The first century of bakuhan rule revealed the inherent structural weakness of the Tokugawa system. Although the first three shoguns, Ieyasu, Hidetada, and Ietmitsu solidified Tokugawa rule through a “systematic” tightening in central rule, the structure unraveled once Ietsuna assumed power in1651. Not only did his tenure reveal his incapability of running the administration, it also exposed the limitations of the system, in which the bakufu was in constant struggle with the domains. Although the shoguns played a vital role in the shaping of national policies in early Tokugawa Japan, a great deal of their political, social, and economic policies was formed within the constraints of the daimyos’ interests. In analyzing the rise of the Tokugawa system, this essay examines the continuities and changes that Hideyoshi (1580 to 1598), Ieyasu (1600 to 1616), Iemitsu (1632 to 1651), and Ietsuna (1651 to 1680) faced during their tenures in power, and more importantly, what their roles were in the ultimate deterioration of bakufu rule after 1651.

From the outset of his rule as hegemon, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s aim was to build a federation rather than a centrist government. Despite subduing his opponents, the new Hideyoshi administration was a rather fragile arrangement between the leader and his vassals. Without the support from the domains, Hideyoshi would not have achieved his unification of Japan. On the other hand, without his leadership, the domains would not have had a central government as grounds to end the ongoing warfare.[1] Since Oda Nobunaga’s brutal campaigns to centralize the nation left a “psychological imprint” in the minds of the domains, there was an additional urgency to prevent their inevitable destruction through coalescing with a more conciliatory individual. Hideyoshi’s “unification” was in reality a coalition of daimyos propping him up as a figurehead for maintaining stability among each other.[2]

Yet to fully comprehend Hideyoshi’s federation, and how it extended into the Tokugawa regime, the history of the domain must also be considered. Underneath the fractious and autonomous political landscape concealed a long-established “imperial culture” in which the different polities shared a common language, religion, cultural, as well as a political tradition, so much so that most continued using their titles from the imperial court and the Ashikaga shogunate. Up to the sengoku warring states period (1457-1573), Japan had existed as a unified entity; hence, most daimyos were used to vassalage under a ruler.[3] Hence, Hideyoshi was never a unifier of autonomous kingdoms, but rather an “organizer” of domains assembled and reassembled by years of war and the constant realignment of political loyalties. Because of this interdependent arrangement, Hideyoshi had to manicure his policies in such a way as to demonstrate his authority without offending the domains lest he lose their “collective submission.”[4]

Yet the significance of his governmental framework cannot be ignored. Besides absorbing his former antagonists into his federation, Hideyoshi worked around the barrier to centralization by controlling the population through social policies that were consistent with the interests of the domain. In particular, the 1588 edict for a “sword hunt” effectively disarmed the peasants, forcefully separated the samurai class from the peasantry, and subsequently eliminated the possibilities of uprisings. Yet, closer examination reveals that it likewise benefited the daimyo, for unarming the peasants made it easier for the local governments to subdue their populace. The 1591 edict for “freezing” the social order resulted in the separation of the farmer from the samurai class. Forbidding soldiers from entering village society, while prohibiting farmers from leaving cultivation, the arrangement resulted in a landless samurai class that relied entirely on the daimyo for subsistence. Intended to prevent uprisings against the central government, the outcome benefited the daimyo the greatest, as it them easier access to village resources without the hindrance of armed farmers, while also allowing them total control over their military men, namely the samurais.[5]

To further solidify his rule over the fragile nation, Hideyoshi sought legitimacy through the imperial court. Emperor Goyozei willingly awarded Hideyoshi a host of royal titles, one of which was regent to the emperor, in order for the court’s continued existence. In attempting to establish a political structure based on tradition, history, and law, Hideyoshi eradicated the militaristic setting of the sengoku era, without giving the throne neither wealth or power to sufficiently overshadow his rule. Not only did this create a blueprint which would be emulated by his successors, the culmination of his other policies helped pave the way for a relatively smooth political transition for Tokugawa Ieyasu’s ascension in 1600, after his victory at Sekigahara. Yet the political culture of his era never disappeared with Hideyoshi, but instead continued into the Tokugawa period, and became particularly consequential during Ietsuna’s reign as shogun.

Hence, since the administration that Ieyasu inherited from Hideyoshi was still fragile, his bakufu faced similar political limitations from the han. Because the Tokugawa was only one of many barons after 1600, Ieyasu’s greatest threat came not from his defeated foes, but from his allies. One reason was Ieyasu’s breaching of too many oaths and alliances during his rise to power; he simply could not trust any of his allies in fear that they would betray him. His weakness is apparent after his victory in 1600, for he distributed more land to his allies than he had actually won; he took 6,221,690 koku, but gave away 6,511,000 to his newly established fudai daimyos.[6]

Despite such limitations, the period from 1600 to 1651 witnessed the gradual “tightening” of bakufu rule at the expense of the domains. This was achievable only through the aggressive vigor of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, particularly Ieyasu and Iemitsu. Though the bakufu recruited men mainly from the fudai domains, Ieyasu was attentive in surrounding himself with his own advisors, individuals who had little or no ties to the daimyos. Because all came from lowly origins, they were wholly dependent and loyal to Ieyasu.[7] In quarantining himself and his men from outside influences, particularly from the daimyos, the shogun had set a precedent for future successors.[8]

Yet Ieyasu’s grip on the domains remained weak. Though land confiscation of the domains was impressive at 3,594,640 kokus during his reign, Ieyasu was careful not to create policies that would conflict with the interests of the domains. In particular, his 1615 edict, the Buke Shohatto, or Laws for Military Households became the clearest example of such vigilance.[9] The bylaws were mainly concerned with social control of its citizenry, for it decreed filial piety, hostility to Christianity, as well as regulations on the style of clothing one may wear.[10] Although the decrees also prohibited all han from building and repairing fortifications, their effects were inept, for daimyo autonomy remained relatively untouched as it had during the sengoku era. Most continued running their own armies, tax systems, administrative staffs, as well as private regulatory codes decreed by the daimyo.[11]

Instead, Ieyasu had to resort to other forms of “legitimacy” as his grounds for rule. Building on Hideyoshi’s use of the court, Ieyasu went one step further as he manufactured a geneaology to assert his descent from the Minamoto shogunal line.[12] As well, in 1603, he requested that he be installed as shogun by the emperor. Though only a claim to the rights and responsibilities of national governance, Ieyasu had made the first imprint of shogunal rule, which would be expanded by his heirs.[13] His retirement from office in 1605 in favour of his son, Hidetada, was also used as a strategy to gain power; a practice called ogosho, it would be emulated by Hidetada in 1623, as well as future shoguns. In removing himself from the office of shogun, Ieyasu was free from the mercy of the court’s grip, for it still had the power to appoint court titles and ranks. In order to prevent his rival Hideyori (Hideyoshi’s son) from gaining any political advantage over the bakufu, Ieyasu’s Kuge Shohatto edict in 1615, or the Regulations for Governing the Nobility, effectively eliminated the court’s authority to issue imperial promotions; as a result, it severed Hideyori’s last remaining source of power.[14] Ieyasu also promoted his sons into positions of collateral daimyos, or shimpans, in order to strengthen bakufu rule. Not only did they hold strategically important locations for Ieyasu, the shimpans would continue the Tokugawa lineage in case future shoguns failed to provide an heir.[15] To avoid the mistakes of Hideyoshi, Ieyasu prevented factional infighting by his heirs by personally handpicking his son and grandson for shogunal succession. However, less emphasis will be placed on Hidetada, for his policies were mostly a continuation of his father’s reign; instead, Iemitsu and Ietsuna’s tenures deserve greater analysis, for both marked the apex as well as decline of bakufu and shogunal authority in early Tokugawa history.

It was not until Iemitsu’s ascension to power that the peak of bakufu rule became realized. Unlike his predecessors’ contented coexistence with Kyoto and the daimyos, Iemitsu endeavoured to sever these bonds by making the Bakufu the sole autonomous centre of authority.[16] In expanding the Buke Shohatto from thirteen to twenty-one articles, the new laws circumscribed the daimyos’ sovereignty considerably. Not only were all criminal matters handed over to the jurisdiction of the bakufu, all disputes between domains were to be settled by the bakufu’s hyojosho tribunal. However, what delineated Iemitsu’s central control from his predecessors was the effectiveness of its enforcement. With the creation of the jukenshi central intelligentsia in 1633, teams of officials secretly monitored the domains’ performances, and brought reports back to the shogun, which often determined whether confiscation was necessary. Iemitsu was not discriminatory in his land confiscations, for he actually increased land attainders of the fudai domains relative the tozama. Since peace was achieved during his reign, there was no more need for the military assistance from the fudai daimyos as is the past; hence, he did not relent from antagonizing them as had Ieyasu, and Hidetada. [17]

Until the end of Iemitsu’s reign in 1651, the daimyo’s tenure of the han became insecure, for property no longer became a right, but instead a privilege on the condition of good behaviour. During his reign, a total of forty-six domains were confiscated at an estimated 3,580,100 koku’s.[18] Another key weapon of central control was the bakufu’s deployment of land relocation; during Iemitsu’s reign, 250 han transfers were made. Making sure that no daimyo ever felt permanence in his residence. With such an attainment of power and fear, Iemitsu was able to compel the domains into financing the construction of bakufu castles, with the amount of subsidization determined according to the wealth of the han. Iemitsu’s intent was to limit the daimyos’ economic threat, and at the same time, the castles provided the administration with prestige as well as strategic fortifications in vital areas between Kyoto and Edo.[19]

In particular, the buke shohatto established the sankin kotai, or alternative attendance system. Initially intended for the tozama domains, the system eventually expanded in 1642 to also include the fudais. During Hideyoshi and Ieyasu’s rule, only tradition governed their hostage systems; hence, enforcement was often limited and unnecessary. In fact, it was a staple of medieval politics, for Hideyoshi even sent his own mother to Ieyasu as a hostage in order to secure his allegiance. Yet, in incorporating sankin kotai into the buke shohatto, Iemitsu used the system for his own purposes by decreeing that the wives and children of all the daimyo were to be permanently domiciled at Edo. The bakufu thus prevented any potential rebellion by keeping the daimyo families as hostages. Not only were these lords continuously monitored by the bakufu, travel was rigidly enforced, as highway inspection sekisho stations were posted to patrol roads leading out of Edo. Although not in its initial intentions, the living expenses in Edo also weakened the daimyo’s economic base, for most had to maintain two residences, one in their fief capital, and another in Edo. [20]

The policy of national seclusion, sokuko, resulted in the bakufu’s greatest control of the nation’s society and economy. In denying the population from leaving the country while banning Westerners from entering Japan, sokuko not only allowed the bakufu to control information from abroad, it also turned into an anti-Christian campaign, thus making it an instrument of social control of the masses. With his violent campaigns against the Jesuits, in which most were rounded up, tortured, killed, or forced to apostatize, the terror ruminated throughout the nation; this display of authority subsequently compelled the domains to follow suit with their own anti-Christian movements. At the same time, in limiting foreign trade to the port of Nagasaki and restricting business to only the Dutch, seclusion allowed the bakufu to monopolize commerce, and thus stripping it away from the domains. Unlike Hideyoshi, Ieyasu and Hidetada, who did not ban Christianity for fear of local uprisings and subsequent conflicts with some Christian domains, Iemitsu’s consolidated military strength allowed him the luxury of disregarding these obstacles. [21] Unlike his predecessors, Iemitsu was more daring in jeopardizing trade with the West in order to augment his personal rule over the nation. He calculated that the bakufu would not be hurt by seclusion, for the increase of imports would remedy the drop in exports; indeed, his scheme was correct, for trade volume actually increased during his reign.[22]

However, a weak military background became Iemitsu’s greatest obstacle, for he could not rely on the victory at Sekigahara or Osaka as sources for authority. Instead, he had to resort to other tactics, with the emphasis on control rather than personal relations as his predecessors once had. In particular, Iemitsu attempted to “sacrelize” Ieyasu in 1635 as the divine founder of the Tokugawa regime with the rebuilding of Ieyasu’s shrine in Nikko into a mausoleum; daimyos gradually followed suit and built miniature shrines in order to hold services in memory of the first shogun. In enhancing Ieyasu’s already divine status, Iemitsu’s strategy was to convert his rather delicate political mandate into a sacred one, linking his rule to a divine lord, and in effect, sanctifying shogunal rule with the “way of Heaven.”[23]

In relations to the court, Iemitsu continued his predessors’ work, but the tightening of his power proved to be much more aggressive. To display his military might and intimidation of the court, Iemitsu marched into Kyoto three times, with the greatest display in 1634, in which he accompanied a militia of 309,000 men drawn mostly from the daimyo. The fact that the court sent delegations from Kyoto to Nikko in honour of Ieyasu’s mausoleum reveals the extent of its subjugation under Iemitsu.[24] Nonetheless, although Iemitsu may have suppressed the court and daimyos, he never completely eradicated them.

Even during Iemitsu’s reign, cracks in the bakufu’s central rule were apparent. Decades of land accretion in forty-seven of sixty-eight provinces resulted in an over-extension of resources in which bakufu land was too sparse and far away for Edo to monitor. Hence, the nearby domains had to help collect taxes for the bakufu. Most daimyos weakened the state coffers by keeping portions of the money to themselves. Moreover, the sankin kotai was never really a “hostage” system, for any captive could leave Edo if they really wished; in fact, daimyos who did favours for the shogun were often excused all or parts of their Edo duties. In 1638, a number of daimyos was released when their hans provided troops in the Shimbara revolts. Control of commerce was also quite suspect as domains often ignored bakufu policies which ran counter to their own commercial interets. The buko shohatto’s explicit prohibition of the domain’s private embargoes, called tsudome was rarely enforced during times of famine. Most daimyos hoarded their resources, while denying foodstuffs even to the bakufu.[25]

Within such a context, the chaos that ensued after Iemitsu’s death in 1651 eerily resembled Hideyoshi’s demise in 1598. Although a strong ruler in Ieyasu surfaced to take power, in 1651, there was no such individual to assume this role. Beneath the surface of the political stability (owed to the sankin kotai and buke shohatto) hid a nervous and divided leadership that wrestled with fears that stemmed from an unprecedented dilemma in Tokugawa rule: for the first time, no strong leader assumed rule. Instead, a ten-year old boy, Tokugawa Ietsuna, assumed control of a baku-han administration that was too immature for centralized rule without a decisive shogun to lead the way .[26]

Like Hideyori, Ietsuna’s young age forced his father to leave much of his administration to a few selected advisors. For the first time in Tokugawa rule, major bakufu offices were filled by fudai daimyos. Not only did these advisors take advantage of the weak shogun, they also attempted to take shape policies that suited their own domains rather than the bakufu. Hence, the Ietsuna decades were marked by political infighting among the fudai.[27] Instead, the shogun’s regent, Hoshina Masayaki ran much of the bakufu from 1651 until 1666 only “to keep the ship of state afloat.”[28] His successor, Sakai Tadakiya, continued Masayaki’s regency only to be deposed of in 1680.

Under Ietsuna, the fudai not only loosened themselves from the bakufu’s grip, they also sought to rebuild from their weakened positions. Hence, after 1651, policies immediately shifted in favour of the domains. In particular, deathbed adoptions were permitted, in which dying barons were allowed hasty adoptions of an heir to keep the name, fief, and vassal band intact. On more than fifty-eight occasions between 1600 and 1651, the absence of an heir led to confiscations of daimyo territory, representing one-half of all attainders during that period; after 1651, the number decreases dramatically.[29] Bakufu construction projects as well gradually came to a halt. In 1657, after a great fire destroyed the Edo castle, the bakufu never rebuilt it. Ironically, bakufu finances shifted to the refurnishing of many existing han castles. The jukenshi inspection system also lost its fear and importance, for after 1651, secret inspections, once used as the shogun’s instruments for land confiscations, were now either made formal or announced well ahead of time.[30]

Another bakufu decree in 1660 proved to be a major fudai victory in the baku-han struggle, for hereditary offices were permitted. Entry into the bakufu bureaucracy was no longer determined by ability or service performance; instead, family relations became the basis for recruitment. As a result, offices would not lapse after one generation, but rather, it would be inherited and perpetuated by the han. In 1663, the buke shohatto was again revised, in which its policies emphasized the importance of the domain rather than the state, for “filial piety” to the household (and hence the domain) overruled the importance of loyalty to the bakufu. [31]

In this vulnerable position, bakufu rule was marked by an ideological “paranoia”, for most feared that alternative thought might somehow destabilize the regime. Unlike earlier shoguns that often turned to advisors for suggestions on ideological concerns, the Ietsuna regime suppressed and controlled ideas at a velocity that far exceeded earlier years. Not only were Buddhism and Shintoism put under greater scrutiny and supervision, intellectuals were severely disciplined as never before.[32]

In particular, masterless sumarais, or ronin, became the favourite targets for suspicion, for they were seen as the greatest destabilizing force. Just a few months after Iemitsu’s death, a ronin-led coup d’etat threw the bakufu into disarray and panic. Furthermore, a violent ronin insurgence in 1652 led by Yui Shosetu decisively pressed timid Edo officials in adopting the policy of reducing the rate of daimyo attainders, for ronins were viewed as a product of the land confiscations. This policy ultimately marked the greatest compromise of the bakufu, for it no longer used confiscation in reducing potential domain rivals. [33]

Confiscations of daimyo holdings, 1601-1705

Shogun Daimyo (number) Amount Confiscated (koku)

Ieyasu 41 3,594,640

Hidetada 38 3,605,420

Iemitsu 46 3,580,100

Ietsuna 45 728,000

Tsunayoshi 45 1,702,982

Figure. 1[34]

As the figures above reveal, Ietsuna’s ascension marked the watershed of Tokugawa bakufu rule, for land confiscation, the symbol of authority for the shogunate and the bakufu, drops drastically during and after his reign. Bakufu affairs instead became more concerned with han order and its stability of tenure. While Iemitsu confiscated an average of two domains per year between 1632 and 1651, under Ietsuna, the average fell to less than 0.86. Moreover, under Iemitsu, domains were transferred 117 occasions; under Ietsuna, only 47 cases were reported.[35] Although his successor Tsunayoshi revived the practice of confiscation somewhat, the shogun’s powers along with the bakufu never quite regained its vigour as it once had.

Instead, confiscation was often replaced my mere reprimands. When 3000 peasants fled to a neighbouring bakufu territory from the Takato domain in 1654, the daimyo Torii Tadaharu faced only criticism for his mismanagement, whereas under an earlier shogun, land would certainly involved enfeoffment.[36] Even in cases which the bakufu arbitrated conflicts, the results revealed its weakness and indecisiveness. In 1671, bakufu settlement of a dispute between the Honda family in the Koriyama domain resulted not in confiscation of land as bakufu tradition dictated; rather, the domain’s 150,000 koku was equally divided amongst rival daimyo claimants in order to maintain harmony.[37]

Yet, to fully comprehend the disintegration of bakufu rule, it is necessary to look beyond the influence of the daimyo, and instead focus on the shogun himself. Ietsuna’s indifference and unwillingness to express his own opinions in bakufu administrative policies earned him the nickname the “so be it” shogun.[38] Unlike his predecessors, and even his successor, Tsunayoshi, Ietsuna commanded little respect. As the daimyo Date Tsunamara of Sendai notes, whereas he involuntarily laid his head down for Tsunayoshi, “when I had audiences with Ietsuna . . . I always looked at his face.”[39] So it is inaccurate to lay the entire blame of the bakufu’s woes on the daimyos. Rather, Ietsuna must bear much of the responsibility in the administration’s weakness during his reign. His incompetence in the office of the shogunate ultimately destroyed the laborious years of autocratic command achieved by his predecessors.

In many ways, the Tokugawa’s decline occurred long before Commodore Perry’s ultimatum to the bakufu in 1854. On his way to moulding his rule into a central monarchy, Iemitsu’s death not only threw the nation into disarray, his heir’s ineffective rule for the next three decades virtually stripped away the bakufu’s grip on the nation, so much so that not even his autocratic successor Tsunayoshi could not restore it to its former glory. Yet, in further examining the bakuhan relationship, we see that it was already weak even during Iemitsu’s autocratic control. This revealed that although the shoguns played a vital role in the shaping of national policies in early Tokugawa Japan, much of their political, social, and economic policies were fashioned within the limitation of the daimyos. Hence, Tokugawa rule was indeed marked by tensions within the bakuhan system, which is why central rule was never completely achieved.