Last week I described how, on the night of 5-6 May, the enemy at La Chu had been encircled by C and D Companies of the 1/501 and by B and C Companies of the 2/501, all operating under the commander 2/501. On 6 May the 2/17 Cav Squadron, opcon to the 2d Brigade, attacked with D/1/501 south into La Chu and, in an illuminated battle that went on into the early morning of May 7, destroyed the encircled C115 Local Force Company and 9th Battalion, 90th Infantry Regiment. This was our sixth successful cordon. Five days later, a few kilometers northeast of LZ Sally, con-tact with significant enemy triggered a brigade attempt at an eighth encirclement; this one would be unsuccessful.

The action began shortly before noon May 12 with an intelligence report of enemy activity and a suspected enemy regimental headquarters at Ap Co Thap hamlet. 2/17 Cav, which with its vehicles had been in a night defensive position north of the An Lo bridge, was ordered to move east to attack into that hamlet, and C/1/501, at the An Lo Bridge, moved overland. By noon C Company was in heavy enemy contact at the south of the hamlet. It withdrew to a position southeast of the hamlet upon which an encirclement could be built under the opcon of the 2/17 Cav, and B/1/501 and D/1/501 were inserted on its north, also to that purpose. Meanwhile, A/1/501 (overland) and D/1/502 (helilifted) were placed on C/1/501’s left flank west of the hamlet. All five encircling rifle companies were in place by late afternoon.

Meanwhile 2/17 Cav moved eastward with its two troops and by midafternoon was in heavy contact in Ap Son Tung hamlet, just north of Ap Co Thap. From the 12 May division summary: “A/2/17 Cav and B/2/17 Cav attacked eastward… As the contact developed… four additional maneuver companies were rapidly air assaulted into the area to encircle the enemy position. As the cordon was being established, 2/17 Cav continued to attack… the enemy, now estimated to be the elements of a battalion, made a determined effort to escape before the cordon could be closed.” (Fighting was indeed heavy. The 2/17 reported two tanks hit by RPGs, one of them destroyed.)

With now two hamlets to be encircled, that moment was the time for me to put the 1/501 in charge, to bring in three more rifle companies and seal the top of the encirclement, and to disengage the 2/17 from the night fight (which it soon did in any event), so that it could attack the next day. But I did not. During the night of 13-14 May, a battalion or more of the NVA slipped through the north end of the nonexistent “cordon.” Our losses were 6 troopers killed and 52 wounded; a next day sweep of the area found 36 dead NVA and one AK-47. I don’t remember so, but I am reported by Captain White, brigade S-4, to have been furious at the lost opportunity. I had only myself to blame.

Shaking off that disappointment, the 2d Brigade now went on to other things. On May 14 rumors of an expansion of our task force area of operations to the southeast of Hue became a reality. We would take over the AO of Task Force X-Ray, a Marine Corps command with a mission of securing a tank farm on the beach at Col Co (“Cocoa Beach” to the troops) and the security of the pipeline that took the fuel to depots near Hue. That afternoon C/1/501 deployed by air to Phu Vang as the 1/501’s first contingent; A/1/321 Arty wold join. And I visited the Thua Thein province chief to discuss with him how we could work with his RF companies and the PF and hamlet militia of Phu Vang and Hung Thuy districts to accomplish our mission. I also stopped by the command post of the Marine battalion that we would relieve. (To be continued.)