On May 14 I had stopped by the command post of the Marine battalion that the 1/501 would relieve in our new brigade mission, which was to secure a tank farm on the beach at Col Co and the pipe line that took the fuel to depots near Hue. I was surprised to learn that, while Marine rifle compa-nies were 20% larger than those of the 2d brigade, that battalion had three of its four companies in static positions and only one operating in its AO. The consequences of this were evident; the enemy roamed the countryside at night without interference from the Marines.

The 1/501’s commander, Jim Hunt, turned that ratio around. He put one platoon at the fire base of A Battery,1/321 Arty, at Phu Vang’s district town. It, along with the fire base’s occupants and nearby PFs, would secure that position and the platoon would do the daily minesweep of the road to Col Co beach. The rest of that company would secure the beach’s pipeline terminus, enjoying the beach by day, rotating that duty with the 1/501’s other companies, which when not there would operate night and day in the AO. From our experience working with district chiefs and their PF platoons I was confident that, if we gave them fire support and a rapid reaction force, we could rely on the PF for road and pipeline patrols and for ambushes that would imperil any enemy sneaking around localities that it was our duty to protect. On 16 May the 1/501 moved into position and its units began scouring the countryside by day and setting ambushes at night, to the enemy’s surprise. It sprung an ambush the night of May 17.

Our new brigade disposition tied us in with every district chief. The 1/502d continued to operate both eastward and westward from the An Lo Bridge, but primarily in Quang Dien district where its command post remained at the district town. The 2/501, its command post at FSB Pinky, was operating south and east of LZ Sally, primarily in Huong Tra district as far as Hue, keeping a liaison officer at district headquarters. The 1/501 stationed its recon platoon at Huong Thuy to protect a vital bridge on Highway 1 and to maintain contact with the district intelligence officer.

The 2/17 Cav, now based at Camp Eagle, joined us in our new AO south of Hue, with two attached platoons, one of tanks and one of USMC Ontos (several jeeps, each mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles). The 2/17 would have its own artillery battery, C/6/33 Arty, at FSB Forward nine kilo-meters SE of Phu Vang, where the squadron would occasionally establish a tactical CP.

On May 20, the 1/501 executed a first encirclement in its new AO. B/1/501 made the initial contact. It was joined by A and D Companies and by C/2/501, helilifted in from north of Hue. From the after-action report: “…under constant illumination the encircled enemy, identified as elements of the 810th Local Force Battalion, vainly attempted to escape... US casualties, 12 WIA. The enemy lost 65 KIA, 2 POW.”

Meanwhile, the 2/501’s and 1/502’s areas of operations north of Hue had become relatively quiet. D/2/501 reported one sharp action on 22 May: “…made contact with 30 NVA/VC… killed 10, captured an AK-47 and 2 RPG rounds. VC/NVA fled east – are being engaged by gunships.” Other action consisted of an occasional sprung night ambush, and support of PF platoons. On 23 May the 1/502 reported that a raid by two PF platoons killed two VC/NVA, captured 22 (two of which were NVA nurses), and seized seven AK-47 type weapons. But, relatively, things were so quiet that one company of the 2/501 conducted live-fire training exercises to orient new personnel.