Autonomy of Ethics vs. Divine Command Theory
“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”—SocratesIn his famous ‘Euthyphro’ problem, Plato has Socrates debate the above question with a man who has brought his father to court for killing a murderous slave. In a head spinning, confusing dialogue, Euthyphro makes assertions and then has to retract them as Socrates dances all around him with logic attacks. The two positions argued by Socrates can be called the autonomy of ethics position (“the pious [is] loved…because it is pious”) and the divine command theory (“[it is] pious because it is loved”). Both have to deal with how involved God and religion should be with ethics and morality.
The autonomy of ethics position states that morality is separate from God; even deity must obey the rules of ethics. This is equivalent to answering the question “Can God make a rock so large He cannot lift it?” as no: the laws of logic bind even God. The rock question is itself a contradiction, implying the impossible, and even God cannot do the impossible: He cannot be in one spot and not be in the same spot all at once. The autonomy of ethics position essentially seeks to divorce morality from religion and (by inference) also from aesthetics, politics, etc. This view is attractive to theists for several reasons, one of which is the logic in the system. If the laws of logic bind God, then His behavior will be logical; if the laws of morality bind God, then His behavior will be moral. Another enticing feature of this view is the universality of morals: God cannot simply change his mind and change the moral code. Thus, there is an unchanging, timeless view of morality to rely upon. This view cannot be subjectivism because if God were to create His own system of values to live by, His being divine would make those values divine commands. Thus, if ethics are autonomous, they must be objective.
This position naturally raises some questions. If moral principles apply to God, then He is held to the same good/bad choices that humans are: can God be omnipotent and Divine and still be thus limited? The answer to this question is no: omnipotent means all-powerful, so any limit on the all-powerful is a contradiction, and if God is subject to the laws of logic then A cannot be non-A. Another question: did God create the universe? If He did, then He must have created the laws of logic and morality that confine Him, because these objective laws are in the universe itself, not in God (since we are discussing autonomy of ethics). How can God have created the very laws that cripple His actions now? If God did not create the universe, where did it come from? How can God be God if He did not create physical substance from nothingness? The whole basis for a belief in a Deity is the need to explain, so to have a belief in God but not in that He created the universe are irreconcilable views. Also eventually irreconcilable are the views that an omnipotent God can be bound by moral principles that somehow came into being without His command. Finally, how can a Deity be divine if He is not omnipotent? Thus, if a God who is not all-powerful is not a God, and autonomous ethics limit the power of God, then ethics and religion cannot be separate.
The Divine Command Theory states that moral principles are simply the commands of God, and that God gives them their validity and reality. In answer to the question “Can God make a rock so large He cannot lift it?” this theory says yes: God can do anything, even the impossible. Logic and morality do not apply to the Divine; the Divine creates them. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and eternal; He is everywhere and nowhere at once. This is the more traditional view of God from a theistic (or at least Judeo-Christian) standpoint: the Ten Commandments are the Word of God and are therefore universally applicable and true. This view is attractive because any behavior sanctioned by God is automatically good, and vice versa. The rules of the game are very clear to the believer.
Is this view supportable? What if God commands murder, as is found time and again in the Old Testament of the Bible? When God said kill, killing was good. However, is killing ever good? A possible answer to this particular dilemma is that the omniscient and benevolent God would not (or could not) command anything bad. If God simply chooses not to do what is wrong, and chooses to command that which is right, isn’t He living up to the moral standards as well? In other words, if God knows right and wrong and has to choose between the two, how is this different from autonomy of ethics? On the other hand, if God is inherently good, because He defines the good, then He cannot command that which is evil. There are two flaws with the previous statement. First, if God cannot do something, then God is not truly omnipotent. Thus, if God does not have the capacity for doing evil, then how is He all-powerful? Second, if God is good, and what He commands is good, then He is what he commands. This is as circular a definition as God’s Old Testament name, ‘I AM WHAT I AM’. These two definitions of God are nonsensical and tautological by nature.
What about subjectivism? If God is the standard of all morality, and God has the power to change His mind, then moral principles can change from day to day, minute to minute. Thus, if God is the ultimate standard of morality and He can change, then all of morality is based on a whim, the spur of the divine moment. God can change the entire moral code to fit a situation and He cannot be blamed for it because He acted within His code. God is the subjective standard of moral values in the divine command theory. Another problem with this theory is that God has not been proven to exist, and no one religion has been proven absolutely correct, so there are thousands of different paths to Him. Are all these beliefs in the same God? The Muslim, Jewish, and Christian God is all essentially one because of the spiritual reading matter tied to the three, but they command very different actions. How can it be right for Christ to say ‘do not murder’ but for Mohammed to say ‘slay the pagans’ and for Moses to say ‘kill the Canaanites’? The divine command theory assumes that one God or view thereof is correct, when in reality there are so many views and so many gods (or faces of one God) that none of them can be judged by another one’s laws. The terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Center believed that they had been commanded by Allah to destroy the infidels. Either they misinterpreted Allah’s message (which is plainly set forth in the Koran), or Allah commanded them to do something that was wrong. Either way, we can plainly judge the mass destruction of September 11 to be a wrong act (to say the least), but who is to blame?
As far as my own position on the issue goes, it is not simple. I do not believe in the divine or supernatural, so the divine command theory is directly out. However, the autonomy of ethics theory, which divorces morality from religion, also tries to divorce ethics from other areas of life, like aesthetics, where values are not set in stone and are subject to taste. I personally don’t think you can separate moral values from aesthetics that easily, because one’s moral principles will affect how they judge art. For example, if the content of a painting is uplifting and beautiful, and the work is obviously talented, then even if I don’t like the painting I can evaluate it as a good piece of art. Art is a means of translating the artist’s vision of reality into another mode of communication, like a canvas or a sheet of paper and ink. If the artist sees reality as flawed or nonexistent, then their work will reflect that. So, my moral principles affect both how I create art and how I evaluate art. In politics, my moral code affects the stance I take on issues: the two are intertwined. In my life, if I did not apply my philosophy to the issues I face, of what use would that philosophy be to me? Since autonomy of ethics essentially seeks to set morality in its own little category, only useful for judging behavior in a certain realm, I don’t agree with it, either. I see ethics as a means to live each day; most theists see religion in the same light. Thus, I would agree more with the divine command theory in the sense that morality is not separate from spiritual or intellectual (and by inference, aesthetic) matters. Because as an atheist I cannot subscribe to the divine command theory, and as a practicing ethical egoist I cannot agree with autonomy of ethics, I will settle for disagreeing with both positions and advocating a third: Objectivism.
October 2001