Marine Vignettes #17-20

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Marine Vignettes By Gunny G

#17 Fire Fight at Yudam-ni By Russ Carlson

January 16, 1998

The December 1996 H-3-5 Newsletter carried the personal account by Col. Williamson of the 1st Division"s march from Yudam-ni to the sea. This brought back memories for me of this bloody battle, and my first fire fight.

Col. Williamson mentioned a machine-gunner getting hit across the helmet by a Chinese on the night of November 28 to the 29, 1950. I was an ammo carrier with that machine gun squad and was in the fox hole to the immediate left of the machine gun position. My squad leader was Cpl. Cletus Munie and my section leader was Sgt. Ken Partlow. Since I was the newest guy just having arrived in Korea November 7, Cpl. Munie took me under his wing, and I was with him in the fox-hole next to the machine gun. We were sure we were coming under attack that night, so our fox-holes were very close together, no more than ten feet apart. We started out with 100% alert, and this went between 50% and 100% all night long. The previous night we hadn"t gotten any sleep at all. This night we were trying to sleep in sitting positions, with our boots and helmets on, weapons cocked and ready, and sleeping bags pulled up to the chest. The temperature was almost 50 degrees below.

We had been told that there was one of our listening posts to the front, down the draw, which would be the most logical approach for the enemy to attack us. For hours we stared through the moonless night down the snow covered hill to detect enemy movement. To keep the men on watch awake we would occasionally throw small rocks from fox-hole to fox-hole so the rocks bounced off the helmets and the noise kept us from falling asleep.

At about 3 or 4:am I was startled to see a Chnese soldier looming up in front of me not more than 15 to 20 feet to my right. I hollered "Look Out! They're Here! " The enemy soldier was shouting a command in Chinese and sprayed the area with his weapon. Closely behind him came many more enemy troops. In a matter of seconds the enemy point man was on top of our machine gun position and in hand-to-hand combat with our gunner. Fortunately our gunner was able to push the attacker backwards and the assistant gunner shot the Chinese with his 45. Then all machine guns opened fire.

At daybreak we inspected the front. There were 17 dead Chinese within 40 to 50 feet of our position; further down the hill we counted 25 more. We saw that the dead Chinese soldiers wore one quilted layer of clothing and on their feet shoes that looked like tennis shoes to us. Each soldier carried a seven-day supply of food in the form of mixed grains encased in compartmentalized cloth tubing tied to the waist. Then we began to understand how the Chinese Army could move so furtively and undetected without the massive amount of supplies we normally consider essential.

How did the Chinese get so close to us? Our listening post had been withdrawn and had taken a different route back to our lines. Unfortunately we did not get the word! I sometimes wonder how close we came to losing our entire unit that night if the enemy had succeeded in pushing through our position and getting to the center of our perimeter. This night was for me, the raw recruit, baptism by fire.

Russ Carlson

H-3-5 Newsletter (9-97) Editor: Jim "RATs" Ratliff rats@centuryinter.net

#18 INVASION BREAKFAST WOLMI-DO AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

by Rod McDonald

January 27, 1998

With the exuberance of youth, tempered by the realities of the past two months of combat with H-3-5 on the perimeter, we lads which make up five of the seven-men FO team were excited about making an honest to god combat landing just like the Marines of WWII had done so many times in our memories of the recent past. I'm not really sure, but in retrospect. I would doubt that either Lt. Fly or S/Sgt Bill Conley, both of whom had made similar invasions during WWII, were sharing our enthusiasm for the forthcoming event. One of our major topics of conversation as we made 1-2 trip aboard the Japanese LST from Pusan to Inchon was the expectation of that legendary Invasion breakfasts of steak and eggs. Come September 15th our gear was all prepared and laid out ready for fast retrieval when our turn to load on the boats came. We hurried to the small mess hall for that eagerly awaited invasion breakfast, and were summarily served two cold hard boiled-eggs and semi-warm fried potatoes (aka, fried gravel.) We were more than a tad disappointed, but in the finest Marine Corps tradition, we accepted it as just anther shafting by our beloved Corps. This was our first inkling that the day may not prove to be nearly as memorable and exciting as we had anticipated. Following our invasion breakfast, we gathered up and donned our 782 gear plus all that ancillary equipment needed to make our FO team operate effectively, then hurried to our appointed gathering place on the top deck. Fly and Conely were already on station. Landing craft from some of the ships were beginning to load and form up in little circles. There may have been some naval gunfire and air strikes hitting the Wolmi-do beaches, but I have no memory of them. Time passed and we continued to stand there waiting for the word for Charlie FO#1 to load up. More and more loaded landing craft were joining the circles. Two LSMR's moved in along the beach and began giving it the dampest pounding I have ever witnessed. I knew this had to be the final stage before the circles fonmed into waves and would be moving toward the beach. Finally I had to ask. Lieutenant, it must be time for them to hit the beach, when do we load up and join them.?"Mac", he said, We won't go in until later. We don't land with How Company. I couldn't believe my ears. The Company had never before gone on an assault, or defense without us being with them to give artillery support. So we asked, what to me was the obvious question.- - - Why not? Fly just stood there for several seconds looking at me like I'd just dropped in from the planet Pluto. Finally he said What the hell are we going to use to give them fire support? All the 105's are in the holes of these two LST's.. Damn, somehow I hadn't thought about that. Over the preceding weeks we'd more or less set aside the fact that we were members of an artillery FO team who would double in brass as riflemen. We had become so enmeshed into the How Company mystique that we now had the attitude we were valued How Company riflemen who also had the side-line of adjusting artillery fire when it was necessary and needed. Late that day Charlie FO#1 was finally given a call to board a landing craft. We motored in and landed on a beachhead, long since secured, on an island which was also long since secured. We kind of felt like men who'd gone over the wall at the Alamo then returned after the battle was over to rejoin our friends. I don't recall us ever again discussing the Inchon landing during the long days and longer nights which took us from Wolmi-do to Hill 296. There was nothing to discuss. The initial disappointments had been supplanted by an emotion much akin to shame. - - - We were learning to live with the fact that when the balloon went up, we had not been called to join our company when they hit the beach. - - To hell with the good tactics and sound reasoning, we'd been left behind!

Rod McDONALD

H-3-5 Newsletter (12-96) Editor: Jim "RATs" Ratliff rats@centuryinter.net

#19 CHOSIN

By Colonel H.P. WILLIAMSON, USMC Ret.

January 27, 1998

Arrival in Yudam-ni from the east side of the reservoir took place on 27th Nov. The east side of the reservoir did not provide too much excitement, however there are a couple of items perhaps worthy of mention:] (1) Col. Taplett had arranged for the galley section to come forward and serve Thanksgiving dinner. It was the last hot non-C" ration food "H" Co. as well as the rest of 3/5 would get until we arrive much later in the Hagaru Perimeter. (2) The nights were bitterly cold, considerably below zero. I recall the motor vehicles had to be kept running most of the time to keep from freezing. How we kept from freezing is amazing. (3) My company had established an outpost - road block about one thousand meters north of the company position along a road that ran south toward the Battalion position. As I recall we had a rifle squad reinforced by a light machine gun section and some AT weapons. The unit, as I remember, must have been on fifty percent alert and all was quiet. A small group of Chinese (probably a small platoon) moved very quietly to within a few yards of the outpost without detection, then with lightning speed they raced through the position. Their mission must have been to capture a Marine prisoner because two good-size Chinese grabbed a Marine in his sleeping bag and started pulling him down the road While the Marine was being pulled down the road and unable to get out of the sleeping bag, he was shouting for the machine gunner to fire. The gunner was hesitant because of his fear of killing the Marine. Finally he fired a high burst, the Marine was dropped by the Chinese, the Marine unharmed and the Chinese killed I went out later in a jeep and saw the first Chinese killed by "H" Company. Col. Taplett also came out. To my surprise the Chinese soldiers were wearing tennis shoes with no socks, although they had warm quilted uniforms and head gear. Other than riding in a jeep in rear areas, that was my one ride in a "H"' Company jeep which stayed in the Battalion motor pool. We arrived in Yudam-ni just after noon on the 27th and Col. Taplett put the Battalion in an assembly area at the base of North Ridge toward a spur that led to hill 1384. "H" Co. occupied a sector toward the west. >From our position, H/7 position on Hill 1403 was directly to our front. We settled in peacefully, set up our defensive positions and even set up a warm tent so "all hands" could rotate through it during the night and thaw out a bit. During the early evening all was quiet then (probably about 2200) we began to hear activity toward the front of Frederick's Platoon. A small stream ran across in front; the ice was kept broken so the enemy would have difficulty in crossing. About this time bullets were hitting the warming tent. Don Watterson, the Ist Sgt., and I were a few yards (about 30) away and the tempo of firing increased on our front. To this point we had held-fire hoping to let them get close and have a "turkey shoot". As the activity increased in tempo I requested illumination from Battalion, got it. Then commenced firing and set two native houses on fire to the front with tracers and it sounded like the 4th of July. I called Tap and told him we had Chinese all across our front and we were cutting them down like "cord wood". Very quickly he called back and told me that H/7 had people to our front having been pushed off a Hill 1402. I had visions of Marines from H/7 among the Chinese or in our line of fire so I ordered cease fire. It was like turning a switch, the rifles, machine guns and mortars fell silent. With Chinese still visible to our front, for a few short moments it was hard for the Company to see why I had ordered cease fire. I was pleased with their response. Shortly thereafter we began to get H/7 Marines in our lines, the wounded were sent to Battalion Aid and others placed in our warming tent for a while then sent to Battalion Headquarters. The remainder of that first night did not provide too much excitement. When dawn came no Chinese were visible to H/5. During the daylight hours on the 28th "H:' Co. was moved to the high ground to the east of and overlooking the 3/5 C.P. We set up a light position (perimeter) and it wasn't hard to get the men to dig in well because this was a good way to keep reasonably warm. By nightfall we were well established with the likely avenues of approach toward our position well-covered. The early evening passed without incident and all hands managed to get some rest. We were on 50 percent alert as I recall. Toward dawn we heard movement coming toward the position from the northeast. We had a listening post set up in an area considered the most likely area from which an attack would come. The machine gun section and riflemen plus BAR men thought the noise to be the listening post coming back to our lines, (at this point we had lost communication with them). As it turned out the men on the listening post had to take an alternate route, which they did safely. The Chinese came right up to the muzzle of one of the machine guns before they were identified as the enemy. In fact the gunner was hit across his helmet by a Chinese (gunner not hurt) at which point the assistant gunner killed the Chinaman with his 45 pistol and all weapons commenced firing. We estimated we had been attacked by a company which was quickly repulsed. As dawn came activity to our front subsided and quiet prevailed. About 40 Chinese were lying dead where the brunt of the attack came. The Chinese were able to get their wounded out before daylight because of the uneven terrain. We remained in this position until 3/5 was ordered to move south and attack toward Hagaru. H/5 was not really bothered again by the Chinese in any force as long as we remained in that position. YUDAM-NI to HAGARU-RI On the first of December 3/5 was ordered to displace from the high ground in the north section of Yudam-ni and pass through elements of the 7th Marines and spearhead the assault to the south. Much credit should be given to Lt. Col. Taplett at this point because the manner in which he ordered the companies off their position using maximum air and ground artillery to cover the move was done so smooth Iy the Chinese did not slow things down in the least. "H" Co. was designated the lead Company to attack south along the MSR then northeast to seize the high ground overlooking the MSR. Lt. Col. Taplett told me.my objective that night was a Chinese Division MLR! It was obvious to me we had quite a job to do. Each man was carrying a heavy load and we had to lighten theindividual load yet maintain the ability to fight and move fast and still survive the elements. In the assembly area, prior to moving out, all excess equipment was burned; packs, etc. All hands had a hot "C" ration. We moved out with a maximum load of ammunition with sleeping bags attached to each Marine's cartridge belt. The extra socks and shoepack felt liners were carried under each person's shirt next to the body to keep from freezing. Rations, mostly fruit cans and dry component "C" rations, were carried in the parka pockets. As we departed the perimeter south down the MSR accompamied by one tank in the lead with the point platoon, all moved smoothly for a very short distance then all hell broke loose. The Chinese had a road block set up in force. In the ensuing action forward movement ground to a halt. I was quickly behind the assault platoon with my small command group. I ordered my radio man to stay put while Gunnery Sergeant (Tech. Sgt.) Ray Morgan, Corp. Donald Terrio and I moved forward to see what action had to be taken to get things moving. As I was talking to the Platoon Commander, Morgan and Terrio moved forward toward the tank only a few yards, and Terrio was killed by machine gun fire. He was a brave young NCO and his loss was a great blow to me. He had been Joe Fegan's runner in the heavy combat in South Korea and a real pro in every sense of the word. At this point "H" Co. was deployed on either side of the MSR. Morgan and I moved back to where I had left the radio man. Capt. George Schrier (C Co 1/5) came forward and met me, his company was following the tracks of "H" Co. We talked very briefly and it was obvious to both of us that the high ground on either side of the MSR would have to be seized in order to reduce the road block and get things moving south again. We galled Lt. Col. Taplett (Dark Horse 6) on his radio and had a joint conversation. Our recommendation was that "H" Co. seize the high ground to the right of the MSR and "I,' Co. seize the high ground on the left of the MSR This was logical because "H" was already positioned mostly on the right of the MSR Tap approved the plan and off we went. We encountered some heavy small arm and automatic weapon fire but seized the objective without undue difficulty. It was easy to tell when our assault elements were reaching the Chinese positions because we could smell the heavy stench of garlic, in addition to the bullets flying here and there. We pushed the Chinese from the position and for the most part manned the position they had dug. It was now well after dark the troops were cold, it must have been about 20 below zero, and the men were exhausted. I called Tap on the radio and recommended that we hold this position for the night; Schrier also recommends we hold this present position. As I recall he told us to wait, he then called back very shortly and told us to move out to the next high ground along the MSR. His orders, as I recall from the conversation, were that Col. Murray had directed that the attack had to be continued "at all costs". I moved forward as directed, leaving an outpost detachment on the high ground we were vacating. We reached our objective without difficulty but ITEM Co. ran into extremely heavy opposition. The bulk of the enemy force was facing I/5. We spent the remainder of the night and most of the next day in that position. Other than long range sniper fire, which inflicted a few casualties, we were not bothered by the enemy. By late morning of the 2nd George Co. passed through the depleted ITEM Co., and "H" Co. also continued the attack. The forward movement of our company was slow because of the many positions manned by small arms and automatic weapon-firing Chinese. By now we were out of water and when the enemy fired mortars on us as we crossed a frozen stream much rejoicing went up as the water flowed freely from the falling mortar shells. We all dunk our fill. At about 0230 we reached the high ridge and consolidated the position. On the attack up we heard Chinese in plain English calling "Corpsman". I was with Frederick's lead platoon and we did not fall for that ruse. The Chinese apparently thought we were a much larger force because they didn't stay around Early on the morning of the 3rd we moved forward along the high ground heading for Fox Hill and Tok Tong Pass. It was snowing and air and artillery were hampered We were held up and not gaining any ground. I called the Battalion FAC on the radio and requested air. He told me (he being 1st Lt. D. Greene) he had two planes but due to the snow they could not see us. The Good Lord must have been with H/5 at that moment because the snow lifted and the plane spotted us. I did not have a FAC but talked to Greene and he in turn talked to the Flight Leader. Those two Navy AD type aircraft saved the day. After expending their ordnance they made dummy runs while we overran the positions. Many of the enemy moved toward the MSR and were caught by other elements of 3/5 and a large number were amnihilated We then continueued along the high ground and by late afternoon I joined my old friend Charlie Mize with "G" Co. in the vicinity of Fox Hill. My people by this time were totally exhausted, hungry and thirsty. We made them get on their feet every few minutes and jog in place to keep from getting frostbitten feet, even so we had a few cases, but none requireing evacuation. We were to await the remaining elements of 3/5 for the move to Hagaru. However this was to take quite some time and nightfall and darkness were upon us. Charlie Mize and I realized that the longer we stayed in place the worse the troops would become. We talked with Tap and he told us (via radio) to join up with one of the artillery units and head for Hagaru. We moved out walking alongside the artillery pieces and trucks but we didn't stay with them long. We couldn't keep pace with the vehicles and they moved on to Hagaru. We continued the pace and arrived in the Hagaru perimeter prior to daylight. We got our first real food (hot food) in four days. We had no mess gear so we got cans from a dump, cleaned them out, and ate heartily. Then some much needed rest. We were assigned a defensive position in Hagaru but our stay in Hagaru was one of relative calm. HAGARU-RI to KOTO-RI The night 3/5 departed Hagaru Lt. Col. Taplett directed Charlie Mize and me to proceed forward with our companies, contact Lt. Col. Joe Stewart, (Reg. XO) then determine what was holding up the advance of the vehicles. We did as directed and without difficulty all elements began to move south. When daylight came Lt. Col. Taplett probably issued one of the shortest combat orders of his career. He directed Charlie and me to move out and keep the column moving. We were moving along the MSR and rail line. If enemy resistance came from the left of the road it was mine to eliminate, if enemy resistance came from the right, Charlie was to deal with it. We were to support each other. We moved well with this arrangement until my elements on the left met heavy opposition, probably a battalion of Chinese. They were in prepared positions and some among abandoned native houses. We moved out quickly, deployed, and the fight was on. We had plenty of supporting arms and aircraft and the position, with the help from "G" Co. providing enfilade fire across our front the enemy suffered heavy casualties; our casualties were very light. Just prior to going in the assault Charlie Mize called me on the radio and the short radio conversation was as follows: "Willie, this is Chally. If you need a little hep, I'm right over heah." His Georgia accent was music to my ears and with his help we eliminated the enemy. As the fight was going on Marines on the long line of vehicles to the rear on the road were standing and cheering. We arrived in Koto-ri in late afternoon,on the 7th of Dec. and were assigned a positional the perimeter. Our movement from Koto-n to the sea was routine except for the exhaustive pace, I have tried to confine my remarks to my company and have not commented on the heroic efforts the various units performed in order to make the march from Koto-n to the sea possible. Getting aboard that Navy transport was like checking in at the Waldorf Astoria; The treatment was first class.. Colonel H. P. Williamson USMC Ret. ************************** H-3-5 Newsletter (12-96) Editor: Jim "RATs" Ratliff rats@centuryinter.net ***************************************** (Addendum by Jim Ratliff, Editor: H-3-5 News) COLONEL H.P. WILLIAMSON USMC RETIRED Company Commander of How Co., 3rd Bn. 5th Mar., 1st Mar. Div. from November 7, 1950 till April 3, of 1951 Editor: The story of How Company's actions, by Colonel Williamson, on the 1st Division's march from Koto-ri to the sea, was written on the 25th of June, 1979 by the Colonel for Eric M. Hammel. Mr. Hammel was at that time writing his now famous book "The Chosin". I had requested from the Colonel, to share his personal account of the Chosin, with H-3-5. That he has most graciously done in the preceding story. As most of us foot sloggers know, we only knew what was taking place within our immediate area and what was taking place, sometimes even in the next foxhole, else-where, we knew nothing about. (Too busy trying to save our own butts). The Col. would like very much to find out who it was on the outpost the night of Nov. 25th, when the Chinese hit the outpost, and was dragging the Marine off in his sleeping bag. Do any of you know that information? Much has been written about the "CHOSIN", now we have the story from the Company Commander that brought How Company through it. From the men of the best damn Company in the Corps, Colonel, THANK YOU.

#20 A Genuine Sea Story By John R. Henson February 6, 1998 * Ready! Seats!--I will tell you a genuine sea story. First of all , I am John R. Henson, GySgt USMC (Inactive) I served with D-2-11 in Korea (1953--1955) and later with MACS3 Korea(1956) and Iwakuni(1957). Now for the story: 1955, The First Marine Division is on the way home from Korea in convoy. We are 15 days out from Inchon and have more than 15 more days until we see San Diego. My unit, D-2-11, is on board an LST. We have just passed through the tail end of a typhoon and everyone is sick and pretty miserable. We have been kept busy with rifle inspections, compartment inspections and even junk on the bunk. Most enlisted personnel have been assigned policing duties aboard. They have been instructed to "paint it if it's fastened down, and get rid of it if it's not!" Standing orders. Finally ,it appears as though we will have something good to look forward to as the mail boat appears on the horizon. Eventually it pulls along side of our vessel and the Navy attempts to shoot a line over to us for the transfer of mail bags. After several missed attempts, the line lands on the main deck adjacent to the suprstructure. A loud chorus of cheers erupts! Then, before any one can react, a private appears from below decks, and seeing the offending loose object, he promptly tosses it overboard!---- Just following orders sir! John R. Henson E-Mail: JOHNH@mpic.org

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