Introduction:

The literature on the decolonization of the British Empire is still quite scant compared to many other subject areas such as the rise of imperialism or effects of the Industrial Revolution. Part of the reason for this gap is the fact that decolonialization is a relatively recent. It was not until the return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 that last significant piece of the British Imperial Empire was finally laid to rest.[1] Therefore a majority of the literature written about decolonialization was (and still is) a work in progress. With little hindsight and much hypothesizing, it is not surprising to see that scholars have had a multitude of reasons for decolonialization. Hence, the purpose of this paper is twofold. In examining monographs prior to 1980, this essay analyzes how “earlier” historians pioneered and formulated the direction that future scholarship would build on. In the second part of this paper, I will look at the more “recent” literature after 1990, and will compare the main differences in material and methods that historians in both periods employed, mainly concerning the areas of Asia and Africa.

Although Harold MacMillan’s historical interpretations are biased, and generally discounted by most current historians, it should not be excluded from this discussion because they nevertheless helped lay the foundations of this field of literature for subsequent scholars.[2] As Darwin suggests, MacMillan was one of the first political commentators to have formulated an explanation for the decline of the British Empire. Yet to consider Pointing the Way, 1959 – 1961 purely as an historical monograph is a precarious undertaking, for much of the material is subjective and even hagiographic.

He not only brazenly defends Britain’s shortcomings, MacMillan disregards the colonial nationalist movements, and instead attributes the process of decolonization entirely on the goodwill of the British government. He refuses to acknowledge or even discuss the British government’s weaknesses or inability to hold onto its empire, and instead asserts that the government never lost the “will nor even the power to rule,” claiming that since the inception of imperialism Britain never considered having the “right” to govern in perpetuity.[3] Indeed, as MacMillan contends, it was the “duty” of the British to spread to other nations European civilization and it was British policy had always regard independence as the ultimate goal.[4] Because his government had deemed these colonies mature enough for self-government, MacMillan justifies that decolonization was a natural occurrence encouraged and guided by the British.

However, MacMillan’s version of history can hardly be considered objective. As Prime Minister of Britain between 1957 and 1963, the approximate period when its Asian and African colonies began to vie for independence, it is likely that MacMillan’s memoirs intends to rationalize and diminish any inadequacies of his legacy. Moreover, his chronicles are based entirely on his own opinions; there is not one single source to support his arguments. Hence, it would be more prudent to treat MacMillan’s work as a primary account rather than a secondary source, for MacMillan was an actor who was intimately involved in British decolonization; hence, his claims cannot be taken as historical value.

In contrast to MacMillan’s personal views, Paul Baran’s The Political Economy (1957) offers a much more objective approach to the decline of the British empire. Although decolonization is only as an auxiliary to the book’s main examination of international developmental economics, Baran presents a detailed analysis of the fall of the European colonists. In doing so, Baran argues that the factors for decolonization were not limited to the British; rather, it was collective European experience due to structural changes in the international economy.

Baran asserts that imperialism was built on the cooperation between mercantilists and the imperialist governments, but the strength of the state depended on the support of capital interests and entrepreneurs. But once this system became unprofitable, the capitalists no longer had incentive to support the imperial empires. Baran insists that British decolonization had begun as far back as 1870, when investments from British businesses had already started to decline.[5] Contending that “imperial capitalism” replaced political imperialism, large European and American businesses substituted support for the former European colonialist governments with native industrial monopolists (he calls them “comprador governments”) in order to continue controlling economic development more efficiently.

Yet, Grimal’s research has its weaknesses. Because he is a Marxian economist, he views political and economic changes in a very biased manner. He simplifies the process of decolonization merely as the workings of the capitalist order exploiting the native colonial proletariats. Because he believes decolonization was a homogenous process, he neglects to give any attention to geographical differences. In his mind, India’s independence was not anymore unique than China’s. In looking at decolonization from a purely Marxian viewpoint, he entirely overlooks the role of the nationalist leaders and their movements in the colonies.

In contrast to Baran’s economic perspective, Henri Grimal’s Decolonization (1965) focuses chiefly on the role of the native colonial regimes. Arguing that the seeds of decolonization had been sown long before the Second World War, the self-destruction of the imperialists accelerated during the war because the Europeans had lost their prestige in the eyes of the colonies. Japan’s occupation of Asia particularly exposed the defenselessness of the white colonizers. Grimal asserts that the destruction of the “racial superiority myth” paved the way for the emergence of new indigenous elites, such as Nigeria’s Abofemi Awolowo, to lead the nationalist movements in search of political and economic autonomy.

Unlike MacMillan and Baran’s argument, Grimal asserts that British decolonization was not a geographically homogenous process, for the Asian nationalist movement in the colonies preceded the African movement; in fact, even the strategic reactions of the British governments’ towards both movements differed according to geography.[6] In the Asian case, Britain’s desire to retain economic ties with its colonies, particularly India, Malaya, and Singapore compelled it to moderate its stance towards self-government. Realizing that it could not jeopardize severing all ties with its colonies through revolutionary wars (though violence did occur), Britain opted to permit political autonomy, provided that the new independent governments continue to be governed under the Commonwealth Empire.[7]

Decolonization in British Africa came later, with inspiration coming from the Asian experience. Unlike Asia, African nationalism did not evoke the scale of violence in Asia, for it generally operated within the existing political structure, namely constitutional elections.[8] At the same time, Britain avoided outright violent

confrontations, generally preferring to incarcerate the nationalist leaders rather than using arms against the masses.

However, because Grimal is a political scientist, he often overlooks other possible economic, social, or cultural factors of decolonization. Rather, he is fixated on equating decolonization on a zero-sum scale, in which every action taken by the colonialist is countered by reaction from the colonizer. Hence, Grimal portrays decolonization as an

uncomprising political tug-of-war in which only the colonies come out as the victors in the battle. Yet in doing so, he entirely neglects the long-term causes and effects such as changes in international relations or Britain’s domestic politics which played a part in decolonization.

In contrast to both Baran and Grimal’s internationalist viewpoints, John Strachey’s The End of Empire (1964) examines the British domestic political scene. Strachey argues that decolonization was a “decisive event” in relations to its politicians and the general public. In particular, the “anti-imperialists,” played the largest role in the shift in public opinion. Comprised of politicians and supporters of the Labour and Liberal Party movements, these anti-imperialists vehemently opposed the material gains from imperialism that benefited only 10% of the British population while much of the government’s resources were diverted away from social welfare programs in favour of propping up its colonial estates.[9] As a result of public pressure coinciding with the nationalist independence movements in the colonies, the Labour (and later the Conservative) government was thus “decisively” convinced in paving the way for colonial self-rule.[10]

Similar to MacMillan, Strachey’s study does not reveal any citations that support his arguments, although his text does intermittently refer to other historical monographs.[11] Strachey does mention the research of such Indian historians, such as Romesh Chandra Dutt’s Economic History of India Under British Rule, William Digby’s Prosperous British India, and also R.P. Dutt’s India To-Day, but no footnotes or citations are given. He mentions these works merely as books as he had come across reading yet makes no attempt to connect them into his research. In fact, Strachey’s book does not include a bibliography. Consequently, much of the arguments proposed are entirely on Strachey’s own opinions; moreover, it implies that he has done little empirical research, choosing instead to rely on his own intuitions.[12]

Even though MacMillan, Baran, Grimal, and Strachey are credited with laying the foundations for future scholarship on decolonization,[13] there are notable flaws in each of their arguments. Not only are their viewpoints excessively Eurocentric, each scholar tends to have such contrasting positions that each argument tend to discount the other. In terms of Eurocentricism, all four authors maintain that decolonization occurred as an act of British consent. While MacMillan and Strachey assert that the British government voluntarily permitted colonial self-rule, Baran insists that political imperialism was merely replaced by economic imperialism; but all refuse to give credit to the nationalist movements nor admit British vulnerabilities. Although Grimal’s study focuses on the colonial setting, it nonetheless credits indigenous nationalism as products of European institutions. Without Marxist ideology, American anti-colonialism, and the creation of the United Nations Organization, nationalist leaders would not have had the inspiration nor international support for lobbying their causes.[14] Strachey, although not as involved to Britain’s imperial decline as MacMillan, was also a British civil servant; not surprisingly, his views are quite biased and Anglocentric. Not only does he sympathize with Britain’s loss of its empire, Strachey credits India’s democratic movement as a result of years of fostering by the British parliamentary model of government. Even more outrageous is that he parallels “British civilization” to that of the Greek and Roman Empires.

Yet the main problem with the authors’ arguments is that each author contradicts each other’s opinions. John Strachey completely refutes Paul Baran’s internationalist capitalist viewpoint, for he insists that free trade and imperialism could indeed coexist; thus decolonization was not the process of corporate interests, but British public pressure. Harold MacMillan goes further by arguing that British decolonization was entirely voluntary and benevolent. However, Henri Grimal altogether ignores economic factors, and instead fixates his approach on political relations between Britain and its colonies. As a result of such incongruities, it makes researching Britain’s imperial decline a difficult task if we rely exclusively on the earlier literature, particularly works written prior to the 1970s.[15]

Although not entirely free from blemishes, recent scholarship after the 1980s has helped abridge such contradictions. John Darwin has suggested that such research has integrated different arenas of political, economic, and cultural change to produce a more “systematic” explanation for the Imperial breakup.[16] In order to adequately account for British decolonization, more scholars have fused three particular “sub-historiographies”: British domestic politics, the power shifts in international relations, as well as colonial politics in order to ensure a more balanced approach to decolonization.[17] Rather than focusing on the Europeans and Britain as the main actor, recent scholarship gives greater emphasis on the nationalist movements, suggesting that British decolonization was primarily a reluctant and involuntary process.

Louis and Robinson’s “The Imperialism of Decolonization” (1994) asserts that imperial historians have often neglected the American role as a prime cause of decolonization. Both authors argue that decolonization occurred due to the shift of international power from the British to the Americans; consequently, after World War II, it was the United States government – not the British – that determined the future of the Empire. Because the Americans regarded empires as obsolete, its economic loans to Britain were exclusively for the purpose of domestic recovery and not empire-building.[18] The Cold War further heightened anti-imperialist sentiment, for the US decided to prop up the European colonies itself in order to counter potential Communist penetration into the colonies. In fact, Louis et al. even suggests that it in doing so, the US had joined the “Great Imperial Game.”[19]

The creation of Pakistan and the Suez Crisis were two compelling cases. Louis et al. contend that the Americans wanted Indian autonomy because India would act as a buffer to Sino-Soviet expansion; moreover, it wanted to demonstrate that third-world democracy as the better alternative to socialism. It also played a large role in supporting Pakistan’s independence in 1947, so much so that Pakistan became allies with the US instead of the Commonwealth.[20] In securing Southeast Asia from Communism, the US had in reality replaced European and British rule.

Yet true decolonization did not truly occur until after the Suez Crisis in 1957. Because of the failure of the British-French coup of the Nasser regime in Egypt, the US immediately replaced the British under the guise of the United Nation’s protection; the US wanted to not only prevent Soviet infiltration into the Middle East, it also sought to secure the oil needed by its oil industries and consumers.[21]

In contrast to Grimal’s lackluster recognition of the indigenous nationalist movements, Louis et al. assert that decolonization could not have succeeded without the skillful political bargaining by such nationalist leaders as Kenya’s Jomo Kenyetta and Egypt’s Abdul Nasser, who used Communism as their political bargaining chip. Such nationalist leaders often “forced” the British and Americans to provide military and political aid in return for their allegiance to the West and resistance to Communist infiltration.[22]

Focused mainly on decolonization in British Black Africa,[23] John Hargreave’s Decolonization in Africa (1988) begins where Louis et al.’s assessment of the nationalist movements leaves off. What is unique and noteworthy about Hargreaves is that he is a professor of African history. Hence, unlike earlier literature, Hargreaves work is a reflection of the emerging use scholarship from a purely colonial perspective.

In particular, Hargreaves focuses on Kwame Nkrumah, for his successful independence movement in Ghana was not only the first in Africa, it ultimately became subsequent models for Sudan and Nigeria. Offering a thorough analysis into Nkrumah’s political career and personal ideology, Hargreaves asserts that Nkrumah was never a communist; rather, he was a “populist nationalist” who only deployed communist strategies to advance his cause.[24] Because his tactics resulted in tensions with the British (and the West), Nkrumah was ultimately incarcerated in 1950 for allegedly being associated with the Soviet Union.

Yet British suppression proved to be futile, for Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) had won a majority government in 1951, thus legitimately achieving political autonomy within its constitutional structure. Realizing that it would face a revolution if it did not concede defeat, the British government also feared a violent insurrection would endanger its cocoa trade in Ghana, which proved to be huge profit-maker for the British economy. Hence, Hargreaves suggests that political and economic constraints ultimately forced the British to relent clinging onto its empire. Yet, because most of its colonies sought independence legally within its constitutional framework, the “African Revolution” occurred as a peaceful transfer of power.[25]

Comparable to Baran’s economic explanation, Hind’s Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization (2001) is also examination into the world economy and its effects on decolonization. But it does a more methodical assessment in that it reveals that World War II’s ravaging effects on Britain’s domestic economy ultimately strained its abilities to sustain its colonies economically and militarily. Hind argues that the independence movement in India between 1939-1958 was largely due to the fact that India had ended the war as a creditor rather than a debtor to Britain. As a result, the British no longer had substantial economic motives for retaining India; indeed, the war had ultimately severed any remnants of India’s “value as a repository” for Britain’s old staple manufacturers.[26]

The international economic and political order also weakened the British empire. Because of the shift in international power from the Britain to the US, Britain was forced to change its sterling policy and commit itself to the American dollar in order to receive American economic assistance. Hence, many of old economic ties with Britain’s colonies (such as India) could no longer be a contributor to the new dollar pool. Britain had to reduce its reliance on its non-dollar colonies and instead export to other areas where they could earn the dollar.[27]

In the case of India, Britain could not have maintained its toehold in the area even if it wanted to, for Hind argues that the Indianization of the Indian army and civil service had been too advanced to be reversed. In almost all stations of administration, native politicians and professionals had already filled positions of importance. Had Britain wanted to retain its empire through force, Hind suggests that it might have been unattainable, for it simply did not have enough resources, politically and economically, in suppressing a mutiny. By 1960, when Britain’s most profitable resource-rich colonies of Malaya, Ghana, and Nigeria had achieved autonomy – more importantly, economic sovereignty – Britain’s financial profits with its remaining colonies simply did not outweigh the administration costs needed to sustain them. Hence, when its remaining colonies vied for independence after 1957, Hinds reveals that Britain was actually more than happy to comply, for it could no longer be accused of abandoning its colonies to escape the burden of its financial obligations to them.[28]

What is most impressive about Hind’s research is the fact that is synthesizes materials from the recent decolonization literature. Published only recently in 2001, Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization has the benefit of years of retrospection on which to build and extend on prior research. Besides his reliance of British Parliamentary Papers for primary documents, Hinds also uses a great deal of research from John Hargreaves and William Louis Robinson as supporting secondary sources. Hence, as John Darwin has pointed out, Hinds text reveals that a greater degree of synthesis has emerged in decolonization literature. While hypothesizing tended to be contradictory in earlier literature, more recent research has tended to make use of each other’s ideas rather than entirely discounting one another.

Yet the amount of research and scholarship on decolonization of the British Empire is still quite inadequate compared to other more established areas of British history, for it occurred only quite recently. Because historians writing about this topic have had not much hindsight in properly assessing British decolonization, it is an extremely frustrating task in producing a clear and coherent “rationale” as to how the Empire dissolved. Much of the literature precipitates as many questions and contradictions as it do rationales and answers. Fortunately, the purpose of this paper was not to add any more confusion to this already hazy topic. Rather, my examination has analyzed the “evolution” of this collection of literature. It has attempted to expose some of the deficiencies of earlier literature in this field, such as personal biases and the lack of conformity. Yet, in exploring the more recent texts on British decolonization, what seems to be noticeable is that such deficiencies have been relatively improved, for a greater degree of “fusion” has occurred in scholarly research on decolonization; moreover, researchers tend to be less attached to the British decline. Thus, the study of the historiography of decolonization is itself an exciting topic, for it is fascinating in tracing how the “psyche” of those experiencing decolonization evolved over the past half century.