This week tragedy struck the 1/502. On 26 March its B Company, operating along a trail in the hills six miles south of LZ Sally, made contact with an estimated enemy platoon. As First Strike’s mortar platoon was firing 4.2 inch rounds into the jungle ahead of the column, a fire direction miscalculation placed several rounds directly on the company commander’s command group near the head of the column. I was in the air at the time and took my Huey C&C ship into a tiny cleared area by vertical descent and ascent. Along with dustoff helicopters we were able to get the dead and wounded out. To the great grief of all concerned, B Company lost 11 KIA and 19 WIA.

That day, March 26, the 2d Brigade was planning to move its command post to Camp Evans where we would take charge of areas of operations of brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division which were to move northward to a major operation west of Quang Tri, relieving the besieged US Marines at Khe Sahn. We would be joined in our new AO by the 3d Brigade’s 2/327 Infantry, but would leave behind the 1/501, attached to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, just arrived from Fort Bragg. The 3d Bde/82d would take over LZ Sally.

With the loss of too many fine troopers to sappers just days before, and even more to the 1/502’s mortar accident, and with little to show from our air assault and search and destroy operations, recent days had been discouraging. But on March 27, the 1/501 launched an operation that would begin a new phase for the 2d Brigade. It was to be our first “cordon,” or “encirclement.”

On the night of March 26-27, the 1/501 learned that part of the 810 VC local force battalion had just moved to the vicinity of a hamlet, Thuan Hoa, on the west bank of the Perfume River. US Navy patrol boats, with whom the 1/501 were in contact, made a similar report. LTC Wayne J. Prokup, battalion commander, had already laid on a two-company combat assault, supported by the 188th Assault Helicopter Co. Redirecting its objectives, he launched in the early morning.

By noon A/1/501, having moved again by helicopter, was approaching Thuan Hoa from the west. D/1/501 then air assaulted to a hot LZ to the hamlet’s south; the 1/501 recon platoon was lifted into position to the north. Artillery, gunships, and three airstrikes had supported the 1/501. Wayne Prokup and I could see that, with Navy patrol boats in the Perfume River, we had the enemy encircled. But night was coming on, and the surrounded enemy might slip away. So we called on USAF C-47’s to drop flares so that the encircling troopers could see. During the night escaping enemy were killed or driven back, After bringing up psyops loudspeakers to broadcast surrender appeals without result, the 1/501 with artillery and air support took the hamlet. Results: 2 US KIA, 19 US WIA; 31 NVA KIA, 3 NVA POW, 22 VC KIA. This action would be followed by similar 2d Brigade encircle-ments.

Meanwhile in the mountains fifteen miles to the southwest of LZ Sally, the 2/501, supported by artillery and tactical air strikes, had been in heavy contact with the 9th Battalion, 90th NVA Regiment . The brigade journal reported: “Enemy assessment 7 NVA KIA, Friendly losses: 1 KIA, 10 WIA.”

On March 30 we reported the results of 20 days operations under division control: Friendly losses: 68 KIA, 271 WIA. Enemy assessment: 233 NVA KIA, 105 VC KIA, 12 NVA POW, 7 VC POW. We would soon begin a series of operations that would improve that ratio.