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Chapter 8:"An honour to have such faithful and valiant warriors dwelling among us. "The British Government plans to support the Poles.

The realisation in the corridors of Whitehall that Britain would be left with the responsibility of looking after many thousands of Poles led to an air of resignation that tempered the feeling of moral obligation to which the British Government had originally subscribed. The first problem the Foreign Office found was the need to define who, from the hundreds of thousands of Polish men across Europe, wearing Polish uniform, were eligible for their help.
        By the end of the Second World War, it has been estimated that 38% of the overall foreign work-force in the German Reich was made up of Poles. The Nazis had incorporated some 92,000 Kms into Greater Germany and despite mass population transfers out of these areas and the hurried planting of 'Aryan' settlers from Germany, there were around 2,500,000 Poles living in the Reich.
        After 1939 the German Occupation forces held some 460,000 Polish POWs including 19,000 officers. When the Germans occupied Romania and Hungary this number rose by a further 8,000 as the Poles interned there were also captured. By 1944 some of these Poles were allowed to go home - most were not. 400,000 POWs had their status changed to 'civilian labourers' so that they could fill up the slave labour camps that flourished across occupied Europe. 57,000 Poles remained as POWs, including 17,000 officers and after the ill-fated Warsaw Rising this number rose by another 20,000.
        The system of Stalags [Mannschaftsstammlager] for NCOs and other ranks was spread across Europe; Polish officers on the other hand were concentrated in six Oflags [Offizierslager]: Woldenburg IIc, Grossborn IId, Frie-Sack IIIb, Doessel VIb, Murnau VIIa and Luebeck Xc. Although Colditz IVc had not been used as a regular Oflag for Poles since 1943, its position as a 'Special Camp' or 'Sonderlager' meant that many Polish "Prominente" were held there, particularly after the Warsaw Rising when, among others, General Komorowski was held there. [1]
        Given the massive number of soldiers and former soldiers who had a claim on being members of the "Polish Armed Forces" an immediate problem presented itself to the British Foreign Office who had the task of resettling Polish troops who refused to return to Poland, namely, who to count and who to exclude from these provisions.
        The precept chosen was that only Polish troops who had served under British command would be eligible for help. This would exclude most of the POWs from 1939 in Germany and it would also exclude most of the AK who had been captured in 1944. However, the British authorities quickly found out that the Poles were not playing by the same rules as they were.

        Once the POW camps were liberated, there was very little to stop Poles drifting to their nearest Polish unit and enlisting into the very British commanded units that they were supposed to have been excluded from and this is just what they did. The Polish High Command was only too eager to accept this growth in its manpower, particularly since it was the only way these soldiers were going to get any help from the British Government.
        Even during hostilities, the Foreign Office was showing concern that the Polish military establishment was growing beyond what was needed and that SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] was actively encouraging this growth:
         "The Poles... seem to be making another backdoor attempt to expand their armed forces over and above current operational needs, which we have agreed form the only possible criteria so long as the Polish political question is unsolved. The Shaef paper in N895 is rather alarming. I suggest we should be on our guard against Shaef's letting us in for an increase in the Polish forces not justified by current needs.
        Shaef may seek to argue that they alone are the judge of what they want. But it is we who will have to carry the baby and as we are half of the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff] who must approve Shaef's schemes we can hold the situation.
        SHAEF will disappear in due course and HMG in the UK will be left with the problem of repatriating or otherwise disposing of these unfortunate Poles." [2]

        The War Office issued a memo to the FO trying to clarify an otherwise confused situation. If it was agreed that a limit had to be placed on the Polish forces, then a date would have to be given after which enlistment would not be considered. The War Office admitted that the date should have been the 31st May, 1945 but in Italy official enlistment had ended on the 2nd October. In Germany it had been even later - the 12th, and in France the situation had been so confused that there had been no official date given. The Foreign Office decided that the date for Germany should be accepted across the board but as Hancock of the FO added:
        "In doing this we must, however, realise that the Poles have in effect bounced us. Nevertheless, I think that it would be difficult and rather unfair and unduly rigid to adopt either of the previous dates suggested." [3]

This, of course, did not stop the Poles from continued recruitment. According to the FO, General Anders and the SACMED did not know what to do with the "steady trickle" of Poles arriving at 2 Polcorps. It was reported that even the pilot bringing ambassador Kot to Italy from Poland defected on his arrival. The WO was told to:
        "Instruct AFHQ to ensure that recruitment into two Polish Corps does not continue, on however small a scale." [4]

Members of the former AK would not be allowed to join the Resettlement Corps, yet there was still confusion over the question of 'British command'. Some Poles had been sent from Britain to join the AK as part of SOE operations, some Poles from the AK were in Britain and all the members of the AK were under the command of the Polish Government that was in Britain and were considered by the Poles as being part of the Polish Armed Forces. The FO reiterated that the only members of the AK who would be allowed into the PRC would be ones who had been in the UK prior to the 1st July, 1946 - and they admitted that that was only because the WO had assured them that the number involved would be less than 100. The FO did make provision for that small number of civilians sent abroad by SOE - on a discretionary basis - but it was that very civilian nature of the Home Army that precluded admission for most. Even General Komorowski was "designedly" excluded as he was considered a civilian "with no official status" despite being officially appointed as the C-in-C Polish Armed Forces. [5]
        The fact that so many Poles were left in Germany after the war was viewed with unease by both Britain and Poland. The British objected because they, along with the US Government and to a lesser extent the French Government, would have to foot the bill for the Poles in their respective zones of occupation. The Polish Government objected to the situation because so many Poles concentrated in so small an area could foment trouble for the new regime. Certainly, Warsaw suspected the intentions of the Control Commission in Germany and of UNRRA. As far as they were concerned, the former POWs [PWX to use the War Office terminology] and the DPs were a hotbed of counterrevolution. As one PUR report stated:

"With regards to the repatriation of Poles, more or less up to the Middle of 1946, the Western Occupation Authorities, with the tacit agreement of UNRRA, were admitting the possibility of a change in the Polish policy and so wanted to maintain a cadre of people who would take over the political life of Poland. With the support of Polish military formations stationed at that time in Germany they used their newly formed watchmen companies to create a military and political apparatus for Poland that was dominated by right-wing elements. In the full knowledge of the occupation authorities these units - in particular the Swietokrzyska Brigade and the Deuxieme Bureau of the 1st Armd. Division - supported the active operations of the Polish Underground, supplying them with instructions, money, arms and liaising abroad with foreign intelligence services." [6]
        Although somewhat overstated, the power of the Polish 'Dwojka' should not be underestimated. Colonel Gano's intelligence network had posts across Europe but more importantly there was a large network in Poland itself, with the largest going under the code-name of 'Pralnia II'. This network, like all the others working for the Polish O.II were supposed to have been shut down after the war but both the Warsaw authorities and the British Government suspected otherwise. [7]
        The Poles in the West had been in radio communication with Poland throughout the war. From their cipher and transmitter centre at Woldingham in Surrey they were outdistancing the British Secret Service and the electronic devices they produced and according to one source, "...pushed all other existing devices to the status of museum pieces." [8] Much to the chagrin of the British, the Poles continued to broadcast their anti Communist message to the old country, particularly from secret bases in Italy. Most of the files covering this aspect of Polish undercover work remain closed to the public but from the little that is available it would appear that Britain's MI6 were monitoring Polish radio broadcasts to Poland. When the Poles set up a "wireless school" in Rome the move did not convince the Foreign Office who obviously gave instructions to AFHQ to keep an eye on what was going on. On the 16th October, 1945, AFHQ ciphered the FO:

        "My telegram No.1866

         Station did not transmit yesterday

         2. The mobile unit will continue to lie in wait.

         Foreign Office please repeat to Warsaw as my
         telegram No.10" [9]

This was passed to General Sugden, Director of Military Operations and to "C" (the secretive General Stewart Menzies, Head of MI6). As well as two-way radio traffic, the Poles also had Radio "Fighting Poland" that broadcast the word according to the exiles. BBC Monitoring picked up its broadcast on September 10th, 1947:
        "Its entire tone was anti-Soviet and, to some extent anti-Semitic. In a talk on "who rules Poland?" most of the members of the Polish Politburo were mentioned either as Soviet citizens or Jews, or as having been Soviet trained. Poland's rulers were said to have been forced upon the country by the USSR." [10]

The security aspects of this situation were not wasted in London and Warsaw. The agents of a government no longer recognised by HMG were inciting 'counterrevolution' in an allied state, the government of which was recognised by HMG. The implications were far reaching and it was for this reason that the British security apparatus was brought to bear on the Poles in the West.
        Colonel Kuropieska questioned the Foreign Office in October, 1946, about the Polish Ex-Combatant Society [SPK] that had recently formed in Britain, seeing it as a new source of conflict between Warsaw and the British. The FO was equally anxious to establish the true nature of the SPK and planned to infiltrate its leadership but as this might prove difficult they settled for an investigation by MI5. The Home Army Association was investigated by Special Branch for much the same reasons. The Polish Forces in the West would not be allowed to become a nest of subversion. [11]
        The security aspects of controlling the Poles became more serious with the demobilisation of the military structure that bound so many men together. Since the Poles were no longer under the 1940 Allied Forces Act, there was no legal sanction if a Pole chose to absent himself from his unit. How could the British keep control in the Resettlement Corps?
        If the Poles were considered as possible subversives this was nothing compared to British views of the "Palestine Group", a group of 245 Jewish Poles expressing a desire to go to Palestine. The War Office viewed this new headache with unrestrained horror. Since the increase of Jewish terrorist activity, culminating in July, 1946, in the King David Hotel Massacre in Jerusalem, Britain had been put on the alert for Jewish extremists in the UK. Armed guards had been assigned to the homes of ministers, and staff at Westminster were warned about parcel bombs, so the prospect of bringing 245 highly trained Jews to Britain was viewed with some apprehension. Bombs and murders coloured many attitudes in the War Office; Colonel Balfour of the WO wrote to Crawford of the Control Office for Germany regarding "...illegal Jewish immigrants and potential terrorists however noisy and whatever their backing from elsewhere" [12]. When the "Palestine Group" was to be brought to the UK the Home Office advised keeping them as far from London as possible. The War Office, keen to comply, chose Thurso a mere 651 miles from London. Although they were to be held there for security reasons at a joint meeting:

        "...it was also agreed that NO mention of Jewish terrorist activities would be made, and that the reason given for the separation of the "PALESTINE GROUP", and their dispatch to THURSO, would be that it was administratively convenient to have these Poles in one camp and that the camp selected was at THURSO." [13]

After the Foreign Office covered up the banishment of these Polish Jews to the farthest corner of the island, they decided that the group would have no leave for two weeks in order to give MI5 a chance to investigate them and when leave did come through then the Home Office, War Office, MI5 and MI11 [Directorate of Field Security] all wanted to know about it.
        The problems surrounding the Resettlement Corps did not end with the question of who to admit. There seems to have been some confusion over what to call the Corps. The Foreign Office wanted to use the title: Polish Industrial Settlement Corps to "...emphasise its essentially civilian character". The Treasury preferred to use the word Resettlement as the word "settlement" had "...a more permanent ring". The Home Office was not keen on the use of Polish but they let that go, their principle objection was to the term Industrial given that most of the Poles would end up working in agriculture - the synthesis of the three views was the Polish Resettlement Corps. [14]
        The Polish name for the Corps did not come any easier for the promoters of the idea. Kuropieska writes of exiled President Raczkiewicz talking about the Polski Przemyslowy Korpus Osiedlenczy - Bevin's idea of the Polish Industrial Settlement Corps [15] - but the Polish version was as short-lived as the English one. At a meeting on the 25th June, 1946, some of the notables concerned with Polish issues met to muse over a Polish name for the Corps. One suggestion put forward was to call it the Korpus Przysposobienia Do Zawodow Cywilnych [Training for Civilian Labour Corps] but the meeting decided that this title was too long and although they tried to compromise with Przysposobienie Cywilne [Civilian Training], it was decided that the phrase was bad Polish and, in any case, the Ministry Of Labour was against vocational training for the Poles and so wanted the term for 'training' [przysposobienie] dropped.
        As to the Resettlement part of the title the Korpus Osiedlenczy [Settlement Corps] was suggested but rejected by General Kopanski as it implied that the Poles would all be planted "...as a body in one place." Frank Savery in his notes given to Hankey highlights the conclusion of the meeting:

        "Somebody - [Jozef] Lipski, I think - then suggested "Polski Korpus Przysposobienia i Rozmieszczenia". [Polish Corps of Training and Distribution] This seemed to me excellent and [Brigadier] Davy agreed when I explained to him that "Rozmieszczenie" connoted the dotting of people about in various places, half a dozen here and nine there." [16]

The Polish initials P.K.P.R. were quickly twisted by some cynical Poles to "Poki Krol Placi Regularnie" or "While the King Pays Regularly" and it was in this spirit most joined the Polish Resettlement Corps. [17] As Hankey was the first to admit, many Poles considered the Corps as an alternative to returning to Poland. "We must make it clear this is not so. It's only an alternative to chaos!" [18]
        If the PRC was to work smoothly and efficiently, then careful consideration would have to be given to the quality of leadership and the structure the Corps followed. The Polish generals would have to have some input and nominally be in charge but there were limits to how much control the Poles would be allowed. As Hankey minuted:

        "In general it will probably produce the best results if we can give the Polish generals the impression they are being consulted + invited to advise + assist." [19]

This did not help to allay the fears of the Warsaw Poles, already suspicious that the Corps was to be run along military rather than civilian lines. As Colonel Sidor noted:

        "It is clear to us that the PRC is an organisation created to prevent return to Poland, especially when we consider that the leaders of this organisation are officers favoured by Anders" [20]

As was often the case, Sidor overstated the situation. Far from keeping the PRC to further Anders' control over the Poles, the Foreign Office was endeavouring to find some tactful way of removing the bothersome general from any influence at all. Having come so close to relieving him from command earlier, they were certainly not going to have him as the officer commanding the Resettlement Corps. The political advisor to SACMED put forward the idea of giving Anders a "...Roving Commission where his messianic qualities can be put to good use with the minimum of embarrassment to HMG." [21] The Polish Forces Committee on the 1st August, 1946, speculated that "we should like to see him go to America" [22] There was still the question of how to control Anders after his demobilisation and to prevent him from making the political mischief that, in the eyes of the British, he was apt to do. Brigadier Pyman of the WO thought financial blackmail might do the trick:

        "I can only suggest that before General Anders is retired, he is given a warning that he is not to take part in political activities which might embarrass the policy of HM Government. If he is found to be taking part in any undesirable political activity we can always threaten to withdraw his pension." [23]

As an alternative to Anders, the Polish Forces Committee put forward the Polish Chief-of-Staff Stanislaw Kopanski who was, in their view, a moderate man and a "...straightforward non-political soldier (remarkably so, for a Pole)." [24] As well as agreeing to the nomination of Kopanski as GOC PRC it was also agreed that:

        "The general feeling of the Committee was that everything possible should be done to ensure that as few Poles as possible remained in this country." [25]

What this meant in reality was that the British would continue to encourage the emigration of the Poles; the Foreign Office would be "unremitting" in its efforts to find places abroad for them; the Ministry of Transport would give favourable consideration to any request to take the Poles abroad; the Foreign Office would consider the desirability of asking the US Government for help in shipping.
        
        Kopanski, as the new Inspector-General of the PRC, recommended the Poles to join the Resettlement Corps and that the exile Government did not construe membership of the PRC as membership of a foreign armed force. This, of course, was a moot point and an argument can be made for another interpretation - and it was this very line Warsaw used to remove the citizenship of the most prominent Polish generals. A secret letter from Colonel Komar, head of Warsaw's O.II to Minister Olszewski at the Warsaw Foreign Office in July, 1946, highlighted this very military nature of the PRC insomuch as although it was under UK command it would be run by Poles on military lines, with military uniforms and ranks and in the same military structures - brigades and divisions - and by the same officers. [26] The London Polish Government's view of the PRC was different in that:
        "The creation of the Polish Resettlement Corps enables the soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces to survive abroad while the change in Poland's fortunes does not allow them an honourable return to a free and independent Republic." [27]

        One of the principle anxieties in the minds of Polish servicemen was a concern about the future of their families and dependants, scattered as they were in War Office camps across the globe. Many men adamantly refused to join the PRC unless it was made clear what was to become of them - a view to which the War Office was largely sympathetic. In July, 1947, Colonel Fitz-George Balfour wrote a paper for the Chairman of the subcommittee of the Polish Forces Official Committee regarding Operation "Polejump" by which Polish dependants were to be brought to Britain:
        "It is unreasonable and useless to expect most men to agree to move to the United Kingdom and join the Polish Resettlement Corps if he does not know what is to be the fate of his family and dependants. Failure to obtain a quick decision will therefore complicate and delay the move." [28]

Kuropieska estimates that in 1946 there were some 41,400 dependants of the Polish Armed Forces:

United Kingdom : 8,000
Italy : 8,200
East Africa : 12,400
South Africa : 200
New Zealand : 400
India : 3,600
Palestine : 5,200
Mexico : 400
Western Germany : 3,000
======
Total : 41,400 [29]

To a great extent these Poles were the lucky ones as by nature of their dependence to service personnel they could rely on the provisions of the Polish Resettlement Act to help them come to Britain and start new lives. For the hundreds of thousands of Polish DPs in Europe, the future was a bleak one. Despite the rigours of slave labour and concentration camps, the end of the war did not bring an end to their misery. Many felt that the threat of a sudden and brutal death at the hands of the Nazis had been replaced by a slow and lingering death at the hands of the Allies.
        The exact number of DPs is difficult to determine and it is even more difficult to record the figures by nationality. Tannahill puts the figure for DPs under British control as:

NATIONALITY BRITISH ZONE
(on 17/11/1946)		AUSTRIA
(on 23/11/46)		TOTAL
Estonian 13,309 120 13,429
Hungarian 3,808 7,446 11,254
Latvian 45,413 667 46,080
Lithuanian 23,882 268 24,150
Polish 151,664 7,167 158,831
Romanian 3,243 2,183 5,426
Ukrainian
(Polish)		 Not available.
(In Poles/Others)		 3,350 3,350
Ukrainian
(Russian) 		ditto 1,032 1,032
Byelorussian ditto 1,257 1,257
Russian 260 4,527 4,787
Yugoslav 13,390 27,155 40,545
Others 3,324 7,256 10,580
Undetermined 23,851 9,680 33,531
       282,144 72,108 354,252

[30]

In the British occupation zones of Germany and Austria there were around 160,000 Polish DPs, but this figure also included Jews, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who declared themselves Poles for a variety of reasons. Across Germany there were over 300,000 Poles. PUR established the figure for November, 1946:
DPs in Germany, November, 1946.

       US ZONE BRITISH ZONE FRENCH ZONE TOTAL
POLES 111,602 180,007 25,868 317,477
All DPs 220,695 204,426 26,247 451,368

[31]

These figures are confirmed by UNRRA who gave the figures for DPs seeking assistance in Germany and Austria, during September, 1946:

GERMANY         

Poles 315,110         
Czechs 1,143        
Soviet Citizens 9,600        
Yugoslavs 14,216        
Estonians 31,362        
Latvians 93,170        
Lithuanians 56,647        

AUSTRIA

Poles        15,621
Czechs        486
Soviet Citizens        519
Yugoslavs 7,103
Estonians 350
Latvians 1,169
Lithuanians 779
[32]

The end of 1946 also saw the end of the mass DP repatriations that typified the direct post-war years. Anyone who had not returned to Poland by that time would probably never return. The Head of the Consular Section, Polish Military Mission, Berlin, wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw in 1948 regarding the DP situation in Germany. Between the end of the war and the 1st August, 1948, there had been some 1,200,000 repatriations from Germany to Poland:

1945 - 409,881
1946 - 294,337
1947 - 75,304
Up to 1/8/1948 - 6,007

It was further estimated that around 400,000 Poles made their own way to Poland through unofficial channels. It was noted in the report that as late as 1948 there were 83,000 Poles still in DP camps in the British Zone and a further 4,000 outside the camps. In the US Zone there were still 49,759 Poles in camps and a further 77,868 Polish Jews and 24,000 Poles living outside camps. In the French Zone there were still 11,000 Poles.
        All three administrations in Germany came in for criticism from the Polish Mission for an apparently negative approach to repatriation. The British, it was alleged, did not take repatriation seriously and wanted to keep the best Poles for themselves with only a desire to be rid of troublemakers and convicts. In the spring of 1947, the British set up the Civilian Mixed Watchman Service and then the Civilian Mixed Labour Organisation to use Poles as an unofficial guard unit in Germany; the idea was so popular that by July, 1948, there were 11,550 men in these organisations. The Americans set up a similar organisation which employed around 11,000 Poles - much to the suspicion of Warsaw.
        It was the French Government's attitude that was seen to be the most hostile by Warsaw's men although this hostility was always "masked in niceties and externally seeming quite correct". [33] This was something that the Polish Consul in Rastatt, Jerzy Krzeczowski, complained of when he wrote a secret report to Dr. Marecki, the Consul General in Berlin. He alleged that the French were hostile to the idea of the Poles returning to Poland and so actively encouraged recruitment by other countries to ensure they did not go to Poland. French and Belgian industry had been recruiting in the French Zone since autumn of 1945, Canada had been allowed access in mid 1946, the British at the end of 1946 and Brazil at the start of 1947. [34] A cynical interpretation of these events might suggest that the Poles did not want to return to Poland and needed little encouragement from the tri-zonal authorities not to go. On the other hand the Warsaw Missions needed to blame someone - they could not blame the situation in Poland and so chose to blame the ill will of others. In reality, the complaints of Warsaw's people present an unlikely scenario. Not only did the occupation authorities not encourage DPs to stay in exile but they actively encouraged and on occasion used force to return DPs to their respective countries.
        UNRRA was well aware of the general feelings of the DPs in its charge. The report at Appendix L demonstrates the feeling of Polish DPs and why they refused to return to Poland and yet the US military was unsympathetic in its dealing with these DPs - a problem that threatened the stability in Germany as time went on. An UNRRA report highlighted this deterioration:
        "At this stage, the morale of the Displaced Persons is at its lowest ebb. The change of attitude and treatment by the U.S. Military leaves them utterly bewildered. The incomprehensible moves of entire populations from one camp to another, abruptly destroying whatever meagre [sic] roots they may have established, fills them with dismay. The increase of German authority over them and the announced prospect of their being dumped into the German community and left to their own resources, is draining their very last hopes." [35]

SHAEF had stated that DPs would be cared for at the expense of the German population and that priority would be given to DP requirements over the Germans. In practice it did not work out that way. The same UNRRA report continued that:

        "Army directives have always stated that priority in employment be given to DPs, yet consistent discrimination has been practised against this group by all Army echelons."

General Joseph T. McNarey, head of the Military Government in the US Zone, tried at first to rid himself of the Polish DPs by bribing them to leave. He offered two months extra food to any DP who volunteered for repatriation to Poland.

        "I urge all Polish displaced persons in the US Zone of Germany to take advantage of this new plan for a 60 day food ration, available to all who return to Poland during the period October 1 to December 31, 1946. The U.S. Army and the American people firmly believe that your future lies in Poland, helping to rebuild your devastated country" [36]

This worked with some Poles - for most it did not. The Americans then tried another approach to encourage the Poles to go. The British Foreign Office had begun a policy with regards to the Polish Armed Forces that can be best described as the "lesser of two evils": conditions in Britain would be made so bad that the Poles would want to return to Poland. The US Military Government carried out much the same policy with the DPs in its charge but with a ferocity that the British could never have envisaged using against the citizens of an ally. The UNRRA report below deals with American attitudes to the DPs:

        "They [DPs] are held in the greatest contempt by the Germans, who lose no opportunity to discredit them in the eyes of the American Military authorities. The effect of this derogatory influence has been strong and widespread to the point where it has seeped up from the operating levels to even the highest military echelons. The DP problem has always been a nuisance to the Army. With redeployment and the introduction of new, untrained and unoriented military personnel, there is now an almost complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the factors which created the DP situation in the first place.
[...] The DP are generally considered by military personnel as "lousy Poles" and "Goddam DP" who should be sent back where they came from whether they like it or not." [37]

Richard Lukas in his book "Bitter Legacy" lays the problem at the feet of UNRRA itself. Although UNRRA officials criticised the military, their own house needed putting in order. Lukas highlights two policies from UNRRA offices:

        "Effective October 1st, 1946, all educational, recreational and other cultural activities are to be discontinued in all camps caring for one hundred or more Polish Displaced Persons"
"Do not employ Poles - repatriate them as they must go home... [there is] no such thing as an unrepatriable Pole.... Hire Outsiders, even Germans, to replace essential Poles, but fire Poles and get them home." [38]

It was becoming clear that Germans were getting preferential treatment to the DPs. The eagerness of US troops to confiscate DP property had much to do with this as UNRRA reported:

        "Independent efforts by the DP to obtain supplementary clothing are again attacked as black-market activities; in fact, items of clothing legitimately possessed by the DP are often confiscated by U.S. troops or German Police during shakedown raids. The German civilian is still unusually well dressed and presents a neat respectable appearance. In contrast the DP looks like a bum, and this difference does not fail to make its impression on the U.S. troops. The German looks like a gentleman (or a lady) and the U.S. soldier accept him as such; the DP man or woman looks like a bum or a tramp and that is the way they are regarded." [39]

These events did not go unnoticed in Warsaw. PUR recognised that the DPs were particularly vulnerable. A report from September, 1946, alleged that armed US troops burst into a DP transport train at Freilassing in Bavaria to "confiscate US Army property" but ended up stealing cigarettes, chocolate and even the blankets given by UNRRA. [40] This evident disregard for the welfare of these poor unfortunates united Warsaw with the Polish community in America. The Polish paper "Zycie Warszawy" in January, 1946, cited "Nowiny Polskie", a Polish language paper published in New York, in which an article under the title "Disgraceful attitude of UNRRA towards Poles" complained that UNRRA had a two tier system with the West Europeans refugees being in the upper tier while the Poles and other East European DPs being in the lower. "We are a second class nation" complained the article. [41]
        This did not escape the notice of the War Office which compiled a file of protests from various PWX who were still being held by the US 7th Army in the former Oflag Murnau. One letter, written as early as July, 1945, complains:

        "Now we are free, but it is a pretence only. To tell you the truth we have passed from German captivity to the American one. I have to confess that I am very disappointed with this apparent freedom. We are in the same barracks, the same dirt and bugs. We have repeatedly to endure the same humiliations as before. The Germans have much more liberty than we here."
Another complained in September, 1945:

        "What can we do. We are betrayed by the allies, we are treated as before as prisoners of war, if we are to perish let's perish in our country." [42]

It seems little wonder that many Poles chose to return to Poland rather than rely on American aid but this was not just an American problem. Although not as well documented as the attitude of the US authorities, British policy towards DPs appears also to have been questionable as well - at least at ground level.
        A report from the Political Division of the Control Commission for Germany in January, 1946, emphasised that this was a delicate matter and the military had to "...go carefully in the matter of putting pressure on DPs to go home." It further added that 43rd Division "...appear to have badly overstepped the mark". In DP camps in the divisional area the military had let it be known that a refusal to return would involve the removal of Red Cross parcels, uncertain rations and a deterioration of living condition. DPs would be "...on the lowest priority for what is available." Although the 51st Division was "...more reasoned" in its approach, it was still telling the DPs to go. If a DP agreed to be repatriated and then changed his mind, then the Division would not guarantee to feed or house that DP or to make provision to repatriate him later. This, according to the CCG, was not Government policy. Pressure should not be put on DPs and they were at liberty to change their mind at any time without sanctions being applied. [43]
        Another case brought to light by the CCG was a leaflet hung up at Fallingbostel DP Camp which threatened that if the DPs did not return to Poland they would lose DP status and the Allies would wash their hands of them. The leaflet concluded:

        "There is no room in the world today for idlers. You must face reality. You have only two alternatives. To remain here and work for the Germans or to return to Poland and work for your own salvation, and the salvation of your country. There is no third course. There is only one right decision. You must make it now." [44]

The leaflet was signed by "Major J.W. Murray, Military Government, 711 Det." and "H.E. Rendell, Director UNRRA Team." Whoever first read the leaflet at the Allied Liaison Branch scribbled "Good Heavens" in the margin and the comment "If this doesn't shift them nothing will!": such was the tone of the message.
        The Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Division of the CCG [PW+DP Div CCG(BE)] went to great pains to stress that the document was unauthorised and would be suppressed. However the Political Division did ask the PW+DP Div. for a report on the effects of the document and "...whether it in any way hastened repatriation".
        One of the reasons for a change in attitude towards DPs was a perceived growth of lawlessness. A Polish report from March, 1946, lists the number of Polish criminals in Germany in the previous quarter of a year:


Murder - 8
Arms Offences - 209
Robbery - 14
Theft - 214
Curfew Offences - 6
Burglary - 7
War Crimes - 11
Black Market - 104
Petty Offences - 218
Other - 191
-----------------
Total ............... 982 [45]

What aggravated the situation from a Polish perspective was that the justice system used in Germany appeared to be geared against the DP. The case of the "Paderborn 4" caused much official and unofficial protest from Poland at the time and put a spotlight on the way the Allies administered the law.
        A band of Polish DPs had been caught by German security guards while in the act of theft and one of the Poles was killed. In the resulting riot that ensued, as Poles from the local DP camp visited the nearest German village intent on vengeance, several Germans were killed. Whereas the German security guard was exonerated as he was found to have killed the original Pole in self-defence the rioting Poles, on the other hand, were given long prison sentences - 35 were sent to prison for periods of from 3 to 20 years - and four were sentenced to death. The Warsaw Foreign Ministry greeted the news with outrage and warned it might affect Polish-British relations. The British argued that it was necessary to impose harsh penalties in Germany to maintain law and order; the Poles argued that they were a special case and to them it looked - with some justice - that the German were being better treated than the Poles. As it turned out, the death sentences were commuted by the C-in-C Germany, Field Marshal Montgomery on "solely legal grounds". [46]
        The case of Chaim Katz also raised questions in London. Katz, a Polish Jew, had been found guilty of the unlawful possession of a revolver and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. On hearing of this harsh punishment Sir Arthur Street (Permanent Secretary to the Control Office for Germany and Austria, London) wrote to the Deputy Military Governor of Germany, General Sir Brian Robertson, that he was "disturbed" by the judgement, especially since Katz was only 20 years old; he was "a member of a persecuted class" and had spent five years in Buchenwald concentration camp. Sir Arthur assumed the court had passed such a severe sentence expecting it to be reduced later but this went against natural justice.
        "The court, no doubt, had in mind the increase of crime among DPs when imposing what, by our standards here, was an immense sentence. I feel too that they acted on a wrong principle in passing a sentence which they expected to be reduced on review: and that, within reason, sentences be based on the principle of making the punishment fit the crime." [47]

The options that were open to the Polish DPs were limited. They could either return to Poland - an option not welcomed by many Poles despite the privations inflicted on them by others - or they could remain in Germany awaiting an altogether uncertain future. By 1947 there was a new lifeline being thrown to the DPs in the shape of the European Voluntary Worker scheme [EVW]. In the case of the Poles the EVW scheme led to a certain amount of confusion as to British policy, especially since the DPs had heard of Bevin's note suggesting to the Polish Armed Forces, in the strongest possible terms, that they should leave Britain, yet only months later other Poles were being encouraged to come to Britain to work. This hardly seemed a consistent policy.
        From the British point of view, the Poles were not the first choice as EVWs. The two main operations for bringing these workers to Britain were operations "Westward Ho" and "Balt Cygnet", the latter being for Women primarily from the Baltic states. The total EVW figures, according to the Ministry of Labour, were:

Ukrainian 20,930        
Polish 14,018        
Latvian 11,832        
Yugoslav 10,192        
Lithuanian 5,732        
Estonian 4,114        
Hungarian 2,474        
Czech 1,336        
Sudetans 1,319        
Romanians 800        
Bulgars 91        
Stateless 1,137        
Others 536        
===============
Total...... 74,511 [48]

What is interesting about these figures is the high proportion of Ukrainians and Balts, especially considering the overall proportions of the DP population in Europe. The reason is explained in David Cesarini's book "Justice Delayed - How Britain became a refuge for Nazi war criminals", a study filled with moral indignation at a British Government cover-up to secretly bring former SS men to work in Britain.
        At the head of the list of potential workers who could be allowed into Britain, men of the Baltic states were deemed to be the most desirable. According to a letter from the British Consulate in Baden-Baden to the FO Refugee Department, Balts should be given preference over Poles as they were "...a much better type than the Poles, more intelligent, honest and reliable, with a higher standard of education." [49] The plan was guided by the principles of eugenics, if Britain was to have foreign settlers then they should be of 'good stock'; they should be white - thus excluding most of the Empire; Jews were to be excluded at all cost. Of the European DPs, the Poles were to not to be encouraged to join the scheme. Although, technically, the EVW scheme was open to all and no discrimination would be applied, the FO announced: "There is no objection to your making clear that Polish men except miners will not be invited to volunteer for the present." Waterfield of the FO pointed out that this was discrimination by anyone's definition. Although discrimination against the Poles would continue, the Foreign Office would not allow "open discrimination" and to emphasise this point Hankey minuted: "Let discrimination against Poles be hidden so far as possible, please. It will make much trouble for us." [50]
        Because potential workers from the Baltic States were considered to be better workers they were given preferential treatment, even to the extent that men of the 15th and 19th Waffen SS (Latvian) Divisions and the 20th Waffen SS (Estonian) Division were offered a life in Britain. If the British could let in individual SS men, then it became possible to rehabilitate an entire SS Division. It was in this way that virtually the whole of the 14th Waffen SS (Ukrainian) Division was transferred to Britain - war criminals included. The Foreign Office was "...not holding membership of the Waffen SS (which was compulsory for non-German volunteers) a crime against them" [51] and despite warnings from the War Office that its screening process was hopelessly inadequate, Boothby of the FO was still prepared to tell the Ministry of Labour: "I think that there is little, if any, possibility of any person with an undesirable wartime record being brought to this country". [52] Despite being so convinced that these SS men had clean records, it was thought best to keep the whole issue quite as the British public might not understand the policy.
        The case of the SS blood group tattoos that erupted in October of 1947, was an occasion when the FO did its best to keep its actions quiet. As the potential EVWs were arriving in Britain they had to undergo medical examinations. One group in London were examined by a Polish doctor who recognised the distinctive tattoos of the SS and was justifiably horrified by what he saw. The story leaked out to the press and public outrage ensued. The Foreign Office was more concerned with the actions of the Polish doctor - Boothby accused him of acting "irresponsibly" and Brimelow of the FO noted that the doctor should "confine attentions to the sick and NOT meddle with blood groups". [53]
        Charles Zarine of the Latvian Legation wrote to the Foreign Office to try to clear up the confused situation. It was certainly true that troops of the SS had their blood groups tattooed on their bodies but, Zarine argued, tattoos did not necessarily mean membership of the SS since it was the policy of the Germans to tattoo all the troops under its command. They had started with the SS, they had tattooed the foreign volunteers and had not had time to tattoo the rest of the German Armed Forces. Despite being a blatant untruth, Zarine's explanation was seized upon by the Foreign Office as a cover story to use if the news of these former SS men threatened their moves to place these men on the labour market - particularly in the mining industry. It was feared that British miners might well see these telltale tattoos in the shirts-off environment in which they worked and given the fact that they did not want any foreign workers in the mines they would certainly not take kindly to SS men. The FO ruled that any EVW with the relevant tattoo would not be employed in mines but this too would be kept quiet so that only the Coal Board medics would know. The man concerned and the Baltic Legation would be told that the man had been rejected on "suitability grounds". [54]
        Despite Britain's desire to import Balts, it was soon realised that there were not enough of these people to meet Britain's labour shortage. The EVW scheme was thus expanded to take in Poles but this led to a contradiction and a circle that was difficult to square.
        Britain, with the hundreds of thousands of Poles in its charge, had to encourage repatriation to Poland or convince other countries to take them while at the same time ensuring that they picked the best workers for their own economy. Britain could not allow "...foreign countries to skim the cream of possible settlers". [55]
         Given Polish perceptions of hostility to their presence, there was little enthusiasm towards the prospect of life in Britain. As 1946 drew to a close the FO complained that only 342 Poles had been placed in civilian employment. It was, as Hancock minuted, "Pretty rotten!". Hankey was even more open with his criticism:

        "This is going very badly. It is really ridiculous that we can't even get agreement to take on Poles to deal with Xmas parcels traffic! I am plotting with W.O. an onslaught on M[inistr]y/Labour who are fumbling their local machinery." [56]

This, combined with Polish pessimism, did not bode well for the future. The Poles had a fear that they would be used to do Britain's dirty work abroad, just as Napoleon had used his Polish Legions a century before. In 1802 Napoleon dispatched some 6,000 Poles to Santo Domingo [Haiti] to clear up a rebellion there and only 300 ever returned. Therefore, news that the British might want to use the Poles in Asia was met with horror. As Frank Savory told the Commons in March, 1947:
        "The rumours are that those people who go into the [Resettlement] Corps will be sent out to Burma where they will be used to clear out swamps, and there is...

Mr Callaghan (Cardiff South) "Jolly good idea."

"That is the rumour that has been spread." [57]

It is little wonder that when other countries offered the Poles work they took it. The Dutch put in a request to the British for 5,300 Polish miners but the move was vetoed by the Ministry of Labour which argued that Britain needed miners, a view that did not please the Dutch nor, for that matter, the Foreign Office. The FO view was that it was better to get rid of 5,300 Poles out of the country than "keep them hanging about on the off chance of the Trades Unions agreeing to them working here." [58]
        The Poles, for their part, were quite keen to settle in the Netherlands. 1,200 men of General Maczek's Armoured Division which had liberated part of Southern Holland were given the right of residence there and their dependants added another 800 to that number. [59]
        Although France had been trawling the DP centres for workers, they did not want to take any Polish servicemen other than those resident there before the war. This, in fact, amounted to some 3,500 Poles who, in March of 1946, were leaving at a rate of 200 men twice a week. [60]
        A report by the Under Secretary of State, Hector McNeil, in April 1946, outlined the potential for dispersing Poles to third countries. The Dutch wanted miners but France did not look promising, and neither did Belgium - a country already holding 10,000 Polish refugees and unwilling to accept any more. Scandinavia had yet to come to a firm decision at that time and the Italian Government had said it would take Poles with "local obligations", that is Poles who were married to Italian women, but would not go much further. If the 'Old World' offered little scope for emigration the prospects in the 'New World' seemed brighter and more open. The US
Government, it was believed, might be induced to allow retrospective emigration within the unused quota for the previous five years. Since few Poles had moved to the USA during the war, it was hoped that the Poles in Britain would be allowed to go to the States to make up the figures. This would inevitably mean that no Poles from Poland would be allowed into the USA for the next five years to keep the immigration numbers level - it was doubted, however, that the Warsaw regime would allow mass emigration anyway so this did not present too much of a problem.
        South America seemed to be even more fertile ground. There was the prospect that Chile might take some 20,000 European families and the Dominican Republic was in need of some 10 to 15,000 agricultural workers; Brazil wanted immigrants but had yet to come to a firm decision; Columbia, Mexico and Uruguay had given unfavourable responses to British requests for mass settlement; Bolivia had not given a concrete answer and while Guatemala had shown some interest they had not been definite in their answer. [61]
        Argentina, a traditional exile for Poles, had given a very positive reaction to the idea of accepting Polish troops. Although the Argentine Government agreed to agricultural and skilled workers, they certainly did not want intellectuals, neither did they want Jews. The reason for this was not racial, according to the Foreign Office, but rather that experience had shown in Argentina that Jews did not make good agricultural workers and tended to drift into commerce in towns - this was just the opposite of what the Argentine economy needed. The Argentine Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Polish troops would "...contribute to the raising of the efficiency of the Argentine Armed Forces". [62] On the 13th April, 1946, the "Highland Monarch" sailed for Argentina and Uruguay with 191 Poles on Board:

Argentina: Polish Army 67 Polish Navy 19 Polish Air Force 46

Uruguay : Polish Army 53 Polish Navy 1 Polish Air Force 5

Few of these men were front line troops, most being service and medical personnel.
        Just as the British had wanted to keep specialists for themselves, so the Polish Government in Warsaw was anxious for the return of its highly trained men and women. An advert by the Labour Section of the Welfare Department - Interim Treasury Committee for Polish Questions, published in the "Polish Daily" led to a protest from the Polish Embassy in London:
        "Departure for Brazil: Chemical expert wanted for metallurgical analyses, electricians, welders, locksmiths, fitters, carpenters, blacksmiths, moulders.
        Civil Engineer or technical experts in designing of mechanical parts.
        Agricultural labourers and jobbing gardeners for casual work; also all kinds of domestic servants." [63]

Warsaw's protest was that the British should be putting more effort into encouraging Polish soldiers to return home rather than going to Brazil. Hankey, in his response to the embassy, agreed, in principle, to the Polish protest but the fact still remained that these same Polish specialists did not want to return to Poland and as such:
        "We can in existing circumstances neglect no opportunity of finding suitable employment and places of settlement whether in this country or abroad for those who remain here...."

Again this added fuel to the flames of Warsaw's conspiracy theory that Britain was doing its best to ensure Poles did not return to Poland. Warsaw's Charge d'Affaires in Cairo, Janusz Makarczyk, complained to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about General Paget [GOC MEF] who was "...the main obstacle to the return of Poles to Poland and has thrown his entire authority behind keeping the 2nd Corps in existence." According to Makarczyk, Paget's plan was to put his charges into the Sudan or some other independent country "...so that the British Government would no longer be formally responsible for the existence of a Polish colony run on paramilitary lines." [64] Although Warsaw's concern was deeply felt, the Polish Armed Forces were not all made up of peasants from beyond the River Bug. There were nearly 10,000 highly qualified workers in the PRC:

63 University Professors
102 University Lecturer
319 Secondary School Teachers
690 Primary School Teachers
131 Journalists
54 Professional Writers
617 Lawyers
400 Actors/Musicians/Artists
850 Members of the Judiciary
64 Architects
71 Members of the Clergy
Over 1,000 Qualified Engineers (All branches)
790 Doctors/Dentists
302 Qualified Chemists
2,500 Civil Servants (All grades)
1,800 Private Sector clerks/officials [65]


The loss of this core of pre-war intelligentsia, combined with the Nazi extermination of the same social strata in Poland, was something the country could ill afford. For the British, this wealth proved more of a nightmare than a Godsend. Although many Poles spoke English to a certain degree few spoke it well enough to carry on with their Polish profession in the UK. Also many of these Poles were of an advanced age and Zbyszewski states that the average Polish trooper was older than a British Captain or a Major in the US Army. There were, he goes on, men in the Polish Armed Forces who were too old to be in the British Home Guard. [66] The age factor was particularly acute in the Officer Corps. The FO statisticians calculated that there were over 2,500 Polish officers over 50 years old. [67]

Although these older officers would be difficult to place in employment, it would be even more difficult to find work for the criminal element that was found in every army. In July 1946, AFHQ Casserta wrote to the War Office seeking advice about what to do with these undesirables which it separated into three groups:

1/ 1,200 Soldiers with multiple service entries on conduct sheets.

2/ 727 Dependants:

23 : Collaboration with Germans Proved
56 : War Criminals i.e. Gestapo, SS, Volksdeutsche
10 :Strongly suspected of collaboration
164 : Notorious criminals
63 : Inveterate alcoholics or dope fiends
133 : Notorious prostitutes
29 : Suspected prostitutes
114 : Persons hostile to Poles ie of Russian extraction, Ukrainians etc.
7 : Mental Cases
128 : Deserters from Cervinara Repatriation Camp

3/ 2,300 Poles who had "disconnected themselves" from Polcorps and settled in Italy [68]

The Foreign Office, which advised the War Office on matters of policy, said that the third category in the AFHQ list could be treated as DPs in Italy but the first and second group - inveterate alcoholics, dope fiends and notorious prostitutes among them - would have to come to the UK for resettlement.
        As time went on and more and more Poles began arriving in Britain, so the realisation began to dawn on the British that they were now stuck with these undesirables. The following summary of a report on one of the last dependant transports from Africa would have made depressing reading for the National Assistance Board [NAB] who would soon have to support the Poles:

         "The Commission is at Tengeru Camp in Tanganyka and are in the process of examining 1,000 Poles.
The following is an analysis of the first 250:-

230 (92%) Accepted for residence in UK, or for transit purposes prior to further emigration.

5 (2%) Rejected on Medical Grounds

6 (2%) Rejected on Immigration Grounds

6 (2%) To be queried on Immigration Grounds

3 (1«%) Local Resettlement in East Africa.

Analysis by Age:
0-5 Years - Male:16 (14%) Female:10 (8«%)
5-15 Years - Male:11 (9«%) Female:10 (8«%)
15-40 Years - Male:37 (32%) Female:43 (37%)
40-60 Years - Male:39 (34%) Female:44 (38%)
60+ Years - Male:11 (9«%) Female: 9 (8%)

General Notes:

1/ The foregoing figures are possibly a fair picture of the position in the camp.
2/ Camp living conditions are bad. The site is a partly controlled malaria swamp. "If the Poles survive here they will flourish in a N.A.B. Hostel."
3/ Morale is low. The people contribute little and are eager to sit back and accept.
4/ The Malaria rate is fairly high.
5/ The VD rate is said to be high.
6/ The Canadian Commission took the best of the inhabitants when they visited the camp in 1948 and the Australian Commission took the best of the remainder when they visited in 1949. The British Commission is now quite clearly scraping the bottom of the barrel.
7/ "There is a good leavening among the residents of crooks, criminals, 'smart boys', etc."
8/ "There is very little real infirmity or disablement, that the special NAB hostels will hardly be needed."
9/ Few of the younger people and hardly anybody over the age of 40 speak English adequately.
10/ There is no marked enthusiasm to come to England. Many want to go to the USA and Canada and there is a great desire for the Argentine.

Dr. Boucher May 31st, 1950." [69]


It has to be said that if the British were reluctant to accept certain Poles then the feeling was mutual among certain Poles who wanted nothing to do with the British. The so-called "recalcitrants" who refused to join the Polish Resettlement Corps were another group who provided the Foreign Office with yet another problem to sort out. If a Pole refused to return to Poland and at the same time refused to join the PRC - many were in just that position - what could the British do with them? In August, 1946, the Cabinet Polish Forces Committee discussed how best to dispose of recalcitrant Poles. Two options that were mooted were either to send the troublesome Poles to Tripolitania [Libya] or to Germany. The former option was not one favoured by the Committee; the future of the area was still not clear so to move the Poles to North Africa would, at best, be a temporary move and the logistics of supplying the Poles would be difficult, not least since new camps would have to be built to accommodate the Poles. The option of Germany was favoured by the committee although the FO's German Department was not at all keen. According to the German Department the British Occupation Zone was overcrowded - the most crowded of all the zones - and there was not enough food or accommodation to supply the Poles. [70] The War Office also saw Germany as the most likely option and they issued an order on the 2nd February, 1947:

        "Officers and men who have not signed on as members of the Resettlement Corps will be given 7 days in which to do so. If after this period they have not signed, they will be taken to a camp near Hull, then by ship to Cuxhaven near Osnabruck there demobilised, given 400 Marks, a civilian outfit and left to fend for themselves." [71]

The War Office and Foreign Office went through with their threat to deport various recalcitrants, more as an experiment to see how the deportation of a token few would affect the remainder. On the 14th February, 1947, there were 12,796 recalcitrants refusing to join the PRC. The War Office threatened 189 Poles with deportation to Germany. Of these 189 Poles: 39 decided to join the PRC; 86 decided to return to Poland; 64 chose to go to Germany. The WO extrapolated that if 66% of this batch ended up in Germany therefore across the total number some 4,700 would end up in the British zone. Fortunately for everyone concerned, this example seemed to help many Poles to make up their minds and either join the PRC or return to Poland. Therefore in March there were 10,720 recalcitrants - a drop of 2,000 in a month. [72]
        At the Foreign Office the 'Polish Question' must have indeed seemed hydra-headed; just as one problem was resolved so a new one would arise to vex them.
        One of the problems involved in allowing the Poles to live in Britain was how to stop them waging a propaganda war against the Warsaw Government. These "White Poles" as they became known at Foreign Office - a clear reference to the pejorative term used in Russia after the revolution - seemed to be "spiteful, malicious and improper" towards the Communists. In London, Marjan Hemar's newest play at the "White Eagle Club" in May 1947, drew particular criticism from Warsaw and its apologists in Britain. Hankey, on the other hand, was having none of it; as he minuted:
        "I don't see what we can do. And nothing Hemar says is likely to be worse than what Gomulka says about us. Only on May Day he let fly at us again. Charity begins at home." [73]

        There was also the Polish Government-in-Exile to contend with. Although most countries had ceased to recognise the London Poles in 1945, to the Polish Armed Forces in the West it was widely regarded as the only legitimate Polish Government regardless of what London or Washington thought of about the subject. One issue that again drew protest from Warsaw was how to stop Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz from calling himself "President" which, to the Poles in Britain, he still was. According to Hankey, there was very little that could be done. It was not a criminal offence to call oneself "President" or, for that matter, to organise a "government". One option that Hankey offered was to send Raczkiewicz and his group to the Irish Free State which still recognised the exiles, but since Bevin had no intention of asking the Irish for anything that option also seemed closed. The only way out that Hankey could see was the simplest - ask him to stop. As it turned out, only days after Hankey wrote these minutes Raczkiewicz died, thus solving that particular problem. [74] However, even in death Raczkiewicz proved troublesome. At his funeral the British Government was represented and the Poles provided an armed honour guard. The Warsaw Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertook the rather churlish step of protesting to the new British ambassador, Sir Donald Gainer, that since Raczkiewicz was a "private individual" the British should not have attended. Warsaw also questioned the fact that if the Resettlement Corps was supposed to be a non-combatant unit, then how did it provide armed guards. Again Hankey was having none of Warsaw's impudence and he told Gainer to inform Warsaw that the funeral of Raczkiewicz was totally in line with the courtesy provided to an Allied wartime leader. [75]
        As if it wasn't enough for the Poles in Warsaw stirring up the waters, the Poles in the UK were doing much the same. The Poles made a request with the War Office to be allowed to fly Polish flags at PRC camps. Although today it appears a reasonable enough request, the Foreign Office looked at it with horror. As Roper of the FO wrote to Major Roberts at the WO:
        "Frankly we do not like this. The flying of Polish flags would involve, no doubt, the usual ceremonies, and the whole thing will draw public attention to the foreignness of the men in the Polish Resettlement Corps, which is just what we are trying to get away from. They are a part of the British Army which is going to be absorbed into civilian life alongside British citizens.
        If you agree, perhaps the British Advisory Staff could intimate to General Kopanski that they do not want to hear anymore of this proposal for the reason I have given." [76]
        The terms of the Polish Resettlement Act provided that a Polish soldier or sailor could join the Polish Resettlement Corps for a period of two years - the Polish Air Force had their own PRC wing. Once a man was in the Corps he would carry out vocational training and take English classes whilst at the same time look for civilian employment. When he found work he would be put on the "Class W(T) Reserve" list and continue to work out the remaining days towards the two year mark when he would be a fully fledged civilian. If, for some reason, he left his job he would rejoin the 'active' list of the PRC until he found another one. The whole process was to act as a cushion for the Poles between the order of military life and the freedom of being a civilian, albeit in a new and very foreign country.
        Despite many problems and the many hours given over to Polish affairs, the Poles settled in Britain and formed a successful part of the community in the UK. During the debate on the winding down of the PRC in 1949, the British Government expressed its satisfaction at what it had done for the Poles. The Under Secretary of State for War, Michael Stewart, told the Commons:
        "My hon. friends will remember the propaganda which was rife in certain sections of the Press in 1920 on the subject of abuses of the Unemployment Insurance Act and how it was common form in certain quarters, by picking out particular abuses, to suggest that the entire British working class was endeavouring to live in idleness on public funds. I am sorry to say that some of the Press comments that have been made in some quarters on the Polish Resettlement Corps bear an ugly resemblance to the propaganda of that period. I believe that if we look at the story as a whole, we shall see that those attacks are not justified, and that although there must inevitably have been some mistakes, we have carried out our handling of this problem with due regard to our obligation both to the Poles and the people of this country." [77]

The total number of Poles who were demobilised from the Polish Armed Forces were:

114,000 : Polish Resettlement Corps

86,000 : Returned to Poland from United Kingdom
12,000 : Returned to Poland from Italy
5,000 : Returned from Germany
2,000 : Returned from Middle East

8,000 : Disbanded without joining PRC

1,000 : Recalcitrants" ineligible for PRC

14,000 : Repatriated to countries other than Poland

7,000 : Settled in France
=========
249,000 [78]

From the nearly quarter of a million Polish Armed Forces, 105,000 returned to Poland. The above figures do not give a clear indication of how many Poles began new lives in Britain. According to Zubrzycki, the peak of Polish settlement in Britain was in December, 1949:

91,400 : Polish Resettlement Corps

2,300 : Ex-Polish Forces not in PRC

31,800 : Dependants of the Above brought to UK by War Office

2,400 : 'Distressed Relatives' brought to UK (Poles married to UK Citizens) :

29,400 : Polish 'European Volunteer Workers' :
=======
157,300 [79]

In 1949, according to the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, Poles made up well over a quarter of the aliens in the Police District: 37,819 or 27.2% of the total. [80]

         After many years and many thousands of miles of wandering "General Sikorski's tourists" had finally found their home - even though it was not the one that they had wanted in the first place.