Returning the focus back to the Chechen rebels, the following information pertains to Chechen Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov, who (according to Russian sources) was a suspected CIA operative. This is in March of ’05, from Moscow News: “Field commander Rizvan Chitigov has been killed in Chechnya during a raid carried out by pro-Moscow security forces and the republic’s Interior Ministry troops…In the early 1990s Chitigov visited the United States and upon his return he oversaw military intelligence in Aslan Maskhadov’s government…. The FSB, Russia’s domestic security service, suspected that Chitigov had been maintaining ties with foreign intelligence services and was himself a CIA agent… According to some reports, Chitigov had a green card — a permanent residence permit in the U.S.” [490] Correspondent for the Journal of Military Ordnance, Adam Geibel’s report implies that the evidence tying Chitigov to the CIA is weak. Although, he does state that Chitigov’s group had collaborated with other units under the directive of Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev. “Chitigov had once lived in the United States and had participated in the infamous 1995 raid on Budennovsk. This seems to have been the basis for FSB spokesman Zdanovich's April 2001 accusation that Chitigov was an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency. Chitigov, also known as "Suraka," was one of "Khattab's" trusted men. His group, which mustered from 50 to 500 Mujahidins, specialized in laying mines in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Osetiya. They cooperated with groups under Maskhadov, Khattab, warlord Shamil Basayev, and Chechen General Magomed Khambiyev.” [491] It’s interesting that Geibel fails to mention key background information pertaining to Chitigov’s formal training.

From the Washington Times (citing UPI): ”Chitigov had the nickname in the Chechen resistance of "Amerikanets" ("the American.") Chitigov had graduated from an elite U.S. subversion and reconnaissance school and had served on a contract basis in a U.S. Marine battalion in the early 1990s, and U.S. Marine dog tags indicating his name, and date and place of birth were discovered on his body. Chitigov went to the United States with the support of an international Muslim fund, which had a mission in Chechnya. When Chitigov returned to Shali in 1994, he…initially fought under Khattab and commanded the Chechen's only tank battalion during the 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen war. According to the Russian authorities, Chitigov was involved in terrorist attacks in Moscow and Chechnya and participated in the 1999 execution of four kidnapped officials from the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe.” [492] Interesting connection, Chitigov, with the backing of the International Muslim Fund coincidentally is trained in an “elite U.S. subversion and reconnaissance school.” Chitigov also provided details of his unit’s “successful combat operations” (sabotage) to the Chechen-connected news media outlet Kavkazcenter.com, a source with a number of other URLs based in the U.K. [493] There’s a little more on one of those mirror sites (kavkaz.org.uk) further into the compilation. Note: various sources report that the FSB intercepted a “mobile telephone conversation” and/or a walkie-talkie transmission to establish Chitigov’s location. Another point sources note is that Chitigov spent the winter in Baku, Azerbajan prior to returning to Chechnya.

Before a closer review of Ilyas Akhmadov, information pertaining to Chechen warlord Arbi Barayev and Chechen envoy Akhmed Zakayev will be examined. In ’02 Cali Ruchala, an independent journalist and co-founder of diacritica press, produced a dossier on Arbi Barayev. “By 1991, Barayev was on the payroll of the Chechen National Security Services, more or less acting as a bodyguard for important dignitaries - chief among them Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, one of Chechnya's leading ideologues and later the leading convert to Islamic Fundamentalism. After proving himself to Yandarbiyev, Barayev blossomed during the First Chechen war and found his calling commanding a small detachment of men near his stomping grounds in Alkhan-Kala. In January 1996 he kidnapped 29 visiting Russian engineers in Grozny and held them for ransom in support of the movement. After the Russians withdrew from Chechnya, Barayev turned his gruesome wartime expertise into a professional business. Scores of tourists, journalists, government officials - even Boris Yeltsin's envoy to Chechnya - were nabbed from as far away as Kalmykia, brought to Chechnya and forced to write letters to their employers or their loved ones, begging for their lives and for their captor's ransom. … Along with this lucrative business…the Chechen warlord also controlled the oil business at Chernorechye, where a system of homemade stills refined the oil pumped from nearby wells and dumped thousands of gallons of waste into Chechnya's water supply. … With the money to pay for more capos and soldiers, Arbi Barayev moved to establish his control over more of Chechnya with an attempted takeover of the city of Gudermes in June of 1998.” Accordingly, Maskhadov then dispatched a division to support the local opposition and “…issued an arrest warrant and stripped Barayev of his rank in the Chechen Armed Forces and all medals he had earned.” [494] “However, each attempt to bring the "Wahhabi" to the Court of Shari’ah ended in mass protests of field commanders opposed to the government, who eventually set up a Court of Shari’ah of their own and a Shura - a body parallel to the State Council.” [495]

Ruchala continues, providing evidence that Barayev’s immediate handlers were FSB agents. “…his very high-profile public life in Alkhan-Kala - led many to speculate that Barayev was living under the protection of the Russians who were supposedly out to kill him. It was alleged that local FSB head Yunus Magomedov was his partner in crime.” Ruchala, citing journalist Mark Irkali continues: "No matter what the truth of it was - and every prominent Russian politician of any weight has been accused of having 'friends' among the unsavory Chechen leaders - the Russian soldiers who garrisoned his district were absolutely in bed with Arbi Barayev. They controlled the Nazran-Grozny Highway during the day. He controlled it at night. This is a fact, because I dealt with both of them when I drove in from Ingushetia (and…Barayev collected a higher 'toll').” A search linking Arbi Barayev and Akhmed Zakayev directly yeilded nothing, though both are implicated in the kidnapping trade. From intelcenter.com, citing Itar-Tass in June of ’00: “Taisla Isayeva, a messenger in a Chechen gang during the first Chechen war, was detained at Nizhny Zaramag checkpoint on the Chechen stretch of the Russo-Georgian border. She was in Akhmed Zakayev's unit during the first Chechen war and played a part in numerous kidnappings of Russian and foreign journalists, mainly as informer and later as mediator. She was directly involved in the kidnapping of a camera crew of NTV television in 1997 and in the capture of British citizens Camilla Carr and Jon James in Grozny. At the time of her detention she was director of the Chechen-press news agency’s office in Tbilisi.” [496] From Wikipedia, “Akhmed Zakayev is a Chechen envoy, former separatist guerrilla leader and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Aslan Maskhadov, appointed by President Maskhadov shortly after the 1997 election. … Living in London, he organized the World Chechen Congress in Copenhagen, Denmark which brought together Chechens and Russian human rights activists in October 2002. During the congress, Zakayev denied Maskhadov's involvement in the theater capture in accordance with Maskhadov's condemnation of attacks against civilians, but threatened new acts of political violence against Russia (allegedly including the use of nuclear materials).” [497]

As noted earlier, Zakayev was granted asylum in Great Britian. From a Russian source (Moscow News) dated Sept. of ’04, again Zakayev is quoted as stating that Moscow’s reluctance to negotiate could lead to other terrorist attacks. “Chechen envoy Akhmed Zakayev has urged Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, to hold peace talks or risk provoking further atrocities like the Beslan massacre. … Zakayev insisted that linking Maskhadov, a democratically elected leader, with Basayev was a deliberate attempt to confuse international public opinion about the real issues in the Chechen conflict.” [498] From an Australian based source is an interesting Q&A with Zakayev. Note that Zakayev, rather than condemning the taking of hostages, actually believed that the situation provided an opportunity to negotiate for peace after Chechen guerrillas had seized control of the Beslan middle school and made their demands. “Q. When the siege began at Beslan…I understand you received a call early on. Can you tell me about that and who it was from? A. This was on the 2nd of September. … I received a phone call from the ex-president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev and he connected me to the current President of Northern Ossetia, Alexander Dzasokhov. Perhaps you will wonder why they rang me and how I could help them and truly I wondered this as well… Q. What exactly were the demands as they were put to you? A. The demands [from the hostage-takers] had to do with the end of the war in Chechnya and the exit of Russian troops. This was the reason I felt that would have been possible to save the children because if the demands dealt directly with Chechnya and if the authorities are demanding of the attackers that they liberate the children without any other conditions, then it seemed possible to me that we could have worked together in this direction and we could have saved the children. Q. Actually removing the troops from Chechnya, this is not something that can happen instantly, what makes you believe that negotiations really were a realistic possibility. A. The main thing I think is we should have tried since these people were the ones who made contact with us and since these people were making some sort of demands, it meant that there was a chance to save as many people as possible and in the given situation both in Nordost and in the school in Beslan, we didn’t make a single attempt to save the children or to save the people.” [499]

The reason former and current officials handling the Beslan situation would contact Zakayev would seem obvious. The following information is in the context of Russia’s attempt to have Zakayev extradited from Great Britian. Testifying before the Bow Street magistrates was Sergei Zhigulin, a monk who accused Zakayev of ordering his capture. From buzzle.com, citing the Guardian (07/03): “Before the Bow Street magistrates 2 witnesses accused Zakayev of kidnapping and torture… Mr Zhigulin also said he had recognised another of his captors as a man he had seen in Mr Zakayev's house when he had visited it earlier that month to negotiate the release of a hostage being held by Chechen guerrillas.” That’s interesting, and if true, clearly ties Zakayev to hostage negotiations. The source also adds that at “…the end of the hearing yesterday, Mr Zhigulin and Mr Zakayev met at the back of the court and shook hands.” [500] A Russian source which appears to be citing Reuters states: “Back in 1996 Akhmed Zakayev negotiated with the priests for the release of Russian soldier Boris Sorokin, who had been taken captive by the Chechens.” Zhigulin (before a Danish court) stated that he and senior Orthodox Priest of Grozny Rev. Anatoly were headed to meet Zakayev for further negotiations when they were taken captive. [501] Amnesty International confirms an earlier source, noting that the charges levied against Zakayev were not prosecuted until years later, while at the same time Moscow recognized Zakayev “…as a legitimate representative of his government and held peace negotiations with him…” [502] The fact that Russian authorities have proven themselves corrupt and presented little evidence to support their contention, it shouldn’t be assumed that Mr. Zakayev is innocent.

On to llyas Akhmadov, who was granted asylum in the U.S. in May of 2004. According to Wikipedia, in the first Chechen war “…Akhmadov fought against the Russians, serving as the public affairs officer to the Chechen army headquarters' chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov. … a month before the beginning of the Second Chechen War, President of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov appointed Ilyas Akhmadov as Foreign Minister. …He claimed asylum in the United States in 2002 but his initial bid was turned down after opposition from the United States Department of Homeland Security. However, he gained support from members of the United States Congress and peace campaigners, who saw him as a moderate. Indeed, Akhmadov has repeatedly criticised suicide bombings and hostage-takings… Akhmadov appealed the decision to deny him asylum and in May 2004, a judge in Boston ruled in his favor. The US Government announced that it would seek to overturn the decision but in August 2004 its objections were abruptly dropped, much to the annoyance of Russia.” [503] Discussing the crisis in Chechnya, Akhmadov was a guest speaker at Princeton University in 2003. Accordingly, prior to being named Foreign Affairs Minister, Akhmadov “… assisted Doctors Without Borders in the delivery of humanitarian assistance… He served as a clerk in the Chechen Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992 and previously served in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces at the Kapustan-Yar Strategic missile testing ground.” [504] Before examining background material linking Akhmadov to Shamil Basayev, the kidnapping and slave trade, as well as to narcotics trafficking, the compilation examines Akhmadov’s connections to the neo-cons in Washington. Moscow news citing another Russian source: “Ilyas Akhmadov…has officially been granted asylum in the United States, RIA Novosti has learnt from the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya [ACPC], co-chaired by former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and former US secretary of state Alexander Haig. … The committee confirmed that not long ago Akhmadov was appointed to a post at the US non-governmental foundation National Endowment for Democracy and now plans to move to Washington for permanent residence and work. National Endowment for Democracy confirmed that Akhmadov has been awarded a research grant under the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program and hence is entitled to monthly allowance, medical insurance as well as reimbursement of transportation costs.” [505] Readers may recall and as William Blum states, “The Endowment played an important role in the Iran-Contra affair of the 1980s, funding key components of Oliver North's shadowy "Project Democracy" network, which privatized US foreign policy, waged war, ran arms and drugs and engaged in other equally charming activities. … Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was quite candid when he said in 1991: "A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA. … In effect, the CIA has been laundering money through NED.” [506]

While Akhmadov’s support in Congress crosses party lines, the ACPC members aren’t exactly known as peaceniks or for their commitment to humanitarian causes. Those of note include, Elliott Abrams, Michael A. Ledeen, James Woolsey, Richard Perle, Frank Gaffney, and Nicholas Daniloff. [507] Kenneth Adelman, an ACPC member, who was an assistant to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from 1975 to 1977 and arms control director under President Ronald Reagan, wrote in Feb. of ’02: “I believe demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.” [508] Cited for an overview of ACPC is the IRC profile of the organization. ACPC “…works closely with a range of nongovernmental policy groups and think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute… Glen Howard serves as ACPC’s executive director… Howard previously worked for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a high-tech defense contractor, as a military analyst, and has served as a consultant for the Department of Defense, National Intelligence Council, and “major oil companies operating in Central Asia and the Middle East.” … ACPC was founded in 1999 by Freedom House, a neoconservative organization that has existed since 1941 and has worked closely with the U.S. government, receiving funds from the National Endowment for Democracy and other U.S. democratization initiatives. … ACPC says that the rebel forces don’t have links to al-Qaida, and that the U.S. should support their efforts to create an independent Chechnya. Whatever the facts…the rebels certainly include Islamist fundamentalists, including those affiliated with Wahhabism. ACPC’s governing committee includes a wide range of conservatives, neoconservatives, and liberal hawks, although the neoconservatives—most of whom have been associated with the Project for the New American Century—appear to be dominant.” [509] To clarify ACPC’s position as of Sept. of ‘04 is a report sponsored by the organization focusing on terrorism in Chechnya, particularly young female recruits committing suicide bombings. “Moscow is ultimately responsible for creating the underlying conditions of despair and anguish that precipitate suicide terrorism in Chechnya.” The premise here is that the situation in Chechnya is attributable to the Kremlin’s militaristic foreign policy and the media’s focus on radical fundamentalism. Accordingly, Zarema Muzhikhoyeva was one of the girls expected to carry out a suicide bombing. When she couldn’t manage it and decided to back out, authorities quickly captured her. In custody her statements lacked consistency. “However, underlying all of her statements is the claim that she was kidnapped and forced to carry out the suicide attack virtually against her will. She also claims that she was indoctrinated and trained with other suicide bombers at a camp outside of Moscow…“ [510]

The same month the ACPC report was released U.S. & Georgia officials associated the Pankisi based rebels to terrorism and attacks against Russian forces, though they contradicted one another. Citing Reuters, Moscow News quotes U.S. ambassador to Tbilisi, Richard Miles, as saying “Chechen rebels with links to international terrorists are still hiding in a remote part of Georgia.” Georgia Interior Minister Irakly Okruashvili was also quoted as saying: “There have been no fighters or terrorists in Pankisi for a long time.” [511] While the argument can be made that in fact both officials are making a distinction between nationalists and terrorists, their statements link the Chechen cause and terrorists to the Pankisi simultaneously. Again, the problem with all this is the evidence proving the collaboration between secessionist forces headed by Basayev & Maskhadov. Reasons being of course, the extremists’ handlers were FSB, which meant Maskhadov was collaborating with the enemy. This of course was never going to attain the goal of independence, let alone security for the Chechen people. A reality he had to of known. As two additional sources further prove, the use of militant proxies by Russian Intelligence is to press political aims, which is always the oppression of the indigenous people, which happen to serve the same interests of the U.S. government. Jeffrey R. Nyquist, also in Sept. of ’04, wrote: “As it stands today, the Russian security services control the Russian government. They control the “former” Soviet republics (even where there is a pretense of independence). … They direct and coordinate organized crime. … There is a great deal of evidence and testimony that President Putin came to power through FSB-sponsored terrorism. Russian state security provoked the Second Chechen War. Putin’s agents planted the bombs that leveled Russian apartment buildings in 1999. Furthermore, Chechen terrorists who take hostages have been publicly identified as Kremlin agents.” [512] From a Sept. of ’05 Moscow News article, U.S. stooge “…Mikhail Saakashvili [Georgian President] has accused Russia of supplying weapons to separatists.” Note, this is referring to Abkhaz separatists. [513] In January of 2000 Akhmadov was a guest speaker at a seminar held at Harvard University, after which he answered questions. When asked about reporting that linked the Basayev brothers to the FSB, Akhmadov’s response was, “I do not have any information indicating that the Basayev brothers had connections with Russian intelligence. As far as certain political influences or certain political games and pressure, it is quite possible that things like that might have taken place.” [514]

PAGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 References

.

.