cocaine. The Mexican military, however, has the military force to move throughout the country with impunity thus rendering moot the need to mask the odor. It also has access to large vehicles that can easily move large quantities of the bulky weed. The military has used these unique abilities to their advantage, and have largely stayed out of the cocaine and heroin business, though they do provide security for clandestine airstrips operated by cocaine and heroin traffickers. Over the past 30 years, the Mexican military has emerged as a major cartel in its own right, and currently has a virtual monopoly in the marijuana transportation business. While there is little hard data, U.S. law enforcement officers stationed on the U.S.-Mexican border have long noted, "where the Mexican army goes, dope flows." Marijuana is grown year-round in Mexico and the army has literally tons of harvested marijuana at its disposal, and even oversees the production and crop security end of the process in some regions.

It appears that each Mexican military regiment operates somewhat independently and there is a de-centralized flavor to the operations, though high-ranking Mexican military generals are clearly involved (Dillon, 1998). This would suggest at least some semblance of an organizational hierarchy, where orders move down the chain of command, and money moves up. One of the results of Operation Casablanca, a U.S. government undercover operation undertaken in the late 1990s, was the acquisition of several tapes, one of which featured then Mexican Secretary of Defense Enrique Cervantes seeking ways to launder $150 billion. Many have suggested, on the basis of vast circumstantial evidence though there is still no hard evidence, that this flow of "cannabis cash" reaches up to the office of the Mexican president. What is clear is that the Mexican military are heavily involved in the transportation of marijuana and that they will use force to protect their business. In a chilling video, aired for the first time on American national television by PBS on October 10, 2000, a squad of elite Mexican national police officers who came upon a shipment of marijuana, are gunned down by a squad of Mexican army personnel. The video further revealed that the army regiment was deployed in a strategic military context to protect the clandestine airstrip (Frontline, 10/10/00).

In the past few years, the Mexican military has become more and more aggressive in the border regions, shaking down ethnic Mexicans with impunity, regardless of citizenship and regardless of which side of the border they were on. Numerous accounts are filtering in of camouflaged Mexican military units crossing the "Rio Grande" and carrying out their business on the American side of the border (see AFP, 11/03/00). In January of 2000 for example, there was a running fire fight near El Paso, Texas between several U.S. law enforcement officers and several Mexican military personnel who had driven across the border in broad daylight. Outgunned by the military personnel, the U.S. officers had to retreat. By the time they returned with more firepower, the Mexican military personnel had finished their business and driven back across the border.

O'Day (2000) provides numerous case studies of Mexican military operating north of the border. "What is surprising," he writes, "is the open and singularly aggressive demeanor of the Mexican soldiers [who are] on American soil." In conjunction with the American law enforcement community, they are turning both sides of the border region into a de-facto military zone, with all the accompanying infringements and abuses spawned by such a demarcation. Continued movement in this direction will threaten the very foundation of Mexican democracy.

THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS The Mexican cartels originated in response to a demand for smuggling both people and contraband into the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The cartels began operating as middlemen smugglers for more powerful groups. With smuggling networks in place, the 1970s saw the cartels branch out on their own and begin to smuggle the high demand drug, marijuana, into the United States. In the 1980s the Colombian drug cartels rose to power, and they needed a way to bring cocaine into the American market. The Caribbean routes were used, but so were routes through Mexico. In the beginning, the Colombians would pay the Mexican groups as much as $1,000/kilo to smuggle cocaine into the United States. The Colombians would then pick up the drugs and resume distribution and sales efforts. This arrangement brought the Mexican cartels wealth, but little power or control of the drug trafficking market. This arrangement did not last long, and a number of meetings were held between Mexican and Colombian cartel leaders in the early 1980s, shortly after the connection was made. These meetings were arranged by the Honduran drug trafficker, Matta Ballesteros. Ballesteros worked with both the Colombian Medellin Cartel and Mexican smugglers. Ballesteros (currently serving a life sentence in United States for drug trafficking), introduced a number of Mexican cartel leaders to one of the founders of the Medellin Cartel, Rodriguez Gacha (killed by police in 1989). Gacha, nicknamed "the Mexican," was very impressed with the efficient Mexican smuggling operations and felt comfortable doing business with them. His deal making shifted more and more of the cocaine trade routes from the Caribbean to Mexico. In the early 1990s, United States anti-drug operations kicked in and began to focus on the Colombian-Caribbean drug smuggling connections. The Colombians were forced to smuggle increasing amounts of cocaine into the United States through Mexico. The pressure on the Colombian cartels was mounting. The Mexican and Colombian cartels began another series of meetings. At one such meeting, in January of 1992, Cali Cartel leaders Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejula decided that Juarez Cartel leader Carrillo Fuentes would arrange to fly planes loaded with cocaine directly from Colombia to Mexico. Carrillo Fuentes would eventually earn the nickname, "Lord of the Skies" for his diabolically brilliant ability to deliver literally tons of cocaine. Fuentes became a master at smuggling drugs not only with planes, but also with boats and trucks and people.

Smuggling through the Mexican cartels continued to grow throughout the early 1990s. Instead of merely dumping the cocaine in warehouses just across the border, the Mexican cartels became so powerful that they could guarantee delivery anywhere inside the United States. New deals were in the making between the Colombian and Mexican cartels.

In the early 1990s, the head of the Gulf Cartel (the most powerful Mexican cartel at the time) Garcia-Abrego, secured a major deal with the Colombian cartels that increased the Gulf Cartel's power even more. Instead of paying with cash, the Colombians would forfeit half of their cocaine shipments to Garcia-Abrego who then took the risk of selling, but also took the profits (Lupsha, 1995:90). By 1994 this became the standard business practice of all Mexican cartels (O'Brien and Greenburg, 1996; Wren, 1996). This deal was a major turning point in the fortunes of the Mexican cartels. With this new business arrangement, the power and wealth of the Mexican drug cartels exploded. The Mexican cartels set up their own cocaine distribution networks in cities such as Houston, Dallas, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Denver. The Colombians agreed to all of this as long as Mexican cartels would leave the Colombian markets in Miami, and the bulk of the east coast to the Colombians.

In the summer of 1995, the Colombian cartels fell under a renewed attack and received even more pressure from the Colombian National Police, who were aided by the American CIA and DEA. The police tracked down and arrested seven Cali Cartel leaders, including the Rodriquez-Orejula brothers. They tried to run their organization from prison, but failed. William Rodriguez, son of Miguel, was chosen to run the Cartel. He was so offensive that those with whom he was making deals wanted to kill him. He was forced into hiding and the Cali Cartel split up into small, separate businesses. While the Colombian cartels were dividing, the Mexican cartels were consolidating.

The Juarez Cartel, run by the then extremely powerful Carrillo Fuentes, became even stronger after Gulf Cartel leader, Garcia-Abrego, was arrested in January of 1996. Garcia-Abrego's replacement, Oscar Malherve, allied himself with Fuentes, making Carrillo Fuentes Mexico's drug kingpin.

Carrillo Fuentes continued to work on gaining even more power. Most of the coca crop is grown in Peru and Bolivia and then taken to Colombia to be turned into the final product, cocaine. Fuentes arranged for eight multi-ton shipments to be flown from Bolivia straight to Mexico. Fuentes intended to cut Colombia completely out of the picture. The Cali Cartel, although down, still had an intelligence operation in tact. They quietly notified the Bolivian authorities of the shipments, leading to the seizure of 4.1 tons of cocaine by Bolivian authorities on September 26, 1995.

This blow could have brought the cartels into an all out war, and it would have, if not for the wisdom of Carrillo Fuentes. Fuentes realized that a war among the cartels would only hurt and weaken them. He also knew that a war would give the scattered remnants of the Cali empire something to rally around, which could possibly re-unite the Cali Cartel fragments and return the Colombians to the powerful drug trafficking dynasty they once were. Fuentes called for a series of new meetings in neutral sites. In these meetings, Fuentes (actually represented by Gulf Cartel leader Oscar Malherve) told the Colombians that he would continue to deal directly with Peru and Bolivia. He would bypass Colombia because of the unstructured and unstable cartels in Colombia at the time. He proposed a new plan for business with Colombia. The plan basically allowed the Colombians to take their cocaine as far as Mexico, where they would be paid in cash for it. This meant that the Mexican cartels now had almost complete control of the cocaine trade in the United States, the largest cocaine market in the world. The Colombian profits would take a dive, but they would be alleviated of some of the risks involved in the business.

By 1997, many new, small organizations were jumping into the cocaine market in Colombia. Instead of cooperating, they competed with each other which left the market and the power structure quite fragmented. The Mexican cartels took advantage of this arrangement and soon took control of the entire market. By 1997, it appeared that Colombia's drug cartels were going to die out. General Rosso Jose Serrano, director of the Colombian National Police, said in 1997, that Carrillo Fuentes's Mexican organization was overpowering the Colombian drug organizations. It was "... by far the strongest cocaine-trafficking group. He is the one who buys and distributes everything" (Farah and Moore, 1997).

Carrillo Fuentes was on top of the world. He had left the Colombians in the dust. He was making an estimated $200 million a week and was smuggling four times as much cocaine into the United States as all the other Mexican cartels combined. As would later be revealed, Carrillo Fuentes even had Mexico's law enforcement drug czar, Gutierrez Rebollo, in his pocket. He developed a grand master plan and began to put it into effect: 1. Cut Colombia out of the picture with respect to the cocaine trade by dealing directly with Peruvian and Bolivian suppliers. 2. Move into the methamphetamine market. 3. Move into the money laundering trade.(5) 4. Maintain tight contacts with Mexican government officials.(6)

The plan was never able to be fully realized, for on July 4, 1997, Carrillo Fuentes died while undergoing plastic surgery. He had undergone plastic surgery in the past, and was attempting to further alter his appearance to conceal his identity from American government authorities. There was some thought at the time that he may have been purposefully killed on the operating table, but it now appears that he simply died due to surgical complications. As a result of his death, the Juarez empire and its immense cocaine market was up for grabs, and a war broke out to seize control. Mexico experienced 40 to 50 gangland slayings in the following six months (Reuters, 2/13/98).

The small Colombian organizations used that time to re-assert themselves. A number of groups by-passed Mexico, and set up Puerto Rico as the transshipment site of choice. The Puerto Rican syndicates took only 25 to 40 percent of the cut, and packages sent to the United States from Puerto Rico (an American possession) were not inspected as closely as those coming in from other countries. Some success was achieved, but the Puerto Rican connection suffered a major blow however, in August of 1999 when 58 persons, including a number of American Airline personnel, local Puerto Rican law enforcement officials, a federal employee, and the son of Puerto Rico's chief law enforcement official were arrested on drug trafficking charges (AFP, 8/26/99).

At this writing, the Colombians have been unable to consolidate themselves, and the "cartels" are little more than small, drug-running gangs. There are thought to be about 300 such entities at present, and they really have no other option but to run their cocaine and heroin through Mexico. The fact that the American cocaine market is experiencing a sharp decline is certainly complicating matters.(7) A number of the Colombian drug gangs have now abandoned the American market, and have turned their attention to what is fast becoming a literal drug supermarket - Europe and Central Asia.

Meanwhile, the Mexican cartels, after a period of upheaval subsequent to Fuentes' death, seem to have stabilized. At present, it appears that the cocaine trade has dichotomized, with power being shared by Oscar Malherve and the Gulf Cartel in the east, and the Federation in the west. Again, the September 1999 arrests by U.S. officials of 93 Juarez cartel associates mentioned previously, along with the loss of drug supplies and millions in currency will surely serve to weaken the Juarez cartel and further strengthen the Gulf Cartel and The Federation.

The shrinking cocaine market in America has forced the cartels to aggressively (and successfully) exploit other underworld markets, as will be discussed. They have historically demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt, just as the American syndicates demonstrated in the post-Prohibition era, and unfortunately appear to have a bright future. Before examining those new markets, however, there is a need to review the current state of the Mexican political scene so as to better understand the context in which the Mexican drug cartels now find themselves.

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SCENE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE As has been noted, Mexico has been governed by one political party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or Institutional Revolutionary Party), for 70 years. The PRI was founded by former Mexican President Plutarco Calles in 1929 and further developed and strengthened by President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940). It was originally called the National Revolutionary Party and took its current name in 1946. The party was created in an attempt on the part of officials at that time to bring a sense of stability to a beleaguered nation, and to seek a more conservative socio-economic evolution (ie. slow the rate of change) in the post-Diaz era. The PRI was wildly successful and eventually blended in with the government, evolving into the present autocratic party-state system, which has brought Mexico a relative measure of domestic peace over the past 70 years (see generally, Meyer and Sherman, 1979).

To better understand why the contemporary Mexican political system functions as it does requires a more detailed historical discussion. Mexican politics was dominated for some 35 years by Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz who served as President from 1876 until 1911 (with a four year hiatus from 1880 to 1884). Adopting the role of benevolent autocrat, he saw Mexico through a period of general economic growth, peace, and prosperity. A series of circumstances, including a growing public demand for democracy, resulted in him being forcibly removed from office in May of 1911 by Francisco Madero. As Diaz was being escorted away from Mexico City into exile, he reportedly said, "Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now let's see if he can control it."

Diaz's observation proved to be tragically profound. Less than two years later, President Madero was removed from office and executed, and the nation plunged into a dark decade of violence. More than 1.5 million people were killed during the second decade of this century; approximately 12 percent of the Mexican population. Brutality and calloused disregard for life became the norm for rebel and soldier alike. Rebel leaders such as Emiliano Zapata and Poncho Villa captured the public's attention and generated a significant measure of popular support. In the 10 years subsequent to Madero's death, 11 different men served as president. A Constitution was ratified in 1917, giving more political power to the central government, largely in an attempt to quell the violence. In an historical context, that move is now generally viewed as having been successful. Open hostilities abated by 1920, but the new decade saw extreme political turmoil, intrigue, and occasional assassination. In 1929, the turning point in modern Mexican political history, President Plutarco Elias Calles organized the National Revolutionary Party (the precursor of the modern PRI), returned to the benevolent autocrat model that had been implemented so well for so long by Diaz, and smoothed the transition of power process by instituting a closed system of selecting political successors.

The current Mexican model of federal executive leadership is the outgrowth of policies put in place by President Calles in response to two decades of extreme unrest. Its basic tenents have remained unchanged for 70 years, and have become more deeply entrenched in the Mexican political culture. Only now, at the close of the 20th century, with memories of the decade of violence confined to the history books, have democratic interests begun to again stir in the Mexican populous. Given the disastrous results of their previous flirtations with its principles, Mexico's reluctance to move toward a legitimate model of democracy is somewhat understandable. It must be re-emphasized that the current model of Mexican governance is the result of nearly 120 years of socio-political evolution; the model is deeply imbedded in the Mexican political psychic and the general political landscape. There will certainly not be any abrupt divorce decree nor a sudden wholesale embrace of grassroots democracy. The cultural traditions and political infrastructure are simply not in place. Today, the PRI Central Executive Committee still controls the party and the state. The Chair of the Central Executive Committee is appointed by the President of Mexico. The primary function of the Central Committee is to prepare nominations for all important "elected" government positions. Once nominated in this party-state system, the PRI candidate is all but elected. There is a public election, but it is little more than a public relations exercise designed primarily to placate the international community. Even if the citizenry were to vote an opposition party member into office, the Senate, with the Constitutional power to ratify elections, has been known to place the "appropriate" PRI candidates in office, regardless of the actual vote.

This arrangement clearly institutionalizes fraud and corruption, and it has been a part of the Mexican political environment for nearly four generations. With only one party to please, and without opposition party whistle-blowers to contend with, the drug cartels have been able to quietly pay-off government officials at all levels with little fear of public reprisal. Favoritism, corruption, and bossism are simply an institutionalized aspect of Mexican politics. A political party with no opposition is accountable to no one. The PRI, and thus the government, has simply been corrupted, and there is little interest or incentive within the PRI to come clean. Any attempt on the part of political officials to do so would likely draw the wrath of fellow PRI members who are still on the take. Not only would their political careers be ruined, but they would likely face life threatening opposition from both the cartels and the government. Recent court testimony has revealed how torture, kidnapping, and murder has been used regularly by the PRI to maintain control and generally crush dissident voices; a model similar to that used by Joseph Stalin decades ago (AFP, 9/3/99).

Nowhere was corruption been more blatant than in the administration of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas, generally recognized as Mexico's favorite person to deride (AFP, 6/14/99). The former president and his brother, Raul Salinas, fled Mexico in 1996, at the end of Carlos' term in office. Raul has since been apprehended and is currently serving a 27 1/2 year prison sentence for the murder of a political rival (he is currently in a medium security prison outside Mexico City). The sentence was slashed from 50 to 27 1/2 years by Judge Hernandez in July of 1999 due to mitigating circumstances. Raul has spoken to investigators and have led them to over $300 million in various European bank accounts, at least $120 million of which has been traced to the Gulf Cartel (AFP, 12/11/97; Reuters, 3/13/98); Wall Street Journal, 3/13/98). In addition to the murder charge, Raul Salinas is strongly suspected of being involved in various drug activities and masterminding several other political killings. Carlos, however, remains in a self-imposed exile in Cuba (he initially took up residence in Ireland but has since moved to Cuba), allegedly supported by at least $600 million stashed away in Swiss bank accounts. In May 1999, he did venture a brief 3-day return visit to Mexico for the first time since fleeing the country. Carlos's reception was not one of a revered former president but rather gave new fuel to old fires of anger, hate, and mistrust. He has returned several occasions since, including a visit in October of 2000 (AFP, 10/3/00). It is suspected that he may have been using whatever political clout he had left to influence then President-elect Fox's cabinet appointments, though Fox seems to be making very independent and creative choices in that area (Associated Press, 11/24/00). Publicly, the purpose of the visit was to discuss the creation of a Truth Commission that would begin to examine many of the atrocities that have occurred in Mexico over the past several decades (AP, 10/3/00).

In the past five years there have been five very public murders in which the organized crime interests have most certainly played a role, and they are of particular note. In September of 2000, deputy commerce secretary Raul Ramos was found dead in a rural area outside Mexico City. Ramos, an active PRI player, was commonly acknowledged to have been involved for many years in a multi-national auto-theft ring with underworld figures from Argentina and Colombia. He was likely killed to prevent his testimony from coming forward, with both organized crime figures and PRI officials signing off on the "hit" (AFP, 9/9/00). In March of 1994, the leading presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated in Tijuana. This murder greatly unsettled the Mexican people. The disruptive impact of his death is still evident today and investigations are unlikely to ever fully reveal the entire scope of the assassination plot. Different accounts have Raul Salinas, the Gulf Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel, and various members of the PRI party behind the murder.

One month after this assassination, the very progressive and reform oriented Chief of Police of Tijuana, Jose Fredrico Benitez, was murdered. It has recently been revealed that Mexican federal police officers working for the Tijuana Cartel carried out this murder.

In September of 1994, PRI heir-apparent Jose Francisco Massieu was assassinated. A strong case has been made by a number of commentators that he was prepared to begin a clean-up in the PRI, and that his death was consequently arranged via an agreement between the cartels and the PRI. In a damning suicide note left by his side in September of 1999, Jose's brother, Mario Massieu, implicated President Zedillo in Jose's murder, a matter that will surely disrupt an already uneasy political situation in Mexico (AFP, 9/17/99).

In June of 1999, the very popular television personality Francisco "Paco" Stanley was killed, allegedly on orders of drug lord Luis Amezcua in connection with drug debts (AFP, 8/27/99). More careful investigations have revealed that Stanley maintained long, on-going relationships with known drug dealers, including the infamous Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the notorious "Lord of the Skies."

As long as the party-state arrangement continues, there will be little hope of any serious law enforcement attention given to the cartels; token efforts to please American certification requirements, yes, but no serious efforts of consequence, and public murders of this nature as well as other inappropriate behaviors, will continue to occur.

Consider this parallel example from another Meso-American nation. Clearly one of the reasons that the Colombian cartels lost power in the early and mid-1990s was because the multi-party political system in Colombia began to assert itself. More particularly, one party began to publicly accuse the other of being corrupt. Out of a newfound need to maintain political credibility and obtain political capital and public confidence, significant law enforcement efforts were undertaken by the seated Colombian government to respond to the cartels. This was done by the government not so much out of a moral imperative to rid the country of drug dealers, but as the means of preserving its own power, which in a truly democratic state means keeping the citizenry happy and convinced of proper performance.(8) Because Mexico has historically lacked a viable multi-party system and the checks and balances that such a system brings, no such public crack-down has occurred, nor could we realistically expect it to occur given this backdrop. But this political backdrop is perhaps about to change.

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SCENE: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE Steps have been taken to move the Mexican political system toward legitimate multi-party status. In the past few years, major inroads by opposition parties led to the presidential victory of opposition party leader Vicente Fox, ending a 71 year political monopoly of the PRI. In the past, the infamous "dedazo" or Mexican finger, was the method used by the PRI party to select its presidential candidates. Dedazo, Spanish for "big finger," refers to the closed, secretive method used by seated Mexican presidents to unilaterally designate their own successors (AFP, 2/27/99). Though denied by several former Presidents, Jose Lopez Portillo, who served as president from 1976-1982, has publicly conceded the existence of such a practice, further noting it would vanish "only when a president renounces it" (AFP, 2/27/99).

That time arrived in they year 2000 when then president Ernesto Zedillo stated that he would not participate in the process of designating his own successor; effectively amputating the finger (AFP, 2/27/99). Many wonder, however, whether the process of dedazo truly ended. Of the six major politicians who initially indicated their intention to run for the office in 2000, the former Interior Secretary Francisco Labastida was widely seen as President Zedillo's favorite. Furthermore, immediately following Labastida's resignation as Interior Secretary (which enabled him to run in the PRI's November 1999 primary election), several trade unions and other groups linked to the PRI party publicly declared their support for him. Additionally, two other candidate hopefuls pulled out of the preliminaries as soon as Labastida announced his candidacy. As expected, Labastida easily won the PRI primary, which suggests that the rumors of the death of dedazo were perhaps somewhat exaggerated, at least as far as internal PRI-politics is concerned.

On August 3, 1999, after months of discussion, Mexico's two main opposition parties [the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)], announced an agreement to form a grand coalition and to present a united front for the presidential elections in July of 2000 (AFP, 8/4/99). With significant effort, the coalition hammered out a seven-point political platform, though many of those points have remained vaguely defined.(9) The next exercise was to select a single presidential nominee. This proved to be somewhat of a difficult task, for both the PAN candidate (Guanajarto Governor and former Coca-Cola executive Vincent Fox) and the PRD candidate (Mexico City Mayor, Cuautehmoc Cardenas) were strong contenders. In the end, the opposition settled on Vicente Fox, and with the support of the coalition, he defeated the PRI candidate Labastida in the July 2000 elections and took office December 1, 2000.

The selection and backing of a single candidate was a crucial decision for the coalition. The polls clearly indicated that in the absence of a united front from the opposition, the PRI party would not have been removed from power, even with the public revelations of gross PRI misconduct (money laundering and bank bailout scam; kidnapping and torture activities; assassination of Massieu and Colosio)(AFP, 8/30/99; 9/1/99).

This grand alliance was the first of its kind in the history of modern Mexico, and it toppled a long-reigning government. Representatives of the coalition continue to emphasize that their goal in forming the united front was not only the defeat of the PRI party, but also "...to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy, (and) to achieve the just political system that the majority of the citizens want," (AFP, 8/4/99). Time, of course, will tell whether or not such aspirations are achieved or relegated to the garbage dump of political rhetoric. The Mexican people, as well as the Mexican government, corporate and civic institutions all operate with a deeply imbedded paternalistic-aristocratic political culture that pre-dates the Spanish. Some very legitimate queries can be aired as to whether they really have the tools necessary to embrace modern democracy.

To date however, some very public and seemingly legitimate efforts are being undertaken by President Fox in an attempt to steer his nation down this new path, and he has taken a very aggressive public position on a number of fronts since his election. Among other initiatives, he has called for the creation of a Mexican Truth Commission to examine past atrocities and bring those responsible to justice. President Fox is aggressively pushing the U.S. to end its drug certification program, publicly stressing that the drug problem will not be resolved until America addresses its own corruption problem; "as long as the United States does not end corruption, efforts to curb the illegal drug trade will not be successful"(AFP, 8/19/00). In response to the issue of American corruption, he recently responded, "I ask myself how tons and tons of drugs enter the United States without anyone noticing and how consumption grows without anybody stopping it." (AFP, 8/19/00). In his most vocal speech to date, on the even of his inauguration he specifically called on the United States to accept more of the blame for the drug problems (Associated Press, 11/27/00).

He has openly challenging the policies of the International Monetary Fund (no doubt due to the fact that Mexico, with its August 2000 payment of $3 billion, currently has no outstanding financial obligations to the IMF), and is championing the development of a Latin American union built along the same model as the European Union. Tied in to this is his call for increased privatization of state-owned industries, and a desire to join Mercusor, the Argentine and Brazilian dominated free-trade bloc. President Fox has also called for the European Union to develop closer ties with Mercusor (Associated Press, 10/2/00). More substantively, he signed a free-trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association that will go into effect in July of 2001 . In addition, in July of 2000, President Fox negotiated an agreement with the European Union to in essence tear down all trade barriers between these two trading partners by the year 2010 (Associated Press, 11/06/00). This pact with the European Union will have monumental and far-reaching implications, effecting literally every aspect of the Mexican social, economic and political communities, potentially even surpassing the impact of NAFTA.

During personal visits with President Clinton, Al Gore and George W. Bush in August of 2000, he argued for the complete opening of the U.S./Mexican border within the next 10 to 30 years, and proposed an amendment to NAFTA which would allow for a free labor flow between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada. He has continued to push this "NAFTA-plus" notion and the need to create a North American common market, and gives every indication that he intends to continue pursing this goal (Associated Press, 11/27/00). He has also openly challenged the United States and Canada to spend up to $30 billion annually to close the "development gap" with Mexico so as to realize an economic convergence between the three nations. While many of his proposals have fallen on deaf American ears, his stated human rights agenda in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas and the creation of the Truth Commission is clearly in line with American political philosophy. His willingness to pump additional oil to ease the winter 2000-2001 energy crisis, and his public support for a reduction and long-term stabilization of oil prices is even more central to American interests. Taken together, these (and other pro-American positions such as the increased privatization of state-owned industry) will continue to increase his political capital in America, and will certainly result in a number of his initiatives obtaining increased American support (see AFP, 8/19/00; AFP, 9/22/00; AFP, 9/25/00; Cox, 2000; Smith, 2000).

In sum, Fox has embarked upon, at least in word, an aggressive anti-corruption, pro-human rights, pro-global business position. To be successful, he will need to take control of the economy away from the traditional Mexican power brokers, and that will not be easy. If victorious in this effort, he will surely root out a significant measure of the institutional corruption that has both hampered Mexico's socio-economic development and collaterally permitted its' organized crime syndicates to prosper for half a century.

The role of the printed press in contemporary Mexico is also undergoing a significant shift. Perhaps the best known Mexican newspaper, Excelsior, long sold itself to the government in exchange for price supports, massive tax breaks, and outright payments from governments leaders. The paper had what amounted to a government protected monopoly. Excelsior editors sold themselves and their newspaper to the PRI in the late 1920s, and as a result, Excelsior emerged in the 1930s as Mexico's national paper. Excelsior became one of the primary tools used by PRI officials over the years to maintain their power. Headlines were articulated by government leaders, and "news" stories towed the party line. Atrocities went un-reported, as did unfavorable economic news. Socio-economic issues of the day were ignored. There has no been no independent Mexican press of any stature for at least 70 years. An independent press serves as a legitimate check on the government, informs the populous, and is crucial in the development and maintenance of a viable democracy. With the changing political winds, Excelsior is now paying the price for its years of prostituted reporting. Circulation and sales have plummeted. Its credibility all but destroyed. Now more than $70 million in debt, it may not survive. Other papers have "hit the streets," but what remains to be seen is if a truly independent press can emerge from the ashes of a general community mistrust of the press and help move Mexico toward a more responsible form of democracy. Prominent Mexican news mogul Armando Sepulveda, has said that the media now enjoys "freedom of expression, but the press still does not know how to use it"(Associated Press, 10/31/00). It will be some years before his "freedom of expression" assertion can be validated, and it will be longer still to see if the Mexican mass media successfully conquerors tradition and emerges with a new face with an independent and powerful democratic countenance.

Mexico also has another political institution in place that has historically protected PRI leadership and concomitantly provided a healthy climate for syndicates to grow and flourish. A decades old unwritten rule in Mexico prohibits the indictments of present and former Presidents and cabinet members. Originally designed to prevent wars and unsavory politics between rivals, the rule has outlasted its usefulness and has now become a major obstacle to effective drug enforcement efforts. It completely insulates high-level government officials from liability for their actions.

The United States has repeatedly called for Mexico to end the traditional impunity for high level officials. Journalist John Anderson states,

"No law, no special task forces, no number of helicopters and chase planes can compare to the impact that one strategic indictment would have, as every cabinet member, general, and police commander would suddenly be made to understand that impunity will no longer be tolerated" (Reding, 1995).

The problem of course, is that this would be counter to the vested personal interests of the Mexican government officials who would be asked to implement this policy change. President Fox, however, has publicly stated that if evidence of criminal wrongdoing undertaken by his predecessor came to light, he would do what he could to institute legal proceedings against him (Weymouth, 2000, p. 35). What remains to be seen is if Fox is full of typical political rhetoric or atypical substance. While there are growing opposition voices calling for the removal of this traditional executive privilege and for the development of a legitimate multi-party system, at this writing Mexico can still be classified as a de-facto one-party system; a party-state system, with its accompanying twin - institutionalized corruption (Paternostro, 1995; UPI, 1/30/98).

Current events clearly suggest that Mexico appears to be ripe for change. The world community is certainly supportive. President Fox had his staff must now put their plans into actual practice. They must particularly resist the powerful and deeply entrenched forces within the Mexican culture that will attempt to deflect this electoral revolution into a "business as usual" reality and the continuance of the well-established governmental connections with the region's drug cartels.

INSTITUTIONALIZED CORRUPTION A report published by the United States General Accounting Office stated that one of the major problems in the drug wars is the endemic, institutionalized corruption within the Mexican law enforcement and military community (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996). In its 1998 annual report to Congress on human rights, the White House noted that "corruption is rife within the ranks of Mexico's police and members of the security forces..." (UPI, 1/30/98). In a recent piece of investigative reporting, the New York Times broke a story that a number of Mexican generals met with cartel leaders on at least two occasions in 1996 and 1997. The evidence seems to indicate that bribes were offered in exchange for the military leaders turning a blind eye to the drug operations (UPI, 3/26/98).

Mexican police are prone to corruption for many reasons. Mexico is a major money-laundering location because of its lack of significant regulations on banking transactions. Due to a disastrous string of bank failures, Mexico is now beginning to modernize its banking laws and grant its regulatory agencies concrete enforcement powers (AFP, 9/21/99). Off the books cash flows very freely. As much as $30 billion a year is now being laundered in Mexico (Reuters, 2/16/98). Perhaps an equal amount of money is brought into the country from the drug trade. It is estimated that ten percent of that wealth is used specifically for law enforcement, military and political pay-offs. Police and military officials are paid an extraordinarily low wage roughly 3,000 pesos ($300) a month (AFP, 8/4/99). When they are offered an entire years' wages to turn a blind eye, or take a shot of "lead in the head," the money is taken very readily and gladly. Bulita (1997) states, "the partnership between drug traffickers and police is so open that it could not exist without the knowledge of senior officials." The Felix-Arellano brothers of the Tijuana cartel, for example, openly employ off duty (and perhaps a few on-duty) state police as their body guards. The shear amount of money involved makes it possible to undermine virtually all law enforcement efforts in such a poor country.

Adding to the problem of rank-and-file officer corruption is an internalized and institutionalized mode of corruption within the police ranks. Mexican police commanders routinely demand incoming officers to sign over a large percentage of their already low salaries, or risk receiving poor assignments and/or poor equipment. In August of 1999, 26 police commanders were charged with forcing new officers to forfeit 35 percent of their salaries back to their commander (AFP, 8/4/99). It is estimated that collectively, commanding officers in the Mexican law enforcement community may have taken in up to $315 million pesos ($31.5 million) over the past several years (AFP, 8/4/99). While this type of corruption is not directly tied to the drug trade per se, it establishes a pattern and practice of corruption within the ranks that is easily mined by drug cartel personnel, who have vast amounts of bribery funds at their disposal.

While Mexico's economic growth for 1998 was greater than expected with a gross domestic produce (GDP) up about 4.8 percent, 45 percent of the population still live in poverty, with more than one-fourth of the population living in extreme poverty (AFP, 2/17/99). Additionally, the unemployment projections indicate record levels due to the regional economic recession - an estimated 9.5 percent unemployment rate is anticipated for 1999 (AFP, 2/28/99). Economic need also serves as a powerful factor in explaining institutionalized corruption.

The Mexican drug cartels have accumulated such wealth and power that they have been able to corrupt public officials all the way to the top - the country's top drug prosecutor (Associated Press, 8/27/99), the former Mexican drug czar (AFP, 3/3/98), the former head of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (AFP, 3/28/98), the former director of the Mexican federal highway police (AFP, (9/26/00), the Chief of Police in Mexico City (Reuters, 12/11/97), Mexican state governors (Moore, 4/8/99), numerous military generals (AFP, 1/23/98; 3/3/98; UPI, 1/30/98), and even members of the Mexican foreign ministry (AFP, 2/6/98). As a result, the Mexican people have little trust in their law enforcement and military personnel (Associated Press, 9/17/96)/(10).

Numerous case studies provide support for this mistrust. In November of 1991, for example, a United States Customs Service plane trailing a Mexican police plane in pursuit of a plane transporting drugs recorded an extraordinary scene using long range infrared video equipment. The Mexican police airplane followed the drug transport plane to an airstrip where it stopped to re-fuel. The plane was being serviced and fueled by Mexican military personnel. As United States Customs officials watched, Mexican army personnel proceeded to kill all seven Mexican police officers as they attempt to seize the drugs.