United Nation Assistance Mission In Rwanda In Retrospect

by Major Abdul Latif Mohamed RMAF for Military Operation Other Than War

INTRODUCTION.

            When Kofi Annan made an official visit to a memorial for those who were killed in the Rwandan genocide, he was told politely by a local official, “We consider this site, like hundreds of others, to be a sanctuary for people who were abandoned.”[1] The fact that they were abandoned before being killed mercilessly somewhat portrayed the true capability of United Nation when the mission that ran under its name was not of significant interest to the member states, especially the big powers. Realist paradigm stands firm on this regard.

            United Nation Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) began in the late 1993, when the violent conflict between the government and the rebel that raged the country since independence, was pushed to a settlement via a peace accord. The peace accord failed since one party to the mediation, that is, the extremist faction within the government saw that they had much to loose from the agreement. Subsequently, unknown to the member states, the UNAMIR was doomed to failure from the start. Ironically, this mission was intended to be a successful peacekeeping operation to offset the failure in Somalia.[2] The U.N. staff and members wanted not only a successful operation to restore the U.N. besmirched image but also a success at a low cost. Colin Keating, New Zealand’s ambassador to the U.N. described the prospect of a successful operation in Rwanda “was like manna from heaven.”[3]

            Perhaps the saying “we are the enemy to what we do not know” holds very true in describing the interaction between UN and the indigenous political actors in Rwanda after the conclusion of the Arusha Peace accord.[4] The only party that had the grasped of the situation and hence succeeded in manipulating the events was the extremist faction of the Rwanda government. These extremists knew very well that they could send home the UN peacekeepers by killing some of them.[5] They read this message through the event that happened in Somalia. They were able to measure the effectiveness of the UN peacekeepers by provoking with hostile actions, which was not being dealt with effectively, day after day.[6] Consequently they concluded that the UN peacekeepers did not have the capability and willingness to stop the atrocities that had been planned.

            The UN or the international community did not understand that the Arusha peace accord was very fragile since the extremist element within the Rwanda government including President Habyarimana did not respect the truce and would like to see it failed in order to preserve their power. They were prepared to unleash their atrocities to block the creation of a broad based transitional government.[7] Nobody at the UN headquarters really understood the Rwandan politics and its historical root at that time.[8]

            On the other hand, the Rwanda moderate political actors who participated in the Arusha agreement did not understand the bureaucracy that governed the mechanism of UN peace operation.  Dangerously they presumed that the UN peacekeepers can be deployed the “next day” after the accord was signed;[9] the presence of UN peacekeeper can stabilize the country; and the UN peacekeeper will protect them if the extremists resort to violence.

            In the end, the UN came up with an unrealistic operation to cope up with the situation in Rwanda while the moderate politician and the innocent civilians in general relying on false impression that they were safe with the presence of the UN peacekeepers.

            Tragically, the outcome of this political debacle caused approximately eight hundred and fifty thousand people died in the ensuing violence in Rwanda. The UN suffered a humiliation for being too naïve in responding to the crisis that were beyond their comprehension.

            In this paper, we will present a brief analysis on UNAMIR. A historical background of the conflict, which led to the culmination of the Arusha Accord, will be examined, followed by the study on UNAMIR operation with respect to the crisis that developed in Rwanda. Invariably, we find that UNAMIR had successfully adhered to Chapter VI mandate but at a cost of an enormous number of lives lost in the ensuing genocide. It challenged the applicability of neutrality principle that made the UN decision maker too naïve in responding to the crisis. Apart from the failure to move from the concept of neutrality to impartiality, UNAMIR had not being able to prevent the genocide due to the unwillingness among the Security Council members to take the risk of another “Somalia”. The various factors that had been stated above especially the false perception of the UN staffs regarding Rwandan crisis and the false perception of innocent population within Rwanda regarding the presence of UNAMIR consequently lead to a disastrous outcome.

BACKGROUND ON THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA.

Rwanda, which means a land of thousand hills, is located just south of the equator in the east-central Africa. It has a population of around 9.2 million in 1992, comprising

Figure 1: Position of Rwanda with respect to Africa

around 83% Hutu, 16% Tutsi and 1% Twa. During the pre-colonial period, they lived intermingled with one another, belonged to joint clans, spoke the same Kinyarwandan language and share the same culture. Occurrences of intermarriage were common.

The situation was drastically changed when Rwanda was colonized by Belgium.[10] Public service and higher education was reserved to the Tutsi as a strategy for indirect rule[11]. Systematically, the Belgian removed the Hutu from the administrative position and assured the Tutsi monopoly of power within Rwanda. In order to affect this policy, the Belgian segregated the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa with the used of “ethnic identity card”.

Figure 2: Map of Rwanda showing key areas.

This identity card, introduced in 1933, resembled a solid fence between the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa that could no longer be crossed or reversed. Sadowski finds that the issuance of this identity card to all Rwandans eliminated the “fluid movement between castes and permanently fixing the identity of each individual, and his or her children, as either Hutu or Tutsi”.[12]

The Belgian used Tutsi administrators to oppress the majority Hutu in order to achieve their objectives. With the introduction of the segregation policy, it effectively created an impression among the oppressed Hutu that all Tutsi regardless of their position in the society as the oppressor. Ironically, “Tutsi” identity cards that were supposed to carry privileges, later on became literally death warrants in the cyclical massacres that plagued the nation for the next thirty years.

In the mid 1950s, the educated Tutsi began to embrace the idea of decolonization that was spread across Africa and demanding independence for their country. This certainly angered the Belgian who understood that their interests will no longer being served by the Tutsi. In retribution, the Belgian began to switch its preference towards the majority Hutu. Coincidently, the international community through the United Nation had been criticizing Belgium for their discriminatory colonial activities. By giving the political field to the Hutu and educating them through the Catholic schools, the Belgian managed to address both problems simultaneously.[13]

In 1959, a few Hutu that had been educated at these Catholic schools organized their movement and eventually overthrew the Tutsi oligarchy in a coup that was known as the “social revolution”. During this revolution, which lasted to 1963, thousands of Tutsi were killed and more than 100,000 fled the country[14]. Even though the Belgian did intervened to retain order when the first violent conflict occurred in 1959[15], Rwanda fell into the conflict trap; in Gurr’s term: an ethnopolitical conflict.[16] Grievances faced by the Tutsi translated into protracted violent conflict, which increases over the time. Eventually the refugees formed a political and military organization called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to further their cause, and demand their right to return.[17]

On the pretext of advancing democracy, the United Nation sponsored a Rwandan election in 1961 that legitimately transferred the power to the majority Hutu.[18] Post-independence Rwanda saw the legacy of colonial period applied in reverse. The minority Tutsi was systematically discriminated in all aspects. Gregoire Kayibanda who was the first president, rule Rwanda as a Hutu totalitarian regime. Unfortunately, during his rule from 1962 to 1973, the government and Hutu civilians massacred around 10000 Tutsi, in reprisal for every Tutsi guerilla attack at the border.

In 1978, Habyarimana who ruled over Rwanda after coup d’etat against Kayibanda in 1973, institutionalized a one party system in order to strengthen his power base.[19] This party, known as Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) was a totalitarian party where every Rwandan including babies

and old people had to be a member.[20]  Practically, Habyarimana extended his control to the lowest level of the populace.

Rwanda had been performing well economically for 12 years under his regime and the external political affiliation shifted towards the French.[21] Unfortunately, in 1986, Rwanda was hit by an economic crisis that caused the prices of its two main exports, coffee and tin crashed on the world market. Ravaging famine that ensued in 1988 severely weakened the legitimacy of Habyarimana government due to its failure to successfully address the situation. Eventually in 1990, the RPF, which consists mainly of former Tutsi soldiers serving in the Ugandan army, took the opportunity of the unstable situation to launch an invasion from the North. With the French’s assistance, the government forces managed to stop RPF advancement and push them back towards the northern border[22].

Due to the pressure from the IMF and other aid donors, Habyarimana government was forced to form a power-sharing government with four opposition parties and resolved the conflict with RPF in order to address the economic down turn of the country. [23] The four opposition parties were not very strong and always being manipulated by Habyarimana to serve MRND purposes.

Subsequent RPF attacks prompted international mediation that was sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[24] For the opposition parties, the leverage provided by the RPF increase its bargaining power against the MRND. [25] On the other hand the political liberalization and forced negotiation with RPF pressured Habyraimana and his political circle to salvage the remaining power that they had. Subsequently it led to the formation of the Hutu extremist CDR (Coalition pour la Defence de la Republique) in January 1993.[26] In order to undermine the peacemaking process, the CDR and MRND supervised the murders of political opponents and increase the violence against Tutsi populace. [27]With the deteriorating situation, the donor nations including the World Bank threatened Habyarimana that the financial assistance will be halted if he did not sign a treaty with the RPF by August 9, 1993.[28] Sensing that government coffer was close to empty due to economic recession and the military expenditure on the war, Habyarimana was obliged to sign the peace agreement on August 4, 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania.[29]

THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORD.

            In essence, this accord consists of two protocols. Firstly it covers the integration of the armed forces of the government and the RPF. Secondly, it deals with various other issues including human rights violations, rule of law, power sharing, transitional institution, resettlement for displaced persons and reparation for refugees. A timetable was drawn up for a projected period of two month in which a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) should be established within thirty-seven day after signing of the agreement, that is, by September 10, 1993 and end with a fair and free election[30].

            On the surface the parties to the negotiations seemed to be successful in paving a way for a stable Rwanda, but “underneath they were quite fearful of the future because the extremist were venomously opposed to the accords.”[31]

            The only real achievement that came out from Arusha accords was the ability of the international mediators to persuade all the parties involved “to put their signatures” on a piece of paper.[32] According to Prunier, Habyarimana himself signed the agreement as “a tactical move calculated to buy time, shore up the contradictions of the various segments of the opposition and look good in the eyes of the foreign donors.”[33]

Understanding the grave situation in Rwanda, the parties to the negotiations “told Boutros Ghali that they hoped that the international force would be on the ground before September 10 so that it could help facilitate and oversee the establishment of [BBTG]”.[34] In response, Boutros Ghali stated that such request was impossible and explained to them the “cumbersome UN procedures.”[35] In fact, the Security Council only authorized UNAMIR on October 5, 1993. [36]

THE UNAMIR.

            Against these settings, UNAMIR was deployed to assist in implementing the Arusha agreement and support the BBTG according to the mandate in Annex A.

Based on the findings of UN reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda which is part of UNOMUR, Boutros Ghali proposed a force of 2548 peacekeepers, plus various military, civilian and police personnel to undertake the tasks of UNAMIR.[37] “The United Nations solicited troop contributions, but initially only Belgium with a half a battalion of 400 troops, and Bangladesh with a logistical element of 400 troops, offered personnel. It took five months to reach the authorized strength of 2,548”[38].

The UNAMIR troops were plagued with the same problems that were faced by “virtually all peacekeeping operations, [that is], lacked of trained personnel, equipment, and finances”[39]. As Laegreid contends “The Rwanda operation was in this matter not a unique case, but the limitation would have devastating consequences when the crisis erupted in early April.”[40]

On the other hand, the United States who bears a large amount of UN peacekeeping costs “had suffered 370 percent increase in peacekeeping expenses from 1992 to 1993 and was in the process of reviewing its policy on such operation.”[41] Consequently it was determined to keep the cost of UNAMIR as low as possible.[42] The UNAMIR budget was only approved on April 4, 1994, and this delay coupled with low funding prevented UNAMIR being equipped with enough ammunition and armored personnel carriers (APC) when the genocide began on April 6, 1994[43].

Brigadier General Romeo Dellaire, who had been the UNOMUR’s commander, was tapped again to lead the UNAMIR under the Secretary General Special Representative, Jacques Booh-Booh from Cameroon. Dallaire arrived in Kigali on October 22, followed by Booh-Booh a few weeks later. The Belgian and Bangladeshi forces which formed up the Kigali battalion arrived in the first week of December and by December 28, the force accumulated only 1260 personnel from a dozen of different countries.[44] Organization of UNAMIR at the end of March 1994 was as shown in the figure 3.[45]

The deployment of UNAMIR was structured into four phases. Phases I began with the departure of foreign forces and the mission objective were to establish a secure condition to institute broad based transitional government (BBTG). Once BBTG is installed, UNAMIR should move into phase II that call for the preparation for disengagement, demobilization, and integration of former belligerents. In phase III, the objective to disengage, demobilize and integrate the former belligerents should be completed. In the final phase, the objective is to normalize the situation and subsequent withdrawal of UNAMIR upon the completion of election process.

Phase I was completed successfully by UNAMIR including the additional task of establishing an operation area in Southern Rwanda to mitigate the effect caused by the influx of refugees who fled Burundi due to ethnic violence.[46] Unfortunately, Habyarimana kept delaying the formation of the BBTG by challenging the interpretation of the Arusha Accords.

Des Forges charged that the UNAMIR was devoid of provision “for gathering information about political and military developments” through out its deployment since the Belgium, U.S., France and Germany diplomatic representatives who had good sources of information failed to communicate it to the UNAMIR[47]. This was evident in the Dallaire’s comments published in the Canadian Press, “A lot of the world powers were all there with their embassies and their military attaches. And you can’t tell me those bastards didn’t have a lot of information. They would never pass that information on to me, ever.”[48]

But it is naïve to presume that UNAMIR was totally ignorant of the incoming calamities. At the end of 1993, minister Felicien Gatabazi sent a letter to Dallaire warning “in clear terms of the danger that was brewing.”[49] He insisted that Dallaire should request for a new operational rules from UN headquarters that would allow UNAMIR personnel to intervene to stop massacres.[50] Dallaire also received letters from Senior officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces drawing his attentions to the increased incidence of violence that was planned to incite the RPF to violate the cease-fire, “which will then give a pretext for the general resumption of hostilities.”[51] Adding to this background the extremist’s radio station (RTLM) had been broadcasting daily calls to violence against Tutsis and dissidents.[52]At this stage, “Dallaire and other UNAMIR officials were now keenly aware that they were supervising a highly explosive situation”.[53] Dallaire’s requests to UN headquarters for more troops and a broader interpretation of UNAMIR’s mandate to tailor the situation were repeatedly refused.[54]

The most detailed warning was delivered to Dallaire on January 11, by Jean-Pierre Twatzinze who had personal ties to the palace and involved in training the Interahamwe.[55] According to him the Hutu elites had been busy planning to exterminate all Tutsis and transforming the Interahamwe into a killing machine. Weapons had been stockpiled and ethnic cleansing would begin once the BBTG was established. Calculating that the Interahamwe would not be able to fight a two front war with RPF and UN, they were planning to killed several Belgian peacekeepers which they assessed will caused Belgium to pull out their troops (which they learnt from Somalia event). He offered to take UNAMIR to the weapon cache and promised to supply more information if UN could guarantee a protection for himself, his wife and four children.[56]

In response, Dallaire sent a cable to his superior at the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) in New York detailing the information that he received. He stated that he planned to seize the arms within thirty-six hours and requesting protection for Jean Pierre. He concluded the cable by saying “Where there is a will, there is a way. Let’s do it”[57]. Unfortunate, DPKO responded by stating that UNAMIR mandate did not permit such action and directed Dallaire to discuss the information with Habyarimana. Furthermore protection for Jean-Pierre could not be offered.[58]

The effect was damaging. After the meeting with Habyarimana, Dallaire concluded, “the president and officials of his political party were bewildered by the specificity of the information at our disposal. The president of MRND seemed unnerved and is reported to have subsequently ordered an accelerated distribution of weapons”.[59]

While Dallaire repeatedly request for a more flexible mandate, the Secretary General repeatedly “underline that the success of the mission depended on the cooperation of the Rwandese parties and their willingness to implement the Arusha Agreement.”[60] Furthermore, the DPKO viewed Dallaire’s plan as an attempt to repeat UNOSOM’s failure, and “they feared that the Interahamwe would give an Aideed-like response to a UNOSOM-like provocation.”[61]

The genocide began in the evening of April 6, 1994 after the aircraft that carried Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down while on approach into Kigali airport. Immediately the extremist set into actions, killing individuals who were high on their hit lists. During the first phase of the slaughter, prominent opposition politicians, human right activists, lawyers, critical journalists and moderate civil servants were targeted.[62] “Hours after the plane crash, Dallaire sent a message to New York saying, ‘Give me the means and I can do more.’ DPKO’s immediate reply was that ‘nobody is interested in that’.”[63] Dallaire’s attempt to save the Rwanda prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana failed when the ten Belgian soldiers that he dispatched to protect her, laid down their weapons in compliance with the demand of the government soldiers, “in order to keep up with their mandate.” The prime minister was killed and the Belgians were taken to Camp Kigali where they were tortured and mutilated.[64] Attempts to protect other politicians also proved fruitless, since basically the UNAMIR personnel had to negotiate with the killers in order to carry out their duties. On April 8, RPF renewed the war especially to rescue their 600 men who were trapped in Kigali[65]. In the words of Laegreid, “The radical deterioration of the situation after 6 April put UNAMIR in an impossible situation. Its mandate was closely tied to the peace agreement, and the success of the operation required that the Rwandan parties work to implement the Accords. Both premises vanished in early April.”[66]

During the first week of the genocide, the Security Council attention’s was focused “on the evacuation of foreign nationals from Rwanda”[67]. Consequently, UNAMIR was tasked to “assist and help coordinate [the] evacuation effort” despite its meager resources were stretched thin trying to prevent the massacres.[68] The evacuation events were deplorable and described by Dallaire as obscene.[69] No effort was made to supply the provision for the UNAMIR forces via the empty aircrafts that came to pick up the foreigners. Dallaire was told by DPKO not to act beyond the mandate while protecting the Rwandan but may exercise discretion if essential for the evacuation of the foreign nationals[70]. The Belgian withdrew its battalion on April 19 and consequently Dallaire had to redeploy the Ghanaian battalion form DMZ to Kigali in order to protect his own force and the civilians.   

As the genocide ravaging through out Rwanda, the Security Council was debating whether to withdraw UNAMIR or changed the mandate for intervention.[71] The camp that insisted for withdrawal argued that Rwanda was not a genuine threat to international peace and security and the future of UN peacekeeping should be considered since it depends on the willingness of member states to provide troops. Failure of Security Council to take necessary measures to protect their soldiers will cause them to refuse sending troops in the future.

The camp that insisted on intervention did not have much to convince. Not a single UNAMIR soldier representing their country. Absence of viable peace process and ceasefire, which are the precondition for UN peacekeepers’ presence, blunt their argument. They could only use moral argument to stop the massacres - not a winnable argument in a realist world. On April 21, The Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR strength to 270 personnel with an adjusted mandate, that is, to negotiate a ceasefire, provide humanitarian relief operations, and monitor developments in Rwanda.[72]

As reports of genocide reached the outside world, public outcry pressured Security Council to revise the UNAMIR mandate. On May 17, almost six weeks after the genocide began, Resolution 918 was passed that increased UNAMIR strength to 5500 troops[73]. Still authorized under Chapter VI, UNAMIR is to provide safe condition for displaced peoples; assist and protect the relief efforts of humanitarian organizations; and provide protection sites for displaced peoples throughout Rwanda. The next usual problem was to solicit troops and equipments from member states. By the time full strength was achieved, the genocide was already over with nearly 850 000 peoples killed.[74]

The UN did authorized France’s intention to conduct humanitarian intervention on June 22 that operated under Chapter VII for duration of sixty days. Dubbed as Operation Turquoise, the 2500 French soldiers quickly established a “humanitarian protected zone” in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda.[75] Even though this operation provide sanctuary for around fifteen to twenty-five thousand Tutsis, it was criticized for providing a safe passage to the retreating genocidaires and Rwandan forces who fled the RPF advancement.[76]

By August 94, the RPF had controlled most of Rwanda and established a new government in Kigali. But the Hutu leaders coupled with their Interahamwe band who fled across the borders also encouraged and forced nearly 2 million of the population to go with them. [77]

The exodus into neighboring countries captured international intention since the media covered it widely. With the new situation brewing, UNAMIR’s  tasks “were to ensure stability in the northwestern and southwestern regions of Rwanda; to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of displaced population; to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda; and to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.”[78]

Unfortunately, the strong presence of UNAMIR after the genocide was over drew severe criticism from the new government. The discomfort is easily understood. UNAMIR had failed to stop the genocide that happened in front their eyes, and “now” they are providing humanitarian assistance for the fleeing genocidaires and halting the government effort to deal effectively with the cross-border insurgencies by Interahamwe and former government forces. Apart from that, the presence of UNAMIR prevented the new government from receiving bilateral military support, and UNAMIR itself, in the word of Laegreid “had become a mission without a credible rationale since its humanitarian functions could be better provided by humanitarian agencies that did not antagonize the population to the same extent.”[79]

Finally when UNAMIR mandate ends on March 8, 1996, it was not renewed and the withdrawal of the forces began on March 9 and was completed on April 19,1996.

CONCLUSION.

For the people who were threatened into the grave situation, UNAMIR simply vanished into thin air when the genocide began. As Des Forges observes in her report “As the killers began their assaults, everyone in Rwanda – Rwandan and foreigner – looked to UNAMIR to see what it would do. The killers watched to see if it would threaten them; by and large, it did not. People at risk counted on it to protect them; for the vast majority of Rwandans, it did not do that either.”[80]

As had been described in detail above, UNAMIR’s Force Commander,  Dallaire was forced to carry out his duty with his hand tied at the back. The knot was tightened after the murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers. Dallaire was ordered not to take risk or any action that might lead to reprisals. This was later commented bitterly by Dallaire, “An operation should begin with the objective and then consider how best to achieve it with minimal risk. Instead our operation began with an evaluation of risk and if there was risk, the objective was forgotten. You can begin by asking if there is risk. If there is no risk, they could have sent Boy Scouts, not soldiers.”[81]

The failure of UNAMIR to prevent the genocide was largely attributed to the unwillingness of member states to commit their resources to a task that was not beneficial to their national interest. Apart from suffering the trauma of Somalia, the American was interested in cost cutting for peacekeeping operation to tame the congress. The Belgian were interested in saving face while withdrawing their forces, and “the French were interested in saving their ally, the genocidal government”.[82] On the other hand, the members that were interested to intervene did not have the commitment to supply the troops.

The success of UNAMIR if assessed according to Diehl’s guidelines only stopped at the first phase of its deployment. This is concurred by Durch in his book[83]. Diehl suggested two criteria to evaluate the traditional peacekeeping operation: how well the mission prevents violent conflict in its area of deployment and how much it facilitated resolution of the conflict.[84] The first criterion was achieved clearly by UNAMIR during the first phase but the achievement of the second criteria was a bit ambiguous since the extremists were increasingly hostile to the resolution. Anyway, if the extremists were absent, Rwandan history will be very much different, and UNAMIR will be a very successful operation, something like UNTAC but at a lower cost; as had been dreamt by many at the UN headquarters.

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