Plato's Theory of Forms as Applied to Ethics and Politics

In a time and place where traditional morality faltered, and "no one . . . blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them" (Plato, Republic 59), the ancient Athenian philosopher Plato undertook the challenge to reverse the morally degenerate trend in contemporary thought and restore confidence in what was regarded as the "hopelessly fallible instrument" of human reason (Jones 123). In order to meet this task, he developed a theory that later became the basis of his political, ethical, religious, and other theories. This Theory of Forms allowed Plato, in his mind, to satisfactorily prove that a life of justice truly is the best life to live.

As a philosopher, Plato's primary concern was to discover what would bring the greatest happiness to mankind, both individually and as a whole . He firmly believed that the key to real happiness is to live a just life, and he spent a good amount of time and effort to, not only discover and explain the concept of justice itself, but to prove that it was indeed among the most desirable of virtues "both for [its] own sake and for the sake of [its] results . . . whether seen or unseen by gods or men" (Republic 47,61). This concept was not a generally accepted one, nor was the idea that such absolutes as real happiness, justice, or morality even exist and are not based on personal interpretation and prejudice (Republic 47; Jones 121). In order for Plato to prove his postulate that justice brings happiness, first he had to overcome these obstacles of contemporary Greek thought.

Especially perplexing was the "puzzle about change" or the problem of "appearance and reality" (Jones 121,122), which pits the constant changes in everyone and everything that are so apparent against the set identity that seems so obvious. The question posed by the puzzle about change is, "How can something change and still be the same thing?" For example, suppose a caterpillar undergoes metamorphosis and becomes a butterfly, changing its bodily structure completely. Although the newly-emerged has dramatically changed, it is still the same entity that entered the cocoon as a caterpillar. It has changed, yet it is still the same.

The dilemma seemed impossible to resolve as neither the Parmenidean argument, which denied the existence of change, nor the Heraclitean argument, which denied eternal identity, could satisfactorily answer the problem. Both change and identity obviously exist, but nobody could adequately explain how two opposites could coexist in the same object (Jones 121-123).

Plato sought to resolve the problem by proposing that reality exists in varying degrees. According to his theory, the universe can be compared to a straight line which is divided into two parts (Jones 126-130). The two divisions are then subsequently divided into two parts each, both of the same relative proportions as the first division. The left side of the original division represents the physical, sense-perceived world in which we live. Objects in this world are then divided up into two groups, according to their respective reality. Shadows, images, and reflections fall on the far left side of the divided line, while the actual objects that cast these images, being more real, fall to the right (although these, too, remain on the left side of the original division).

The respective positioning on the divided line of shadows and the physical objects that cast them is not arbitrary. That which is more real and falls to the right on the line (for example the physical objects) illuminates and enhances our understanding of that which is but a shadow and falls to the left. Plato illustrated this illumination of understanding in his well-known Myth of the Cave. In the myth, Plato tells of people who are held prisoner from birth in a cave slightly underground. The people are shackled in chains so that they can neither move nor see anywhere but straight ahead. There is a parapet behind them that is used as a sort of puppet stage, behind which people hide with crude objects protruding from the stage. A fire behind the stage casts shadows of the objects, and these shadows are the only things that the Cave Dwellers see (Jones 135-136). Someone who has spent his entire life in the Cave will have doubtless seen thousands of shadows from any one of the objects protruding from the parapet, and from these shadows, he will make various conclusions, none of which will be especially accurate. If, however, he could be freed and forced to look behind him at the actual object (which falls to the right of the shadow on the divided line), his understanding of the cast shadows would be augmented drastically. In addition, by completely understanding the object, he would also be able to accurately predict the nature of any given shadow of that object.

The right side of the Plato's divided line consists of a "nonphysical, nonspatial, nontemporal . . . world [which] Plato called the world of ideai" (Jones 123) or "forms" as it is generally translated. Simply put, forms are "objects of thought" (Jones 124), ideal concepts that embody everything there is to know about their respective "reflections" that exist as physical objects in our world of sense perception, thus illuminating and enhancing our understanding of them. Just as seeing the physical object (which may have been, for the sake of argument, a parrot) caused the Cave Dweller to understand the parrot-like shadows, when we grasp the form Parrot, we will understand all the shadows of that particular form (in other words, all the physical parrots that physically exist).

Forms, like physical objects, also exist in varying degrees of reality divided into two general groups represented by the two divisions on the line. Those forms which fall to the far right are known as higher forms and are even more abstract than their shadows, which are the forms that have been heretofore explained. The highest of all forms is what Plato termed the Form of the Good, which Plato compared to the sun (Jones 132-133). The sun is a real entity that emits light, illuminating our surroundings and permitting us to see. In addition to its luminous properties, the sun is also the earth's source of life, making physical existence possible. Similarly, the Form of the Good is a very real, albeit abstract thing that not only sheds light on our understanding of forms (are consequently of their physical shadows), but provides for the existence of these. If the Cave Dwellers' knowledge increased by looking around the Cave in the firelight, how much more would it increase by his leaving the Cave and emerging into the sun (Jones 136)?

The dual-existence explained by Plato's Theory of Forms gave an answer to the puzzle about change. Although that which we perceive may change (i.e. a caterpillar may undergo metamorphosis), the entity still participates in its particular form (in this case Danaus plexippus or Monarch Butterfly). As one author phrased it, "It may be that we can never step in the same river twice, but the ever flowing river in the main keeps within its banks" (Jones 123).

Despite our inability to perceive forms with our senses, Plato held them to be even more real that their reflections with which we are so familiar, due to their eternal, unchangeable nature. They allowed Plato to satisfactorily prove the existence of absolutes, without it would be impossible to fulfill what he believed to be “his highest duty to try to discover the basis for a good state, one in which a good man might be happy and live in peace?(Jones 119).

As previously mentioned, Plato lived in a time when justice was generally regarded as a lesser virtue, one that ?does] us good but we regard [it] as disagreeable; and no one would choose [it] for [its] own sake, but only for the sake of some reward or result which grows from [it]?(Republic 46). His philosophical opponents went so far as to claim that injustice really was the better choice, inasmuch as one could deceive his fellow beings as to his ignominious nature and thereby escape any punishment (Republic 47-60). Plato, who viewed it “an impiety [to be] present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defense?(Republic 62), held justice to be essential to the good state’s happiness and prosperity. He therefore took upon himself the responsibility to discover the form “Justice?and prove its worth.

In order to find Justice, Plato, through his character of Socrates, created in his mind a hypothetical just state. He began by considering all the people necessary for a good society (i.e. the tinkers, the farmers, the merchants, etc.), and found that the city grew in population quite quickly to a decent size, for there are many needs to be satisfied in any society (Republic 63-68). In the end, Plato narrowed his citizens down to three basic classes: the producers, the rulers, and the military. Each class has its own characteristics and its own functions that contribute to the well being of Plato’s Just State.

The first class, the producers, is, by far, the largest in number. Plato, biased a bit perhaps by his own society, viewed this class as the lowest, most vulgar of the three (Jones 173), and the one that would need the most restraining. They are those whose interest lies in the various pleasures in life: money-making, fine foods, etc. (Republic 157). They perform the physical labor necessary for the sustenance of any city, as well as the money exchanging and administrative responsibilities necessary for the production of goods.

The militaristic class has the duty to defend the city from internal and external attack. In addition to the armies and navies, people such as police and other law enforcement personnel are also included in this second class of citizens.

Finally, Plato set the wisest of his citizens apart to be the ruling body, in which the entire political power was to be invested. All possessions of the Rulers (including property and family) were to be held in common, in order to avoid discord and division (Jones 180-182). Plato appeared to assume that his Rulers would know the Form of the Good, and subsequently all other, lower forms, giving them a more or less perfect knowledge of what would be best for the State as a whole. The Rulers were to be given dictatorial powers to indoctrinate, whether through education or “a considerable dose of . . . deception for their good?(Jones 181), into their subjects the principles that the Rulers deemed beneficial to the state, or to force them to obey if necessary.

These three classes of citizens exist, of course, in every society, whether just or unjust. What sets a good state apart from an evil one are the virtues contained therein. Plato listed four-- wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice-- as the cardinal virtues (Republic 151). Although these should be shared by all citizens in the good state, some apply more specifically to one class than to the others.

Wisdom, for example, is the virtue of the rulers. There are many varying types of knowledge, all of which are important to the smooth functioning of society, but if a city’s carpenters are all extremely knowledgeable about their trade, that does not necessarily make it wise. As Glaucon in Republic phrased it, “that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering?(Republic 152). Wisdom is a specific kind of knowledge that makes one “good in counsel?(Ibid.), or good at making decisions. Therefore, a wise city is one whose rulers (who make the decisions) are knowledgeable about what decisions are best for the whole. Likewise, courage, the virtue “which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about [what is] to be feared and not to be feared?(Ibid.) pertains chiefly to the military class.

Temperance, on the other hand, concerns all three classes, although it is most important to find in the producing class. On an individual level, ?t]emperance . . . is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires?(Republic 156), subduing them to the dictates of reason. Plato believed the state to be analogous to man and viewed temperance in the state in a similar way. A temperate state, he claimed is one in which “the meaner desires of the few are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few?(Republic 157). In other words, the governed agree to subject themselves to the rulers.

Justice, the last of the cardinal virtues, is the most elusive of the four. Obviously, justice exists in the just city, and it appears that of necessity, so do wisdom, courage, and temperance. In fact, it seems that justice “is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative? (Republic 160). Justice would be, then, that virtue which allows everyone to live in peace and cultivate all other virtues. Plato defined this virtue as “doing one’s own business, and not being a busybody?(Republic 159), or in other words, not encroaching upon the rights, responsibilities, or functions of others. When the citizens of a city all perform their functions well without interfering or impeding others from doing the same, the city functions like a well-oiled machine.

Since Plato maintained that the state and the man are analogous, it follows that his ethical theory should follow the same line as his politics. The concept of the three classes of citizens exist in man as three driving elements in a man’s psyche, each motivates by a distinct desire (Republic 163-164, 368-369). Analogous to the ruling body in the state is reason in the man, which is driven by a desire for truth and knowledge. This reason should order the individual’s actions, always choosing what is best for the whole. When these reasons are backed by a good deal of knowledge as to what really is beneficial, it can be said that the man is wise.

Similarly, man has inherent in him a protective element that causes powerful emotions such as anger, ambition, loyalty, etc. This passionate side of the individual can be called spirit, and, like the military in the just state, it is closely allied with the ruling element of reason, although in and of itself, it has no authority. Courage in a valiant man is noted in his spirit or passion and the degree to which he sticks to the convictions of his reason and “preserves under all circumstances that opinion about [what is] to be feared and not to be feared?(Republic 152).

Finally, there is a part of man’s nature which is driven by pleasure and gain. This more appetitive element compares with the producing class of society, whose goal is also physical prosperity. The appetite is necessary and should be satisfied, but not to excess, against the dictates of wise reason, just as passion must be controlled. When man’s appetites and passions subject themselves to the wise commands of reason, he is temperate; and as in the just state, these virtues are only possible when none of the three elements of man encroach upon the others. In other words, he must be just. When a man is just, his three elements work in harmony and he, like the just state, functions smoothly.

This harmony is important when the organic nature of man’s soul and of his analogous counterpart the state is considered. Plato’s opponents defended injustice because of the worldly gain that can be obtained through unjust means. However, it is obtained at great expense. The unjust man becomes a slave to his appetite, which unjustly encroaches upon the functions of reason and passion. This, in turn, damages even his appetitive element, for whatever harms one part of an organism ultimately will damage the whole, and thereby each and every element therein (Jones 163-164). The unjust man “has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him?(Republic 367). Naturally, this also applies to the state. Thus, “the question [of whether justice is better than injustice] has now become ridiculous . . . [for] when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though . . . having all wealth and all power?(Republic 178). Truly, regardless of external reward or punishment, the just life is the best to live.

Plato’s ethical-political theory is admittedly impractical, due largely to the unpredictable and fallible nature of men, especially those in power. Plato invested a great deal of trust and power into his ruling body, and there are no auxiliary precautions in the event that the Rulers act according to Joseph Smith’s admonition “that it is the nature and disposition of almost all men, as soon as they get a little authority, . . . they will immediately begin to exercise unrighteous dominion?(D. & C. 121:39). Hence, in all practicality, Plato’s just state may very quickly disintegrate into a totalitarianistic dictatorship (Jones 186). However, Plato never intended his theory to be practically applied. He was, in effect, applying his Theory of Forms and detailing out the form “Just City,?which will never be found in its plenitude in a real community, any more than the ideal form “Man?is found completely manifest in any one individual (with the possible exception of Jesus Christ). What Plato wished to illustrate was the existence of such ideals as virtue and justice, giving mankind a goal for which to strive. Through his forms, he was able to do so, and to the extent that his forms are accurate, he proved effectively that a just life really is the best life to live.

Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. (Salt Lake City, Utah: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: 1981).

Jones, W. T. The Classical Mind: A History of Western Philosophy. 2nd ed. Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1970.

Plato. Republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928.