OVERVIEW
- General Game
Info
PLAYER RATINGS
- Defense
- Offense
-
Pitching
ROSTER CONSTRUCTION / TEAM LINEUP
FORM
- Pitching
Chart
-
Manager Tendencies
Player Tendencies
- Offensive
Tendencies
- Pinch
Hitting Tendencies
- Pitcher
Tendencies
- Catcher
Fatigue
OVERVIEW OF ERAS
- General
OVERVIEW
Time after time, Diamond
Mind Baseball has been chosen as the best computer baseball game for
your PC by reviewers throughout the industry. Why? Ease of use,
unmatched realism, statistical accuracy, speed and in-depth player
research.
As the manager of your
own big league club, you choose your starting lineups from rosters
of real players. You decide when to use a pinch hitter, attempt a
steal, take the extra base on a hit or fly ball, bring in a relief
pitcher, pitch around a hitter, and more. After the game, you can
print or save to file a boxscore or play-by-play scoresheet of the
game.
Almost everything that
happens on the field in big-league baseball can happen in Diamond
Mind Baseball, including rundowns, pickoffs, outfielders missing the
cutoff man, arguments with umpires, ejections, dropped third
strikes, brawls, and pitchers leaving games when their arms stiffen
during a long rain delay.
And Diamond Mind Baseball
offers the first and only statistically accurate pitch-by-pitch
simulation ever developed. You'll be amazed at how much more
strategy and drama is introduced to the game when you can call for
pickoff throws and pitchouts, give your batter the green light on
3-0 pitches, and change your tactics on every pitch.
Your players make great
plays and a few blunders, too, just as in real life. Certain
ballparks will yield many more doubles and homers than other parks.
The outcome of some games will turn on a wind-blown fly ball or a
fielder slipping on wet turf. You may suffer an injury to a key
player just when you need him most, forcing you to sign a free
agent, make a trade or call up a player from your farm system.
Diamond Mind Baseball
automatically tracks injuries, forces managers to rest pitchers and
catchers when they are tired, and compiles detailed batting,
pitching, and fielding statistics. And it's easy to exchange
rosters, computer manager instructions, and game results with
managers in other cities.
You can use real-life
rosters, teams and leagues, or create an entirely new league with
the players drafted onto new teams. You can even create new teams,
parks, and players, or assemble a custom league with teams from many
Diamond Mind Baseball Season Disks.
For much more detail
please see this
article
on DMB Home Page.
PLAYER RATINGS
DEFENSE
Range
This rating indicates a player's
ability to reach balls hit in his direction and turn those batted balls
into outs. Most baseball announcers use the "range" to mean the ability
to cover ground, and that's certainly an important part of what goes
into our range ratings. But it's not the whole story.
Our range rating (which takes values
from Excellent to Poor) measures each fielder's overall playmaking
ability (minus his tendency to commit errors, as we have a separate
rating for that). Playmaking ability is not just about range, it's also
about positioning, handling the ball cleaning, throwing quickly and
accurately, and making good decisions about where and when to throw the
ball.
For modern seasons, we carry out very
extensive studies of play-by-play data when assigning our range ratings.
We look at each player's individual performance on the balls hit his
way, overall team defense, the effects of neighboring fielders (3B often
take balls that the SS could have handled anyway, so we don't punish the
SS for failing to make those plays), and ballpark effects.
Unfortunately, good fielding data can
be hard to get for past seasons. The best sources we've found are the
team section of the Macmillan Baseball Encyclopedia and the STATS
All-time Major League Handbook.
By comparing putouts (for
outfielders) an
(for infielders), and adjusting for playing time, you can get
an idea how a player compares with his peers. These types of measures
(commonly known as range factors) can sometimes be very misleading,
however, as they don't take into account the groundball/flyball nature
or left/right mix of the pitching staff. The more of these factors you
can take into account when assigning range ratings, the more accurate
your ratings will be.
Error rates
This rating is a percentage
indicating how this player's error rate compares to the average fielder
at his position in the era in which he played. A rating of 100 means the
player is average -- that is, he makes 100% of the errors expected of
someone at that position. A player who makes only 50% as many errors as
his peers is rated 50. Someone who makes twice as many errors as his
peers is rated 200.
The following table summarizes how
error rates have changed over time, in five-year intervals. Each entry
in the table is the number of errors made per 100 full games (or 900
defensive innings).
Year |
P |
C |
1B |
2B |
3B |
SS |
OF |
1895 |
24 |
27 |
26 |
44 |
46 |
67 |
19 |
1900 |
22 |
24 |
23 |
38 |
38 |
59 |
14 |
1905 |
18 |
22 |
20 |
31 |
28 |
50 |
10 |
1910 |
16 |
19 |
18 |
28 |
25 |
45 |
9 |
1915 |
16 |
17 |
15 |
25 |
22 |
40 |
9 |
1920 |
14 |
14 |
13 |
23 |
20 |
35 |
8 |
1925 |
12 |
12 |
11 |
21 |
17 |
32 |
8 |
1930 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
19 |
16 |
30 |
7 |
1935 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
18 |
16 |
27 |
7 |
1940 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
17 |
15 |
25 |
6 |
1945 |
10 |
9 |
9 |
16 |
15 |
23 |
6 |
1950 |
10 |
9 |
9 |
15 |
15 |
22 |
5 |
1955 |
10 |
9 |
9 |
14 |
15 |
20 |
5 |
1960 |
10 |
9 |
9 |
13 |
15 |
19 |
5 |
1965 |
10 |
9 |
9 |
13 |
15 |
19 |
5 |
1970 |
10 |
9 |
8 |
12 |
15 |
18 |
5 |
1975 |
10 |
9 |
8 |
12 |
15 |
17 |
5 |
1980 |
9 |
9 |
8 |
11 |
15 |
16 |
5 |
1985 |
9 |
9 |
8 |
10 |
15 |
16 |
4 |
1990 |
9 |
8 |
8 |
9 |
15 |
15 |
4 |
1995 |
9 |
8 |
8 |
9 |
15 |
15 |
4 |
2000 |
8 |
7 |
7 |
9 |
14 |
14 |
4 |
This table shows the errors per 100
games over time by position.
For example, to assign an error
rating to a shortstop from 1912, determine how many errors that player
made per 100 games. Suppose the player made 39 errors and was the
shortstop about 80% of the time. Based on a 154-game schedule, that's
about 123 full games. In 100 games, he would have made 39 x 100 / 123 =
32 errors. Looking at the rows for 1910 and 1915 in the table, we can
estimate that the average shortstop in 1912 made 43 errors per 100
games. Our shortstop's rate is 32, which is 74% of 43, so his rating is
74.
Outfielder throwing
The strength and accuracy of an
outfielder's throwing arm are indicated in this rating, which is used
whenever a runner tries to take an extra base on a single, double or fly
ball. These ratings takes values from Excellent to Poor.
When we assign throwing ratings for
modern outfielders, we use detailed information about the number of
extra bases opposing runners took on singles, doubles and fly balls hit
to that outfielder. We also look at the number of runners thrown out,
but outfielder assists can be misleading. Some outfielders pick up
meaningless assists on plays where one or two runners score on a weak
throw to the plate, and the batter is retired when the throw is cut off.
If you are assigning throwing ratings
for past seasons, we suggest you compare assist totals across the
league. Generally speaking, the higher the assist total, the better the
throwing arm. This is not always true, of course, because some
outfielders have such a great reputation for throwing that nobody tries
to run on them (meaning their assist totals are low). So you will need
to use some judgment here.
Catcher throwing
This rating indicates the strength
and accuracy of the catcher's throwing arm and is used whenever a runner
tries to steal second or third. It has values from Excellent to Poor.
When we assign catcher throwing
ratings for modern seasons, we use detailed studies of play-by-play data
to see how often opposing runners challenged each catchers arm and what
percentage of those runners were thrown out. Our studies take into
account any SB that were credited to trailing runners on double steals
and how often a runner was caught stealing as a result of a pickoff
throw by a pitcher. Most importantly, we look at the performance of each
pitcher-catcher pair, an approach that helps us determine whether it's
the pitcher or catcher who deserves the credit or blame for the results.
When assigning throwing ratings for
past seasons, you can start by comparing assist totals across the
league. Unfortunately, the best throwing catchers often don't have high
assist totals because opposing runners don't run on them in the first
place, so you will need to use some judgment.
Passed ball rating
This number indicates how many times
a catcher will allow a passed ball in 1,000 plate appearances
with runners on base. The
formula is similar to that for wild pitch ratings for pitchers: rating
= (passed balls * 1000) / (batters caught * .43)
Official statistics don't include
batters caught, so you'll need to estimate it. For example, if a team's
pitchers faced 6300 batters and this catcher was behind the plate 72% of
time, he caught about 6300 * .72 = 4536 batters.
The .43 factor indicates that about
43% of all plate appearances occur with runners on base. This number
rises and falls with the level of offense in the league.
Playing out of position
You can use a player at a defensive
position for which he is not rated, but his performance will suffer. How
much? It depends.
Players can make a relatively
painless transition to an easier position that is similar to one they're
already rated for. The penalties are much greater for moving to a very
different position that is also more difficult to play.
For example, a CF can play LF or RF
without suffering much at all. Both positions are similar and easier
than the one he's rated for. A LF or RF moving to CF has a more
difficult time because there's more ground to cover. Similarly, a move
from SS to 2B won't cost you too much, while a move from 2B to SS will
hurt more. And the moves that will hurt the most are (a) from any
position to catcher, (b) a catcher moving to any position except 1B, and
(c) a 1B moving to CF or another infield position.
How will these penalties show up? In
lots of ways. More balls in their zones will go for hits. They'll make
more errors. Guys without outfielder throwing or catcher throwing
ratings will be easier to run on. Unrated catchers will have more passed
balls. Unrated middle infielders won't start as many double plays on
balls hit to them, and they won't turn two as often when they're the
pivot man on the play.
You might ask why we apply penalties
even when a player is moving to a less difficult position. Couldn't a
top-rated SS play 2B as well or better than the average 2B? In the many
years that we've been assigning fielding ratings, we've seen a lot of
players get higher ratings when they make the transition from a harder
position to an easier one (especially SS -> 2B, 3B -> 1B, and CF -> LF),
but we've also seen plenty of cases where the player needed some time to
learn how to play the new position.
Every position requires mastery of a
different set of skills. A CF moving to RF needs to learn how to play
the caroms on balls hit down in the corner. A 3B needs great reflexes to
handle the hot smashes that come his way, and that might not be the
strong suit of a middle infielder moving to 3B. A SS moving to 2B must
learn how to make the pivot with his back to the runner.
If our out-of-position adjustments
assumed that every player could instantly adapt to a new position, even
an easier one, we think it would create too many opportunities for
managers to abuse the game by moving players around in ways that
real-life managers would never get away with. So the game imposes
penalties of varying degrees on all out-of-position players.
OFFENSE
Sacrifice bunt rating
The Sacrifice bunt rating indicates
the player's ability to advance a runner with a sacrifice or squeeze
bunt.
In real-life games, bunt singles are
quite rare in sacrifice and squeeze situations (about 10% of the time),
but the runners advance over 80% of the time when the batter gets the
ball in play. But a significant percentage of bunt attempts are fouled
off, putting the batter behind in the count and significantly reducing
his effectiveness. The ability to get the ball in play is often the
thing that separates the best bunters from the worst.
When we assign bunt ratings for
modern seasons, we study pitch-by-pitch and play-by-play data from every
real-life game to determine which bunters have more success getting the
ball in play and advancing the runners.
The ratings range from Excellent to
Poor. The better the rating, the fewer the number of foul bunts, and the
higher the success rate when he does get the ball in play.
Bunting for a hit
Most of what we just said about
sacrifice bunts applies to bunting for a hit, except that this rating
applies only when the batter attempts to bunt with the bases empty or
with two out.
In real-life games, bunt singles are
fairly common in these situations. The best bunters are successful over
40% of the time. But because the hitter often tries to get a running
start on these bunt attempts, two-thirds of them are fouled off, putting
the batter behind in the count and significantly reducing his
effectiveness. As with sacrifice and squeeze bunts, the ability to get
the ball in play is often the thing that separates the best bunters from
the worst.
The ratings range from Excellent to
Poor. The better the rating, the fewer the number of foul bunts, and the
higher the success rate when he does get the ball in play.
Running rating
The running rating measures the
player's ability to take extra bases on singles, doubles, and caught fly
balls. It measures both running speed and the player's judgment about
when to take the extra base. Some slow runners have good ratings because
they know when to try for the extra base. Some fast runners have low
ratings because they don't read the ball off the bat very well or
because they're too aggressive and get thrown out frequently.
When we assign running ratings for
modern players, we use detailed information about the number of extra
bases a runner takes on singles, doubles and fly balls, and the number
of times each runner is thrown out on the bases.
If you do not have this information,
you can assess a player's running ability based on statistics and other
factors -- triples, stolen bases, defensive position, batting order
position -- that suggest speed or lack of it. This method isn't
foolproof -- our studies always uncover fast players who don't seem to
succeed on the bases -- but it's a good method when you don't have
play-by-play data to work with.
The running ratings range from
Excellent to Poor. We rarely assign a running rating better than Average
for pitchers and catchers, but there are exceptions from time to time.
Jump and steal ratings
The jump and steal ratings work
together to indicate how well this player can steal bases. The jump
rating measures his ability to read the pitcher and get a good jump on a
steal attempt. The steal rating measures how successful he is on those
attempts.
When we assign jump and steal
ratings, we look at the player's stolen base and caught stealing totals,
but we also examine the play-by-play data to see whether these
statistics are telling the whole story. Some players pick up a few bonus
steals as a trailing runner on double steals that were really earned by
the lead runner. Others are very selective, trying to steal only against
the weakest catchers and pitchers. So we don't rely on a strict formula
when developing these ratings. However, because most people don't have
access to this type of information, we've put together some guidelines
to use when creating your own players.
One way to calculate the jump rating
is to divide the number of steal attempts by the number of times the
player reached first base (singles + walks + hit by pitch), using the
following table:
Rating |
Rate |
Ex |
at least 25% |
Vg |
at least 15% |
Av |
at least 9% |
Fr |
at least 3.5% |
Pr |
less than 3.5% |
Excellent stealing ratings are
reserved for players who succeed at least 83% of the time. Average
stealers are successful about 67% of the time. Poor stealers are thrown
out more than half the time.
Hitter type
This rating indicates whether the
batter is a pull hitter or spray hitter. A right-handed batter is
considered a pull hitter if he hit theball to the left fielder, third
baseman or shortstop at least 50% of the time in real life. The same
rule is appliedto left-handed batters, but the right fielder, first
baseman and second baseman are used instead.
Power rating
This rating doesn't appear on the
ratings form, but we'll mention it because it's on the player profile
and in other places in the game. It indicates how well a player hits for
power (doubles, triples and homers) against left- and right-handed
pitching, and it is automatically calculated by DMB whenever you create
a player or modify a player's event table.
This rating, which has values ranging
from Excellent to Poor, does not determine the outcome of any plays. Its
purpose is to give you a quick indicator of how much power is
represented in the player's event table, and is therefore a useful
companion to the player's batting average.
Statistically, the rating represents
a batter's rate of extra-base hits after adjusting for park.
PITCHING
Durability as a starting pitcher or
reliever
These ratings (which take values from
Excellent to Poor) are used to determine how quickly a pitcher gets
tired.
A player who was not used as a
starter in real life does not have a rating. If he is used as a starter
in DMB, he tires more quickly than a player with a Poor rating.
A player who was not used as a
reliever in real life does not have a relief rating. If he is used in
relief, he will have above-average durability in that role, since his
arm is accustomed to long outings.
There are three ways to determine how
durable a pitcher was. The best way, which can only be used for recent
seasons, is to look at the average number of pitches thrown per
appearance. These days, only the most durable and effective starting
pitchers throw an average of 110 pitches or more. Most are in the 90s.
The second way is to compute the
average number of batters faced per start. As you can see from the
following table, which shows the average number of batters faced per
appearance, pitchers are being used very differently today than they
were 100 years ago. Back then, relief pitchers were used only in
emergencies. Today, a complete game from a starting pitcher is unusual.
Year |
Starters |
Relievers |
Year |
Starters |
Relievers |
1895 |
35 |
17 |
1950 |
29 |
8 |
1900 |
34 |
18 |
1955 |
29 |
7 |
1905 |
34 |
13 |
1960 |
28 |
7 |
1910 |
33 |
12 |
1965 |
28 |
7 |
1915 |
33 |
10 |
1970 |
27 |
6 |
1920 |
32 |
10 |
1975 |
27 |
6 |
1925 |
32 |
9 |
1980 |
26 |
6 |
1930 |
31 |
9 |
1985 |
26 |
6 |
1935 |
31 |
9 |
1990 |
26 |
5 |
1940 |
30 |
8 |
1995 |
26 |
5 |
1945 |
30 |
8 |
2000 |
26 |
5 |
The third way is to look at a
pitcher's complete game percentage compared to the norms for his era.
We consider all three of these pieces
of information (when we have them all) when assigning durability ratings
to starting pitchers. But keep in mind that there are some other factors
that you may also want to consider:
-
bad pitchers don't last long, but
it's not necessarily because they tire out. For a pitcher like this,
you may want to assign a better durability rating than would
normally be assigned based on batters faced per game. On those rare
occasions when he's pitching well, this pitcher might indeed be able
to go deep into the late innings or even throw a complete game.
-
it follows from the previous
point that starter durability rating is most important for good
pitchers. It doesn't matter much if a bad pitcher is allowed to stay
in your games too long, but if a pitcher was very effective but
didn't consistently pitch into the late innings, his starter
durability rating is the only thing that will stop him from
completing too many games.
-
a pitcher on a bad team may also
be more durable than his batters faced numbers indicate if he's
frequently removed from games for a pinch hitter
-
today's pitchers throw an average
of 3.8 pitches per batter. Historical data of this type is not
available, but we estimate that pitches per batter have risen over
the past 100 years from the a low of 3.0-3-2 to today's much higher
levels.
-
the values in the above table are
averages, not maximums. In any given game, a pitcher can usually
face 5-6 more batters than these tables indicate without getting
tired. The values in the table reflect an average of the pitcher's
short outings (the ones where he got pounded and he left the game
before he could get tired) and his longer ones.
In DMB, as in real life, there is no
magic indicator to tell you when a pitcher is tired. You must make a
judgment call based on his performance in the current game and from his
durability rating.
The following tables may help you
decide when to remove a pitcher. Keep in mind that these tables are
based on how pitchers are used today, so you'll need to make adjustments
if you're playing older seasons. And remember that fatigue sets in
gradually, so you may occasionally get away with pushing a pitcher
beyond the normal limits.
For starting pitchers (pitch counts):
Rating |
One game |
Five days |
Ex |
125-135 |
210-230 |
Vg |
115-125 |
195-215 |
Av |
105-115 |
180-200 |
Fr |
95-105 |
165-185 |
Pr |
85-95 |
150-170 |
For relief pitchers (pitch counts):
Rating |
One game |
Five days |
Ex |
60-70 |
100-115 |
Vg |
45-55 |
80-95 |
Av |
30-40 |
50-65 |
Fr |
25-35 |
40-55 |
Pr |
20-30 |
35-50 |
Holding runners
This rating indicates a pitcher's
ability to hold runners close on steal attempts. An Excellent rating
indicates a pitcher against whom opposing runners attempt to steal with
the next base open less than 5% of the time. Poor pitchers allow
attempts almost 30% of the time.
When we assign hold ratings for
modern seasons, we use detailed studies of play-by-play data to see how
often opposing runners challenged each pitcher and what percentage of
those runners were thrown out. Our studies take pickoffs into account,
along with any steals that were credited to trailing runners on double
steals. Most importantly, we look at the performance of each
pitcher-catcher pair, an approach that helps us determine whether it's
the pitcher or catcher who deserves the credit or blame for the results.
Unfortunately, there is very little
information available for past seasons. It's only in recent years that
stolen bases against pitchers and catchers were routinely published.
ROSTER CONSTRUCTION /
TEAM LINEUP FORM
PITCHING CHART
The pitching chart includes your
starting rotation, rules for how your starters are to be used, a list of
other pitchers who may start from time to time, and the assignment of
relief pitchers to various roles.
Roles
You can assign up to five pitchers to
each of the following roles:
-
Starting rotation. You identify the pitchers that make up
your starting rotation and the order in which they appear. You can
use a rotation with three, four or five pitchers -- just leave spots
empty if you don't want to use five pitchers. You also indicate
whether starting pitchers should be used in strict rotation, in
rotation but with the option to jump to the #1 starter if off-days
make him available, or in proportion to the number of starts made in
real life.
-
Spot Starters. If you want a pitcher to make occasional
starts, you can designate that player as a spot starter. The list of
spot starters parallels the list of pitchers in the starting
rotation. If you want someone to start 20% of the time in place of
the number four starter, enter this player in the fourth spot in the
spot starter list, and enter 20 when you are prompted for the
percentage.
-
Mopup situations. You can designate up to five pitchers for
the mopup role. This role is used for the weaker pitchers on the
team. They will normally be used only when your team is winning or
losing by a large margin and the outcome of the game isn't really in
doubt, though they may appear in close games if other pitchers are
not available due to injury or fatigue.
-
Long Relief. You can designate pitchers for the role of long
relief. Long relievers are generally used when the starting pitcher
is replaced prior to the seventh inning, but will also be used in
other game situations when required, particularly when a team is
losing by a large margin and wants to preserve its better pitchers
for future games.
-
Setup Men. There are two lists of setup men, one to face
left-handed batters and one to face right-handed batters. Setup men
are generally used in the seventh inning or later in close games,
but will also be used in other situations when required.
-
Closers. There are two lists of closers, one to face
left-handed batters and one to face right-handed batters. Closers
are generally used in the eighth or ninth inning when the team has a
lead in a close game, but will also be used in other situations when
required.
In most game situations, the computer
manager uses the first available pitcher in the appropriate list
whenever a reliever is called for (excluding players on the reserve
roster). So it is important that you list your players in the order you
wish them to be considered, with your first choice at the top of the
list.
However, there are other situations
where another choice will be made. If the bullpen has been used heavily,
the computer manager may use the most rested pitcher. If either team has
a big lead, it may choose to use a less talented pitcher to make sure
your top pitchers are rested for future games. If a game goes into extra
innings, everyone in the bullpen is a candidate to enter the game.
Enter a pitcher on more than one list
if you want him to be considered for more than one role. For example,
your top setup man may also be your number two closer. However, there is
no need to fill up all of the lists, since the computer manager chooses
from other lists if nobody in a particular role is available.
MANAGER TENDENCIES
There are twenty tactics for which
you can influence how the computer manager makes its decisions:
-
seven govern
offensive plays: bunting for
a hit, sacrifice bunting, squeeze bunting, using the hit and run,
stealing, baserunning, and taking pitches.
-
four influence how frequently
pinch hitters will be used in
various situations: for a pitcher, for a non-pitcher, for a platoon
partner, and in the late innings of a blowout.
-
three affect
defensive tactics: holding
runners, guarding the lines, and bringing the infield in.
-
and six help determine how the
pitching staff is used:
pitching around hitters, intentionally walking hitters, pitching
out, making pickoff throws, using relief pitchers, and using
closers.
The values you can set for each
tactic are Most Frequent, More Frequent, Neutral, Less Frequent, and
Least Frequent.
Playing the Percentages
For each of these tactics, Diamond
Mind has studied play-by-play data to analyze the frequency with which
they are deployed by real-life managers. We have examined how those
frequencies are affected by the inning, number of outs, the score,
baserunner locations, the ability of the players involved, and other
factors.
When set to
Neutral, the computer manager
attempts to replicate these real life patterns by choosing, for example,
to bunt with only the best bunters in the most appropriate bunting
situations and when the batter wouldn't do better against this
particular pitcher by swinging away. In other words, if you set
everything to Neutral, the
computer manager plays the percentages.
Based on an analysis of thousands of
real-life games, the computer manager knows the odds of winning a game
in any situation (such as when you're the away team and down by a run in
the seventh), and it knows the probability of scoring a certain number
of runs in any situation. So it sometimes plays for a big inning, and
sometimes it plays for one run, whichever gives it the best chance to
win. And it preserves the element of surprise, so you cannot always
predict what the computer manager will do in a particular situation.
If all of your manager tendencies are
set to Neutral, a team with more
good base-stealers will steal more often than a team with fewer good
base-stealers. A team with more good runners will take more extra bases
on hits and flies than a team with fewer good runners. This is equally
true of real-life rosters and draft-league rosters. As a result,
the Neutral setting is the best choice
for most teams, especially teams with which you are not too
familiar.
The other settings are intended to
override the computer manager's natural inclination to play the
percentages. If you want your team to sacrifice bunt less often, despite
having many good bunters, set your Sacrifice bunting tendency to Less
Frequent or Least Frequent. If you want your team to try to pressure
your opponent into making throwing errors, set your Running tendency to
More Frequent or Most Frequent. But be aware that being more aggressive
may mean taking more chances than the percentages would normally call
for.
What the settings mean
Because there are too many variations
in game situations and talent levels among different rosters, there are
no precise answers to the question, "What will the computer manager do
if I choose this setting?" However, you may want to consider the
following when making your choices, then play some games using the
computer manager to see how it handles your team in different
situations:
Bunting. As is the case with all tendencies, a player's bunt
rating is still the most important factor in determining how often the
computer manager asks a player to bunt, but you can use the three
bunting tendencies to increase or decrease bunt attempts by the players
on your team.
The
squeeze bunt tendency is used
whenever there's a runner on third with less than two outs.
While it is true that some real-life
managers will use the sacrifice bunt with runners on first or third in
order to move the runner from first to second and holding the runner at
third, the DMB computer manager does not use this tactic.
It prefers not to give up an out when it
already has a runner in scoring position.
The
bunt for hit tendency is used whenever there are two out, the
bases are empty, and in a couple of other situations where runners are
on base but sacrificing makes little sense.
For example, with a position player at the
plate, real-life managers rarely call for a sacrifice with one out and a
single runner on either first or second,
so DMB uses the bunt for hit tendency in those situations.
With nobody out, or a pitcher at the
plate, it's a different story, and DMB uses the sacrifice bunt tendency
in those cases.
The
sacrifice bunt tendency is used with nobody out and a runner on
first, a runner on second, or runners on both first and second.
With one out, the sacrifice bunt tendency
is used with a pitcher at the plate, but the bunt for hit tendency is
used when a position player is batting, because real-life position
players rarely sacrifice with one out. More
often than not, they're bunting for a hit even with a runner on base.
Hit
and run. When
deciding whether to use the hit and run, the computer manager is looking
primarily at the batter's ability to make contact (and thereby protect
the runner) and the likelihood that he'll hit into a double play if he
does. High
strikeout rates discourage the use of the hit and run, while high rates
of ground ball double plays encourage the use of this tactic.
The settings for this tactic nudge the
computer manager in the direction you choose by adjusting the
contact-rate and GDP-rate thresholds it uses to make these decisions.
Stealing. When set to Neutral,
the computer manager is reluctant to attempt steals with runners owning
low Steal ratings, since they
will be thrown out too often. If you want to further restrict your steal
attempts to those players with the highest steal ratings, choose
Less Frequent or
Least Frequent. This will not
stop your best stealers from running, but will restrain other players.
Running.
This tendency governs how many chances the computer manager will take on
the base paths. When the computer manager makes a running decision, it
compares the chances of gaining the extra base
safely to a minimum threshold
based on the game situation.
The chances of gaining the extra base
are determined by the nature of the batted ball, whether the runner was
going on the pitch or on contact, the running rating of the runner, and
the throwing rating of the outfielder.
The minimum threshold is based on the
game situation and whether it makes more sense to play for one run (as
in the late innings of a close game) or a big inning. Depending on the
number of outs and where the runners are situated, the value of taking
the extra base can be high or low, as can be the cost of getting thrown
out. The computer manager takes these factors into consideration when
deciding how high the chances of success need to be to justify taking
the risk of getting thrown out.
The Running tendency controls the
minimum threshold. If you choose "less frequent" or "least frequent",
the minimum threshold rises. That causes the computer manager to send
the runner only when the chances of success are higher. If you choose
"more frequent" or "more frequent", the minimum threshold is lowered,
and the computer manager will take more chances.
NOTE:
This tendency applies to singles, doubles
and fly balls. It does not affect the decision to send the runner home
from third on a ground ball.
Taking pitches.
This tendency enables you to increase or
decrease the likelihood that your best hitters
will have the green light to swing with three balls and no
strikes. It doesn't affect any other
counts. And you don't need to use this tendency to prevent your weaker
hitters from swinging at 3-0 pitches because the computer manager never
gives them the green light.
Pinch
hitting. In
all game situations other than blowouts, the computer manager uses a
pinch hitter only if he is rated to be better than the scheduled hitter
against the current pitcher. This
assessment takes into account the handedness and the left/right splits
of both the batter and the pitcher.
A "least frequent" setting tells the
computer manager to pinch hit less often; that is, only when the pinch
hitter is much better than the scheduled hitter. A "most frequent"
setting tells the computer manager to pinch hit more aggressively; that
is, even when the pinch hitter is only a little better than the
scheduled hitter.
Pinch hitting in blowouts is a
different matter altogether. In these situations, the goal is not to
gain an advantage, it's to replace the team's better players to reduce
their risk of injury. In blowouts, the computer manager generally
replaces a better player with a weaker one, so the relative strength of
the players is not a concern. Instead, the blowout pinch hitting
tendency influences the computer manager decisions about (a) how big a
lead is needed for the game to be treated as a blowout and (b) how early
in the game it will begin to remove players.
In blowout situations, the "In blowouts"
tendency takes precedence over the other pinch hitting tendencies.
Holding runners. When set to
Neutral, all runners but the worst are held. Choosing Most
Frequent causes all runners to be held. Choosing
Least Frequent causes the first
basemen to play behind runners with low
Jump and Steal ratings.
Guard
the lines. This setting controls the inning in which the computer
manager begins to think about guarding the lines:
Tendency |
Inning |
Most frequent, more
frequent |
7th |
Neutral |
8th |
Less frequent |
9th |
Least frequent |
never |
Infield in. This setting controls the inning in which the
computer manager begins looking for opportunities to bring the infield
in:
Tendency |
Inning |
Most frequent |
1st |
More frequent |
4th |
Neutral |
6th |
Less frequent |
7th |
Least frequent |
8th |
This tendency does not affect the
decision to bring the infield in at the corners, which can occur anytime
during a game to discourage a batter from bunting.
Pitching around and Intentional walk.
The computer manager issues intentional
walks with first base open and a dangerous hitter at the plate if the
on-deck hitter is much less of a threat. If
the intentional walk tendency is set to most frequent, the computer
manager will issue a walk with a smaller difference in hitting ability
between the next two hitters. If
it is set to least frequent, the computer manager will issue the walk
only if the current hitter is even more dangerous relative to the
on-deck hitter.
If the next hitter is more dangerous
than the on-deck hitter, but not to a large enough degree to convince
the computer manager to issue an intentional walk, the computer manager
might instruct the pitcher to pitch around the next hitter.
The pitching around tendency is very
similar to the intentional walk tendency in that it determines how large
the gap in hitting ability must be to justify the decision to pitch
around a hitter.
Pickoff throws and pitchouts. Both
of these tactics are used to slow down opposing base stealers.
You may find that the "most frequent" and
"more frequent" tendencies are helpful, especially if your pitcher and
catcher are not especially good at shutting down the running game
without a little extra help. Keep
in mind, however, that pitchouts can give the hitter an advantage in the
ball-strike count and too many pickoff throws can lead to errors and/or
wear and tear on the pitcher's arm.
Using
relievers, using closers.
The decision to use a
reliever is very complex. Each
decision involves so many factors -- including the inning, score,
location of baserunners, quality of the current pitcher, quality of the
potential reliever, left/right matchups, fatigue, the makeup of the
pitching portion of the manager profile, fatigue, and more -- that it's
not possible to lay out simple rules that tell you exactly how these
tendencies will affect the computer manager's decisions.
The basic idea, however, is that they
influence how quickly the computer manager will make the move to bring
in a reliever (in non-save situations) or the closer (in save
situations) when the current pitcher begins to get into trouble.
PLAYER TENDENCIES
Reasonable limits
DMB is a strategy game that is
designed to provide you with a real baseball experience.
It's not like many video games that give
you so much control that you can easily play games and produce
statistics that bear little or no resemblance to real big-league games.
As a result, there are reasonable limits
on the impact of player tendencies.
It's not possible, for example, to
set a tendency that tells a certain player to attempt a steal every time
he reaches first base with second base open. There isn't a player in
history who has done that, and it's just not realistic to allow that to
happen in your DMB games. Similarly, it doesn't make sense to allow a
runner with a Poor jump rating and a Poor steal rating to attempt 50
steals a season.
It is possible, however, to set a
player's Stealing tendency to Most Frequent. By doing so, you're telling
the computer manager to give that player the green light
more often than it normally would for a
player with his ratings.
How much more often? It varies from
tactic to tactic, but it's generally in the range of 20-40%. In other
words, you can't use player tendencies to double or triple the rate at
which a player attempts to steal, take extra bases, bunt for hits, and
so on. Game situations and player ratings are still the most important
factor in how the computer manager makes decisions.
On the other hand, it's not all that
unusual for a real-life player to go several seasons without trying to
steal a base or drop down a bunt. So it is possible to assign a
Never tendency, and the computer
manager will honor that request.
OFFENSIVE TENDENCIES
Most of these tendencies have the
same meaning as in the context of manager tendencies, so we won't
describe them again here.
Bunting. As is the case with all tendencies, a player's bunt
rating is still the most important factor in determining how often the
computer manager asks a player to bunt, but you can use the three
bunting tendencies to increase, decrease, or eliminate bunt attempts by
this player.
Setting the Bunting for a hit
tendency to Never only stops a
batter from attempting a bunt in non-sacrifice and non-squeeze
situations. If Sacrifice and Squeeze bunting tendencies are not set to
never as well, it is still possible for a batter to get a bunt single if
he beats one out in a sacrifice or squeeze bunt situation.
Similarly, if you set Sacrifice
bunting to Never but do not do
the same for Squeeze bunting, it is possible for a hitter to sacrifice
in squeeze situations. This is why the batter would compile sac hit
statistics.
Hit
and run. DMB players don't have a hit and run rating, but the
computer manager does look at a player's skills to determine how often
he should be asked to execute a hit and run play. Strikeout-prone
hitters are less likely to be called upon, while contact hitters and
slower runners (who are prone to grounding into double plays) are more
likely to participate in a hit and run play. You can use the hit and run
tendency to increase, decrease, or eliminate the hit and run play when
this player is batting.
Stealing. As is the case with bunting, this tendency is quite
straightforward. The computer manager will continue to rely on the
ratings of the players involved (jump and steal for the runner, hold for
the pitcher, throwing for the catcher) and the game situation to decide
when a steal attempt makes sense. You can, however, use this tendency to
increase or decrease the attempt rate for a player, or eliminate steal
attempts altogether.
Running. This tendency governs how many chances the computer
manager will take on the base paths. When the computer manager makes a
running decision, it compares the chances of gaining the extra base
safely to a minimum threshold based on the game situation.
The chances of gaining the extra base
are determined by the nature of the batted ball, whether the runner was
going on the pitch or on contact, the running rating of the runner, and
the throwing rating of the outfielder.
The minimum threshold is based on the
game situation and whether it makes more sense to play for one run (as
in the late innings of a close game) or a big inning. Depending on the
number of outs and where the runners are situated, the value of taking
the extra base can be high or low, as can be the cost of getting thrown
out. The computer manager takes these factors into consideration when
deciding how high the chances of success need to be to justify taking
the risk of getting thrown out.
The Running tendency controls the
minimum threshold. If you choose "less frequent" or "least frequent",
the minimum threshold rises. That causes the computer manager to send
the runner only when the chances of success are higher. If you choose
"more frequent" or "more frequent", the minimum threshold is lowered,
and the computer manager will take more chances with this runner.
Setting the Running tendency to
Never means that the runner will
always be held if there is any chance he
could be thrown out. Because taking an extra base is automatic
for even the worst runners on some batted balls (e.g. very deep flies),
especially if the hit and run is on or the runner goes on contact with
two out, players with a Running tendency of Never will run from time to
time. But you won't see them trying to advance when the outcome is
uncertain.
NOTE:
The Running tendency does not apply to situations where a batter tries
to stretch a single into a double or a double into a triple. In those
cases, the batter/runner makes his own decision and is not influenced by
any manager or player tendency.
While it's true that you can
dramatically reduce the number of outs your players make on the bases by
assigning the Never tendency, that doesn't necessarily mean it's good
strategy. You may miss out on high percentage opportunities to score a
runner from third on a fly ball or from second on a single, and if the
other hitters don't cash those runs in, your team will leave more
runners on base. You may also hit into more double plays if your runners
aren't taking advantage of running opportunities.
Taking pitches. This tendency enables you to increase or decrease
the likelihood that your best hitters
will have the green light to swing with
three balls and no strikes. It doesn't affect any other counts.
And you don't need to use this tendency to prevent your weaker hitters
from swinging at 3-0 pitches because the computer manager never gives
the green light to weaker hitters.
PINCH HITTING TENDENCIES
There are four tendencies in the
category of "Remove for pinch hitter" that govern how often this player
should be lifted in different situations:
-
the
"Versus LHP" and
"Versus RHP" tendencies
enable you to indicate how seriously the computer manager should
consider using a pinch hitter in place of this player. Choose Never
to tell the computer manager not to pinch hit for this player
(except perhaps in blowout situations).
-
the
"In a platoon" tendency
applies only if this player is in the starting lineup and a platoon
partner is listed in the depth chart at his position. To prevent a
player from being removed for a platoon partner, choose
Never. (You can achieve this
same effect more easily by removing the platoon player from the
depth chart.)
-
the
"In blowouts" tendency
applies only in the late innings of a game in which one team has a
very big lead.
In all game situations other than
blowouts, the computer manager uses a pinch hitter only if he is rated
to be better than the scheduled hitter
against the current pitcher. This assessment takes into account
the handedness and the left/right splits of both the batter and the
pitcher.
The player tendencies for pinch
hitting indicate how much better the pinch hitter needs to be. A "least
frequent" setting tells the computer manager to pinch hit less often;
that is, only when the pinch hitter is much better than the scheduled
hitter. A "most frequent" setting tells the computer manager to pinch
hit more aggressively; that is, even when the pinch hitter is only a
little better than the scheduled hitter.
Pinch hitting in blowouts is a
different matter altogether. In these situations, the goal is not to
gain an advantage, it's to replace the team's better players to reduce
their risk of injury. In blowouts, the computer manager generally
replaces a better player with a weaker one, so the relative strength of
the players is not a concern. Instead, the blowout pinch hitting
tendency influences the computer manager decisions about (a) how big a
lead is needed for the game to be treated as a blowout and (b) how early
in the game it will begin to remove players.
In blowout situations, the "In
blowouts" tendency takes precedence over the other pinch hitting
tendencies. If a player's tendencies are set to
Never for the three non-blowout
situations, he can still be replaced by a pinch hitter in a blowout.
PITCHING TENDENCIES
Most of these tendencies have the
same meaning as in the context of manager tendencies, so we won't
describe them again here.
Using
relievers, Using closers.
These settings indicate how aggressively the computer manager should go
to the bullpen with this pitcher already
in the game. They have no any impact on how often this pitcher is
brought into the game in the first place.
The
Never setting for "Using relievers" and "Using closers"
doesn't really mean never. It
would be highly unrealistic to ask a pitcher to stay in the game no
matter how tired he gets or how hard he's being hit. The computer
manager always reserves the right to lift a tired or ineffective pitcher
regardless of your tendencies, though it will stick with an ineffective
pitcher longer if you choose "less frequent", "least frequent", or
"never".
Instead, a setting of Never tells the
computer manager to keep this pitcher in the game until he gets tired,
until he loses effectiveness, or until the opposing team creates a
meaningful threat, whichever comes first. With this setting, the
computer manager won't go to a setup man or closer just because that
potential reliever is a better pitcher.
TIP:
If you want a closer to be used as often as possible, set the
team's manager tendency
for "Using closers" to "most frequent". Or, if you want a little more
control, set the "Using closers" tendency for some of the team's
starting pitchers and middle relievers to "most frequent".
Catcher fatigue
The catcher fatigue system is
designed to ensure that you limit your starting catcher to about 85-90%
of total playing time. It does so by monitoring usage within a moving
ten-day window as the season goes along.
If you're in a stretch where your
team has no days off, your catcher will almost certainly get tired if
you start him ten games in a row. Giving a catcher an off day once every
ten days is sometimes enough to keep him rested, and giving him two days
off will definitely keep him at full strength unless he caught a couple
of long extra-inning games in that stretch.
A catcher's workload is determined on
a batters-caught basis. In a modern season, a team typically faces about
6250 batters over a 182-day schedule. That's about 344 batters per ten
day period, and because we try to limit catchers to 85-90% of total
playing time, you should try to keep your catchers from facing more than
300 batters in a ten day period. You can monitor catcher usage using the
Team Status report and the Status page of the player profile window.
If a catcher is used more than this,
he will be less productive as a hitter and fielder, with the penalty
being greater the further the catcher is over the limit. The penalty is
very severe if you let someone catch every inning of every game, so it's
not something you'd want to try on a regular basis.
Using a catcher at another position
(including designated hitter) is equivalent to giving him the day off,
but you need to do this in advance. If you catch him too much and he
gets tired as a result, you can't play him at another position the next
game without penalizing him at the plate. But if you play him somewhere
else once in a while, that will help keep him rested in the first place.
OVERVIEW OF ERAS
Much of baseball's rich tradition is
due to the unchanging nature of the game. Nevertheless, some aspects of
baseball have changed dramatically over time. For example:
-
Today, league batting averages
are typically around .270. But over the past seventy years they have
ranged from under .240 to over .300 due to changes in rules,
ballparks, and equipment.
-
At the turn of the 20th century,
it was common for shortstops to make over 60 errors in a season.
Today, few shortstops make more than 25 errors.
-
Also at the turn of the 20th
century, it was common for starting pitchers to complete over 80% of
the games they started. Today, teams rely much more on their relief
pitchers, with starting pitchers completing fewer than 10% of their
starts.
-
Pitchers in leagues using the
designated hitter rule usually allow one more run every two games
than they would in a non-DH league, because they do not face
weak-hitting pitchers.
It is not possible to play realistic
games among teams of different eras without adjusting for these changing
playing conditions. For example, without these adjustments, a 1912 team
would have almost no chance of beating a 1984 team because it would make
two to three times as many errors. Are the 1984 fielders really that
much better? Of course not. They just have the advantage of using modern
gloves and playing on artificial turf.
Or, to use a modern example, a
pitcher from a DH-league typically allows an extra run every two games
compared with a pitcher who does not have to face a DH. If you want to
see what would happen if this pitcher was traded to a non-DH league, or
you wanted to release all of the players from both leagues and draft new
rosters, you need a way to make sure the DH-league pitcher is not
unfairly punished.
DMB uses eras to adjust for these
factors. In DMB:
-
A .280 hitter in 1968 (when the
league batting average was under .250) is a better hitter than
someone who hit .280 in 1930 (when the average player batted .300).
-
A shortstop making 40 errors in
1912 is a better fielder than a shortstop making 30 errors in 1993.
-
A starting pitcher completing 30%
of his games in 1984 is more durable (relative to his peers) than
someone who completed 50% of his starts in 1920.
-
A DH-league pitcher with a 3.30
earned-run average is a better pitcher than someone with a 3.00 ERA
in a non-DH league.
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