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See also: [artist as shaman]
Invariance, Evolution, and Act
In this section, i begin to explore the concepts of various kinds of
acts. The (existing) terminology seems a bit muddled. So, hopefully
i can delve into it and shed a bit of 21st century light upon it.
(After all, i am (ahem) some-what intellegent, and if *i* am having
difficulty sorting it all out, how can the purely practising artist
hope to incorporate these important ideas into their work -- not only
from a theoretical POV, but from a very down-to-earth way of *thinking*
about the work and the aritst, and of course the socieity/time/planet/etc
that we find ourselves embedded into, and more importantly: A part of
the main as John Donne put it. Perhaps *we* are the bell ringer of
whom he refers to: "Do not send to ask for whom the bell tolls; it
tolls for thee". [Ref: "The Tolling Bell; an elegy" by the poet
John Donne ??date?? ??link??]
For indeed as Smith concluded in his article [P.481]
It is in ritual space that the hunter can relate himself
properly to animals which are both "good to eat" and
"good to think".
I take this to be of the two ways of understanding:
Contemplative and Reflective.
Indeed, i would go so far as to posit:
Contemplative The Act Reflective
pre-liminal liminal post-liminal
future-possible the present past-subjunctive
This is an attempt to tie the variety of terms together.
And thus, what i have learned from these two readins is
comprised in this new way of my own thinking; ie, thus,
i too am transformed - the writer transforms the reader
and the "message" sent is both knowledge and understanding
as well as (if the reader is open-minded) seed for
imagination.
Thus, my primary thesis would run something like this:
1) The oath that is sworn is indeed an act and it is indeed
*just* words. As "just words, the oath ties the oath-maker
in the present-then (pre-liminal) to some future action
(the liminal). The *extent* to which this oath is to have
meaning and thus require the oath-maker to full-fill the
promise of the oath is tied to *ritual*. If the oath-maker
performs the ritual, then she/he/ne is *morally* required
to full-fill. I would go further (differing from Rappaport)
that the ritual does *not* have to be performed publically.
If the oath-maker takes the oath in what Sartre would refer
to as "in good fatih", then the oath (for the oath-maker)
is as meaningfull and contractually obligatory as if it
were made in front of the community.
This extends Rappaport's idea:
To say that ritual is the basic social act must
be to say that it is in some sense moral, for
the social subsumes the moral. ... [ellison, mine]
It might even be argued that the violation of
obligation is the fundamental immoral act.
[as quoted in Grimes, P. 435] {ref}
Thus, this becomes (in the privately sworn oath) a private
reproach or a privat act of immorality if the oath is NOT
full-filled.
Thus, the sworn oath (or other ritual of commitment to act in
the future) is just that: a future-possible action: That is,
future-indicative; ie, I *will* come to your aid, I *will* do
such and so, etc.
2) Contrasting this with the liminal event/act/time itself.
The *actual* act is performed. This either does or does
not full-fill the oath in the pre-liminal state of the
ritual. Note that in this state, we are in what Rappaport
calls the "performative utterances" which are "factive".
Thus (in his example) if i name the ship "The Queen Elisabeth"
then the ship IS named by that utterance.
This, devolves to what i would refer to as "associated co-ercive
oaths"; ie, an oath which is formally undertaken and then
observed -- acted out/full-filled/etc.
Note that we can not insure that we can full-fill the oath.
Indeed, we might swear to give our lives to save the king's,
but we might be killed in the performative present; ie, the
liminal "now".
3) Finally, after the event, as remarked earlier by the quote
from rappaport. We are in the reflective post-liminal state.
And in retrospect/reflection/musing/etc we enter the "i shouod
have done this", and other such after-the-fact thoughts. This
of course *can* lead to a different plan of action for the
future, and hence to a different way of thinking about even
the *same* oath/action/result at some point in the future.
A Brief Comparison
I will now consider three aspects of ritual and how Rappaport
and Smith differ in their approaches. There are no "right or wrong"
answers. We wish to understand the complex and intricate natures
of riutal that we often take for granted, and as such over-look
or even more dangerously: mis-interpret.
The concept of invariance is the idea that the ritual (or at least
certain parts of it) can not and should not vary. This is to
insure that the "mile posts" of the ritual remain constant,
recongnisable and meaningful. The reason that this imporatant is
that without the explicitly stated/acted/etc portions of the
ritual the underlying metaphore of the ritual (and hence the
meaning/relevance/symbolism/etc of the ritual, in-toto) becomes
lost or at the very least garbled.
The next aspect investigated is the concept of the act itself.
To a certain extent, even the *intention* to perform a ritual
is in itself the ritual. Thus, if i say "i should perform the
rain danse", then this calls to mind the facts of the *actual*
rain danse. Thus, this "future-possible" oath (taken in the
subjunctive) has a power *on-par* with the performance of the
ritual itself. For example, in a certain tribe in the Hebredes
(as i recall) there is a ritually planted tree that ends a
feud between two tribes. At some point (when the population
of the tribes has over-grown the ability of the environment
to support them), people start saying "some one ought to pull
up that tree". These *potential/subjunctive/future-possible*
statements open the door to the ritual and form a coercive beginning
of the ritual which (during the liminal stage) cause the slaughter
of many people in both of the tribes.
Finally, in terms of the *adaptation* of the ritual; ie, evolution.
This clearly falls into the category as Hegel would say:
Thesis --> creates its anti-pode: anti-thesis
and the "fall out" from the conflict of these two creates
Thesis x Antithesis --> syn-thesis (new thesis)
Thus, the failings of the current ritual in handling new input
(usually from an external influence, or some unique event in
the society's experience) -- leads to a changing of the ritual.
Rappaport focuses quite a bit on *liturgical* ritual which
almost by definition can *not* change.
Invariance vs Non-Invariance
We now look at two diametrically opposed forces in any system:
Invariance vs Evolution. The concept of invariance is to maintain
the status quo and thus assure stability in the society -- even
if that stability consists of very dynamic changes in behaviour,
etc. Evolution is of course how a system (in this case a society)
adapts to changes in the environment (both internal and external).
From one point of view: "Stay the course or risk chaos" vs
"Evolve or die".
On the one hand Rappaport emphasizes how the ritual is repetitive and
invariant. And the nature of the *message* transmitted (he doesn't make it
clear if there is a one-to-one (invariant) relationship between the
message and the signals by which it is transmitted. Thus, the
cannonial message (invariant) does not necessarily reflect the signals
used to encode it. Frankly, i'm reading between the lines here a bit,
since as Rapport states:
The [the messages] are found by participants already
encoded in the liturgy. Since these messages are more
or less invariant, obviously they can not in themselves
reflect the transmittter's contemporary state. For
instance, the *order* of the Roman mass does not, [emph mine]
in itself, express antyhing about the current states
of those perofrming it. In recognition of the
regularity, propriety, and appartent durability
and immutability of these messages, I shall refer
to them as "canonical".
We contrast this with Smtith's view that the rituals are almost
*always* mutable. In fact, he begins his essay with:
I should liie to begin tis essay with one such coincicdecne
[ie, similar to Joseph Campbell's encoutnring the same sorts
of fold stories in various cultures witn no possibility of
common origin] and juxtapose two texts separated in time
by eighteen centuries. The one is from Kafka, the other
from Plutarch.
Leopards break into the temple and drink the
sacrificial challices dry; this occurs repeatedly,
again and again; finally it can be reckoned on
beforehand and becomes part of the ceremony.
[Local note 1: F. Kafka, "Reflections on Sin,
Hope, and the True Way", in Kafka: The
Great Wall of China, (New Yorkk, 1970, P.165]
At Athens, Lysimache, the priestess of Athene Polias,
when asked for a drink by the mule drivers who had
transported the sacred vellses, replied, "No, for I
fear it will get into the ritual."
[Local note 2: Plutarch De vitioso Pudore
(ca. 534CE0]
This indicates the two diametrically oppsing views of ritual: Immutability
vs. evolution. In either case, the *meaning* of the various acts that are
part of the ritual (and the meaning of the ritual in total) must be known
by the particiapants. Otherwise the ritual becomes "mere" pastiche of the
original purpose and meaning of the ritual. One of the clearest examples
of this is the ritual of saying "Bless you" when some one sneezes. Originally,
there was actually fear that the person would be sneezing out the very
"breath of their soul" and than un-less blessed, they could imperile
their eternal soul. These days, the response is so rigidly embodied
that we respond without thinking. Note that the *act* of the tirual
(saying "bless you") still remains, although the purpose has been all
but lost. Thus, this immutable ritual has *not* evolved, but since
the meanings of the symbols has been lost it has become pastiche and
thus meaningless. Although, i should say that now the act of saying
"bless you" has retained one aspect of its original weight: It shows
that the person saying "bless you" not only acknowledges the existence
of the other person, but is (to some extent at least) in sympathy with
them.
I would thus maintain that unless the meaning of the ritual is maintained
then the ghost of the ritual remains and thus looses any effectiveness
that it might have had.
Thus, the only invariant is variance.
Pledge: Promise of Future Action
Another difference between Rappaport and Smith is the concept of "pledge".
For Rappaport, the pledge is not just spoken, but is in and of itsefl
and act. For example:
By dancing at a kaiko a Maring man singals his
*pledge* to help his hosts in warefare. Dancing signals [emph mine]
a pledge becasue it is itself a pledging. As such ...it [ellision in original]
indicates rather than merely symbolises the pledge with
which it is "identififed"; ie, made identical. Now I wish
to emphasise that "to pledge" is not merely to say
something. A pledge is an act. [Grims, P.430]
This clearly sets the pledge above just words (obviously). But, it further
asserts (or so i would maintain) that the pledge is almost as "good as"
the act. Indeed, Rappaport goes on for several more paragrpahs about
other pledges; eg, "We declare war", "I swear to tell the truth", etc.
It should be obvious that if the head of state declared war on another
country, then it wouldn't matter if they attacked or not; steps would
be set in process for war. This actually goes back to the code of the
Samurai in that even if two camps are declared in a state of war, if one
of one camp acts honorably to defend one of the other camp's members
when attacked by a third party (or nature), then this is seen as a
"higher calling" and thus, the act (acting honorably) takes precedence
over the pledge (we are sworn enemies to the death). These kinds of
juxtapositions are in fact inevitable in any sufficiently advanced
system of behaviour.
On the other hand, Smith [Grimes, P.478] clearly indicates that the
pledge can in fact be a promise and nothing more. he recounts the
killing reitual of the Yakuts in that hunter must awake the bear
before he attacks it, or esle the hunter will be killed in his
sleep by bears. Indeed, the ritual is to openly greet the bear
honoring it, and *pledging* to kill it; ie, the bear is there to
be killed as a conscious act of being and the hunter pledges to
keep his end of the bargain and perform the killing. Should the
bear decide to leave and not take part in the hunt, then it
leaves the pledge un-full-filled. It should be noted that as part
of the ritual is that the hunter tells the bear that he will not
chace after it, that the bear should come and meet its death.
Thus, (at least in this case), Smith maintains that the pledge is
*not* above the act -- as opposed Rapport who (at least in the
case sited) that the pledge is at par with or possibly even above
the act.
And yet, on the third hand, one could argue that both Rappaport and
Smith vary only in *degree* and are not so diametrically opposed as
one might suggest. To counter Rapport, we need only look at the
fake threats that are often given to *avoid* conflict, thus the pledge
becomes empty -- or at the very least "as-yet un-full-filled". To
counter Smith, we can look at the same "fake oaths" as they esculate.
In this case, if the oaths esculate to a certain point, then
conflict *will* occur. Thus, i would say that although of different
points of view, Rapporat and Smith are both describing the same
elephant.
What then are we to make of oaths, pledges, threats, etc in general?
In the case of human viz-a-vis human, the signals sent back and forth
must be mutally understood. Otherwise, it devolves to the human
vz-a-vis animal model. For example, if two different tribes encounter
each other for the first time and use the methods of pledge, threat,
etc that they are each used to, then it is almost inevitable that the
signals will be mis-interpreted.
On the other hand, in dealing with human viz-a-vis animal. It is
unlikely that the animal (eg, the bear) understands a real pledge
from a symbolic one. In the example given, i would assume that the
Yakut issuing the pledge would make it in such a manner that the
bear would understand the *tone* of voice. I think that at least
*that* much of the message could be carried across the chasm between
man and bear. If the pledge given is merely symbolic (eg, before
the hunt begins, and there is little chance that the bear would hear
the pledge), then it falls to the realm of the spiritual rather than
the material.
This brings us to another point of interest: The Material vs. Spiritual.
Or more properly "symbolic" vs "manifest" -- or however, you want to
put it. Prayers given in private are usually considered to be indirect
in that they are "hoped for" and may not come to pass; ie, they may
not become manifested, and thus reamin spiritual/symbolic. Prayers when
given in public although symbolic can in fact become manifest. For
example, the "pep talk" that a coach gives before a game is meant to
co-erce the team to play to win. One of the best examples of this
(in literature) occurs in Mark Twain's "The War Prayer" in which after
a preachers stirring prayer for victory of their troops, an angel
from on high comes to answer it. But, first wishes to clarify the
request by indicating the "other side" of the praryer; eg, that
you wish for your sons to return home alive hides the "other prayer"
the the other side's sons will die horribly in battle, etc.
Thus, even the symbolic pledge has an *implied* manifest partner.
Of the manifest pledge, there is clearly indicated some sort of "back
drop" within which it operates. As such, it should be clear that
every manifest pledge carries with it an *implied* spiritual pledge.
Thus, to Rapport, i would say that even the most manifest pledge does
not necessarily manifest itself, but that as Smith points out, that
the spirtual message is given (and heard) by the issuer. Whether the
pledge has an effect depends more on belief and emotion than any
pure physics of the situation.
Yes, i know i'm dancing dangerously on the rather brittle edges between:
ontology (how does each "item" work, and what are their relationships
between the issuer of the pledge, the pledge itself,
and the receiver of the pledge - even if the bear isn't
present when the oath is given)
phenomenology (if the bear doesn't hear the oath, then does it still
go "gladly to its death"?)
epistimolgy (do the spiritual/unknowable/in-direct actions/oaths, etc
have any *physical* effect on the situation? Can they?)
But one fact remains: The issuer of the pledge *knows* that s/he/ne has
made a pledge and when the *event* that the pledge
is about comes up: How does that affect their state of being?
And of course it was at this point that the left-leaning, and much hobbled
would-be philosopher's befuddled brain knew that it was out of its depth and
the philsopher (of whom the brain belonged to) stepped off of his soap box
and fell face first into a very recently depositied load of horse hockey
and then night fell, and there was a thunderclap, and suddently it was
thursday (for the third time that week)...
-- Frank.
References
(tips towel to [ed.usa.edu]
[in the new way]
"Readings in Ritual Studies" by Ronald L. Grimes
ISBN 0.02.347253.7, LCCN BL'600.R453'1996,
(Prentice-Hall, 1996, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Terra).
Bibilography
[in the way of tradition]
Bahti, T. (1971). Southwestern Indian Ceremonials. Las Vegas, Nevada: KC Publications.
Bruchac, J. (1994). A Boy Called Slow. New York, NY: Philomel Books
Grimes, Ronald L. (1996) Readings in Ritual Studies. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prenctice-Hall.
Lutske, H. (1986). The Book of Jewish Customs. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc.
Rappaport, Roy A. [Grimes: Pp.427-440] The Obvious Aspects of Ritual. Grimes: OpCit.
Smith, Johnathon Z. [Grimes, P.478-481].The Bare Facts of Ritual. Grimes: OpCit.
Tiersky, E. & M. (1975). Customs and Institutions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Regents.
Van Gennep, A. (1960). The Rites of Passage. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press.
"Rite of Passage." The World Book Encyclopedia. 1989 ed.
Slave Narratives-Part 3. Vol. 12 St. Claire Shores, Michigan: Scholarly Press, Inc., 1976.
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BEGIN BLOCK QUOTE
Oh don't you know?
We could have changed the world
When we were young
And the world was ours
But who were we?
Auch die Natur wartet auf die Revolution
(Nature, too, Awaits the Revolution)
[synopsis by the original author]
The erotic energy of nature - an energy which is there to be
liberated; nature, too, awaits the revolution! (Herbert Marcuse,
Counter-Revolution and Revolt) - how can this sentence be rationally
reconstructed?
The paper proposes to define nature as the aggregate of all
self-organizing objects of physics. This establishes a formal
teleology which enables us to attribute "intention" to nature
without a recourse to metaphysics: anything that turns
self-organization into self-destruction is "against nature's
intention" because it opposes the very meaning of nature.
There are several levels of self-organization in nature, the
two highest being sexuality and mind. In contrast to lower
levels of self-organization, sexuality "plots" and optimizes
the information for catalytic self-production by combining two
sets of data before realizing their inherent structures. Mind
is an even higher level of self-organization in that intentional
self-production doesn't need a physiological substrate to
represent the plotted data.
As a somatic and at the same time self-conscious being, man is
located amidst the two levels mentioned above. If you call the
synthesis of sexuality and mind erotic, it can thus be said that
the main principle of self-organization of man is erotic. Since
sexuality and mind are the highest forms of self-organization we
know of, we can call nature's potential for self-organization as
a whole the erotic energy of nature.
Tensions between the two poles of sexuality and mind have lead to
self-destructive deformations of erotic self-organization which is
the subject of Sigmund Freud's studies (Civilization and Its
Discontents) as well as Herbert Marcuse's (Eros and Civilization).
While Freud takes a pessimistic stance on whether these tensions
can be dissolved, Marcuse argues against Freud that they are induced
by social conditions, and that revolutionary change will be able
to dissolve them.
However, Marcuse's critique of Freud isn't fully consistent. An analysis
of the inconsistencies suggests postulating a cognition instinct. Given
this instinct, (revolutionary) change of social conditions could indeed
dissolve the self-destructive tendencies obvious in current societies.
Since self-destruction is "against nature's intention" (see above) and
blocks its potential for self-organization, it can be said that this
potential (nature's "erotic energy") is there to be ("intends")
"liberated" ("unblocked from self-destruction"), and therefore nature,
too, awaits the "revolution" (a social change that dissolves instincts
of self-destruction).
Causality in the Social Sciences
Zum Problem der Kausalität in den Sozialwissenschaften
(On the Problem of Causality in Social Sciences)
Usually the concept of causality is discussed in the context
of hard sciences, especially physics, which are considered to
be paradigmatic. To transfer this concept of causality to social
sciences is believed to be a merely pragmatic problem: since the
objects of social sciences are highly complex and can hardly be
isolated, social science is not as "hard" a science as physics,
although on principle it could be.
This essay argues for the other way round: that social sciences
are paradigmatic for understanding the concept of causality: we
couldn't understand the concept of causality in hard sciences
had we never experienced it in our social world in the first place.
David Hume had argued that when we refer to causality, all we really
experience is that what we call the effect will always happen after
what we call the cause. But how did we arrive at the idea of
perceiving this as a causal relationship at all, one that points
to an inner connection between cause and effect rather than the
mere temporal sequence we perceive? The answer is that we get this
idea from our social experiences.
Social reality has the form of a text, i.e. everything in it has
meaning and can and will be interpreted. Saying something is just
as meaningful as not saying anything - both these actions deliver
a message to the people around, whether intended or not. The rules
that structure social reality are the rules of meaning respectively
language; as speakers of our language we all know them implicitly.
Therefore, to make our knowledge about them explicit, the social
scientist has to only reconstruct them in their own medium - language
respectively meaning. The rules exist objectively insofar as they
actually generate the phenomena that need to be explained; they
are generative rules.
The hard scientist, however, applies the concept of causality only
by analogy to her social experiences. She may assume the fact that
the cause is always followed by the effect stems from the same inner
connection we experience when we talk of reasons in the social world,
but she'll never know. Since nature has no meaning and doesn't speak,
there are no existing rules merely to be found and reconstructed
(rules are a property of language). Instead, the hard scientist has
to construct the rules. They don't exist objectively (language is no
property of nature) but are used to subsume our discrete empiric
data; as such they are subsuming rules.
Therefore, it can be said that the hard scientist has to translate
her object data into the medium of language and rules, while the
social scientist need not do so. The act of translation moves hard
sciences farther away from their objects, introducing new
possibilities of error. In this respect, social sciences are less
error-prone as hard sciences, contrary to common belief.
However, due to their very nature of being subject to human free
action (which constitutes change and thereby history), social
rules are of less prognostic value than those in the hard sciences.
Therefore, the question which kind of science comes closer to truth
depends on the perspective. If the concept of truth is reduced to
prognostic value (a prevalent view at least in Anglo-Saxon countries
nowadays), it's certainly hard sciences. If it's not, it's probably
social sciences.
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