1. F.W. de Klerk
2. Hendrik Verwoerd
3. P.W. Botha
4. Jan de Klerk
5. Wimpie de Klerk
6. Marike de Klerk
7. Mike Louw
8. Niel Barnard
9. Willie Esterhuyse
10. Con Botha
11. Hans Strijdom
12. Jan Mentz
13. Piet Badenhorst
14. Petrius Malan Cillie
15. Barry Hertzog
16. D.F. Malan
17. Pik Botha
18. Kobie Coetsee
19. Chris Heunis
20. Pieter de Lange
21. Kobus Jordaan
22. Sam de Beer
23. Attie du Plessis
24. Barend du Plessis
25. Mof Terreblanche
26. Louis Kriel
27. Andries Treurnicht
28. Aubrey du Toit
29. Jimmy Kruger
30. Robie Leibbrandt (WWII)
31. Christiaan de Wet (WWI)
32. Fanie van der Merwe
33. Stoffel van der Merwe
34. Johan Heyns
35. Gerrit Viljoen
36. Roelf Meyer
37. Magnus Malan
38. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert
39. Basie Smit
40. Jakes Bleeker
41. Richard Goldstone
42. Krappies Engelbrecht
43. Eugene de Kock
44. Adriaan Vlok
45. Hernus Kriel
46. Tertius Delport
47. Derek Keys
48. Dawie de Villiers
49. Leon Wessels
50. Janusz Waluz
51. Eugene Terre’blanche
52. Richard Carter
53. Tertius Delport
54. Fanie Uys
55. Alwyn Wolfaard
56. Nic Fourie

1. Nelson Mandela
2. Winnie Mandela
3. Mac Maharaj
4. Thambo Mbeki
5. Oliver Tambo
6. Chris Hani
7. Jacob Zuma
8. Cyril Ramaphosa
9. Joe Slovo
10. John Vorster
11. Pieter Willem
12. Steve Biko
13. Govan Mbeki
14. Jay Naldoo
15. Harry Openheimer
16. Bobby Godsell
17. Dirk Coetzee
18. Griffiths Mxenge
19. Parks Mankahlana
20. Seretse Choabe
21. Matthew Goniwe
22. Joe Modise
23. Mohammed Valli Moosa
24. Walter Sisulu
25. Breyton Breytonbach
26. Alfred Nzo
27. Desmond Tutu
28. Penuella Meduna
29. Pallo Jordan
30. Ronnie Kasrils
31. Frene Ginwala
32. Trevor Manuel
33. Tito Mboweni
34. Alec Erwin
35. Johannes Tladi
36. Thozamile Botha

1. Mangosuthu Buthelezi
2. Nkosi Dhlamini
3. Philip Powell
4. Joe Matthews
5. Goodwill Zwelithini
6. King Shaka
7. King Cetshwayo

1. Henry A. Kissinger
2. Chester Crocker
3. Herman Nickel
4. Ronald Reagan
5. Bill Clinton
6. Margaret Thatcher
7. Kenneth Kaunda
8. Harry Openheimer ?
9. Tony Bloom ?
10. Vernon Webber
11. Gavin Relly ?
12. Michael Young ?
13. Franz Josef Strauss
14. Malcolm Fraser
15. Olusegun Obasanjo
16. Lord Barder
17. Moni Malhoutra
18. Helmut Kohl
19. Robin Renwick
20. Harold Macmillan ?
21. Washingotn Okumu

Quotes from Waldmeir’s Anatomy of a Miracle

• ”These were two crucial breaches in the dyke of apartheid – relaxing the job color bar and extending black education. …Spending on mass black education – by Verwoerd, ironically, as much as by Vorster – produced generations of politicized students to man the barricades during both the Soweto uprising and the upheavals of the 1980s.” – p. 26
• ”even more important, collective bargaining between black labor and white business provided a model for the peaceful resolution of conflict in the political arena as well. For it was in the world of industrial relations that South Africans designed, tested, and perfected the negotiating paradigm which eventually delivered a new South Africa.” – p. 28
• ”The influx of black South Africans to the towns was “the main factor in defeating apartheid” … But he believes morality also played a role. “Of course a thing like that [apartheid], if it doesn’t work, becomes immoral, …I think people began to realize that a bit.” – p. 30
• ”The economy was suffering from apartheid labor and economic policies; black political opposition was finally rising from its long depression; the international community was increasingly hostile; Marxist regimes in neighboring countries posed a threat to state security; and Afrikaners had begun to recognize and act against the political and social contradictions implicit in apartheid.” – p. 35
• ”It involved repression at home coupled with military operations against neighboring states to dissaude them from harboring the ANC. – p. 44
• “In 1983, [Botha] made the first decisive break with the concept of a white nation when he introduced the new “tricameral” Constitution. The new Constitution created the three-chambered Parliament, with separate houses for whites, coloureds, and Indians, according to a ratio that roughly mirrored the country’s demography – 4:2:1. Whites continued to dominate the system, both numerically and through strong new powers granted tot he (white) state president. …The introduction of the tricameral Parliament was a moment fo truth for whites. It provoked the first major split in Afrikaner politics: …whites were divided by it and blacks united against it. – p. 45
• ”Congress resolved that all South Africans, black and white, would be citizens of one state, whether or not they lived in areas designated as “homelands” (except those living in the four trival areas which has already accepted independence from South Africa – Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda). – p 45
• ”Esterhuyse identifies two phases to the talks. First, the two sides had to discuss the issue of how to start negotiating. After a year or so, they moved on to the second stage, a discussion of positions and principles. When would the ANC suspend its armed struggle? Would it accept a multi-party interim government to rule in the transition to full democracy? What about constitutional safeguards for the white minority? And crucially, what economic system did it favor? – p. 79
• “[The Eminent Person’s Group (EPG)’s ] terms for negotiation: The government must release political prisoners, unban the ANC, and halt its violent campaign against blacks. In exchange, the ANC must temporarily suspend (not renounce) violence, and start talking.” – p. 96
• “The negotiations began in earnest. Coetsee went straight to the heart of the matters dividing the two sides: Under what circumstances would the ANC suspend armed struggle? Did Mandela speak for the movement as a whole? Did he envisage constitutional guarantee for minorities? – p. 98
• “Pretoria was even more optimistic about electoral success, believing it could put together a moderate coalition with leaders like Chief Buthelezi of Inkatha, to outvote the ANC at the polls. At the very least, the National Party expected to emerge an equal partner with the ANC, after any election. Defeat, surrender, capitulation were not on the agenda.” – 103
• ”Morality, religion, ideology – in the end, they all bow to pragmatism. For de Klerk, apartheid’s greatest sin was that it failed the reality test. ‘If one believes a policy is unworkable, it becomes immoral to advocate it… [apartheid] is wrong because it is unworkable,” he once told a television interviewer. His logic, as always, was impeccable: Apartheid had failed, therefore it became immoral; because it was immoral, it must be replaced; to replace it, government must talk to the ANC; but the ANC could not negotiate without its lead, so he must be released from jail; and he could not be released to lead an illegal organization, so the ANC must be unbanned.” – 116
• “All the main pillars of the Afrikaner establishment – the Church, the press, the universities, the business community, the Broederbond – had withdrawn their support for apartheid. But its ideology – communism – was in even more trouble. Only weeks after de Klerk became president, the Berlin Wall fell. Deprived of their cherished ideologies, both sides were more amenable to reason.” – 117
• “Understandable, communism terrified the Afrikaner, for in South Africa, where race and class were synonymous, Communist class warfare would mean race warfare. And there was no way whites, representing only 12 percent of the population, could win such a battle; they saw communism as an invitation to race suicide. Afrikaners objected to it on economic, and political, but also religious grounds; many believed that an ANC Communist government would not only confiscate their homes and farms but abolish churches altogether.” – 121
• “[De Klerk’s] goal was to create a system of power sharing based on group rights, which would preserve a modified form of minority power in South Africa. He was decidedly opposed to majority rule, or “simple majoritarianism,” as he sometimes called it, because that would end white domination in a single stroke…although he was prepared to allow the black majority to vote and create legislation, he wanted to retain a minority veto. …De Klerk joined the battle because he thought he had a fighting chance to outsmart and outmaneuver the ANC in negotiations; just possible even to outvote them, by forming a coalition with moderate black leaders like Chief Buthelezi, or at the least to deny them an overwhelming majority; and if all else failed, to overrule them in a new power-sharing government.” – 135
• General summary of the Groote Schuur Minute: “Pretoria must lift the state of emergency; the ANC must reconsider the armed struggle; and the two side must agree on a definition of political crimes before they could bring up to forty thousand political exiles back home and get the remaining political prisoners out of jails. Then, constitutional negotiations could begin.” – 146
• “In August 1989, [the ANC] published the document known as the Harare Declaration, which set out a host of preconditions to negotiation: Legalize the ANC< release all political prisoners, end the state of emergency, remove all troops from the townships.” – 148
• “The organization had little in the way of a negotiating strategy, scant organizational competence, and few ideas about the new South Africa, or how to achieve it. As Joe Slovo told me at the time, ‘We’ve had to devote the bulk of our energies to getting her – not to what we’re going to do when we arrive.’”
• “…the urban-based UDF, which opposed what it considered Inkatha’s ‘backward’ tribalism. They condemned Chief Buthelezi as a ‘collaborator’ with the white government, for though he had refused ‘independence’ for his KwaZulu black homeland under apartheid, he accepted a salary from Pretoria to run it. He paid traditional chief from the homeland coffers, and so controlled them. That gave his Inkatha movement an iron grip over rural Zululand, which the ‘comrades’ fought with their lives. The radical UDF, on the other hand, was run largely by Communist trade unionists in the province. It promised equality, industrial power, and socialist redistribution of wealth. Employed, educated, urban, youthful Zulus inclined to the UDF; the rural poor, squatters, older traditionalists, and migrant workers preferred Inkatha. In crowded, underdeveloped, underemployed Natal, these were the perfect conditions for civil war.” – 153
• “To be a Zulu, in Inkatha’s book, meant youth must obey age, and everyone must obey the chief and his headmen. They control access to land, housing, health care, education, water, and other services, and are empowered by the KwaZulu government to decide all but the most serious criminal cases.” – 155
• “They were fighting, ostensibly, about politics, But few people in either village could have identified the policies of their adopted parties if their lives depended on it (which they did not). Joseph was ANC; but … [he was] apparently unaware of his party’s devotion to the idea of a South Africa where tribal labels are shunned. Samuel could recite Inkatha policies; but his affiliation appeared to be based on his position as a paid Inkatha official rather than true commitment. They were fighting about power, not policy.” – 155
• Three Separations after Codesa I:
  1. ”[De Klerk] wanted to pick and choose between the various attributes of a democratic state, to find those that would best protect the power of his minority constituency. So he wanted a bill of rights to protect the civil and and property rights of the individual; and independent judiciary as a check on state power; and separation of powers between legislature and executive, and between central government and the provinces.” – 178
  2. “[De Klerk] did not want the majority to rule, the most central tenet of democracy, for that would consign his people to permanent, hopeless, impotent opposition. …So he sought artificially to balance power between vastly unequal ethnic groups, with a constitution that enforced multi-party coalition government. That would mean cabinet posts shared out according to each party’s proportion of the vote; extra representation for minorities in an upper house of Parliament, coupled with special high majorities for passage of some legislation in the lower house; a presidency that would revolve between the leaders of rival parties, rather than residing in one man; the requirement that cabinet decisions be taken by consensus, a system that would give each party an effective veto over the others.” – 178
  3. “The [third] issue was federalism. The ANC wanted a highly centralized state, a fact that enraged Chief Buthelezi, who manufactured a reason not to attend Codesa. Buthelezi was fighting for maximum devolution of power, the only constitutional formula which would given regionally based leaders like himself any power.” – 179
• “[De Klerk] offered that day to clear away the biggest obstacle to a deal, when he agreed for the first time that the new South African Constitution should be written by elected representatives of the people.” – 179
• “[De Klerk] proposed a compromise: the nineteen Codesa parties would write and ‘interim’ constitution. That document would provide the ground rules for the first all-race elections, which would choose a constituent assembly and an interim government to rule for at least ten years. The elected constituent assembly would then give South Africa its final Constitution. But it would not have a free hand. It would be bound by firm principles agreed to at Codesa, including, if de Klerk had his way, permanently entrenched power sharing, devolution of power, protection for minorities, and other checks and balances. The old would not give way to the new overnight, as the ANC demanded, but would face imperceptibly away. Whites would have something like ten years to get used to the idea of losing power.” – 179
• “F.W. de Klerk had just announced that he was putting his more optimistic vision of the future to a vote: he had called a snap referendum of white voters to take place on March 17, 1992. They would be asked to endorse or reject the new South Africa. … As it turned out, South Africans voted massively for change – by a majority of 68.7 percent on a turnout of 86 percent of the white electorate (only the northern Transvaal voted against it).” – 183, 184
• “[The National Party] suggested that a two-thirds vote would be enough to pass most constitutional clauses in the assembly. But those dealing with a bill of rights, devolution of power, multi-party democracy, and minority rights would need a three-quarters majority. It also proposed that a Senate, representing minorities, should pass the interim constitution by a two-thirds vote. The effect of this would be to give minorities a veto over crucial clauses in the constitution, unless the majority controlled more than three quarters of the assembly.” – 187
• “’What was clear was that the regime was not ready to settle. Why not? Because the security forces were concerned about their future – they were not going to go along with an agreement that would put them before a firing squad; why should they? The civil service would not make the settlement happen if it meant that the day after the elections they would all lose their pensions and walk the streets. The National Party were not philanthropists; there had to be something in it for them…and we had to try and understand what they wanted.’ The idea of ‘sunset clauses’ began to gain currency. These were measures to protect the vested interests of whites: job guarantees for white civil servants and security force members; pension protection; amnesty for apartheid crimes; and most of all, compulsory power sharing for a fixed number of years after the adoption of the interim constitution, including a coalition cabinet enforced by law.” – 198
• Joe Slovo in the African Communist newspaper: “First, he told them a few home truths, which many had yet to accept: That Pretoria was not a defeated enemy, and as such, could not be expected to give up power voluntarily; that they must prepare to accept a deal which was ‘less than perfect’; that steps should be taken to get white soldiers, police, and civil servants on side, because they might otherwise destabilize the new democracy. He argued that the ANC should seize the initiative – and the moral high ground – with a package of concessions on compulsory power sharing.” – 199
• “The Record of Understanding included measures, such as the fencing off of Inkatha hostels and the banning of Zulu traditional weapons, which were bound to enrage Chief Buthelezi. The Record of Understanding convinced Buthelezi that the ANC and National Party were ganging up on him.” – 201
• “The ANC had originally set fourteen preconditions for returning to talks, but after Bisho, these were reduced to three: releasing a number of political prisoners, including three ANC members convicted of terrorist murders; fencing in Inkatha hostels; and stopping Inkatha members from carrying “traditional weapons” in public.” – 201
• “ANC negotiators insisted that the talks should set a date for the first all-race elections. Agreement on a constitution to govern the elections then seemed impossible distant, but the ANC did not care.” – 210
• “In the meantime, they went about the business of writing a classic, liberal democratic interim constitution for South Africa. It broadly incorporated the principles of separating power between the three branches of government (executive, legislature, and judiciary), spreading it from the center to the provinces, and preventing the misuse of power. It included a bill of rights enforceable in the courts, to protect human rights and individual property; a constitutional court to resolve disputes and ensure that the constitution reigned supreme in the new state; and it assigned some limited powers to provinces.” – 213
• “The constitution also included other provisions aimed directly at appeasing the National Party: guarantees for the jobs and pensions of white civil servants (though these were later proved to be less than watertight); and provisions for the first local government elections, which would give white voters in conservative rural areas a heavier weighting in the poll.” – 213
• “The rift between Inkatha and the others was fundamental. Inkatha wanted the new South Africa to be a federal state, one where regional governments would have strong powers. …Under such a system, Inkatha, as a regional party, would have a change to rule in Natal. But for the ANC, federalism was “the ‘f’ word”: four decades of apartheid – itself a demented form of federalism – had discredited the concept forever. The ANC feared that by devolving power to regions, it would lose the ability to control government at the center. ANC officials argued that federalism would create chaos and constrain development.” –226
• “Their bitterness could not obscure the central fact. Buthelezi’s decision to participate was impossibly, almost miraculously good news, for the fate of the first election. Three days before the poll, the Volkstaat Accord was finally signed, sealing the participation of Constand Viljoen. Every significant political group in South Africa had now agreed to contest the poll: the ANC and the National Party; the radical right Freedom Front and the radical left Pan Africanist Congress; and now Inkatha. Only the rump of the ultra-radical right – the Conservative Party and the AWB – were left out. United by a common danger – the risk of a descent into barbarism – the soldier and the statesman, the politician and the chief had finally chosen a future based on broadly common values. Each had demonstrated that essential attribute of the reasonable man: that if the price was right, he would compromise. They had compromised on a new South Africa which none of them really liked – and then decided they were stuck with it. Three hundred and fifty years of South African history had taught them that they could not live without each other. Now they would no longer try. – 235
• “The ANC got 62.7 percent of the vote, short of the two-thirds majority it would have needed to write a new constitution on its own. …The National Party got 20.4 percent of the vote, just above the important psychological barrier of 20 percent, but well below its hopes. …It may not have been an accurate result, but it was a designer outcome. The African National Congress got just enough of the vote to exercise real power, without dominating. The National Party gained enough to avoid humiliation. The Inkatha Party got control of its home base, newly christened KwaZulu-Natal. The Freedom Front got 680,000 votes in the provincial ballots, out of a total Afrikaner electorate of 1.8 million – enough to be taken seriously in its demands for self-determination. The radical left, the Pan Africanist Congress, got almost nothing (1.25 percent), proving once against that the vast majority of South Africans eschewed political extremes. – 246
• “That mission did not end on the day apartheid ceased to exist. Mandela vowed to dedicate the rest of his life to completing the unfinished business of liberation – the psychological, economic, and social emancipation of South Africa. He would preach his religion of non-racialism to all his countrymen. He would create powerful symbols of a single nationhood, to unite the many peoples of South Africa in one rainbow. And he would tackle the toughest challenge of all: the battle for economic equality and prosperity, which would determine the fate of democracy itself.” – 254
• “The main difference, for white, was the surge in violent crime, which took the murder rate to ten times the U.S. level. White felt politically secure, but physically threatened. The violence was not racist…and it was less a product of black rule than a legacy of poor policing bequeathed by the old government. Poverty drove the criminals, who found automatic weapons easy to come by once the township political battles had largely ceased. The new government found it difficult to reestablish respect for the law, undermined both by apartheid and by the ANC’s own ungovernability campaign of the 1980s.” –260
• “Hopefully, the same factors that brought South Africa together for the 1994 election will keep it together: the realities of economic interdependence; the expectations of the outside world; and above all, the essential pragmatism of South Africans. Before the election, they were repeatedly and temptingly faced with the chance to destroy their country and to further their own sectional interests. They always refused, and there seems at least a chance that they will continue to do so.” – 266

• “Brute force could keep the Afrikaner in power until the early part of the next century, but it was not worth the cost in economic devastation." – page 53
• “The Afrikaner nation was on the move. Not fast enough, however, to forestall an economic and diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, sparked by international opposition to apartheid.” – page 53
• “The [Rubicon] speech inaugurated an era of economic sanctions and international isolation that would end only with Botha’s departure from power. Ever defensive, P.W. Botha remains adamant that his Rubicon speech did not provoke the economic state of emergency wchich paralyzed South Africa for much of the rest of the decade. And technically, he is right. Chase Manhattan Bank prompted an international crisis of confidence in South Africa’s finances when it stopped rolling over loans to South African borrowers. But it made that decision at the end of July 1985, two weeks before Rubicon.” – page 56
• “The Chase move was crippling, for where it withdrew, others followed. With some two thirds of the country’s $24 billion foreign debt short term, South Africa was perilously exposed to such action. Even before Botha spoke, the country was facing the most acute financial crisis of its history. But the speech made matters immeasurably worse. The South African currency, the Rand, fell precipitately; capital fled by all means, legal and illegal; markets were forced to close and the government declared bankruptcy, imposing a unilateral moratorium on the repayment of foreign debt. Though these debts were later rescheduled, and Pretoria resumed payments, South Africa was shunned thereafter, economically and financially, as well as diplomatically and morally. …In August 1986, the U.S. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, a package of highly visible measures including a ban on new U.S. investment and loans, on landing rights, and on imports, among them, coal, uranium, iron, and steel. The Commonwealth and European Community also imposed various sanctions. Taken together, these hurt far less than the financial sanctions, which seriously inhibited Pretoria’s ability to pay for apartheid.” – page 56
• “It was in the area of economics however that the stalemate was most telling. The economy had not been destroyed by the forces ranged against it, from trade sanctions to disinvestment to the foreign lending ban to the township revolt; but neither could it grow. By early 1989, the fact had begun to worry both sides. …For economic prosperity was by then a major concern of both sides. Afrikaners were rapidly outgrowing their ethnic paranoia, and worried as much about their swimming pools as about their language; and Africans wanted development even more than they wanted democracy. Neither would be able to enjoy the good things of life if South Africa was left a wasteland.” – page 117
• “Economic activity had been minimal since the 1970s; from 1980 to 1985, it averaged only 1.2 percent per year. Growth was depressed by apartheid itself; by a number of economic shocks, including the severest drought of the century, and fluctuations in the gold price; by the uncontrolled spending of homeland governments and the huge triplicated bureaucracies introduced under the tricameral constitution, and by the rising costs of internal unrest (man-days lost to strikes, most of them political, rose nearly 1000 percent between 1983 and 1985, and the government lost hundreds of millions of Rands a year in township rend and service payment boycotts). Sanctions exacerbated the situation, but they were not its primary cause. South African exporters were proving well equal to the task of circumventing trade sanctions, albeit at a cost. After dipping initially, while exporters looked for new markets – and clandestine ways to penetrate existing ones closed by sanctions – export volumes rose by 26 percent from 1985 to 1989. Disinvestment also appear to have had little direct effect on economic growth. Many disinvesting companies simply sold their assets cheaply to local white businessmen, but maintained non-equity links such as franchise, licensing, and technology agreements that permitted them to keep operating. But if these politically inspired sanctions had only limited effect, the same could not be said of the restrictions imposed by the international financial markets, where decisions were determined more by risk than by politics. By the time de Klerk became president, South Africa had lost some R30 billion in capital outflows (a hemorrhage of R6 billion per year, or $2 billion at the prevailing exchange rate), both in debt repayments necessitated by the foreign loan moratorium and in illegal capital flight. Foreign reserves had shrunk to a level where they could cover only just over five weeks’ imports, a perilous situation for any country. South Africa, which needed to import capital to grow, was forced to export it to repay old debts. The government was in an impossible bind. To make repayments in foreign currency, it needed a trade surplus. That meant boosting exports and depressing imports; but suppressing imports, in this import-dependent economy, meant choking off growth; and without growth, it was impossible either to buy off the township revolt or to keep white constituents in the style to which apartheid had accustomed them. Quite apart from capital exported to pay debt, large amounts were spent at home to develop strategic industries that would circumvent the international oil and arms embargoes. South Africa spend many billions building a sophisticated arms industry as well as an oil-from-coal industry to supply its energy requirements.” – page 118
• “De Klerk was struggling to find a way to end white rule without surrendering white prosperity, while Mandela was determined to redistribute wealth along with power. …Business and labor and government and institutions of civil society would be fighting over how to distribute economic power for years to come.” – page 237
• “ANC economic thinking was dominated by the South African Communist Party; the party believed it had to control economic production, in order to redistribute wealth. The ANC’s policy in 1955 – when it published its economic blueprint, the Freedom Charter – had been the nationalization of mines, banks, and “monopoly industries.” – page 237
• “Yet four years later, Mandela took office armed with an economic policy indistinguishable from that of any other liberal democratic leader on earth: nationalization was out, privatization was on the horizon, capitalism was to be encouraged and nurtured to provide growth, fiscal and financial discipline were dogma.” – page 238
• “Mandela urged his colleagues to remove the word “nationalization” from their policy; they refused. In the end, he suggested a compromise. Everyone agreed that not only nationalization but privatization were possible policy options.” – page 241
• “Keys brought home to the ANC the extent of the fiscal crisis they would inherit from the previous government: the high level of government debt and the bloated civil service. Servicing the one and paying the other would consume 91 percent of the government budget, leaving only 9 percent for development expenditure. Spending on social services like education and health was already high by international standards (though inefficiency, corruption, and overstaffing meant that service provision was poor). Keys confronted ANC policy makers with the unpleasant reality that they were not taking over a rich country with lots of surplus cash to spend on black economic upliftment. They would have tragically limited room for economic maneuver.” – page 242
• “the share of whites in the country’s total personal income dropped from 70 percent in 1960 to 53 percent in 1994, while black South Africa’s share rose from 22 percent to 35 percent – the gaps remain wide. IN 1995, at the dawn of the part-apartheid era, whites still earned on average eight times more than blacks. An estimated 45 percent of the economically active population (mostly non-whites) were either unemployed or worked in the so-called informal sector (hawking a handful of vegetables on the street, or doing other odd jobs). With some 400,000 new job seekers coming onto the labor market each year, and only 30,000 finding new formal-sector jobs, the problem just gets worse and worse.” – page 267
• “Ultimately, even if both racial and political reconciliation can be achieve, a huge task of economic reconciliation will remain. …The issue of economic inequality, which had never been central to the liberation struggle, has become the focus of the post-apartheid government.” – page 266
• “Previously, the tax bases of the two areas had been separate; now they were one, and the local budget – funded almost entirely by the taxes of white Koppies – was controlled by a black-dominated council.” – page 270

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