1. The Armenians during the war
Nearly three-quarters of a century has passed since 1914, and the question whether the Ottoman Empire could have avoided entering the war is still being discussed today. As no one at that time knew with certainty why the Empire entered the war, and no discussion took place when the decision was made, it is not clear why it is being discussed today.
The subject is outside our topic of discussion, and we shall not dwell on it. We only wish to mention a point which most people are still unaware of, owing to the erroneous explanations made intentionally by those who were largely responsible for entering the war, to defend themselves.
In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was pursuing an agreement with any one of the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance. There were very few prominent members of the government who supported Germany's groups, that is the Triple Alliance. In fact, Enver Pasha was probably the only one.
Jemal Pasha, Talat Pasha and Javit Bey were supporters of the Triple Entente. They made many unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement with France or England. Then they turned to Germany. Contrary to what is generally known, Turkey made the request to Germany, rather than Germany to Turkey. At that time, Germany was convinced that Turkey would only be an impediment to its allies.
On 23 July, Enver Pasha courteously asked the German Ambassador whether an agreement could be reached with Germany. The First World War was about to begin.
We do not find it necessary to include it here, but the telegram sent by Wangenheim to Berlin concerning this meeting is worth reading (telegram dated 22 July 1914).1 Upon instructions given by the Kaiser himself, in the belief that even one more rifle would be useful in the coming war, it was decided to make an alliance with Turkey, and this agreement was signed on 2 August. The First World War had already begun on the 1st.
This agreement was not the decisive reason why the Ottoman Empire entered the war, for the agreement was drafted as a defensive alliance against Russia. The war began with Germany declaring war on Russia, so Turkey was not under any obligation to enter the war.
In spite of this, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on 31 October.
In order to explain the attitude of the Armenians during this period, we must refer to an incident which occurred in 1909.
After the event of 31 March and the Adana rebellion, an agreement was made between the Party of Union and Progress and the Istanbul delegation of the Tashnak Committee. We quote this agreement, which was published on 3 September 1909 in the Tanin newspaper, from Esat Uras' book.
In order to ensure the independence of the country, to protect till the end its integrity and policy, to eradicate the evil thoughts appearing in various individuals, and to establish good relations between Ottoman subjects, total agreement has been reached between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Tashnaksutyun Committee on the following points.
We have been unable to find a document to the effect that the Tashnak Central Committee approved this agreement made by the delegation responsible for Istanbul.
It is known that the Tashnak Committee held a congress at Erzurum in June 1914. Because, at that time, an agreement had been reached with Russia concerning the eastern provinces, and the inspector-generals had
even been designated, Erzurum had become a place where the Tashnaks could speak freely on any topic.
Esat Uras reports the decision which was taken during this Congress: `The Tashnaksutyun Congress, bearing in mind the contradictory economic, social, and administrative policy implemented for a long time by the Government of Union and Progress in regard to the Christian communities, and especially to the Armenians, has decided to remain in opposition to the Government of Union and Progress, to criticize its political programme, and to engage in a fierce struggle against it and its organization.
H. Bayur has included this decision in his book, quoting from Esat Uras. However, Esat Uras gives no reference for this decision, and we have not found it in any other source.
On the other hand, it is reported in all the sources that representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress took part in this congress. Esat Uras denies this, asserting that there is no document to support it, and that this was a claim made by the Tashnaks in a book published in 1920 in Istanbul. We do not think that it was entirely impossible for the representatives of the Party of Union and Progress to have taken part in this Congress. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to establish what they suggested, if they did take part.
Clair Price wrote as follows on this subject:
The Armenian bloc in the Parliament at Constantinople was holding its 1914 congress at Erzurum in the eastern provinces when the Enver Government entered the war. Government emissaries visited them there and laid before them the Pan-Turanian project whose immediate object was to throw Russia back. A partition of Russian Trans-Caucasia was proposed, the conquered territory to be divided between Armenians, Georgians and Tartars each to be accorded autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty. The Armenian bloc replied that if war proved necessary they would do their duty as Ottoman subjects but they advised the Government to remain neutral.
Toynbee's memorandum, which we referred to earlier, says: `. . . In the fall of 1914 Turks came to the Armenians' national congress in Erzurum, and offered them an autonomous Armenia (on Turkey's and Russia s lands if they would actively help Turkey during the war. The Armenians refused this offer.
Papazian states:
When the world war broke out in Europe, the Turks began feverish preparations for joining hands with the Germans. In August 1914 the young Turks asked the Dashnag Convention, then in session in Erzurum, to carry out their old agreement of 1907, and start an uprising among the Armenians of the Caucasus against the Russian government. The Dashnagtzoutune refused to do this, and gave assurance that in the event of war between Russia and Turkey, they would support Turkey as loyal citizens. On the other hand, they could not be held responsible for the Russian Armenians. . . . The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. The Dashnagtzoutune in the Caucasus had the upper hand. They were swayed in their actions by the interests of the Russian government, and disregarded, entirely, the political dangers that the war had created for the Armenians in Turkey. Prudence was thrown to the winds; even the decision of their own convention of Erzerum was forgotten, and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasian front.
Kachaznuni wrote:
In the beginning of fall 1914, when Turkey had not yet entered the war, but was preparing to, Armenian volunteer groups began to be organized with great zeal and pomp in Trans-Caucasia. In spite of the decision taken a few weeks before at the General Committee in Erzurum, the Dashnagtzoutune actively helped the organization of the aforementioned groups, and especially arming them, against Turkey. . . . There is no point in asking today whether our volunteers should have been in the foreground. Historical events have a logic of their own. In the fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer groups were formed and fought against the Turks. The opposite could not have happened, because for approximately twenty years the Armenian community was fed a certain and inevitable psychology. This state of mind had to manifest itself, and it happened.
Kachaznuni was one of the prominent leaders of the Tashnak Party, and had been Prime Minister of the independent Armenian Republic. Consequently the information he gives is not based on hearsay, but carried his personal responsibility. His book, in fact, is his speech which was read in 1923 at the Party Council, and was not approved because it criticized the Party. He later published this speech, together with a letter written to a friend of his, named N.N. Towards the conclusion of the letter we read the following sentences: `You say "As we were unable to prevent the communication being read, I hope that it is forgotten as soon as possible". I find it dangerous and useless that this subject too, causes arguments. . . .
For me the publication of this communication was a moral obligation on behalf of the Armenian cause. If I had not written, I would have committed a great sin. Because the General Council was unable to meet, I submitted my comminication to the Advisory Council and I was told to "shut up".' (This may be the reason why it is not possible to find this book in the world libraries.)
These sources we have quoted indicate the possibility that representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress went to the Erzurum congress. However, the Armenians may also have discussed among themselves the kind of action to be taken during the war. Various dates are given as to when the congress was held. It seems logical that the date should be August or later. It also appears that it was decided during the congress that in the event of a Russo-Ottoman War, the Armenians in Turkey would not oppose the Government. But we are also informed by authorized Armenians that this decision was not followed.
It is apparent that the volunteers mentioned in all these sources were Armenians of Turkey. It is natural that the Armenians of the Caucasus were recruited and took part in the war, as they were Russian subjects.
When the Ottoman Government decreed mobilization, the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent a letter to Vorontsov-Dachkov, the Governor-General of the Caucasus, on 5 August 1914, and received a reply on 2 September. We quote a passage from the Catholicos' letter:
Based on the information I have received from the Istanbul Patriachate and the Armenian Assembly, I am convinced that any reform to be implemented by the Government which today rules Turkey, for the improvement of the condition of the Armenians, will not survive long, as long as it is not based on particular and solid engagements. . . . I request from Your Highness that you present to His Majesty the Emperor, the devotion of his faithful subjects on my behalf and on behalf of my congregation in Russia, the sincere loyalty and attachment of the Armenians of Turkey, and at the same time that you defend to the Czar the hopes of the Armenians of Turkey. .
This passage clearly indicates cooperation between the Istanbul Patriarchate and Etchmiadzin, and that the Catholicos could speak on behalf of the Armenians of Turkey. We shall now quote a few statements from Vorontsov-Dachkov's reply:
I wish that the actions of the Armenians here, as well as those on the other side of the border, be now in accordance with my instructions. I request that you use your authority over your congregation, and ensure that our Armenians and those who reside in the border regions implement the duties and services which I will ask them to carry out in the future, in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, as in the situation of Turkey today.
The text of these letters was included in Gr. Tchalkouchian's work entitled The Red Book which was published in Armenian in Paris in 1919. The second letter, in particular, indicates clearly the kind of instructions the Armenians of Turkey would be given in the event of a war. The quotation we have given from various sources show that they did indeed receive these instructions when the day arrived.
There is another document which few people remember today.
When the Ottoman Empire had not yet entered the war, but as soon as it declared mobilization, Turkish Armenians living in Marseilles held a large meeting on 5 August 1914, and drew up a declaration which was published in various newspapers. We quote bélow a few passages from this declaration which was published over Aram Turabian's signature.
The Russian Armenians, in the ranks of the Muscovite army, will do their duty, to revenge the insult made on our brothers' corpses; as for us, the Armenians under the domination of Turkey, no Armenian rifle must be turned towards the friends and allies of France, our second land.
Turkey is mobilizing, she calls us on active service, without telling us against whom.
Against Russia? Surely not! We shall not go and fight against our own brothers of Caucasus, against the Balkan States, for which we have nothing but sympathy, never! Gentlemen, you came to the wrong address; let us not forget the past, without being certain of the future yet.
Armenians, Turkey calls you to fight without telling you against whom: join as volunteers the ranks of the French Army and of her allies, to help destroy the army of Wilhelm II, whose railway is built on the corpses of our 300,000 brothers. . . .
In this book, an alphabetical list of 400 individuals who enlisted as volunteers, complying with this summons, is included.
In fact, we find in almost every source that the Armenians cooperated with the Russians when war broke out. Let us give a few examples.
Rafael de Nogales writes:
After hostilities had actually commenced, the Deputy to the Assembly for Erzurum, Garo Pasdermichan, passed over with almost all the Armenian troops and officers of the Third Army to the Russians; to return with them soon after, burning hamlets and mercilessly putting to the knife all of the peaceful Mussulman villagers that fell into their hands. These bloody excesses had as their necessary corollary the immediate disarmament by the Ottoman authorities of the gendarmes and other Armenian soldiers who still remained in the army (probably because they had been unable to escape) and the utilization of their labour in the construction of highways and in carrying provisions back and forth across the mountains. The altogether unjustifiable desertion of the Armenian troops, united to the outrages they committed afterwards, on their return, in the sectors of Bash-Kaleh, Serail, and Bayacet, did not fail to alarm the Turks and rouse their fear lest the rest of the Armenian population in the frontier provinces of Van and Erzurum revolt likewise, and attack them with the sword. This indeed is precisely what happened a few weeks after my coming, when the Armenians of the vilayet of Van rose en masse against our expeditionary army in Persia; thus giving rise to bloody and terrible occurrences which, under the circumstances, might have been foreseen.
Let us now turn to Philips Price: `When war broke out the Armenians of these regions [the Eastern provinces) made secret contact with the Russian authorities in the Caucasus, and an underground network was created which enabled recruits to be gotten from these Turkish provinces for the Russian Army.
Philippe de Zara, who is not well known, writes:
After having accomplished the minimum of their duty as Ottoman citizens, the Armenians began to encourage the activities of the enemy. Their ambiguous attitude had certainly little to do with loyalty. But which Westerner would have the right to accuse them, when a tradition taught by Europe made the insubordination of the Sultan's Christian subjects the most sacred of obligations? An insubordination which was often sanctioned by granting autonomy, if not sovereignty. Nevertheless, how can anyone deny that, in the opinion of the Turks, according to the law of all the states, the conduct of the Armenians, facilitating during the war the task of the adversary, can be recognized as anything but a crime of high treason? . . . The committees, divided among themselves for internal issues, were often in agreement to facilitate the advance of Russian armies: they were attempting to obstruct the retreat of Turkish troops, to stop the convoys of provisions, to form bands of francs-tireurs. Mass desertions took place in the Eastern provinces: Armenians thus formed many troops officered by Russian officers. Here and there local revolts occurred. The leaders were setting the examples: two Armenian deputies fled to Russia. A literature of hatred was recalled: `Let the Turkish mothers cry. . . . Let's make the Turk taste a little grief.' The culpability of Armenians leaves no doubt.
Clair Price, too, has focussed on the subject of cooperation with Russia:
Under the 1908 Constitution, the Enver Government had a right to mobilize Armenians of military age as well as Turks, but armed opposition broke out at once, notably at Zeitun. . . Along the eastern frontier, Armenians began deserting to the Russian Armies and the Enver Government, distrusting the loyalty of those who remained, removed them from the combatant force and formed them into labour gangs. . . .
In April, Lord Bryce and the `Friends of Armenia' in London appealed for funds to equip these volunteers, and Russia also was presumably not uninterested in them. . . . These volunteer bands finally captured Van, one of the eastern provincial capitals, late in April and, having massacred the Turkish population, they surrendered what remained of the city to the Russian Armies in June. The news from Van affected the Turks precisely as the news from Smyrna affected them when the Greeks landed there in May,1919. The rumour immediately ran through Asia Minor that the Armenians had risen.
By this time, the military situation had turned sharply against the Enver Government. The Russian victory at Sarykamish was developing and streams of Turkish refugees were pouring westward into central Asia Minor. The British had launched their Dardanelles campaign at the very gates of Constantinople, and Bulgaria had not yet come in. It does not seem reasonable to assume that this moment, of all moments, would have been chosen by the Enver Government to take widespread measures against its Armenians unless it was believed that such measures were immediately necessary. Measures were taken.
Felix Valyi has written:
In April the Armenian revolutionaries seized the town of Van, established an Armenian `General Staff' there under the command of Aram and Vardan, which delivered up the town to the Russian troops on the 6th of May, after having 'freed' the district of Van from Mohammedans. . . .
Amongst the most notorious of the Armenian chiefs was Karakin Pastermadjian, a former member of the Turkish Parliament, known by the name of 'Garo', who put himself at the head of the Armenian volunteers at the time of the opening of hostilities between Turkey and Russia, and the Turks accuse him of having set fire to all the Mussulman villages he found on his way and of massacring their inhabitants. It is known that the attempts made by Turkey to win the support of the 'Dachnakzoutioun' party against Russia at the beginning of the War were repulsed in the month of September, 1914, by the Armenian Congress at Erzurum, which declared itself `neutral'. Nevertheless the thousands of Russian bombs and muskets which were found in the hands of its members prove what this neutrality meant. And indeed the Turks attribute the Russian invasion of the north of Asia Minor to the behaviour of the Armenian bands whose attitude made the defence of the country exceedingly difficult.
It must not be assumed that these authors we have quoted are friendly to the Turks and hostile to the Armenians. Rather, most of them are Armenian sympathizers. The passages we have quoted from them indicate the grounds for the relocation decision. Actually, if we had continued quoting, we would have arrived at passages referring to this decision. However, it was necessary, in our opinion, to examine first the developments within the borders of the Ottoman Empire through concrete incidents rather than by making general statements. We shall do this now, based on the Ottoman documents.
The Ottoman Government decreed mobilization on 3 August. The Armenians of Zeitun did not want to be under the Ottoman flag, and wished to protect their region by forming a volunteer regiment of Zeitun led by their own officers. As their request was naturally denied, they rebelled on 30 August.l5 As a result of the pursuit, approximately sixty rebels were caught with their weapons, and although tranquillity was established for a while, in December the Zeitunites began to attack civil servants and gendarmes.
In February 1915, it was necessary to send soldiers and ammunition to Zeitun from Marash. (It must not be forgotten that the country was at war.) The Armenians who attacked the troops guarding the ammunition killed six gendarmes, wounded two, and then escaped, and in the meantime cut communication links with Marash by breaking the telegraph lines. Almost all of those who had been enlisted from the area deserted. The rebellion of the Zeitunites continued until the implementation of the relocation decision. The brigands who had not been caught left the region when there was no place left to hide, and order was restored. In the pursuits which took place during the rebellion, 713 rifles, 21 shotguns, and 12 mausers were found, and 61 brigands, including their priests who had led them, were arrested.
We want to mention here a report sent by the American Consulate in Aleppo to its Ministry concerning these incidents which occurred in Zeitun during the war. The Consul included in his report a letter written by a Protestant priest, John E. Merill, an American missionary of the region. We quote a few passages from this letter:
Before a confrontation occurred in Zeitun, a Committee formed by Herr Blank, a Protestant missionary, and two Gregorians, went to Zeitun with the approval of the Government to obtain, if possible, a friendly agreement. As they met the inhabitants of Zeitun, they were told by the Zeitunites that they had attempted everything in order to persuade the outlaws to surrender, but that they were unable to persuade them. Naturally the Committee was not successful. The outlaws number around thirty, and hide in the hills between Zeitun and Marash. They have water, food, and ammunition, and the only road that leads to their hide-out is a path large enough for one person. . . . later the Zeitunites were persuaded to hand over these outlaws, and in return they have stipulated that their villages be not harmed. . . . But later some of the villagers were transferred to Marash. . . . The inhabitants of Zeitun have been duped by the Government. . To force the educated and competent Christian community of the Marash region to migrate is a direct blow to the interests of the American missionaries. The results of more than 50 years' work and thousands of dollars is being threatened. . . .
This report is quite amazing. Missionaries are attempting to reach an agreement with outlaws in a country at war (these are deserters), and they consider the deportation to Marash of certain families who feed and hide them a blow to the missionaries' interests. If these outlaws are killed in an armed confrontation, this is considered a massacre.
One of the main reasons for the misfortunes of the Armenians is this missionary mentality, and the uproar made by those who believe their claims.
A report sent on 30 August 1914 by the Eleshkirt Border Battalion Command to the 3rd Army Command stated that the Russians searching houses in the villages near the border gave the arms they found to the Armenians, and that the Armenians of the region were engaged in propaganda to escape to Russia.
A message sent by the Supreme Military Command to the 3rd Army Command on 6 Septemberls stated that information had been received to the effect that the Armenians of Van were in contact with the Russians.
On 13 September 1914, the Governor of Erzurum sent a memorandum to the 3rd Army Command, stating that he had been informed that the Russians were attempting to bring the Armenians to their side and were preparing to engineer a rebellion in the eastern Anatolian provinces whenever they wanted; that an individual named Aramayis, who had been exiled to Siberia after having been sentenced to one hundred and one years, had been freed by the Russians, and that he was now organizing bands in Kars; that a band had arrived at the village of Pasinler and was engaged in propaganda, telling the villagers to rebel when the Ottomans entered the war, and to desert if they were enlisted.
On 18 September 1914, the Governor of Bitlis, Mustafa Bey, sent a similar message to the 3rd Army Commander, and stated: `According to the recent decisions and suggestions of prominent Armenians, if there is a war, the Armenian soldiers in the Army will desert with their arms to the enemy.
If the Ottoman Army advances, they will remain calm, if it retreats, bands will be formed to prevent passage to and from the front.
A message dated 25 September sent by the Supreme Military Command to the 3rd Army Command, stated that `The Armenian Tashnakzutun and the Hinchakian Committees in the Caucasus have agreed with Russia to incite the Armenians of Turkey to revolt in the event of a war.
The Governor of Trabzon, Jemal Azmi Bey, in a message he sent to the Ministry of the Interior on 8 October 1914, stated that `A band of 800 people comprising the Ottoman and Russian Armenians in Russia, has been armed by the Russians, and sent to the vicinity of Artvin. We have been informed that they will spread out between Artvin and Ardanuch, that their number will be increased to 7,000, and that they will be used to disturb security within the Ottoman country.
On 11 October 1914, the 3rd Army Commander sent the following message to the Supreme Military Command: `It has been established that the Russians are forming bands in the Caucasus by arming Russian and Ottoman Armenians and Greeks, that they will send them here and enlarge the bands in our territory. The Armenian desertions from our detachment are increasing.
On 13 October 1914, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division informed the 3rd Army Commander that the Russians were distributing arms to the Armenians of Narman.
On 14 October 1914, the Governor of the sanjak of Beyazit sent the following message to the Ministry of the Interior: `We have been informed that on September 26th, Sehpat of the Armenian revolutionaries in Russia came to Hoy with 600 Armenian volunteers, and that they went to Selmas. Most of these Armenians are Ottoman citizens and are inhabitants of Van, Mush, Bitlis, Kars, and Gumru. It has been established that they are waiting for the arrival of their commander Antranik. We have been informed that pharmacist Rupen Migirdichian living in Erjish in the region of Van, along with Toros Karakashian and Portakalian, and Surin, who is doing business in Beyazit, are thinking of going to Selmas with the force they have gathered in the regions of Ighdir and Revan, that the individuals named Melkon and Ohannes have gone from Hoy to Van to make propaganda.
On 22 October 1914, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry division informed the Army Commander that Armenian volunteers were gathered in the regions of Mush, Van, and Bitlis, that Armenian brigands were present near the borders, and that 30-40 brigands were present in the village of Pertos.
A report sent by the 3rd Army Command to the Supreme Military Command on 25 October 1914 stated: 'Approximately 800 people, most of them Armenian deserters with Ottoman citizenship, have gathered in Kaghizman. They are armed by the Russian Government. The Armenians named Surien of Beyazit and Hachik Sirup, who have gone to Russia, have each gathered 2,000 people. We have been informed that one group will attempt to go to Mosson by way of lake Abbas, and that the other group will go to Beyazit or Iran.
On 24 October, the Governor of Erzurum stated in a report that he sent to the 3rd Army Commander: `According to the statement made by Sitrak who is one of the brigands who a few days ago attacked the mail coach on the border of Gumushhane, and who was caught, his companions are in Bayburt and Surmene, and the head official of Bayburt has gone to arrest these individuals.
On 28 October, the Governor notified the authorities that these individuals had been arrested.
In November, the Ottoman Empire was at war. The first reports concerning the planned Van rebellion came, on 29 November, from Kazim Bey (Ozalp), the Gendarmerie Division Commander. Kazim Bey stated that, according to the statements of two spies who had been caught, a rebellion would occur in Van soon, and that the enemy was gathering the weapons of the Muslims in the areas it invaded, and giving them to the Armenians, thus forming detachments. All the Armenians in the division whose weapons had been taken, had deserted.
The following day, 30 November, the Governor of Van, Jevdet Bey, stated in his telegram: `I am working to prevent the Armenians from creating an incident. The Russian Forces are advancing from Kotur. I do not think that the Gendarmerie Division will be able to resist these forces for long. I will start sending families to Bitlis.
It may be appropriate here to depart from the chronological order of events, and to describe the Van rebellion.
A telegram sent on 2 December from the province of Van to the Ministry of the Interior stated: `At this point, Armenians are calm in the capital and in other areas; however, all the Armenians of the region of Selmas are working with the Russians. The person who leads the bands along the border is the notorious Antranik and his companions, who had once engineered the Taluri rebellion [the second rebellion of Sassun]. After the Hanik battle, some Armenian privates deserted and joined the ranks of the enemy. I was informed that an Armenian bishop was in contact with the Russian Commander in Gari. I had him placed under police supervision.
A telegram sent on 15 December from the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor of Van stated that some of the telegraph lines of Reshadiye and Karjigan had been destroyed by the Armenians, and that the superintendent of the post had reported an armed confrontation with these Armenians. Additional information was requested.
The Governor of Erzurum, Tahsin Bey, sent the following report to the Supreme Military Commander on 20 December: `The Armenians of the kazas of Kerchikan and Gevash in Van are preparing to rebel. They have cut the telegraph lines of the area and have killed a corporal. Gendarmerie and militia have been sent to the area from Bitlis, and armed confrontations have begun. Because our forces are few, and the Militias have insufficient arms, more forces are needed.
The Governor of Bitlis sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior on 21 February 1915: `The Armenians of the nahiye of Haksef have rebelled. In the village of Siranun under the jurisdiction of the central kaza of Mush, shots were fired on our detachment, and the confrontation continued for two hours. In the village of Kumes, under the jurisdiction of the bujak of Akan, shots were fired at the house where the bujak superintendent and the gendarmes were staying, and the confrontation lasted for eight hours.'33
The same day, the governor of Bitlis, in a second telegram, stated: `Armenians have revolted in many villages. I became suspicious when I saw that among the Armenians who opened fire in Kumes, a village in the bujak of Akan, were Rupen, the Tashnak delegate of Van, Zovin, and Eshroone of the Tashnak leaders in Mush. As a precaution, I had the delegate of Van, Papazian, be a guest of the sanjak governor, to hold him as a hostage.'34
On 27 February, about 300 volunteer soldiers from Sürt, who were on their way from Adiljevaz to Van, wanted to spend the night in the Armenian village of Arin. The Armenians, who attempted to prevent this, opened fire and killed eight privates. Upon this a detachment was sent from Erchish to Van, but the Armenian bands escaped to Lake Van.
On 4 March 1915, the head official of the district of Mahmudi in the province of Van sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior: `As a result of the investigation carried out after our kaza was taken back from the enemy, the following profile with regard to the torture and massacre which took place emerges:
Those who were killed in the village of
Merkehu
41
men,14 women
Those who were killed after having been raped
4
women
Those who were killed in the village of Ishtuju
7
men, 4 women
Those who are alive among those who have been raped
5
women
The wounded
3
men, 2 women35
A telegram dated 16 March sent by the Van Gendarmerie Division Command stated that in the kaza of Shatak of the province of Van, Armenians had attacked the gendarmerie station and the soldiers and had destroyed the telegraph lines, and that armed confrontations had occurred between the forces sent to the area and the Armenians. The incident began when a revolutionary teacher named Osep was caught with his weapon.
On 20 March, the Governor of Van stated: `In all parts of the province armed confrontations continued until the evening and have now increased. It is thought that the rebels number more than 2,000. We are trying to crush the rebellion.37
The Governor, in a telegram he sent on 23 March, stated that `the inhabitants of the villages of Bayrik, Alakoy, Iblankanis, and Buganis, which are at a distance of four hours from Van, are holding the strategic
points above the village of Bayrik, and have besieged the village of Kusha. The number of rebels has increased to 1,000. Forces must be sent. Following this, the rebellion spread to the entire province.
Ali Ihsan Pasha wrote about this rebellion:
Jevdet Bey, the governor of Van, had informed the First Army Commander and the Supreme Military Command, as early as March 1915, that the Van rebellion was about to begin, and finally the rebellion occurred on April 17,1915 in all parts of the province. The same day, the First Army was only able to arrive at Rumiye. (This is the force of which Rafael de Nogales was a member.) After the rebellion began, it proved necessary to use the main part of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division to crush the rebellion.
If the First Army had not spent weeks in Mussul and Revandiz, we might have repelled the Russians in the vicinity of Dilman, before the Armenian rebellion occurred in Van, by using all the forces of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division. As time passed, the Armenian rebellion made it necessary to use an important part of our forces, and in mid-April, to make use of most of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division in fighting against the rebels in the rear. On the other hand, the Russians took advantage of the situation to increase the number of their forces in the vicinity of Dilman.
In April 1915, the First Army encountered the Russians, engaged in an offensive (together with part of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division on the eastern border of the province of Van) against the Russians on 1 May 1915 near Dilman, and retreated having suffered a great number of casualties. Because of the Armenian rebellion in Van, and the Russian forces advancing towards Van, the army was unable to free Van and was forced to retreat in the direction of Bitlis, through the mountains to the south of lake Van.
On 20 April 1915, the Governor of Van sent the following telegram to the 3rd Army Command: `The rebels have begun to open fire on our police stations near the Armenian quarters of Van, and on the Muslim houses. We are resisting and defending. In the confrontation which occurred near the village of Atalan until yesterday evening, most of the rebels have been crushed. The telegraph lines of Gevash have been repaired and opened to communication. Today the telegraph lines of Bashkale, Havasor,
Memortki, Shersat have been cut. We have begun their repair. In the city, the confrontations are continuing with all their might. The insurrection is widespread. We request help and artillery.
On 24 April, the governor sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior: `Until now approximately 4,000 insurgent Armenians have been brought to the region from the vicinity. The rebels are engaged in highway robbery, attack the neighbouring villages and burn them. It is impossible to prevent this. Now many women and children are left homeless. It is not possible nor suitable to relocate them in tribal villages in the vicinity. Would it be convenient to begin sending them to the western provinces?
On 8 May, the Armenians began their offensive and started burning down the Muslim quarters. Upon this, the Governor, Jevdet Bey, ordered the evacuation of Van. On 17 May, the Turkish soldiers left Van, then the Armenians began to set fire to the Turkish quarters which had been evacuated. The Russians then entered Van. (The booklet entitled Zeve about the Van rebellion is worth reading.)
The Turkish forces engaged in an offensive on 22 July 1915, and repossessed Van. In August they lost it again to the Russians.
The rebellion in Van had spread to Mush. The Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division was charged with crushing this rebellion, and the operation continued until 11 July 1915.
On 2 May, before the fall of Van, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Enver Pasha, sent the following message to the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey:
Around lake Van, and in specific areas known by the Governor of Van, Armenians are constantly gathered and prepared to continue their insurrection. I am convinced that these Armenians who have gathered must be removed from these areas, and that the rebellion's nest must be destroyed. According to the information provided by the 3rd Army Command, the Russians brought the Muslims within their borders into our country under wretched and miserable conditions, on 20 April 1915. In order to respond to this, as well as to reach the goal I have stated above, it is necessary to either send these Armenians and their families to Russia, or to disperse them within Anatolia. I request that the most suitable of these two alternatives be chosen and carried out. If there is no inconvenience I would prefer that the families of the rebels and the population of the region in rebellion are sent outside our borders and that the Muslim community brought into our borders from abroad are relocated to their place.
This message is the first indication of the relocation decision.
Let us continue now with the chronological account of events, which we interrupted to report the Van rebellion.
On 17 December 1914, the Commander of the l2th Army Corps in Antakya stated that it was feared the Armenians of Antakya would engage in an offensive.
The Commander of the llth Army Corps stated in a telegram he sent on 19 February 1915 from Elazigh to the Ministry of War, that Armenians, in various villages of the region, had opened fire on the gendarmes, and that the confrontation with the rebels had been continuing for the past three days.
On 21 February, the same Army Corps sent the following telegram to the Ministry: `Approximately 40-50 Armenian revolutionaries who were in the village of Siranun, two and a half hours away from Mush, have attacked villages, and have fought with the police and the cavalrymen who had been sent there.
On 25 February 1915, the Commander of the llth Army Corps informed the Supreme Military Command that they had been notified that bombs were being produced in the kaza of Develi, and that during the search that was carried out, bombs, guns, gunpowder etc. had been found.
The 10th Army Corps notified the 3rd Army Command in a report dated 27 March that the Armenians of the village of Purek in Sushehri had opened fire on unarmed volunteer soldiers who were passing by, that after the village was searched, 95 deserters and 25 guilty privates were arrested, and that guns and bullets had been found.
On 30 March 1915, the Commander of the 11th Army Corps wrote to the Supreme Military Command that a gendarmerie detachment had fought for two hours with an Armenian band near the village of Murfe, which is at a distance of four hours from Bitlis.
On 22 April 1915 the Governor of Sivas sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior: `Within the province the areas having a dense population of Armenians are Shebinkarahisar, Sushehri, Hafik, Divrik, Gurun, Gemerek, Amasya, Tokat, and Merzifon. Until now, during the searches carried out in the Armenian villages of Sushehri and its vicinity, in the villages of Tuzhisar and Horasan of Hafik, and in the nahiye of Olarash of the provincial capital, a great number of illegal weapons and dynamite have been found. According to the statement of the suspects who were caught, the Armenians have armed 30,000 people in this region,15,000 of them have joined the Russian Army, and the other 15,000 will threaten our Army from the rear, if the Turkish Army is unsuccessful. Armed confrontations took place between the Armenians and the security forces who were sent to the village of Tuzhisar where Murat, of the Armenian Tashnak Committee, was hiding; those who escaped are being pursued.
The Governor of Diyarbekir wrote on 27 April 1915: In Diyarbekir searches have been carried out for deserters, weapons, and bullets. As a result a great quantity of arms, ammunition, military uniforms, and explosives was found. In the capital alone, among the Armenian revolutionaries, more than 1,000 deserters were found.
Such was the internal situation of the country in May 1915, when the Russians were advancing in eastern Anatolia, when the British and the French were threatening the Dardanelles, and the canal operation was in progress in the south.
Rebellions had occurred in Zeitun, Van, and Mush; the Van rebellion resulted in the Russian occupation of the city: the rebellions of Zeitun and Mush were still continuing. Every inch of the country was filled with deserters, every part was subject to the attacks of brigands. Because every Turk capable of bearing arms was recruited, the field was left to the Armenians. On the one hand, the state was fighting the war, and on the other, it was forced to deal with these insurrections.
The following information about the Zeitun rebellion is worthy of inclusion.
On 24 February, the Russian Ambassador in London went to the Foreign Office and stated: `An Armenian of Zeitun has consulted Count Vorontzov-Dachkov, the King Regent of the Caucasus, and told him that they have gathered a force of 15,000 to attack the communication lines of the Turkish Armies, but that they lacked guns and ammunition, and that it would be very convenient to provide them with their needs. The French and the British might send the provisions by way of the Antakia harbour. How would England react to this possibility? 'The project was abandoned as the British refused.
Under these circumstances, the Ottoman Government was forced to take the decision for relocation.
We have quoted various authors as they summarized the events leading to the relocation decision. None of these authors considered the decision unjust.
Before dealing with the subject of relocation, we want to mention a few more points:
The term tehjir (relocation) is Arabic and derives from the root hijret (emigration). It is used in the sense of `having one emigrate . This word has no connotation of putting one in a concentration camp, but indicates 'changing one's location'. For this reason, the term `deportation used by the British and French is incorrect. Deportation has the connotation of forcing one to settle in a place under custody, that is, having one exiled. The individual who is exiled, who is deported, is not free in the place he is sent to. He lives in a specific place, in a prison, fortress, or camp, without any contact with the outside world.
The word tehjir has none of these meanings. If it was still used in Turkish today, we would be able to explain, for example, the transfer of those villagers whose villages were located on the site of the newly built Keban Dam, to other areas, using this term. Now, we use the term 'relocation' instead. In every language there are equivalents of this word tehjir. That they are not used, is another matter. In fact, even the term tehjir was not used in the decisions which were taken, as we shall see.
The second point we want to mention is that every country, during war, sends citizens of the enemy within its borders to concentration camps. This is an established practice implemented in every country. There have been cases when this practice was taken further, against individuals who had become citizens of a country. Now, naturally, it will be said that the Armenians were not foreign subjects. This is true, and for this reason they were not sent to concentration camps. However, remembering the attitude of the Armenians during the First World War, should they be considered Ottoman subjects or Russian subjects? This question cannot be easily answered. But one thing is certain, although the Armenians were legally Ottoman subjects, they acted in fact as Russian subjects. We shall return to this point later. We shall see that the Armenian leaders attempted to be known as belligerents.
A third point is that any country at war will consider as traitors those who work for the enemy, and even those who interrupt the war effort of the country. The punishment for traitors is invariably the most severe punishment in that country. For example, if the Ottoman Government had executed the insurgents of Zeitun who rebelled after the war started, along with those who helped the insurgents by hiding them, or by providing them with clothing, food, weapons and ammunition, this would have been a legal and justifiable attitude under the circumstances. To relocate them instead of executing the insurgents surely cannot be considered more inhumane. During war, the first obligation of the State is to protect the country, and this means to struggle with the enemies of the country according to the rules of war. We have seen the strangest and most far-fetched application of this rule, even in countries that were accusing Turkey most strongly. Oden Hedin has written:
At a time when the British were pleading for the Armenians in the entire world, when Lord Kitchener invaded Sudan, he established order in the country by exterminating the whole population capable of bearing arms. The French Archives are full of atrocious pictures of concentration camps in the Transvaal, where tens of thousands of Boer women and children starved to death. 'As the British', wrote the Irishman George Chatterton-Hill in the magazine 'Ord och Bild' (1916, p. 561), 'could not annihilate them (the Irish through outright murder or through laws which would force the entire nation out of the country, they attempted another method, which they have also tried in India: organized hunger. And this method proved itself to be very efficacious. In a period of seventy years, from 1841 to 1911, the population of Ireland fell from 8,196,597 to 4,381,951! During the three years of the so-called great famine (1846-8) over one million people died of hunger in Ireland in the midst of rich fields of grain! During these three years, not less than 50 Million Pounds' worth of foodstuff (grains and cattle) was taken out of Ireland under the charge of British bayonets, in order to pay taxes to the British State and rent to the absentee British landlords. During the next three years (1849-51) approximately 400,000 more people died due to privation.'
If the 'Protector of the small nations', of 380 Million people, does not have enough elbow-room for her philanthropic activity, then she should knock on the door of her closest ally! In Russia, there is much more to be improved than in Turkey!