Prolegomena to Kant:

The Critique of Pure Reason
by Kevin Winters

 

Introduction

In the late 1800’s the philosophical world was in turmoil. Distraught with the epistemological conjectures of the current generation, the mental life of the Western world was in complete upheaval. It was at this time of great (philosophical) alarm that Immanuel Kant composed his Critique of Pure Reason.[1] A stunning work, utilized in an attempt to reconcile the views of the great men of his day, the Critique of Pure Reason stands as an exceptional introduction not only to epistemology but also to anthropology.

In the following paper I will attempt to provide a basic framework from which one can approach Kant’s Critique. I will provide a brief historical account of the ideas that brought on Kant’s desire to reconcile the ideas of his day after which I will define, and elucidate, Kant’s main terminology as found in the first part of his work. Lastly I will show how Kant’s novel approach helped him, and others, to overcome the turmoil of his day.

 

Historical Background

The 18^th century stood as a monumental time in Western thought. It was at this time that three very important schools of philosophy found their voice in striking, and sometimes inharmonious, chords. This was a period immediately following the Scientific Revolution where many of the State’s, and the Church’s, most widely held beliefs were shattered in a breathtakingly short time. Copernicus had displaced the Earth from its hitherto central location in the cosmos.[2] Galileo had proven Copernicus’ assertion and been greatly persecuted for doing so by both Church and State.[3] Kepler had further displaced the heavenly bodies by showing that they did not move in perfect circular orbits. Descartes had founded modern science, which began to quickly monopolize the ethos of that era. Lastly, in terms of science, Newton had come to show the mechanical nature of the world creating further impetus for skepticism in the area of religion to flourish in many circles.[4]

In the aftermath of the above revolutions, three schools arose in philosophy, which schools laid a foundation that many have built upon, and continue to build upon. These are, in order: empiricism, idealism and skepticism. The three main contributors, Locke, Berkely and Hume, formed the basis of the philosophical world in which Kant was born and spent his life. We will briefly review the relevant views of each.

Locke – the modern founder of the empiricist school of thought,[5] Locke continued the scientific worldview developed by Descartes. Locke viewed “perception” as “the first faculty of the mind” and, hence, “the first and simplest idea we have from reflection.”[6] Given his view of perception, Locke held that all our knowledge comes from perception. He claimed that by experience “all our knowledge is founded, and from it ultimately derives itself” and that observation “is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking.”[7] Further, Locke claims that sensible qualities (such as sounds, tastes, colors, etc.) “whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz., bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts, as I have said.”[8] Though Locke was a realist in foundation he appears to have understood, and demarcated, the difference between the object itself, with primary qualities, and our perceptions of it, through secondary qualities.

Berkeley – Bishop George Berkeley stands as the founder of the idealist school of thought. Inherent in this view is the denial of the transcendent existence of the “outside” world. In explanation, he can state, “as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse [existence] is percipi [perception]; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”[9] Thus, “it is evident that there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives.”[10] Berkeley sought, then, to reduce the existence of all things to mental conceptions, giving the perceptions no objective existence or ground outside of the given thought.[11] Whereas Locke gave an origination of our perceptions/conceptions in objective world and the impression of those objects on our senses, Berkeley absolutely denied any existence outside of the mind.[12]

Hume – the father of modern skepticism, David Hume proved to be a disturber to the Scientific Revolution and the belief structures that emerged from it. Hume proposed two types of understanding: Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. In the former can be found the “sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.”[13] Every Relation of Ideas are á priori facts in that they, by definition, are true. Of the latter, Matters of Fact, we can receive no such certainty. “The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.”[14] Hence, aside from mathematic knowledge, all else is in flux and will forever lie in uncertainty. Furthermore, the only true knowledge one may gain is á priori as all else cannot be known. In one wide sweep Hume has desolated scientific knowledge, denying the viability of the inductive process upon which nearly all scientific conclusions depend.

 

Transcendentalism

It was in the wake of the battle between the above epistemological theories that Kant found himself. Seeing validity in all three camps, but recognizing the dangerous nature of either of the three taken on its own, Kant sought to provide relief to the philosophical world by utilizing the strengths of each position in a synthesis that still allowed for genuine knowledge apart from á priori conceptions. It is in this vein that Kant wrote the Critique of Pure Reason.

Before we can illuminate how Kant’s Critique provided a basis to solve the above difficulties we stand in need of defining the concepts that he utilizes. We will deal primarily with three interrelated concepts: á priori knowledge, transcendence, and the phenomena and noumenal world.

Á Priori Knowledge – Kant defines “á priori knowledge” as “such as is absolutely so of all experiences.”[15] Thus, for Kant á priori knowledge is not necessarily that knowledge known before experience, but that knowledge, or form, which structures experience. Á priori knowledge, also termed “pure reason,” can be distinguished from á posteriori, or empirical, knowledge in that “a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judgment á priori” whereas “an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction).”[16]

Of “principles existing á priori in cognition,” Kant sees such as “the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently, prove their existence á priori.”[17] On a metaphysical plane, Kant ascertains that “this kind of knowledge must unquestionably looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis).”[18] In this, Kant admits to the need of metaphysics, at least in the context of the human mind. In other words, there must be principles the existence of which must predate our physics, must stand above our physics so that we might come to understand it. It would appear that we can equivocate Kant’s á priori conceptions with his metaphysical theory, giving us a rich anthropology upon which to base our epistemology.

Transcendence – Kant uses the term “transcendental” in the context of “all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognitions of these objects.”[19] Kant’s goal in his “transcendental critique” is “not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone off the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge á priori.”[20] Transcendent and á priori appear to be equivocal terms in Kant’s epistemology.

A common misconception is to apply the theistic understanding of “transcendence,” i.e. above understanding or application, to Kant’s transcendentalism. From the above that does not appear to be the case. With Kant, transcendence is applied to that which cannot be located in experience but permeates all experience.[21] It is transcendent, perhaps infinite, in that it cannot be segregated within our empirical knowledge but stands as the basis, the foundation, upon which experience must be built (at least within anthropological beings). Further, without transcendent and á priori knowledge experience would be impossible.

Phenomenal and Noumenal World – Kant brings in the conceptions of the phenomenal and nouemanal world in a later section of his Critique. To analyze Kant’s resolution of the epistemic problems of his time, though, they must be addressed, albeit shortly.

The phenomenal world is the world of intuition.[22] It is our phenomenal/empirical impressions and the transcendental categorizations of those impressions. The noumenal world is “an object of a non-sensuous intuition.”[23] To explicate further, a noumenal object is a thing-in-itself, an objective reality not mediated by the á priori categories. As the á priori categories are limited to sensuous/phenomenal experience,[24] we cannot possibly know (or know that we know) the nature of the noumenal (objective) world. Such stands beyond our capability, or capacity, to understand.

Kant does admit that “we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition.”[25] Thus, there might be a form of intuition that does not rely on the transcendental categories through which one could see things-as-they-are, but since we are not capable of such an intuition our knowledge must be limited to the phenomenal world.

 

The Search for Objectivity

With the above in mind, how would Kant react to the three views given above, those that dominated the intellectual life of his time? I will now address those issues, given the conceptions above:

Empiricism – it seems readily apparent that Kant agrees with much of Locke’s empirical views. He is a realist in giving the noumenal world objective reality which he allows that most (though not all, contra-Locke) of our knowledge is empirical. The point where Kant breaks from Locke’s empirical philosophy is in positing the transcendental categories that make empirical intuitions possible. There are, Kant maintains, things we know prior to knowledge, even though the term “know” might be a little ambiguous.[26]

Idealism – Kant agrees with Berkeley in that the empirical impressions we receive are in the mind, given the phenomenal world. Further, Kant would certainly agree with Berkeley on the emphasis of the mind in our knowing, especially in light of the fact that we cannot directly know the noumenal world as it is. Kant’s major disagreement would be in positing an existential reality outside of the mind. An object does not depend on a mind perceiving it for it to exist though the mind does depend on the transcendental categories to perceive of those objects in a meaningful way.

Hume – Kant’s contribution to Hume’s arguments prove the most interesting. In his exposition on time and space Kant admits that space and time are merely phenomenal conceptions and have no objective reality (at least that we know of) outside of the mind. Further, since both space and time are inherent in the process of induction and cause and reaction (both being points that Hume argues against) Kant can claim that if we restrict our appropriations of laws such as the above to the phenomenal world then objectivity can be gain; there will be a consensus among phenomenal beings as to the principles’ reality. But, Kant continues, one cannot then proceed to extend these laws to the world-as-it-is because that world, the noumenal world, is beyond our conceptions.

It would appear, then, that Kant’s theory of the á priori categories of thought helped to solve, at least at a basic level, many of the difficulties that were present in his day. He was able to synthesize the realist, idealist and skeptical views that were prevalent at his time in a way that was both aesthetically pleasing and internally powerful. More to Kant’s credit, the findings in modern neuroscience, cognitive psychology and even quantum physics appear to provide further support to many, if not all, of his claims as given above. A theory that can adequately answer the difficulties of the time, do so powerfully and in a way not repugnant to our humanity, and which can stand the test of time, as Kant’s theory has, stands as a rare and incredible theory.[27]

 

Conclusion

In the above analysis, I have attempted to provide an introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In doing so I have attempted to bring to light the philosophical considerations of his day, his general concepts that stand as the foundation of the Critique, and the success that his theory has accorded since its inception. It is my hope that this prolegomena will prove useful in helping others understand Kant’s breathtaking philosophy and come away more sympathetic to their own humanity/subjectivity.

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Berkeley, George, “The Reduction of Objects to Experiences of a Mind,” excerpts from A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), in Ernest Nagel and Richard R. Brandt, Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Epistemology (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), pp. 550-561.

 

Hume, David, “Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact,” excerpts from An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Halverson, William H., Concise Readings in Philosophy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1981), p. 31-36.

 

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, J.M.D. Meiklejohn, trans. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990).

 

Locke, John, “A Causal Theory of Perception,” excerpts from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding quoted in Ernest Nagel and Richard R. Brandt, Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic Readings in Epistemology (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), pp. 537-550.

 

Locke, John, “All Knowledge is Gained Through the Senses,” excerpts from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924) in Eichhoefer, Gerald W., Enduring Issues in Philosophy (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1995), pp. 29-37.

Outline

 

I.                    Introduction

II.                 Historical Background

a.       Locke

                                                               i.      Empiricism

b.      Berkeley

                                                               i.      Idealism

c.       Hume

                                                               i.      Skepticism

III.               Transcendentalism

a.       Á Priori

                                                               i.      The substance of “pure reason”

                                                             ii.      Basis of all experience

b.      Transcendence

                                                               i.      Mode of cognition of phenomenon

c.       Phenomenal and Noumenal World

IV.              The Search for Objectivity

a.       Á priori conceptions the basis of an objective view of reality

                                                               i.      Only applicable in phenomenal context

V.                 Conclusion