Site hosted by Angelfire.com: Build your free website today!

FORTY YEARS AGO THIS WEEK


(Mar 2 - 8, 1968)

By LTG (then COL) John H. Cushman

As the week began. the 1/501 was working on the defenses of newly established LZ Sally. During the week the 1/502, supported by artillery, First Cav gunships and tactical air, operated in the enemy infested area of Quang Dien district around FSB Nola and the An Lo Bridge and did most of the brigade’s fighting.

On March 3d the brigade journal reported that B/1/502 and C/1/502, operating to the east of the An Lo Bridge, “made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 12 enemy KIA, and 4 US KIA and 11 US WIA. West of Nola, D Company made contact resulting in 6 VC KIA and 3 detainees. The Bn CO in the C&C made an assessment of air and artillery in support of Cos B and C contact… (reporting) an additional 48 NVA KIA.”

We began operating jointly with nearby ARVN units and with local district chiefs’ PF (popular force platoons). In its plans summary for March 3, the brigade journal reported that on the next day… “2d Brigade will provide artillery support for LZ preparation, coordinate air support, and assist in supervision of a combat assault… of 3d Bn, 3d, Regiment, 1st ARVN Division. Battalion will attack south… to destroy suspected VC units. A platoon size PF blocking force will combat assault… in support of ARVN operations. One PF platoon will conduct operations on each side of the Song Bo river in conjunction with C 1-502.” This had been worked out in detail by brigade and by the 1/502, which soon had a full time liaison officer with the Quang Dien district chief, exchanging operational and intelligence information.

On March 5 the 1/502 reported that an A Co combat assault the next day would involve two Quang Dien District PF platoons, 30 men each, working with A Co in a combined operation and village sweep. On March 6 the brigade journal reported that A Co and the two RF/PF platoons had made negative contact, but that “B Company with two PF platoons had made contact with an estimated 50 VC, resulting in the PFs killing 5 VC and taking ten detainees, 1 60mm mortar, 1 AK-47, 1 B40, 1 ChiCom 7.62 LMG, 1 M-1 rifle, 1 M-79, and some AK 47 ammo… D Co also made heavy contact with a battalion size element, and called in artillery and air strikes and extracted the unit. Friendly losses were 5 KIA and 25 WIA, Enemy losses were 8 NVA killed, 4 AK-47s, 1 SKS, 1927 rounds AK-47 ammunition, and 9 RPG-2 rounds… An assessment of the damage in the village was not made due to heavy ground fire received by aircraft attempting to make the assessment, and dense foliage. A joint US-PF combat assault operation is planned for March 7.”

The brigade operations summary reported that on March 7 “the 1-502 conducted combat assaults and search and destroy operations in the area where D/1-502 had met heavy resistance 6 March. Significant enemy contacts were made by A, B, and C, 1-502 resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Enemy assessment: 14 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 1 SKS.”

The 2/501 continued to operate to the south of LZ Sally, from its fire base at LZ Pinky. On March 5, the brigade journal reported that the 2/501 “reacted to reliable intelligence indicating enemy unit attempting to infiltrate into the city of Hue. Two rifle companies were combat assaulted into likely avenues of approach and were placed in blocking positions.”

Meanwhile LZ Sally continued to grow into a base from which our units in the field could be supported and to which they could from time to time return for a day or two of rest.