In 1994, the United States, Canada, and Mexico passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its side agreements on the environment and labor. The passage of NAFTA was a major milestone in the political history of all three countries and touted as the "greenest ever trade agreement." (Fox 49). NAFTA was one of the first international trade agreements ever to take environmental conditions into account. The Mexican-U.S. border was notorious for its growing maquiladora industry, environmental degradation, and poverty. The Clinton Administration proposed NAFTA as the ultimate solution to these increasing problems.

But has NAFTA really been successful in remedying the problems? I shall look at several problems involving the border area environment and NAFTA's role. In the first half of the paper, I will discuss the extent to which the Mexican government and its policies have affected the border environment, and the actual problems on the border and their sources. In the second half, I will focus on actual policies and agreements regarding border environmental issues pre and post- NAFTA and whether they are successful or not. It is clear that there is an imbalance in Mexican policy between economic and ecological interests. The Mexican government tends to lean on the side of economic growth and prosperity at the expense of ecological concerns. The question I seek to address is whether NAFTA has helped Mexico create a more effective environmental protection policy for the economically vital and ecologically threatened border area.

In the early 70's, like most of the developed world, Mexico became conscious of the growing environmental problems faced by nearly every nation. The first dramatic actions that the Mexican State took towards implementing environmental protection and/or regulation policies were in 1971 under the leadership of President Luis Echeverría. The first law that Mexico put on the books was the Federal Law for Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination. This law gave the Consejo Nacional de Salud (CNS) control and administrative powers over the law through the Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (SSA). Later that year, a law was passed to control air pollution (Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Contamination Originated by Dust and Smoke). In 1973, a similar law with regards to water pollution was created with stronger standards and penalties along with a clause that allowed the public to file complaints against violators (Mumme 1988, 13). In 1972, Echeverría created the Subsecretaría de Mejoramiento del Ambiente (SMA) to implement the 1971 laws and organize other governmental agencies actions within the environmental scope. In addition to implementing a national policy, Mexico took part in the UN conference on Human Environment in 1972 and even hosted a regional meeting on Environment and Development in 1971.

Under President José Portillo, environmental issues on the US-Mexican border began to get some attention. In 1976, sanitation problems on the border became bi-national, aggravated again in 1979 by an oil spill, which spurred the US and Mexico to make the first bi-national environmental agreements and policies (Mumme 15, 1988). In 1978 Portillo made plans to implement an air-quality monitoring and regulation system in Mexico City, which was plagued by ever increasing air pollution, but protests of government employees dissatisfied with the government's policies stalled this effort until 1982 under President de la Madrid's administration (Mumme 16, 24, 1988). At this time the SMA investigated and closed five plants that the public protested as being the biggest contributors to the air pollution problem in the Federal District. Perhaps most important in Portillo's administration, was the revision of the 1971 law in 1982. The revised law included new chapters on marine pollution, radioactive hazards and food contamination, along with revisions of the air, soil and water contamination policies. In addition, the revision created stiffer penalties for violations of the law, and a provision for "popular action," which allowed the public to file complaints against industry or the government (Mumme 1988, 17). Stephen Mumme says that the dramatic revision and implementation of government actions in environmental policy were mostly a reaction to public dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of the government to what they perceived as pressing environmental problems. These revisions were not spurred from within the government (17, 1988).

There was a dramatic change in the pitch and intensity of environmental policy making and publicizing when Miguel de la Madrid began his presidential campaign. He openly recognized failures of past administrations and laws and put environmental policy squarely on the presidential agenda (Mumme 18, 1988). During earlier administrations environmental laws had been passed as symbolic measures, to quell the demands of the Mexican public. The environment remained as low priority on the list of administrative concerns within the Mexican government. de la Madrid became a national spokesman for the environment and appealed to the Mexican population that action must be taken. His three goals for improving the state of the environmental policy in Mexico included developing a popular movement, strengthening administrative and legal structures in the environmental sphere, and improving regulation and enforcement (Mumme 18, 1988). De la Madrid reorganized the government's environmental regulation agencies and formed the Secretaría de Desarollo Urbano y Ecología (SEDUE). He gave the body more authority over in environmental matters than ever before, and he strengthened the sanctions and standards in Mexican environmental law (Mumme 127, 1992).

De la Madrid also effectively created a popular environmental movement. To achieve this he sponsored local public meetings and a four-day Congress on the Environment to educate and inform the public and stimulate organization. Some of the groups that emerged from de la Madrid’s efforts included the Movimiento Ecologista Mexicano (MEM), the Alianza Ecologista (AE), and Pacto de Ecologistas (Pacto), each of which created nationwide chapters (Mumme 127, 1992). According to Mumme, de la Madrid and more specifically Carlos Salinas, legitimized the public participation in environmental issues and policy in a "preemptive reform strategy," which Mumme describes as "aimed at diverting or co-opting potential threats to the political system arising from political mobilization" (125, 1992). There are two components of this "preemptive reform," the substantive, which provides resources to potential critics, and the organizational, which provides forms of participation for potential dissenters (Mumme 125, 1992). If Mexican environmental interest groups were informed, supported and created by the government, they would be dependent on the government for further information and support. In this manner the government could maintain control over a potentially volatile, mobilized sector of society. In a sense, by co-opting the environmental movement, the Mexican government could relieve itself of the pressure of a dissatisfied and mobilized public (Mumme 125, 1992).

The Salinas administration increased regulation and enforcement of environmental law as a reaction to the mobilized public that was becoming increasingly critical of the government's lack of action (Mumme 131, 1992). Much of the public was concerned about air pollution in Mexico City, and most of the reforms of policy were directed specifically to the Federal District's problems. Starting in 1988, Salinas implemented new regulations on industrial and vehicular emissions and hazardous waste management and disposal in Mexico City (Mumme 132, 1992). Under Salinas, SEDUE was granted more authority, and was able to make some government-industry agreements on environmental regulations. Most of these agreements are voluntary and SEDUE does not consider itself a "police agency" concerning environmental law violations (Mumme 25, 1988). Alicia Barcena, a former Director of the Subsecretary of Ecology in SEDUE said of the organization:

SEDUE cannot force industry to comply with their proposed measures in these agreements.

Finally in 1988, the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection was passed and included comprehensive statements regarding water, air, hazardous waste, pesticides, and industrial chemicals (Report on Environmental Issues, 25). The increased regulation and policy reform seemed to be becoming productive in many cases, but the economic crisis in the 80's forced the government to cut funding to SEDUE and other environmental projects just as they were getting on their feet (Mumme 133, 1992). Salinas then placed much of the responsibility of environmental protection on the public, in the form of community clean-ups or educational fairs. But these public measures generally do not provide protection from abuses of the environment by large industry because they lack legal authority (Mumme 134, 1992).

Does this mean that environmental policy was only implemented to quiet the masses and maintain executive legitimacy, or was it truly a move towards "greener" politics? The environmental interest groups, organized and supported by the government were not as co-opted as the government had hoped to make them (Mumme 128, 1992). Groups like Grupo de los 100, a group of academics and artists concerned with environmental problems, continually criticized government policies and actions in environmental reform. And for example, the protests in Vera Cruz over the Laguna Verde Nuclear Plant, in which the Grupo de los 100, Las Madres and other environmental groups were involved were clearly in direct opposition and critical of the government's stance (Mumme 128, 1992).

I think that to a certain extent the Mexican government implemented environmental reforms and laws due to pressure from the international community, such as the UN, and discontent within the Mexican public. The government could not ignore those factors, but the reforms and laws were non-specific and too under-funded to make a real difference. It is important to consider that for most of the presidents in this era, the prime objective was to stimulate the economy through free market policy. Favoring ecological concerns over economic development was not likely. In effect "environmental regulation is hostage to economic recovery." (Mumme 138, 1992) There is a general public concern for the environment, but it is nearly always secondary to the government's policy of supporting economic development and prosperity. This is key in looking at policies in the border region.

There is a constant struggle to achieve economic development through the industrial maquiladora sector on the border, and lack of regulation and enforcement has led to an increase in environmental degradation and public health dangers. The Mexican government would not condone the loss of economic profit for the sake of a few lower class citizens who suffer from chemical pollution, poor working conditions, and environmental degradation. The Mexican citizens on the border are generally poor and not mobilized in environmental groups or protests, and it is easy for the government to turn their eyes away from the environmental problems of the area. This could be a case of "environmental racism," or "discrimination" which is defined by Reverend Benjamin Chavis as:

And several studies have shown that it is "primarily low income communities of color that are often targeted for industrial and toxic waste disposal sites (Di Chiro 302)." In Mexico, race is determined in many cases by social status and/or class. The lower class citizens of the border region are suffering from a case of "environmental discrimination," and the Mexican government deliberately looks the other way as maquiladoras illegally dump waste. But has the implementation of NAFTA and the Side Agreements on the Environment, perhaps forced Mexico to take another look and take action in the area?

High levels of industry and a high level of poverty characterize the U.S.-Mexican border region. These two factors combined with an ineffective management system, contribute to one of the worst incidences of environmental destruction in both the US and Mexico. Pollution in both countries is due primarily to industrial production.

Since the implementation of the maquiladora program in the 60's, industrialization on the border has been increasing. And since 1994, and the adoption of NAFTA, the maquiladora industry has grown many times over. In the first 21 months after NAFTA was passed, there was a 20% increase in the numbers of maquila workers, and exports from maquilas to the U.S. also increased by 20%. The Mexican government approved 258 permits to companies to operate maquilas in Mexico, most of which concentrate on the border (Public Citizen 5). According to a 1996 Public Citizen report, there are several reasons for this. Locating on the border is the best way for companies to take advantage of the protection of industry by NAFTA; it is also easier and cheaper to make exports from border factories to the U.S because access to highways and transport is readily available. Companies on the border escape U.S. regulations, and are also free from intense surveillance by the Mexican government (7). The National Council of Environmental Industrial Businessmen in Mexico admits this as well: "inspection of the maquiladora industry is virtually non-existent…which is a great environmental problem for Mexico," (qtd. in Public Citizen 13). There are four main areas in which industrial pollution and/or overuse has led to environmental destruction; hazardous waste, air pollution, water pollution and shortage, and issues in public health and infrastructure.

Mexico's law regarding the production and disposal of hazardous industrial waste by maquiladoras states that any waste produced must be returned to the country of origin for disposal. But many U.S. companies with maquiladoras on the border are not complying with that law. According to Public Citizen, only about 54% of waste generated is returned to the U.S. for disposal (Public Citizen 12). Only 70 of 352 industries reported properly disposing of hazardous waste (Public Citizen 13). What happened to the rest? Perhaps a quarter was disposed of in Mexico through legal means and a quarter remains unaccounted for. This means illegal disposal of these materials by U.S. companies is occurring regularly, in Mexico, in local communities near the maquiladora from where it was produced (Public Citizen 12).

Does the Mexican government not care about the illegal and harmful disposal of hazardous materials? Mexican Ecology Commission President Oscar Canton Zetina said, "each year seven million tons of toxic wastes are, without control, illegally dumped in drains and marine waters. Only one percent are under surveillance in the country." (qtd. in Public Citizen 13). I think part of the problem resides in the fact that the Mexican government has cut funding for environmental regulatory programs, such as HAZTRACKS, a bi-national tracking system for hazardous wastes, making regulation and emergency actions effectively more difficult, if not impossible.

Illegal dumping of hazardous materials directly on the ground, as was the case in Tijuana at the Alco Pacifico smelter, where 3 million pounds of industrial waste full of lead, arsenic and cadmium were found near a factory shut down by the Mexican government, is just one problem (Public Citizen 16). There is also a lack of pre-treatment of industrial wastewater (Public Citizen 13). This wastewater is easily rinsed down the drain, contaminating drinking water that is to be treated by local municipal treatment plants. Public treatment plants aren't equipped to deal with the heavy metals found in industrial waste, which are hazardous to human health. The inadvertent presence of such materials can wear down the treatment systems or create extremely dangerous circumstances, as was the case in the explosion of the sewer system in Guadalajara in 1992, due to a Pemex gas pipe leak (Public Citizen 16). In 1994, after the explosion, the International Boundary and Water Commission set up a warning device in Nogales to detect hazardous materials in waste before moving through the plant, and the alarm literally goes off everyday (Public Citizen 16). There is also much concern over the disposal of nuclear waste, especially at the Sierra Blanca site in Texas, which is near a fault line and is within miles of the water drainage system for the West Texan Bolson, the aquifer that supplies El Paso/Ciudad Juarez with drinking water (Public Citizen 15).

Emissions from maquiladoras on the Mexican side of the border, and heavy, slow traffic at border crossings have created a crisis in regards to the quality of the air in many of the metropolitan areas of the border region. A study done in 1995 by Harvard, Brigham Young University and the American Cancer Society found that airborne particles were killing people at an increased rate in cities that met EPA regulations for air quality, but border cities like El Paso/Ciudad Juarez do not meet EPA standards for air pollution (Public Citizen 43). A toxic release study done by the EPA identified industries which produce high levels of air pollutants harmful to people and the environment, and two of the worst culprits, chemical production and electronic production, are two of the most prevalent industries located on the border (Public Citizen 43). The President of the American Lung Association, Alfred Munzer, M.D. said of air pollution: "A lot of people still think of air pollution as more a nuisance than a threat…but pollution is not merely dangerous, but deadly." (Public Citizen 42). Clearly the pollution problem is grave, not only is it contributing to atmospheric phenomena such as the greenhouse effect or acid rain, but people are becoming fatally affected as well. In 1993, before NAFTA was adopted, it was estimated that 58% of the days of the year had unhealthy levels of ozone. In 1995, just two years later it had increased to 75% and so far there have been no efforts to improve the situation, only monitor (Public Citizen 44).

The fact that pollution has increased since NAFTA points to either an extreme increase in production or a failure in management systems, I propose that it is result of both. The second biggest factor contributing to air pollution is traffic at the border crossings. About 70% of exports from maquiladoras on the Mexican side of the border are trucked into the US, and long lines of idling cars at border crossings create high concentrations of vehicle CO₂ emissions (Public Citizen 45).

A coal burning power plant in Coahuila, Carbon II, emits huge quantities of sulfur dioxide, today two times the amount allowed in 1970, while it provided only 10% of Mexico's electrical supply (Public Citizen 47). During the NAFTA debates in 1993, there was a struggle over the fate of the Carbon II plant. Many environmentalists claimed that the emissions would reduce visibility by 60% and pollute the air above Big Bend National Park, Maderas del Carmen and the Canyon de Santa Elena, all protected wildlife areas (Public Citizen 47). But the Mexican government denied any effect on the areas. In fact Mexico refused money from the US to install scrubbers in the Carbon II plant, which would reduce the emissions by 60% (Public Citizen 47). Why on earth would the Mexican government flat out refuse to acknowledge and remedy an environmentally hazardous situation? It turns out that the government was planning on privatizing the plant and didn't want to have to reduce the selling price because they had made it less lucrative to investors (Public Citizen 47). This is an obvious example of the Mexican government favoring economic development over ecological concerns. The plant was not necessarily valuable in providing energy to Mexicans, but it was a source of economic improvement through foreign investment. As has been the case in previous instances, the Mexican government usually falls on the side of economics, rather than ecology.

Water issues are also becoming an increasing problem along the border. Not only are the precious few water sources in a near-desert climate being contaminated with toxic waste and sewage, but many of the water resources of the area are also running dry, making desertification increasingly widespread in the area. In Ciudad Juarez, raw sewage is dumped into the Rio Grande; in 1993 it was 55 million gallons daily (Public Citizen 30). Many towns on the border have no waste treatment plants, or old plants are overworked due to the large increase in the population in the last few years of maquiladora growth. In addition many people on the border live in poverty, in colonias and slums, taking water from the contaminated sources with no treatment (Public Citizen 32). The contamination of the river leads to increased rates of contraction of infectious diseases, such as hepatitis-A, typhoid and cholera, borne by pathogens in feces or bacteria present in deoxygenated water. The increased level of nitrates and phosphates dumped into the river creates an overabundance of plant growth, which kills fish and produces bacteria in a low oxygen system (Public Citizen 30).

Since much of the border region is in a desert climate, water is a rare and precious resource. Overuse is becoming a big problem in metropolitan areas, such as EL Paso/Ciudad Juarez, which share an aquifer, the Hueco Bolson, the largest source of groundwater used for drinking. The level of the aquifer is approaching levels susceptible to salinization and is being depleted faster than it can be replenished naturally. In a fresh water aquifer, there are two layers of water. The top layer, fresh water, lies on top of a layer of water full of minerals such as sodium, which make the water "salty." If the layer of fresh water is pumped out and used faster than rainwater can replenish the level of fresh water in the aquifer, the salty water will rise to the surface and make agriculture on the land impossible. Mexican environmental attorney, Alberto Szekeley told the International Boundary and Water Commission:

In 1995, a water shortage forced Mexico to appeal to the state of Texas for a loan of water distribution allocations, but Governor George W. Bush denied the request (Public Citizen 37). There is not enough water and it is being poorly managed. The border faces severe consequences if the situation does not change. The water dispute crosses the border, neither the U.S. nor Mexico are safe, since they share the same local resources. Lack of water is leading people to take desperate measures. There have been instances where wastewater has been used to irrigate crops, which then become contaminated (Public Citizen 30). NAFTA has only aggravated this problem by increasing the contamination of water sources and creating a situation of dramatic increase in water use due to the population growth.

The maquiladora industry has concentrated on the border and has contributed to an environmental crisis. The scale of the problem has only increased since the passage of NAFTA. But the pollution is not only harmful to the environment; poor living and working conditions and environmental hazards in border communities have spurred an increase in disease and human suffering. As mentioned before, many of the border communities have little or no public infrastructure. No water treatment systems, plumbing, electricity or health care are the norm in many communities, on both sides of the border. This lack of basic amenities has increased rates of disease in the region to higher than the respective national averages. In Taumalipas, Mexico the rate of Hepatitis is 2.7 times the average and the rate of intestinal diseases is 1.5 times the average, and by age 35 85-90% of adults have Hepatitis-A (Public Citizen 29, 31).

Another factor aggravating the problem is the high rate of population growth in the area. Maquiladoras are providing more jobs and more people are migrating to the border zone to work. But despite the growing population, the infrastructure to support such a population has never been built. People are crowding into colonias, squatter communities on the U.S. side, and into Mexican border cities with no funding to build the appropriate infrastructure to support such a population.

In the Brownsville/Matamoros region an incidence of babies born with Neural Tube Birth Defects was possibly correlated with an increase in the production in maquiladoras (Public Citizen 23-24). Between the 1987 and 1992 in the state of Taumalipas, the rate of babies born with defects rose from 3 in 10,000 to 15 in 10,000 (Public Citizen 21). In samples of tissue from babies born with defects, high levels of toxins like DDT, Lindane, and phenylglyoxllic acid (used in the manufacture of plastics) were found in the blood (Public Citizen 23). Although there is no data pointing directly to the correlation of the defects and the maquiladoras, it seems likely, and several doctors believed it to be linked, because many of the mothers were exposed to toxins in the workplace (Public Citizen 23, 25).

The La Paz Agreement had five annexes that addressed environmental and pollution problems. Annex 1 provided for construction of wastewater treatment plants in the Tijuana/San Diego area. Annex 2 dealt with the development of the transboundary Inland Joint Response Team and taking action in the case of a hazardous waste emergency. Annex 3 addressed problems of transport of hazardous materials over the border. Annex 4 implemented measures to make copper smelters in various states on the border to comply with emission standards. And Annex 5 addressed the establishment of air quality monitoring, inventory and analysis in urban areas on the border (Rich 2).

The La Paz Agreement was a big step for Mexico in dealing with environmental issues on an international scale, but it was not necessarily successful at fighting pollution on the border (Rich 2). The agreement did not address issues that were important to border communities. For example, it neglected to mention the growing water shortage, lack of public infrastructure, and lack of financial resources to support environmental programs, enforcement and management. It also failed to deal with U.S. companies that were illegally dumping hazardous materials in Mexico rather than shipping them over the border to be treated (Rich 2).

In the early 90's, environmentalists and border communities took the opportunity to demand for a better-planned border environmental management agreement. In 1991 a draft of the Integrated Border Environmental Plan was presented to the public, which quickly criticized its inefficiencies and problems, and a new draft was proposed and accepted in 1992 (Rich 26). This border plan had four goals in order to protect the border environment and human health. In the NAFTA Report on Environmental Issues they are as follows;

1. To strengthen enforcement of existing environmental protection laws,
2. Reduce pollution and improve the quality of the area through new initiatives,
3. To increase cooperative planning, training and education, and
4. to improve understanding of the border environment (47).

In 1994, NAFTA was passed, and with it the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which is an international agreement between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement was also created to address environmental issues specific to the border between the U.S. and Mexico. The combination of these three agreements created a complex system for enforcement and management of environmental issues between the U.S. and Mexico, but has it proved to be the "greenest ever trade agreement" regarding real life environmental issues?

The primary organization for addressing environmental concerns within the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) is the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC is a tri-national body that will "foster environmental cooperation and avoid or settle environmental disputes between the countries of North America." (Report on Environmental Issues 16). The primary goals of the CEC as an environmental management body for NAFTA are:

1. To foster cooperative development;
2. Improvement of environmental protection policies;
3. Improvement of enforcement of environmental protection laws within the member countries;
4. To assure access by the general public to environmental information and policies;
5. To assure that new projects fully investigate the environmental impact and its transboundary effects;
6. To foster the establishment of administration systems within NAFTA member countries to allow for redressing of adverse transboundary environmental impacts (Report on the Environment 17-18).

The CEC is made up of three smaller bodies; the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee. The environmental ministers from each of the three member countries head the Council; and its primary functions are as a forum for discussion, to study and develop recommendations on transboundary environmental issues, and the settlement of environmental disputes between the member countries (Report on the Environment 17). An Executive Director heads the Secretariat and its primary jobs are to propose the program and budget for the CEC each year, and to prepare reports on the CEC's activities of the previous year (Report on the Environment 18). The third section of the CEC is the Joint Public Advisory Committee, made of 5 members of the public from each member country. The Committee's functions are to assure that the public is informed about and has access to CEC decisions and reports, advise the Council and Secretariat on possible future discussions of policy, and provide information to the above bodies of the CEC (Public Citizen 57).

At the first annual meeting of the CEC in Oaxaca, Mexico, in 1995, the CEC created a list of goals for the year. Those goals included were:

1. Reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the implementation of "green" technology and conservation;
2. Develop an effective management strategy for bioaccumulative pollutants (including DDT, lead and other toxins, which are still in use in Mexico);
3. Develop a North American Pollutant Release Inventory, which would combine the databases of the three NAFTA members;
4. Protect wildlife habitat and to produce "ecoregion" maps that would delineate protected, endangered and urban areas (Public Citizen 55).

According to Public Citizen's 1996 report on NAFTA, the CEC did not accomplish much in the way of these goals; I shall explore the reasons for this later.

Also in 1995 the CEC began its first investigation of an environmental problem. At the Silva Reservoir, in Guanajuanato, Mexico, 20,000-40,000 migratory birds were found dead. The Grupo de los 100, the Mexican center for Environmental Law and the National Audubon Society petitioned the CEC to investigate and address the problem (Public Citizen 60). Upon investigation the CEC found that residents of the area were sick, and the Mexican National Water Commission admitted to a one time dumping of the pesticide endosulfan. The Grupo de los 100 suspected chromium pollution. Chromium was heavily used nearby in the tanning industry, whereas endosulfan was not used in the area (Public Citizen 60). The primary issue at stake and on which the petition was based, was whether the Mexican government was enforcing its current environmental laws, or if the laws were being "overlooked" to protect the much-needed industry. Since the Mexican government had previously made an industry-government agreement about pollution regulation in the area, the Turbio Basin Initiative, the CEC did not address the issue of whether laws were being broken or if industry was responsible for the pollution (Public Citizen 61). The final CEC report stated that the bird kill was due to botulism. Botulism is present in eutrophic lakes, where a surplus of nitrates in the water, from sewage or fertilizer, lead to an explosion of plant life, notably algae, which removes oxygen from the water, allowing anaerobic bacteria such as the one that causes botulism to proliferate. The CEC gave four recommendations for dealing with the situation in the future. These included:

1. Monitoring deaths and planning for an emergency response strategy;
2. Draining of the lake if die-off occurred again;
3. Developing of alternative sites to keep the birds off the Silva Reservoir;
4. Altering the topography to make the area less susceptible to botulism (Public Citizen 60).

But the CEC report did nothing to remedy the situation, punish the offenders, or help create new policy in Mexico for dealing with the pollution, whether it came from industry or sewage (Public Citizen 60). The question in response to this is why? Why did the CEC not remedy the problem? What is preventing the CEC from making a real change?

Later that year, in October, the executive branch of the Mexican government tried to waive the requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement from new foreign investment in Mexico. Again, the Grupo de los 100 filed a petition to the CEC to investigate the problem. Not surprisingly, the crux of the problem, again, was whether Mexico was failing to enforce its environmental laws to favor industry. In this case it was foreign investment at stake, but the issues was the same, and it is in direct contradiction of the General Ecology Law of 1988 and the NAAEC policies (Public Citizen 64).

These examples again bring us to the question of whether Mexico's domestic and international environmental laws and policies are just symbolic, or meant to accomplish something in the protection of the environment. As the case was in each of these instances, Mexico had laws to protect the environment, but chose to look the other way and directly violate the environmental agreement to favor the well being of industry in Mexico. It is a hard balance to strike, one each country must deal with, but the CEC and NAAEC should be able to provide a solution. A body that regulates and requires a government to adhere to its own policies, without infringing upon its sovereignty could be very effective in maintaining a high standard of environmental protection. So why has the environmental degradation on the U.S.-Mexican border continued? What is it that the CEC is not doing to improve the conditions of the highly industrialized and polluted border region?

In addition to the NAAEC and CEC, NAFTA provided for the U.S. Mexican Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, which created two new bi-national institutions to remedy and manage environmental problems and improvements specific to the border region. These two organizations are the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank).

The BECC is based in Ciudad Juarez, and is made up of a Board of Directors, Staff and Advisory Council, all of which are run by citizens of both countries. The BECC is supposed to help states and border communities create solutions to their environmental and infrastructural problems, but does not propose the projects itself (Report on the Environment 23). BECC meetings must meet a public access requirement and meets several times a year (Public Citizen 76). The BECC approves projects for financing by the NADBank that any non-governmental organization or border community submits, and it provides advice and consultation for these projects. For projects to be approved they must meet several criteria. The project developers must show an ability to be able to pay back the NADBank and/or partially finance their project (Public Citizen 70). A project that has transboundary effects must show the ability to "achieve a high level of environmental protection" for the shared area, and submit an environmental assessment of the project (Report on Environmental Issues 23).

The NADBank, in San Antonio, is the financing body for the U.S. Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement. The NADBank Board of Directors includes the US Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of State and an EPA administrator, the Mexican Secretaries of Finance, Foreign Trade and SEDESOL (Public Citizen 75). The NADBank also has a bi-national staff, which provides projects with oversight and financial advice (Public Citizen 76). Unlike the BECC, the NADBank has no public access requirement and meets as often as needed to discuss financing of BECC projects. The NADBank funds only BECC approved projects (Public Citizen 69). The NAFTA Report on Environmental Issues states that the NADBank itself, from funds from both the Mexican and U.S governments, should be able to provide up to $3 billion for environmental projects on the border (24). But the funds are meant to be supplementary to other sources of money from "other institutions," such as the World Bank and other private investors (Public Citizen 71). Creating a total of near $7-8 billion available for improvements in the border area over the next decade (Report on Environmental Issues 24).

In the first two years after NAFTA and the implementation of the new Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, several projects went to the BECC to be reviewed and approved for funding, any only a few were certified for funding. Included in the reviewed projects was a project for wastewater treatment and reuse in agriculture in Ensenada, Baja California, an $8 million project that was approved. Another wastewater treatment plant project in Ciudad Juarez was postponed for certification because the public could not afford the loan or come up with equity financing on their own. A treatment plant for the FINSA industrial waste was not certified either, because it "lacked public participation, and environmental impact statement, a user fee study and had no discharge permit." (Public Citizen 79).

Again there are inconsistencies and complications within the system, which prevent effective environmental improvements and management. In the next section I will discuss what it is about each of these institutions that prevent a truly effective bi-national environmental protection plan and why the environmental problems on the border have not improved since the passage of the much-touted NAFTA and its environmental side agreements.

Mexico has signed a few international trade agreements in the last 20 years, and to remedy environmental problems on the border stemming from that free trade, they have passed numerous transboundary agreements. The La Paz Agreement in 1983 was the first agreement of that sort, and being the first was a sort of test run. Not everything worked and not many problems were remedied. Then in 1991-92 the new Integrated Border Plan was introduced to try to correct and add to the provisions made by the La Paz Agreement. The plan presented to the public in 1991 was revised due to public criticism of its inadequacies. According to Jan Gilbreath Rich the public's main criticisms were its lack of financing, poor prioritizing of projects, failure to even describe the projects to be accomplished, and lack of detail in addressing the actual statistics of the area (4). Shortly thereafter the NAFTA debates began, and conservationists on both sides of the border pushed for an environmental agreement to protect border environments from increasing production due to the easing of trade restrictions between Mexico and the U.S.

We have already seen how the institutions and environmental organizations associated with NAFTA work, but are they helping? I believe that the environmental agreements and organizations have the potential to make a difference in the border region, but there are some inherent, inevitable flaws in the institutions that are supposed to remedy the problems, and failures in the planning and foresight of the effects of NAFTA on the border.

Since NAFTA was implemented in 1994, the population and production on the border has only increased, which has led to an inevitable increase in environmental degradation and public health concerns.

The Clinton Administration even admitted that an increase in maquildora industry would create a bigger problem, leading to more environmental destruction and degradation of the quality of life on the border (Public Citizen 3). In addition, there were many promises that the economic provisions of NAFTA would indeed reduce the negative effects on the border environment by improving the Mexican economy, allowing for more money to be spent on environmental protection and clean-up projects (Public Citizen iii). But that has not proved to be true, pointing to a lack of accurate forethought. If problems on the border have only increased since NAFTA, the organizations must work twice as hard to make changes, follow through with improvements, clean-ups, and be strong enough to enforce environmental protection policies on the growing number of polluting industries. But that is precisely the problem; the NAFTA agreements and institutions are not strong enough to make those changes.

The CEC's main problem in making effective change in policies along the border is the fact that it cannot legally enforce its decisions and suggestions for policy improvement, because it would infringe upon the sovereignty of the national government with which it is dealing (Public Citizen viii). According to the 1996 Public Citizen report the CEC itself claims that it has no enforcement power other than using public reactions and complaints to pressure the government in question, and is not a police organization, "If the report makes recommendations and Mexico doesn't follow, we can't do anything." Said the CEC spokesperson, Rachel Vincent (qtd. in Public Citizen 61). In the 1995 Oaxaca goals, the CEC didn't get much accomplished either because it had spread its efforts over too wide an area, they needed to have "fewer more specific goals" and limit their scope (Public Citizen viii). There have also been complaints about the public access to CEC for making a petition or just getting the results of an investigation that the CEC made (Public Citizen ix). If it is difficult for petitions to be made, or for the public to get a hold of the results that may affect them, the CEC will become a useless body, precisely because it relies on public and NGO petitions to make investigations (Public Citizen 65). Public Citizen also cites no authority to independently investigate problems without petition from a public source, uncertainty about funding, and conflicts of interest as other problems that contribute to the difficulties (Public Citizen ix).

There are several problems with the BECC and NADBank in becoming able to effect positive change along the U.S.- Mexican border. The BECC tends to only fund certain projects regarding water and waste issues, projects in another sector are not likely to get approved nor funded (Public Citizen xi). The BECC also tried to limit public access to meetings (Public Citizen 76). Project proposals must also show an ability to pay back the NADBank loans to be approved for financing. This excludes some of the poorest areas on the border, where environmental infrastructure is needed most, from ever getting funding to help improve the situation (Public Citizen xi). How will effective change be wrought when only a very few cases get heard and even fewer approved? The NADBank itself is also only authorized to fund BECC approved projects with loans (Public Citizen xi). There are no grants and many valid and useful projects will never get funded. In the first two years since NAFTA was signed, there were no projects funded at all, and the planned joint funding of the bank by both the U.S. and Mexico failed (Public Citizen 70-71). Mexico underwent a serious economic collapse in 1994, the Federal budget was cut by 10%, and Mexico was not able to provide all the promised funding to the bank (Public Citizen 9). The U.S. Congress in extended debates also prevented the planned U.S. contribution to the Bank from arriving (Public Citizen 70). Loans from the World Bank were also reduced (Public Citizen xi). If the bank lacks its funds, how can it even start to finance projects to make improvements in environmental infrastructure on the border?

Mexico never had a very strong environmental policy for the border and consequently has relied on agreements such as NAFTA and the La Paz agreement to enforce regulation and effect change in the area. In addition Mexico's, numerous financial collapses have led to decreasing amounts of funding for environmental organizations and projects, within and without NAFTA and Mexico's own institutions. Mexico is waging a constant battle between increasing economic development and prosperity at the expense of the quality of environmental law, regulation and protection. NAFTA seemed to hold the key to an effective way to manage both. Mexico thought it could benefit from free trade, foreign investment in its industries and fewer restrictions on development of an international scale economy; at the same time be involved in international organizations sworn to protect the fragile environment of the border and beyond. But the flaws of NAFTA institutions and lack of accurate foresight on the effects on the border region has led to little improvement and increasing problems on the border.

Public Citizen gives a series of recommendations for the improvement and amelioration of the problems with NAFTA as a method of environmental protection and management. These are:

1. No expansion of NAFTA into the Caribbean, South or Central America;
2. Objective measurement of the real effects of NAFTA on the environment, and withdrawal or renegotiation if the conditions worsen;
3. A new type of agreement between North American countries that is responsive to the needs of the environment and citizens therewithin;
4. Help remedy the problems that NAFTA has caused by: providing standing in U.S. courts for citizens of NAFTA members in citizen suits, a transaction tax on North American Trade, and an Environmental and Health Grant Program for the poorest communities on the border (Public Citizen xiv-xv).

But perhaps NAFTA is just another step on the ladder towards economic prosperity and a healthy environment for Mexico. It certainly has taken measures to try to insure better management of the environment on the border, but as with all international agreements, there is disagreement and there are legal complications. Hopefully NAFTA will be reviewed, its institutions revised and improved, and will help lead Mexico to a higher level of environmental management and much needed economic prosperity.