Modern soldiers are overloaded with acronyms and catchphrases, but “Flank the Tank” is one worth remembering!Added 15-5-24
Modern soldiers are overloaded with acronyms and catchphrases, but “Flank the Tank” is one worth remembering!
Very early in its life, it was appreciated that the bazooka could be used on targets other than tanks. Early manuals, such as FM 23-30 (1944) included techniques for using the ammunition without the launcher for demolition or as an off-route mine. Rockets could be launched from their transport container or by using a wooden plank, trough or half‑pipe as launch rail.
The 3.5" “Super Bazooka” rocket was used to create the M24 and M66 off‑route mines. Fifteen M24/M66 were issued to infantry, paratrooper and engineer companies.
The USSR used a similar device, the LMG (“Galitskii Flying Mine”), during World War Two. Often erroneously described as a rocket, the projectile seems to have been a rifle grenade.
Given that many current designs of anti‑tank weapons use disposable launch tubes, it is perhaps surprising that more attention is not paid to their potential as remotely fired or target‑initiated off‑route mines.
Addermine was a system using the British LAW‑80 with a substantial tripod and a sensor system that included acoustic, infrared and laser sensors. The system could also be remotely fired from up to 2 km away by laser‑link. The ARGES mine was a development, with some examples using the AT4 weapon rather than LAW‑80.
With modern technology such as motion detectors,`and car‑alarm remotes, a much more compact, infantry-compatible system for using SLMs as off‑route mines or firing them remotely could be created.
This may be something as simple as an electrical interface input added to new productions of existing weapons.
Arming distance may be a consideration. The AT4 and LAW M72 take ten metres to arm, and this may be longer for some other weapons. Care would need to be taken that an off‑route mine or remotely fired weapon was not too close to its intended target.
The US DOD definition of man‑portable is “capable of being carried by one person over long distance without serious degradation of the performance of normal duties. Man-portable equipment has an upper weight limit of about 31 pounds (14 kg).”
Contrary to some poorly researched articles on Wikipedia, and some manufacturer’s claims, many infantry anti-tank weapons are not man‑portable!
Most genuinely man‑portable anti-tank weapons cannot penetrate the frontal protection of a modern main battle tank. If encountering an enemy tank head‑on, an RPG, AT4 or LAW fired at the turret front or glacis may damage vision or targeting systems. Most likely, it will disrupt the tank long enough for the infantry unit to seek cover or move to the tank’s sides.
Throwing a smoke bomb at the bow of the tank is another option.
The side armour of a tank is considerably weaker than that used for the turret front and glacis. For many tanks armour will be 76mm or less. The rear armour of a tank is also thin, and there may be vulnerable structures such as electrical junction boxes and engine radiators. These structures may be vulnerable to placed fragmentation or concussion grenades. Side and rear armour of most other fighting vehicles, including APCs, may be even lighter. Attacking the rear section of an APC is preferable since it may disable many of the infantry it carries before they can dismount.
Older weapons, such as RPG‑7 are quite capable of penetrating such armour. Weapons such as AT4 were deliberately designed to attack the side and rear armour rather than attempting to defeat frontal protection.
Most of the infantry weapons suited for “tank stalking” are not suited to frontal attacks on MBTs.
As I have noted in my article on the bazooka age, most tank stalking weapons are unguided systems such as RPG‑7 and AT4, with a practical range of under 300 metres. Man‑portable guided systems designed to operate within 600 to 1,000 metres would be a useful supplement to the unguided systems and heavier, longer ranged systems such as FGM-148 Javelin and Spike MR.
Relatively few weapons of this type have appeared so far.
Options include the Saab NLAW, FGM-172 SRAW Predator and the IMI Shipon.
Minimum range for the Predator is 17 metres, and that for the NLAW 20 metres.
All of the above named weapons use predicted line of sight guidance (PLOS), which eliminates the need for gathering.
Some form of homing or terminal guidance to counter evasive manoeuvres by the target would be an obvious improvement.
An approach worth investigating is a wire‑guided SACLOS missile based on a one‑use launch tube of about the size of an AT4. The AT4 is a recoilless gun. A SACLOS system would need a projectile with rocket propulsion. Possibly the warhead of the AT4 could be used, or components of other existing designs
An intended range of less than 1000 metres and shorter time of flight removes many of the objections to wire‑guidance, while rendering the system resistant to most electronic countermeasures.
Unlike a PLOS system, the operator may compensate for changes in target direction or velocity.
If fired from within gathering range, the missile would behave as an unguided ballistic weapon.
A man‑portable SACLOS guided missile would also be suited to a missile designed to overfly a target and attack with one or more downward angled SFF warheads.
In “Men Against Tanks”, p.123, John Weeks comments about a rifle grenade that “It has been unkindly said of one such small grenade that it will knock out any tank in the world provided that it hits the commander in the eye.” Intended as a joke, it does remind us to exploit a target’s weak points rather than play to their strengths.
The anti‑tank rifle grenade has fallen out of fashion in many armies, the flatter trajectory and shorter time of flight of an SLM offering a greater chance of hit probability.
Even for use against “non‑tank” targets, weapons such as M72 are more readily available.
In the quasi-guerrilla role, infantry may have to destroy numerous lightly armoured or unarmoured targets such as supply trucks.
Several anti‑armour rifle grenades may be carried for the same bulk‑mass as a single M72 or AT4, and are likely to be just as effective in this role.
If attacking a lightly armoured personnel carrier, the priority is not just to penetrate the armour, but also to disable many of the vehicle’s occupants. Similarly, if attacking a supply vehicle, destruction of the cargo is just a important as disabling the transport.
Such requirements must be considered when designing new anti‑armour grenades and light SLMs.
There are some larger, heavier anti‑tank rifle grenades still in use or offered, many based on or inspired by the Belgium Energa grenade. This tactical niche is probably more effectively filled by light SLMs.
Earlier I described the hypothetical, but possible, situation of an infantry unit encountering a tank at close range.
One of the survival options open to this infantry unit would be to exploit the blind zone around an enemy vehicle.
The area within which infantry cannot be seem by a tank crew extends several metres from the sides or rear. Such infantry are difficult for the crew to attack, and often they rely on mutual support from other vehicles or friendly infantry.
As one British veteran officer (A.F.U. Green, The British Home Guard Pocketbook) remarked: “The tank is a terror at 200 yards, a poor blind beggar when you can touch it.”
What options does infantry within a tank’s blind zone have? They are too close to use SLMs or rifle grenades. Retreating to a range at which they may use these weapons may expose them to enemy attack.
One option for infantry encountering a tank at close range is to throw a fragmentation grenade on to the glacis area. The grenade may damage the driver’s vision systems, forcing him to withdraw for repairs or operate with his hatch open.
Placing smoke grenades on the horizontal decking will hinder the turret crew. Infantry operating close to enemy tanks should make free use of smoke munitions to give some protection against “backscratching” fire from other enemy units. A pair of smoke bombs joined by a short cord may be draped over the breech end of the gun barrel to blind the gunner.
Thermite/thermate grenades applied to the engine decking has been suggested. Good information on how effective this would be against a modern tank is hard to find. On lesser protected vehicles, there is a better chance of disabling the engine or an internal fire. Thermite grenades are not carried routinely by many infantry units. Some units have them for the destruction of sensitive equipment or materials.
The Spanish Civil War saw a number of close‑range combats between infantry and tanks:
• Some of the techniques used included using crowbars, steel bars or lengths of railway line to damage or foul the running gear.
• Machine gun barrels, radio antennae and other structures could be bent or broken using blows from a crowbar or axe.
• Bedsheets and blankets were used to temporarily blind vehicles, making them vulnerable to other measures.
• Charges of dynamite proved effective against the running gear, belly armour and engine deck.
• Petrol bombs (later to be christened “Molotov cocktails” by the Finns) were used, although there was already some scepticism in some circles as to their effectiveness and practicality (“New Ways of War” p.56, Tom Wintringham). The petrol bomb’s most useful property was probably that their smoke could hinder a tank’s vision. In the primitive early designs of tank, smoke would often be sucked into the interior. A Scrapboard article on Molotov cocktails and related devices is scheduled.
Many of the techniques used in Spain were taught to the British Home Guard.
How effective they might have been in practice is open to debate. Some pamphlets for the Home Guard admitted the petrol bomb was only suited to tanks under nine tons, which should be attacked at the rear.
The majority of tanks used in Spain had been light vehicles such as the PzKpfw I and BT-26. In a relatively brief interval, heavier armoured vehicles such as the PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV had become common, and it is doubtful some of the techniques previously used would have been as effective.
In fairness, many of the vehicles the Home Guard were likely to have initially encountered would have been armoured cars and light tanks from reconnaissance and airborne forces. The techniques from Spain may have proved effective on these.
Once the practical applications of the Munroe effect were appreciated, infantry anti‑tank weapons became considerably more effective.
History may teach us a lot, but I have cautioned elsewhere on the trap of trying to refight previous wars with no allowance for new factors.
Some tanks now mount compact video cameras to see into some of their blind spots. Rear‑view cameras have become a common feature on civilian cars, so it seems reasonable to expect the use of such devices to become even more widespread. Tanks will mount more cameras, and they will become standard on APCs and other military vehicles.
Taken to its logical conclusion, with have the tank crew utilizing the system I have called “virtual transparent armour”. In another article I have suggested that these cameras may be paired with weapon systems that can sweep an area not accessible to the vehicle’s main weapons.
In practice, some of these cameras are likely to be disabled during combat conditions, so the crew will have some blind spots. This will be difficult for an external enemy to gauge, however.
Whether infantry should be issued systems for very close range use against armour is something I will leave for others to debate. I wish to examine some of the design considerations.
Dismounted soldiers have a lot of gear to carry already. They must be convinced that any new addition will be useful, likely to be used and may be used for other useful purposes. If this is not achieved, the extra mass may rapidly be “lost in action” or put to some other purpose. so the soldier does not have to carry it around.
Psychologically, fighting tanks at a range too close to use SLMs is not a prospect that many soldiers will wish to dwell on, and this may contribute to resistance against items intended for this role.
Even after the bazooka and panzerfaust became widely used, a number of weapons were issued for close range attacks against tanks.
One such weapon was the anti‑tank hand grenade. This consists of a hollow‑charge warhead and some stabilization mechanism to ensure the grenade impacts the tank warhead first.
At least one model of these weapons is still in use in various forms.
While researching this article, I came across someone erroneously describing the RKG‑3 as “obsolete”. Old does not mean obsolete! It may be taken to suggest something has proven worth. This article states “the RKG-3 (Ruchnaya Kumulyativnaya Granata) high-explosive antitank (HEAT) handheld shaped‑charge grenade is the most lethal and prolific weapons system in the Sunni rejectionists’ arsenal...”
In a previous article, I suggest a design of anti‑armour hand grenade that uses its handle to create correct stand‑off distance, optimising penetration.
Early models of RKG grenades had a penetration of 100mm RHA. Variants of the RKG‑3 series have penetration of 125 to 220mm RHA equivalent.
Accurate information on the armour thickness of modern tanks is hard to come by. According to some older sources, the side and rear armour of the T‑72, M60 and Centurion averages 76mm or less. Hollow‑charge resistant composite armours are probably likely to be restricted to the turret and frontal armour. Protection on lighter vehicles will be less.
Interestingly, I have seen at least two different photographs of troops training with RKG‑3 and throwing them against the front of the target tank. This may be in the good old Russian tradition of disinformation!
While some models of RKG‑3 may have sufficient penetration to penetrate the frontal armour of older tanks, tactically it seems much more prudent to attack the sides and rear.
There is more to attacking a vehicle than simply making a hole in one side. The secondary effects of a penetration may be more significant. The impact or explosion may have a “disruptive” effect, disabling or damaging the crew or vehicle systems.
If we accept that tactically, anti‑armour hand grenades will be used for non‑frontal attacks, then existing designs seem to have ample penetration. Newer models of RKG‑3 with larger warheads may be intended to increase the incendiary and disruptive effects of an attack.
A quick survey of anti‑armour and dual‑purpose rifle grenade designs reveals many are 35 to 50mm in calibre and have penetrations varying between 150 and 200mm.
This suggests an effective anti‑armour hand or rifle grenade intended for non‑frontal attack need not have a particularly large or high calibre warhead.
For a rifle grenade, modest weight and good sectional density will improve its trajectory characteristics. The grenade may be small enough to slip between some bar-armour defences.
For an anti‑armour hand grenade, a smaller warhead decreases the chance of the weapon injuring its user, particularly when used from within the target’s blind zone. Wearing your helmet and hitting the ground as soon as the grenade leaves your hand is recommended, however!
Design priorities for a modern anti‑armour hand grenade are a very reliable (electronic?) fusing mechanism and minimization of danger to the user.
Ability to be used at close range is preferable to a long throwing range.
Some current and previous anti‑armour designs were designed to produce fragments. This could affect enemy personnel close to the tank, and allowed the grenade to have an alternate role as a fragmentation grenade.
If we are designing anti‑armour hand grenades for close range use against vehicles, construction must minimize the chance of fragments that may injure the user or his comrades.
For special purposes, an attachable fragmentation sleeve could be issued or improvised.
If practical, it should be possible to attach an anti‑armour grenade to a target and have it detonate after a timed interval.
One of the early techniques used against tanks was detonating charges of explosive against their surface or beneath them. German soldiers in the First World War used bundled stick grenades. Spanish fighters used charges of dynamite. The Finns used “satchel charges”, their version being boxes of explosives fitted with handles and attachment hooks.
As tank armour improved, devices using hollow‑charges were designed and issued.
Since a tank is a large lump of steel, magnetism seemed an obvious solution to keep a shaped‑charge in place until it detonated.
The Germans developed a non‑magnetic paste (“Zimmerit”) and applied it liberally to their vehicles. Ironically, none of the allies issued magnetic anti‑tank charges. Only Germany and Japan developed designs. Zimmerit only provided a defence against captured German Hafthohlladung weapons.
Modern tanks do not have non-magnetic coatings. Degaussing the hulls, as was once done for warships, is apparently not practical due to power constraints.
Some military vehicles use aluminium armour, and it is possible some of the new or future composites are less magnetic than traditional steel. Unarmoured or civilian vehicles being used in a military role may use materials such as fibre‑glass. Surfaces may be covered in dirt, dust, oils, rain or snow.
An explosive charge only needs to keep in contact long enough for it to detonate, so attachment need not be that strong or permanent.
If we are considering an explosive charge that can be attached to a vehicle, it will be prudent to accept there may not be a single solution.
Relatively small limpet mines for naval use already exist. One of the first that springs to mind is the Russian SPM, once much favoured by South African terrorists. The SPM is relatively compact and masses about 2.58 kg. The fuse can be set from 5 minutes to 823 hours. A shorter duration would be needed for the battlefield anti‑armour role.
The British company of Huntington Engineering once worked on an anti‑tank mine they called the “IMP”(Jane’s Military Vehicles and Logistics 1992-93 p.201) The IMP was sized and shaped to fit in a soldier’s ammunition pouch. Mass was “less than a kilo” and the design featured an 88mm shaped‑charge warhead. The IMP was designed to be buried in the ground and detonated by a tank’ magnetic field.
The American SLAM, mainly issued to special forces, is similar.
Such designs could be adapted into infantry limpet mines.
The mines used for systems such as GATOR and RAAMS are another possibility to base an infantry limpet charge on.
The mine is about 120mm diameter and 1.7 kg mass. It uses the Misznay-Schardin (M‑S)effect, so there will be no loss of penetration if the device is placed directly against the armoured plate.
The limpet mine would only need one M‑S plate, the rest of the device constructed for minimum fragmentation for the safety of the troops using it.
An effective weapon of around a kilo mass should be practical.
The infantry limpet mine would need to be easy to operate. Being in close proximity to a tank may be expected to be somewhat stressful and no time for overly complicated procedures!
Delay should be sufficient for the infantry to get clear or take cover. Ten to twenty seconds, perhaps?. Instructions for some field expedient anti-tank devices suggest a six inch length of standard time blasting fuse (M700) burning at 40 to 42 seconds per foot.
For sabotage applications, it should be possible to easily fit alternate triggering mechanisms to the limpet mine.
The optimal location for a placed shaped‑charge is probably on a tank’s engine deck or the roof of an APC’s troop compartment. Attackers may not be able to reach here, so some means of attaching the charge to the vehicle’s side will be needed.
Magnets are likely to be the primary means of attachment. Most similar magnetic devices have employed covers on the magnets until they are needed.
The influence of these mines on other devices such as compasses needs to be investigated. There is little point issuing limpet mines if the unit carrying them always gets lost!
There needs to be a feature so that in the heat of action, the operator is sure to uncover the magnets before using the charge. Perhaps the initiating system is not revealed until the magnet cover is unfolded?
If the device is to have an unfolding cover, then unfolding it may also expose a patch of adhesive, such as the slow‑dry, tenacious stuff used on adhesive mouse traps. This would facilitate attaching the mine to non‑magnetic targets. It also seems logical that this folding cover would have hooks for hanging the mine up, and cut‑outs that can be hooked over projections.
The back of the limpet mine would be provided with a handle for secure manipulation under adverse conditions. This handle might incorporate a squeeze bar or similar that automatically raises the cover when operated.
The infantry limpet mine is, if anything, a somewhat easier “sell” than the anti‑armour hand grenade.
Any soldier worthy of the name can probably think up numerous other applications for the device. During urban combat, they may be used to “mousehole” through walls, and are handy for any enemy vehicle flanked at close range.
Limpet mines would also be useful for sabotage, supply destruction and various other covert or special forces missions.
The anti‑armour hand grenade is a solution to attacking armour at close range that has survived the decades, despite the general issue of anti‑tank SLMs.
Is it the only, or even the best solution?
An anti‑tank grenade that could be thrown like an American football, did not work out.
Rather than a grenade, an easier system might be a device like a short javelin, lawn dart or Roman plumbata with a hollow‑charge warhead. Components of existing rifle grenade designs could be utilized.
Elsewhere, I gave my take on an idea to create combined rifle/hand fragmentation and smoke grenades.
Since it is evidentially possible to throw a hand grenade so that it arrives head first, then an anti‑armour combined rifle/hand grenade using a shaped‑charge is technically feasible.
The shape of many existing rifle grenades closely resembles a stick grenade. The main objection that I can see is that the fin or aerofoil assemblies do not make for a good handle, and may catch on the fingers when being thrown.
If a hand‑thrown grenade may use streamers or ribbons for stabilization, there appears no reason why the same grenade launched from a rifle muzzle should not use the same mechanism. Submunitions such as the M42 already use similar systems. The Japanese Type 3 grenade simply used a bunch of hemp fibres for stabilization.
While writing this discussion, it became apparent that the disposable grenade launcher technology that I have proposed for the DGL might be adapted to short‑ranged attacks on vehicles.
For convenience, let us call this the Close Range Anti‑Armour Weapon (CRAAW) or Light Antitank Pistol (LAP).
Many of the criteria already suggested for an anti‑armour hand grenade would also apply to the CRAAW projectile: Adequate penetration against side and rear armour, useful secondary effects and low risk of injury to the user and comrades.
The role of this weapon is to bridge the gap between the limpet charge and the minimum range of SLMs and rifle grenades. Ideally, it would be practical for use from within a tank’s blind zone, say three to five metres range.
The weapon should be capable of being fired from cover or a prone positions, both to minimize the risk to the user from secondary effects and for protection from supporting fire from other enemy units.
Maximum range for the CLAAW does not need to be more than twenty metres. This permits a reasonably large yet low velocity projectile, mitigating the effects of recoil and improving target effect. Greater ranges may be achieved using higher angles of fire.
I imagine the CLAW as a short, large calibre barrel of about 50mm, with a plough‑handle grip.
Propulsion is by a hi‑lo pressure system adapted to the disposable, one‑use launch “pistol”. This gives something that resembles an comically exaggerated flintlock pistol! Alternately, it might resemble a cylinder or paint can with a spade grip on one end.
Other approaches may be worth investigating.
The French GIAT ARPAC (Jane's Infantry Weapons 1975 p.575) was a very compact soft‑launch anti‑armour rocket weapon with a bore safe distance of just three metres.
A number of alternate uses for the CLAAW seem obvious. It may be fired from very confined spaces, such as a spider‑hole. Similarly, it is well suited to indoor conditions and ranges. It would be a useful “doorbuster”. With no backblast, the CLAAW can be fired at near vertical trajectories, for example, to fire into a nearby but high window. CLAAW would also be suited to use as an off‑route mine.
• CLAAW should be designed so that it may be fitted to a P-rail on a rifle/carbine and fired like an underbarrel grenade launcher.
• CLAAW should be capable of being used as an off‑route mine system or fired by remote means.
A technique that the drag stabilized anti‑armour grenade suggests is to use an underarm motion to throw it in a high arc and have it descend vertically towards the tank’s engine deck or turret top. Whether this is actually practical, or sufficiently accurate I do not know. If the grenade is particularly slow in falling wind drift may be an issue. Whether the CRAAW can be used for a steep angle “drop shot” on to the engine deck or turret top is worth experimenting.
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