CHINA, RUSSIA, LIBYA, IRAQ, IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA ARE TARGETED. In a major change of nuclear policy, a secret Pentagon report – The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) -- called for developing smaller nuclear weapons that would be better suited for striking targets in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, China, Russia, and Syria. Released on March 8, 2002, the report included plans for developing and positioning nuclear weapons. Much of the report was unclassified, but certain portions were secret. (New York Times and Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

One reason for targeting these eight countries was the impact of the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11 that shook Bush administration’s strategic planners. Though Congress directed the new administration “to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces” before the events of 9-11, the final study was striking for its single-minded reaction to those tragedies. (New York Times and Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

The NPR included the following:

**It indicated that the Pentagon viewed nuclear weapons as an important element of military planning, including in potential conflicts with adversaries that did not have their own nuclear arms. One of the most sensitive portions of the report was a secret discussion of what kind of nuclear capabilities were needed and which countries they might be used against.

**The NPR also stated that the weapons could be used in three types of situations: against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; or “in the event of surprising military developments.”

**The report called for new emphasis on developing such things as nuclear bunker-busters and surgical “warheads that reduce collateral damage,” as well as weapons that could be used against smaller, more circumscribed targets – “possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility.”

**The report also proposed to train United States Special Forces operators to play the same intelligence gathering and targeting roles for nuclear weapons that they had played for conventional weapons strikes in Afghanistan. And cyber-warfare and other non-nuclear military capabilities would be integrated into nuclear-strike forces to make them more all-encompassing.

**The NPR coins the phrase “New Triad,” which it described as comprising the “offensive strike leg,” (American nuclear and conventional forces) plus “active and passive defenses,”(American anti-missile systems and other defenses) and “a responsive defense infrastructure” (the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons and resume nuclear testing). Previously, the nuclear “triad” consisted of bombers, long-range land-based missiles, and submarine-launched missiles that formed the three legs of America’s strategic arsenal.

**The review emphasized the integration of “new non-nuclear strategic capabilities” into nuclear-war plans. “New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply-buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and re-locatable targets, to defeat chemical and biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage.”

**It called for “a new strike system” using four converted Trident submarines, an unmanned combat air vehicle, and a new air-launched cruise missile as potential new weapons.

**Beyond new nuclear weapons, the NPR proposed establishing what it calls an “agent defeat” program, which defense officials say includes a “boutique” approach to finding new ways of destroying deadly chemical or biological warfare agents, as well as penetrating enemy facilities that are otherwise difficult to attack. This included “thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities.”

**The report called for incorporation of “nuclear capability” into many of the conventional systems that presently were under development. An extended-range conventional cruise missile in the works for the Air Force “would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads if necessary.” Similarly, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should be modified to carry nuclear weapons “at an affordable price.”

**The review called for research to begin next month on fitting an existing nuclear warhead into a new 5,000-pound “earth penetrating” munition. (New York Times and Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

Pentagon officials long acknowledged that they had detailed nuclear plans for an attack on Russia. However, the NPR apparently marked the first time that an official list of potential target countries was declassified. The report said that Russia was no longer officially an “enemy.” Yet it acknowledged that the huge Russian arsenal, which included about 6,000 deployed warheads and perhaps 10,000 smaller “theater” nuclear weapons, remained a concern. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

The NPR report included China because of its nuclear forces and “developing strategic objectives.” The report referred to China as “a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.” Specifically, the NPR listed a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan as one of the scenarios that could lead Washington to use nuclear weapons. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

North Korea was included as a potential nuclear target because of its threat to South Korea. Iraq was included because of its threat to Israel or its neighbors in some Arab-Israeli crisis. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

The Defense Department was also ordered to develop plans for using nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical or biological attacks, as well as “surprising military developments” of an unspecified nature. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

Administration officials argued that smaller weapons had an important deterrent role because many aggressors might not believe that American forces would use multi-kiloton weapons that would wreak devastation on surrounding territory and friendly populations.

But as expected, Bush was hit with a barrage of criticism. Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear arms expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said, “This is dynamite. I can imagine what these countries are going to be saying at the U.N.” Arms control advocates said the report’s directives on development of smaller nuclear weapons could signal that the Bush administration was more willing to overlook a long-standing taboo against the use of nuclear weapons except as a last resort. They warned that such moves could dangerously destabilize the world by encouraging other countries to believe that they, too, should develop weapons. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, likewise castigated the Bush administration, saying, “They’re trying desperately to find new uses for nuclear weapons, when their uses should be limited to deterrence. This is very, very dangerous talk … Dr. Strangelove is clearly still alive in the Pentagon.” (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

Congress requested the reassessment of the United States nuclear posture in September 2000. The last such review was conducted in 1994 by the Clinton administration. That report stayed classified. The 2002 report, signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was handed over to the United States Strategic Command to prepare a nuclear war plan. (Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002)

When the Bush‘s plan to target seven countries with nuclear weapons, the president quickly sent out his top lieutenants to defend his policy. Speaking on Sunday morning talk shows, National Security advisor Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell tried to justify the proliferation of the nuclear arsenal. By targeting nuclear weapons at “enemy” countries, White House officials claimed that the policy was a deterrent. They said it was designed to make clear to the world that chemical and biological attacks “would be met with a devastating response.” (New York Times, March 11, 2002)

Rice said, “The only way to deter such a use is to be clear it would be met with a devastating response. … This is a report that recognizes that, thanks to our new strategic relationship with Russia, the likelihood of nuclear war with Russia is less likely now than at any time and that we can indeed reduce our nuclear forces by two-thirds and intend to do that whether Russia does or not.” (Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2002)

Powell described the policy as “prudent military planning,” not a plan for imminent attack. He added, “There are nations out there developing weapons of mass destruction. Prudent planners have to give some consideration as to the range of options the president should have available to him to deal with these kinds of threats. … We should not get all carried away with some sense that the United States is planning to use nuclear weapons in some contingency that is coming up in the near future. It is not the case.” (Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2002)