Defamation law is seen as having separate interests. First there is the protection of reputation; however, this can restrict other significant rights, such as freedom of expression. As stated by Edgerton J. in Sweeney v. Patterson128 F. 2d 457 at 458, "whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Canadian law attempts to balance the competing interests. Even though a defamatory statement may have been made and a harm to reputation may have occurred, other interests are considered paramount. In such cases, the law provides certain defences for the defamer. 

Under the Canadian Common Law, truth is the only complete answer to a civil action of defamation. The law will not permit recovery of damages for a harm to a character which is not possessed. The defences available are justification, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, fair comment and innocent dissemination, which has become increasingly important in the Internet context. 

Justification

If a person publishes a statement which lowers the reputation of another, the law presumes the falsity of the statement and the defendant then has the burden of proving the truth of the statement. If it is the truth anyone is free to say it. However, if the plaintiff consents to the statement being made, he/she cannot later argue they have been defamed. As noted by Klar, actionable defamation only consists in a false statement impairing ones reputation. 

Absolute Privilege

On the grounds of public policy, the Common Law has recognized that certain occasions require an absolute privilege be granted to participants; so they may speak freely without fear of liability for defamation no matter how false or malicious.(19) Examples of absolute privilege as set out in More v. Weaver [1928] 2 K.B. 520 (C.A), these are statements given in evidence extending to Judges, juries, and witnesses or those made in Parliament. This privilege also extends to the fair and accurate reporting of those proceedings. Canadian systems of justice and parliamentary democracy demand that in such situations participants are free to speak candidly, thus the mind-set and purpose of the speaker become irrelevant.

Qualified Privilege

Unlike the previous defences, qualified privilege is a partial immunity which attaches itself to certain occasions. Like absolute privilege, for public policy reasons communications that pertain to the legitimate purpose of the occasion without malice, are excused from liability for defamation. As per Adam v. Ward[1917] A.C.309 at 334 per Lord Atkinson qualified privilege usually arises, "where the person who make [the] communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a corresponding interest to receive it." However, qualified privilege may be defeated only by proof of malice on the part of the defendant. Qualified privilege, then will not protect those statements made with actual or express malice, or for an improper purpose.

Fair Comment

Fair comment on matters of public interest is also protected from liability for defamation provided it is based on fact. Such matters fall within two categories; first those in which the public has legitimate interest, i.e. governmental activity, political debate, proposals by public figures, and public affairs. Secondly, pertaining to works of art displayed in public such as theatrical performances, music and literature. Fair comment must be based on fact and these facts must be included in the communication, or indicated with sufficient clarity to lay a proper foundation for the comments being made.(20)  However, both the defences of justification and fair comment will fail if the defamatory publication is a misstatement of fact.

The "Innocence" Defence

Finally, the Common Law recognizes the "innocent dissemination" defence, which has - and will - continue to gain prominence in the context of the Internet. This defence is especially significant in cases of secondary publication. In Canada, rules regarding innocent dissemination are based on older jurisprudence. A person can invoke the defence under three conditions, as stated by Romer .L.J. in the case of Vizetelly v. Mudies Select Library[1902] 2 Q.B. 170 at 180 (C.A.) where it was held that liability could be escaped when the secondary dissemination occurred in the course of business and it can be shown that: 
 

[It is a defence to] a person who is not the printer or main publisher of a work which contains a libel, but has only taken, what I may call, a subordinate part in disseminating it; if he succeeds in showing (1) that he was innocent of any knowledge of the libel contained in the work disseminated by him, (2) that there was nothing in the work or the circumstances under which it came to him or was disseminated by him that ought to have lead him to suppose that it contained a libel, and (3) that when the work was disseminated by him it was not by any negligence on his part that he did not know that it contained the libel, then although the dissemination of the work by him was prima facie a publication of it, he may nevertheless, on proof of the before mentioned facts, be held not to have published it.

The three elements outlined by Romer L.J. must be proven to the satisfaction of the jury.(21) The third element, lack of negligence on the part of the distributor is the most difficult to prove. The standard of care imposed must be reasonably proportionate to their duties in the chain of distribution.(22)

Apology 

Although not a defence, pursuant to s.9, newspapers and broadcasters may plead in mitigation of damage that libel was done, "without actual malice and without gross negligence" and that a, "full apology" was made "at the earliest possible opportunity," as per Munro v. Toronto Sun Publishing Corp. (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 100. Any defaming party can then offer an apology in the hopes of having their damages reduced. 

Some relief has been granted where publishment has occurred in error. The Ontario Libel and Slander Act, s.5(2), for example, allows recovery if the alleged libel is, "published in good faith," that it, "took place in mistake or misapprehension of the facts" and a, "full and fair retraction" is published immediately. 

This is problematic for the Internet as e-mail or newsgroup based publishment may be repeatedly passed on and redistributed causing serious harm despite only being first published for a matter of minutes. This issue of mass publications and the effectiveness of retraction was prominent in the on-line Drudge case. The timing of the apology can aggravate damages as per Good v. North Delta-Surrey Sentinel, [1985] 1 W.W.R. 166. How these concerns have been played out in Cyberspace shall be further discussed.