CONTENTS

THE REAGAN-BUSH YEARS

Starting in 1976, the Pentagon sought interceptors so extraordinarily precise that nuclear intercontinental missiles would be rendered obsolete. The Pentagon's solution was to have the interceptor zero in on heat emanating from enemy warheads. An infrared seeker and a tiny computer would fire small jets, steering the hurtling mass of metal toward sure destruction. After seven years Reagan courted Congress to allocate billions of dollars for his new pet project which he coined the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars. The objective was to construct a network of laser beams which would shoot down incoming enemy missiles. At the end of Reagan's eight years in the White House, over $30 billion had been spent on Star Wars, and there was virtually nothing to show for it.

Critics of Reagan's program immediately pointed out: (1) that it was technically unworkable; (2) that it violated an existing international treaty; and (3) that the actual chances of war were increased. An Interagency Intelligence Assessment of Possible Soviet Responses released soon after Reagan proposed Star Wars: "There will be a large variety of possible measures the Soviets can choose from to preserve the viability of their ballistic missile forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be upgraded with new boosters, decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of these systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemes can be devised which make them less vulnerable to U.S. missile warning and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened or modified to reduce their vulnerability to directed energy weapons. The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularly manned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improved penetration aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greater burden of the strategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in U.S. air defense capabilities." This simply meant that Star Wars just would not work.

Opponents of Star Wars also pointed to the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which stood as an obstacle in the development of the national missile defense system. This limits the United States and Russia from deploying anti-missile defenses at more than one site. The United States would legally have to abrogate the accord in order to move ahead with Star Wars. White House officials informed Russia's Yeltsin that their plan did not represent a commitment to deploy any anti-missile system and did not represent a change in the United States commitment to the ABM treaty.

SALT I clearly applied to large scale strategic anti-missile systems which were defined as tested against targets moving faster the two kilometers per second and above 40 kilometers in altitude. ICBMs move faster than two kilometers per second, and since space is slightly higher up than 40 kilometers, the treaty would apply to Star Wars. But the Reagan administration basically ignored the ABM treaty and justified the inception of Star Wars by loosely interpreted the treaty and stating that it did not apply to the new technology.

Critics of Star Wars maintained that its implementation would upset the balance of power between the superpowers and that it would encourage the Soviet Union to proliferate its nuclear arsenal. Hence, Moscow would need to maintain a credible threat to the United States and would be tempted to threaten a first strike in a crisis. This brinkmanship atmosphere would increase the risk of launching a nuclear war from both sides. Additionally, the ability to intercept only a small fraction of an opponent's missiles would not be a deterrent. It would, however, create an incentive for the opponent to build more missiles.

The CIA released secret documents in March 2001, showing how National Intelligence Council (NIC) reports NIC reports showed they continued to overestimate the Soviet missile buildup in the 1980s when President Reagan was promoting his Star Wars. (New York Times, March 10, 2001 and www.foia.ucia.gov)

A 1987 analysis of the Soviet Union's response options to Star Wars concluded that the Soviets were likely to pursue arms control measures to gain American concessions on the proposal. Many independent analysts believed that Reagan's vigorous and hugely expensive buildup of the United States military in the 1980s caused the downfall of the Soviet Union because Moscow was unable to match the Pentagon with a similar buildup. A September 1991 CIA analysis of the defense implications of a breakup of the Soviet Union concluded that a Russia without Ukraine and other republics would "retain the potential of a major military power."

FALSIFYING THE RESULTS OF TESTS. The first Star Wars took place in February 1983. A mock enemy warhead was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Thousands of miles away in the South Pacific, at Kwajalein Atoll, an interceptor of the Homing Overlay Experiment blasted off. It missed the warhead by a wide margin.

In June 1984, the Reagan administration boasted that an interceptor destroyed a mock target for the first time. "We successfully "hit a bullet with a bullet for the first time," according to General James Abrahamson of the Air Force and head of the Pentagon's anti- missile program. He said that the interceptor had worked by zeroing in on "a warhead with its inherent heat."

However, the Pentagon later admitted that the results of this 1984 SDI test were falsified. Also, four former Reagan administrators came forward and acknowledged that this test was rigged, that the data was falsified, and that the system was inoperable. Four former Reagan officials said that the deception program was approved by Secretary of Defense Weinberger who neither confirmed nor denied that he had given approval. The four former administration officials said that the purpose of the rigged test was to mislead the Soviet Union. It was crucial that this fourth test be successful, since the first three indicated the ineptness of Star Wars. One scientist said, "If we didn't perform it successfully, it would be a catastrophe. We rigged the test. We put a beacon with a certain frequency on the target vehicle. On the interceptor, we had a receiver." In effect, the target was talking to the missile and saying, "Here I am; come get me. The hit looked beautiful, so Congress didn't ask questions." However, this deceptive information persuaded Congress to continue to allocate more funds for Star Wars.

The GAO reported years later that the Pentagon had actually raised that heat artificially so the test was easier. The doctoring was done by heating the mock warhead before launch to 100 degrees. So in flight, the long warhead was instructed to fly sideways, exposing a greater surface area to the distant heat seeker. Investigators from the congressional accounting office reported later that the two decoys had been tethered to either side of the dummy warhead, and the interceptor's computer had been programmed to pick out the target in the middle. Officials at the congressional accounting office reported that dozens of public statements by DOD officials had failed to mention "the steps taken to enhance the target's signature."

The next test was conducted in January 1991, and it also was touted as a major success. It not only demolished a mock warhead but was said to have succeeded in ignoring two inflatable decoys. The ability to ignore false targets was considered crucial in anti- missile warfare, as belligerent nations were expected to scatter decoys and chaff around warheads in hopes of confusing and defeating any defense.

In 1992, another interceptor blasted off, only this time the system was allowed to try to freely distinguish between a mock warhead and a decoy. It missed both. In 1997, the Pentagon appointed a panel headed by Larry Welch, a former Air Force chief of staff. In a blistering report issued in February 1998, it concluded that the failures rooted in poor design and fabrication, lax management and lack of rigorous government oversight. Managers tended "to trivialize the causes of these costly failures," the panel said, adding that aggressive new test schedules had joined with such callousness to produce a "rush to failure."

In 1984 and 1991, the Pentagon claimed that interceptors succeeded in hitting targets. Lockheed Martin which was fined $15 million for the failure in March. DOD officials finally acknowledged that the tests had been conducted quietly and that some results had been exaggerated. The Pentagon later admitted that two of four was a more accurate portrayal.

By the end of the Reagan-Bush era, $40 billion had been pumped into the SDI program with most of the Pentagon checks being turned over to corporations such as Lockheed Martin. The Pentagon conducted a total of 16 times. Star Wars never did work. Space-based lasers did not work. Particle beams did not work.

THE CLINTON YEARS

After Clinton was inaugurated, he announced that the Star Wars program would be terminated. However, the truth eventually surfaced. SDI was not actually dead, but the program was revamped and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) by Defense Secretary Les Aspin. The "Star Wars" program was renamed the National Missile Defense System (NMD). Congress initially appropriated nearly $4 billion for the new program with cost estimates ranging from the Pentagon's $36 billion to the General Accounting Office's $60 billion by the time deployment would be completed. Contractors for NMD were Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW. These corporations received more than $2.2 billion in missile-defense research-and-development money over a span of 21 months, according to a report issued by the World Policy Institute. In 1997 and 1998, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW spent $35 million on lobbying. Boeing even considered running a television campaign touting the need for missile defense.

The Pentagon hoped to perfect a kill vehicle that carries two heat sensors and an electro-optical eye that help it find the warhead. Small rocket thrusters enabled it to maneuver. If all went as planned, the craft could distinguish the warhead from any nearby decoys and ram it head-on, reducing it to a shower of tiny particles. NMD relied on a network of five Defense Support Program satellites to detect enemy missiles. These sensors, which registered the intense heat of a missile's engines in the Eastern Hemisphere, were upgraded five times since their introduction in the 1970s. The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) was a network of sophisticated high- and low-altitude satellites designed to simultaneously track hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- of warheads and other objects. While infrared sensors could pinpoint a missile's location to within about 10 miles, the theory was that they would be able to track them to an area the size of a football stadium.

Unlike earlier sensors, SBIRS allowed the defenders to track missiles through their entire flights. The key was the capacity of SBIRS' two dozen lower-altitude satellites to "see" warheads after their rocket engines burn out when they were cooler and far harder to find in the cold void of space. Once in space, the 130-pound "kill vehicle" atop the interceptor rocket would break free and, using sensors and tiny thruster rockets, maneuver its way into the path of the target. A collision, at about 15,000 mph, would reduce both vehicles to particles of dust. Proponents of NMD claimed that this technology allowed the interceptor missile to be fired early in the attack, increasing the odds of success.

NMD also relied on advanced radars which were originally designed to detect clusters of objects at great distances without providing much detail. In their upgraded form, they were designed to track not just clusters but individual objects at distances of more than 2,000 miles. Far more sophisticated were the new "X-band" radars which used very high frequency radar waves to gather highly detailed information at distances of more than 1,000 miles.

The Pentagon's goal was to implement a high-powered "X-band" radar system on Alaska's Shemya Island and deploy 100 anti-missile interceptors by 2005, as well as in North Dakota by 2010. The DOD maintained that this plan would not have posed a risk to Russia, because they could easily overwhelm the defenses with their sizable missile force. The Pentagon said that they would be used to block missiles which might be launched intentionally by rogue nations such as North Korea or Iran -- or by Russia and China. The Clinton administration pointed to Iran's test of an intermediate-range missile and North Korea launch of a three-stage rocket capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii a year earlier.

In 1997, Pentagon officials named the defense system the "three-plus- three" program -- three years assessing the program and then three years deciding whether to deploy it. The DOD claimed that they were convinced that a nuclear threat was real and that they needed to change three criteria to perfect the anti-missile system. Their goals were to finance the program, revise their arms-control treaty obligations, and overcome the technical challenges of the system. The Pentagon moved the target date of deployment from 2003 to 2005. The timetable called for the Pentagon and White House to decide in June 2000 whether it will deploy the system, even though tests on some key components would not be completed for three more years. The Pentagon asked for $6.6 billion for deployment of the system in the department's long- term, six year budget.

In 1997, the Pentagon appointed a panel headed by Larry Welch, a former Air Force chief of staff. In a blistering report issued in February 1998, the DOD concluded that the failures rooted in poor design and fabrication, lax management and lack of rigorous government oversight. Managers tended "to trivialize the causes of these costly failures," the panel said, adding that aggressive new test schedules had joined with such callousness to produce a "rush to failure."

The anti-missile program gained increased political momentum since the Pentagon claimed unfriendly countries were developing advanced missile systems. The DOD pointed to North Korea which test-fired an advanced three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile in August 1998. Pentagon officials claimed that North Korea was working on a successor missile with a 3,600-mile range, sufficient to reach Alaska and Hawaii. Additionally, the Pentagon said that Iran tested an intermediate-range Shahab 3 missile, and DOD officials believed that they were only several years away from an intercontinental weapon. The Pentagon also feared the motives of Iraq as well as nearly two dozen countries believed to be trying to develop missile programs.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen said, "We affirm that there is a threat and the threat is growing. And it will pose a danger not only to our troops but also to Americans here at home." Air Force General Lester Lyles, the Pentagon's top missile defense official, said: "As announced by Secretary Cohen, we've acknowledged that the threat is real and growing in the near future. That, essentially, leaves one major thing. Are we technologically ready to deploy such a system?"

The DOD asked for an additional $6.6 billion to possibly deploy a system by 2005. Political pressure was also applied by defense contractors working on the project. The Pentagon made missile defense its biggest research effort, spending nearly $4 billion a year to develop rockets, radar, heat-detecting sensors and even more futuristic technologies -- such as laser weapons -- to protect American troops abroad and civilians at home. Congress responded by appropriating $3.8 billion in 1998, and $23 billion more was earmarked for missile defense for the following five years. By the end of 1998, $100 billion had been spent on NMD -- about $45 billion of which had been appropriated since the Reagan administration.

Five other tests were conducted in the course of the next 12 months. All failed. The fifth failure in May 1998 resulted with the missile spinning out of control and crashing at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The Pentagon unsuccessfully tested another anti-missile in March 1999. Lockheed Martin was fined $15 million for the failure. DOD officials finally acknowledged that the test had been conducted quietly and that some results had been exaggerated.

In March 1999, the anti-missile program received a gigantic boost when Congress overwhelmingly voted to deploy a national missile defense shield "as soon as technologically possible." The Senate voted 99-0 after conservative Republicans added language to placate Democrats. In order to win Democrats over to their side, Republicans added a measure whereby the United States would continue to work with Russia to resolve the two countries' commitment to the 1972 SALT I ABM treaty which limited the number of anti-missile installations around the perimeter of each country. Members of Congress agreed to continue to negotiate arms reductions with the Russians and pledged not to bypass the usual appropriations process to create the missile system. The bill also did not compel Clinton to deploy a system which was capable of shooting down incoming missiles before they could reach American targets. Yet it significantly increased pressure on the president to do so.

The DOD boasted that the next test over the New Mexico desert was successful. Pentagon officials announced that a 20 foot missile hit a test rocket and called it a potential breakthrough for "Star Wars" technology. It was reported as the first successful test. General Richard Davis said, "It's significant because it demonstrates that the technology can be made to work. "It is a major milestone, because this is our first successful intercept, but we still have a ways to go." Davis said the rocket had been designed to resemble a Scud ballistic missile like those fired by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. A Pentagon spokesperson said that a missile flying at supersonic speed 24 miles to 60 miles above the White Sands Missile Range -- the exact altitude was not revealed -- hit and destroyed a test rocket fired minutes earlier.

Even though most Pentagon officials branded the test a "success" and "a watershed in the technological history of the United States," others claimed that little was accomplished. A spokesperson for the Union of Concerned Scientists said, "It is quite possible for a system to work well in tests and fail in the field." The group described the test as a "relatively trivial step."

Philip Coyle III, director of operational test and evaluation for the Pentagon, said that the tests were "highly scripted" and that there was no evidence to indicate that the anti-missile system could knock out incoming missiles. Coyle maintained that the tests differed from the conditions of a real attack in many important areas. First, he said that the tests were conducted in a relatively small area of the White Sands test area. Therefore, the Army was forced to use a target missile that flew a shorter path. This made it relatively easy to be located. Second, Coyle said that the test flight was "shaped and scripted" so the collision would occur in a relatively small area of the sky. Consequently, the debris did not fall in areas where it might do damage. Third, he pointed out that the anti-missile was merely a prototype that would never be used if and when the system was completed. Coyle said that future tests of the prototype should be conducted realistically before the Pentagon continues ahead to the final system. He suggested, for example, that the Pentagon should move its tests to the much larger Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands.

The GAO reported that the program still faced serious technical problems because of its reliance on parts that may be fault. The GAO report also stated that most of the components were produced before the reorganization of the program, when quality control was inadequate. According to a Lockheed Martin report, steps were taken to guarantee that the key parts would function in future tests. Lockheed Martin contended that only the seeker -- the part used to locate and track the target missile -- was built after 1996 when the quality controls were improved. After the fifth failed test in May 1998, Lockheed Martin reevaluated and retested the parts. However, the GAO contended that this was not a sufficient substitute for building parts with sufficient quality controls. The GAO also quoted the Pentagon's director for Operational Test and Evaluation as saying that until new equipment is built, "there is no reason to expect any improvement in the interceptor missiles' performance."

In mid-1999, the Pentagon terminated its tests in the New Mexico and turned to the Pacific where more realistic tests, at a cost of over $100 million each, could be conducted over a range of over 4,000 miles. The first of 19 planned tests over the Pacific occurred in October when a Minuteman missile with a dummy warhead was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Twenty minutes later, an interceptor missile, the "kill vehicle," was fired 4,300 miles away from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The interceptor missile was equipped with a computer, heat and optical sensors, telemetry equipment, and small rockets which allowed it to maneuver in space towards its target. The missiles reached an altitude of 140 miles above the earth and reached speeds of 15,000 miles per hour. Twenty minutes after the launchings, the Pentagon claimed that there was a direct hit over the central Pacific Ocean. Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon boasted of its success, saying that "it will protect the whole United States" from accidental or limited nuclear attack if a decision is made to deploy such a system. Despite hailing the first test a success, the Pentagon later was forced to acknowledge that the "kill vehicle" initially had drifted off course and picked out the large bright decoy balloon instead of the mock warhead.

The Clinton administration suffered a major setback three months later. In the second Pacific test in January 2000, the "kill vehicle" launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base failed to destroy a surrogate enemy warhead. The two missiles streaked through the skies in opposite directions over the Pacific. Almost three minutes after liftoff, the interceptor's booster rocket was programmed to fall away and to leave the "exoatmospheric kill vehicle" to maneuver through space to find the target. However, it failed to find the Minuteman missile. The "kill vehicle" missed the target by 300 to 400 feet after a clogged cooling line interfered with the functioning of a sensor.

The Pentagon attempted to downplay the problem, saying that a simple plumbing leak foiled the test, delaying the next test of the anti-missile system for May. A Pentagon spokesman said that the mechanical glitch of a clogged cooling line was of minimal concern because it did involve the question the basic physics and design of the proposed anti- missile shield. The failure of the $100 million flight test threatened to upset Clinton's plan to decide whether to build the system increased the chances that Clinton would not deploy the national missile shield.

Coyle said that the Pentagon was under "unrealistic pressure" to meet an "artificial" deadline for recommending whether to deploy NMD. According to the New York Times (February 14, 2000), he said that the project was unfairly driven by the Clinton timetable to make a decision on deploying the anti-missile system by the summer of 2000. Coyle said, "Undue pressure has been placed on the program to meet an artificial decision point in the development process. This pattern has historically resulted in a negative effect on virtually every troubled DOD development program."

This conflicted with Secretary of Defense Cohen's statement a week before. Cohen had told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the project was "on track" and that he expected to tell Clinton in June whether the Pentagon believed the missile defense system was ready for deployment.

On March 20, the Pentagon announced a delay of approximately two months for its third Pacific test, delaying it for four months. The DOD said that it took several weeks to determine the cause of the last failure was a plumbing leak and that it would take several more weeks to remedy that problem. This also meant that the Clinton administration would again delay the decision as to whether NMD should be deployed.

Despite the failure of the test, Texas Governor George Bush while campaigning for the presidency made it clear that he supported the anti-missile system. In fact, Bush described pursuing a more expensive and poorly described anti-missile system than that proposed by Clinton. While Clinton anticipated deploying 100 anti-missiles in Alaska, Bush promoted a three-stage program: 100 missiles in Alaska followed by another 100 in North Dakota and finally a space-based system to knock out incoming warheads. Naturally, Russia and China interpreted this missile shield as one that would render all their offensive missiles impotent. Consequently, they would be compelled and justified in escalating the arms race.

The third test of NMD in July was all but branded a success in advance. A week earlier, Pentagon officials in Time (July 10, 2000) conceded that the test conditions would be far more favorable than an actual attack. The DOD played down the chances of a direct collision, saying that a flight test could be a success even without a direct hit by the "kill vehicle," provided other aspects of the system perform suitably. Crews firing the interceptor missile from the Far Pacific were given full knowledge of the launch, including the origin and power of the target missile. According to Time, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester said that all subsequent NMD tests until 2004 will have interceptor crews fully briefed on the "timing, direction, and counter measures" employed by in-coming missiles. Accordingly, critics said the third test was a misleading guide because it was taking place under conditions that do not reflect a real attack. They said that the decoy was not a true decoy but was more like a lure that attracts the kill vehicle to the real target, and that an adversary would use many decoys -- not one.

Despite all the leeway given to calling the test a success, it failed once again, resulting in another embarrassment for the Clinton administration. The interceptor missile from the Marshall Islands failed to hit a mock warhead launched 4,300 miles away in California. The Minuteman rocket containing a mock warhead and a decoy balloon was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Twenty-one minutes after that, a 54 inch, 130-pound "kill vehicle" was launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. Instead of guiding itself to a collision with the incoming mock warhead in midflight, it missed.

In the first official government statement, Defense Secretary Cohen told the New York Times (July 10, 2000) that he would take another month to decide whether to recommend that Clinton proceed with the project's fast-track schedule. Colonel Rick Lehner, a Pentagon spokesman for NMD said, "We're going to press forward" for another test. He added, "We now have to go back and do a second-by-second analysis of the entire flight test to determine exactly why, after the second stage burnout, the booster did not send the electrical signal to the kill vehicle telling it to detach."

According to the New York Times (July 8, 2000), Air Force General Ronald Kadish, the director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, explained that the problem occurred when the kill vehicle did not separate from its booster in the second stage. An additional malfunction was that the decoy balloon attached to the mock warhead did not inflate as planned. Furthermore, Pentagon officials said that the interceptor rocket began to tumble off course as it streaked toward its dummy warhead target.

Other supporters of NMD downplayed the snafus, saying that they merely were routine developmental problems that have little bearing on whether the system will work. Retired Navy Vice Admiral J.D. Williams, a missile defense advocate at the Coalition to Defend America Now, contended there was no question that the technology will work. He said, "The technology is ready; it's the Clinton policy that isn't ready."

On the other hand, critics contended that the missile's components had been in use for decades. Luke Warren, of the Council for a Livable World, an arms control advocacy group, noted that the Pentagon simplified its flight tests and that it would be easy to brand its tests a success.

The test failure made it politically more difficult for Clinton to move forward with even the most basic decision to issue contracts for beginning construction of a radar guidance system in the Aleutian Islands. The test failure was also certain to influence Congress in deciding that the future of NMD be left to the next president. The missile failure also had a major impact on construction of radar sites in the Aleutian Islands. Because of harsh winter conditions in that area of Alaska, barges must begin ferrying equipment by spring if the radar is to be completed by 2005, the date when the administration concluded North Korea could have a ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States.

In late September, the Pentagon conducted two NMD tests, but the rocket flights did not include any attempt to shoot down warheads. The Pentagon said that two Air Force Minuteman-3 missiles were fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base toward Kwajalein Island in the Pacific to test the ability of a radar on Kwajalein to discriminate between targets in space and to test electronic integration of the anti-missile system.

CRITICS OF NMD. In September 1999, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a CIA advisory panel, released a report entitled "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015." The report castigated the effectiveness of NMD. It read: "We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. ... The Russian threat, although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially posed by other nations."

The NIC was not concerned with the rogue states, presumably because the council could not cite their specific nuclear programs. Syria and Libya were not even listed. The main threat came from Russia which already had the bulk of the old Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. And with the nuclear capability of lobbing thousands of warheads into the United States, NMD would be a boondoggle.

NMD was solely aimed at striking incoming missiles. Yet the NIC conceded that countries could build vehicles other than missiles to deliver nuclear warheads. These could be more reliable than ICBMs that would go through decades of testing, upgrading, and certification. Rogue nations could threaten the United States in more effective ways such as disseminating biological warfare agents. Thus, NMD would be rendered useless. Biological and chemical weapons are too large to be delivered on ballistic missiles. Instead, these weapons would be transported more easily by ship, truck, or airplane.

The NIC report even conceded that ballistic missiles were not a viable method of delivering weapons. "We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies. Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology -- including separating re-entry vehicles (RVs), spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys -- to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.

Critics argued that enemy countries could foil the effectiveness of NMD by such countermeasures as the use of radar-absorbing materials or balloon decoys. Furthermore, they could simply send nuclear bombs into the United States on cargo ships or in suitcases. Critics of NMD also maintained that deployment of the system undermined SALT I, just as Star Wars did in the 1980s. But the Pentagon continued to set its own rules for judging the success of the test. They claimed that the Pentagon's "yardstick" was too low. John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World -- an arms control advocacy group in Washington D.C. -- maintained that the test was insufficient. "(It) is like saying that one test of an AIDS vaccine in a monkey proves the vaccines will be successful with humans." Instead of proceeding with NM, critics claimed that the United States should have proceeded with new arms control accords and tighter limits on technology transfer.

Moreover, critics maintained that a rogue nation which had the capability of delivering nuclear weapons on missiles would only have a few launchers. A nuclear weapon could be delivered to a world power more efficiently by ship or truck than by a missile. In order to avoid violating SALT I by deploying NMD, the Clinton administration made overtures to Russia in the fall of 1999 to amend or abrogate the treaty. The White House offered to help complete major defensive radar projects in Russia in exchange for an agreement to alter the 1972 ABM treaty. White House Chief of Staff John Podesta said that the United States' missile defense system "may necessitate adjustments in the (ABM) treaty." Podesta suggested that the United States could help Moscow complete its radar arrays near Irkutsk, Siberia. That system was set to be deployed across Russia's southeastern coast and would cover North Korea and other nations.

Just days later, Russian Foreign Ministry Vladimir Rakhmanin said that Moscow would not bargain over the ABM treaty. He said, "We aren't negotiating any kind of amendments to the ABM." General Valery Manilov, the first deputy chief of the Russian general staff, said, "There can be no compromise on this issue." The Russians said that radars, command and control systems, and satellites deployed under the American plan could serve as building blocks for a more comprehensive missile defense.

The Russian defense system, known as A-135, had the maximum of 100 interceptor missiles permitted by SALT I. The system had a dual defense against ballistic missiles. If Russian radars detected incoming missiles, the military could launch up to 36 longer-range SH- 11 Gorgon missiles. Should any missiles penetrate this layer, the system also had 64 short-range SH-08 Gazelle missiles which were quick-reaction and high-acceleration interceptors. Originally, the interceptors around Moscow were armed with low-yield nuclear warheads. The missiles were not intended to hit incoming missiles but rather to explode near them. However, news reports said that Russia removed the nuclear warheads from the interceptors around the capital.

In October 1999, the Russian military warned the United States that it had tremendous weaponry to overwhelm any ABM system. Moscow threatened to deploy more atomic warheads if the United States were to build a missile defense system. Nikolai Mikhailov, the first deputy defense minister, said, "Our arsenal has such technical capabilities to overcome any anti-missile defenses. This technology can realistically be used and will be used if the United States pushes us toward it." The objective of proliferating the Russian nuclear arsenal was to attempt to outnumber and penetrate any defensive shield constructed by the United States. Mikhailov said that it would be easier and less expensive for Russia to deploy more warheads on missiles than it would for the United States to implement an anti-missile defense system.

Analysts theorized that Russia could increase the number of warheads by slow the dismantlement of existing multiple-warhead missiles. Moscow could also turn the single-warhead Topol-M missile, now being deployed in limited numbers, into a three-warhead delivery system. The Topol-M allegedly has countermeasures against an anti-missile system. It has a lower trajectory and shorter engine burn which would help missiles evade an American missile tracking system. Yet Russia would have to spend an exorbitant amount of money to prolonging the life of existing missiles which have already passed the period in which they were to have been dismantled. Additionally, the Russian government does not have the resources to design and build new weapons. Even the most modern missile, the Topol-M, is being deployed at a rate of only 10 missiles a year.

In May 2000, Russia proceeded with an anti-missile test in an apparent attempt to head off an American decision to go ahead with NMD. A short-range interceptor missile failed in the first test. General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, said that the launching at the Sary-Shagan testing ground in neighboring Kazakhstan was the first of its kind since 1993. The Russian government did not identify the test missile, but it was one of many which had been installed around Moscow after the 1972 ABM treaty. Yakovlev said the tests confirmed the combat readiness of the missile and that the Strategic Rocket Forces would extend its service life to 12 1/2 years which indicated that the test involved missiles which have been deployed for some time.

At the May Moscow summit with President Vladimir Putin, Clinton once again was hit with a barrage of criticism from the Russians. Putin proposed an alternative to the Clinton plan, suggesting that the United States and Russia collaborate on new ways to shoot down enemy missiles soon after they were launched -- rather than in space. Putin's proposal resembled the plan known in the United States as "boost phase defense," that would provide the United States, Europe, and Russia with the protection that the Clinton administration insisted it needs from rogue states. However, such a system would be of little use against the Russian nuclear force. That would make it far more acceptable to the Russian military, which has feared that a solely American missile defense would be used to gain a strategic edge.

In mid-July at a public signing ceremony, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Putin once again denounced the plans to build NMD and agreed to closer cooperation on international affairs. Among the five documents they and their aides signed, two took aim at the United States, singling out the proposed anti-missile defense system. As reported in the New York Times (July 18, 2000), Beijing and Moscow accused Washington of using the system "to seek unilateral military and security advantages that will pose the most grave, adverse consequences" to China, Russia, and the United States itself. Putin and Jiang urged Washington to adhere to SALT I and warned that altering the treaty "will trigger an arms race and lead to an about-face in the positive trend that appeared in world politics after the end of the Cold War." They pledged that their countries would cooperate to "defy hegemonism" and oppose attempts to "threaten others by force or to interfere in other countries' internal affairs." They also criticized an American proposal for a more limited anti-missile system to protect its troops and allies in East Asia which Beijing fears would undermine its claim to Taiwan.

The tests of the anti-missile system were designed to determine if the missile could knock down another missile while both were flying at 11,000 miles per hour. The first test of NMD occurred in June 1997. While the Pentagon hailed the test a success, Theodore Postol, a leading critic of NMD and a prominent Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor, accused the TRW of falsifying the test results.

According to Newsweek (June 12, 2000), the interceptor in the first test in June 1997 had to pick out a warhead from eight decoys. While the Pentagon hailed the test as a success, Postol maintained that TRW's data showed that the sensor totally failed. So BMDO decided to abandon multiple warheads in its subsequent tests and used a single shiny silver balloon which, they hoped, would be easily spotted.

Postol first became famous for suggesting after the 1991 Gulf War that the Patriot air defense system was not as successful as the Army claimed. Working with George Lewis, another MIT professor, Postol analyzed news footage of more than 40 Patriot-Scud engagements frame-by-frame, about half of the Gulf War total. They concluded that not one Patriot appeared to have stopped a Scud from reaching the ground.

The Army and Raytheon, the company that built Patriot, responded with a barrage of criticism. Officials claimed that news footage was too coarse-grained to show anything; that the camera's shutter speed was too slow; and that the flashes did not correspond with the exploding Patriots. But soon, government investigators also began finding fault with Patriot. Both the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service found that Patriot's success rate was far lower than the 96 percent claimed by the Army. In a later review, the Army revised its own estimate of Patriot effectiveness down to 60 percent, even though the actual number was closer to zero.

ANOTHER FALSIFIED TEST. In 2000, Postol learned of a whistle-blower named Nira Schwartz who had sued her former employer, the defense contractor TRW. An engineer at TRW, Schwartz of Torrance was fired and subsequently sued the company. Her lawsuit included allegations that the company had faked work on the project to promote its product.

Later, in December 1997, after Schwartz had modified her lawsuit to include fraud allegations, Boeing and TRW made further disclosures. According to the report, they gave details of the sensor's high-false alarm rate, the shortcomings of the discrimination software and other problems.

Schwartz charged TRW had faked test results performed for the national missile defense program. Postol invited Schwartz to MIT, where she made her case to experts from the university and the Union of Concerned Scientists, an advocacy group opposed to the missile defense plan and dedicated to reducing nuclear arms. Schwartz’s central claim was that TRW’s kill vehicle, designed to identify and destroy an incoming missile, could not tell the difference between a real warhead and a decoy. Both the company and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization had declared the test of that capability a success. In June1997, officials from Boeing and TRW reported that their anti-missile “kill vehicle” prototype was tested successfully, even though it “had trouble finding its intended targets in space and couldn’t distinguish a mock warhead from decoys. The report also said the missile defense component operated “excellent” and was “success.” (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

Boeing and TRW disclosed additional information on the anti-missile system’s weaknesses in a report in April 1998. All these reports together were enough to fully brief the Pentagon on the kill vehicle’s capabilities, the GAO said. (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

TRW officials said the GAO found that in test reports presented in August 1997, the contractors cited only a few problems and called the sensor’s overall performance “excellent.” Pentagon officials told GAO investigators that the contractors also reported orally to them at the time that there were more problems in performance. But there was no written evidence of such disclosures, the GAO found. (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

In an April 2000 study, a group of missile defense critics -- including Postol -- argued that simple decoys could render almost any missile defense system useless. Eventually, TRW’s kill vehicle was dropped in favor of one built by Raytheon, which was reported to be able to distinguish warheads from decoys. However, Postol combed through TRW’s charts and tables and found abundant evidence to the contrary. It looked to him as if the report’s authors had ignored their own evidence to reach the conclusion the Pentagon wanted.

In April 2000, Postol wrote to White House chief of staff John Podesta about his discovery. He attached supporting documents, including the report. “I ... have discovered that the BMDO’s own data shows that the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be defeated by the simplest of balloon decoys. I also have documentation that shows that the BMDO, in coordination with its contractors, attempted to hide this fact.” Podesta passed the letter on to the BMDO which promptly classified it. Postol was livid. As far as he knew, nothing he had sent to the Pentagon was classified. In fact, the report Postol had gotten from Schwartz had the words “Unclassified Draft” all over it.

In a second memo to Podesta, Postol complained that the BMDO had no reason to classify the report or his letter except to silence him. Five weeks later, three Defense Security Service investigators showed up in Postol’s office. The four men adjourned to a conference room, where the investigators produced a folder labeled “Secret” and asked Postol to read its contents. Postol was unsure if they were legitimate inspectors, since they gave him information instead of trying to get it. If this “secret” folder contained information from the report that he needed to make his case, he would be obliged by that security clearance not to talk about it. According to a government report of the incident, Postol refused to look inside the folder. After some unpleasantness, the agents gave up and left.

The next day, Postol wrote Podesta a third time to complain that instead of responding to his first two letters, the government had sent agents to harass him: “It cannot be ruled out that this unannounced meeting was an attempt at intimidation. I would therefore appreciate it if you would have this matter fully investigated.”

Podesta responded in a handwritten note: “I must say that the overall impression you leave from your correspondence is that your brilliance is only exceeded by your arrogance. Rest assured that we are taking the issues you raised seriously and reviewing them at the highest levels.”

The General Accounting Office did investigate the agents’ visit. It concluded that the Defense Security Service had acted properly in classifying Pistol’s letter and the attached report, because a Pentagon lawyer had failed to blacken a few sensitive parts before passing the study on to Schwartz. The FBI also investigated and determined that TRW was not guilty of fraud.

Charging that the anti-missile tests were rigged. Postol said that the Pentagon knew it could not build an effective missile shield and planned to build one anyway, concealing the system’s ineffectiveness with unnecessary secrecy. Postol said that he finally deciphered the instructions TRW used to tell its kill vehicle how to distinguish between a real warhead and a decoy. He concluded that the instructions were useless and that in some situations they might even guarantee that the kill vehicle missed its target. Postol wrote the GAO, which was already investigating Schwartz’s claims against TRW. Again, his letter reached the missile defense office and was classified.

The Pentagon took its case to Postol’s employer. Valerie Heil of the Defense Security Service wrote two letters to MIT demanding the university confiscate the missile decoy report from Postol and investigate how he obtained it. But MIT refused to intervene. President Charles Vest responded with a public statement defending his professor’s right to criticize missile defense and expressing concern over the Pentagon’s attempt to reclassify public information. (Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2001; Newsweek, June 12, 2000)

Nearly five years after the questionable anti-missile test -- in March 2002 -- a General Accounting Office report concluded that said it found no fraud and said that, taken together, the contractors’ reports to the Pentagon did convey the test results and the system’s limitations. The GAO report found that the company had “acted properly” and had “neither withheld or manipulated key data.” (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

But the GAO faulted the contractors’ use of imprecise favorable language, saying that the use of subjective terms “increase the likelihood that test results would be interpreted in different ways, and might even be misunderstood.” (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

The GAO report came amidst the push by Bush to build the National Missile Defense system. It also came at a time when he was riding high in the polls as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In January 2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of deploying the anti-missile system at between $23 billion and $68 billion or more, depending on the design. (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

While critics charged that the results of the 1997 test was fraudulent, the Pentagon and the defense contractors said the report was irrelevant because the Defense Department has since selected a different design for the system. Trying to legitimize the anti-missile test, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the missile defense program, said the GAO’s findings had no bearing on the antimissile effort since the component “hasn’t been part of this program for more than four years.” He said the TRW-Boeing component differed from the component now in use in several ways, including the sensors, the discrimination system, and the mathematical logic. Lehner also said that despite the TRW-Boeing kill vehicle’s problems, it did demonstrate that it had the fundamental capabilities required. Since it was the first flight test of the antimissile system, “you wouldn’t expect it all to be 100 percent. But it was on the right track.” (Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2002)

MORE NMD TESTS. Five other tests were conducted in the course of the next 12 months. All failed. The fifth failure in May 1998 resulted with the missile spinning out of control and crashing at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The Pentagon unsuccessfully tested another anti-missile in March 1999. Lockheed Martin was fined $15 million for the failure. DOD officials finally acknowledged that the test had been conducted quietly and that some results had been exaggerated. In 2000, Postol learned of a whistle-blower named Dr. Nira Schwartz who had sued her former employer, the defense contractor TRW where she was employed as an engineer. Schwartz charged TRW had faked test results performed for the national missile defense program. Postol invited Schwartz to MIT, where she made her case to experts from the university and the Union of Concerned Scientists, an advocacy group opposed to the missile defense plan and dedicated to reducing nuclear arms. Schwartz's central claim was that TRW's kill vehicle, designed to identify and destroy an incoming missile, could not tell the difference between a real warhead and a decoy. Both the company and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization had declared a 1998 test of that capability a success.

In the spring of 2000, Schwartz brought a $500 million lawsuit against the federal district court. She showed that interceptor missiles would be incapable of distinguishing incoming warheads from harmless decoy balloons. Schwartz was hired by TRW to develop computer programs that would enable interceptors to distinguish between warheads and decoys. She asserted that TRW falsified tests and evaluations, and subsequently she was fired in 1996.

Postol, who had earlier denounced TRW for falsifying test data, concurred with Schwatz's study. According to the New York Times (May 19, 2000), Postol explained that the "kill vehicle" in space sees the decoy and the warhead as points of light, and then it attempts to pick out the warhead by examining how each fluctuates in time. However, he pointed out that the data from the first flight test indicated that the points of light fluctuate in a "varied and totally unpredictable way." As a result, he explained that there was "no fluctuating feature in the signals from decoys and warheads that could have been used to distinguish one from the other."

Pentagon officials responded sharply, contending that the June 1997 flight test that Postol analyzed relied on a different "kill vehicle" hardware to identify the warheads and decoys. Air Force Colonel Rick Lehner said that since 1998 a "kill vehicle" with two sensors -- instead of one -- had been had been used. Postol responded by saying that the choice of a "kill vehicle" was irrelevant to his hypothesis, since it concerned the signals that were emitted from the warhead and decoys.

In an April 2000 study, a group of missile defense critics -- including Postol -- argued that simple decoys could render almost any missile defense system useless. Eventually, TRW's kill vehicle was dropped in favor of one built by Raytheon, which was reported to be able to distinguish warheads from decoys. However, Postol combed through TRW's charts and tables and found abundant evidence to the contrary. It looked to him as if the report's authors had ignored their own evidence to reach the conclusion the Pentagon wanted.

In April 2000, Postol wrote to White House chief of staff John Podesta about his discovery. He attached supporting documents, including the report. "I ... have discovered that the BMDO's own data shows that the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be defeated by the simplest of balloon decoys. I also have documentation that shows that the BMDO, in coordination with its contractors, attempted to hide this fact." Podesta passed the letter on to the BMDO which promptly classified it. Postol was livid. As far as he knew, nothing he had sent to the Pentagon was classified. In fact, the report Postol had gotten from Schwartz had the words "Unclassified Draft" all over it.

In a second missive to Podesta, Postol complained that the BMDO had no reason to classify the report or his letter except to silence him. Five weeks later, three Defense Security Service investigators showed up in Postol's office. The four men adjourned to a conference room, where the investigators produced a folder labeled "Secret" and asked Postol to read its contents. Postol was unsure if they were legitimate inspectors, since they gave him information instead of trying to get it. If this "secret" folder contained information from the report that he needed to make his case, he would be obliged by that security clearance not to talk about it. According to a government report of the incident, Postol refused to look inside the folder. After some unpleasantness, the agents gave up and left.

The next day, Postol wrote Podesta a third time to complain that instead of responding to his first two letters, the government had sent agents to harass him: "It cannot be ruled out that this unannounced meeting was an attempt at intimidation. I would therefore appreciate it if you would have this matter fully investigated."

Podesta responded in a handwritten note: "I must say that the overall impression you leave from your correspondence is that your brilliance is only exceeded by your arrogance. Rest assured that we are taking the issues you raised seriously and reviewing them at the highest levels."

The General Accounting Office did investigate the agents' visit. It concluded that the Defense Security Service had acted properly in classifying Pistol's letter and the attached report, because a Pentagon lawyer had failed to blacken a few sensitive parts before passing the study on to Schwartz. The FBI also investigated and determined that TRW was not guilty of fraud.

Charging that the anti-missile tests were rigged. Postol said that the Pentagon knew it could not build an effective missile shield and planned to build one anyway, concealing the system's ineffectiveness with unnecessary secrecy. Postol said that he finally deciphered the instructions TRW used to tell its kill vehicle how to distinguish between a real warhead and a decoy. He concluded that the instructions were useless and that in some situations they might even guarantee that the kill vehicle missed its target. Postol wrote the GAO, which was already investigating Schwartz's claims against TRW. Again, his letter reached the missile defense office and was classified.

The Pentagon took its case to Postol's employer. Valerie Heil of the Defense Security Service wrote two letters to MIT demanding the university confiscate the missile decoy report from Postol and investigate how he obtained it. But MIT refused to intervene. President Charles Vest responded with a public statement defending his professor's right to criticize missile defense and expressing concern over the Pentagon's attempt to reclassify public information. (Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2001)

Critics argued that the proposed national missile defense could backfire and actually increase tensions between the United States and other leading global powers. In May the first critical government report was released. The National Intelligence Estimate reported that NMD could trigger a wave of destabilizing events around the world and possibly endanger relations with European allies. According to the New York Times (May 19, 2000), an American intelligence official said construction of the system would result in a series of political and military ripple effects among leading world powers. He said that it would likely result in a sharp buildup of strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles by China, India, and Pakistan and the further spread of missile technology in the Middle East. The report also stated that the threat of attack from North Korea when Pyongyang froze testing of the Taepo-Dong 2 ICBM after the White House proposed relaxing economic and diplomatic sanctions in 1999.

Even the CIA chimed in, concluding that Russia's overwhelming number of nuclear-tipped missiles would be no match for an American anti-missile system. Consequently, it was unlikely that Moscow would counter by increasing its nuclear arsenal. However, the CIA surprisingly predicted that China -- with just 20 CSS-4 ICBMs -- would lose its deterrent force. Consequently, the deployment of an American anti-missile system would push Beijing into proliferating production of ICBMs and warheads. Additionally, the CIA predicted that China would build several dozen mobile truck-based DF-31 missiles, which were first tested in 1999, as well as adding countermeasures such as booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, and chaff and simple decoys to confuse or evade American interceptors.

The CIA asserted that construction of the missile shield could lead to a domino-style nuclear arms buildup. Russia and China would begin selling nuclear weapons and technology to North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Moreover, India would be likely to increase its nuclear missile force if it detected a sharp buildup by China, its neighbor and longtime rival. That could lead to induce Pakistan, India's archenemy, to increase its own nuclear strike force.

Arms control and national security specialists also were concerned that the unilateral deployment of NMD would carry political and security costs so great that they would leave the United States more -- rather than less -- vulnerable to external attack. Unless Russia agreed to alter SALT I, they feared that deployment would seriously damage relations with Moscow and Beijing and strain ties with America's European allies. If Washington and Moscow reached an agreement, America's security still could be sharply diminished.

According to the New York Times (May 8, 2000), the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists predicted that the United States encouraged Russia to keep its entire strategic nuclear force of about 3,000 missiles on first alert as a way to reduce Moscow's anxiety about an American missile defense system. Joseph Cirincioni, an arms control specialist with the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, "Deployment will make the country less secure, not more secure. The (political and security) costs of deploying a national missile system unilaterally are extremely heavy and have to be paid for upfront, while the possible military benefits require the better part of a decade to appear. It's like a balloon mortgage. The big payment occurs immediately when you worsen relationships and existing security arrangements." Cornell University physicist Kurt Gottfried, who heads the Union of Concerned Scientists, also said that the anti-missile system had serious flaws. He asserted, "The proposed ... system will not work against the threats it is designed to face."

Critics also argued that the proposed national missile defense could backfire and actually increase tensions between the United States and other leading global powers. In May the first critical government report was released. The National Intelligence Estimate reported that NMD could trigger a wave of destabilizing events around the world and possibly endanger relations with European allies. According to the New York Times (May 19, 2000), an American intelligence official said construction of the system would result in a series of political and military ripple effects among leading world powers. He said that it would likely result in a sharp buildup of strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles by China, India, and Pakistan and the further spread of missile technology in the Middle East. The report also stated that the threat of attack from North Korea when Pyongyang froze testing of the Taepo-Dong 2 ICBM after the White House proposed relaxing economic and diplomatic sanctions in 1999. Forty-five American experts on China wrote Clinton urging him to delay his decision on building a national missile defense, saying the plans "are viewed by China as a sign of increased hostility toward their country."

When Clinton arrived in Germany for a state visit in June 2000, and he immediately faced criticism of his administration's proposal to build an anti-missile defense system. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder warned Clinton that the deployment of NMD could touch off a new arms race. According to the New York Times (June 2, 2000), Schroeder said that he had "concerns that we have to be very careful that any project does not re-trigger the process of a renewed arms race." In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung, Schroeder was even more forceful, saying, "Neither economically nor politically can we afford a new round of the arms race. No one can dispute the Americans' right to develop what they believe is right for national defense. On the other hand, we are partners in a common alliance."

President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pointed out that any attempt to erect a defense would lead to a proliferation of nuclear arsenals by other powers. In an interview with Global Viewpoint, published in the Los Angeles Times (June 5, 2000), McNamara said that in 1966 "it would be insane for them (the Soviet Union) to deploy it (an anti-missile system) just around Moscow and, therefore, concluded this was a first step toward a nation-side system." McNamara explained that the United States -- as well as the Soviet Union -- pursued a joint policy of no defense and limited the offensive build-up of weapons under SALT II in 1979.

More skepticism of NMD emerged in Washington in mid-2000. The GAO concluded that the anti-missile plan was based on uncertain assessments of potential threats and could face rising costs and delays, The Washington Post (June 17, 2000) reported. The report said that because of limitations on the Pentagon's ability to test all of the missile shields' components, it would hard to know whether the system would work during an attack. Analyzing the findings of studies conducted by the Pentagon and government agencies, the investigators said the technological uncertainties of the system greatly increased the prospects for delays, with each month of delay increasing costs by $124 million. In addition the GAO report said that the intelligence community was uncertain about what countermeasures countries such as North Korea or Iran would employ in attempting to defeat a missile defense system.

Coyle, director of tests and evaluation for the Pentagon, said that the tests were "highly scripted" and that there was no evidence to indicate that the anti-missile system could knock out incoming missiles. Coyle maintained that the tests differed from the conditions of a real attack in many important areas. First, he said that the tests were conducted in a relatively small area of the White Sands test area. Therefore, the Army was forced to use a target missile that flew a shorter path. This made it relatively easy to be located. Second, Coyle said that the test flight was "shaped and scripted" so the collision would occur in a relatively small area of the sky. Consequently, the debris did not fall in areas where it might do damage. Third, he pointed out that the anti-missile was merely a prototype that would never be used if and when the system was completed.

Coyle said that future tests of the prototype should be conducted realistically before the Pentagon continues ahead to the final system. He suggested, for example, that the Pentagon should move its tests to the much larger Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands.

In the spring of 2000, the GAO reported that the program still faced serious technical problems because of its reliance on parts that may be fault. The GAO report also stated that most of the components were produced before the reorganization of the program, when quality control was inadequate. According to a Lockheed Martin report, steps were taken to guarantee that the key parts would function in future tests. Lockheed Martin contended that only the seeker -- the part used to locate and track the target missile -- was built after 1996 when the quality controls were improved. After the fifth failed test in May 1998, Lockheed Martin reevaluated and retested the parts. However, the GAO contended that this was not a sufficient substitute for building parts with sufficient quality controls. The GAO also quoted the Pentagon's director for Operational Test and Evaluation as saying that until new equipment is built, "there is no reason to expect any improvement in the interceptor missiles' performance."

In early September, Clinton averted a diplomatic crisis by announcing that he would leave the decision on deployment of the anti-missile program to his successor. He said in the New York Times (September 2, 2000) that though the new technology was "promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven. We should not move forward unless we have absolute confidence the system will work."

Clinton's decision immediately won favorable reaction abroad. Russian President Putin remarked, "U.S. President Bill Clinton's decision not to take upon himself the responsibility for deploying the national anti-missile defense system is seen in Russia as a well- thought-out and responsible step." British Foreign Minister Robin Cook praised Clinton for a decision that "has taken careful account of the views of the United States' allies and international partners." French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said that Clinton's decision was "wise and reasonable."

But Clinton's move drew a strong negative reaction from some congressional Republicans. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl called the move "a capstone to a string of poor decisions that have left us defenseless against a growing threat."

A highly classified intelligence report, "Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment," warned that deploying an American national missile defense could prompt China to expand its nuclear arsenal tenfold and lead Russia to place multiple warheads on ballistic missiles that now carry only one. The report, a National Intelligence Estimate, represented the collective assessment of the nation's intelligence agencies, including the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. .

Although the report reaffirmed that China and Russia publicly opposed the system, it offered a detailed analysis of how those two nations were likely to respond and suggested that the effects of an American decision to build a nuclear defense would extend around the globe from Europe to South Asia.

The report did not intend to predict with certainty how China, Russia, and other countries would respond, but rather simply laid out a range of responses. It warned that China would expand its relatively small arsenal of nuclear missiles to a quantity large enough to overwhelm the limited defensive system that the Clinton administration considered. According to the New York Times (August 10, 2000), one government official estimated that China could deploy up to 200 warheads by 2015, prompting India and Pakistan to respond with their own buildups.

The report suggested that the Russians could accept a trade-off that would strictly limit the American defensive system to 100 interceptor missiles based in Alaska. But without an agreement, Russia could respond by increasing the warheads on each missile. Although Russia's economy was unlikely to support a large buildup of its missile forces, officials said the report found that it could again deploy shorter-range missiles along its borders and resume adding multiple warheads to its ballistic missiles. The report also included an assessment that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea could develop ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States by 2015.

At the same time, Defense Secretary Cohen postponed his recommendation to proceed with NMD, citing "a number of difficult issues" that still have to be resolved, the New York Times reported (August 8, 2000). Officials said the Pentagon had not reached a consensus on critical aspects of the program to build the anti-missile system. Those aspects included the costs of building the system, the building schedule, and the need for new tests, the officials said. Cohen said there was "no immediate or artificial deadline for a recommendation to the president," even though White House officials had previously indicated that Clinton would make his decision at this time. But Cohen indicated that the administration could begin work on the system -- clearing ground in Alaska to build an advanced radar station -- without violating SALT I.

THADD. Clinton also pushed for the $15 billion Army's Theater High-altitude Missile Defense System (THADD), developed by Lockheed Martin. THADD was a small scale "theater missile" defense program, aimed at protecting troops and equipment in the field from short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

In September 1998, Republican senators failed 59-41 -- one vote short of the 60 percent requirement -- to allocate more funds for THADD. All 55 Republicans and four Democrats -- Daniel Akaka and Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, and Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut -- voted for the legislation. Despite Congress' refusal to provide more funds for THAAD, Clinton requested $7 billion over six years to continued research on the THAAD project despite five successive failures as well as other technological problems.

At the same time, the Pentagon was pushing ahead with the top secret National Test Flight Center flight center at Falcon Air Force Base in the Rockies. Military personnel researched how missiles could knock out incoming warheads from other countries. The computers were not connected to real interceptors because none had been designed.

Coyle said that the Pentagon was under "unrealistic pressure" to meet an "artificial" deadline for recommending whether to deploy the national missile defense system. According to the New York Times (February 14, 2000), Coyle said that the project was unfairly driven by the Clinton timetable to make a decision on deploying the anti-missile system by the summer of 2000. Coyle said, "Undue pressure has been placed on the program to meet an artificial decision point in the development process. This pattern has historically resulted in a negative effect on virtually every troubled DOD development program."

This conflicted with Secretary of Defense Cohen's statement a week before. Cohen told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the project was "on track" and that he expected to tell Clinton in June whether the Pentagon believed the missile defense system was ready for deployment.

On March 20, the Pentagon announced a delay of approximately two months in the next scheduled test. The DOD said that it took several weeks to determine that a plumbing leak was responsible for the failure of the previous test and that it would take several more weeks to remedy that problem. This also meant that the Clinton administration would again delay the decision as to whether the National Missile Defense system should be deployed. Meanwhile, Texas Governor George Bush made it clear that he supported the anti-missile system.

Additional opposition to the deployment of the National Missile Defense System emerged in June. More than 50 House Democrats urged the FBI on Thursday to investigate "serious allegations of fraud and cover-up" in development of a national missile defense system, according to the Los Angeles Times (June 23, 2000). Air Force General Ronald Kadish, in charge of developing the system, denied any deception and told Congress that such allegations already have been disproved.

Senate Majority Leader Lott said he was "not going to be outraged" if Clinton left a decision on the system to the next president. Lott was the first high ranking Republican to suggest that a delay might be acceptable.

THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS. The National Missile Defense System (NMD) would require a huge increase in the missile defense budget of $4.5 billion a year. The initial system would likely to cost tens of billions of dollars and the larger one many hundreds of billions of dollars. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Clinton's administration's limited system of 100 ground-based interceptors would have cost about $60 billion. (Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2001)

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) in the Pentagon concluded that the Bush administration needed to proceed immediately with NMD, beginning with construction on a crucial radar system in Alaska -- aiming for completion in 2005. (New York Times, January 9, 2001) That was the date by which a commission led by Rumsfeld predicted that North Korean missiles might be able to reach the United States. But the radar was only one element of a functioning defensive system.

Until a workable missile interceptor technology was developed, no effective missile shield could be built. Meanwhile, negotiations begun that could eliminate, or at least delay, North Korea's missile program. March was far too early to expect the new administration to make a decision with such weighty potential consequences. Starting construction on the Alaska radar set America on a path that would require it to give notice later this year that it intends to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Moscow warned that that could jeopardize other treaties, including the two valuable nuclear arms reduction agreements negotiated by Bush's father in the early 1990s.

The Army's THAAD (Theater Anti-air Defense) and the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) would not be completed until the end of the first decade of the 2000s. And then, at best, those systems would be able to protect an area with only a 100-square-mile radius, far short of the global shield that Bush proposed. Furthermore, THAAD was considered as a "last-gasp" shield to protect cities against warheads that slipped through other layers. In addition, NMD could not handle surprise attacks from vessels close to United States shores or military forces. (Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2001)

The anti-missile system could be a multi-faceted system with three branches of the military participating. The original ground-based defense, involving interceptors launched from Alaska or North Dakota, would be coordinated with advanced radars and sensors in space.

THE OPTIONS ON DEPLOYMENT. Several scenarios were discussed. As the primary system for NMD, the program involved launching a booster rocket carrying a "kill vehicle" that would seek out and slam into a warhead in space. A second option would be to base interceptors on land, but that would require United States-Russian cooperation at a site south of the port of Vladivostok. However, Russia was vehemently opposed to the United States abrogating SALT I in order to proceed with NMD. Another option hinged on the NTWD that was under development to protect troops in a battlefield theater. Navy missiles would be launched in an attempt to intercept incoming missiles above the atmosphere. NTWD tests would not begin before 2002.

Another possibility would be to equip Navy ships with anti-missiles. Even a basic version would require new heat-sensing capabilities. And a more sophisticated boost-phase system -- placing Navy SM-2 air defense missiles on Aegis destroyers with a new radar and intercept system -- would not be ready until 2006. SM-2s would be outfitted on Aegis destroyers so that they could be fired at incoming missiles. They could be stationed around 100 miles off the coast of Japan. The United States also would need to develop faster rockets to catch up with rising missiles 100 miles or more away. The system could be expanded to carry interceptors to knock out ballistic missiles. But analysts said that the Navy interceptors, armed with kill vehicles to destroy warheads, must be deployed close to the launchers to be effective. Interceptors could shoot down missiles fired from North Korea but would be useless against missiles launched further inland. Interceptors also faced the same decoy problems as their land- based cousins. The Navy estimated the cost at about $15 billion, but the Council for a Livable World claimed it would be in excess of $47 billion. Under the plan, seven new Navy ships costing about $1 billion would be built, produced either by General Dynamics or Litton Industries, a unit of Northrop Grumman. (Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2001 and May 23, 2001)

Another option was to employ missiles on planes. The Air Force's $11- billion project involved equipping a modified Boeing 747-400 jumbo jet with a chemical laser that would be able to shoot down short-range ballistic missiles. It was designed to protect troops in the field and eventually would include fielding seven ABL planes by 2009. Two planes would be in the air at all times, flying in a circle-eight pattern while five would be able to rush to a combat zone within 24 hours. Because of the laser's limited range -- about 200 miles -- the plane's primary role would be to provide defense for a regional conflict. The plane would fly at about 40,000 feet and shoot down a missile as it cleared the clouds, because its infrared sensors could not see through them. Once a missile was detected, the beam director would track the missile and measure atmospheric distortion before the laser was fired through a mirror that instantly would adjust the laser beam for the distortion. Boeing would construct the planes, and TRW would devlop the lasers. But critics claimed that the beams would not be accurate, that the laser might not be able to adjust for the atmospheric distortions, and that the planes could be vulnerable to attack. (Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2001)

Still another option was based on laser technology that was still in the earliest research stages. During the 1980s, President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars. Over $50 billion was funneled into the program that failed to produce any positive results. The Air Force dubbed its version of the program "Death Star" and claimed that it could launch a demonstration laser by 2010 with an in-orbit shoot down of a missile about 18 months later, more than two years ahead of schedule. The Air Force said that they would need 24 satellites for the system to prevail. Developing, launching and testing the demonstration laser would cost over $4 billion. Full deployment, which would involve sending six laser-equipped satellites into space, would not occur until a decade later and would cost $70

However, lasers showed limited success in some joint United States- Israeli tests. But they dissipate when bent by the atmosphere, making them difficult to use except over short ranges. The most advanced research was conducted in an airborne laser program that involved mounting a laser cannon on a modified Boeing 747. But it was designed by Lockheed- Martin Space Systems Corporation for use against enemy aircraft and cruise missiles -- not against ICBMs. Flight tests were not expected until 2002. If completed, an airborne laser could be used as a boost-phase defense against short-range or "theater" ballistic missiles with a beam that could travel only hundreds of miles. (Washington Post, May 3, 2001)

And another possibility would be to deploy the updated version of the Patriot missiles. But they met with limited success during the Persian Gulf War to protect Israel from Iraqi Scud missiles.

UNREALISTIC TESTS -- AND FAILURES. The missile interceptor program during the Clinton administration had undergone only three of its 19 planned tests. Two failed completely and the third was only a partial success. After Bush took office, he proposed accelerating deployment of NMD and spending $3 billion more for all missile defense in 2002 -- a 57 percent increase -- despite warnings that the system was deeply flawed.

Philip Coyle, formerly the Pentagon's chief civilian test evaluator, testified in September 2000 at a hearing before the national security subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform that NMD had serious problems. But the report was squashed for eight months. Finally after eight months, six official requests, threats of subpoenas, a letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld from 55 House Democrats, and over the continuing objections of Pentagon officials -- the report was made public.

It described a phenomenon in simulation exercises called '"phantom tracks'" in which interceptors were accidentally launched against missiles that did not exist. Although operators attempted to take emergency actions to override these launches, they failed every time. The system "simply was not behaving according to operator actions."(Boston Globe, July 10, 2001)

Coyle concluded that the system's effectiveness was not yet proven, even in the most elementary sense. In fact, according to his report, the program is so immature that "a rigorous assessment of potential system performance cannot be made." Yet, the Pentagon had no plans to test basic elements of the system, not even to conduct flight tests with more than a single missile, even though the Pentagon conceded that multiple engagements were the most likely scenario. The testing program also ignored widely available decoys that adversaries would find simple to implement. (Boston Globe, July 10, 2001)

The report described how flight tests were being altered to ensure the public perception of success. First, the Pentagon reduced the number of decoys. Second, operators relied on artificially "canned" scenarios. And third, interceptors were given advance information they would not have in real engagements. Even with these advantages, the program still experienced embarrassing failures. Furthermore, the report also pointed out that the system could not defend against accidental or unauthorized launches from major nuclear powers, as originally envisioned. (Boston Globe, July 10, 2001)

FAILING TO SELL THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ON MISSILE DEFENSE. In February, Rumsfeld told European allies that the Pentagon would press ahead with NMD despite their objections. Meeting in Munich, it was clear that the gulf that had opened between United States and European members of NATO since the collapse of communism in 1991. In addition to differences over missile defense and the European Union's drive to create an armed force outside NATO, it was evident that a rift had also developed over American participation in Balkan peacekeeping missions and the speed and scope of NATO and EU expansion into Eastern Europe.

The New York Times (February 4, 2001) described Rumsfeld's composure with the 250 conferees as "relaxed and chummy," as he tried to assure them that they would always be apprized of any decision from the White House. He told them, "The United States has no interest in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies." And he claimed that NMD would also protect them from attacks from rogue nations.

However, Rumsfeld never explained exactly what he was proposing. Would it be sea-based, land-based, space based, or all three? And he never identified the scale of the proposed project. He just rambled about "outlaw regimes" and "rogue nations." Only on a handful of occasions did Rumsfeld mention Russia which was vehemently opposed to the anti- missile system. He never mentioned SALT I which would be violated if the United States unilaterally implemented NMD.

Furthermore, the day before Rumsfeld was urging the EU leaders to raise their military budgets, announcing to the Munich delegates that the Bush defense budget would not surpass Clinton's. The very next day. Fleischer announced at the White House that the Bush administration would not seek an increase in American defense spending for two years. That did not square with Bush's campaign promises. The president had said in September 1999, "My first budget will go further, adding a billion dollars in (military) salary increases." And in an August speech to the Southern Center on International Studies in Atlanta, Cheney had accused the Clinton-Gore administration of "eight years of neglect and misplaced priorities" with the military, with an "underresourced" armed services. Cheney had said, "Defense spending today is lower as a percentage of GNP than at any time since 1940, the year before the attack on Pearl Harbor." (Salon.com, February 8, 2001)

Fleischer claimed that the White House was compelled to complete a full-scale strategic review before seeking any increases. According to the Washington Post(February 7, 2001, an administration official said that an Rumsfeld "didn't know this was coming." Not only was it an embarrassment to Rumsfeld, it was a major foreign policy defeat to Bush who had broken his first campaign promise. The Munich conference tossed Rumsfeld's plans into disarray. And Bush's proposals to revamp the military lost credibility.

On the campaign trail in 2000, Bush and Cheney had castigated President Clinton for neglecting the military for eight years. They charged that defense spending, as a percentage of the GNP, was lower than at any time since World War II. One of Bush's campaign promises was to improve the military and to increase the budget by $4.5 billion a year. And he vowed to increase spending on weapons research and development by $20 billion, starting with the 2002 fiscal budget.

Bush's problems continued to escalate. There were signals from conservative think tanks that the Pentagon was not ready to launch into this futuristic and unproven program. Gary Schmitt, executive director of the Project for a New American Century, a conservative advocacy group in Washington, said that "a real tussle" was shaping up within the new national security team, primarily because of the astronomical expense. He added, "It's clear that, at current budget levels, there won't be enough money to fund (multiple) programs. It's not a pretty picture." And Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, a conservative think tank in Washington, said, "You'd really be building it from scratch, and it would take longer, it would cost more and you'll have less to show for it." (New York Times, February 4, 2001)

There were even rumblings within the Bush administration itself. Steven Cambone, Rumsfeld's chief of staff and executive director of a commission headed by Rumsfeld on the missile threat, spoke at a Washington conference in 2000 and told the audience that NMD should not be pursued. Robert Joseph, a senior National Security Council official with responsibility for missile defense, wrote that it "has become so contrived that it will have only a minimal capability against near-term threats." (Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2001)

But officials at the top of the ladder in the intelligence community attempted to justify the implementation of NMD despite its failed tests during the Clinton administration. Condoleezza Rice claimed that the United States' legal obligation to uphold SALT I. Interviewed on CNN's "Late Edition" (February 4, 2001), the NSA adviser said that "the world has changed. We look forward to conversations and discussions at all levels with the Russian government about how we move forward to a new restructured relationship that is ... more capable of dealing with the threats we face today, rather than the ones we faced 25 to 30 years ago." Conservative GOP Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran said, "I think we should go forward with the system that has been developed and tested. The technology is ready and it should be deployed." Cochran said that the Pentagon could add other components later but warned that jumping to a new system now would mean leaving the country unprotected for a substantially longer period. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona said he wanted to start with the ground- based system, then add other components to create a "layered" approach. And Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens of Alaska, where the ground-based system would be located, called it "the only national missile defense system we have right now." (Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2001)

Officials from the young Bush administration and the Chinese government began exploring ways to make such a shield acceptable to Beijing. NMD could effectively neutralize China's minuscule nuclear forces, and Beijing officials refused to discuss their own plans to expand their nuclear arsenal. Li Bin, a nuclear physicist and arms control expert at Qinghua University, said in the New York Times (January 28, 2001), "If the American intention is to use this system to defend against China, then I can't see any room for compromise. But if they really are just worried about the so-called rogue states, and they aren't trying to undermine China's deterrent. Then it may be possible in principle to reach agreement."

Bush's plan to move ahead with NMD was also met with disapproval in Moscow. Ten years after the crumbling of communism, Russia began restructuring its military infrastructure in the post-Cold War world. Moscow began reducing its military manpower and conventional weapon stockpiles. The lingering Chechen civil war and the sinking of the submarine Kursk in August 2000 compelled President Vladimir Putin to act on reforms. He knew that efforts to keep Russia's nuclear deterrent credible in the face of NMD would further damage wobbly economy. Additionally, Bush's comments during Campaign 2000 added to Moscow's uneasy feeling towards the new administration. Bush had threatened to ignore SALT I, which Putin refused to renegotiate, and move ahead unilaterally with the implementation of NMD.

Rumsfeld, chair of the Pentagon advisory panel, urged Bush to continue funding the Clinton administration's limited, ground-based system, while supplementing it with anti-missile systems based in the sea, on aircraft, and in space. The least amount of progress on the system in the 1990s had been made on the sea-based and space-based technologies they prefer. The cost would run into the hundreds of billions of dollars, although missile defense supporters contended that only $10 billion would be earmarked for the program each year and would ultimately cost just $60 billion.

The Pentagon panel recommended a system designed to strike warheads just before they hit the Earth, in their so-called terminal phase. The report stated that the Pentagon would have to choose the terminal-phase system that had the "highest potential," and then "focus resources, to field as soon as possible." The blue-ribbon panel also urged continued work in the Airborne Laser program -- to develop a weapon small enough to be carried in an airplane and capable of destroying enemy missiles early in their flight. The report also said the Pentagon should continue to fund the Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser airborne program, while branching out with more research and development for "follow-on" laser technologies. Finally, Rumsfeld's committee recommended that the Pentagon continue with development of a space- based laser. These weapons were the controversial key component of the anti-missile program that President Reagan promoted in the early 1980s. The committee said the Pentagon should focus the first flight test -- scheduled for 2012 -- on gathering "engineering and design" information. (Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2001)

At the end of April, the Bush administration, made it clear that it would proceed with NMD. Lucas Fischer, the deputy assistant secretary of state for strategic affairs, told the Danish Parliament, "We will deploy defenses as soon as possible. Therefore, we believe that the ABM treaty will have to be replaced, eliminated or changed in a fundamental way." (New York Times, April 30, 2001)

On May 1, Bush officially announced that the Pentagon would proceed with NMD. This meant that his administration would have to abrogate SALT I. Immediately, the president was hit with more criticism by leaders across the globe as well as from opponents on the home front. Lawmakers of both parties wondered how Bush planned to cut taxes and spend the $100 billion likely to be needed for minimal missile defense without cutting into other defense priorities. But he simply disregarded the skepticism leveled against him from allies and adversaries alike.

European leaders refused to support Bush's plan, claiming that it could jeopardize global security. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said bluntly that his government opposes any precipitous move to scrap the ABM treaty. "The ABM treaty worked well. ... We want control mechanisms that worked well in the past, should they be replaced, to be replaced only by better ones or more effective ones. We don't want there to be a new arms race." (Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2001)

The Bush administration dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz's delegation to sell Europeans on the merits of NMD. But they were immediately met with heavy criticism. German leaders were unconvinced by Bush's proposals and said that the anti-missile system posed "very, very serious questions." Wolfowitz's team was just as unsuccessful when the delegation met with NATO leaders in Brussels. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, met Turkey's prime minister and Italy's secretary of state for political affairs, resulting in similar opposition to the anti-missile system.

The reluctance of NATO members to accept NMD also revolved around the Balkan question. Earlier, Powell assured NATO that American forces would remain in Bosnia: "We went in together, we will come out together." Three months later, Rumsfeld made it clear that he wanted to cut the number of missions that American forces deployed overseas. To the dismay of NATO allies, the secretary of defense hoped to withdraw the 3,300 "peacekeepers" in the Balkans.

In May, Powell again contradicted Rumsfeld's position. In an effort to rally European support for NMD, Powell tried to persuade skeptical NATO allies to assure that the United States would not desert the Balkans. Speaking at a 19-nation NATO meeting in Budapest, the secretary of state tried to squash reports that the Bush administration was divided on its policy towards Eastern Europe, since Rumsfeld had said that the United States was ready to leave Bosnia. Powell insisted that Bush, Rumsfeld, and he were all committed to not pulling American troops out of Bosnia and Kosovo prematurely -- even if he and Rumsfeld had different perspectives. Powell said, "I'll try to reassure them that there isn't a big split in the administration" on whether to stay the course in the Balkans. (The Guardian, United Kingdom, May 29, 2001)

The NATO foreign ministers indicated support for modestly trimming peace-keeping forces in Bosnia. They expected to cut about 10 percent to 15 percent in the peacekeeping force of 21,000. They also expressed alarm at rising violence and political instability in Macedonia, urging the government to use "proportionate force" in maintaining order. (New York Times, May 29, 2001)

But Powell's strategy on NMD failed. France and Germany led the resistance among the NATO leaders to strong language on missile defense. NATO leaders promised only to maintain consultations with Washington on NMD. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urged a thorough study, arguing that any missile defense plan "must add to our security and stability. It must not lead to another arms race. If you want to have systems that can deal with such a threat, you don't wait until they're pointed at your heart." (New York Times, May 29, 2001)

Wolfowitz also met with Russian officials, led by General Andrei Nikolayev, head of the Russian parliament's defense committee. He accused the United States of seeking world domination and claimed that the vast scale of the anti-missile system betrayed its real purpose as a defense against Russia and China. Aleksandr Yakovenko, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said that the American side "failed to produce convincing arguments that would prove to us that the United States has a clear understanding of how to resolve international security questions without relying on the extensive disarmament architecture that has evolved over the past 30 years." (Washington Post, May 12, 2001) Even before the meeting, Russian Foreign Ministry officials were quoted by the Interfax new agency as saying that a few hours of talks on such complex issues had no chance of bringing the sides closer together.

When it appeared as if the Bush administration's had stalled, the White House was forced to change course. Bush chose to try to buy off Moscow with several promises. First, he offered to purchase Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles that could be integrated into a defensive shield over Russia and Europe. The S-300 surface-to-air missile, also called the SA-10 had a range of 75 to 250 miles. It was similar to the American Patriot, designed to intercept and destroy fast-moving bombers, cruise missiles, and some less-advanced short- and medium- range missiles. But both the Patriot and the S-300 were inaccurate at times. Russia was trying to upgrade the S-300 to the S-400, which would have a range of 75 to 250 miles and could be guided by a Russian- designed radar.

Second, he proposed to hold joint exercises in future years to identify and shoot down attacking warheads. And third, he offered to upgrade Russia's decaying radar system and to share early-warning data. Just weeks earlier, a fire at one relay station temporarily knocked four Russian satellites out of commission. (Washington Post, May 29, 2001)

But Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov on Monday officially shrugged off the proposal to purchase Russian missiles in exchange for Moscow's consent to abrogate SALT I. Ivanov said that the ABM treaty must remain intact: "If such proposals come - - we have not yet received them -- I am sure that they will not solve the ABM issue." (New York Times, May 29, 2001)

Another team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, toured Asia and received a lukewarm reception in New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee lauded Bush's proposal but stopped short of openly endorsing the NMD plan.

China reacted strongly to a possibility that the shield could be extended beyond the United States to cover Japan and Taiwan. Beijing's first official response came in the form of a written commentary by the official New China News Agency. The median reported that Bush's defense plan "will destroy the balance of international security forces and could cause a new arms race." (Washington Post, May 3, 2001) The news agency continued, "The U.S. missile defense plan has violated the ABM treaty, will destroy the balance of international security forces and could cause a new arms race. Therefore, it has been widely condemned by the international community." (Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2001)

Days later, the White House team dispatched to Beijing was headed by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Kelly met with Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. Besides abrogating SALT I, the Chinese delegation feared that the United States could extend NMD to rival Taiwan, reducing Beijing's ability to use its growing missile forces to intimidate the island. Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said, "China's constant position is unchanged. We are opposed to the National Missile Defense because it destroys the global strategic balance and upsets international stability."

Sun also dismissed as "groundless and irresponsible" a Washington Times report that American spy satellites detected evidence that Beijing was preparing to hold an underground nuclear test. The Washington Times quoted American intelligence officials as saying spy satellites picked up vehicle activity at the Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site in the remote western province of Xinjiang. (Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2001)

South Korea voiced disturbed that NMD would undermine peace initiatives with Pyongyang and that the chances of bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula would be lost. Seoul had hoped that, by distancing itself from NMD, it might limit damage to Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of reconciliation with North Korea that became stalled when Bush severed negotiations with Pyongyang. Han Yong Sup, an analyst at the National Defense College in Seoul, said, "President Kim had proposed a division of roles" and Bush "reflects deep mistrust by the U.S. of North Korea. It will pose a difficulty for South Korea in emphasizing the sunshine policy. ... There's no advantage to it. (NMD) will put South Korea in a difficult situation. In 1999, we made a clear statement we are not participating. This would mean a reversal of our policy." And Jang Sung-min , a South Korean legislator, said, "This will begin a new cold war in northeast Asia." But President Kim Dae Jung tempered his words, saying that he "praised U.S. contacts with Asian nations as ‘desirable.' ... I hope that through this process, the U.S. will contribute to peace and stability in the world." (Washington Post, May 3, 2001)

Japan raised concerns over its military role in the Far East. Its constitution bars joint military efforts with other countries. And even if Tokyo cooperated with the United States, it risked escalating tensions with North Korea and China. Kazuhisa Ogawa, a military analyst in Japan, said, "If Japan takes part in this proposed system, that means Japan is taking part in the United States' nuclear strategies. That would mean Japan would violate our own national principles and our own non-nuclear policy." And Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda commented, "The fact that the U.S., our ally, plans to deploy such a system may be all right, but we must avoid a situation in which such systems expand throughout the world. Depending on developments, we may have to say something to the United States." (Washington Post, May 3, 2001)

Even New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff and Disarmament Minister Matt Robson, opposed deployment of NMD. He said, "The establishment of the missile defense system runs the risk of halting and reversing multilateral progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons." (Los Angeles Times, May 2, 2001)

With NATO and Russia vehemently opposing NMD, Bush appeared boxed into a corner. And to compound problems, the administration received another blow when Vermont Senator James Jeffords jumped the GOP to become an independent in late May. But the minority president continued to unilaterally prod ahead. Senator Joseph Biden replaced Jesse Helms as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that further complicated the problem. Helms, a hawkish Republican, solidly supported the anti-missile system. But Biden, a Delaware Democrat, was far more skeptical. He immediately signaled that his committee seriously questioned the proposal's feasibility, necessity, and costs.

After months of threatening to ignore SALT I, the White House hinted that they might not dump the controversial treaty. Senior Bush administration officials pointed out that they could continue development of the shield for two years, and perhaps longer, without violating the ABM treaty. They stressed that they did not want the controversy over the issue to damage diplomatic relations and, in particular, wanted to explore whether they could craft an understanding with Russia.(Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2001)

Some observers believed that the administration's statements meant that the White House wanted to leave the treaty temporarily untouched -- and keep diplomatic conflict at a minimum -- while the Pentagon started building the anti-missile system. Others interpreted the White House comments as meaning that the administration might reconsider its commitment to NMD. (Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2001)

During Bush's European tour in June, he lobbied Putin to buy into his anti-missile system. The American president offered Putin "logic" in urging Russia to agree to set aside SALT I. But Putin rejected the unschooled American president, cautioning Bush about developing a missile defense shield without Moscow's consent. Putin lectured the American president that such an action could seriously strain relations between the two countries. The Russian president stressed that the 1972 ABM treaty was the "cornerstone of the modern architecture of international security." When Bush emphasized his support for the eastward expansion of the NATO, however, Putin stressed Russia's concerns about the alliance moving so close to its borders. (Los Angeles Times, June 17, 2001) Putin insisted that abandoning the 1972 treaty would only make it easier for third countries to develop nuclear arms. And he warned that it would be foolhardy to expect missile defense to provide true security: "It's like a bullet hitting a bullet. Is it possible today or not? Today experts say that it is impossible to achieve this. And the experience of the real tests demonstrates that today it is impossible." He also warned the United States that any attempt to impose its will on the rest of the world would backfire. "When we hear that some program or other will be carried out ‘with or without us' -- well, we cannot force anyone to cooperate with us, nor will we try to. We have offered to work together. If that is not needed, fine. We are ready to act on our own." (Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2001)

The Bush administration continued to brush aside warnings by Putin that he would upgrade his country's strategic nuclear arsenal if the United States deployed a missile defense system. On June 23, Putin issued the warning again, threatening a nuclear buildup if the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. Putin commented, "This means that all countries, including Russia, will have the right to install multiple warheads carrying nuclear weapons on their missiles." He said that for Russia, installing multiple nuclear warheads on existing missiles "is the cheapest response." (Associated Press, June 28, 2001)

However, Powell seemed almost dismissive of the Russian leader's stand when asked in an interview with the Associated Press. Powell responded, "I am not in charge of Russia but I don't think that's what they would do." He said that he was confident that Putin would not try to expand Russia's strategic force once he realized the cost. Powell added that Putin also would come to realize that an American missile defense was not a threat to Russia. (Associated Press, June 28, 2001)

Four days later, Russia test-fired a 26-year-old ballistic missile, hinting the weapon could gain new life as a "hydra-headed" countermeasure if the United States pressed on with NMD. Moscow also threatened to stack multiple nuclear warheads on its missiles as a countermeasure, if Bush proceeded to implement his missile shield. The Stiletto, referred to by NATO as the SS-19, was built between the mid-1970s and 1980s, capable of carrying a payload of more than four tons. A Russian Strategic Rocket Forces official told Reuters the Stiletto could be re-equipped to carry up to six warheads. Only the even older SS-18 Satan missile, which could carry 10-12 warheads, was larger. The Satans were about to be scrapped altogether under the START 2 which was signed in 1993. Russia's most modern strategic missile, the Topol-M, was more mobile than the older generations of rockets, but only carried one ton of payload. It could also be refitted to take more than one warhead. (Reuters, June 27, 2001)

Putin said that START 2 would be automatically void if the Bush administration unilaterally abrogated SALT I. If the United States deployed a missile shield, he said, no missile defense system would be able to counter multiple warhead rockets for decades. (Reuters, June 27, 2001)

In July, Putin proposed eliminating over 75 percent of Russia's 6,000 nuclear warheads, if the United States would not unilaterally abrogate SALT I. Putin made his offer after meeting with visiting French President Jacques Chirac. In their talks, Putin sought to enlist France and other European nations to rally around the ABM treaty. Putin said, "Russia welcomes the reciprocal readiness of the United States of America to reduce strategic offensive weapons. We are ready for a further verifiable reduction of strategic weapons to the level of 1,500 warheads or even less. I would like to stress, a verifiable reduction." (Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2001)

While Putin continued to reject Bush's missile shield proposal, the two leaders did find common ground on one issue at the G-8 summit in Genoa. Bush's only high point was a pledge by him and Putin that Russia and the United States would pursue deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals and link the offensive weapons talks to tougher negotiations over NMD.

Soon after he became president, Bush directed the Pentagon to consider further cuts in nuclear weapons, while Putin has suggested reductions to 1,500 warheads each -- about one-fifth of the current American stockpile. Bush had hoped to link offensive and defense weapons strategies since early in his presidential campaign. The president commented after the possible breakthrough with Putin, "The two go hand-in-hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for peace. I believe that we will come up with an accord." (Washington Post, July 23, 2001)

But Bush and Putin did not agree on the size of nuclear cuts, a timetable, or what weapons would be involved. And there was no evidence that Bush made headway in convincing Putin that NMD was not a strategic threat to Russia.

The Bush administration continued to brush aside warnings by Putin that he would upgrade his country's strategic nuclear arsenal if the United States deployed a missile defense system. On June 23, Putin issued the warning again, threatening a nuclear buildup if the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. Putin commented, "This means that all countries, including Russia, will have the right to install multiple warheads carrying nuclear weapons on their missiles." He said that for Russia, installing multiple nuclear warheads on existing missiles "is the cheapest response." (Associated Press, June 28, 2001)

However, Powell seemed almost dismissive of the Russian leader's stand when asked in an interview with the Associated Press. Powell responded, "I am not in charge of Russia but I don't think that's what they would do." He said that he was confident that Putin would not try to expand Russia's strategic force once he realized the cost. Powell added that Putin also would come to realize that an American missile defense was not a threat to Russia. (Associated Press, June 28, 2001)

Four days later, Russia test-fired a 26-year-old ballistic missile, hinting the weapon could gain new life as a "hydra-headed" countermeasure if the United States pressed on with NMD. Moscow also threatened to stack multiple nuclear warheads on its missiles as a countermeasure, if Bush proceeded to implement his missile shield. The Stiletto, referred to by NATO as the SS-19, was built between the mid-1970s and 1980s, capable of carrying a payload of more than four tons. A Russian Strategic Rocket Forces official told Reuters the Stiletto could be re-equipped to carry up to six warheads. Only the even older SS-18 Satan missile, which could carry 10-12 warheads, was larger. The Satans were about to be scrapped altogether under the START 2 which was signed in 1993. Russia's most modern strategic missile, the Topol-M, was more mobile than the older generations of rockets, but only carried one ton of payload. It could also be refitted to take more than one warhead.(Reuters, June 27, 2001)

Putin said that START 2 would be automatically void if the Bush administration unilaterally abrogated SALT I. If the United States deployed a missile shield, he said, no missile defense system would be able to counter multiple warhead rockets for decades. (Reuters, June 27, 2001)

In July, Putin proposed eliminating over 75 percent of Russia's 6,000 nuclear warheads, if the United States would not unilaterally abrogate SALT I. Putin made his offer after meeting with visiting French President Jacques Chirac. In their talks, Putin sought to enlist France and other European nations to rally around the ABM treaty. Putin said, "Russia welcomes the reciprocal readiness of the United States of America to reduce strategic offensive weapons. We are ready for a further verifiable reduction of strategic weapons to the level of 1,500 warheads or even less. I would like to stress, a verifiable reduction." (Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2001)

While Putin continued to reject Bush's missile shield proposal, the two leaders did find common ground on one issue at the G-8 summit in Genoa. Bush's only high point was a pledge by him and Putin that Russia and the United States would pursue deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals and link the offensive weapons talks to tougher negotiations over NMD.

Soon after he became president, Bush directed the Pentagon to consider further cuts in nuclear weapons, while Putin has suggested reductions to 1,500 warheads each -- about one-fifth of the current American stockpile. Bush had hoped to link offensive and defense weapons strategies since early in his presidential campaign. The president commented after the possible breakthrough with Putin, "The two go hand-in-hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for peace. I believe that we will come up with an accord." (Washington Post, July 23, 2001)

But Bush and Putin did not agree on the size of nuclear cuts, a timetable, or what weapons would be involved. And there was no evidence that Bush made headway in convincing Putin that NMD was not a strategic threat to Russia.

A White House document, released on July 11, confirmed the Bush administration's intent to withdraw from SALT I in less than two years. The policy statement, drafted in early July, said that the administration's testing plans would conflict with the ABM Treaty and would thus force withdrawal from the pact "within months, not years." It said that the administration did not intend to conduct its anti-missile tests "solely ... to exceed treaty constraints." Yet there was no intent to "design tests to conform to, or stay within, the confines of the treaty." (Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2001)

The document also suggested that the administration intended to try to quickly deploy a rudimentary "emergency" anti-missile system in Alaska that would include not only a ground-based component but also other components in the air and in the sea. The report suggested that, as part of the ground-based system, administration officials would like to include an aircraft-mounted anti-missile laser, as well as a sea-based anti-missile system, as quickly as possible.

Democratic senators attacked Bush's anti-missile plans. They challenged the president's wisdom of a program that could require withdrawal from an arms control treaty signed 29 years earlier. Some accused him of withholding key details of its plans and suggested that it was concealing its intention to quickly deploy a system that would conflict with SALT I.

Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz at a hearing that he had repeatedly pressed administration officials to answer whether their development plans would require withdrawal from the treaty. But the administration provided no answers and failed to conduct a legal analysis on whether a new round of tests would violate the treaty. (Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2001)

As if it would not and could not accept a "no" answer, the Bush administration continued to press Moscow to terminate the SALT I treaty. In August, Rumsfeld traveled to Russia as part of "consultations" in what appeared to be never-ending lobbying attempts. He met with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov who responded to the non-stop lobbying attempts, saying, "The existing, multilayered system of strategic security that exists in the world today fully meets Russian needs. And we feel no compunction to leave ... any treaty or accord that we currently have."

Russian officials complained that Rumsfeld had arrived without concrete proposals along those lines. Putin said, "It is important for us to get answers to several questions. Among them are thresholds of armaments reductions (and) timing of reductions, as well as measures of control, trust and transparency."

Rumsfeld replied that he was conducting a thorough review of American nuclear policy and would be able to talk specific numbers only when it is complete. He said, "We have been reviewing every aspect of the program. I suspect we will come to a point where I will be able to make a recommendation to the president in the next month or two, at which point we'll have a number. If anyone thinks it's been an intentional delay, they're wrong."

When Rumsfeld described SALT I as an example of outmoded "Cold War thinking," Defense Ministry spokesman General Anatoly Mazurkevich suggested that his emphasis was misplaced. He said, "We understand, of course, that we live in an era after the Cold War, and are ready to agree with our American colleagues that the existing system of agreements on strategic stability will have to be amended. We are willing to do this, but only on one condition: The ABM treaty must not be touched." (Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2001)

The Bush administration prodded ahead to find a loophole by which it could abrogate SALT I. Undersecretary of State John Bolton suggested that the United States could take advantage of a clause in the ABM Treaty allowing either party to withdraw if no progress was made during ongoing discussions with the Russians. Bolton said that he hoped that future talks between Bush and Putin would be profitable. But he stressed that the United States "would like, together with the government of Russia, to find a way out of, or somehow jointly withdraw from, the treaty, or somehow go together outside the limits and framework imposed by it." Bolton added, "If, even though we don't wish it, we fail to reach an agreement with Russia, then we will have to use the right stipulated by the treaty to withdraw from it, without violating it. I would like to stress that we prefer a joint resolution to avoid any arguments about (the United States') violating the treaty." (Los Angeles Times, August 22, 2001)

DEMOCRATS CHALLENGE BUSH'S NMD. In September, congressional Democrats launched their first assault on Bush's defense and foreign policies, attacking his anti-missile system as a waste of money that would make the world more dangerous over the next 15 years. Democrats also set out to challenge the administration's vision of threats to the United States in the post-Cold War world.

Democrats charged that the Bush White House ignored foreign policy dangers during his first nine months. They maintained that his unilateral decisions to reject several global treaties jeopardized America's leadership role. The Democrat's attack was led by Joseph Biden Jr., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Majority Leader Daschle. Although they were not successful in their efforts to bring a halt to Bush's NMD proposal, they made it more difficult for the White House to win funding for the program.

Biden told Tim Russert (NBC's Meet the Press, September 9, 2001) that the Bush administration sacrificed every aspect of foreign policy to missile defense. Biden said, "Everything -- including relations with Russia and China, even NATO -- is viewed through the prism of missile defense, which is dangerous and potentially disastrous. It weakens us. It weakens NATO. And it weakens our ability to deal with the real threats." What Biden called "weaponizing" space -- going ahead with missile defense and abrogating SALT I -- would create greater insecurity than at any time since the nuclear buildup in the early 1960s. Biden added, "This is one of those historic moments. If they move forward, a new genie will be out of the bottle. We'll have rejected 50 years of strategy that says, ‘Reduce weapons and all sides will feel more security.' " Biden said that the money allocated for NMD would be better spent on making the American military stealthier, more mobile, and more self-sufficient. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2001)

Biden predicted that deploying missile defense would also "raise the starting-gun" on a new global arms race. He said that allowing China to continue its missile buildup in exchange for allowing the United States to build missile defense amounted to pulling back the gun's hammer. The Delaware senator said that Chinese leaders felt forced to upgrade their nuclear deterrent if missile defense became a reality. The CIA's National Intelligence Council predicted that China could deploy up to 200 warheads, potentially including multiple warheads, in response to missile defense -- up from 20 intercontinental missiles in 2001. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2001)

Biden also said that the money allocated for missile defense could be used for a whole new generation of fighter aircraft and other warplanes, including 339 F-22 warplanes to replace an aging fleet of F-15s for $62 billion, replace aging F-16s, A-10s and F-14s for another $233 billion, and replace Cobra and Kiowa attack helicopter gunships for $39 billion. He said, "We could provide our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines virtually everything they need in the immediate future for about $385 billion -- less than what a missile defense system would cost." (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2001)

After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, Senate Democratic leaders handed Bush a temporary victory when they decided to drop from the annual defense authorization bill a provision to block any anti-missile test that violated the SALT I. That provision was vehemently opposed by Republicans, who said it would hamper the president's push to develop NMD. (Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2001)

A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE FAILURE. On July 14, the Pentagon conducted its fourth test of the anti-missile system and immediately declared it a success. An anti-missile "killer" vehicle, launched from the Kwajalein Islands, destroyed an incoming mock warhead that was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California 4,800 miles away. In the $100 million test, the collision occurred 140 miles above the Earth. But as was the case in all the previous tests, homing beacons, unrealistic decoys, and other techniques were used to create the appearance of success. But these aids to detection and target discrimination did not provide any meaningful information to help a planner learn how to intercept a real missile.

The Pentagon initially branded the test a success, but later acknowledged that a prototype radar was unable to tell ground controllers whether a kill vehicle had destroyed its target. The radar falsely reported that the interceptor had missed the dummy warhead. Independently, several sensors set up to monitor the test showed a hit. When the intercept did occur, it was not able to relay the information instantly, although it was able to determine that the target had been hit during a review of the test. The test was no more useful than any of its predecessors at providing data that would realistically simulate a real missile attack.

As was the strategy of the Pentagon in past failures, officials immediately downplayed the incident as a computer programming glitch that easily could be fixed for the next interceptor test. Officials said that the radar system failure was "not a major concern." Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said, "The software they installed just couldn't keep up with the information that was coming out. It wasn't a major problem. We just need to make some modifications." (Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2001) In giving the appearance that the test was a success, NMD's principal contractors -- Boeing, Raytheon, TRW, and Lockheed Martin -- received a big boost.

However, defense analysts said that they were troubled by the radar's failure to make the so-called hit assessment. In addition to identifying real warheads from decoys, the prototype radar was supposed to help ground controllers determine whether they should launch backup interceptors in case the first failed to hit their targets. The Raytheon X-band radar, the core of the NMD system, properly detected the target warhead and provided data before the interception. But its data-analysis capability was then overwhelmed by the cloud of debris caused by the collision of target and interceptor. The radar would thus have been incapable of tracking any additional targets or discriminating between them and any decoys, an essential task in any real attack scenario. (Los Angeles Times, August 19, 2001)

The journal Defense Week reported that the X-band radar was able to detect and track the warhead, and distinguish it from the accompanying decoy, because of a beacon implanted in the warhead that emitted a stream of identifying radio signals. A Reuters dispatch, reporting on the Defense Week story, was largely ignored by media outlets.

Other analysts said that the incident illustrated the immense complexity involved in developing NMD. Philip Coyle, who had overseen tests in the Clinton administration, said, "I think it indicates one of the big challenges that the program is going to face. I think it's fixable, but the question will be what about when you get into a more difficult engagement. It's going to take a long time to sort through all this stuff." (Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2001)

Air Force Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the missile-test organization, acknowledged that the United States did not have the technology to hit a missile with another missile, let along distinguish enemy warheads from decoys without radio aids. He acknowledged that the Pentagon was a long way from a national missile defense and a testing program that focused on the problems that such a system must overcome. (Los Angeles Times, August 19, 2001)

Russia's Foreign Ministry immediately denounced the test, saying it threatened SALT I and the international order on disarmament. Alexander Yakovenko, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, said: "A logical question again arises ­ why take matters to the point of placing under threat the entire internationally agreed structure of nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation, including its core, the 1972 ABM treaty?" (New York Times, July 15, 2001)

China's official Xinhua news agency said: "Arms control experts said that the U.S. missile defense plan, opposed by the international community, will not only spark a new arms race, but also threaten world peace and security, and stimulate nuclear proliferation." Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Putin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation less than a week after the fourth test of the anti-missile system. In South Korea, 1,000 demonstrators clashed with police at an American bombing range, calling for Seoul to reject any role in the planned system. (The Guardian, July 17, 2001)

After two postponements because of inclement weather, the Pentagon conducted the fifth test -- the third during the Bush administration -- on December 3. Once again, the DOD claimed it claimed it scored a hit. A missile carrying a mock warhead was launched from Vandenberg. Twenty-two minutes later, the interceptor missile blasted off from Kwajalein Atoll in the central Pacific 4,800 miles away.

After climbing into space, the interceptor released its booster, leaving a 120-pound, 55-inch- long "kill vehicle" equipped with sensors, thrusters, and on-board computers searching for and then destroying the target about 140 miles over the Pacific. (Washington Post, December 4, 2001)

UNILATERALLY ABROGATING SALT I. Bush's spirit of bipartisanship came to an abrupt halt on December 13, when he announced that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty. It could not have been more carefully timed. It came when his support was strengthened at home and abroad as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan.

However, by unilaterally abrogating SALT I, Bush not only opened the door to more criticism by allies and foes alike, but he invited a dangerous new arms race with Russia and possibly China as well.

Putin responded by criticizing Bush's decision, calling it "mistaken" and saying it could create a "legal vacuum" in arms control at a time when the world faced new threats. Other Russian analysts and politicians were more blunt, saying Bush's decision had humiliated Moscow after Putin agreed to cooperate with the United States on its war against terrorism.

Some said the decision to abrogate SALT I could provoke other nuclear-armed countries to proliferate their nuclear weapons. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of Russia's State Duma, said Russia should announce that it will no longer abide by the START II treaty that it ratified in 2000. That agreement required both sides to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads apiece, and restricted certain missiles to single warheads. Arbatov said Russia should plan for a greater number of land-based missiles than it previously anticipated, and arm them with multiple warheads. (Washington Post, December 14, 2001)

Politicians and analysts outside Russia were more critical of the United States withdrawal than was Putin. Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, said he feared the decision would spark a new arms race far more difficult to control than the one that led to SALT I. He said, "We might have, I am afraid, some kind of turning point where there are no rules of the game and everyone is for himself. It will be different from the Soviet-American arms race, but it will be more dangerous, because there will be more players." (Washington Post, December 14, 2001)

China voiced similar complaints. Zhang Qiyue, the spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said, "We have taken note of the reports and express our concern over them. It is of crucial importance to maintain the international disarmament and arms control efforts. ... China opposes the missile defense system. We are worried about the negative impact of the U.S. move and hope that the U.S. will listen to the opinions of other countries, exercising prudence on the question of missile defense." (New York Times, December 14, 2001)

MORE PROBLEMS WITH THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. In tests in New Mexico, the Pentagon had claimed 11 successful tests of the PAC-3 system, including previous tests in which more than one missile intercepted targets simultaneously. The high-velocity PAC-3 was the next generation of Patriot missiles being developed to provide better defense against advanced tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile aircraft. The upgraded Patriot Advanced Capability 3, or PAC-3, missile, made by Lockheed Martin, was supposed to intercept a cruise missile target in the test in New Mexico. (USA Today, February 19, 2002)

However, in the first in a series of four tests, a PAC-3 missile test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico failed on February 16, 2002 when two Patriot missiles did not hit their targets. The test was designed to simultaneously shoot down a remote-controlled QF-4 Phantom fighter jet, a cruise missile and a smaller unmanned aircraft.

The Army and the Missile Defense Agency fired a PAC-3 missile to intercept a cruise missile target. It missed. Meanwhile, two PAC-2 missiles were launched to intercept a subscale aircraft and a drone emitting radar-jamming signals. The missile trained on the drone hit its target while the other one missed. The test was aimed at demonstrating the operation and interaction of all the elements of the system -- including radar, command, and control equipment and systems to identify targets. It involved the PAC-3 made by Lockheed-Martin and upgraded PAC-2s developed by Raytheon. (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

Two other older Raytheon PAC-2 missiles also were launched as part of the test. The Army said one of the two missiles scored a successful hit, destroying an unmanned aircraft. The “hit-to-kill” missiles, advanced versions of the Patriot anti-aircraft missile used against Iraqi Scud missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, were designed to collide with their targets in flight at high speed. (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)