This essay will analyze the development of the Japanese Communist Party between the period 1920 and 1950. Because the JCP existed in a volatile political landscape during this time frame, assigning periods to the party’s development can be quite subjective.[1] In analyzing “transitions” from one period to the next, it is therefore necessary to be sensitive to three factors: party factionalism, foreign communist influence, and constant government suppression. The interplay of these three variables resulted in the continual realignment in JCP policy which consequently hindered it from formulating a cohesive political platform. In examining the JCP according to three periods: 1922 to 1928; 1928 to 1932; and 1945 to 1950, this essay examines the reasons as to why the JCP failed to become a mainstream party.
I. First Period (1922-1928)
Internal factionalism characterized the first phase of the JCP. Formed on July 15, 1922, the first JCP was hardly a party at all, for there was little solidarity and no effective central leadership. The intellectual schism between the Yamakawa Hitoshi and the Fukumoto Kazuo factions particularly hindered party solidarity. Both factions were more interested in theorizing and spreading ideas than in engaging in political activity. “Yamakawaism” as it was popularly dubbed, nonetheless shaped the party’s early policies, for Yamakawa was the most learned expert in Marxist theory prior to Fukumoto’s arrival.[2] Yet, in what was to characterize the movement throughout its interwar existence, communist theories rarely aligned with the Japanese reality.
In particular, Yamakawa argued in his treatise “A Change of Direction in the Proletarian Movement” that the most important task for JCP was the win over the labour unions. Although the JCP attempted to erect a united front in the labour movement as a means of cultivating a support base, the effort failed miserably, for various factions in the coalition often broke out into brawls during labour rallies. Clashes between JCP members and anarcho-syndicalist activists were so vehement that police were often mobilized to break up the scuffles.[3] Many labour leaders consequently became disillusioned with the JCP’s ineffective strike tactics, particularly since they were followed by heightened government retaliation; hence, the JCP never garnered the full support of the workers. As a result of the movement’s inability to produce any substantial progress, it briefly suspended operations in 1924.
Unsuccessful at creating a support base of workers as it initially intended, the JCP instead gravitated to the intellectuals, and especially capitalized on the student movement that was simultaneously taking shape in the 1920s. Hence, the era of “Fukumotoism” began when the revived JCP in 1925 scrambled for replacements, for many had either fled Japan or were jailed during government crackdowns. Because Fukumoto’s Leninist concept of an elite vanguard party paved the way for intellectuals to attain positions of high leadership within the JCP, he was successful at attracting university students. The existing intellectual-led movement, the shinjinkai, or the “new man’s movement” eventually fused with the JCP. In fact, the student movement became a kind of training ground for JCP recruits.[4] When mass arrests became so frequent by the late 1920s and 1930s, students were taken directly into positions of authority into the JCP. The relationship between the students and the JCP was unique in that the JCP did not go out in search of student recruits, but rather it was students who sought the JCP for membership.[5]
Yet Fukumoto’s emergence in 1925 precipitated the vitriolic struggle between the theorists, whom either associated with “Fukumotoism” or “Yamakawaism.” Fukumoto spent much of his time and energy to discredit Yamakawa’s strategy and organization and as a result, such attacks weakened the JCP movement. While Yamakawa favoured the Comintern orders for the creation of a legal Communist party that would participate in parliament, Fukumoto, a theoretical purist, was interested mainly with re-establishment of an autonomous JCP.[6] Because Fukumoto’s theory attracted more students, his faction became the mainstream of the JCP, called the koza-ha, while Yamakawa’s alternative survived only as a minority, referred to as the rono-ha. Despite their differences, both factions confined their activities mainly within the academic arena. The infighting was so severe that Yamakawa’s faction broke from the JCP in December 1927 and formed its own organization, called the New Labour-Farmer Party.[7]
Although
government suppression occurred in the first period of the JCP, it was in fact
a build-up to the crackdown on March 15, 1928.
Politicians from as early as 1921 had attempted to pass anti-radical
legislation to quell the Leftist movement.
Although such bills failed to pass, another wave of paranoia against the
JCP swept throughout Japan after the Kanto Earthquake in 1923, for many
believed the JCP had started fires and plotted revolution amid the chaos.[8] Not only was martial law declared, the
government created the tokko state police to monitor suspicious JCP and
radical activities. In 1925, the
bureaucrat Hiranuma Kiichiro helped establish the Peace Preservation Law that
spearheaded development of a thought-control system and provided a legal basis
for the expansion of the tokko.[9] With the conservative Tanaka cabinet came to
power in 1928, it revised the Peace Preservation Law and enhanced the tokko’s
jurisdiction. The escalation of control
against the JCP ultimately culminated in the 3-15 mass arrests, and
subsequently set the stage for the transformation of the JCP.
The 3-15 incident
was an important turning point in JCP history, for its causes had both domestic
and international implications. The
primary stimulus that led to government suppression was the Comintern’s order
to step up JCP activities, particularly in putting up candidates under the
names of the proletarian parties. When
candidates from the Left reaped more than half a million votes, the government
retaliated by intensifying its attack.[10] The 3-15 arrests came as the biggest blow to
the JCP, for the majority of its leadership was either arrested or exiled. Consequently changes in party policies
concurred with the influx of new JCP organizers. Yet the JCP’s second phase was a paradoxical one, for even though
it suffered severe government repression, it actually experienced a surge in
grass roots support.
II. Second Period (1928-1933)
Comintern control over the JCP characterized the period between 1928 and 1932. The JCP’s shift in policy was the consequence of the power struggle in the Soviet Union between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Not surprisingly, Fukumoto, who belonged to the Trotskyite faction, was removed from power after Stalin’s victory in 1927. His demise precipitated in a change of direction for the JCP. Although his unapproachable personality ironically heightened his influence and stature, Fukumoto had no disciples to carry on his work.[11] Led by inexperienced leadership of mostly Tokyo Imperial University students with meagre monetary funding, the JCP consequently relied on the Comintern for assistance.
Yet the Comintern’s rigid management hindered the development of the JCP, for it operated in Soviet interests, but rarely concerned itself with the Japanese political environment. Because Stalin believed that the West was conspiring to invade the USSR, the Comintern devoted much of its energy preparing for war. It consequently instructed the JCP to oppose the “imperialist war” in Asia, as well as preparing for a revolution that would eliminate its emperor. But Stalin and the Comintern’s views were incompatible with Japanese realities. Not only did they identify the system of kokutai with that of the Russian Tsar, it even categorized Japan with the other semi-feudal countries of India and China, despite the fact that it was an advanced industrial state.[12]
In particular, the Comintern advocated the JCP to engage in illegal activities regardless of government repression.[13] The JCP consequently limited its activities to street fighting and staging demonstrations. Yet such public activism only invited further police retaliation. While the JCP gravitated towards radicalism, the government simultaneously became more nationalistic and intolerant of social activism. The establishment was especially concerned about the renewed threats of the Showa emperor’s dethronement. The global depression in the 1930s also played a role in the JCP’s failure to attract sympathizers. Japanese citizens accepted the government’s authoritarian tactics and military expansion, for they believed such actions were necessary to offset the nation’s economic woes.[14]
Because policies shifted to protecting
Moscow’s interests rather than promoting solutions for Japan’s domestic
problems, the JCP became a narrow and closed organization. [15] Similar to the era of Fukumotoism, the JCP
directed its energy on the attacking other Leftists. It was especially keen on fighting against Yamakawa’s New
Labour-Farmer Party despite their similar views and policies.[16] Without an alliance with the Left, its
development as a mainstream party stagnated.
The constant threat of government arrests had a paradoxical effect, for while it weakened the JCP’s organization, it conversely stimulated grassroots activism from its student members. The immaturity of the government’s suppression system in the late 1920s allowed the student-intellectuals to actively participate in the JCP activities with relatively little interference.[17] As a result, the number of students who joined the JCP during this period actually increased relative to the Fukumoto era. Not only did the constant threat of suppression give the student movement a tone of tension and excitement, it also gave study circles a wide array of issues and incidents to discuss, and to build their movement around in the name of academic freedom.[18] But the government gradually strengthened its surveillance over the campuses in the 1930s, so much so that the tokko were attached to the student supervisor offices for the purpose of on-campus arrests. By 1933 control was so tight that any suspicious element could be arrested and disciplined.[19]
The tenko conversion proved to be the second “shock” which again transformed the shape of the JCP, for on June 10, 1933, two JCP leaders, Sano Manebu and Nabeyama Sadachika officially defected from the party and denounced its policies. Years of intense tenko mechanisms ultimately broke the inmates will. It created a ripple effect that influenced the majority of other communists to follow suit. Not only did these converts condemn the Comintern for its inability to understand Japanese society, they further argued that it was possible to carry out a socialist revolution under the imperial family.[20] But central to conversion was the sense of defeat. To fill the emotional void of rejecting communism, the tokko convinced its converts to embrace ultranationalism.[21] Tenko was successful, for out of the 2440 JCP members released, only 37 were classified as “unreformed.”[22]
However, tenko was not the sole cause of the JCP’s demise. Contrary to popular belief that government repression had severed communication between the Comintern and the JCP, such was not the case, for a Soviet spy network continued to operate in Japan during the war.[23] Rather, Comintern aid had been cut because of the Soviet Union’s loss of faith in the Japanese revolution. Instead, Stalin’s hopes had turned to the Chinese Communists; consequently, he avoided contact with his Japanese affiliates.[24] Without financial support, the JCP resorted to violence in the hopes of delaying its inevitable fall. Yet disorder only added further intensity to the tokko arrests and brutality. As a result, the party imploded, as paranoia of internal espionage led to the accusation and removal (and murder) of the few members that remained. Such “red lynchings” in addition to the defections of prominent JCP leaders demoralized the rank-and-file members and ultimately forced the party to cease operations as a political entity between 1933 and 1945. As a result, this essay will omit this period since it was predominantly a period of inactivity.
III. Third Period (1945-1950)
Rather, the JCP’s third phase did not resume until 1945 when it was legalized by SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers). Although the political landscape in Occupied Japan was quite different from the pre-war era, foreign communist influence, internal factionalism, and government repression continued to plague the party, and ultimately hindered it from developing into a mainstream party. Because the Soviet Union was mired in economic chaos due to the failure of Stalin’s collectivization program, it left the Chinese Communist Party with the responsibility of supervising the JCP movement.[25] Like its predecessor, the CCP played a role in the instigation of factional infighting in the JCP. Because the global communist movement was taking a sharp turn to the Left after 1945, the CCP criticized the JCP for not falling into line, namely preparing for guerrilla warfare and a peasant revolution like the Chinese themselves. It particularly condemned the JCP for its cooperation with the American “imperialists.”[26] While the party mainstream refused to adhere to such an approach, a number of dissidents sided with the CCP, and even argued for the elimination of the emperor, whom they accused of being a war criminal.
But the majority of JCP leaders, many of whom were just released from prison or returned from exile, realized that opposing the SCAP would mean political suicide. The old guards of the JCP leadership had been persecuted for more then twenty-three years, and were understandably apprehensive in jeopardizing their freedom by provoking the government.[27] More importantly, they recognized that the American goals of democratization and destruction of militarism were compatible with the party’s own goals.[28] The JCP attuned its platform to Japanese patriotism and the opposition against radicalism; moreover, it concocted its new mottos of “peaceful revolution” and a new “lovable” JCP as a ploy to attract supporters. It also channelled its energies on creating a Popular Front that would use industrial workers as its mass base of support.
Total JCP Votes % of Total Votes # Candidates Elected
1947 1,002,903 3 4
1949 2,984,780 35 35
Figure 2[29]
But though the election results for 1949 indicate that the JCP had increased its elected candidates nine-fold, while tripling its total of votes, empirical data can be misleading if taken at face value. The JCP did not merit its votes exclusively on its popularity. Rather, factionalism created in the Socialist-Liberal coalition precipitated a flurry of scandals and mutual recriminations which had split a large portion of votes. Hence, the Communists received a much higher percentage of the vote than was normal.[30]
In reality, the organization of the JCP was fragile. Not only did factionalism within the JCP wreck solidarity, alliances with other Leftists as part of a broader Popular Front failed to materialize. The Socialist Party, the largest party in the Left, particularly refused to cooperate, for it viewed the JCP as too Soviet-influenced. Moreover, it failed to mobilize the labour unions because the recovery of the Japanese economy by the late 1940s negated most of the workers’ enthusiasm for staging large-scale labour strikes.[31]
Similar to the pre-war era, the survival of the JCP depended on the government’s mercy. Although the JCP’s intentions towards their occupiers were benign, SCAP’s views of the JCP were not. It needed the JCP’s cooperation as part of a larger scheme to pacify the nation after its surrender. By 1947, the JCP became expendable, for the Americans turned to the conservatives for help in the reconstruction of Japan. In fact,
SCAP viewed the JCP as a threat to political and economic stability.[32] Douglas MacArthur’s intervention in the labour movement was an enormous blow to the JCP, for on February 1,1947, he ordered a termination of a general strike that had been planned months ahead. Not only did it signal the end of the labour movement, which deprived the JCP from garnering a substantial mass base, it marked the end of American toleration of the JCP.
The movement was once again forced underground on June 6, 1950 after MacArthur decreed for the purge of JCP members, indicating the end of the third phase of the party’s history. As the Korean War and American anti-communism intensified in the 1950s so did the purges. Under such circumstances, the JCP turned to guerrilla warfare under the management of the CCP. Ironically, the old guards of the JCP found themselves reliving the past, as their increased aggression met even greater repression.
Hence, the evolution of the Japanese Communist Party between the period 1920 and 1950 has been a rather erratic process. In investigating the transitions from one period to the next, we see that party factionalism, foreign influence, and constant government suppression resulted in shifts and counter-shifts in JCP policies which ultimately hampered it from evolving into a mainstream party.
[1] There are different
interpretations to the periods of the JCP.
George Beckmann divides the prewar-JCP according to its formation and
dissolution: 1922-1925; 1926-1932; and 1932-1945. Germaine Hoston partitions the JCP according to shifts in the
Comintern’s policies: 1921-1925; 1925-1927; 1927-1931; and 1931 to 1932. Paul Langer assigns the JCP according to
“pre-Stalinism” and “Stalinism” eras.
In my view, each of these theories simplifies the matter too much, and
uses only one perspective, while reducing the importance of other factors. Rather, “transitions” of 1928 and 1932
encompass all three factors and thus are more appropriate.
[2] George Beckmann. The Japanese Commmunist Party. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press)., p.54.
[3] Ibid., p.49.
[4] Henry Dewitt Smith, Japan’s
First Student Radicals. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).,p.166-167.
[5] George Beckmann. The Japanese Commmunist Party. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press).,173.
[6] Ibid., p.108.
[7] Sandra Wilson. “The Comintern and the Japanese Communist
Party.” International Communism. Ed. Tim Rees and
Andrew Thorpe. (New York: Manchester University Press).,p. 294.
[8] Elise Tipton. The Japanese Police State. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).,p
21.
[9] Ibid.,p 22-24.
[10] Elise Tipton. The Japanese Police State. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).,p.24.
[11] Henry Dewitt Smith, Japan’s First Student Radicals. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).,p.168-170.
[12] Germain Hoston. Marxism and the Crisis of Development in
Pre-War Japan. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press).,p.61.
[13] George Beckmann. The Japanese Commmunist Party. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press)., p.190-191.
[14] Rodger Swearingen, Red
Flag in Japan. (Cambridge: University Press).,p.50.
[15] Paul Langer. Communism in Japan (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press).,p.7.
[16] George Beckmann. The Japanese Commmunist Party. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.,p. 190-191.
[17] Henry Dewitt Smith, Japan’s
First Student Radicals. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).,p.186.
[18] Henry Dewitt Smith, Japan’s
First Student Radicals. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).,186-187.
[19] Ibid., 204-205.
[20] George Beckmann. The Japanese Commmunist Party. (Stanford: Stanford University Press)., p. 248.
[21] Richard Mitchell, Though
Control in Pre-War Japan. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press)., p.144.
[22] Ibid.,p.147.
[23] Sandra Wilson. “The Comintern and the Japanese Communist
Party.” International Communism. Ed. Tim Rees
and Andrew Thorpe. (New York:
Manchester University Press).,p.296-297.
[24] Ibid.,p.297-298.
[25] Robert Scalapino. The Japanese Communist Movement.
(Berkeley: University of California Press)., p.62-63.
[26] Robert Scalapino. The Japanese Communist Movement.
(Berkeley: University of California Press)., p. 64.
[27] Paul Langer. Communism in Japan. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press).,
p.6-8.
[28] Robert Scalapino. The Japanese Communist Movement. (Berkeley: University of California Press)., p.53.
[29] Robert Scalapino. The Japanese Communist Movement.
(Berkeley: University of California Press).,p. 72.
[30] Ibid.,p.73-74.
[31] Ibid.,p.74-75.
[32] Robert Scalapino. The Japanese Communist Movement. (Berkeley: University of California Press).,73-75.