I. Introduction

This paper will argue that Canadian and British parties which favour moderate policies tend to attract a larger support base. As a result, the parties in government in these two countries (British New Labour and Canadian Liberal) tend to take a "middle-of-the-road" position on particular issues in order not to upset their electoral success. In contrast, a party that governs more rigidly according to its principles tend get penalized by being marginalized at elections, for it tends to alienates voters. The time period that I will be focusing on will from 1961 and to 1997.

In analyzing the two Canadian parties, the Liberals and New Democratic Party, I will compare each party's policy on foreign and multinational corporations (MNC). Americanization of Canadian industries and MNCs have often heatedly debated issues in the House of Commons during the 1960s and 1970s, for many politicians feared it would erode Canada's national interests. Since the NDP's creation in 1961, it has advocated policies which are closely linked to its socialist ideology; consequently, it tends to do poorly at elections because Canadian voters tend to avoid its more radical platforms. However, Liberal economic policies since the 1960s have often been based on public consensus, compromise, and more importantly, policies that don't offend to big business, yet not alienating to workers. As a result, the Liberals' thrive on appeasing voters; as a result, it has often attracted a larger, more diverse support at elections than the NDP.

In examining Britain's two parties, the Conservative Party and the New Labour Party, will compare each party's policy on European integration, also known as the EEC. The Common Market is a unique issue in that Britain's two parties have often debated as to whether a single European market would erode British nationalism; hence, New Labour and Conservative parties that were government during the 1960s through to the 1970s have often used this issue to criticize their opposition parties in order to gain more electoral support.

II. British Labour and Conservatives on European Integration

European integration is one of the major policies in which the British New Labour Party has compromised in order to gain electoral success. Political issues after World War II in Europe were exclusively based on economic recuperation; as a result, integration was an often-debated topic among parties. Whereas Britain's other two main parties, the Liberal-Democrats and the Conservatives position on integration were consistently pro-European, Labour's stance for much of the 1950s and 1960s was based on hostility and suspicion (Daniels 1998: 72). Hence, Labour abided by a foreign and defence policy that was "guided by working class solidarity, an aversion to power politics, a deep commitment to disarmament, opposition to imperialism, a dislike of cooperation with capitalist powers" (Aughey 1996: 37). When Britain first applied for membership into the European Common market in 1961, Labour, then in opposition, abstained from the House of Commons vote, for they feared that British membership into the European Economic Community (EEC), which was dominated by right-wing parties, would obstruct its attempts to carry through socialist policies in Britain (Daniels 1998: 73).

However, Labour revised its policy towards integration in 1983, for it realized that it was an issue in which it was losing a high percentage of votes to the the Conservative and Liberal-Democratic parties. The party's defeat in the 1983 elections humiliated Labour, for it garnered the lowest votes in its party's history. As a result, after 1983 Labour made a sharp break from its old Labour programme (Daniel 1998: 73). More significantly, its policy of withdrawing from the EEC was the first to be discarded, for it not only appeared negative and unrealistic to the British voters, it also provided the Conservatives an easy target to criticize the Labour platform during the election campaign (Daniel 1998: 74). Furthermore, its anti-EEC stance also gave Labour an image which was out of touch with the voters and dominated by the hardline socialists (Daniels 1998: 79). Thus, between 1983 and 1987, Labour gradually shifted away from outright rejection of Britains' EEC membership towards acceptance that early withdrawal was not a "viable policy platform" which was agreeable to most voters (Daniels 1998: 74).

Further, as the 1980s progressed, the British and European economies continued to expand and prosper as a result of its Common Market; accordingly, Labour eventually came to the conclusion that withdrawal from the EEC not only seemed impractical, it would most likely thwart its chances at winning future elections (Daniels 1998: 78). Hence, the party made an even sharper break in its philosophy, for it finally accepted EEC membership in its 1987 Labour Manifesto. (Aughey 1996: 34). When the party in 1987 gained favourable results in the elections, it shifted some of its foreign policies even closer to the ideological centre (Baker 1993: 428). In 1990, Labour and the Conservatives' foreign policies were quite consistent with each other's; most notable was that both favoured the enlargement of the EEC (Young, 153).

The Labour Party's purpose for its "europeanization" had three main purposes, and all three compromised the Labour doctrine for more votes. First, it was mainly a response to its long exclusion from national office; thus, pro-European integration was part of its public relations program to transform the Labour party into a "modern, credible party, fit to govern" in order to widen the party's electoral appeal (Daniels 1998: 77). The second purpose was that it wanted to seek revenge on the Conservatives for Labour's humiliation in the 1983 election. Thus, when Margaret Thatcher's new Tory government in the mid-1980s shifted away from its pro-integration became more anti-European, Labour took advantage of its new official pro-European position to criticize the Conservative policies (Daniels 1998: 77). Finally, the Labour Party decided to a adopt a pro-EEC doctrine because it needed to satisfy the demands of the British trade unions, which had also changed their views on integration. Trade unions since the 1980s had realized that effective economic strategies in an era of globalization "required coordination at a transnational level" (Young 1997: 40). Thus, in order not to alienate its largest and most dependable support base, Labour compromised in joining the EEC (Baker 1993: 430).

However, in shifting away from its socialist roots, Labour was truly contradicting its principles. In 1979, the party was so rigid in its anti-Europeanism that a faction of dissidents who disagreed with its anti-EEC policy separated from Labour and formed their own party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Yet Labour refused to modify its hardline position and did nothing to prevent the break (Young 1997: 145). Nonetheless, eight years later, after three consecutive failed elections, Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, made a U-turn in his policy in 1987 and alienated his "hard left" socialist members, those who refused to accept integration by marginalizing their influence in party decision-making (Daniels 1998: 77). Instead, in order to compete with the Tories by widening the party's appeal, Kinnock collaborated with the "soft left," who were mostly comprised of trade unions and small businesses (Daniels 1998: 77).

In contrast to the Labour strategy of maintaining policies close to the centre, and not alienating voters with provoking issues, the Conservatives in the 1990s did just the opposite, for they became increasingly anti-integration and anti-EEC. The ultimate consequence was that it disoriented a majority of its supporters, which culminated, with a host of other factors, to its lost in the 1997 election to the "New" Labour Party. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, the Tory government followed a sceptical conception of the EEC's political and economic direction, and as a result, it was fighting a predominately negative campaign in both the British and European elections (Daniels 1998: 77). The Thatcher-led Conservative government feared that a single European market was going to impede its implementation of conservative policies (Aughey 1996: 152).

Nevertheless, in 1997, Tony Blair's New Labour took advantage of the Tories hesitation of proceeding with integration by exhibiting itself as the only viable pro-European party in Britain (discounting the Liberals). In the 1997 election, Tony Blair's revamped New Labour Party attacked the Conservatives and charged that its anti-EC platform had ultimately isolated Britain and undermined its national interests; in contrast, Blair emphasized the potential benefits of EC membership for Britain (Daniels 1998: 77). Yet, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was the Labour Party who had condemned Britain's participation in the European Community, for integration "would destroy the Commonwealth, undermine parliamentary sovereignty and impede the pursuit of socialist policies in Britain" (Aughey 1996: 151).

III. Canadian Liberals and NDP on Foreign Investments and MNCs

One of the major issues in Canadian economic policies since the 1950s has been the role of the government in regulating foreign investment; not surprisingly, the Liberals and NDP have had distinctive views towards this issue. Since the 1960s, the Liberal Party has favoured compromise while the NDP has often positioned itself as the nationalistic hardliner. Consequently, the Liberals have often managed to maintain compliance among voters; in contrast, the NDP's stance has frequently alienated business and foreign investors alike (MacLaren 1994: 47). In the 1950s, Canada's Minister of Finance, C.D. Howe, an economic nationalist who personally despised foreign enterprises and foreign capital, nevertheless encouraged foreign investment because he realized that the alternative would be a slower rate of economic growth, less prosperity and a weaker, more vulnerable and dependent state; more significantly, he recognized that he would need to compromise in order to maintain a stable economy and a content population (Blais 1990: 331). Similarly, in the 1960s, Howe's successor, Mitchell Sharp, who was also an economic nationalist, refrained from discouraging foreign investment through high taxes because he knew that it would only slow down and damage the current Canadian economic prosperity (Christian 1990: 56). The Liberals managed to unify, even though there was division, and agreed to continue with foreign investment throughout the 1960s, for they rationalized that it would ultimately extend economic stability and thus bring more support in future elections (MacLaren 1994: 47).

In the 1970s, the topic which created the most debate among politicians was American multinational corporations (MNC) who invested in Canada. Many members within the NDP and the Liberals were divided over this issue, for there was worry that the high degree of American ownership and heavy reliance on US markets, or "Americanization," would Canada's ability to pursue an independent foreign policy and to achieve its own economic national interests (MacLaren 1994: 47). Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister, and his Liberals sought a "middle road" solution which satisfied both the pro and anti-MNC factions, namely the domestic industries and foreign investors. The Liberals created the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) to manage Canadian crown corporations and to invest in Canadian companies in order to counterbalance US and foreign companies (MacLaren 1994: 47). The Liberals also established the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) as a complement to the CDC to screen takeovers and new acquisitions by foreign-owned companies already operating in Canada. Although these two agencies still divided Canadians, for some thought they were too harsh while others thought them too weak, they nevertheless offered a practical middle course solution (MacLaren 1994: 50).

In contrast, the goal of the NDP between 1961 and 1980s was to create an independent socialist Canada, which in effect not only alienated moderate voters, but also many businessmen (MacLaren 1994: 209). The NDP was also emphatically anti-American and considered American ownership in the economy to be the most important barrier to the establishment of a socialist state (Christian 1990: 209). As a result, the NDP fiercely opposed FIRA and the CDC and insisted in replacing foreign corporations with a "traditional socialist one, namely the state" (Christian 1990: 209). It also denigrated the corporations, many of which were foreign-owned or controlled, as "corporate welfare bums" because most received grants and subsidiaries from the federal government; moreover, the NDP maintained that Canadian development was distorted by a corporate capitalist economy, in which corporate investment "creates and fosters superfluous individual consumption at the expense of social needs" (Christian 1990: 212). Moreover, the NDP federal convention's main platform in 1971 was to resist foreign ownership of resource industries and protested "the continentalist energy deal with the US and the sell-out of our resources to that country" (Christian 1990: 269).

In 1990s, the situation has not changed, for the NDP continues to antagonize Canadian investors and businesses (Christian 1990: 232). The NDP refuses to concern itself with mainstream issues, namely employment and the Canadian deficit; consequently, it has earned a reputation as the party "loved for its heart, but not is brain" (McLeod 1994: 85). In addition, the NDP often evades the major issues of economics and instead focuses on saving medicare, taxing the rich, and exposing the Liberal's corporate links, a strategy which has had little appeal to the public (McLeod 1994: 99). Consequently, in 1993 polls which asked for the public's reflections on Canadian parties' economic competency, 61 percent chose Liberal, while only 4 percent favored the NDP (Blais 330: 107). Because the NDP pivots on emotional appeal rather than economic pragmaticism, the NDP has waited for the labour unions to do the work of cultivating an economic program, while labour unions have waited for the NDP (McLeod 1994: 87).

Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the NDP's economic policies compared to the Liberals is that the NDP has relied too much on class-based support. Because Canada does not have a country-wide class cleavage, the Liberals have capitalized on this point by adopting moderate policies attractive especially to the middle-class, which compose the majority of Canadian voters (Blais 2000: 105). In contrast, the NDP has relied on its socialist doctrine ever since 1961 and continues to differentiate itself from the centre of the ideological spectrum. It has often favoured assimilating its traditional socialist indoctrination into its economic policies with slogans intentionally dividing society into "us" versus "them," and lobbying itself as "standing with ordinary Canadians," "we're on your side," and "people like us" (McLeod 1994: 85). In the 1993 national election, the NDP's strategy was based exclusively on portraying corporations as tax evaders who participate in political corruption (McLeod 1994: 85). As a result, the NDP, unlike the moderate Liberals, have often failed to assemble a diverse support base; rather, it has managed to entice only trade unions as its dominant support, which constitute a minority of voters in Canada (Blais 2000: 107). The ultimate consequence is that the Liberal Party has won eleven elections since 1961, while the NDP has only never won even one election. Its most successful election was the 1988 election, when it garnered 20.4% of the popular support; nevertheless, it was still meagre compared to the Liberal's 31.9% (Blais 1990: 320).

IV. Conclusion

Party systems in Canada and Britain favour parties which adopt moderate policies. As a result, the parties in government in these two countries tend to take a compromising stance on particular issues in order not to upset their electoral success. In contrast, a party that governs more rigidly according to its principles tend to pay a hefty price by being marginalized at elections because it often antagonizes voters.

In analyzing the two Canadian parties, I have compared each party's policy on foreign and multinational corporations (MNC). As we have seen, the NDP parties in the past have adopted an anti-foreign stance on MNCs; as a consequence to its uncompromising stance, it tends to get less votes than the other principal parties in Canada, namely the Liberal Party. In contrast, the Liberals' "middle-of-the-road" policies that do not offend big business nor the work force tend to enjoy more success at the polls. As a result, it is not surprising that the Liberal Party has won numerous elections since 1961 as opposed to the NDP, who have never won an election, nor more than a pitiful 20.4% of the popular vote in its history.

In examining Britain's two parties, the Conservative Party and the New Labour Party, we see that both the Conservatives and New Labour have used European integration as a weapon in discrediting each other. Interestingly, governments have often used this issue to criticize opposing parties in order to gain more electoral support; as a result, we see that New Labour has in essence adopted the Conservatives' 1960s and 1970s policy in order to attain popular support. As a result, this essay proves that, over time, parties that refuse to be "flexible" on certain issues will only get hurt at elections because of less voter support.

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