POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL DISPUTES
ON THE ACADEMISATION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

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Yasin AKTAY

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Examining Committee in Charge:

Prof. Dr. Bahattin AKŞİT (Supervisor)

Ass. Prof. Elizabeth ÖZDALGA

Ass. Prof. H. Ünal NALBANTOGLU

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AKTAY, Yasin

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This study aims to examine the institutional possibilities of producing higher Islamic knowledge in the modern times, in the case of Turkish Modernization and the experiences of the faculties of divinity. The history of the higher Islamic education has been very closely correlated with the political and intellectual developments in the Turkish society. Therefore, two major experiences of the higher Islamic education, the Faculty of Theology in the Darülfünun of İstanbul (1923-1933) and the Faculty of Divinity in Ankara University (1949) are reviewed in the context of Turkish political and intellectual development, and in the context of various quests for producing higher Islamic knowledge in modern times, which tend to arrive at an Islamic grand theory.

Thus, there is represented, in the study, a short description of the Islamic intellectual trends working in the Faculties of Divinity together with the elaboration of the political trends during the growth of the Faculties. Furthermore, some intellectual tensions aroused among Muslims with modernization are identified and analyzed in terms of their response to the modernity, and of the influences took place on their consciousness. The major outcome of modernity is identified as the injury of the Muslim consciousness that is assumed to take place as a result of the incoherence between what they live and what they (have to) live. These problems together with the problems originated from the need to produce or reproduce Islamic knowledge in accordance with the requirements of the contemporary world necessitates institutionalization of the higher Islamic education. But encountering such a task also creates some problems as legitimation and power relations. This study tries to concentrate, thus, on these problems and on their possible implications on the consciousness.

Keywords: Academisation, Religious Knowledge, Superstition Defendership, Muslim Consciousness, Muslim Paradox, Laicisation, Incitement to the Discourse, Effectivity of History, *Unus*, *Vertere*, *Facile*, Discipline.

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ÖZ

DİNSEL BİLGİNİN AKADEMİZASYONU ÜZERİNE
POLİTİK VE ENTELLEKTÜEL TARTIŞMALAR

AKTAY, Yasin

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Bu çalışma Türk modernleşmesi ve ilahiyat fakulteleri deneyimleri örneğinde, modern zamanlarda yüksek İslâmî bilgi üretiminin kurumsal imkanlarını sorgulamayı hedeflemektedir. Turkey'de yüksek İslâmî eğitimin tarihi toplumdaki siyasî ve entellektüel gelişmelerle çok yakından ilişkili olagelmiştir. Böylece, yüksk İslâmî eğitim alanındaki iki büyük deneyimi -Darülfünûn İlahiyat Fakultesi (1924-1933), Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakultesi (1949)- bir yandan Türk siyasî ve entellektüel gelişmesi bağlamında, diğer yandan sonuçta bir İslâmî grand teoriye götürebilecek şekilde modern zamanlarda yüksek İslâmî bilgi üretiminin çeşitli arayışları bağlamında incelenmektedir.

Böylece, çalışmada İlahiyat Fakultesinin içinde işlerliği olan değişik İslâmî entellektüel eğilimlerinin bir tasvirinin yanısıra, Fakultenin gelişimi esnasındaki siyasi eğilimlerin bir değerlendirmesi sunulmaktadır. Ayrıca, müslümanlar arasında Modernleşmeyle birlikte gelişen gerilimler, modernlik durumuna tepkileri ve modernliğin biliçlerinde yol açtığı etki açısından teşhis edilip çözümlenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Modernliğin başlıca sonucu düşündükleriyle yaşadıkları/yaşamak zorunda oldukları arasındaki tutarsızlıktan doğduğu varsayılan, Müslüman bilincinin yaralılığı olarak teşhis edilmektedir. Bu sorunlar, çağdaş dünyanın gereklerine uygun olarak İslâmî bilgi üretiminin veya yeniden üretimi ihtiyacından kaynaklanan sorunlarla birlikte yüksek İslâmî eğitimin kurumsallaşmasını zorunlu kılar. Fakat böyle bir görevi üstlenmek, aynı zamanda meşruiyyet ve güç ilişkileri gibi sorunlar yaratır. Bu çalışma da, böylece, bu sorunlar ve bu sorunların mümkün îmâları üzerinde yoğunlaşmayı denemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akademizasyon, Dinsel Bilgi, Hurafe Savunuculuğu, müslüman Bilinci, Müslüman Paradoksu, Laikleşme, Söyleme Kışkırtılma, Tarihin Etkinliği, *Unus*, *Vertere*, *Facile*, Disiplin.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to examine the institutional possibilities of producing higher Islamic knowledge in the modern times. When I put the subject in such a way I feel the charge of answering the question firstly: what is Islamic knowledge? And what does it mean to produce Islamic knowledge? Can the relationship between knowledge and its involvement be explained with such an economical term from an Islamic point of view? Since Islam is a religion, its all knowledge store is already commonly accepted to be absolutely given. Then, what kind of contribution is expected to come from an academic style of production of knowledge? An academisation process requires certain distance from the object studied. But what is the situation in the case that the academist is a carrier of the faith under study? What is the chance of objectivity in taking a phenomenon of that domain as an object? What is the possibility of existence for a completely religious institution, within a dominantly secularist organization of the society? These are the questions I am faced with in studying an academical, or religious-academical institution, in Turkey where a radical rupture from being a religious society has taken place, although the fear of reactionarism has never been overcome.

To study the case of the Faculty of Divinity would provide perspectives for approaching such questions, because institutionally and intellectually it has been lying just at the heart of the involution of various balances in the Turkish political and intellectual history. For instance only to give a short story of the Faculty had to incorporate an elaboration of the uniqueness of Turkish modernization which at each level has had clear implications on the interrelationships between the university and state, science and politics, religion and secularism etc. which all together have constituted the unique kind of Turkish involution of political and intellectual balances.

Thus such a study would inevitably incorporate at least two histories of the Faculty of Divinity. The first is what I shall identify as official history as originated from the will to secularization, in terms of the failures and successes of the Faculty in the achievement of secularization in particular and modernization in general. No doubt, modernization from a level become to be treated as a spontaneous development in the life of the societies, though it

usually originates either as a result of its imperialistic tendency or of its adoption and importation by the governing elites rather than resulting from some internal reasons that might have occurred in the life of all societies. But such an explanation of the process, again, would reflect a modernist understanding of history. For it follows that, although initially it often emerges as a result of its appropriation and importation by some government elites in the rest of the west, later it gets into its stride. At this level the Subjects, with a capital S, become unimportant. The modernization process together with its explanations becomes subordinated to its own autonomous history-without subject, which is also universalist and teleological. My contention, here, however is not simply to concentrate on the analysis of modernization but rather to achieve some clarifications of modernization process, particularly in Turkey, in terms of its influence on and requirements for the formations of the religious knowledge.

In the story of the Faculty of Divinity again two kinds, or rather periods of the interrelationship between the state and religion or politics and university can be discerned. The first is the single party period, in which the relationship is dominated by direct intervention of the state with certain degree of coercion on the opposition forces, which was expected to, might have located even in the universities. The second period begins with the same date of the transition to multiparty regime in Turkey. My contention here is to show the involution of the situation, again. It was on the one hand the Islamic forces (the secularist fear of the revival of reactionism) that has constituted an obstacle to the development of democracy at all levels for many years and that had caused a violence on some Islamic elements and institutions to be exercised during this period. For example the religious institutions had been closed, the religiousmen and religious believes and practices had been held under pressure etc. although, as I shall try to show, they could be utilized in the service of the government policies even against the local religious forces. But, there was a higher pressure toward democratization, as well as dangerous occurrences in the periphery because of the lacking of the official religiousmen in charge on the other hand. The former factor i.e., the pressure toward democratization would invulnerably give various opportunities to the Islamic forces in their working against the secularist regime. Thus in the fourth chapter I am trying to show that, democratization and laicisation have always reflected a paradoxical correlation in Turkey as perhaps in most of the other Islamic countries (the case of Algeria, for example, is the recent and the best example). The steps taken in favor of democratization have also been reconsidered in favor of the penetration of non-secular claims in the political and social life. For, the supplies of the democratic parties and the popular demands toward

Islamisation, together constitute a convenient ground for the development of such a paradoxical correlation. Coming to the latter factor, i.e., the local religious occurrences was dangerous because it was possibly to divide the centrality of the nation-state that had tried to unify the life-worlds with the enterprises like the unification of education and the closure of the local religious centers like the *tekke*s and *zawiye*s. Thus as I shall try to show, what motivated the nation-state to open the faculty of divinity and the other religious gates, beside the pressures toward democratization, was, in fact, the same reason that had made it close them. That was the quest for keeping and maintaining the central control over the territory of the nation-state.

The second history of the Faculty of Divinity looks for the possibility of achieving the task of producing Islamic knowledge in the modern times. No doubt this story is related with a territory that has been the subject of modernization for at least two centuries. Turkey represents a good example of what kind of transformations has been realized in terms of the production of Islamic knowledge by these countries. But it has had some other features that made it possible to talk on a unique way in these processes. I mean, as much as Turkey has shared the same experiences with the other countries in terms of the characteristics of the formation of the nation-state as a post-colonial case, it differs radically in terms of being the previous center of the Islamic world (Caliphate), while it has tended to a radical rupture until the adoption of secularization, even by the considerable amount of its people. Of course, these uniquenesses, in question, have created some difficulties as well as easiness in terms of the possibility of the production of Islamic knowledge. Notwithstanding my position will not be to go in details of the narration of these advantages and disadvantages. But, rather I shall try to summarize the modern conditions only in terms of its influence on the formations of the contemporary Islamic discourses. At this stage the Islamic intellectual profile seems very fragmented, the consciousness seems injured, and the praxis seems very incoherent because of the disharmony between what the Muslims believe and think and what happens in the on-going reality. This called for higher debates of the historicity of Islam that, in fact, has been implying some modifications in the Qur'anic understanding for accommodating to the changing world. In the fifth chapter I try to put the problematic of historicity or the adaptation of Islam to the changing conditions in terms of the role of Islam in the modern times: accommodation or challenge? How should or could Islam adapt the conditions? By its transformative initiative i.e., challenge or by compensating for the changing conditions i.e., modernization or accommodation?

The problem of the adaptation of Islam to the modern conditions creates a highly rich ground for discussions through which I am involved as a part. In the fifth chapter, again, I try to summarize the responses to this problem of historicity under four titles, so that I think each one represent, so to say, a grand theory for appointing Islam to its genuine role in the modern time. The first one, Fazlur Rahman, formulates the Qur'anic solutions to the specific problems as if they have resulted from the ethical will rather than being the ultimate solutions. By looking to how the Qur'an produced responses to the specific issues we can deduce some meta-ethical principles that would guide us in our search for solutions to the specific problems of our age. Thus, the Qur'an appears to have given an ethic of law rather than the law itself. Undoubtedly such a theorizing ignore much discourses that are apparent in the Qur'an such as those which clarify that God usually does commands to people to examine that who will obey and who will not obey among them, rather than to provide a this-worldly prescription.

Among these theoreticians, Hasan Hanafi, the Egyptian social scientist a theologist, perhaps constitutes the extremist position of such an historicism. His suggestion goes even to the level of transforming the theology to anthropology, because of the inflexibility of the theology to the changing conditions. That is to say that theology as a source of theoretical work suggests us an ahistorical and asocial theoretical entity that would, as has been doing, make the human societies retarded in their historical lines. We need a human theology that would change in parallel with the historical fluctuation of the men. Even the Portray of the God should change according to the historical needs, as the well-known God of the theology was already the product of a specific period in history, but of course by the God himself. This approach, together with that of Rahman requires the application of the term historicism in its full sense. In this study, nevertheless, I cannot claim to have achieved a sufficient elaboration and criticism of this approach, because, such a task would exceed the boundaries of the study. What I tried to do remained in the boundaries of required amount of consideration and depiction of the attempts to, so to say, grand theorizing of the contemporary condition of the Islamic religion. Naturally this would have been helpful in clarifying the role of a higher Institution of Islamic knowledge as a Faculty of Divinity.

The third and fourth attempts of grand theorizing made by Ziauddin Sardar and R. İsmail Faruqi call the problem of academization of the Islamic knowledge within the body of secularist formations and disciplinizations of the knowledge, in question. The term discipline should be thought with its Foucaultian implications, and it also should be applied to the position of the discipline of the religious knowledge in terms of the power mechanisms it

operates. In the case of Islam, which is characteristically a monotheistic religion in a high claim for monopolizing the all power to the God, the issue is really very interesting.

The study largely depends on my historical documentary surveys as well as on my direct interviewing with various members of the faculty either as undergraduate and postgraduate students or as instructors. Sometimes I participated to the class meetings of the instructions together with the students, so that I tried to catch a convenient perspective among them. Some of my concrete evaluations and suggestions depended on that possibility of insight. I listened to more than fifty students in the faculty, on various issues, although I haven't used my all observations and impressions systematically. For, my initial intention was not to look for the answers of predetermined question. What I was looking for was perhaps an atmosphere or a spirit, which hopefully I have reflected it during my study.

The study of the Faculty of Divinity could and should be completed with a good elaboration of the power relations arising within the institutional procedures of the Faculty in terms of its place in the secular society and university, and during the production of knowledge in academic manner. I attempt to enter in the issue in the Conclusion but in no more sophisticated manner than some preliminary remarks to a larger investigation of the subject.

During my survey of the documents I realized that the field was really untouched with an exception of the article by Howard Reed, which touched directly upon the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara, in 1957, just seven years after the establishment of the Faculty. But for the later period than 1957, for around 35 years of the Faculty there hasn't been made any considerable study on the Faculty, or on the history of the higher Islamic knowledge in Turkey, except that of Münir Koştaş, which don't do much contribution to the issues, but rather gives a brief history of the Faculty of Divinity for the celebration of fortieth anniversary of its establishment in the annual journal of the Faculty.

Undoubtedly my study will not exhaust the issue it tries to encompass. It might have various absences, insufficiencies and inefficiencies. The issue really has expanded in front of me as long as I tried to catch its boundaries. Yet, I tried to find (draw) the limitations of a possible study in such domain, knowing that such an enterprise would be effective in the formation of disciplinary activity. Finally to suggest reading the study as an introduction or as a preliminary work for a wider project of such an activity will not be considered as humility.

CHAPTER II
THE UNIFICATION OF EDUCATION OR
THE UNIFICATION OF LIFE-WORLDS

On February 3, 1923, Mustafa Kemal gave a clear indication of the impending unification of education as well as his views on the efficacy of the *medreses* when he stated in a speech at İzmir:

"When we inquire what will become of the medreses... of Evkaf, we at once encounter a certain resistance. It is proper to ask those who resist by virtue of what right and of what power do they oppose these questions? Our religion is the most reasonable and logical religion. For a religion to be natural, it must conform to reason, to science, to knowledge and logic."

"In the social life of Islam, no one has the right to exist in the form of a special class. Whoever opposes himself to this right, acts against the prescriptions of religion. There is no clergy among us [Muslims]. We are all equal."

"The hearths of culture of our nation, of our country, must be single (unified, one). It is out of these same hearths (schools) that must emerge all the children of this land, men and women, in the same way. But we should have higher institutions of education to get distinguished and true religiousmen who would be able to investigate the true philosophy of our religion as we should have highly professionals and specialists in every case" (Reed, 1956: 299).

The idea of opening a Faculty of Divinity within the body of Darülfünûn of İstanbul appeared at the same time with the coming of the Law of the Unification of Education into force. As an idea it could originally be traced back to the first opening of the Darülfünun, when it was being thought only at the level of extending the medrese education to the modern university under the title of "*ulum-u Şeriyye*" (The Sciences of the Holy Law) But the first distinct Faculty of Theology in Turkey dates back to 1900. It had developed under various forms and side by side with the *medrese* until the university reform on October 11, 1919, when the Faculty of Theology was abolished (Reed, 1956; Jäschke, 1972: 75). The idea had a

natural development in the Turkish intellectual history. Here, the case in which such a faculty of divinity was outlined was completely different. This point requires further elaboration, together with the social and political atmosphere accompanying it. In this respect, the speeches by which Mustafa Kemal gave also a clear indication of such a project seem to be important together with his other words and actions, in order to bring into light the real position of a Faculty of Divinity in the new society, perhaps in relation with its' broken ties. Furthermore such elaboration would be useful in understanding what kind of gap was a faculty of divinity would fill or what performance was it to fulfil in the project of Turkish Revolution.

The speeches by Mustafa Kemal when he was talking on the requirement of teaching the doctrines of Islamic religion in scientific methods and under the light of the latest knowledge of the contemporary science were ending up with the suggestion of opening a Faculty of Divinity. What is striking in these speeches, firstly, is that they seem to include a calling to the monotheistic dimensions of the religious understanding, which had, for centuries, taken the legitimating support of the orthodox Islam. This calling at first sight was stimulating the fully-religious values and ideas against the specific kind of religious life which was currently lived among the Turkish people and against which a pure Islamic calling might possibly be motivated with a similar discourse functioning in a way of elevating the will to egalitarian and scriptural attitudes. It follows that the religious discourse is based upon the true contact with the God in a way open to every individual without excluding any one, and this way is a learned one mediated through the Holy Book provided that any kind of mediation of the clergy who can do no more than making the true believers confuse the true way with the varieties of the false ones be excluded. Therefore any attempt to revolt against the authority of religion in the administrative mechanism had no way other than finding some legitimating supports based on religion.

The second point that is striking in either the speeches or in the general directions of the policies carried out by Mustafa Kemal at the early stages of the revolution is that it was in a high quest for centralizing the control and authority apparatus.

What was initially to be unified in the domain of education by this act was the dual character of the education that had settled in the Turkish life of *maârif* as a result of the conditions created by the reforms known as the *Tanzimat*. Excluding the very few non-

religious, special schools before the *Tanzimat*[1] the education was virtually the only source of formal learning in the Empire from its foundation to the Tanzimat. With the Tanzimat reforms a dual system began to grow up when an official Council of Education (which later became the Ministry of Public School or *Mekâtibi Umumiye Nezareti*) was declared in 1847 (Kazamias, 1966: 59). A number of higher institutes, based on European models, which were to form the nucleus of a university were developed along more secular lines, separate from, but roughly parallel to the ancient *medrese* hierarchy of schools (Reed, 1956b).

The duality between the Westernized education and the one which remained religious had been the major cause of various tensions that developed during the process of modernization of Ottoman society. Together with its all established institutions, religion was the first and the ultimate cornerstone of the resistance against the westernization movement. On the other hand in terms of being the major means for a society to reproduce itself, education understandably is the focus of the conflicts and struggles of power within a society. What is more understandable is that with a reutilization of a society's self-reproduction procedure we can observe what Ibn Khaldun depicted as settlement or in his own terms *tahaddur* or *temeddün*. And against any challenge of a less-routinized or *bedevi* movement such a society becomes increasingly defenseless.[2] Thus the process that opened the way to the Tanzimat, and then, acquiring legitimation, strengthened and increasingly threatened the current situation was as much the result of the decreasing flexibility, created by such routinization, of the old regime to adapt to the new situations as the increasing pressure of the Western expansion and penetration. Indeed the break of the religious society whose problem-solving ability failed to compensate the new occurrences, thus, firstly began with leaving some of its own roles to the non-religious initiative areas in quite tolerant and contented state, to the contrary of the prevalent opinion. For example, the religiousmen in Ottoman Turkey

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[1] For example, the famed Palace School (Enderûn Mektebi) which was established by Mehmed the Conqueror in order to train the ablest children for leadership positions in the Ottoman body politics, either as military leaders or as high administrators in the "Sublime Porte" and the provinces of the empire (Kazamias, 1966: 27)

[2] This conceptualization was adopted from Ibn Khaldun although he in fact, had not extended his attempt to be an explanation for such a process of ideological or cultural movement without including a tribe or quasi-tribe's horizontal movement as of which occurred between the Ottoman and the Europe where the former could be located in *Hadhari* and the later in the *Badawi* condition (Ibn Khaldun, 1975). It might be useful, perhaps, to make a similar application with certain modifications of Weber's "routinization of charisma" (Weber, 1968).

have always been the part of the state even during the penetration of the Westernization except under the condition where that penetration was intervening to some elements which had culturally symbolic meanings:

> "...Ottoman stratum of Ulema, though have grown in an anachronical education, apart from the fact that they have never opposed the modernization, they also almost competed with the modernists in declaring that much reforms do not contradict with Islamic religion."[3]

The new occurrences in question, thanked largely to the legitimative support of the allowance of the religious institution, for their establishment. The religious universalism, so to say, had been losing its totality as soon as its domain of efficiency was being straitened by the new flux of life style. But this paradoxical relation between the new and the old modes of life was preparing from below a deep dichotomisation of the parts emerged and cultivated from the two camps. As I hope it is to be more clarified in the following chapters that this dichotomisation created two major parts who are usually interchangeable mentioned as *alaylı* and *mektebli* (Güngör, 1981: 220-227) or as religious bureaucracy and civil-military bureaucracy (Dursun, 1992) or secular élite and anti-secularist section etc. In one sense almost most of the power conflicts and struggles that occurred in the past and that can be expected to occur in the future are/can be usually attached to and explained by that dichotomy.[4]

What was expected to be made by the Unification of Education was perhaps to remove that realized dual or more fragmented character of the Turkish intellectual and political life in favor of the *mektebli*, secularist élite or the civil-military bureaucracy. But it

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[3] In his very powerful depiction of the situation of the Islamic intellectual panorama in the nineteenth to twentieth century, Erol Güngör tries to explain the influence of the dependence and/or independence of the religious staff to the state on their attitudes against modernisation and their chances of survival in the cases of Iran and Turkey (Güngör, 1981: 212-213).

[4] Şerif Mardin very finely tries to find the popularly immanent structuration of that dichotomisation when he identified it at certain depth as crudely a conflict between "the just" and "the unjust" (Mardin, 1991). What is more popular has always been considered juster than what is of state elite. That is on the one hand because of the gap between the state and people that had remarked the Turkish political life for at least two centuries, but on the other hand religion has overtaken the role of mediation between the just and the unjust, which usually is the determinate of the "just".

was of course the political intention underlying the Act. Furthermore the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* had much more to unify in practice. Another fragmentation that the Act intended to remove was the diversification of the education, which resulted especially from the Ottoman policy toward the minorities, which was based on tolerance and recognition. There were 'large group of schools in the Ottoman Empire which were supported and operated by Westerners. Almost all were mission schools. Although some foreign Catholic schools, in particular French, had existed for many years in the empire, the rapid growth of mission schools came in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were the years of the great flowering of Protestant oversea missions, of Catholic reaction in kind, and of the new imperialism which led governments and peoples of several European powers to support in the Near East schools purveying their own brand of culture. By the eve of the World War I an unofficial count put French Catholic schools in the Ottoman Empire at 500, American schools at 675, British at 178. The French schools enrolled 59,414 students, the American schools 34,317, and the British 12,800. There were also German, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and Russian schools in lesser numbers most of which were elementary, though there were among them some excellent secondary schools and a few collegiate level.(Davidson, 1961: 289-301).

With the Unification of the Educational Systems all the educational institutions that were functioning under various Ministries in terms of their budgets, organizations and staff were separated from their ministries and connected to the Ministry of Education in order to be administered by single hand. Those institutions were that the mektebs and medreses which were directed by the *Evkaf ve Şeriyye Vekâleti*, the military schools which were connected to the Ministry of National Defense and the schools of orphans which were called *Daru'l Eytam* and connected to the Ministry of Health (*Sıhhiye Vekaleti*). Among those the *Dârul Eytam*s and the military schools were transferred to the Ministry of Education together with their budgets and staff.[5][5] Coming to the mektebs and medreses, which were carrying religious instruction, their budgets were transferred to the *Mebaliğ of Maarif*, which was assigned to the religious foundations. However, these schools themselves were closed, although there wasn't any decree in the code commanding to close these schools. On the contrary as it was being understood from the first, second and the third items of the Code, the religious schools and *medreses*, just as the military schools and orphan's schools, would be transferred to and

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[5][5] However, the military schools, one year later than the emergence of the Act that transferred them to the *Maarif Vekaleti*, were returned to the Ministry of Defence with an additional item. For Further information see (Başgil, 1985: 93).

governed by the Ministry of Education. However, according to the fourth item of the same Code, "the Ministry of education would establish a Faculty of Divinity wherein the specialists of the Religious Affairs would emerge and other schools wherein officials charged with the task of religious leadership and oratory service for the nation would be educated." Thus according to the fourth item, the schools and medreses of that time were declared as needless, for they were growing two kinds of religiousmen: one was the higher religious specialist, instructor, author and orator, and the other was consisting of the *imams* and *hatips* who were learning the affairs of the religion only by heart (Başgil, 1985: 194).

The law of the Unification of Education was on the one hand perhaps the most efficient step in the process of creating an homogeneous society over which the control was expected to be more unproblematique, on the other hand it represented a clear preference between the two political alternatives confronted the new Republic, in favor of centralism which was sociologically advocated by Ziya Gökalp's adaptation of functionalist theory over the Decentralism which was cultivated by Prens Sabahattin's adaptation of Le Play's liberalist approaches. In the educational sphere the same debate was reproduced between Ziya Gökalp and Satı Bey around the searching for solution to the problem of 'what was to be done with the Ottoman Education? Should be left religiously and ethnically pluralistic, or should it be organized under state control?... For Gökalp, the late-nineteenth- and early twentieth century educational pluralism of Westernist Tanzimat schools, Islamist medreses, separatist minority schools and foreign missionary schools were a breeding ground for moral crisis and Durkheimian *anomie*. (Thus) he proposed a statist, centrist, collectivist and culturalist reorganization of the educational system by making a conceptual distinction between civilization and culture" (Akşit, 1991: 155-156). Having a sociological support as functionalism, Centralism was perhaps the most functional political device of controlling and disciplinising a social structure whose most apparent feature was its fragmented character, which was resulted from a largely tolerant ideology. Not in the sense of mutational harmony as would be expected to have survived in the all organisms of the society that such functionalism attempted to correspond to its' theoretical explanation, but in the sense of being helpful in both creating new mediators for attaining a totally different society and in constituting an ideological rely for the legitimation of the radical changes required by such a societal project. It is already not accidental that in all post-colonial societies the dominant and the official mode of sociological tradition is always Durkheimian. It develops as a very spontaneous response to the administrative needs of the colonialism or some governments,

which reflect certain distances by ideology or traditional practices from that of their people.[6[6]]

It is also interestingly argued that Turkish preference of the centralism versus decentralism and so unification versus pluralism, or state initiative versus private initiative was a typical manifestation of the legacy of the French kind of Enlightenment. That is to say, there is a clear distinction between the French and the English Enlightenment where the former is famously known with its authoritative and despotic operations in its colonies. This is because according to the French Intelligentsia a small group of people always had been, and will be in a position of pioneership of catching the truth that creates Enlightenment in the minds. The rest of the people may be, and usually are, not aware of what is true for them in a situation, and may reflect some useless resistances against the guidance of the enlightened élite in question.   Therefore it should be normally the task of this pioneer élite to communicate this truth to the related men in various ways (Belge, 1992). Göle (1986: 13), identifies this avant-gardist mood typically with the ideology of social engineering which reduces social problems to technical data, and "it seems to have gone beyond the subjective domain in as much as it controls and solves the problems as technical ones, and thus, it gains a vision of over ideological and a-political position... The monist-technocratic ideology, excludes social, cultural and political differences: it identifies the technocratic will of the state with that of the society". It is also argued that such avant-gardist mode of Enlightenment, inherited from the French version paradoxically created a "regime of tutelage" (Köker, 1990)[7[7]] during the early periods of the Turkish Republic.

From another point of view the attempt of the Unification of Educational Systems was a good manifestation of the search for a universalist world view, that was again one of the most important tendencies in the legacy of Enlightenment. All of the reforms (*inkılabs'*) later made by the revolutionists, were common in being functional devices in creating a society in line with the mode of life and thinking that was taken for granted as being in universal and scientific quality. The elements of this taken for granted universe were elaborating its faculties and penetrating the complete life of the Turkish society from the everyday kind to

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[6[6]] For example, such influence of Durkheimian sociology is considerable amongst French-trained sociologists in Algeria and Tunisia. For further elaboration of the relationship between the post-colonial conditions and the sociological traditions see (Turner, 1978: 1-4; Yüksel, 1992).

[7[7]] It is declared as paradoxical because the most primary target of the Enlightenment, as appeared in Immanuel Kant's "Response to the Question 'What is Enlightenment?'" (1784, 1959) was to escape from any kind of tutelage, For an approach to the Youth of Turkish Republic as the regime of tutelage cf. Köker, 1990.

the longer terms. In its penetration to the everyday life as we shall return later again it applied to make changes, for example from the dressing to the length and weight measurements.

Of course the underlying idea of that appropriation of the legacy of the Enlightenment was that the Turkish Revolution here is to be considered as a project of Enlightenment. Furthermore, such an idea has much more evidence to be shown in a simple comparison with the ideology of the revolutionary elite and the basic principles of the Enlightenment. One of those affinities that Mustafa Kemal and perhaps his fellows has exercised with the Enlightenment, for example, was what Şerif Mardin indicated as the idea of *irade-i cüz'iyye* or the particular will.[8] For Mardin a philosophical cornerstone that was lying in the depth of Atatürks' revolutions but also that usually has been ignored was the idea that man could dominate his fate:

"The optimism, perseverance and self-confidence that was striking in Atatürk's behaviors were the indications of that idea. Such an insisting effort attempted to turn the society to certain directions could be meaningful only by believing that this effort would be efficient. Thus, we can say that the most exhaustive and deepest philosophical base lied behind Atatürk's revolution was the belief that men could establish dominance over his environment" (Mardin, 1964).

Notwithstanding, we observe in the activities of the Turkish Republic a very manifest intention toward an almost strict nationalism. The attempt to invent and unify an ancient Turkish Age, and to construct certain origins there has brought about the occurrences of funny positions. The Turkish Institutions of History and Language, trying to find the origins of Turkish language and history arrived at a point of claiming that all societies originated from the Turkish ethnicity, and all languages were considered as derivations of Turkish language. Such a quest for nationalism on the contrary of the universalist ideal apparently seems as a contradiction. But the Turkish Republic had justified such a contradiction under the theoretical contributions of Ziya Gökalp, while he was making a conceptual distinction between *civilization* and *culture*. For him "Islam and Western modernity had both represented

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[8] Particular will or *irade-i cüz'iyye* is the concept of Islamic theology which represents and indicates man's limited capacity choice and action in contrast with God's infinite capacity (*irade-i Külliye*) of action. In spite of its emphasis on man's capacity in front of God it gives a possibility to any implication of man's autonomy in his choices and actions rather then being a closed perception of fatalism.

relevant civilizations for the Turkish people, the emphasis shifting from the first to the second. However for the people to constitute a nation, civilization is not enough: a national culture is needed" (Akşit, 1991: 156). Thus such a combination of the culture and civilization would have called for much more progress towards totalitarianism in the Turkish social and political life.

As easily can be understood from the above remarks a faculty of divinity in particular and a *university* of Darülfünun and later the university of İstanbul had much to do within the entire politics such a totalizing Revolution. The performance that had been expected from the university to fulfill will require a brief internal history of the concept and practice of 'a university' in general and 'a faculty of divinity' or a higher Islamic educational systems in particular.

CHAPTER III
A FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN İSTANBUL: 1924-1933

As we mentioned above, in the search of being modern state, the only way for Mustafa Kemal was to turn away from the traditions. Therefore, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in her 3 March 1924 session, in the same day with the abolition of the Caliphate, laid down the law of the Unification of Educational Systems numbered 430. Two of the most important items of that law were the second one declaring that "All of the medreses and schools which are governed by Şer'iyye ve Evkaf Vekaleti or some other special foundations' board of trustees were transferred and assigned to the Ministry of Education" and the fourth one declaring that "there will be established a Faculty of Theology in Darülfünun, in which higher specialists of the religion could be educated and separate schools in which officials who will fulfill religious services would be emerged" (Jäschke, 1972: 75). In the session that concluded with this law there was discussed also the place of the Faculty of Theology in the university. Firstly it had been placed behind the faculty of science, but with the objection and suggestion made by Akçuraoğlu Yusuf the Deputy of İstanbul the Faculty of Theology placed next to the faculty of art. After the negotiations of the law on the legal personality of the Darülfünun, on 21 April 1924 a new law in which the faculty of Theology was mentioned in the first article was accepted and ordered as follows:

"Article 1- Among Medicine, Law, Art, Theology and Science *medreses* that constitute the İstanbul Darulfünun, each is allowed to possess, and accept donations by real estates and movable goods.

Furthermore, in the "*İstanbul Dar'ül-Fünûnu Tâlimatnâmesi*" (Regulation for the Darülfünun of İstanbul) which came into force as subject to the same law it was said that:

Article 1- The Darülfünun of İstanbul is composed of the Faculties of Medicine, Law, Art, Science (*Fen*) and Theology.
Article 2- Darülfünun has a scientific autonomy.
Article 8- There will be thought the following courses in the Faculty of Theology: Qur'anic Exegesis and its History (*Tefsir ve Tefsir Tarihi*), Traditions and its' history (*Hadis ve Hadis Tarihi*), The History of Islamic Jurisdiction (*İslam Fıkhı Tarihi*), The

History of Islamic Theology (*Kelâm Tarihi*), The History of Islamic Mysticism (*Tasavvuf Tarihi*), The History of Religions (*Tarih-i Edyan*), Sociology (*İctimâiyyat*), Psychology (*Ruhiyat*), Ethics (*Ahlak*), The History of Islamic Philosophy (*İslam Felsefesi Tarihi*), Social Psychology (*İctimâî Ruhiyat*) [in terms of the investigation of religious phenomena], Historical Philosophy (*Tarihi Felsefe*), Turkish History of Religion (*Türk Tarihi Dinisi*), Islamic Philosophy(*İslâm Felsefesi*).

There was, as it is seen, a difference between the law and the regulation in terms of the place of the Faculty of Theology. While in the law it was mentioned as medrese, in the regulation it was rectified as faculty. Then the "*Şer'î İlimler Şubesi*" (Department of Islamic Sciences) of the *Süleymaniye Medresesi* was replaced by the name *İlahiyat Fakultesi* synchronously with the command of the minister of education of the time Vasıf Çınar that asked the medreses to be closed (Koştaş, 1989; Jäschke, 1972).

In the consideration of the lessons to be taught in the Faculty of Theology in the regulation, the Exegesis and the Traditions were being announced to be given with their history, whereas the Islamic Jurisdiction was to be given only in the line of its' historical narration. Thus the Islamic jurisdiction was taken by the beginning as potentially opposite to the Constitution and the Civil Code, and was taken in consideration only by its' historical investigation (Koştaş, 1989: 6).

From the curriculum declared in the regulation and the journal that the Faculty had published for seven years (25 volume), it is understood that the faculty of theology has aimed to practice the philosophy and sociology of the religion, rather than making the true reproduction of Islamic knowledge and practices or educating the religiousmen as Subjects of their religious activities. Here the distinction and the rupture between the religiousman and the scholar of religion become apparent. It is the distinction that we shall mention later in the depiction of some Muslim responses to the existence of the faculties of theologies in secular universities, whose most prominent representative is Ali Fuad Başgil. In one sense, it was also why İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, the deputy of Kırşehir, was criticising the Faculty of Theology in the discussions within the Grand National Assembly (*T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi*, Period VIII, Vol 20, session3, pp. 277-284) for the new Faculty of Divinity at Ankara. He said that, together with a group of the instructor, they had done nothing but a faculty of sociology. The Islamic sciences were in the secondary positions compared with the philosophy and sociology within the curriculum.

Thus, transferring the instructors of the old Medreses, who were called müderris, constituted the staff of the Faculty and the lessons were distributed among this staff as follows:

The President of the Instructors' Assembly (Meclis-i Müderrisîn Reisi) Şemsettin (Günaltay) - The History of Islamic Religion and Metaphysic,

Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan) - The History of Islamic Sects,

Mustafa Şekip (Tunç) - Psychology of Religion,

İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) - Sociology of Religion,

Şerafettin (Yaltkaya) - The history of Islamic Theology,

Mehmet Ali Aynî - The History of Islamic Mysticism,

Köprülüzade M. Fuad - The History of Turkish Religion,

Kilisli Rıfat - Arabic,

Mehmet İzzet - Ethics,

Mehmet Emin - History of Philosophy (Koştaş, 1989: 7).

In spite of its excellent staff, and some courageous innovations, students were not attracted to the Faculty so that by 1933 it hardly retained its one of the most important *raison d'étres*. [9] There were 284 students in 1924-5; 167 in 1926-7; 53 in 1927-28; 35 in 1929-30; and 20 in 1932-33. There were only two diplomas awarded in 1931 (Jäschke, 1972: 75; Reed, 1956: 298). The rapid succession of secularist reforms carried out by the Republic in its formative years certainly reduced the potential areas of employment and usefulness of graduates of such a Faculty.[10] 'After 1926, they couldn't serve as judges applying Islamic law even with regard to personal status matters. When Islam ceased to be the state religion in 1928, it lost even more of its prestige. The alphabet reform in that year, and the abandonment of instruction in Arabic and Persian in the state schools in 1929, meant that the Theological

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[9] It is only one, for a faculty that aims to make scientific activity hasn't to got students as İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu said in the same session of negotiation for the second faculty of Theology at Ankara. He said that, "faculties are not schools, so they can and should survive without students."

[10] Sinan Tekelioğlu, the deputy of Seyhan, in the negotiation of the budget of the Organisation of Religious Affairs in the Grand National Assembly, has explained the reason of the decrease in number of the students of the Faculty of Theology as it was the conspiracy of the government. Because it employed its graduates by very law salary and automatically (supported by the effect of the Revolutions that were diminishing the status of the religious affairs) decreased status cf. Ceylan, 1990: Vol. II, pp. 355.

Faculty could no longer count on its students entering with a basic knowledge of the Arabic script and language so essential to advanced Islamic Studies. The tenor of informed, urban, educated public opinion was not favorable to Islamic theological studies with their unpleasant earlier connotations of the outworn, and then despised Ottoman Empire, the Caliphate, and the World War I disasters' (Reed, 1956: 298-299).

There are two much important activities performed by the Faculty that should be considered and elaborated here. One is the journal in which the studies of the members of the Faculty were published: *İlahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuası*. The other was the report prepared by the members of the Faculty, which embodying a number of bold and sensible suggestions for reforming the forms of Islamic worship in June 1928. These two activities, especially the second one reflected largely the position of the notion of a university and its role in a society, thereby giving very clues for a possible history of the university within the Turkish society. And even not only the possible history of the Turkish University but also the various ideological and political characteristics of the changing society can be examined.

3. 1 *İlahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuası:*

The journal published by the instructors of the faculty, tried sincerely to adapt and reinterpret Islam so that it might both share in and contribute toward the great Turkish nationalist awakening. There were published70 articles in the journal about in seven years (1926-1933) and in 25 issues. The subjects varied from the historical and sociological investigation on some small groups or sects of Islamic society to the current philosophical issues, some investigations of theological, and mystical, and ethical issues. The articles on the History of Religions, or the sociological investigations of some living religions constitute the highest proportion among the all articles. There are about twenty articles on this subject. They are followed in the density by introductory articles about the Islamic sects and their histories, no matter how orthodox or heterodox they might be, with 14 articles.[11][11] In my account there are about 10 articles directly on philosophy and 8, again, directly on sociology. But these numbers doesn't reflect the real weight of the sociology or philosophy in the Journal because some articles which were accounted once are published on more than one issue because of

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[11][11] The quantity of the classified articles are not definite, for the domain by which the articles are concerned are not in complete exclusion of the other domains, and as much as the numerical amount of the articles the amount of the pages that each category covers might change the distribution.

their length, for example, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı published a series of articles titled as "*İslâm'da Felsefe Cereyanları*" (Philosophical Movements in Islam) which continued during 14 issues. Moreover, much of the articles on the other issues include quite successful usage of philosophical and sociological themes. There are, for another example, 10 articles on the biographies of various historical persons together with their ideas and depictions of their thoughts and studies. At least five of those persons had some philosophical personalities. The rest were either scholars of any branch of Islamic sciences or leaders of any Islamic sectarian group. I have counted 8 articles on some issues of Islamic Theology, and only 4 directly on the relationship between religion, secularism and science, especially emphasizing their harmonious quality. Finally there can be distinguished another category of articles which deals with issues in relation with the Turkish identity, Turkish religion, Turkish scholars, Turkish architecture etc.

In fact, the proportion of the Turkish studies that would be helpful in both having a share and contributing toward the great Turkish nationalist awakening seems too low in terms of being sufficient. And it would already be criticized by the deputies of the Grand National Assembly and the reporters of the Darülfünun of İstanbul, who were imported to be employed just to prepare a report on the dilemmas and possibilities of the Turkish University, for not being functional and biased in settling the Turkish identity. According to these criticism, not only the Faculty but completely the Darulfünun was criticized for being just an unbiased witness toward the Revolutions made by the Republic and for not devoting their support and scientific activities to the services of the political and social changes brought about by the Revolutionists.[12][12]

The quantitative distribution of the studies in the Journal of the Faculty of Divinity indeed shows that they were highly unconcerned or less concerned with the current political or ideological debates. There were not any contributive or participative lines towards the political activities of Mustafa Kemal. But that was not to justify the criticisms in terms of the Faculty's scientific sufficiency. The studied subjects, the scientific discourse applied in the articles, the methods of treating the subjects etc. was certainly not of lower quality than of any contemporary equivalent journal. In that sense it was perhaps highly active agent of the modernization of Turkey, but this modernization was actually in its' spontaneous running.

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[12][12] See the negotiations by the Grand National Assembly on the reform of the university in Turkey and the report prepared by Albert Malch and the speeches of Reşit Galip in the introduction of these negotiations that will be mentioned in more detail later (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 176-189; Hirsh, 1950)

Otherwise it should had to be considered as highly successful in terms of its level of anatomization of the Islamic knowledge, of course, in a positivistic style of treatment. In this development of the Turkish kind of modernization the university and especially the Faculty of Theology was not alone. All of the social institutions of the country were under the charge of supplying the Revolutionary demands over the domains they were responsible. And this distinctive characteristic of the Turkish modernization and secularization has been usually mentioned by much of the analysts of the modernization of Third World, especially of Islamic countries. Here what sociological tradition usually employed was derived from Weber's view of the capitalist ethic and secularization, which came to fit the Middle East not because of any intrinsic relationship between industrial society and secular ethics, but because these world-views were imported by Muslim intellectuals who had accepted a Western interpretation of history (Turner, 1974: 3, 151-170). Thus, I think we can say that in its natural and instinctive running, the modernization of the university, or its role in and contribution to modernization were not historically retarded. The Revolution, by its nature of being a revolution was in expectation of unnatural and fast contribution, service and fertile from the present institutions. On the contrary, the staff of the Faculty of Theology showed their loyalty to the on-going revolutions, under the chairmanship of Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad Bey, by preparing a report embodying a number of bold and sensible suggestions for reforming of the forms of Islamic worship.

Another point from which the staff of the Faculty in general and the articles published in the journal in particular were criticized was that the scientific activities were mostly relying on translation without any indigenous contribution, and that the articles were composed of just the exegesis and exegesis on exegesis of the old classical books without including any critics of them (Wilson and Başgöz, 1968: 180-189; Malch, 1933). This criticism seemed to me irrelevant after my account of the ratio between the translated and the original articles in comparison with any contemporary journal let me say *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi* or *İslâmî Araştırmalar*. The latter one as we will mention later in more detail is a journal equivalent to the former one. Now much of the staff of the faculty prefers to publish their studies in this journal. And both include translated articles at least as much as the *İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*. There are, as we have mentioned before, about 70 articles in the journal, about 25 of which were translations. The panorama of the translations is also interesting and perhaps more constitutive and contributive for the new regime. There are, for example, translations from Lévy Bruhl who, applying the social evolutionism adapted by

August Comte, studied the primitive religion or the primitive state of religious idea;[13][13] from Dumazil, Durkheim, A.A. Semenow, Theodule Ribot (who has written in Bergsonian context of intuitionism, and whose studies translated by Mustafa Şekip [Tunç]), William Pedgeway (with his Turkologist studies) and Dominique Parodi.

3. 2 The Reforms Suggested by The Faculty:

As we have mentioned before the second of the two most remarkable activities of the Faculty was the report including suggestions for reforming the forms of Islamic worship issued in June 1928, some two months after Islam had ceased to be the religion of the Turkish state in accordance with a constitutional amendment on April 10th. The Dean of the Faculty in 1927, and chairman of the committee which drafted this report was Professor Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuat Bey, later rector of İstanbul University, and in 1950's Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Defense. His Committee, nominated by the Theological Faculty, included: İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Mustafa Şekip Bey, Professor of Psychology, Halil Nimetullah, Professor of Logic, and Professors İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, Halil Halid Bey, Mehmed Ali Ayni Bey, Şerafeddin [Yaltkaya] Bey, Hüseyin Avni [Kunter] Bey of Arapkır, Hilmi Ömer [Budda] Bey,and Yusuf Ziya [Yörükan] Bey (Reed, 1956:299).

In the days of the publication of the project of Islamic Reform *Millî Mecmua* organised a questionnaire among the notable writers or authors on religious and philosophical issues in order to learn their ideas on and responses to the Religious reform. Among the respondents the words that İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who was the instructor of Sociology of Religion in the Faculty, used give us very clear indications of the underlying intentions or expectations from such a reform project, as well as of the nature and directions of the Republic toward constituting its universalist targets in secular lines. It can be easily observed that one of the most important directions that come into view by these response to the questionnaire was that the projected relation of religious life in Turkish state and society was inspired by the situation of Christianity in Western societies. İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu replied to the question searching for the ethical position of Islam against Christianity as:

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[13][13] The titles of the three articles from Lévy Bruhl, for example, are: The Functions of the Mind in the Lower Societies (Aşağı Cemiyyetlerde Zihin Fonksiyonları, Year III-IV, Number, 12,13,15, 1929-30); The Philosophy of August Comte (August Comte'un Felsefesi, Year V, Number, 19, 1931); Primitive Mentality (İbtidâî Zihniyet, Year, III-IV, Number, 11, 16, 17, 1929-30), all had been translated by Halil Nimetullah.

Islam is as much ethical and civil religion as Christianity. Both have become the representative of the eternal enthusiasm of men. Both are the human attacks, not to understand the absolute forms of the trueness, goodness and beauty, but to make it be lived. However there are some interpretative differences between the two rather than conflict relationship. But there is no any possibility of favoring one to another in as much as these differences remained in interpretative level. Therefore it is very natural that the origins of our faiths should be the religious life of our national society. On the other hand it is required that men should differ in religious convictions as they differentiate in sects provided that this differentiation remains on an interpretative level without being extended to the level of hostility.[14]

There was an implicit admission here that Islam (or the Muslims, of course) had no longer got the claim of being the ultimate undistorted, and so the only one true religion surviving on the earth. Moreover the unification of the ultimate goals of the religions having been quested, this unification is admitted to be realized on the way opened or preceded by Christianity in terms of its functionality, or at least, its accommodation to the development of the Western countries. Though Mustafa Kemal in his speeches declared that Islamic religion was the final religion because it was the most rational one, this notion of rationality was implying not more than the position that Christianity took against the this-worldly affairs of the governments in the west. Thus what was elevated through such a discourse emphasizing the advantages or superiorities of Islam over other religions was in fact the recent position of the religion whose most conspicuous characteristic was its accommodation rather than challenging or resisting capacity with its unique character in giving unto Ceasar that which is Ceasar's, in the Western countries. Notwithstanding, the popularity of Christianity wasn't resulted at all from certain investigations on its body in terms of its internal coherence or rationality. As it seems what made it favorable was only its being the religion of the western countries whose all characteristics were considered worth to be imitated in order to be able to attain a real development, namely to the level of "modern civilization". That was because the Turkish secularization and modernization was consciously mimetic in that it took Europe as its specific model of adaptation (Turner, 1974: 168). In other words, it took the western values and cultural elements as the necessary complementary parts of its development, i.e. the

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[14] Quoted from *Millî Mecmua*, (Number 110-111,1928) by Ceylan, 1990, Vol. II, pp. 119.

development had been forced by the total characteristics of the West. Undoubtedly the mimetic characteristic of the Turkish political and cultural modernization had other dynamics far from allowing such a reductionism implying that the governing parts were in unconscious state of behavior. Some analysts have usually considered the integration of Turkey with the recently restored world-system and the associated inkılabs in complementary relation. For those analysts[15], the Turkification of the Ottoman culture was above all serving to ensure the deprivation of the Ottoman from the power provided by the holding of some Islamic privileges rather than being a pure experience of independence of Turkey from the foreign cultures' alienating influences. However, in this study we rather tend to look for the ideological background and implications of various aspects of such an enterprise. Having realized that Islam was a blueprint of society, which claims to penetrate all sectors of the life in a way that constitutes a great obstacle for the realization of westernization attempts, a radical rivalry was applied in the same degree of its totality in order to break its resistant influence. The way that was chosen in diminishing the influence of Islam also is noteworthy. Islam was not rejected or forbidden completely, but it was tried to be modified, both because of the possible legitimation crisis that would have arisen with such a total rejection, and of the expected facilities of modified religion such as that it would be functional in the applied social project (Turner, 1974: 165).

For the realization of the reform project, Baltacıoğlu added that, Islamic texts should be translated into Turkish. Therefore there were high need for the efficacy of two institutions: the Faculty of Theology and the Conservatoire of İstanbul. The Faculty of Theology would investigate the possibility of the progress of religious institutions in harmony with the structure of Turkish nation. While especially ensuring the accommodation of the Islamic religion to the Turkish culture, it would also provide a new kind of religious philosophy that would replace the theology (*İlm-i Kelâm*) and Mysticism (*Tasavvuf*). As for the conservatoire, it was to constitute a religious music, and would have educated the *imams* and *müezzins* musically (Ceylan, 1990. vol. 2: 120).

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[15] For example Fikret Başkaya, in his recent study **Paradigmanın İflası**, (1991, İstanbul, Doz Yayınları) gives very good examples for the international power of the Ottoman society by the Caliphate from India to Algeria. For him the abolition of the Caliphate, in contrast to the widespread idea, certainly was an unreachable target of the rivals of the Ottoman state. His unfamiliar approach is completed, thus, with a subtitle on his book: The Criticism of the Official Ideology and its Approach to History. Another example of the approach in question is İsmet Özel, who try to answer the question of whether the world-system has a brain or centre in positive direction. Cf. (Özel, 1989-1992).

The English translation (by Howard Reed, 1956b: 300-301), of this important document which defines also the role of the Faculty of Theology in the new Turkish society, taken from the İstanbul paper, *Vakit*, issue of June 20, 1928 (see, Appendix II).

Speaking of the reform to the journalists who had asked him for information, Professor Köprülüzade Fuad Bey said that:

"The purpose of religious reform is to make religion also shape the process of the development now active in all the other departments of life. We shall submit this program, which we have prepared to accomplish this, to the Board of Directors of the University and that body in its turn will submit it to the Ministry of Education" (Jäschke, 1972: 40-42; Reed, 1956: 300-301; Ceylan 1990: 116-118; Schimmel, 1988).

Subsequently the Reform was found to be premature, and the Committee was immediately disbanded, because the report had brought about large negative responses from the popular side. The reform bore some fruit in the adoption of the call to prayer in Turkish, which was tried in 1932 and became official in March 1933. However, little else in the formal worship, or prayers and sermons had yet been affected by these recommendations (Reed, 1956: 301; Jäschke, 1972: 45). But what is more noteworthy in this experience, together with the other practices carried out by the Faculty and the Republic was the characteristic relation between the university and state. It was an important stage in the history of the development of University in Turkey. Well, this relation can undoubtedly be defined as the absolute dependence of the university to the state at the beginning of the Republic. But my all intention here is not to show this dramatic dependency, because it is already well known, or at least very easy to learn from any superficial history book written on the Turkish education, and I don't think that just a recurrence of such an observation would have made any contribution to the study of the history of the university.

My intention here is to make the point that although it was criticized, as we shall narrate in the next chapters, for not giving sufficient support for and being just an unbiased witness of the Revolutions, the Faculty of Theology, at least, could be distinguished from the rest of Darulfünun. For, by its minimal activities mentioned above the Faculty has fulfilled at least certain functions that were vital in the process of legitimating and settling the Revolutions. Firstly, it can be recognized that it had taken a considerable way in academization of the domain of faith and religion with certain academic distance. What was

really new here was the overcoming of the tension located between the claim of religious studies from their carriers for full participation in terms of faith and the actual absence of neutrality of the current science in terms of ideological stance. Secondly, together with associated results of the academization of any kind of knowledge, the Faculty had given direct services for the Revolution both voluntarily and regularly, as in the activities mentioned above. Although Mustafa Kemal had requested the reform project, it was propagated that it was the voluntary attempt of the Faculty members, and therefore it had caused a more Revolutionary image on their part to occur. Thirdly, the members of the Faculty with exception of few of them, who were really in opposition with Kemalizm, as Mehmed Ali Ayni Bey and İsmail Hakkı İzmirli Bey, were largely working in harmony with the Revolution, so that most of them would have promoted to the higher levels of government. For example, Şemsettin Günaltay later became Prime Minister; Köprülüzade Fuad Bey became Rector of İstanbul University, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Defense.

3. 3 University Reform and the closure of the Faculty of Theology:

Then, if it was really so useful and successful even for the new Republic, and if it has fulfilled so many functions in the establishment of the new regime, why should it be closed? The closure of the Faculty of Theology has been explained by the same reasons that led the University of Darülfünun to be closed. These reasons have been stated in sum by the official discourse, which was revealed during the discussions within of the Grand National Assembly on the University Reform and in the report, which was ordered by the government to be prepared by Albert Malch.

Before proceeding to the related reports and speeches that prepared the legitimating ground for closing the Darülfünun, I think it would be useful to mention two tendencies toward the autonomy of the university at the early period of the Turkish Republic. One was the tendency of those who advocated that the Revolution should penetrate to all details of the social and cultural life by the state intervention in all institutions as well as the universities. The first Minister of Education Vasıf Çınar as one of the major representatives of this tendency was stating his ideas:

"The Turkish Nation now is walking toward a new goal. The best image of the civilization in our country will be the Darülfünun. The Ministry of Education cannot

leave the Darülfünun in such a plain situation. If it leaves it, it would not have fulfilled its duty." (*Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlarının Milli Eğitimle İlgili Söylev ve Demeçleri*, Ankara, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 296).

Thus he was telling the ideas of the reformists who wanted the intervention of the state and with whom Mustafa Kemal and his fellows were in agreement. For them the Darülfünun had as much a bad legacy from the Ottoman as other institutions. If it was left by itself it couldn't for a long time escape from the backwardness and laziness. Not intervening to the Darülfünun on the name of the autonomy of the university was, in fact, no more than ignoring and tolerating the ignorance, laziness and cliques of the professors embracing each other for various interests. A group was representing the second tendency; one of their famous advocates was the later Minister of Education Mustafa Necati, who violently opposed any kind of intervention to the university. For him the development and the progress of Darülfünun should be expected only from, again, the Darülfünun itself. University, by name, already means autonomy. Thus any intervention by the politicians in order to reform or modify it, wouldn't have do anything but make it worse (Wilson and Başgöz, 1968: 178-179).

During the first decade of the Republic, the former tendency dominated the policies of the Republican governments toward universities. The governments only provided to the universities some possibilities and financial resources, of course with the expectation of some indirect support for the on-going policies, like the reforms in religious sphere, or the efforts for developing a new approach to history and language. There were sometimes also some events in the Darülfünun that were impulsing some responses by the government and in a way to accumulate the will to interfere in the universities. For the first group mentioned above, the autonomy had already not any utility other than protecting and keeping the incapable professors at university. One of such events, for example, was one being called 'the crisis of photograph'. It originated from the response of the authorities of the university to some students who had posed for the objective, for it was reminded that it was religiously forbidden. This was an intolerable leading for a political tendency which was in a high quest for penetrating even the everyday life of the people, and together with other similar oppositional actions led by the staff of the Darülfünun were in any case an indication for potential resistance against such a project. But even these events, I think, cannot be distinguished as the primary factors of the dissatisfactions against the existing university. Since, from an optimistic or the existing point of view, such actions would not be so antithetical. They are already tolerated by many examples in today's universities. But when

the sufficient accumulation of the opposition against the universities was constituted such events, too, have acquired their meanings and places in the history of Turkish modernization or laicization.

When Reşit Galip, the Minister of Education in 1933, repeated his criticism to the Darülfünun in the Grand National Assembly, he was in fact doing more than justifying official decisions for an educational policy. First, he was declaring the temporary victory of the first group mentioned above, which was defending the state intervention to university against the autonomists claiming autonomy for the university and, by implication of course, for the other elements of the society. Secondly, it was a turning point in the process of getting the sufficient potential for settling the Revolution. That provided a good opportunity for the manifestation of the teleological element in the applications of the revolutionists toward a complete laicization of Turkey, and toward a total constitution of a new society. Thirdly, as we mentioned earlier, he was outlining the boundaries of the autonomy of a university in the new society. For him while it had being expected from the Darulfünun to develop in parallel with the other aspects of the rapidly changing society:

"All intellectuals of Turkey have focused their attention on the Darulfünun during the period between 1923-1932. They were hoping that the Darülfünun would progress in accommodation with the general running of Turkey, which was realizing a radical change in every domain of the life. There was not any problem more important than the affairs of the Darulfünun in the country. Nor any institution was criticized more than itself. However, in spite of all these criticisms and interests in the Darülfunun it didn't show any development, rectification and progress the Turkish enlightenment demanded.... There occurred grand political and social revolutions in the country. Darülfünun remained against them as unbiased witness. Basic movements have taken place in economical domain. Darülfünun, again, seemed unaware. Radical changes were realized in the juridical domain. Darülfünun was contended only with taking the new laws in its curriculum. The revolution of letters began, as well as the movement of pure language occurred with the absolute silence of the Darülfünun. A new understanding of history extended and covered all the country as a movement whereas it required three years to wait and working in order to stimulate a simple interest in the Darülfünun against this understanding. The Darülfünun of İstanbul had stopped any more, it had withdrawn from the external world in an isolation" (Hirsh, 1950: 310-319).

In the later parts of his speech, Reşit Galip used quotations from the report prepared by Albert Malch who was invited specifically for this task by the government. This report constituted the technical depiction of the functioning of the darulfünun, in the name of scientific criteria. It was, of course, not a political document though it was being prepared for a political decision, which was not unknown before the preparation of the report. In Reşit Galip's speech the Darülfünun was being criticized in 16 points based on this report. These criticisms might be summarized as: There was no serious scientific study in the university. The instructors of the university didn't perform and create any original scientific study. The few published studies were either copies of each other or bad translations of their foreign references. The appointments of the new instructor were made without consideration of any scientific sufficiency, only the personal relations and cliques played roles. Under such conditions, the autonomy of the university didn't have any facility other than holding some incapable professors in the university and constituting a role of protector for them.'

Thus the closure of the Darülfünun was to be legitimated by such exaggerations of the really bad aspects of the university. Because in fact the real leading motive was the fact also stated by various channels of the government that the university didn't help in preparing and executing the Revolution, and that it opposed to all revolutions which the Turkish Republic attempted to perform, or shown a passive sufferance to those revolutions. Nor had it studied in any way for accelerating the revolutions after they were accomplished.

This criticism was cultivated by the Revolutionist intellectuals like the writers of *Kadro*, which was being published monthly as a medium for the Turkish Marxism. There were published two articles touching directly on the relationship between the politics and university, which also examining the meaning of a university and its autonomy. *Kadro* had assigned a role for itself of advocating the Revolutions and to play the part of the professional ideologist of the state, for there was still a dominant view that the Turkish Revolution was in the true line of the classical historical scheme of Marxism, and the expectation that Mustafa Kemal would prepare the conditions for socialism hadn't been exhausted yet.

The first article, as a matter of fact, is subtitled under the chapter title as "The ideology of the Revolution: The Revolutionary Sensitivity, Darülfünun and The Economism of Cavit Bey" (Süreyya, 1933). The article written as a response from Şevket Süreyya to Ahmet Ağaoğlu, on his speech in the conference organized by *Türk İktisatçılar Cemiyeti* (Turkish Economical Association) in İstanbul. Süreyya simply condemned Ağaoğlu from an authoritarian (perhaps powerful) position for not being a defender of the Revolution by his

scientific approach. For, Ağaoğlu had advocated the autonomy of the individuals, small groups or partial enterprise in economy, which, of course, would have some implications in other institutions of the society. For Süreyya, rather than being Ağaoğlu's own personal opinions, because all instructors of the Darülfünun greeted it with applause. Thus he generalized this attitude and gave it its name as "the opposition of the instructors of Darülfünun to the Statism, so to the Revolution". Then he began to express his image of a university:

"Darülfünun, is a part of any society. Any kind of psychological situations of some members of this part is more or less the reflection of the quality of this part. If this reflection is to give any impression that the running and the claims of the society are in contrary to that of the Darülfünun, then, it is our right to distrust the mental homogeneity or the liveliness of this institution.... this part can show its' originality and its liveliness only in as much as it represents and reflects the claims of its society for material and moral development in the most progressive, straight and complete way. In Darülfünun the problems of the society are elaborated, synthesized and solved. For example the place wherein the notions as *revolutionism, statism* and *nationalism* which have been made the mainstay of our State policies would be elaborated and explained, is Darülfünun."

For Süreyya, those who had always taken the attitude of meaningless but proud silence or backward but wrapped up with a scientific resistance should appropriate the sensitivity of revolution and a loyalty to the problems of the country before such a meaningless silence and phraseological scholarship. The notions as the autonomy of university and to know only for the sake of knowledge should be considered as specific to the nineteenth century liberalist ideology. His examples were, therefore, from Italy and Russia, which declared the bankruptcy of the liberalism for the sake of the revolutions. He asked whether the loyalty of darülfünuns, in Italy and Russia, to the trial of reconstruction of their countries with a full energy was a luxury. And he answered with an example from Russia. He had read how a Russian scholar (with, of course, full of approval) had been condemned for his doubt from the efficiency of the Russian land for the plan of reconstruction of Russia. And there was another example from Milano. Here an international musician, Toskanini, had been thrown out for not beginning his concert with the march of the Balillas. Süreyya says, "Well! These are violent. But they are above all the reflection of a revolutionary sensitivity. And

such sensitivity is necessary for ensuring the continuity of the revolutions and the loyalty of the new generations until the point of not saying that 'what kind of ideal did we leave for the young generation?' in a time of psychological decay."

In the second article touched directly upon the university, Burhan Asaf (Belge) interrogated the meaning of the university under the major title "Turkey in the World: The Meaning of the University" (Asaf, 1933). By emphasizing the two characteristics of the Darülfünun (as, 1- science is done only for the sake of itself, no other goal could be justified, 2- no any intervention can be imposed on the science, because, science is an autonomous institution) which was the result of the liberalist understanding of the nineteenth century, he argued that the university and politics should be in a complementary relationship. That was to modify the view of the autonomy of the faculty. His examples were again from Italy and Russia in addition with Germany, which together had declared the bankruptcy of liberalism and in which the intervention to the universities was being tolerated as well as the intervention to all other societal institutions. As a matter of fact, for Asaf, the motto of all these countries was that "we want such a Darülfünun as would represent the science conforming to the life and all scientific activities making this life possible." He made a distinction between 'liberty as a system' and 'liberty as a notion' and argued that every society had a definition of liberty and it didn't necessarily follow liberalism or at least there was no connection between them. Thus, while clarifying a will to a unique way or *sonderweg*[16] for the Turkish development and progress, he also sustained a Jacobinism ideology, which was an appropriate choice of such radical revolutionists. As we mentioned earlier, this kind of Jacobinism was intellectually based on an adaptation of the French kind of Enlightenment. The article was implying and response on the other side to the attitude taken by the members of the Darülfünun against the new theory of history and language. And the most part of the dissatisfactions which created so much criticism and which also extended the projection on the other aspects of the university was this specific attitude. That was not only a silence of a witness or an unconcerned man, but also a manifestation of a clear opposition, with criticism and rejection.

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[16] *Sonderweg* implies a unique way of a country in German. Of course it has more other philosophical implication as many other concepts in German. In the ways of either modernisation or Enlightenment the word refers to the well-known characteristic tendency of Germany has shown in her history (Çiğdem, 1992) which is characterised by Abdullah Laroui (1976) as "historical retardation".

This attitude of the members of Darülfünun against the new theory of history that had been suggested in the First Congress of Turkish History, in 1932, was the last drop that made the glass spill over. It created a violent reaction in Ankara that found, in turn, its statement in the speeches and review articles mentioned above. Thus, relying on these criticisms the university policy was reviewed and the university was decided to be reformed in the negotiations in the Grand National Assembly in July and August 1933. The Darülfünun of İstanbul was closed and the University of İstanbul was opened and among the 240 members of the darülfünun only 83 members were employed again in the new university. The rest of the members were retired. Their place was tried to be filled by employing the German Professors escaping from Germany (Wilson and Başgöz, 1968: 179-180; Ersanlı Behar, 1992: 168). The university was under dense control of the government, and if Darülfünun was to be considered as in an extreme position of autonomy the position of the new university was in completely opposite position. The right of appointment and dismissal of the rector, general secretary and professors was assigned to the Ministry of Education which asked the pofessors even to order schedule of attendance.

In 1935 there was opened the Faculty of Language, History and Geography (FLHG) in order to complete the universale of the revolution. In this university, the ideology of the revolution would be elaborated and the policies of the state would be sustained. In the First Congress of the Turkish History, the European, Asian, African civilizations, Persian and ancient cultures were already demonstrated that they all were established by the Turks who had migrated from Central Asia, in the presentations of some young scholars whose engagement in the studies of history hadn't been known until that time. The establishment of both the Turkish Institution of History and the FLHG was by the beginning disabled by such lack of seriousness (Wilson and Başgöz, 1968: 189), as also the Theory of Sun Language (Güneş Dil Teorisi) which was to show the origin of all languages to be Turkish. When Afet İnan gave her first lecture in the Faculty she was an undergraduate student. She was sent to Sweden for education in order to give lecture in FLHG. While she was hesitated about giving lecture in university before accomplishing his education, Mustafa Kemal was asking her to begin hastily to her task. She accomplished her doctoral thesis in University of Geneva, which was titled as *On the Anthropological Character of the Turkish People and Turkish History*. The thesis was working in physical anthropology and was trying to explain the political history of the Turks by tracing on the remains of skulls. According to İnan, the Turks had migrated to the West because of the climate conditions, and thus constituted the European countries. This was the major hypothesis of the thesis of İnan (Ersanlı Behar, 1992: 170-171).

But we are still under the task of explaining why should the Faculty of Theology be closed together with other faculties of the Darülfünun. Because as we have seen earlier the members of the Faculty were obeying to the directions of the Revolutionists, if needed and the assignments they all had done under the Islamic reform project was perhaps the most extreme point of elasticity of religion against politics, which cause a way out from the tolerable boundaries of the religion. This was perhaps, also, an indication for almost an absolute obedience of the present members of the faculty to the directions of the government in the religious affairs. Nor can the scientific quality and sufficiency of the instructions or the activities be put forward as the leading motive of its closure. Because as H. A. Allen describes the situation in the religious instruction he was discovering their harmonious quality with the changing world, in the case of İmam-Hatip schools:

"The director of the school wore no clerical garb and appeared to be a keen and thoughtful educator. His previous experience had been confined entirely to lay schools, and he appeared to have no theological qualifications other than a belief in the possibilities of reforming Islam to become a vital and inspiring force in the life of the new Turkey." (Allen, 1935: 183).

The general decrease in the demand for the Faculty cannot be a satisfactory explanation, because it was very clear that it had been resulted from the state policy, as we have mentioned earlier. The schools of the İmams and Khatibs, which were the main sources of the Faculty, were being orderly closed until they had entirely finished. Moreover, as we have seen before the Faculty had been gradually devaluated in parallel with the settlement of the secular policies, as well as in the place of the Faculty in the organization of the University.[17][17] In his report on the situation of the university, Albert Malch remained silent on the issue of the Faculty of Theology because of his respect to the Islamic religion, although he has made some meaningful remarks:

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[17][17] "The students will not attend to the Faculty of Theology because of its inferior position in the university while the Schools of the İmam and Khatib, have been occupied with giving attestations, since the time they were established. Then, we can say that the Faculty of Theology are at the edge of exhausting their natural lives in their counted days..." From an article on the policies of the government against the religious schools, published in *Sebîlür Reşad Mecmuası*, N. 615, pp. 271, 4, September, 1340 (Quoted by Ceylan, pp.259-260).

"If the Faculty of Theology is desired to be protected because of some great requirement, then, naturally I will not make any remark on the issue. Because of the respect I feel about the Islamic Religion I am reasoning the issue from outside without accepting myself authoritative. But if it would be investigated and elaborated as if it is like any other faculty, then it is certain that the present situation couldn't be maintained. It has (only) 13 instructors and students. This faculty can be connected also to the faculty of letter under the title of The Department of Religious Science or Religiosity and the Philosophy of Islam. But in any case the offices, administrative staff and the commission of instruction in this form might have been much expensive. Furthermore it is very disencouraging to instruct in such conditions as so much deprived from practice and future" (Malch, 1932).

Thus one reason of the closure o the Faculty appears in that since the beginning of the Revolution there were an increasing diminishing in the status of the religious affairs and men in parallel with the increasing weight of the Revolutions and the worsening of the conditions of the religiousmen. But there were some points even more important than all these points. First, the existence of any institutional quality of the religion had been seen as a potential threat for the future of the revolutions if not for the current position of the revolution, which was to be characterized more primarily with its dynamism. Therefore the all institutions of religious education were being closed just because of the highly possible connection that H. E. Allen rightly has found:

"To the degree that the problem of (religious) leadership training is solved, to the same degree will the survival of Islam as a vital force in turkey be assured" (Allen, 1935: 184).

Thirdly, the approach that tends to explain the recent two centuries of the Turkish political struggles as resulting from the tension between the military-secular bureaucracy and the religious bureaucracy or between the *alaylı* and *mektepli*, can be applied to a certain degree. That is, the closure of the faculty of theology was a good opportunity in front of the military-secular bureaucracy, and it shouldn't be missed. Notwithstanding, it is really very meaningful that İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who was within the committee for reforming Islam, was also a pioneer of the opposition against the project of the new Turkish history and language (Ersanlı Behar, 1992: 168). For him the opposition in historical consciousness was,

as it seems, more important than the resistance in the religious orthodoxy. But the revolutionists were not tolerating even his opposition to the new ideology of history, so that he was forced to leave his office in the university. This fact increased the weight of the possibility of the closure of the Faculty as an intention to achieve an attack against the religious bureaucracy or to disqualify the potential store army of the religious forces in the society.

As a matter of fact, after the closure of the Darülfünun all the faculties were reopened with some modifications and with their undergraduate students, whereas the Faculty of Theology was not substituted by any institution, except the Institute for Islamic Researches (*İslâmî Tetkikler Enstitüsü*), which was established in the body of the Faculty of Letters in the University of İstanbul without student. In this institute, the following members of the former faculty have kept their places whereas the rest were disqualified: Şerafeddin Yaltkaya (The History of Theology), Mehmed Ali Aynî (History of Islamic Mysticism), Baki (The Literary of Persia), Yusuf Ziya Yörükan (The History of Islamic Sects), Hilmi Ömer Budda (The History of Religions). Şerafeddin Yaltkaya was later appointed to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Mehmed Ali Ayni and Baki Bey were retired. Then because of the absence of students the other remaining two professors were transferred to the high school teaching of philosophy, thus *İslâm Tetkikleri Enstiüsü*, too, lost all of its *raison d'étre*, and was finally abolished in 1942, nine years after its establishment. In1955 it was reopened and was attached to the directory of Zeki Velidi Togan who made it really, completely a centre for researches (Koştaş, 1989: 7; Jäschke, 1972: 75; Schimmel, 1988: 59).

In the years after 1933, Turkey witnessed a very solid practice of the imposition of the secularism. People were called for praying in Turkish, and they were hindered from reading their Holy Book in its original language, although it had been stated very clearly in the Book that it was revealed in Arabic as a specific preference of the God whom the Muslims were obeyed to submission without any condition or restriction. The lack of trained staff of the religious leaders created various dramatic conditions in the religious life of Turkish society. It has been characterized that if they died they could not find any qualified person to lead their religious funeral ceremonies.

The uniqueness of the Turkish secularization has often been mentioned, (Turner, 1974; Smith, 1957) in that it was mimetic because it took Europe as its specific model of adaptation and in that it was forced through as a political measure under the control of an autocratic and statist government rather than being a result of natural development of Turkish society as in other secularized societies of Europe. It didn't spring solely and automatically

from economic modernization, but was the consequence of a series of difficult political choices. This uniqueness in its process of development has required and created other unique features in its structuration. It has required, for example, a one-dimensional separation of the mutual intervention of religion and state in favor of the latter. On the other hand, the religious forces were isolated from their financial supports. The administration of the foundations was taken from the institution of religious affairs. This fact has exhausted almost all power of the religious forces, for demonstrating any response, in Turkey when any intervention made on the religious affairs by the state. Therefore, the separation of the religious affairs from the worldly affairs took place as impoverishment of the religious forces by the state unlike the corresponding development in Europe. When the Kings of Europe cut their ties with the Church, and the clergy lost its previous position in the society, the Church maintained a large institution and economical power enable the clergy to remain standing. Muslims had no institution of church; the heart of their source of income consisted of the foundations, which were called *hayrât*. The religiousmen, were taking their salaries from the administration of these foundations. And because there remained not any official position to which the graduate of the religious institutions of education would be appointed, the all possibility of getting income by a religious service was exhausted, except the village imams. Thus the other unique characteristic of the Turkish secularization appears as abolition of the all factors of religious autonomy.

With the closure of the *dervish* lodges and the prohibition of the activities of the orders, all religious staff lost their positions, and were withdrawn from the scene. The propaganda made about them has devaluated and humiliated them in the eyes of the first generation of the Republican society. For many years and still today the words *medrese, imam, ulemâ, turban, sheikh*s have been stimulating, for many, connotations of the scare movies with some complex feelings between fear and irony (Güngör, 1981: 208-209).

The result of all these developments was dramatic in terms both of the secular state, and of meeting the religious needs of people: problems arising from the absence of capable religious leaders has increasingly dominated the situation and the religious authority was, again, increasingly substituted by the new emergent unofficial and ignorant religiousmen. The unintended consequence of the government policy, which led to a drastic reduction of qualified religious leaders, was, thus, to promote the careers of religious backwoodsmen. As Bernard Lewis pointed out, "the shortage of men with a sound religious education gave scope to fanatics and illiterates... often with unfortunate results" (Lewis, 1970: 414). As we will return in the following pages, according to Lewis it was no doubt for this reason, at least in

part, that the government decided to restore the Faculty of Theology, which opened its gates to students in October 1949.

3. 4 The Official Translation and Interpretation of the Qur'an

One considerable activity of the secular state in the religious domain is the project of producing a Turkish translation and exegesis of the Qur'an. The task of translating the Qur'an was given to Mehmed Akif Ersoy, who at the beginning accepted the task and translated most of its parts, but toward the end of translation was stimulated by some anxieties made him stop the translation. He was in a state of suspicion about the legitimation of the activity because of the political goals behind its being ordered (Kara, 1986: 312). This suspicion was probably cultivated by the long tradition of the attitudes of the ulema against the states in Islamic history. It is a well known phenomena in that history that the great leaders (Imams) of the Islamic sciences have always remained in a certain distance from the political authority, often not because of the principle acceptance of the separation of religious affairs and political-worldly affairs but because of the great will to prevent the autonomy of the religious knowledge and attitude whose major substitutes are the ulema. I think it should be sufficiently satisfactory to remember that the great Imams of the four Sunni sects of Islam and also the Shiite Imams almost all have remained in a certain distance from accepting any official role in the political or rather, governmental levels. So that almost all of those Imams either were condemned by prisons or have been killed by the official authorities of their times. As we shall mention later in the illustration of the power and knowledge (especially of the religious kind) relation in more detail, what motivated the great Imams to resist against taking role in the current political positions was the fear of constituting legitimating support to the political authorities by their participation (Mawdudi, 1963; İslamoğlu, 1990).

The second part of the project was the suggestion of writing a contemporary exegesis of the Qur'an asked from Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır who was potentially opposed to the Republic and had also been tried by the Courts of Liberation (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) because of his opposition. In the years of the establishment of Turkish Republic he was a member of *Medresetü'l Mütehassisîn* as an instructor of Logic. He took place in various stages of the Damad Ferid Pasha cabinet. He didn't show the attitude Mehmed Akif had shown. Instead, he accepted the task, and began to study on the Exegesis, which was named as *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili* consisting of nine volumes published in 1935-1939. Despite the dependence of this

activity to the political decision Yazır has never refrained from making some contrasting points against the structure of the new regime. For example he identified the role of clergy which is rejected in Qur'an because it functioned as creating polytheism with the role of the parliamentary of the democratic societies. For him both the clergy and the parliamentary are common in sharing the role of conducting tutelage over people other than of the God, which determines the boundaries of the moral *(helal)* and the immoral *(haram)*. For, in Islamic convictions the right of determining those boundaries exclusively belongs to the God. He derives this idea from the interpretation of a Qur'anic verse saying that: "They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords in derogation of God, and (they take as their Lord) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but one God: There is no God but He. Praise and glory to Him: (Far is he) from having the partners they associate with Him" (IX: 31) He brings the well known tradition directly touches upon this verse. When the Prophet was reading this verse from the Qur'an, Adiy b. Khatem who had been still a Christian was at the door of the Prophet waiting for permission to enter and request from him to allow his sister taken as war ether by the friends of the Prophet, heard the word and objected to the Prophet: "no we don't worship to our priests". Then the Prophet asked him whether they submit to their priests without any question when they declare something as lawful and some other as unlawful. By taking the answer "yes", the Prophet said, "that is just your worship to them." (Yazır, 1992: Vol 4, pp. 214-215).

It is possible to illustrate more examples of Yazır's fearless and safe interpretation of the Qur'anic verses by which the current governments were being declared as strictly illegitimate from the Qur'anic point of view. He derived very strong identifications of the existing governors with the bad types of the Qur'an like Firavun, Nemrut, Ebu Cehil etc. each one violently and characteristically opposed the prophetic movement of their times and whose actions basically were characterized with the state of *tuğyan* -the action which made them *tağut*, that is, who go too far beyond his limits because of the rejection or ignorance of the boundaries drawn by the God (Yazır, 1992: vol. 2, pp. 136-145). Thus the state was being indicated as religiously illegitimate in the Exegesis ordered to constitute an official interpretation of the Qur'an in harmony with other parts of the Revolutions.

Indeed both M. Akif and M. H. Yazır were famed with their puritanist Islamic attitudes. M. Akif had escaped from the country for he thought he couldn't do any intervention to the on-going deviance that made the conditions insufferable for him. And Yazır had been closed himself in his home for not bearing the frank hat and also not to witness any more the flux of revolutions, which made for him again the conditions

insufferable. These are very well known phenomena about these two men. And it wouldn't be so unpredictable that they would show their opposition in their works. As a matter of fact, M. Akif didn't overcome the problem of justification of such religious activity in order of the secular state, and cut his work at the edge of its accomplishment in fear of the substitution of his translation of the original Qur'an (Schimmel, 1988: 56). And Yazır has written without any refraining from expressing any idea stemmed from the Qur'anic interpretation even in the cases of constituting opposition to the official views.

3. 5 The Muslim Paradox: Between Modernism and "Superstition Defendership"

Then, what made the government choose them for such a task? It is really not easy to answer. The first thing coming into one's mind by this preference is that it was expected to break the violence of the opposition of the Muslim intellectuals who had a great respect of the people. But was it really so matter for the state which had established the Courts of Liberation exercised much coercion on the opposition forces without even the need for any justification? In this respect, it was probably not so difficult for the state to disqualify these authors, too, Although Mehmed Akif's position was very precarious in terms of applying such a way. Could it be said that there was already no other one capable of achieving such a task? Undoubtedly this explanation would have had certain weight. It seems to me that, together with the lack of capable men for overcoming such a task, what led the government to do this was simply a search for a partial fulfilment of the protestanisation of Islamic religion. As we have mentioned earlier the Christianity was thought to be functional in the attack of the west as was pronounced by various levels of the governments and by Atatürk himself. At least such a development as excluding any kind of mediator during the relationship with the Scripture would have create the result that occurred to the Christianity by the equivalent development with Protestantism. That is, when Protestantism began, its major emphasis was on the equality of all men before the God, but also before the Scripture in understanding or interpreting it. This led all people, trained or untrained, capable or incapable to enter in direct contact with the Bible, which subsequently created an explicit anarchism of interpretations of the text. But finally this process created the well-known (thanks to the contributions of Max Weber) processes of rationalization and secularization took place in the west. Guénon (1979) very finely describes the contributions of Protestantism, in such way, in the constitution of individualism, as a main prerequisite of modernization. What was expected to be achieved by

the translation of Qur'an was perhaps to ensure such an influence to work on Islam. For creating a nation state, all people should have been cultivated from single ideological sources, as the unified educations, equally understandable scriptures, or nationalism etc. (Gellner, 1983).

But then, it would really be difficult to understand Yazır's shoulder such a task despite his remaining in opposition and the very probability of attributing a legitimation to the administration he was opposing. However, although it seems so, here what should be emphasized as was before and will be later again illustrated is that the consequences of the Republican experiences of unification, centralization and integration of all social factors, which all together were identified with the Turkification, and the claims of the Sunni (orthodox) and scriptural Islam are somewhere intersecting. Although it was felt that the Turkification was directly an attack to break the Islamic influence on the society, the means applied to realize that project especially the Turkish translation and Exegesis of the Qur'an were also useful from the point of Islamic anxieties in order to achieve a true understanding and praxis of the religion.

Beginning from the abolition of the Caliphate, up to the last of the revolutions, what was expected was to break the influence of the religion, which was permeating the smallest point of the daily life of the people (Mardin, 1977). In spite of the natural development of considerable secularization in the nineteenth century the services of the ulema were still required. Especially the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* and the closure of the dervish lodges, religious orders and *zawiyes* the power of the local factors of the society were expected to be broken. These factors were considered as the major enemies of the centralist control designed to create a nation-state (Gellner, 1983) in integration with the world system (Özel, 1989; Başkaya, 1991).

However, on the other hand there was also a great need, from the point of view of the Muslim intellectuals or *ulema* to make the Qur'an understandable and to break the constitution of any mediatorship in the relation of the men with their God, which was also indicated by Yazır as forementioned as polygamism from the conclusion derived from a Qur'anic verse (XI: 31). M. Akif Ersoy had reflected his attitude against such approaches to Qur'an long before this project as "İnmemiştir Kur'an hele bunu hakkıyla bilin! / Ne mezarda okunmak ne de fala bakmak için" (Know it well that, the Qur'an hasn't been revealed / To be read in the grave nor to tell fortunes) From *Safahat*).

It also has often been mentioned that the Republican policies toward religion repressed the heterodox Sufi Islam in favor of the Sunni-scriptural Islam (Dursun, 1992: 183-

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184). Undoubtedly this is the unintended consequence of the policies of the secularist governments but was largely determined by the fact that sunni Muslims didn't leave the domain of struggle in any case of opportunity, often occurred as a result of the will of the secularist governments to utilize Islamic values for their political ends as its legitimation or its new project in which the religion is thought to be functional.

This casual parallelism between the secularist policies and the Sunni Muslim demands also indicates to a difficult paradox faced the Islamicists: a paradox which sometimes run the risk of advancing in advocating a modernist mentality, or to fall in a state of "superstition defendership" (Özel, 1984: 26). The differentiation of the attitudes of the two very akin scholars of Islamic sciences as such (M. Akif and M. H. Yazır) is to be considered as an appropriate example of this paradoxical situation, though both are neither modernists nor superstition defenders.

The incarnation of the idea of reopening the Faculty of Theology, thus, should be understood, above all, in terms of the failing of the system in breaking the influence of the local religious forces. As Lewis said (1991: 414), the shortage of men with a sound, controllable, official religious education had gave scope to fanatics and illiterate, often with unfortunate results. That was also the leading motive that was brought by the government authorities that decided to reopen the faculty.

Nevertheless, that reason should not be considered enough to make them open the faculty, again which would run the risk of recreating the duality lived for hundred years since the Tanzimat, giving back to the religious bureaucracy its powers again. Not only the reopening of the faculty of theology but also most of the other rights and possibilities given to the religious part in Turkey, in fact, have been experiencing the same paradox once more but in the other side of the struggle. Religious policies in Republican Turkey always carry the potential of manifold problems, in any case, which reproduce themselves in other unpredictable ways.

In addition to these paradoxical conditions, however, in the part of the secularist forces there is another very much determinate factor in the reemergence of the idea of reopening the faculty of theology. That is the popular demand, which appeared so manifestly in the elections of 1946. In this sense the opening the gate of democratization and the elections of 1946 were the turning points, which have given a start to an irreversible process of Islamization in Turkey. One moment of this process as it is well known was the reopening of the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara. Let's look at how did this process occur.

CHAPTER IV
A FACULTY OF DIVINITY AT ANKARA

4. 1 Democratization Versus Laicization

In the history of Turkish Republic two attempts for transition to multiparty regime of democracy were reported until the last and relatively permanent experience of 1945. The first one was tried in 1924. The most important alternative to the Popular Party of the Republic (RPP) was the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). Among the founders of the party there were Ali Fuad Pasha (Cebesoy) who had found the declaration of the Republic as timeless, and Kâzım Karabekir Pasha who had criticized the Westernization movement from the seat of the Darülfünun. The press of İstanbul had supported them. In spite of the name of their party, the members of the party were more conservative. Thus the sixth article of their program was declaring, "the party is respectful to religious convictions and ideas" (Tunaya, 1991: 158). The members of the two parties have therefore conflicted by starting a violent struggle. This was at the same time that Sheikh Said was rebelling and the Courts of Liberation *(İstiklal Mahkemeleri)* were being established, following the approval of the Law of Establishing the Order *(Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu).*

The Prime Minister Fethi Bey (Okyar) informed the Grand National Assembly that the party, or some members of the party, was exploiting the religious feelings in their speeches and activities in various places. Then, the party was closed relying on the decision of the executive congregate (Ibid: 158-159).

The second experience of multiparty democracy was realized in 1930. This experience brought about the establishment of another Islamicist party called *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (The Free Republican Party). But the trend the party followed in the line of supporting some religious demands of the people on the contrary of the Revolutionist policies led the government to close the party again (Ibid: 177). Thus it constituted the second party that had been closed, but also put an end to democratic life.

That is perhaps the characteristic feature of the relationship of the religion with democracy in Turkey. That gives us a possibility to make a point that almost all retardations or ruptures and discontinuities in democratization of Turkey has been caused by the religious

potential of people, which always was frightened to be the main determinate of the political trends of Turkey. It is just because it was desired a democracy, which would exclude Islam as a political alternative, but also because of the recognition that Islam, couldn't be abolished completely and that any democratic step inevitably would be beneficial for an Islamic revitalization. Just as the Constitution redesigned in 1961, in one sense in order to consolidate the secularism against the recent developments in favor of the non-secularism, together with its additional reforms in pluralism and liberation, has helped to the religious forces to participate more powerfully in the political life (Ibid: 9). Thus, reconsidering the exceptional positions, democratization can be perceived since its establishment in Turkey as a major threat to laicization.

As a matter of fact, the rise of opposition political parties, after 1945, helped to bring religious interest to the fore, as rival candidates who had at first eschewed any concern for religion in their political platforms soon changed their minds, and added appeals to the religiously inclined to their campaign promises. Another, more subtle, yet also more important outcome of the development of new political parties in relation to Islam in Turkey was the fact that, in search for votes, all parties, but the Democrats in particular, turned to Turkey's oft-forgotten man and his family -the peasant majority of Turkey. There, perhaps to their sophisticated surprise (although hardly to the surprise of experts such as Celal Bayar and the Learned Professor Fuad Köprülü), the politicians found much more interest in traditional Islam and generally much less change than they had in more up-to-date provincial centers and larger cities. They began to realize anew that Islam had much more vital and traditional respect and force in village life than they had assumed, and that their would be peasant supporters cherished it. The politicians naturally promised to meet this desire for more attention to Islam and even began to exploit it for their own political ends (Reed, 1954; Stirling, 1958).

4. 2 The Seventh Assembly of RPP

It was just because of its promises for liberation of religious beliefs and religious education that the Democratic Party won 62 deputies in the Assembly, in spite of various speculations on the elections in favor of the RPP. This has forced the party leadership to take more seriously the modification of its policies of religion (Dursun, 1992: 192). The party in power also realized the rapidly changing balance of the votes in favor of the opposition parties because of their strong emphasis on religious matters, and of its quite negative image on

religion in the minds of target mass for voting. Tunaya, (1991: 179-180) counts 24 parties most of which were common in their emphasis on the freedom of religion. Then the RPP recognized the necessity of reviewing and modifying its policy of religion. In the seventh assembly met in 1947 the attitude of the party became the focus of violent discussions between the traditionalist and revolutionist fractions of the party.

For the former ones religion was a moral good, so that it should be signified in social life. However, Islamic religion that constituted the religion of the majority of people had been made inferior in respect to the other religions. There was created, thus, an inequality in favor of the non-Islamic minority religions... Secularism was misunderstood and misapplied in Turkey. It was understood as bringing up the youth unaware of religion, which created immorality of them and as intervention of the state... There was no reactionarism in the country. To express such ideas should not be considered as against secularism. There was no backwardness in the country... The East should also be concerned with an importance because a religious concern with the East was the "requirement of our vitality." The two institutions of the Religious Affairs and the administration of the endowments are the source of various problems. Religious beliefs have established their own independent organizations all over the world. But in Turkey this chance has been ignored for Islam. Hence, the organization of religious affairs should be either independent of equipped with some material and moral possibilities for being able to educate true religious men the country required.... Having recognized that religion was a moral good and force, the new generation should and could be grown powerfully only by religious education. So, there should be opened some religious educational institutions...

The secular and revolutionist front of the party, however, rejected these ideas and insisted on consecrating the religious affairs to the relationship of the God and man... Religion could become a tool in the hands of the bad politicians. The ultimate power of the Turk was immanent in his noble blood... So the religion is a phenomenon between the Turk's conscience and the God. Thus the ideas of the traditionalists exceeded the limit of secularism and explained all social life with religion (Minutes of the 7th Congress of RPP, 1948: 449-465).

The seventh congress, thus rejecting the traditionalists' suggestions, declared its rigid revolutionism (Tunaya, 1991: 185). However after the seventh congress, the RPP in 20 May 1948 decided to make a suggestion to the Ministry of National Education to open İmam and Hatip courses to which the secondary school graduate people would participate after they accomplish their military services. Thus, the Ministry of Education opened in 8 various

places, firstly in Ankara and İstanbul, Courses of İmam and Hatib within ten-months period (15, 1, 1949). The essential goal of these courses was to overcome the shortage aroused from the absence of the religious persons who would lead the prayers and even the funeral ceremonies, with the interval staff. But the problem of making the true philosophy and education of higher Islamic knowledge was still a serious problem to be solved. It is again very interesting that even the suggestion developed to solve this problem come from the Assembly Group of RPP (Dursun, 1992: 192-193).

4.3 The Opening of The Faculty of Divinity in Ankara: The Formal Steps

The first formal suggestion that a new Theological Faculty should be set up was made in late January 1948, when deputies İbrahim Arvas and Fatin Gökmen, tabled a bill to this effect in the parliament. On January 31, the influential editor, Cihat Baban, pointed out in *Tasvir* that such a proposal was not out of keeping with secular principles, that religion was both an individual and a social matter, and that if Turkey did not take pains to train religious leaders false beliefs would multiply. He added they must range the might of Islam over against Soviet Pressure. On February 4, M. Tuncer, writing in the İzmir paper *Yeni Asır* added that they must in these times train up a body of well-informed, patriotic religious leaders who could teach religion to the people (Reed, 1956b: 305).

These sentiments were echoed by Nadir Nadi, editor of the Turkey's semi-official paper, *Cumhuriyet*, on February 12, when he reiterated the need for religious guides (*Din Rehberleri*). On February 1948, the caucus of the responsible RPP approved a report of a committee calling for the creation of a Faculty of Islamic Theology and some other institutions of education. The programs and texts for this instruction were to be prepared by the Directory of Religious Affairs subject to the approval of the Ministry of Education. The new Nation Party also stated that it favored the establishment of a Theological Faculty in İstanbul on July 22, 1948. Then Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, the Director of Religious Affairs, said that even in Europe, it was recognized that a thorough knowledge of Arabic was necessary for research in the basic sources of Islam. At a press conference, reported in *Tasvir* (July 29) he said that it was far from being enough to learn to recite the Qur'an by heart like a parrot. For him, it was required studies based on the following subjects: the Creed *(İtikad)*, dogmatic philosophy *(kelâm)*, and its history, worship *(ibadet)*, and its history, Quranic exegesis *(tefsir)*, the history and methodology of Tradition *(hadis)*, the technique of checking the narrators of tradition *(ravileri tenkid usulu)*, the schools of Islamic law *(mezhepler)*, Islamic

jurisprudence and its methodology *(fıkıh)*, the philosophy of law *(hikmet-i teşri)*, the history of Islamic law in its widest sense, the method of liberal interpretation of Islamic law *(ictihad)*, the lives and scientific significance of the great founders of the (four) Islamic schools of law *(büyük mezhep imamları* i.e. Abû Hanifa, Ibn Hanbal, Mâlik, and Al-Shafiî), general history of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, Muslim ethics, moral philosophy, mysticism and its history, the philosophy of religion, the fine arts, sociology, the general history of religion and of Islam, the life and ethics of Muhammed, and Turkish and Arabic literature. He added that entrance into the Faculty should depend upon a six-year course of language study and religious education in a (special) higher theological *lycée*, in which, in addition to Oriental languages, at least one European language was to be taught. He also advocated admitting students who were quite mature and at least thirty years of age. In conclusion, he pointed out that there were then (in 1948) still enough qualified specialists who could form the teaching staffs of these two institutions (Reed, 1956b: 305-6).

The next significant step leading to the creation of the new Faculty of Divinity took place on January 7, 1949, when the Senate of Ankara University decided to examine this project. On January 23 the program of new Republican cabinet, led y M. Şemseddin Günaltay, who was a distinguished historian, student of Islam and *medrese* graduate, was published. In it he pledged to follow Western democratic models and to defend the principles of the Turkish revolution. Freedom of conscience was declared to be holy (ibid).

The issue finally was brought into the national Parliament by the government following the decision of the Senate of Ankara University to open a Faculty of Divinity. The suggestion was made in May 3, 1949 with the following leading motive: "In order to make the investigation of religious problems according to the scientific principles possible, to provide the conditions required for the growing of religiousmen powerful in their profession and comprehensive in their thought, the Senate of Ankara University has decided that a Faculty of Divinity should be opened in accordance with its Western equivalent..." (Koştaş, 1989: 8).

Then, in the National Parliament much anxiety was expressed lest the new Faculty of Theology should once again help generate the rigidity and obscurantism of the old medreses. The minister of national education replied that the proposed Faculty of Theology was a natural result of the reform processes set in motion by Atatürk, and furthermore said:

"This idea is essentially of a nature that will put to rest our friend's anxieties. We are not of the opinion that the old medrese should be revived... School and medrese,

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beginning with the *Tanzimat*, lived side by side for a hundred years and bred people who had two different types of mentality. This person with a two-fold mentality rolled through a whole century with an inner struggle. The Faculty of Divinity that we are about to establish will not work with this mentality... In this respect the Faculty of Divinity will be established as scientific body and apart from encouraging reactionist movements it even will function as a gun against them to preclude them, to annihilate them. The Faculty of Divinity will be a torch of light like other scientific institutions have been established since the *Tanzimat* and the superstitionists will escape before this light like the bats." (Minutes of TBMM, vol. 20, pp. 227-284).

The problem of truly designing the domain in which the theological studies could be accomplished is important from the universalist point of view (see chapter: V). A discipline should always reflect at least the major rules and principles of the universalist conception of the world and "a discipline" is already a definition of the domain which is thought to be the object of somehow knowable, that is, in Foucault's (1977) terms to disciplinize a domain about which certain knowledge would be produced, falsified or verified according to the given a priori. The Turkish kind of universalism, of course, with its mimetic quality and unnatural development, should not be expected to carry the tracks of this involuntary, perhaps, structural mental quality. Because it is a voluntary design, which by itself, already distort the communication of the therapist with his patient, which is just similar with the case, we deal in with the hermeneutics of the Republic in 1945-1949. Turkish universalism gave S.O.S. because its holistic coherence was being injured under the pressure of non-secularist and dualistic demands. No wonder, thus, perhaps, to conclude that democratization distorts the communication of Kemalism with the external world in Habermasian (Giddens, 1985) terms. Because it was under the pressures allowed by democratization that the Kemalist state had to open the gates of the Faculty of Divinity, which is accepted to be belonging to another world of Universalist conception. In any case, religious universalism and any secularist kind of universalism subordinate the conception of time and reality to radically different value that neither of them could give up. Thus, when the Minister of National Education, Tahsin Banguoğlu, touched upon the problem of the curriculum in the Faculty he reflected, on the one hand, the new definition of secularism, religion and university which might have appeared for many as dissolving and deviance of the true secularism, but, on the other hand, reflected the Turkish kind of the involution of state and politics with religion and science (university). Banguoğlu continued that:

"The subjects will be studied on the Faculty will be religious in majority, like exegesis, *(tefsir)*, tradition *(hadis)*, jurisprudence *(fıkıh)*. Besides, there will be taught some courses from the Faculty of Language, History and Geography as ethics, psychology, and sociology... Again the language courses of the Faculty of Letters will be the associate courses. Furthermore there will be learned history of religions and some other religions comparatively... Theology is by itself an autonomous discipline, while the Faculty of Letters is only a faculty of moral sciences. In this respect by its foundation we will not repeat the mistake that once was made at the University of İstanbul. The essential core will be the religious sciences." (Minutes, ibid)

Baltacıoğlu, an adviser of Atatürk on Religious reform, had mentioned the mistake that was touched upon by Banguoğlu in the same session of the Parliament before the speeches of Banguoğlu. He said, "... in that Faculty of Theology (in Istanbul) I, also had some responsibility. In one sense, we realized it as a kind of faculty of sociology. But here, the Islamic sciences will be essential, and the sociological sciences will be secondary.... After fifty years I have come to the conviction, and I do not refrain from expressing it from this seat, viz. that if a man, after acquiring all cultures of ethics, aesthetics, and literature, doesn't receive religious education to be imported by the government- human personality can not be complete" (Ibid).

Thus the law that authorized the creation of the new Faculty took effect on June 10, 1949, and provided for a teaching staff initially appointed for a period of up to seven years. This can include one dean, eight professors, fifteen docents and twenty-nine assistants. The law included an appropriation of T.L. 43000 for the budget of the Faculty of Divinity until the next fiscal year beginning March 1, 1950. Only 39,865 TL of this amount was apparently spent during the prescribed period. A number of influential scholars and politicians joined with welcoming the creation of the Faculty of Divinity and expressed their hopes that it would soon provide urgently required and modern, enlightened religious leadership. Ahmed Remzi Yüreğir said that it would be "no place for superstition mongers." Minister of Education Tahsin Banguoğlu, as we mentioned earlier, announced, "it will be worthy of the Atatürk Revolution and will not work in the spirit of the medreses, but will work against reactionary trends. We may invite professors from Pakistan." (Reed, 1956b: 309).

This was the indication of the dramatic consequence of the applied policies against the university and religion that was making the state import professors from Pakistan. Most of the

ulema of the older generation were dead, and those few who had survived were very old. Since some Islamic education had gone on privately both in the cities and, on a larger scale, in the countryside, it was no difficult to find enough qualified people to teach lower grades in the schools; but teachers for the higher school grades were almost nonexistent. In these circumstances who would teach in the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara? Apart from some surviving relics of the past generation (who would, in any case be inadequate, and could even be harmful for the task envisaged for the institution), who was there? Rahman adds (1981: 94-95) that it is clear that for disciplines like history and philosophy, if any professors could be found, they would be secular -educated- i.e., those who might have taken their degrees at Western universities and have had little to do with Islamic learning. The teaching of Arabic had been banned by the reforming zeal of Atatürk; hence the only link with Islam left was the Ottoman language and the Ottoman history and older sciences that had been enshrined in that language. These subjects were certainly cultivated by a few scholars, but they were actually Muslim *orientalists* -that is they studied the Islamic-Turkish past historically and "objectively" but, by definition, without any reference to normative Islam, and hence without any real possibility of making a constructive or reformative contribution to Islam in Turkey for the future. It was in fact, teachers of these two types that were appointed to the faculty in the first instance. (Rahman, 1981: 96; Güngör, 1981: 209) But that is the appearance of the problem from the point of view of what Rahman said "normative Islam" or in respect of the Islamic initiative itself vs. the secularist initiations. In respect of the universalist orientations of secularism, scientism and/or positivism, however, the orientalism of the indigenous scientists, when studying Islam was just the position required.

Thus, on this day, the first three formal appointments to professorships in the Faculty of Divinity were made. Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, formerly Professor at the Theological Faculty, İstanbul, then member of the advisory council of the Directory of Religious Affair, became Professor of the History of Islamic Schools of Canon Law and sect (*İslam mezhepleri tarihi*). Hasan Remzi Oğuz Arık, Director of the Ethnographic Museum in Ankara, was given the chair for the History of Islamic Art, and Hilmi Ömer Budda, another former Professor in the Theological Faculty, then member of the Turkish Language Institution, was elected Professor of the History of Religions. Esat Arsebuk, Professor of Islamic Law, became the first Dean of the Faculty of Divinity. But the Faculty has lost all of these professors, because they died within the ensuing four and a half years.

4. 4 The Growth of the Faculty

During the first semester over 85 students were enrolled in the Faculty for the four-year course. Of this number a total of 80, consisting of 58 men and 22 women successfully completed the first semester course. In the second semester 130 qualified lycée graduates were enrolled. According to an official announcement issued in the *Resmi Gazete* on June 6, 1950, No. 7536, required courses during the first and second semesters consisted of the following:

Table 4.1. Initial Course of Study, Semesters 1-4, 1949-1951(Reed, 1956b)

1st and 2nd semesters, 1949-1950:

History of comparative religion	2 hour(s) weekly
History of Islamic Religion and four schools	3 " "
History of Islamic art	3 " "
Arabic and Persian	6 " "
English, French or German	6 " "
Logic	1 " "
sociology and Ethics	2 " "

and in the 3rd and 4th semester, i.e. in 1950-1951:

Introduction to Tradition (Hadith)	1 Hour(s) weekly
History of comparative religion	2 " "
History of Islamic Religion and four schools	3 " "
History of Islamic Art	3 " "
Arabic and Persian	6 " "
English, French or German	6 " "
Psychology and Philosophy of religion	2 " "
History of Islamic Science	1 " "

The Faculty First graduated totally 40 students in 1953, nine of who were female. On November 29, 1950, Suut Kemal Yetkin, son of a formerly prominent Turkish religious savant, was appointed Professor of the History of Islamic Art. After Dean Arsebuk retired on April 18, 1951, Professor Yetkin became the second Dean of the Faculty on June 13, 1951. Mehmet Karasan, formerly associated with the Faculty of Political Science, who had studied under Bergson, followed Dean Yetkin. He succeeded Professor Budda, who died in 1952, as professor of the history of religions, and became dean in the spring of 1953. Professor

Karasan and his colleague in this Faculty, the Professor of Philosophy and logic, Hamdi Ragib Atademir, were both elected Democratic party deputies, on May 2, 1954, so resigned from their offices. In June, 1954 Bedi Ziya Egemen, formerly in the Faculty of Letters, then Professor of the Psychology of Religion and Pedagogy was elected Dean for the remainder of former Dean Karasan's term. Sabri Şakir Ansay, Ordinarius Professor in the Faculty of Law and Professor of Islamic Law, became the fifth Dean in the spring of 1955. The Faculty soon got involved in the issues of religious education and reaction. Students of the Faculty of Divinity on February 3, 1951, issued a summons inviting Turks to struggle against religious reaction. On the 19th, Professor İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu declared that the Faculty should produce a correct, popular Turkish translation of the Qur'an and a Qur'anic philosophy for the enlightenment of all Islamic nations. During the parliamentary debate on the budget for the Presidency of Religious Affairs on the 22nd deputies repeatedly expressed their desire for more and better religious education. One complained about the "ineffective Faculty of Divinity" and suggested that a number of religious colleges be established to train religious savants. This theme was repeated on April 29 at a congress on character-building which recommended the adoption of intensified religious education programs in teachers' normal schools, secondary schools, and in the Faculty of Divinity, as an effective means off strengthening morals and combating communism. On May 3, the Minister of Education, Tevfik İleri, informed a caucus of the Democrat party that an expert committee was examining the question of introducing religious education into the middle schools' curriculum, as well as into that of schools of *lycée* rank preparing students for the Faculty of Divinity. By this he doubtless implied the new İmam-Hatip schools.

Dean Yetkin announced on October 11, 1951, that the Faculty of Divinity occupied itself with the comparative study of the religion of all the territories in which Islam had sway. Nevertheless, they thought that the Faculty did not wish to study current trends in Islam in Turkey because these were all linked with politics, which they sought to avoid. In 1954, the Faculty took the novel step of appointing an able young German orientalist from Marburg University with doctorates in science and religion, as Professor of the history of Comparative Religions. Miss Annemarie Schimmel has since been a regular member of the staff, has published two books in Turkish, spoken at the 1954 and 1955 ceremonies commemorating the death of the great mystic Jalal al-Din Rûmî in Konya, and contributed a number of articles to the Faculty journal. Professors Muhammed al-Tanci and Mehmet Tayyip Okiç have been drawn from as far a field as Tangier and Yugoslavia respectively.

Table 4.2. The List of the Deans Since the Foundation of the Faculty (Koştaş, 1989)

Name and Surname	from	to	The reason of leaving
Ord. Prof. Esat Arsebük	1949	1951	By expiring
Ord.Prof.Suut Kemal Yetkin	1951	1953	By expiring
Prof. Mehmet Karasan	1953	1954	Selected as deputy
Prof. Dr. Bedii Ziya Egemen	1954	1955	by resignation
Ord. Prof. Sabri Şakir Ansay	1955	1957	By expiring
Ord. Prof. Suut Kemal Yetkin	1957	1959	Selected to Rectorate
Ord. Prof. Hilmi Ziya Ülken	1959	1959	By Resignation
Ord. Prof. Bedii Ziya Egemen	1959	1960	By Resignation
Prof. Dr. Tahsin Banguoğlu	1960	1961	By Resignation
Prof. Dr. Neşet Çağatay	1961	1964	By Expiring
Prof. Dr. Kemal Balkan	1964	1966	By expiring
Prof. Dr.HüseyinYurdaydın	1966	1968	By expiring
Prof. Dr. H. Ragıp Atademir	1968	1970	By resignation
Prof. MehmetTaplamacıoğlu	1970	1970	By expiring
Prof. Mehmet Karasan	1970	1971	By Resignation
Prof. Dr. Neşet Çağatay	1971	1971	
Prof. Dr. Necati Öner	1972	1977	By expiring
Prof. Dr. Hikmet Tanyu	1977	1980	By expiring
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Atay	1980	1982	By expiring
Prof. Dr. Talat Koçyiğit	1982	1985	By expiring
Prof. Dr.Meliha Ambarcıoğlu	1985	1989	By expiring
Prof. Dr. Necati Öner	1989		Still on his task

Miss V. Gordon, a Scottish lady, taught English, Mr. Izzet Hasan from Syria taught Arabic, Herr H. J. Kornrumpf taught German, and M. J. Roche of France instructed in French. This variety of national positions of the staff was, at first sight an indication of richness that provided more creativity in scientific circumstances, but it was in reality as a result of the fact that the Faculty has had difficulty in recruiting professors, although as mentioned above the Directory of Religious Affairs, Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, in 1949 had optimistic prognostications about the availability of qualified staff. There appeared to have been a

conscious policy of keeping the deanship and control in the hands of professors who were not trained in the traditional medrese system. Several lacked what might be called formal theological training, and few, if any, had experience in practical theology and homiletics. As a result, instruction in the Faculty was entirely theoretical at the beginning (Reed, 1956b; Koştaş, 1989).

For ten years the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara remained as the single institution of higher Islamic knowledge or education except the *İslam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü* that was been working under the body of University of İstanbul with the directory of Zeki Velidi Togan. He was publishing a journal in which some issues related with Islamic and Turkish history (*İslam Tetkikleri Dergisi*). Ten years after the establishment of the Faculty, Institute of Higher Islamic knowledge began instructions in İstanbul on November 19 1959. Why was it required? There are several reasons. First, although İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu made a distinction with the Faculty of Divinity in Ankara and of the Darülfünun, in that the latter was a kind of sociology of religion and the former, therefore would give primacy to religious issues in order to meet the religious needs of people, there were still some problems of practicing. I mean, as Başgil argued (1985), the Faculty of Divinity tended to bring up Philosophers of Religion, or the sociologist of religion rather than in any case to bring up the Subjects -with the capital S- of the religious phenomena. Secondly, the number of the opened schools of İmam-Hatibs had considerably increased (there were 19 İmam-Hatib schools in the country at that time) and the need for instructors couldn't be met with solely the graduates of the Faculty. It was largely because of the fact that at that stage the İmam-Hatib Schools and the Faculty of Divinity were thought of as being quite separate from one another, and there was no mention of any idea of linking the two, the schools were to produce religious functionaries like imams and hatibs, while the Faculty was to be the intellectual center for a scientific understanding and interpretation of Islam in accordance with the needs in adapting the changing world.. And that is the technical reason. On the other hand, with the Institute it was intended to produce only teachers for İmam-Hatib schools, and for the courses of religions in the middle schools and *lycés* (Annual of the İstanbul, Y.İ.E, 1982).

Thus there emerged a duality among the higher institutions of Islamic education, and this duality had marked the situation of the Islamic knowledge in the allocation or distribution of the facilities and roles of the higher religiousmen. It was followed by the new opening of the Institutes of Higher Islamic knowledge in parallel with the increase in the number of Imam-Hatib schools. First the Institutes were opened in Konya, Kayseri, Bursa and İzmir, where Akşit (1986; 1991) finds out that the "Imam-Hatip Schooling Rates" (IHSR) is high or

is near to the places where the IHSR is high. Because, whereas İzmir's IHSR is lower, it is above all a capital city and a rational preference for any faculty because of its metropolis quality and also of its nearness to the cities like Uşak, Burdur, Denizli and Afyon whose IHSR is high. The same perhaps is valid for Bursa and Samsun. The Institutes eventually were unified with the Faculty of Divinity by the enormous reforms made by the Higher Institute of Teaching (YÖK) in 1983. Because the Institutes also were in complaining that their curriculum and status was in a stagnant position. The curriculum really gave an impression that it was an extension of the *lycée*. There were almost the same courses followed during the four years: Arabic, Traditions, Exegesis, Qur'anic recitation, and theology *(Kelam ve Akaid)* in all years. Thus the first reason that YÖK unified these institutions was the demand from the institutes. But there was another reason that was characteristic in similar conditions created by intervention rather than occurred in its own natural development. That is, the will to centralize and unify all pluralities of the life-worlds and assortments (as we mentioned in the 2nd chapter), appeared again to make easier to control and discipline. Thus, though not so radical, the reforms of the YÖK has been considered as the second attempt to the Unification of Education, because of the perhaps same leading motives but with radically different consequences. As a matter of fact, seven Institutes of Higher Islamic knowledge were transformed to the Faculty of Divinity and a same curriculum began to be applied. But the old curriculum of the Faculty was also reviewed in accordance with the criticisms directed to both. Thus at the first year the students began to be prepared hardly by learning Arabic and some entrances to the Qur'anic knowledge and some theoretical problems in the Islamic Theology. The emphasis on the Arabic language is really a good reform in the Faculty, although there was even before the unification of the faculty and the Institute a considerable level in the degree of knowing Arabic. As Rahman told us he had gave lectures in Arabic, in Turkey, and several in the audience have discussed questions with him in Arabic. He added that this was a sight one never see outside the Arab world, except to a limited extent in Indonesia (Rahman, 1981: 98). Notwithstanding, it will be useful to add my observation in the Faculty that one year spent in the preparation class becomes luxurious because at the subsequent years the emphasis on Arabic decreases. Because the textbooks are all in Turkish and no any instructor tend to give his lecture in Arabic. That is because it is not compulsory to instruct in Arabic. But when the instruction is not transformed completely in Arabic the command of the language cannot be kept. And as a matter of fact the students begin to forget Arabic just by beginning the next stages of their education.

4. 5 The Academic structure and the Curriculum Today

The curriculum has been revised for many times, and it is still evolving in accordance with the problems arising in experience, in terms of achieving the promised goals. Recently after the unification of the higher institutes of Islamic education several meetings of coordination of the Faculties have been conferred. One of them was organized by the University of Ondokuz Mayıs, Samsun, with the title "*Yükseköğretimde Din Bilimleri Öğretimi Sempozyumu*" (The Symposium of the Instruction of Religious Sciences in Higher Teaching) between 21-23 October, 1987. In this assembly, the Professor of Islamic Education in the Faculty of Divinity of Marmara University, Bayraktar Bayraklı's declaration was very characteristic in outlining some problems in the faculties of Divinity, in relation with the curriculum, and the human relations between the students and their teachers and among the students themselves. What he tells is mostly what I observed in the Faculty of Divinity in either Ankara or Konya and İstanbul during my series of visiting. He declared that the clergy has emerged as a result of the divison of Labour, which is the dominant character of the developed societies. So the domains of knowledge also should be divided in order to be more elaborated in details. He criticized the educational understanding, which relies solely on what the teacher gives as the classical approach to the state. He asserted that the approach of the students should be modified by some reforms in the curriculum in order to draw the attention and participation of the students. For this, it is important to see that the curriculum is much exaggerated with some futile courses. There are, really many courses that do not but increase the size of the curriculum, so that it become unbearable for the students to attain its requirement straightly. The students exit from one course, and enter in another one from the morning to the evening, naturally without, apart from making any contribution to the course, even understanding the true content of the course. There are some irrelative and perhaps artificial divisions in the subjects of the courses. For example the Qur'an and the exegesis of the Qur'an are given in different courses and both also are given in different ways i.e., one in Arabic and the other in Turkish. If the courses were given in Arabic, for example, the Arabic language would not occupy so time and efforts. Bayraklı argues that it is more important to comprehend some contemporary debates on Islamic and/or modern issues than involving in the fruitless debates that took place between some schools in the early periods of Islam.

Another participator in the symposium, Dr. Adil Özdemir (from the Dokuz Eylül University), insists on the distinction between the consequence of the functioning of the Faculty and on the real goal behind it's functioning. To educate new members for the

Educational staff should be considered, thus, a result rather than a goal in the faculty. The main goal beyond this technical problem should be to find out the characteristics of the Islamic thought, of the contemporary Islamic way of life, and to produce the contemporary human typology of Islam. For Özdemir, the mission our nation has charged on the Faculties is to produce solutions to spiritual and aesthetic problems due to the penetration of the industry and technology, to help the society in overcoming ignorance, to contribute in the society in taking its place at what M. Kemal Atatürk called as "Çağdaş Uygarlık Düzeyi" (contemporary level of civilisation), or even beyond that level. Özdemir indicate rightly the serious problem which the Faculty even today is undergoing. That is, it produces the religiousmen, teachers, academicians and administrative staff with the same curriculum. All these groups take the same curriculum compulsory with the same density, although at least nine of the courses are solely given to make the students gain pedagogic formation.

Another symposium was again organised by the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Ondokuz Mayıs (Samsun) on the Researches of Religious Sciences of Today and Their Problems (*Günümüz Din Bilimleri Sempozyumu* [27-30 June, 1989]). 63 professors or docents of the nine Faculties of Divinity presented their declarations on the problems of various domains of the Islamic sciences in ten sessions. The symposiums have had various effects on the later modifications of the curriculum. For example by the last modification much of the courses required for pedagogical formation dropped or became optional. The density of the emphasis on Arabic increased. Some optional courses were put on the Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Islamic World, Interrelationships Among Today's Religions, Contemporary Movements of Philosophy, The History of the Islamic Countries and their Geography etc. Table III and Table IV show the actual curriculum in the Faculty and the list of the optional courses.

Table 4.3. The Current Curriculum in The Faculty of Divinity, 1992-1993

Class	The Title of the Class	Period I	Period II
		Hour	Hour
	Arabic	22	22
Preparation	Qur'an	6	6
	The Principles of Islamic Religion (AkaidEsasları)	2	2
	Total...	30	30
	The Principles and Revolutions of Atatürk	2	2
	Turkish Language	2	2
	Foreign Language	4	4

	Education of the Body, Fine arts (Tezhip, Hat) (op)	1	1
First Class	Qur'an	2	2
	Arabic	4	4
	Islamic History	4	2
	The Methodology and History of Exegesis	3	-
	The Methodology and History of Traditions	3	-
	Logic	2	2
	Exegesis	-	4
	Traditions	-	4
	The History of Islamic Turkish Art	-	2
	Islamic Ethic	2	-
	TOTAL..	29	29
	Foreign Language	4	4
	Qur'an	2	2
	Arabic	2	2
	Islamic History	2	-
	Exegesis	4	2
	Traditions	4	2
Second	History of Philosophy of the Ancient Ages	-	2
Class	Theology (kelam)	-	4
	Introduction to Educational Sciences	3	-
	Sociology of Education	-	2
	Elective		2
	Elective		2
	Elective		2
	TOTAL..	21	26
	The History of New Age Philosophy	-	2
	Theology	4	-
	Methodology of Islamic Law	4	-
	Islamic Law	4	4
Third	History of Islamic Philosophy	-	4
Class	History of Islamic Sects	-	4
	Literary of Turkish Islam	2	-
	Psychology o Education	3	-
	General Methods of Teaching	-	3
	Measuring and Evaluating	-	-
	Elective	2	2
	Elective	2	2
	TOTAL..	21	21
	Theology	2	-
	History of Religions	4	-
	History of Islamic Mysticism	4	-
	Education of Religion	4	-
	Philosophy of Religion	-	4

Fourth Class	Psychology of Religion	-	4
	Sociology of Religion	-	4
	Islamic Institutions	-	2
	Special Methods of Teaching	3	-
	Professional Practice (staj)	-	3weeks
	Elective	2	2
	Elective	2	2
	TOTAL..	21	17

Table 4.4. The List of the elective Courses in the Faculties of Divinity by 1992-1993.

1- Günümüz Islam Dünyasında Dini Akımlar (Religious Movements in Today's Islamic Countries)

2- Günümüz Dinlerarası İlişkiler (Interrelationships of Today's Religions)

3- Günümüz Felsefe Akımları (Philosophical Movements of Today)

4- Türk Düşünce Tarihi (The History of Turkish Thought)

5- İslâm'da Düşünce Tarihi (History of Islamic Thought)

6- Yabancı Dilde Dini Metinler (Religious Texts in Foreign Languages)

7- Farsça (Persian)

8- Urduca (Urdu)

9- Ottoman

10- Paleography and Epigraphy

11- Hat (line)

12- Tezhip (guildinng)

13- Türk Dini Musikisi (The Turkish Religious Music)

14- Halk Sağlığı (Public Health)

15- Ekonomik Kalkınma (Economical Development)

16- Çevre Sorunları (Environmental Problems)

17- İnsan Hakları (Human Rights)

18- Mukayeseli Hukuk (Comparative Law)

19- Halkla İlişkiler (Public Relations)

4. 6 The Staff and the Graduates of the Faculty of Divinity

At present, there are totally 82 instructors employed in the Faculty of Divinity in Ankara: 12 professors, 24 associate professors, 13 teaching members, 1 professional and 32 assistants.

Actually there are nine Faculties of Divinity in Turkey, and they all contain at each level of their staff some graduates of the Faculty in Ankara. Since 1982-1983 at least thirty Professors or Docents have left the Faculty, and gone to other universities because of the lack of cadre in Ankara. Still the Deans of six of the nine faculties of Divinity are professors graduated from the Faculty of Ankara. This fluid situation has brought about the formation of the general tendencies in the faculties. Many famous authors in various faculties of divinity,[18] by their characteristic approaches to several issues confronted by the Muslim community, they all together have been constituting and representing, so to say, a tradition of the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara, whose characteristic attitudes toward the issues enable us to talk on an Islamic modernism: rationalist, humanist and conformist in the established meaning.

In respect to the teaching period of 1992-1993, there are 96 female and 760 male students actually studying in the Faculty. Having considered that each of the rest of the faculties have the same amount of students registered, the total number of 850 should be multiplied with 9, in order to estimate the approximate amount of the actually registered students in the Faculties of Divinity. That is approximately 7500. There have been graduated about 4000 students including about 650 female only from the Faculty of Ankara since 1953, the first year it gave graduation, until 1992.

As in Islamic and religious issues, the graduates of the Faculty are familiar with Arabic, Persian and a Western language. While they instruct in İmam-Hatip schools' professional lessons and lycées' and intermediate schools' lessons of Religion and Ethical Knowledge, they also, actually, give some cultural lessons in the schools they work in.

The graduates work in various levels of the Directory of Religious affairs, including Prime Ministry. The Ministry of National Defense makes certain amount of its students study in the Faculty of Divinity, some of who become teachers in the Military Middle and Higher Schools, or took mission in the Moral Departments of the Land, Sea and Air forces, or in the

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[18] Especially in Samsun the Professor of Exegesis Süleyman Ateş, mentioned above because of his characteristic participation to the discussion on whether the people given Scriptures *(Ehl-i Kitab)* would achieve the ultimate salvation i.e, the Heaven, or not, and the Professor of Theology Mehmed Dağ, one of the two translators of Fazlur Rahman's book into Turkish (Rahman, 1982) and the writer of an article on the unnecessity of covering which is reviewed below. In İzmir, the Professor of philosophy of religion, Mehmed S. Aydın, the partner of Mehmed Dağ in the translation of Rahman's book, and the Professor of the history of Islamic sects, Etem Rûhî Fığlalı, the author of various books on the contemporary Islamic sects, especially on the Shiite, all are the good examples of suc a tradition.

military educational units of religious and cultural field. Moreover, some graduates have been working in the state archives as professionals. The number of the graduates working as producer and administrative in the institution of TRT is also in considerable degree (Koştaş, 1988).

It took at least twenty years that the teaching task of the Faculty was transferred to the indigenous staff i.e., the graduates of the Faculty. The first dean of the Faculty who has been graduated from the Faculty was Necati Öner who has also today been maintaining his task since 1988, the Professor of Logic in the Faculty. He had been employed as assistant by the beginning of the Faculty together with Bahriye Üçok,[19] Neşet Çağatay and İbrahim Agah Çubukçu, now the professor of Islamic Mysticism and the attendant person of the TV programs on the religious issue. Öner's coming onto the head of the Faculty was occurred in April 11, 1972. Then, we see the first graduate from the directly Islamic sections as a dean of the Faculty. I mean Hüseyin Atay, and Talat Koçyiğit. The former, is even a *medrese* graduate, and has had several enterprises influential in the formation of the Turkish kind of Islamic Modernism.

4. 7 The Intellectual Profile of the Faculty

Today the Faculty reflects fundamentally different situation. There is somehow plurality in the Faculty in terms of the representation of every political or ideological tendency in the country. There is a natural division between the olds and the news, above all, through which very interestingly the olds are represented by those who are Kemalist and Revolutionist whose number and activity in the constitution of either the curriculum or the administrative program has been considerably decreasing.

What is more interesting is the division between the olds of the staff that has been far from being against the normative Islam, but at the same time from being so flexible in adapting their Islamic conceptions to the challenging ideas of Islamic modernism. Here the term Islamic modernism does not refer to the specific one that is systematically formulated and advocated by Fazlur Rahman or Hasan Hanafi. But including this specific kind every

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[19] The typical Kemalist and secularist woman, who had identified herself with the Revolutionary Kemalism against the reactionary movements. She is known as the first protagonist of the struggle of headscarf in the Faculty, in 1968, which caused a large reaction of the students of the Faculty. This was also the first massive student movement in the Faculty of Divinity and even in the universities of Ankara, which is also known as "The Event of Hatice Babacan".

kind of revising the classical Islamic conception of jurisprudence, history and reality is encompassed in this specific usage of the concept. In this respect there cannot be made generalizations about who is modernist and who is traditionalist.

The intellectual trend of a group of instructors in the Faculty, for illustration, provides us a good example of this ambiguity faced by any attempt of classification. Now, these instructors are considered as modernist because of their clear adoption of the ideas raised by Fazlur Rahman and (with certain degree by) Hasan Hanafi etc. who are the most typical representatives of the systematic movement of modernizing Islam, although they had earlier been considered, because of their attitudes against the criticisms of the Tradition(s), and against some other modern challenges, as traditionalists. But even in the meantime they had been also advocating some ideas that were considered by those older as modern. That was, perhaps, because of the misusing of the words as interchangeably. I mean, the term "fundamentalism" was needed, but not in the current sense connoted by the Islamic terrorism, but rather respect of the etymological meaning of the word itself, advocating the fundamentalist principles directly and truly derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This attitude coincides with the *selefiyye* movement whose basic emphasis is the interpretation of the most previous men of the faith, who were chronologically the nearest generation to the prophet.

Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, for a good example, has translated a book known as fundamental rejection of the claims of the Mutezilates against the Traditions, titled as "*Hadis Müdafaası*" (1989)(Defending the Traditions) of Ibn Quteybe, the famous Ash'arite. The Mutazilates has always been the representative of Rationalism, voluntarist humanism, and the rejection of any other source for religion than the Qur'an. In all these features they have constituted a rediscovered legacy for the Islamic modernists in various aspects. For example, just as Althusser thinks of the ideology as an emphasis on the subject, no wonder that the modernist Muslims who try to exercise somehow power on their destiny or in Althusserian words who try to be the subjects of their history, find a good theoretical ground in Mutezilate's voluntarism and humanism. Mutazilates think of the Qur'an as a sufficient source for deriving any practice and way of life etc. But their claim about the Traditions is twofold: firstly, the traditions, contain many additions that have distorted the core of the message; and secondly they are already unnecessary in understanding the Qur'an and in developing a way of life from within. Therefore the study of Ibn Quteybe also is twofold: he tries to prove the authenticity of most of the Traditions, of course accepting that many have been improvised, and on the other hand he tries to reconcile various traditions which seem at first sight

controversial. That is why his book was titled (originally) as *"Tevilu'l Muhtelifu'l Hadis"* (Reconciling the Contradictions of the Traditions). Now it would be more interesting to indicate how the Turkish translation was titled by Kırbaşoğlu as "defense" because of his enthusiastic advocation of the Tradition. But today he has, again, become to be known modernist because of his confession that the domain of the Tradition is not unproblematique (Kırbaşoğlu, 1991a; Kırbaşoğlu, 1992b), although he hasn't, yet, reflected a full participation to the doctrinaire modernism nor to the Mutezilate ideas.

Additionally, a considerable number of the instructors share a characteristic way of instruction. They instruct in a characteristic way. They stimulate and invoke almost the most principle beliefs of the students, of course of those who are charged with classical perception of religion, and cause their heads to be mixed. I witnessed two young men visiting one of those professors with an angry sound, criticizing and complaining all of them on his level. He said, "of course when we are graduated we will be thinking like you, a modernist, academic disbeliever. What could be expected? We are faced with one of you at the first class who causes strict disappointments about the Faculty of Divinity in our minds. Then, the second one comes helping and accomplishing the job at the second class. In the third class we begin to tolerate the relatively less extremist one of you together with his really relatively soft attack on the Tradition. Then you are the last shocking. We are finally produced as disbelievers!"

Among the most important points to be made of the interrogation of the Traditions in relation with Qur'an, or in relation with history, is directly the position of the Prophet that has always constituted the second pillar of the Islamic monotheism. Now, there are several studies achieved by various members of the Faculty, either in the Journal of the Faculty or in the other journals of the outside, which directly interrogate the position of the Prophet in understanding the Message. It also follows to argue that whether it is necessary to believe in Muhammed or even in the Qur'an in order to be a good believer. Süleyman Ateş, the formerly professor of Ankara Faculty of Divinity and now in Samsun, declared that "The Heaven is not Under the Monopoly of Anybody" (January, 1989). He meant that the Christians and the Jews and the other people of religions given Scriptures can go to the Heaven no matter be Muslim or not but to make good activities. This idea is relatively a novelty for the classical acceptances, and has drawn various reactions from the theological milieus. Talat Koçyiğit, for example, formerly the Dean of the Faculty and the Professor of Traditions replied him by repeating the part of the classical view as a motto "The Heaven is Under the Monopoly of the Believers" (July, 1989). Ateş replied again to his answer by asking the universalist question: "Is it so easy for one who was born in Brazil or Mexico and brought up in a Christian

circumstance, and who was also conditioned with that culture to give his religion up? Once put yourself in their place and think: really, if a Muslim who became a Muslim because he was brought up in a Muslim society, was born there, could he give his religion up and become Muslim? Now will the Lord of the worlds throw all of them into the hell without any distinction? If the Qur'an hasn't been told them as they could understand? Unfortunately the universal message of the Qur'an has been narrowed and monopolized. It is already always takes place in the same way: Good ideals, universal thoughts, become narrowed, nationalized and degenerated in the hands of the practitioners" (Ateş, 1989).

No matter the part of the relatively more modernist attitude is represented in this debate by a Professor of the province i.e., Samsun and the more conservative part is taken by the Professor of the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara. Because there can, first, be talked about an homogeneity of attitudes and ideas of at least the Faculties of Divinities of İzmir, Ankara and Samsun against various issues, especially related with the adaptation of Islam to the modern conditions. And secondly, most of the teaching staff of the other Faculties of Divinity has grown from the same atmosphere of scientific and academic ethic. Perhaps it is because of this that all tendencies in any one of those universities immediately find their extensions in the other universities. But it is, of course, also because of the universality of the problems aroused with the level of penetration of modernization. Notwithstanding, it can generally be talked of the three faculties mentioned above as relatively modernism-dominated although they include some members of traditionalism, while the Faculty of İstanbul, Bursa and Erzurum can be -as are already usually- considered traditionalist in this sense, although they, too, include some members of modernism.

Among these faculties, especially there has been talked about the real dichotomy between the faculty of İstanbul and of Ankara. It is usually characterized by the words of the Turkish intellectual Cemil Meriç as "Ankara became the capital city just because of a caprice" so the Faculty of Divinity reflects this caprice as every element of Ankara does. It is of course an irony, but important in reflecting some psychological moods of the attitudes of their relationships. İstanbul is still the actual capital city of the country, hence the natural center of the intellectual life. Prof. Hayreddin Karaman and Bekir Topaloğlu have been for many years the most powerful representatives of Traditionalism, although they, too, have their own definitions and criticisms against the Tradition. This can be understood as much because of their intellectual depth as an indication of their self-reflexive capacity. Karaman is a Professor of Islamic Jurisdiction, and have several studies, which have had considerable affect on the Islamic youth for many years. Paradoxically he has been blamed for being reformist

(Davudoğlu, 1980) because of his some new and interesting interpretations and solutions to some daily issues in terms of the Islamic Jurisprudence (Karaman, 1984). But rather than some specific solutions he brought to daily issues the method he applied for Islamic problem-solving has struck the established order of the traditional milieus. What he was doing, however, was simply to apply the basic principles of Islamic orthodoxy, without rejecting anything from the original tradition.

For Karaman, what was running with a vision of Islamic tradition was not but unconscious obedience to some exegesis of exegesis of exegesis of the former Islamic ulema, in such a way that the Qur'an and the Traditions were loosing their original meanings. That was later taking the form of the "religion of ancestors" which is referred in many places in the Qur'an as a legitimating motive leading the pagans to maintain their ways of life, Karaman reminded that the Qur'an rejected the validity of such a justification, just as the current mode of Muslim practices should be rejected. He translated the very speculative study of Rashid Rıdha, an Egyptian author, the disciple of Muhammed Abduh. The book was outlining a project searching for the possibility of abolishing the dominance of the Islamic sects by overcoming the disagreements living among themselves on various issues.

For Rashid Rıdha, the Muslims have been subordinated to survive the contradictions of the sects developed during their formation period. The debates and/or the knowledge developed to understand the scripture have replaced the scripture itself with a dramatic rupture, which increasingly have been sustained by the accumulation of this knowledge. Although there appeared sufficient evidences that could be effective for each to modify its view on various issues, the schools have not shown any flexibility toward the developments. For, the attitudes taken in the debates gained structural features of identities. The recent evidences, in question, are, for example, the last techniques improved for testing the authenticity of the traditions, and the accumulation of the authentic narration of the early Islam. However the disagreements could still be overcome under the judgment of the Qur'an and the prophet. The totality of the judgments of the Qur'an on the contradicted issues would lead to a "unification of the Islamic sects", that is the name of the project outlined by Rashid Rıdha (1972).

Undoubtedly this project has provoked many reactions from the Islamic milieus of twenty years ago. It was found reformist (with its negative connotations gained with the great but failed enterprise of the reform project in 1928 by the members of the Faculty of Theology) and declared as un-Islamic. The project was reacted by Ahmed Davudoğlu, once the director of Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü of İstanbul and the teacher of Hayreddin Karaman, as

destruction of Islam in the claim of restoring it (*Dini Tamir Davasında Din Tahripçileri*, 1980); by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, as running in 'the deviant branch of the right way' (*Doğru Yolun Sapık Kolları*, 1979); and by Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, the retired member of the army, and the member of the Naqshibendi order, and the founding father of still published newspaper *Turkey*, has criticized, even condemned him as reformist in religion (*Dinde Reformcular*, 1982). All these criticisms were declaring the legitimacy, and even the validity, of only four right sects as the representatives of the only one true way. That was the way of Tradition and the Community *(Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l Cemaat)* excluding Shiite and others. They were also paradoxically excluding the Wahhabis and the contributions of Ibn Taymiyya, although they too, were talking from the same tradition, namely from the Hanbalite sect.

Thus, the criticism and the established tradition of the Islamicists twenty years ago was to be lacking of coherent frame of reference, because their claims could not be rooted neither in the Scripture and the traditions nor in the original imams of the sects. But that paradoxical situation has had another very important reason embedded in the nature of Turkish Islam, which has always kept its uniqueness. This uniqueness was determined by its Sufism and by its property of the leadership, namely Caliphate. It is, perhaps, just because of this that the Ottoman state had always stayed at certain distance against any kind of revivalist movement emerged in the provinces. It is known that, for example, the Ottoman had refrained from supporting the struggles of both Sheikh Shamil in the Caucasia against the Russians and Sayyid Ahmed of Libya against the Italians and Englishmen because of their overt tendency to be much popular in the Islamic world, and to constitute somehow an alternative to the Ottoman centralism (Asad, 1984). So the reactions against such pure-Islamic attempts as that of Karaman and his fellows, by the traditionalists as Kısakürek, Davudoğlu and Işık, have their roots in political and national identity, rather than in Islamic or traditional frame of reference.

Karaman and his fellows M. Yaşar Kandemir, Bekir Topaloğlu and Süleyman Uludağ all of whom were graduated from *Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü* of İstanbul have published the journal *Nesil* for many years until the early eighties. They have written some very practical textbooks in tradition, exegesis, jurisprudence and Arabic which all have been used during the instructions in the İmam-Hatip schools.

Very interestingly, now, Hayreddin Karaman, is blamed for being a traditionalist by the Islamic modernists of the Faculty of Divinity. In his last article published in the Journal of *İslâmî Araştırmalar* that has actually substituted for the Review of the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara University (AÜİFD), declared a challenge to the Islamic modernism. What he meant,

to paraphrase, was that if the conditions have really changed, it is not because this is a necessary process, but it is because of the distance from the real place where God and his Prophet wanted to be. Thus we cannot be considered as historically retarded, or underdeveloped in an evolutionist understanding as the Islamic modernists do. Rather we have to conceive ourselves in a distance from the ideal situation wherein the God and his Prophet commanded us to be ready. These are of course my reading of Karaman. He, actually employs the classical conceptualizations of the Islamic Jurisprudence in explaining the phenomena of modernism in relation with the attempt to modify the position of Islamic women in accordance with the modern trends which are considered as acquired rights and positions for women.

I want to make some more remarks on the implications of the Islamic modernism as it is interpreted in the Faculties of Divinity. For illustration, Rahman's historicism has had a very important emphasis on the so-called ethical aspect of the Qur'an. By distinguishing such an ethical aspect, the Qur'an, is to be understood as composed of much compulsory rules. We conceive an impression that the Qur'an is with full of rules of jurisdiction and of much details of life. They are not the original contributions of the Qur'an. On the contrary they were the chosen ones by the revelation in accordance with some essential principles, which are or can be derived from the holistic comprehension of the Qur'an. So, it is not our task to look for a small rule on any detail of our life, but rather to find out the major principles that the Qur'an itself had care of and to develop some contemporary Islamic system, which perhaps would not carry much similarities with the religion at hand, taking care of the same rules and principles. That is to say that the Qur'an gives the man a methodology of legislation rather than the actual legislation itself. And the current Shariah is to be understood just as the specific applications of the same principles that would probably lead the contemporary Muslims to radically different applications, rather than being understood as the eternal form of the Divine will. That is the summary of Islamic historicism.

In my special conversation with a professor of the Faculty, he said to me that, "look with attention! Islamic theory of politics is so *open-ended* that it has brought about no any compulsory rule, which would have obliged the Muslims. All of the four Rashid Caliphates were also chosen in entirely different ways because of the arbitrariness of Islamic theory of politics." It was really striking enough because of the parallelism of the discourse M. Kemal has applied in his religious legitimation of the abolishment of the Caliphate and Sultanate etc. Mustafa Kemal has insisted on the identification of the caliphate with the presidency. He said "Neither the prophet had informed the Muslims on the Caliphate, nor the early Muslims were

in a state of deciding the nature of the caliphate. It occurred as an election of the president that was not more than the matter of simple leadership. As you know, to almost the most dictatorial governments in the Islamic history the religion and its *ulema* have given legitimacy. Now, was any thing specified in the Islamic Shariah Principles? There are only three major principles that are compulsory to obey: justice, consultation and obeying the governors" (Durukan, 1991: 82).

This parallelism like many other parallelisms with a modernist project sometimes originates from what we indicated in the third chapter as the main cause of the Muslim paradox between superstition defendership and accommodation to the on going "modernus". But such parallelisms are innocent in terms of being unintended and mostly implying intersections of the results rather than reconciliations of the ends. In the case of the recent developments in the Islamic understanding, as illustrated above by the member of the Faculty, however, what is to be noticed is a clear participation to the discourse of modernity without any compulsory influence by the state coercion but by incitements of various power relations, just as Foucault very finely put it (Foucault, 1978, 17-35). This participation by incitement becomes apparent in the attempts to improve an Islamic alternative to the current situation. But as I shall try to show in the next two chapters such attempts very often don't do more than sustaining the current discourse of the established orders. Because if they always not rely completely on the propositions of the modernity, at least, they work according to the same premises of modernity, taking care of almost the same hierarchy of values. That is to say, it reminds a somehow 'retarded Enlightenment or rationalism'. In the following pages, while reviewing the publications, I shall try to exemplify that incitement to the discourse in various domains including sexuality.

4.8 A Review of the Publications of the Faculty

The Faculty of Divinity has been making various publications since 1952. There has been published about 150 compilation or translation books. About 30 of these books were reprinted two or more times, although most of them are now unavailable. Many have reprinted later in the publications of the private sector, especially those who has large intellectual interests. Like *Hadis Tarihi* by Koçyiğit, *Kur'anda Allah ve İnsan* by İzutsu (See the Appendix: I) etc. the publications are made with a view to provide the needs of the curriculum, as well as some original studies by the members of the faculty are published, although the rate of this kind is rather below. Otherwise many, really original studies or translations would be supplied

corresponding the high demand on them. However, there is a considerable decrease in the rate of the publications by the same mechanism. In the last five years for example, the faculty hasn't published considerable number of books compared with the former five years. Or the publications are not but the reprint of the old editions of the actually referred books during the application of the curriculum. So it has been talked about a shortage of original and creative studies in the program of the faculty for many years, although many authors in the Faculty still continue their study and accomplish them outside the Faculty. It is probably because of the increased attraction of both the higher prices of copyrights and the more sophistication of the private sector. It should also be a considerable factor that the printing house of the university allows the faculty for limited amount of publications. The subjects of the books vary between philosophy, sociology, sociology of religion, theology, traditions etc. all of which supplies a requirement of text for a course within the curriculum.

The Faculty has been publishing an annual journal, which was authorized in the official gazette No. 7903, on September 6, 1951. It began to appear early in 1952 as quarterly until 1957 (actually in 1956-1957 four issues of each year were published as a single issue). By respect of the February 1993 the journal was published till the 33 rd issue. That indicates to approximately ten years of retardation for a straightly annual journal. The size of each volume varies between 230 and 800 pages consisting of between 15 and 40 articles and two or five book reviews. In my account within 33 volumes there were published around 540 articles and 150 book reviews. At least about 150 of the articles are translation from Arabic, French, English or Persian. That means a proportion of about 28 % of the total number, which is only 7 points lower than that of the equivalent proportion of the journal of the Darülfünun (*İlahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuası*, with 35 % of translation).

236 of the articles (44 %) are concerned with the basic Islamic Sciences as Qur'an and Qur'anic knowledge, exegesis, traditions, theology, jurisprudence, Islamic sects, mysticism, ethics and Islamic history. 104 articles (19.5 %) are on various aspects of the religious phenomena in respect of the natural religion, Islam, Christianity, Jewish and other religions in the contexts of the philosophy and sociology of religion. 75 articles (24 %) are on philosophy, including metaphysics and metaphysical theories, psychology, logic, ethics, the philosophy of East, of ancient and new ages and of Islam. 52 articles (9.7 %) deal with social sciences and sociology, including Statistics, political sciences, economics, law, public administration, social welfare, education, trade, customs etc. 39 of the articles (7.2 %) are on history, geography, biography, including the history of ancient ages, Europe Asia, Africa, Turkish Near East. 33 articles (6 %) are on fine arts including architecture, picture, music etc. 13 ones

(2.4 %) on Turkish and German Literature. 13 are (2.4 %) on general issues as the bibliographic science, library, journalism etc. 5 (0.9 %) are on linguistics including comparative linguistics, Turkish and other languages, and lastly 3 (0.5 %) are on some theoretical sciences as mathematics, astronomy Chemistry and archeology.

After these numerical informations, I think, it should be useful to point out that the distribution of the articles is proportional with the curriculum of the Faculty. There is no large gap between the proportion of the representation by the articles and the proportion of the courses in the curriculum.

The Faculty has also published another journal with almost completely the same content with the Journal of the Faculty. This journal was published under the authorizing of the Institute of Islamic Sciences within the body of the Faculty. The institute has been established in 1956 and three years later in 1959 began to publish the journal with the title *İslâm İlimleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* that has been published only five times so far. To repeat, its content is almost equivalent with the former journal in terms of its authors, the densities of the subjects of the articles and the scientific or ideological discourse prevalent in its content. Therefore in the discourse analyses it will be dealt by some articles it included.

The subjects of the articles and their distributions according to the weight of the subdisciplines of theology correspond with the official boundaries of the objects of study in a Faculty of Divinity. By this way, I think it would be correct to indicate a clear formation of, or at least participation to the secularist discourse in relation with religion. But that is by no means to say that the articles advocate secularism in clear pronunciation. But the articles all together draw a line of academization of the religion as ruptured from the problems of everyday life with no any claim to be a determinate of the Turkish social life except that the religion is conceived as functional in achieving some official goals as working hard, controlling the population for development, solving some moral problems arisen by atheism, justifying and sustaining the Turkish laicisim by emphasizing and improving some aspects embedded in the nature of Islamic religion such as the rejection of the clergy and superstitions, which give it an impression of parallelism with secularism etc. In my superficial outlook at the journal, I witnessed only few articles extending the study to a domain whom the secularist reforms in Turkey has forbidden the religion to enter. It was because of this that, as we illustrated in the third chapter that in the first Faculty of Theology of İstanbul, the Islamic jurisdiction was to be given only in the line of its historical narration, because of its potential opposition to the Constitution and the Civil Code. Now, again, in the journals there is a highly accommodation to the rule of not to extend the domain of investigation to the

alternative aspects of Islamic religion to the on-going social practices. Instead, there is a concentration on the historical narrations of the early or later Islams, Islamic culture and civilizations, the debates of the early times, which usually have no any implications to the practices of contemporary Muslims. Of course, there are some exceptional examples, though very few. These are, for example, the articles by Şakir Berki (1978), who studies the systems of inheritance in Islamic and Civil Laws comparatively. In his article he arrives to the conclusion that Islamic system of Inheritance Law is superior to that of the Civil one which is officially recognized and applied; or by İbrahim Çalışkan (1992) who studies the nature and the punishment of adultery in Islam; and in another article by the same author (1989), he studies the concept of punishment and some punishments (Hadd). Needless to say whichever are the conclusions of such studies, they would be contradictory with the Turkish secularism which reject any kind of intervention of Islamic or religious-based Law to the daily life of the citizens.

A group of articles can be discerned in terms of advocating Kemalism and secularism, and trying to reconcile it with Islam. Like Beyza Bilgin, and Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, once the dean of the Faculty, whose articles were published in the 26 th volume of the journal in 1983, when the government of the September 12 was still at work.[20] In his article, Yurdaydın, tried to demonstrate secularism as the only way in contemporary world and as it is the higher stage undertaken by the evolutionary history in which Islam constituted a progressive agency. He also argued that the Caliphate was not but the demonstration of the popular will in the time of the prophet, so the continuation of this will today should be recognized as almost religious. Bilgin (1982), however, tried to get closer Atatürk to a religious line, so to speak, in contrast to Yurdaydın who tried to close the religious ideals to a Kemalist will. She argued that secularism has been misunderstood and misused. There has been taking place some educational practices which clearly attacked on the religion on the name of secularism or Kemalism, although in fact Mustafa Kemal intended to reform and get rid the religion of various distortions by the clerical practices in the religion...

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[20] It would be useful to report that the 24 th issue o the Journal of AÜİFD and the 5 th issue of the journal of *İslâm İlimleri Enstitüsü* were published as presents for the 100 th year of the birth of Atatürk.

4.8.1 Transforming Theology to Anthropology:

Among the most important articles published in the journal is perhaps that of Hasan Hanafi (1978), translated from French by the Professor of Islamic Theology Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, once the Director of the Religious Affairs. Although it is quite marginal in the general stances of the subjects of the journal because of its suggestion of a method of actualizing the Islamic theology according to the contemporary needs as a total way of life, eventually his suggestion is also quite appropriate for achieving any kind of accommodation of the religion. That is perhaps because of the very convenience of the method, historicism that dominates the work of Hanafi, for arriving a state of relativism. As a matter of fact, for Hanafi, religious thought is in essence a formless thought. Its form comes from History. The project develops in a radical spirit. Its aim is put an end to tradition for ever so that religion may become part of developing reality. Theology is a false science because it has no object nor subject of study, since the God is not an object. God is not conceivable with reason, but, more importantly the human reason is tied with a complexity of sociology, psychology and physiology. So a theology is not divine and sacred but an historical knowledge, depending on the level of cultural structure of its time. Thus Theology is not a science but an art.

Theology is definitely ruptured from the human realities with its suggestion of constant ahistorical and asocial definition of the God, heaven, prophet, hell, angels etc. all of which are not but charged with their historical and social formations over time. In so far as these concepts become the matters of theology they serve only as despotic entities working violently against human being. So they should be subordinated to history in accordance with the human needs. For example the God today should be reimagined again and again, as a personified (remember Feuerbach's personified man, that was the God Himself) man for establishing esteem to man. He should be reimagined as people, for having the faith of people. For, it is just the major reason of our unhappiness that we despise people. He should be reimagined as history in order to be able to find our role in history, and to know that in which stage of the development we are. He should be reimagined as freedom in order to obtain our freedom. In order to get rid of our lands under the occupation of the enemies, the God should be reimagined as land etc. Because the God is, in fact, not but just what we desire i.e. freedom, democracy, progress, development etc. There would be no danger of loosing the divine being because God already exists as an image. This image is imposed by the age. And the present age imposes the God as progress.

To catch this image the method is simple: to transform the theology to anthropology, because the form and the nature of God is determined by the man. Thus the interpretation of the religious text will be a movement from the reality to the text vs. the classical movement of theology as from the text to the reality.

4. 8. 2 Incitement to the Discourse

Finally I want to mention another group of articles, which I exemplify with four articles. Three of them are directly on the usage of sexuality in terms of the population policy. There have been published at least three articles on the place of population planning, or birth control in Islam considering the Qur'an and the Traditions. What is more striking in this situation compared with the other issues is that all of the articles have been published after the adoption of the anti-natalist polices by the state. Moreover, the Islamic view on the issue until this period was not so open to speculation, in that there was almost a consensus on the attitude against any kind of birth control. For, the birth control was implying more than a mechanical activity during the sexual intercourse. It was/is implying a strict suspicion against the fate of the God more than any other activity of control, for the issue is related with the fate of another individual, who is believed to be created in spite of all human will if the God desired and decided to create him. That view summarizes what dominated the Islamic culture for centuries.

The first article was published by Süleyman Ateş just three years (1968) after the adoption of the anti natalist policy in the country, in which he interrogates the technique of birth control itself. The second one by Hüseyin Atay in 1970, directed toward searching of a quite modern concept as family planning in the Qur'an and the Traditions. The last one is by Esat Kılıçer. He, again, concentrates on searching something like a Family Planning, but in all Islam in general. His article was published in 1981, in the heydays of the September 12 government. But that is by no means to imply any conspiracy approach to the relationship between the directly state intervention and the formation of the articles. My contention here is even to exclude such a probability in order to refer more easily to the being incited to the discourse as Foucault very finely indicated when he described one of the great innovations in techniques of power in the eighteenth century as the emergence of "population" as economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded.

For Foucault, governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a "population," with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation. At the heart of this economic and political problem of population was sex: it was necessary to analyze the birth rate the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of prohibitions, the impact of contraceptive practices. Of course, it had long been asserted that a country had to be populated if it hoped to be rich and powerful; but this was the first time that a society had affirmed, in a constant way, that its future and its fortune were tied not only to the number and the uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and family organization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his sex. Thus, between the state and the individual, sex became an issue, and a public issue no less; a whole web of discourses, special knowledge, analysis, and injunctions settled upon it (Foucault, 1978: 25-26).

Now, the articles, in question, provide us good examples of objectifying the Islamic knowledge and subordinating it to the fluctuation of the discourse, although it includes an absolutist emphasis which might prevent it from the dangers of relativism caused by historicity, though if not from the history itself.

All of the articles share the view that what is known on the issue from the Qur'an and the traditions is open to interpretation, and one can not exclude the probability of the approval of the Prophet the birth control. Even there can be deduced some indications encouraging the birth control etc. Their conclusions are almost completely the reinterpretations of the classical evidences forbidden the birth control. So what becomes more interesting is that there emerged no serious reaction against those reinterpretations, except the translation from Mawdudi (1976) who rejected the birth control violently, declaring it as unlawful and definitely contrary to Islamic principles.

The Last article I want to mention in this review is Mehmed Dağ's article published in 1982 on the place of covering in Islam. He tried to show that the verses of the Qur'an known as the sources of the direction that female must cover their heads are in fact not so clear to give such impressions. Rather than being not so clear, it was also under the influence of its historical conditions, which don't bind the people in the twentieth century. For example, in the two verses from the Qur'an there is no any certainty about the form of veiling. He concluded that, unfortunately in the religious middle or higher schools there are grown rather different

generations in terms of their dressing and their heads. These are the most required to be assimilated with Atatürk's principles and revolutions by filling their brains with them.

CHAPTER V
ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE
BETWEEN MODERNISM AND TRADITIONALISM

4. 1 The Problem: Accommodation or Challenge?

In a study on the Faculty of Divinity in terms of the possibility of reproduction of Higher Islamic knowledge one may hope to be dealt with several issues by which a good ground could be prepared for analyzing and properly approaching some other related issues in the context of sociology of knowledge, on the one hand, and in the context of some noological problems of Islamic religion in the modern world on the other. These problems can be characterized from some major channels as Islamic adaptation to the on-going realities as accommodation or as constitutive agency, and reproduction of Islamic knowledge and practice in the permanently changing world.

The problem of accommodation of a prophetic religion to certain social and historical conditions, and its challenging or constitutive capacity is best formulated by Turner (1974: 22-38) in relation with the attitudes of Islam to the social and historical conditions at Mecca and Medina. He replies to Max Weber's analysis of the emergence of Islam as he has become "one of the first sociologists to abandon his own philosophical guide-lines" (pp. 3) in his observations on Islam and Muhammed. Because Weber's massive contribution to contemporary sociology by outlining a special philosophy of social science and a related methodology which attempt to present the social actor's constitution of social reality by subjective interpretations. And in this effort (*verstehende sociology*), he has represented a powerful critique of those varieties of positivism which ignored the actor's definition of reality by arbitrary imposing the observer's (sociologist's) interpretations and categories on social reality. Turner reminds that Weber has claimed that Islam was a religion of accommodation because it was appropriated by powerful social groups who accommodated the new doctrine to their group or class interests. The Prophet's world-view, for Weber, became socially significant after it had been accepted and re-fashioned by bedouin tribesmen in line with their life-style and economic interests. As a result of such formulation Islam or any Muslim calling for the Prophetic message -in Weber's analysis, of course, Mohammed-

becomes opportunists as Mohammed was. For, Mohammed had motivated the original adherents to Islam "solely in terms of booty and conquest" (Ibid: 23).

Turner criticized Weber for, ignoring Muslims' interpretations of events and by imputing sexual permissiveness to Muhammed, he has not only abandoned some of the essential principles of his own *verstehende* sociology. And he added that Weber also accepted without question the common nineteenth-century reductionist interpretation of Islam. By lumping together a number of different types of commitment to Islam, Weber seemed to imply either that all Muslims were opportunist or that Mohammed was prepared to accept a redefinition of the core of religion in militaristic terms although he should raise the question of whether Islam itself made distinctions between pure and biased commitment to Islam. But instead, he implied that the commitment to booty was perfectly acceptable as the Prophet 'realized more and more clearly' that Islam rested on the material interests of warrior clans. In fact, the Qur'an and early biographical records show that the Prophet and his companions remained permanently hostile to an opportunist commitment to Islam. In particular, there was strong and effective condemnation of hypocrites. The Qur'an itself distinguished between the believer *(mü'min)*, the disbeliever *(kâfir)* and the hypocrite *(munafıq)*. The hypocrite had refused to accept the religion of the Prophet, but clung to Islam for short-term benefits. Accepting Islam under compulsion, 'these people remained opportunists. The slightest misfortune that happened to Muhammed was enough to raise doubts in their minds and to sway their belief in God' (Turner, 1974: 22-38).

Today, an Islamic resurrection, apart from being an unintended result of certain historical conjunctures, has to make a good emphasis on the reconstruction of its discourse, seeking for not to fall into position of accommodation to the on-going realities, but at the same time for not to fall into anachronistic and asocial positions. Still the problem of the Islamic resurrection can, and is explained with certain kind of determinism of modernization (Özdalga, 1990; Çiğdem, 1991) or of geo-political fluctuations (Türköne, 1991; Arkoun, 1992) of the Islamic countries rather than being the function of the intrinsic characteristic of the Islamic believers. Without going far in detail, my contention here is to signify the intended meanings of the actors of Islamic resurrection and their own interpretation of their situations. That is the domain of the relationship between God and man that has much degree of autonomy. That autonomy stems at least in certain degree, if not completely, from the believers' contacts with the Scripture and the biographical reports of the early Islam or Traditions. That relation is constitutive rather than being an imposed consequence of certain historical or social forces (Aktay, 1992a). Thus, it might be not difficult to estimate that any

enterprise to explain the Islamic resurrection with an external determination would have failed in encompassing the situation, although each produce certain contribution in explaining certain aspects and even sizes of the Islamic resurrection. But the problem of reproducing the Islamic knowledge stemmed from the autonomous domain of its epistemology, without being constituted by the conditions but which should include also replies to them, is the focus of my study of the possibility of the reproduction of Islamic knowledge in modern times.

4. 2 Historicity of the Text

The first and perhaps the most important problem that arises from a communication with the religious texts, which, I assume constitutes an autonomous domain of interaction, is the problem of historicity. It might constitute a good frame of reference for overcoming the effect of the changing world to a legitimate and acceptable point. Actually Islam in its emergence had never been carrying the claim that it was an original religion the world hadn't seen before. Instead it was claiming continuity with the other religions, and thus was declaring that the actual situations of those religions had been degenerated for failing in reproducing themselves over against the changing world and their contact with their texts had been constructed falsely. The true contact with their texts was still possible and the Qur'an has advised them to obey their texts truly (V: 43-48). The position of the Qur'an and Mohammed was but the recurrence of the universal and the over-historical (not certainly ahistorical) message in the Arabic society. Because Allah had declared that "We never send an Apostle except with the language of his people, so that he might make the message intelligible" (XIV: 4). And in various places it repeated that Allah had sent to every society prophets called them for leaving the ways they were walking and for committing to the way Allah has suggested to them, and to consecrate the all authority without any exception to Allah, isolating it from all human or superhuman, natural or supernatural forces. The content of the message is not other than a permanent translation of a single one.

4. 2. 1 Fazlur Rahman and the Effectivity of His History

Apart from constituting a good frame of reference, however, the problem of historicity also leads to some paradoxical situations in creating and legitimating the accommodated kind of the message translated. Fazlur Rahman, the prototype of the institutional carriers of the

charge of producing the higher Islamic knowledge, and so much popular in the faculties of Divinity, is perhaps the best example who exercises this paradox. Especially when he criticizes Gadamer's position (1975) on the possibility of understanding a historical text the paradox in question become more and more apparent. Gadamer's answer to the possibility of understanding the objective conditions of a past text is certainly "no", in his discussion with the objectivist school, namely E. Betti. For Betti the meaning of a past text or precedent, the present situation, and the intervening tradition can be sufficiently and objectively known and that the tradition can be fairly objectively brought under the judgment of the normative meaning of the past under whose impact the tradition arose. Thus, the tradition can be studied with adequate historical objectivity and separated not only from the present but also from the normative factors that are supposed to have generated it. Gadamer replies to the objectivism that all experience of understanding presupposes a preconditioning of the experiencing subject, and, therefore, without due acknowledgment of this fact of being predetermined, any attempt to understand anything is doomed to unscientific vitiation. What so predetermines me as an understanding subject is what Gadamer calls "the effective history," that is not only the historical influence of the object of investigation, but the totality of other influences that make up the very texture of my being. Thus there is no question of any "objective" understanding of anything at all. Even when we become aware of this predetermination -that is, develop an "effective-historical consciousness" as distinguished from ordinary "historical consciousness"- the former is so limited that it can not overcome this preconditioning.

In the specification of the issue to the possibility of understanding the Qur'an, for Rahman, Gadamer's position is very rigid, and cut all the ways of the possibilities. Rahman has improved a method which he called it "double-movement theory", that is to make a sociological and historical analysis of the situation to which the text was revealed and to come to the present and read the conditions here, and find the accordances between the two with a translation activity as mentioned above. The system creates no serious problems, but if Gadamer's thesis wouldn't be considered as correct. Rahman's position is that, the objective ascertaining of the past is possible (which Gadamer doesn't allow) in principle provided requisite evidence is available (Rahman, 1982: 1-11).

Now, where is the paradox until here that historicity would lead us? It is characterized with Rahman's position in concluding a modernist interpretation of the text. Although he has advocated an objectivist position against Gadamer, he could be criticized for being actually verifying Gadamer's theory. Because Rahman is very much charged with his own "effective history" that led him to produce some projects in harmony with his history, relying on the

text. He derives very functional interpretation of the religion in solving the actual problems of modernization. Thus, for example, there is no emphasis on the conflicting character of the Qur'an or the Prophetic tradition.[21] When he makes the reinterpretation of the Qur'anic verses touching upon interest, women, and some other issues he tries to exclude the Islamic uniqueness, which made it, appear somehow savage in the modern world. Moreover, for Rahman, "the early suras of the Qur'an make it abundantly clear that the acute problems in the Meccan society were polytheism (idol worship), exploitation of the poor, malpractices in trade, and general irresponsibility toward society (which there is good reason to believe the Qur'an perceived as interconnected). The Qur'an put forward the idea of a unique God to whom all humans are responsible and good of eradication of gross socio-economic inequity" (pp. 5). It is true that the early Qur'anic verses were criticizing the socio-economic inequities, but they have never suggested an alternative project of society in which these inequities would not appear. Instead what is more striking in the early discourse of Mohammed is that, He was calling the people to a message whose next day certainly was dark, i.e. unpredictable (Aydın, 1991). He was not promising to anyone a good future but the Heaven that required selling their lives, animas and properties to the God in exchange with the Heaven (IX: 111). Rahman's project, however, tends to accomplish all conditions of a project: this-worldly, functional, effective and rational. Rather than being a comprehensive alternative to the modern world, he appeared to be accommodated to and sustaining the modernity (Aktay, 1992b).[22] Because, designing projects or theories before any practice, of which Islam for today is strictly lacking, subordinates the all effort to the charge of the established orders. Therefore, I think, it would not be so exaggeration to conclude that Rahman is in full charge of his own "effective history", when he tries to comprehend the text, although I think also that the "effective history" is an exaggeration, and that it is certainly not impossible to understand the Qur'anic text with certain efforts. That is, in one sense, because the Qur'anic text is one of the few texts that determine the way how they should be understood. In addition to the

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[21] It is well known from the Qur'anic teaching on the history of religions or prophets that all prophets have been sent because of somehow negative and degenerated conditions. Not any prophet has come to make an approval of the present conditions. Thus, what is firstly striking, as the most important characteristic of the prophetic message as it appears with a naked eye from the Qur'an, is its almost conflictual-being. That is to say the prophets always have represented a strong calling for searching radical alternatives to the on-going realities which, again, always are found by themselves as dominated with some human or super human power relations.

[22] However this is not to say, in any way that the author is a blind mimic of the West. His profound efforts on the criticism of the modern world and also the Islamic history are also quite far from being ignored.

method specifies how it should be understood, it also provides the practical conditions of a common life-world in which the intersubjectivity among those who understand it arrives at quite higher degrees. This intersubjectivity permanently reproduces a common sense of reality stemmed from the Qur'anic teachings and also located in a specific conception of time (I am not sure whether it can be identified with "history") that is neither chronological nor focused on factual details.

It is really very difficult to combine a historicist explanation of a normative book, which specifies its boundaries in quite absolutist discourse. That is the discourse of the Qur'an, which contains on the one hand an open-ended system of law which runs the institution of *ictihad* over time, that is the double reinterpretation of the changing conditions and its appropriate solution in the Qur'an, but also a will to absolutism and immunity or unchangeability of the text on the other hand. Any review of the text will provide us very clear evidences about the strong emphasis of the Qur'an on the constancies of the judgments of the revelation. Then, it can be shown that the missing point is just in the fact that the mechanism of *ictihad* had worked for long times and reproduced the Qur'anic teachings with certain reinterpretations that created various appearances. But this happened under the initiative of the Muslims in their Islamic praxis. In other words, if any historicist explanation could be attributed to the Scripture this would have no pure-Islamic roots except that the subjects of that history be the initiator agents of their destinies. Today to talk on the historicity of the Qur'an would attach the Islamic teachings to other lines of the conception of history, which are the legacy of the Enlightenment. It would also interiorize the Islamic values and principles into modernity, by which its potential forces of being alternative would be exhausted. Because the subjects that are touched upon as matters of ictihad usually are related with the domains the Muslims have no any initiative, any praxis. The results of the discussions of the theory and praxis in the Marxist literature should be quite fresh and fruitful in this respect, although there is an additional point that Islam is a religion not a theory.

While passing it would be really interesting to note that Rahman desired much to settle in Turkey and to give lecture in the Faculty of Divinity of Ankara. He has had very optimistic comments on the Faculty of Divinity among its equivalents in other Islamic countries and also on Turkey, in terms of being a good potential center of intellectual revival of Islam. He has expressed his this optimism in his book *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. However, his demand was rejected by both tendencies (mentioned in the fourth chapter as Kemalist and traditionalist) of the Faculty at that time. For, he was seen as fundamentalist by the Kemalist part of the Faculty, and as

modernist and reformist (together with it's very negative connotations because of the experience of the Islamic Reform at 1928 by the staff of the Faculty of Theology) by the traditionalists.

4. 2. 2 From Theology to Anthropology: Hasan Hanefi

There is another scholar who is nowadays very popular in the Faculty of Divinity, Hasan Hanefi, an Egyptian professor of philosophy of religion. His study now creates many speculations in the Faculty and in the outside Islamic intellectual milieus. In many respect his study is in parallel with that of Rahman. He, again, makes a strong emphasis on the historicity of the Qur'an. But for him it is no matter to overcome this as a problem. On the contrary this is the richness of the text itself in as much as it could be regenerated in accordance with the changing world. It is striking here and also in almost all of the modernist discourse that it is dominated by a search for relieving the resistance capacity of the religion against almost all kinds of change. That is an evolutionist perception of the history that creates much problems in reconciling it with the dominant and holistic values of the Qur'anic teachings.

Hanefi has tried to transform the theology to anthropology in his article that is touched upon in the chapter on the review of the Journal of *İlahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi*. By this enterprise he put even the notion of God as the subject of historicity and thus open the way to a suggestion that we can or should develop our notion of God, which would be functional in creating an ideal world, a heaven of the earth (no wonder, its very similarity, or perhaps, continuity with the "heavenly city" of saint Augustinous, in the Christian tradition). For Hanafi religious thought is in essence formless thought. Its form comes from history... The project develops in a radical spirit. Its aim is put an end to tradition forever so that religion may become part of developing reality. He tried to develop a leftist Islam, by which Islam is understood as an historical phenomenon to support a leftist position, which constituted for Hanafi the real camp of the historical conflict with the rightist forces, which always have been exploitative (1981). His project is redefined in parallel with some other basic concepts or principles of Islamic religion, in various studies as *Min al-Aqida ile's Thavra* (From the Faith to the Revolution) (1988) or *At-Turath ve't-Tecdid* (Revolution and Reform) (1977). Because originally he is a Marxist, no wonder his basic formulations are derivations of some well-known Marxist argumentations.

Still Hanefi has considerable number of supporters among the teaching staff and the students of the Faculty of Divinity. His first publication in Turkish had appeared in 1978,

with the translation of the Professor of Theology and once the Chief of the Religious Affairs Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, in the journal of the Faculty (Hanefi, 1978). But he hadn't drawn much responses and attention until the times that the discussion of modernity, historicity of the scriptures and tradition took fire. When a polarization as modernism and traditionalism took place somebody have chosen to advance in extreme points of modernism (Güler, 1991; Güler 1992), although for some others he constituted just a temporary discovery during the dialogue with the issue, who is exceeded and found as an extremist. He has another aspect, the Marxist kind of Islamicism that was mentioned in the previous chapter on the review of the Journal. So I find it useful not prolong the word much more.

4. 2. 3 Islamisation of Knowledge: R. Ismail Farouqi

The problems of adaptation and reproduction become problems in as much as they are confronted with the revelation, so the constant being of the Islamic principles which might constitute strong potential of resistance against the penetration of modernity, which is usually characterized by its very invulnerable tendency to change in almost every sector of the life. Having identified the problem as the natural consequence of modernity, which provides us a natural entity of knowledge, it is tried to be responded by some Muslim intellectual entrepreneurs with certain projects as "the Islamization of Knowledge" (Faruqi, 1982). Farouqi was the chief of The International Institute of Islamic Thought in USA until he was killed in 1987. The institute now continues with increasing activities, and publishes a strong quarterly The *American Journal of Islamic Social Science* (AJISS) jointly with its by-foundation The Association of Muslim Social Scientists. He attempted at a very extensive effort of what he called the "Islamization of Knowledge" which underlined that Knowledge of our time is by its nature Western dominated.

It looks, at first, as a very crude proposition, but by knowledge, Farouqi doesn't imply the general usage of the word knowledge or its Islamic usage. He meant that the dominant organization of knowledge had been achieved under the disciplines of which the Western societies had their roots in their culture and history. In other words "Islamization of Knowledge" as a project become to be applied as "Islamization of scientific disciplines." Thus, the Institute had accomplished publishing a series of studies by which the disciplines were Islamised as "Islamic Anthropology", "Islamic Sociology", "Islamic Medicine", "Islamic Psychology" etc. Now the institute supports every kind of study contains contribution to the formation of modern Islamic knowledge from all over the world.

The understanding of the Institute about the realization of its main project "Islamization of knowledge" has still been evolved and always is open-ended. This is probably because of the autonomous atmosphere the institute has brought about for inquiry that increases the self-reflection of the Muslims on their noological activities. Therefore, I think it would be not so right to criticize it radically from an Islamic point of view immediately. But I should mention some; at least equally serious criticisms run on the institute at least until 1988 (Rahman).[23][23] These criticisms almost share the perception that it tends to make just a crude translation of the scientific disciplines to a language which do not more than adding the Islamic principles of faith to the positivistic and secular ones which are, in fact, the inevitable parts of a broader world view. And such a reproduction attempt as a result, serves in reproducing the modern, positivistic and secular ideals and practices rather than the Islamic ones.

4. 2. 4 Ziauddin Sardar: What Makes a University Islamic?

Ziauddin Sardar, for example, the editor of the monthly journal *Inquiry* that was published till 1988 in London asking that "Islamization of knowledge or Westernization of Islam?" (1984), touched directly upon the nature of the idea of a discipline that he thought the designer of the project had ignored. Neither nature, nor reality comes divided into neat-labelled 'Physics' or 'economics' or 'design' or 'political science'. Disciplines are born with a matrix with a particular world-view: they do not have an autonomous existence of their own but developed within a particular historical and cultural milieu and only have meaning within the world view of their own origin and evolution. The division of knowledge into various disciplines as we find them today is a particular manifestation of how the Western civilization perceives reality in its own problems. As such, to impose the existing disciplinary division of knowledge on Islamic universities is to make them subservient to the western civilization and its world-view.

Various classifications of knowledge produced by scholars like al-Kindi, al-Farabi and al-Ghazzali, for Sardar, are not based on epistemological divisions which is what the most modern Muslim scholars like Al-Attas (1984), Bilgrami and Ashraf (1985), project them to

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[23][23] It is also meaningful that the criticiser articles have been published in the publishing organ of the Institute, *AJISS*. That case and the other developments the Institute has reported after those years are really good indications of the increase in the degree of self reflection of the project.

be; there is no such thing as religious knowledge and secular knowledge: all knowledge that promotes the goals of Islam -the ideas of *tawhid* and *khilafah*, justice and equality, understanding and brotherhood- is Islamic. When the Prophet Mohammed said that the ink of the scholar is more than the blood of the martyr he did not qualify the scholar or the 'religious' 'secular' nature of this discipline. Or when he gave a higher rank to learning over prayer, he did not put the adjective religious over it: "to spend more time in learning is better then spending more time in praying- the support of the religion is abstinence; it is better to import knowledge one hour in the night than to pray the whole night". As such, a religious scholar is no more righteous than an important scientist; under Islam both are equally religious and equally important (Sardar, 1986).

Thus, Sardar tries to outline a university with very specification of its characteristics that he thinks makes it Islamic. The Islamic university, for example can not be based on a false dichotomy of religious and secular, rational and non-rational: by the very fact that they provide a knowledge base for Muslim civilized knowledge they cultivate and generate, whether based on reason or revelation, must be Islamic. Secondly, an Islamic university has to be shaped as future oriented institution. To function as institution, which serves the knowledge base of Muslim civilization, it must be capable of assessing the changing contemporary and future needs of the Muslim people. Assessing and meeting the needs of the Muslim civilization, generating the knowledge from within the world-view, working towards the primacy of Islam and complete reconstruction of Muslim civilization- these are all normative activities; and an Islamic university, therefore is a normative institution. Sardar elaborates what he meant by the normative nature of university little further. Thus, for him, if we say that an Islamic university is a normative institution, we are not saying that it is, in any way, a biased or prejudiced academy. A normative, goal-seeking institution is not a 'politicized' institution that takes sides with this or that political stance. It does not 'tilt' as the universities in the post-Reformation Europe were expected to tilt toward Protestantism or toward Catholicism, or during the time of the war they had to tilt against the enemy and all his works - including even his language and all his noblest achievements. Or, as the universities in the Muslim world and in the West do nowadays, adopt a conservative garb under the conservative board of trustees or of a conservative government is in power; or towards some collectivization if a Marxist Central Committee when it takes power. For Sardar a normative institution is free from such scruffy sell-outs:

"A normative academy owes its loyalty only to norms and values that shape its outlook and goals. And it is the objective and universal values of Islam -those which are enshrined in the concepts and injunctions of the Qur'an and about which there is no doubt for believing Muslims- which have the ultimate loyalty of an Islamic university. Within the normative framework of these values, there is complete freedom of inquiry and academic work" (Sardar, 1986: 42-43).

4. 3 Modernity, Religion and Consciousness

Today all these tendencies has been rooted and represented in various densities in almost all faculties of Divinity. A noological analysis of the Faculty of Divinity in terms of an Islamic perspective, thus, requires further elaboration of the background of those orientations, which goes beyond the boundaries of present study, either to identify alternative ways of adaptation or criticize the existing ways. Now certain remarks on the issue:

Marx very finely described modernity as the world in which "all fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all-new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face ... the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men" (Berman, 1982). The world, in which all that is solid melts into air, thereby is also the world in which the traditional modes of life and thought of the Muslims are challenged. In the modern world the Muslims, like many people of other religious world views, really come to exercise much epistemological and even ontological points of assimilation into the air dominated by modernity. Apart from the lack of accordance of the on-going realities with the expectations of the subjects of God from the Divine Justice, they are also good witnesses of the fact that the well known rationalization process devaluates and rejects certain religious commitment as an adequate source of legitimation and/or justification (Habermas, 1977). This is a serious challenge to the ontological position of any Muslim who exercises and adopts the mode of being under modernity. Since it realizes itself not only in terms of mental procedures, but also as a way of life, it penetrates every particular mode of existence. In other words, it tends to project all sections of our life in parallel with its concrete products either in education or in industry and politics that dominate the everyday life.

Thus it is not so surprising that the gap between the on-going realities and the Muslim consciousness leads to various tensions in terms of adaptation and theoretical, ideological as well as practical reproduction problems. What is the capacity or possibility of Islamic epistemology in terms of its adaptation and it's reproducing itself against the challenges of modernization? Since Islam is a blueprint of a social order (Gellner, 1981: 1) what are other real and possible consequences in its encountering with the process of modernity which in one sense can be/is characterized by its monopolizing tendency i.e. not sharing man's control and authority over himself with any power over or except himself? Undoubtedly this humanistic principle of modernity would potentially be the main source of various conflicts in a demystified world. But doesn't the term demystification (or disenchantment) of the world itself already represent a kind of conceptualization originating from the experiences, which are the components of a major part in such conflicts? A part, which classifies, defines and judges.

Indeed, it should be also added that a large part of the analysis of the modern society, especially in terms of the transformations that gave birth to a secular world, have been originated from the series of analysis of the Western societies and have not been yet properly adapted to the rest of the world. The existing adaptations, too, don't do more than applying the reductionism of the global explanations that are modeled on what happened in Western countries (Turner, 1974). Not only because of the analytically requisite uniqueness for every society in general, but especially because of the strict difference between Christianity and Islam in terms of their conceptualizations of the mutual relations between God, man, nature, society and history, they can be/are located in different ontological positions. Therefore such a difference should be an adequate reason for attempting to different analysis rather than be contended with the global explanations of the secularization or modernization. For example, the analysis of the transformation of the traditional society into a modern society that is based on the characterization of the former as 'mystified' and of the latter as   'demystified' an 'disenchanted-worldly', apparently have no chance of being a proper explanation of what happens in an Islamic society, although it may provide certain clues for the approximation of the Islamic world view to Christianity or to any other tendency to which Christianity (like any other religion) has approximated earlier.[24] Above all, the mystification or the enchantment

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[24] Here a good reading of the history of religions, which concentrates on its pendulum character, can be mentioned. This is indeed just what has the Islamic Scripture said on the history of Religions as the degeneration

of the world doesn't explain the relation of Muslims with the external world. And an adoption of the Islamic faith locates individuals in an ontology in which the mystifications are exhausted (if not excluded) by a grammatically and paradigmatically different language.

Nonetheless, this is the language, which became popular in the modernizing Muslim societies in supplying the demands for, either accommodative or constitutive adaptation of Islamic religion to the run of the modern reality. The extremist positions of utilizing this, so to say, positive language are represented by both the governing elite of the modern nation-state, especially in Turkey, that seeks to reach a unique (among the Islams of other races)[25][25] and functional religion in terms of the applied policies of creating a new society i.e. if not being completely functional at least to be disqualified from being an alternative way for the people who might not accommodate to those policies, and by the Islamists who seeks to develop good defense against the challenges of modernity in order to survive. The detailed depiction of how these challenges, and in response the defenses happen exceeds the limits of this study. But as much as it is relevant to certain aspects of the possibilities of the reproduction of Islamic knowledge in accordance with the modern conception in general, and with the concrete analysis of The Faculty of Divinity in particular, it will be included. The two positions mentioned above of benefiting (in one sense) the positive language of Islam, for example, find their best institutional means to restate themselves in the Faculty of Divinity.

All these modern challenges bring about various complexes in the Muslim consciousness by which the question of Islamic adaptation in modern world or more generally the possible changes in the positions of religious world views find their channels of being responded from different state of emotions resulting from different positions. According to Shayegan,[26][26] for example, modernity has brought Muslim people to a state of rupture which is felt at the strict disharmony between what they think and what they (have to) live. This is the major reason of what he names as "injured consciousness" and attributes it to the traditional societies, generally, and to the Muslim people specifically as cultural schizophrenia. So that apart from the fact that this rupture can not be closed simply by adopting the modern technologies leaving the underlying values (the experienced realities for almost a century, really are full with examples falsifying the project of eclecticism), any kind of cultural or industrial resistance against the western influence is a sufficient reason of such a

from monotheism to polytheism. Moreover, the revival from polytheism to monotheism is depicted as the cyclical character of th

rupture. Because, if neither the mental structures can change with some formal revolutions at infrastructural level nor the infrastructural changes, as has been seen, are adequate factors for overcoming the rupture that injures the Muslim consciousness, then, there appears no way other than a complete delivery to modernity, practically and mentally. But this is not articulated explicitly. Rather there is a kind of historicism, which reduces all the so-called unfamiliar exotic phenomena to the state of 'historical retardation' (Laroui, 1974), which, needless to say, is a conceptualization that, in turn, necessitates a European kind of ethnocentrism.

On the other side some other evaluations on the possible pictures of which the spontaneous Islamic adaptation to modern conditions would constitute in comparison with the other world religions, give us an optimistic ground of emotion. For example, Ernest Gellner in his *Muslim Society*, relying on the internally binary character of the Islamic religion that historically occurred as opposition between the "orthodox center and deviant error... knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilization and barbarism, town and tribe, Holy Law and mere human custom, a unique deity and usurper middlemen of the sacred" (pp. 5), he concluded that among the four major literate world religions which were in existence in the Middle Ages, only Islam may maintain its pre-industrial faith in the modern world:

"...The faith of the Christian world has been re-interpreted and adjusted out of all recognition. (Modernist Christian Theology, with its elusive content, asymptotically approaching zero, constitutes by far the best evidence for the secularization thesis, far more so than any overt 'rationalism'.) Confucianism is repudiated in its homeland, however much it may be possible to trace the survival of its spirit. Hinduism survives as a folk-religion, neither endorsed nor discouraged by the elite of its land. Only Islam survives as a serious faith pervading both a folk and a Great Tradition. Its great Tradition is moderniseable; and the operation can be presented, not as an innovation or concession to outsiders, but rather as the continuation and completion of an old dialogue within Islam between the orthodox center and deviant error, of the old struggle between knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilization and barbarism, town and tribe, Holy Law and mere human custom, a unique deity and usurper middlemen of the sacred, to cite the polarities whose linked opposition, sometimes dormant, sometimes virulent, seems perennially latent in Islam" (Gellner, 1981: 4-5).

Thus, there can be found, in one sense, very parallels or accordances in the Islamic "Great tradition" with the demands of the modern industrial society in the expense of its accommodation. But in another sense, it appears that what makes this parallelism possible in Islam, i.e. which could be called as 'the positive language', is also the source of its power of reinterpreting the new world, which would be functional in reproducing its exhaustive and so challenging character. It remains to make the point that the subbinary interpretation of the orthodox part of Islam, too, occurs as permanent opposition between benefiting the religion as a legitimating element of the political decision and the pure recognition and delivery to the religion; between recognition of religion provided that to be modernized and the recognition of full participation to religion even if it make the religiousman stranger in the modern conditions; between the opportunist approach to religion and the sincere participation; between the appeal to religion in order to weaken it or eliminate its influences in the social life and the combat to make religion dominant and director of every part of the life. What is common in all these parts of the opposition is the relying on the so-called positive language of orthodox Islam.

The known struggle between secularism and religion in the history of modern Turkey is the best example of that occurrence. The closing of the *Tekkes* and *Zaviyes*, for example, on the other side of the coin has resulted in the establishment of the Sunni dominance over Sufism (Dursun, 1992: 183-184). And the closing of the tombs, while on the one hand has meant a step against the influence of religious elements in behalf of secularism; it was also an according activity with the ideals of the scriptural orthodox Islam. However, since the Islamists felt the overt intention of the new republic against religion, then, as İsmet Özel very strikingly describes, even the orthodox ulema paradoxically fell in a position of 'defendership of superstition':

> "..When westernization began in Turkey, because the westernist heads couldn't direct their attacks directly against Islam, they tended to the superstitions living among people. For the criticism was coming from the franc admirer snobs, the religiousmen refrained from supporting the criticism, *although they too had potentially been burdened with such a criticism*. So, the religiousmen fell unwittingly in a position of 'superstition defendership' (Özel, 1984: 26) (the italics mine).

It is just the position I have mentioned as the "the Muslim paradox" in the previous chapters. From the point of the sociology of motives as inspired by Weber (Turner, 1974), what motivated the religiousmen to rely on the positive language which was involved in Islam, can be identified as immanent in Islamic scriptures. Really the discourse in Islam permanently turns around the rejection of any kind of mediation in the course of God-man relationship. Any reading of the Qur'an firstly won't show us strikingly more than the dominance of the monotheism that in the religious atmosphere of Meccan society was just the name of the religious intermediary between God and man; or the name of the human dominance over man, excluding or sharing that of the God. Because according to the true meaning of the *Tawhid* (Islamic monotheism) the only ruler in every domain of the social (and undoubtedly of the non-social which is already beyond the claims of secularism) life exclusively is the God. Furthermore it was implying that there is no any power or influence working on the natural facts except the God. And because the God as very explicitly in various places of the Qur'an is declared to have some traditions in his creating the social and natural life, the Muslim people were being prepared against any surprising phenomenon in the nature, which has been understood as the *raison d'etre* of the existence or the emergence of religious orientations among people. Although later it didn't preclude the understanding of this "Tradition of God in His creation as occasionally" by Ghazzali and the others (Fakhri, 1987: 172-183), it was inspiring an almost strict causality in the occurrences of the social and natural world, which in turn was depended on God. Either in causalist or occasionalist understanding of the world or in any case, by its beginnings the Islamic faith was exhausting any kind of mystification of the world. On one hand, everything was directly effect of the creation of God, but on the other, by His tradition (Sunnah) every thing was created in an order that give an impression that everything was happening in a causal way.[27][27] Thus, as I mentioned above, the demystification or disenchantment of the world doesn't imply the same things to the Muslims (undoubtedly to those who didn't pass from the process that the Christians has passed in the religious pendulum between monotheism and polytheism) in terms of their modernization.

On the other hand, for the motivation of the appeal to the positive language of religion as legitimating power of their policies or as a quest for eliminating it from the social life and constructing their secular, scientific and humanist ideals, without settling any kind of conspiracy approach, there can also be identified some correlations between the New

Republican needs and choices in its societal projects and the ideologically possible Islamic supplies. So that these supplies would be, if not always functional in the applied policies, at least assurance against the threat of the, so to say, negative side of the religion. But not because the positive language of the religion contains the elements that really justify the political and societal practices at hand, but because of its more serviceable character of being controlled from a center that leads the republican to appeal to the religion to some extent. Of course, this serviceability comes from its scriptural quality rather than being depended on any particular interpretation of the religious clergy. Because a scripture is always available for every citizen and, thus, is more useful in being a source or support of a widespread ideology, that would provide homogeneity under which all people would be motivated through a calculable, predictable and so controllable way. On the contrary, the particular interpretations that are dominant in the negative side of the religion preclude the emergence of the preconditions of a modern, mobile, emphatic and open society. Indeed, the readiness to change, mobility, openness and empathy as the qualities of the modern man (Inkeles, 1977: 154-157) were sought by the governor just in order to unchain the people from the religious ties that always constituted a serious alternative attraction point to the Republic which was in quest for monopolizing and centralizing its authority. And they were not recognized in searching other way of life than what was the state presenting. Therefore the preference of the positive language of Islam by the republicans was in coherence with their centralist policy as was inspired and formulated by Ziya Gökalp and which was preferred to the decentralist, particularistic and liberalist approach of Prens Sabahaddin.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION, LAST REMARKS

"The Closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought"

M. Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*

The word "university" has been derived as a composition of two words in Latin Language: "unus" and "vertere". "Unus" means one and the "vertere" means turning or transforming. Thus, university appeared to mean to transform to one, to unify, to totalize. And it is this understanding of university that gained its systematic meaning in the philosophical doctrine of universalism that implies the dominance and validity of exclusively single belief in the world. In Christian theology those who believe that all people will arrive at salvation are called universalist.

In Turkish, for many years, instead of the term university there has been used the word *külliyye* in which the will to unify and totalize is, again, apparent. However, what both the *university* and the *külliyye* try to unify and totalize, according to this understanding, is the knowledge itself that they divided for facility. The term "faculty" used to refer to different departments in a university has been already derived from the term "facile" in Latin language, which means facility or easiness (Avcı, 1989: 128). There lies, under these derivations, the assumption that knowledge is indeed a whole entity. And it can be divided for practical purposes of learning. But it finally should be unified and totalized again. This unification of the fragmented knowledge, thus, appears as fundamental step of universalism.

Durkheim's conceptualization of the relationship between knowledge and university is a good example of such a universalist approach. For him, instead of separating each branch of human knowledge from the others in an artificial way, they should be approximated to each other; and a rigorous touch should be ensured among each other in as much as it is possible. Each branch should be aware of the unity of the complex structure to which they participate its constitution. Intellectual life condensates only when it becomes centralized. Fragmentation is death for it. So, the schools working in different domains should be unified. In order to pull

those branches from their professions, they should have been organized as parts of a single entity, of an encyclopedic school whose name in history is university (Durkheim, 1918).

Thus a university appears as quite different from a simple meeting of various faculties or schools in one place. It is a natural unity. Just as the knowledge is one in spite of the existence of various scientific branches, there is unity and cooperation of interest by the nature of the thing, between the schools and faculties in which various human knowledge are taught. The word university is already an expression of this unity and that is why a university has a unique function quite different from that of the faculties of which it is composed (Durkheim, ibid). Ideally the formation of a university depends largely on its cosmological view in terms of its classification and categorization of noological domains.

Now, the problem is arising from the fact wherein a faculty and a university containing this faculty are determined by different conception of the universe i.e. cosmology. The conception of the "unus" and the nature of the process of realizing the "vertere" differs radically from Islamic and positivist point of views. However, that is by no means to say that in Turkey the construction of the university has occurred in its natural development. On the contrary, just as its modernization and secularization are imposed from outside ignoring the internal dynamics of the country; the university has developed as a response to the administrative needs of the Revolutionist government. Undoubtedly, the Faculty of Divinity as a distinct domain of knowledge was born with a matrix with a particular world-view like any other discipline in the west. Like any one of these disciplines, it has an autonomous existence of its own but developed within a particular historical and cultural milieu and have meaning within the worldview of their own origin and evolution. Thus, an idea of a distinct Faculty of Divinity whose focus is only the divine relations of man, is resulted from a secularist cosmology which might be tolerable in Christianity for it gives unto Caesars that which is Caesar's. But how should it be applied to a faculty of divinity which, more or less, is subordinated to a religion which claims rights to all powers including that which is at Caesar's hand, namely the Islamic religion.

It was mentioned in the previous chapters as the Turkish kind of involution of the state and politics with religion and state. This involution appears as the source of various tensions in the university. Well, Islam has its own epistemology, which derives from its own cosmology in which any division between religious knowledge and nonreligious knowledge are intolerable. Because, all knowledge is encompassed by the monotheistic perception of the universe hierarchically subordinated to the God. Therefore, there is no any knowledge that

should be excluded as non-Islamic, except the knowledge that is charged with some values of other cosmological hierarchies.

Thus, the Faculty of Theology or Divinity within the body of a secular university is contradictory for both the university and the faculty or for both secularist and Islamic worldviews. Because for a secularist whose epistemology works according to positivism and empiricism the domain of theology is in full absurdity (Yücekök, 1971). It is so, for either the theology has no real empirical object to be studied (as Hanafi has pointed out, 1978) in scientific methods or it would inevitably represent a fragment within the university, which would be meaningful only in another kind of organization of the university i.e. according to a Theo-centric cosmology, and which would necessarily apply radically different epistemology in its work.

But on the other side of the contradiction exercised by the Faculty or by the actual beneficiaries of the faculty the problem is again manifold. Firstly the problem is epistemological, that is, as I mentioned above, Islamic religion necessitates a universalistic conception of the world, of course, with its unique cosmology. Any Islamic science should be based on the revealed knowledge, thus, should depart from some a priori principles: the acceptance of everything as the creation of God, in somehow harmonious ways and the presence of monotheism in all levels of Being and beings. Islamic knowledge necessitates a university, which don't exclude anything from its framework, because there is no distinction of the professions as religious or non-religious. Secondly, the problem is political, which again, arises from the holistic nature of Islamic religion. In the history of Islam there has settled a strong tradition of the unique attitudes against the political administrations. The great Imams of the four orthodox sects and also most of the Shiite Imams kept certain distance to their governments (İslâmoğlu, 1990; Mawdudi). They refused to accept any task from the governments they thought that they were illegitimate for not being sincere and justice, although they were not completely non-Muslims. Any participation to the political authority would have gained legitimacy to those governments. However, because of their pioneerness they were much more responsible than any other ordinary Muslim. Because there were very strong discourse running the responsibility of the ulema who were known to be declared by the Prophet as "the heirs of the Prophet."

Their distance from the state authorities was on the one hand for not to share their crimes, but on the other hand to protect the autonomy of their knowledge activities. Participating a religious service within a secular entity, which by beginning looses its validity in respect of Islamic point of view, thus, in any way would have serious problems of

legitimacy. Because as Gouldner (1976: 183) rightly asserts when intellectuals are willing to sell their services for a fee, and allow others to specify the ends to which their skills are put, the intelligentsia become controllable technicians and technocrats and an integrated appendage contributing to the reproduction and maintenance of the status quo. Undoubtedly either the staff of the Faculty or the curriculum itself become autonomized as much as the democratization is achieved in the country and then they become far from being just the technicians of the secularist or non-secularist state policies. But the suspicion on the validity of the activities always remains as an interrogative factor of the position of both the Faculty and the Staff of the Faculty.

Here it would be useful to record one response to the epistemological dimension of the Faculty by Ali Fuad Başgil, the author of the speculative book, *Din ve Laiklik* in which he advocated an alternative kind of laicism that would correspond to the dynamics of the country. He also rejected the idea of a Faculty within the body of a secularist university. Because, for him, in addition to the fact that it had no any other example in the European countries, such a faculty would create philosophers or sociologists on religion, who would not feel any tension or anxiety originated from religious emotions. A religiousman is, above all, a pious one and has got a profound scholarship in his religion. In a faculty under the frame of secular university a pious religiousman cannot emerge, just as the rice cannot grow on the stones. His criticisms also included suggestion of opening the Higher Islamic Institutes, which would function as to grow the true men of the Islamic religion. No doubt, the conceptualization by Başgil on the men of religion was in essence secular because it was supposing a distinct religious group like a clergy. And this also reflects the transformation taken place on the Muslim consciousness, no matter because of what factors. That is to distinguish the religious affairs from other kind of affairs and the religiousmen from other men.

As for the political aspect of the problems mentioned above, it has been rooted from the Qur'anic conceptualization of the power relations of any social structure in a way reminding Althusser's formulation of a societal formation which is composed of political, economical and ideological levels. The typifying lies on the interpretation by Ali Shariati (1980) of some Qur'anic verses. In this reading, any non-Islamic social formation includes at least three dimensions: political, economical and ideological which are substituted by three practices: coercion, golden and trick. For Shariati, the historical carriers of these practices are represented in the Qur'an as *Firavun*, the dictator of Ancient Egypt who is characterized by his violent resistance and opposition to the message of the Prophet Moses; *Karun,* the holder

of the economical power by which he supported the political activities of *Firavun* against any opposition movement and; *Bel'am*, the religiousman in the time of, again Moses, given certain amount of divine knowledge, as indicated in the Qur'an (VII: 175-176), but he abused it in the service of the political authority in exchange of some this-worldly utilities, although he was charged by the inspiration of the Divine knowledge to keep his independence and struggle against the authorities who were the enemies of people and therefore of the God. For Shariati those three typifying which constituted a power coalition against people represent a good example of a possible formulation of power relations in a non-Islamic society. Which dimension would be more dominant among those three, varies from society to society. But the typifying of *Bel'am*, which can explain all ideological activities as religion, magic and science, which would serve in both legitimating the on-going authorities and creating or sustaining a mentality by which the illegitimate power relations would be reproduced over time. This typifying has deeply affected the view of the Islamic revivalism to the religious organizations by the secularist states. No doubt, the students of the Faculties of Divinity are in higher degree the subjects of this revivalism. Therefore their approaches to the institution are suspicious and potentially charged with a gap between them and their instructors.

The model derived by Shariati from the Qur'an, no doubt, provides some convenient clues for a theoretical explanation of the power relations dominated the Faculties of Divinity in secular universities, from Islamic point of view. Moreover, that becomes, above all, to mention the legitimation crisis of such kind of religio-cognitive activity in front of the Islamic religion, which is charged with a total rejection of any kind of power relation originated from human behaviors. I hope that I have achieved the task of showing an equivalent crisis of legitimation from a secularist point of view, in the previous chapters, for the disharmony of the religious instruction within a secularist faculty might injure the secularism.

Apart from being a state apparatus, as for the contributions of the Faculty of Divinity to the academization of the religious knowledge as a function in modernization of society, we need to appeal to conceptionalization of "discipline" by Foucault (1977). Discipline is the best word selected by Foucault to refer to the double interrelated functioning of a scientific interest. When we choose any field to study, we firstly make a confinement into which our interest would be subordinated. This confinement will determine what is related with our interest of the subject and what is not. That means, to construct a scientific domain is to construct a discipline in the both meanings. That is to build a scientific way of studying certain domain and to discipline and control our knowledge of the unnecessarily interrelated objects of that domain. It is the simplest rule of the working of the discourse in the academic

process. Furthermore, about the rules of the determination of the discourse a possible Islamic epistemology, too, should have some measures to be taken. For it is the matter of the emergence and production of power.

Undoubtedly Islam has its unique policy of allowing using, distributing and producing power. Therefore it would be quite meaningful to make an interrogation of an academic process in claim of being Islamic. The question to be asked here is, for example, in what extent the knowledge can be prevented from being producer of and subject to various powers during the academization of Islamic knowledge. What leads us to such a questioning is the well-known fact that the academic interest is certainly not determined and shaped by the Islamic initiative which is derived from Islamic anxieties, and that it is obviously subordinated to the general wills of the modernization process to power and to knowledge.

The relationship between power and knowledge works as a political matter just as Shariati depicted with the direct intervention and direction of the state apparatus, and as a discourse matter owning its autonomous rules of developing. The subjects included in the Journal of the Faculty(s) I tried to depict in the fifth chapter might be considered good cases of exemplifying how the domain of knowledge is being confined and determined. The presence of three articles on population control and its approval by Islam, and the lack of any on Islamic conception of power, practical law etc. should be reminded here just as there is not any attempt to fulfill the great need of grand-theorizing of the religious view to modernity which might naturally be expected as a simple task of the institution of higher Islamic Knowledge and education.

Applied to the religious domain the academization process means a separation of the knowledge from the religious Subject who is subject to the religious knowledge. The pious in a state of religious emotion becomes the object of the knowledge of which he is also the Subject. The separation of the religious subject and the academic interest occurs as a high compensation for modernization of the religion, which help in the disenchantment of even the religiously constructed world. One example from my observation and conversation in the faculty may clarify what I mean. The example is what a member from the postgraduate program of the Faculty said in a discussion related with the current problem of Islamic modernism and traditionalism. Very interestingly, he said that "somebody from outside (of the Faculty) thinks that there is some mystical, esoteric and enchantment things in the religion." Very clearly what he meant in the circumstance was that it was the privileges of the religious academicians to be aware of the disenchantment of the religious world, and to declare it to the non-academician religiousmen.

All these remarks call for the task of an investigation of the Faculty of Divinity from other points of view, which I cannot claim to have achieved adequately. That is the power relations and the problems of legitimation arising within and during the academization of the religious knowledge, which could be achieved with coordination with the other subdisciplines of sociology as of sociology of knowledge, religion and political sociology.

However, as for a conclusive remark one should also admit that the Faculty is still the largest and perhaps the best institution through which various problems concerning contemporary condition of the religion find a way of representation in higher level of interest, although this interest is not independent from various engagement of power relations which could be marked easily as problematic from the Islamic point of view. In conclusion I want to repeat that my study should be considered as a preliminary work of the problems mentioned during the study. For the issue is really worth to question. Questioning.... the piety of thought, which will, be sure, open before us the true gates of approaching the God.

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THE ISLAMIC REFORMS
SUGGESTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF İSTANBUL:

"(1) The great Turkish Revolution for democracy with all its social institutions of economics, law, morals, and language represents two main aspects: (a) The scientific development of all social institutions; (b) The nationalisation of these social institutions. As all scientific and rational matters are treated according to the precepts of Science and reason, so all the activities of our national life, emerging from isolation, are becoming real national activities.

"The Turkish Revolution has taken from scientific reasoning and national life the basic principle for the reforms which it has accomplished in language, morals, law, economics and art.

"(2) Religion is also a social institution. Like all other institutions, it ought to satisfy the exigencies of life and pursue the process of development. This development, however, should not be outside of the basic nature of our religion. But it is wrong to think that our religion, whatever its scientific, economic and artistic precepts may be, should be bound to the old forms and conventions, and thus be incapable of any progress. Therefore, in the Turkish Democracy, religion also should manifest the vitality and progress which it needs.

"(3) It is almost impossible, with the modern views of society, to expect such a reform, however much the ground may be ready for it, from the working of mystic and irrational elements. Religious life, like moral and economic life, must be reformed on scientific lines, that it may be in harmony with other institutions. For such a reform our Committee proposes the following measures:

"*First of all the form of Worship*: Our places of Worship must be clean, orderly, accessible and inhabitable. Pews and cloak-rooms must be provided in them. People must be urged to enter into them with clean shoes. These are the sanitary conditions of Worship in Religion.

"*Second, the language of Worship*: The language of Worship must be Turkish. The Turkish (not Arabic as at present) forms of verses (Qoranic), prayers and sermons must be used. They should not be used only from memory but their written forms should be used as well. Special preparations should be made in the mosques on this basis.

"*Third, the character of worship:* Measures should be taken to make Worship beautiful, inspiring, and spiritual. For this reason we must prepare 'Singers' and İmams equipped with a fair knowledge of music. We must also have instruments of music in our places of Worship. The need is urgent for modern and sacred instrumental music.

"*Fourth, the thought side of worship*: The printed forms of sermons are not sufficient. Preaching is something different from mere reading of a prepared sermon. The important elements in sermons are not scientific and economic ideas but rather religious values and ideas. Only philosophers of religion capable of oratory can perform such duties. However, we should profit by the present religious

thinkers and philosophers in our society until the Department of theology prepares a sufficient number of religious works on literature and philosophy.

"Such a purpose cannot be fulfilled either by mere Islamic theology or by mysticism. The really important thing is neither the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish nor the forms of the Turkish words to be used. The important thing is a philosophical view showing the human and permanent nature of the Islamic religion. This has not been shown till now. Unless the Qur'an is viewed and understood in this way it cannot be comprehended. Mere reason and logic are not sufficient.

"*The consistency of the whole reform requires a program prepared by a scientific institution. The Department of Theology is the scientific centre.*

"*The Turkish Revolution by creating this Theological Department has recognised this need. Our Faculty, as a result of its experience in scientific teaching during the last three years of its existence, has come to the conclusion that such a reform would be helpful and uplifting to Turkish society.* It has the conviction also that there would be advantage to the nation in authoritatively presenting such reform in the responsible places. If these bases for reform, containing in themselves elements capable of exerting a creative influence on all Muslim countries, and which concern also the higher policies of our own country, are accepted and approved, *then our Faculty will be able to render more extensive and important service.*

"We shall explain the ways and means of putting into practice these measures dealing with hygiene, Turkification, philosophy and beauty of rituals. We shall publish books and articles dealing with these subjects. We shall establish general courses and give talks. We shall deliver sermons personally on Fridays, announced beforehand, in the larger mosques of Turkey. *We shall publish articles in the Journal of the Department,discussing the scientific basis and implications of this reform.*

"In this way, this New Turkey will not only experience a religious revival but will be the guide for the freedom and progress of all the Muslim countries which are still enslaved and backward in civilisation.

"*Only through such means can a scientific institution of the Republic such as the Theological Department of the University of İstanbul discharge its duties and civilising responsibilities towards the country.*" (The italics mine).

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