Jan Muhammad Khan

The perception that PML(N)'s governance has a "Punjabisation" pattern has invoked intense debate at national level regarding which province has more political representation in the existing political dispensation and is thus calling the shots in the decision-making of the country.
Apart from nationalist political parties, the mainstream PPP has joined the bandwagon clamouring that the heavy-mandated government of the PML(N) wants to turn the country into "Punjabistan."
Detractors of the PML(N) government are very critical about the mega projects like Motorway and the proposed construction of Lahore Terminal and Link Road around Lahore; they question that given the scarcity of the financial resources why the PML(N) is hell-bent on wasting precious funds on projects considered to be economically nonviable but benefiting the Punjab province, the support base of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.
The time is ripe to trace events which led to the reinforcement of the impression of Punjab being a dominant province on the national scene.
* The assertion of the Quaid-e-Azam that Urdu would be the national language instead of Bangla or another language led to Bangla-Urdu riots on February 21, 1952 claiming 26 lives in the then East Pakistan, thus sowing the seeds of strong anti-West Pakistan feelings-despite the fact that over 54.6 percent of the population spoke Bangla as against merely 7.2 percent who used Urdu as a mother tongue, according to census of 1951.
* On April 17, 1953, the then "Punjabi" governor-general Ghulam Muhammad abruptly dismissed prime minister Khawaja Nazimud-din who, in spite of having a non-Bengali background, represented East Pakistan and had a majority in the assembly.
* Urdu was declared as Pakistan's national language on April 28, 1954 causing widespread protest in East Pakistan.
* Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the elected government of the United Front in East Pakistan, imposed governor raj with General Iskander Mirza as governor, thus directly attacking provincial autonomy on May 30, 1954.
* The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954, by Ghulam Muhammad halted the process of constitutional making for a period of nearly six years.
* The change of federal capital from Karachi to Islamabad on March 6, 1959 annoyed East Pakistanis.
* Refusal of West Pakistan to transfer power to East Pakistan in 1971 reflected the regard establishment had for the democratic process in the country.
* The establishment of One Unit or the introduction of parity principle in the history of Pakistan was interpreted to be the first brave attempt of West Pakistan to outnumber the Bengalis in the number game.
* Following the fall of Dhaka, the fixing of population as the sole criterion for distribution of resources and doing away with the parity principle was another attempt to ensure considerable share in resources and power for the big province, i.e. the Punjab.
* The security rationale for the existence of large standing army till date was in fact a blessing in disguise as it continued to be a major employer for the youth of the province in question.
* The election of 1997 proved behind any doubt that the PML(N) primarily drew its support base from Punjab thus felt morally obliged to put the interest of that province on top.
* The accumulated debt, both domestic and foreign, which was borrowed by Pakistani ruling elite predominantly comprising Punjabi military and civil bureaucracy, was not spent on the welfare of smaller provinces particularly Balochistan and Sindh where in some areas people are still forced to drink water from ponds, whereas it has to be repaid from the "national" resources raised in all the four provinces.
* The debt repayment and budget financing in the past had been undertaken through the proceeds obtained from the privatisation of the public institutions while nothing is being granted to smaller provinces, any share whatsoever from the proceeds.
* The elevation of the persons from the same province to the top slots of prime minister, president, Senate chairman, COAS, point to the fact that other three provinces have least representation in the power structure.
* On issues like Pakhtunkhwa, Kalabagh dam, the stand of the PML(N) reflects the Punjabi mindset which is not willing even to tolerate the identity of Pakhtuns in Pakistan, let alone granting provincial autonomy.
* The repeated demands of Balochistan and Sindh governments from the federal government regarding provision of the funds agreed upon under the NFC award, have been left unheeded so far showing the extent of the 'say' of federating units in the affairs of federation supposed to be made up of its constituents.
* Narrow definition of patriotism and selective interpretation of the historical events that led to the emergence of Pakistan and the role of the Quaid-e-Azam have sparked new controversies i.e. whether Pakhtun nationalists like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) and Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai Shaheed whom ordinary Pakhtuns recognise as their national heroes and hold in esteem, were "villains" or otherwise, whether those who took part in the fall of Dhaka were patriots or the perpetrators of a massacre that Nawaz Sharif called a "blunder by the then West Pakistani leadership, whether Urdu, being spoken by a minority should be the language of all Balochs, Sindhis, Punjabis and Pakhtuns and whether the present foreign policy of the country should be in accordance with the aspirations of one province, Punjab, or all the four provinces __ given that Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP have apparently lesser stakes in the "jugular vein" of Pakistan __ Kashmir __ that majority of Pakhtuns compared to their other country men have an emotional attachment with the affairs in Afghanistan, that the three provinces hardly share the hatred and the feeling of animosity towards India as compared to the dwellers of the land of five rivers.
* Conflict of economic interests among the provinces as reflected in the decision of the federal government to export orange to Iran for exchange of apples which grow in Balochistan and the insistence of Punjab province to build Kalabagh dam despite strong opposition by other three provinces, indicate to the divergence of the areas upon which the provincial interests clash, with those of Punjab; withdrawal of incentives from Gadoon Amazai estate is another example of conflicting interests of the industrialists of Punjab with those of the NWFP.
* The decisions of the judiciary regarding the cases of the then Benazir government vs establishment in 1990, Nawaz government vs establishment in 1993, Benazir government vs establishment in 1996 and the 1997 tussle of judiciary and executive have lead to an impression as if justice was biased.
* The PML(N) government seems to have developed a resilience to all criticism made against mega projects like Motorway or proposed plans for establishment of Lahore Link Road, Lahore and Islamabad Terminals proven to benefit the Punjab province only.
* Rhetorics like coming of the nationalists into mainstream politics have brought no benefits for the smaller province: the alliance of the ANP, JWP, BNP and MQM with the PML(N) have caused little progress on substantive issues in the country.
The above events gave credence to the hypothesis of Punjab dominating the realpoliticking throughout the chequered history of Pakistan; it is the role of Punjab that is being blamed for the lack of cohesion and solidarity among the people of Pakistan, failure in shaping common identity, and rival interpretation of national heroes and historical events leading to partition. Contrary to common assumption, centrifugal forces have not been weakened due to reconciliatory and accommodating posture of Punjab rather other factors like fall of the Soviet Union, collapse of the Najib government etc. in particular led the forces to become centripetal.
However, the experience of the '90s did not come as solace for those who wanted to try the ruling elite's intention to build a strong Pakistan; the attitude of the ruling establishment on the 50th anniversary of Pakistan is as non-serious as it was in 1970 when half of the country seceded; the political will needed for the resolution of long-protracted ethnic, lingual, political and economic problems was not witnessed in the governance of the historically mandated government of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif; the emergence of "moderate leadership" of Punjab in the persons of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nisar, Mushahid Hussain and the likes have dashed the expectations of the oppressed masses of the smaller provinces to the ground who fail to understand the way the present ruling echelon deal with the contentious issues.
Nevertheless, Pakistan is plagued with serious political and economic problems among them those related to ethnicity are no way less monumental; the identity issue of NWFP has a potential to ignite an explosive situation corresponding with that of Bangladesh which could not be controlled despite the involvement of army. How stronger are the ethnic feelings could be gauged from the analogy of Bosnia-Herzegovina where neighbours for a hundred years took to slitting each other's throats on the "mere" issue of ethnicity.
Let us initiate a national dialogue on how to run the affairs of the state, which has been predicted to be on the verge of "failing", according to the norms of democracy evolving a mechanism for power structure under which one province is not perceived to be calling the shots. National polity should not be shaped by the dictates of narrow-mindedness and vested interests.