Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another (1992) is based on the Gifford Lectures which he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1986. The lectures were titled "On Selfhood: The Question of Personal Idenitity." The lectures examine the meaning of personal identity, and explore the relation between identity and selfhood.

According to Ricoeur, selfhood implies otherness to such an extent that selfhood and otherness cannot be separated. The self implies a relation between the same and the other. This dialectic of the self and other contradicts Descartes' cogito ("I think, therefore I am"), which posits a subject in the first person (an "I," or an ego) without reference to an other. Thus, the hermeneutics of the self differs from the philosophy of the cogito.

The hermeneutics of the self reaches a different type of certainty than that of the philosophy of the cogito. While hermeneutics leads to an attestation (belief) of truth or certainty, the cogito asserts indubitable knowledge of truth or certainty.¹ But Ricoeur explains that attestation, as a form of belief, is not inferior to knowledge. Attestation expresses a different type of certainty. Attestation is a testimony by the individual self, an assurance that the self believes in the truth or validity of something.

Individual identity may be viewed as either sameness or selfhood. To be identical to someone in some quality or characteristic is to have the same quality or characteristic as that person. To be identical to something in some quality or characteristic is to have the same quality or characteristic as that thing. Identity may be viewed as either a state of being the same as someone or something, or as a state of being oneself or one thing, and not another.

If someone or something is not the same as another person or thing, this may indicate that each has an individual identity. Selfhood may refer to an identity which belongs to an individual person or thing, and not another.

Ricoeur explains that sameness is not selfhood. Sameness may denote a numerical identity, such as oneness or unity (as opposed to plurality). Sameness may also denote a qualitative identity such as a resemblance or similarity. Sameness may also denote an uninterrupted continuity or a lack of variation and lack of diversity.²

Selfhood, on the other hand, refers to the identity which belongs to an individual self, and which is not the same as the identity belonging to another individual. Selfhood may refer to the identity which belongs to oneself and not another. But selfhood may also refer to the identity which belongs to oneself as another. Oneself as another may be a mode of selfhood, rather than sameness. The sameness of oneself as another may have an equivocal relation to selfhood.

According to Ricoeur, narrative identity is characterized by the dialectic of sameness and selfhood. The identity of an individual or a character in a narrative is his or her narrative identity. A character in a narrative is an individual who may be reidentified as being the same. But the narrative identity of the character also reveals a form of selfhood.

Narrative identity defines a character or individual as being an agent of action. Action theory may describe an agent’s capacity to act, while moral theory may describe an agent’s obligation to act.³ Thus, narrative theory can mediate between action theory and moral theory (between the actions of an individual and the ethics of the individual).

Ricoeur views narration as a form of transition between description and prescription. A description is an account or representation of something, while a prescription is a direction for, or judgment about, something. Narrative theory is a theory that includes evaluation of plot, action, character, theme, and method.

To prescribe something as good or bad is different from describing it.⁴ To prescribe is to say what ought to be done; to describe is to say what is. The similarity or difference between prescription and description is revealed by the similarity or difference between judgments of value and judgments of fact.⁵

Ricoeur draws a distinction between ethics and morality, by defining ethics as an aim for personal conduct while defining morality as the articulation of this aim in social norms.⁶ Morality is thus a limited form of ethics. Ricoeur also argues that the self-esteem which results from the aim to be ethical is more fundamental to the development of selfhood than the self-respect which results from compliance with social norms.

The ethical aims of the individual must be subjected to moral norms, but respect for norms reaches its full meaning only if it is based on a respect for others.⁷ Thus, the self-respect which is gained by compliance with moral norms becomes respect for oneself as another. This is not a form of moral solipsism, but is instead a form of empathy and concern for others. Solicitude is the term that Ricoeur uses for this empathy and concern for others.

Responsibility is a state of accountability for events or actions which are within a person’s capacity to control. Responsibility may be accepted by a person prospectively or retrospectively. A person may also accept responsibility for an ongoing action or present situation.

Ricoeur explains that the dialectic of selfhood and sameness is seen in the assignment of responsibility, in that the self who is held to be responsible for an action or situation must be the same self who is imputed to be the agent of the action or situation Thus, the moral identity of the self is defined by the same dialectic as the narrative identity of the self.

According to Ricoeur, the transition from the Same toward the Other is dialectically complementary to the transition from the Other toward the Same. Both of these modes of transition have an epistemological as well as an ethical dimension.⁸ For the individual self, the Same and the Other may each be designated as agents of responsibility. The dialectic of Same and Other may define the responsibility of the self, in that acceptance of responsibility may be an attestation of selfhood.

Ricoeur's Oneself as Another is an illuminating examination of the meaning of personal identity. Ricoeur describes how selfhood is related to otherness, and how otherness belongs to the meaning of selfhood. He also describes how selfhood and otherness are related to ethical identity.

The dialectic of self and other may lead us to recognize that the self may refer to itself as not only itself, but as other than itself. This dialectic may be revealed as not only that of self and not-self, but as that of oneself as another, oneself and not another, another and not oneself, another as oneself. The dialectic of self and other may be dynamically changing.

Further implications of Ricoeur’s viewpoint are important in defining the meaning of responsibility. The attestation of selfhood is a belief in oneself. A belief in oneself as another is also a belief in another. Attestation may be a belief that the self or the Other must accept responsibility. The self may be called to responsibility by the Other, or may summon the Other to responsibility. The self may summon itself to responsbility, and/or the Other may summon itself to responsibility.

It may also be argued that to see oneself as another is related to seeing another as oneself. To see another as oneself may be to transcend oneself. If we see others as ourselves, then we are concerned about them. The suffering of others becomes our own suffering. The happiness of others becomes important to us if we are to enjoy our own happiness. To promote the well-being of others is to promote our own well-being. Thus, to see another as oneself may be as important as seeing oneself as another.

Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.