CONTENTS

12. BUILDING MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. DEALING WITH RUSSIA

THE U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL PACT On May 24, 2002, Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an arms control agreement which cut each nation’s supply of active nuclear warheads to a maximum of 2,200 before it expires in a decade.

The nuclear arms-reduction treaty did almost nothing to lessen the major nuclear threats now facing the world. It failed to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. It failed to stop Iran, Iraq, and North Korea from developing them. It failed to end India and Pakistan’s risky nuclear standoff. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

According John Pike, a defense analyst in Washington, (it might be “a step in the right direction. (But) there are a lot of very important problems -- both between the United States and Russia and outside of that context -- that this treaty doesn’t address.” (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, agreed. “This is not a comprehensive strategy” to reduce nuclear risks. “It’s a partial strategy,” and issues like India-Pakistan require urgent attention. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

The treaty only allowed the United States to store warheads rather than destroy them, and it left both nations with enough missiles to destroy each others’ major cities many times over. That contradicted Bush’s claim after the signing that the Cold War was now “in the rearview mirror of both countries,” Pike said. “It does not move us beyond mutual assured destruction.” (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

The agreement also had few additional safeguards to stop the perpetual chance of accidental or inadvertent launch. And it did little to address emerging threats such as Iran. Even as they signed the treaty, Bush pressed Putin over Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Terrorists also could acquire nuclear material through the black market or by theft.

On the Russian side, Putin failed to achieve his goals on strategic arms cuts and came away without any of the economic benefits he sought. The Treaty of Moscow essentially codified what Bush and Putin had already agreed to in 2001, with none of the detailed mechanisms or verification procedures of past treaties. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Putin knew well that Russia could no longer compete on an equal playing field with the United States, and therefore he needed to find a new place in the global order. He was also aware of Russia’s economic weakness, often citing statistics showing that Russia’s economy per capita is smaller than Portugal’s. While his generals wied about military strength, Putin pushed to move faster on economic change and seeking to ease Russia’s entry into international markets. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Putin set aside objections to United States policies on arms control and other security issues in hopes of forging closer economic ties to the West. Putin wanted the strategic arms cuts in the new treaty to be subject to rigorous verification, and he insisted that discarded warheads be destroyed, not stored. Both positions were rejected by the United States, and Putin accepted the United States view. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Earlier, Putin had objected strongly to United States plans to build a missile defense system but offered no serious protest once Washington decided to withdraw from SALT I. By May, Putin appeared ready to cooperate with Washington. Putin also dropped Russia’s long-standing objection to further expansion of NATO to include some former Soviet republics. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM. While the Bush administration worried about potential missile threats from rogue nations, White House officials ignored the more immediate danger posed by tons of inadequately secured Russian plutonium. The administration continued to indefinitely delay a plan worked out with Moscow in 2000 to begin disposing of the Russian plutonium. The Bush White House claimed that it was waiting until a newer, cheaper disposal technology could be developed.

The agreement provided for each country to gradually eliminate 34 metric tons of plutonium from its own stockpiles, mostly by burning it in power reactors. Russia's plutonium stockpile was immense. It had more than 160 metric tons in all, roughly half contained in weapons and the other half stored under less than ideally secure conditions. The stored portion alone was enough to build about 8,000 nuclear bombs. The 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium and most of the United States' corresponding share -- about 100 metric tons altogether -- were to be mixed with uranium and burned as fuel in power reactors. The remaining American plutonium was to be mixed with other materials and turned into logs of radioactive glass and buried, a cheaper and safer method but one that Russia could not be persuaded to adopt. In early 2001, the Bush administration suspended the glass logs approach indefinitely, arguing that it would be cheaper to use just one disposal method. Then the White House considered giving up on the burning method as well. (New York Times, August 27, 2001)

Cost estimates for both methods increased since the plan was first proposed. Nevertheless, it was still relatively cheap compared with the risk of rogue nations or terrorist groups stealing the plutonium. Even using the more expensive burning method, the total cost of disposing of some 80 metric tons of plutonium would be about $6.6 billion on the American side and somewhat over $2 billion on the Russian side over nearly two decades. Most of the Russian cost was assumed by the United States, although Europe also promised to help. In return, enough plutonium to build thousands of nuclear warheads would be eliminated. (New York Times, August 27, 2001)

RUSSIA’S NEW ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM. Putin announced in November 2004 that Moscow was developing a new nuclear missile system unlike any weapon held by other countries. Perhaps Putin was retaliating for Bush’s unilateral decision two years earlier to abrogate SALT I and to move ahead with an anti-missile system. (Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2004)

Putin referred to the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile, a solid fuel missile that had its first test two months earlier in September. Bulava could be developed in both sea- and land-based versions and equipped with warheads capable of penetrating missile defense. (Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2004)

Also in November, Russia tested a mobile version of its Topol-M ballistic missile that had a range of about 6,000 miles. In addition, Russia was developing a next-generation heavy missile that could carry up to 10 nuclear warheads weighing a total of 4.4 tons -- compared with the Topol-M’s 1.32-ton combat payload. (Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2004)

2. CHANGING AMERICA’S NUCLEAR POLICY: ATTACK FIRST

In June 2002 Bush announced that the United States would not deter attacks from other nations by threatening massive retaliation. Instead, the president announced that he would strike enemies first. This policy shift ran counter to what Bush had said as a presidential candidate two years earlier, when he emphasized the need to limit American intervention to regions with immediate bearing on the nation’s strategic interests.

Bush said the United States “must uncover terror cells in 60 or more countries,” or roughly one-third of the world. He promised to “confront regimes that sponsor terror,” even though he had found few American allies to endorse his desire to overthrow the Iraqi regime. The president said, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.” (Washington Post, June 3, 2002)

In making this decision, Bush teetered on the brink of violating international law. International law allowed for preemptory self-defense, but it demands that such first strikes must meet two strict requirements: necessity and proportionality.

First, it must be demonstrated that force was necessary to prevent an imminent attack. It was not enough that an enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction. There must be a credible indication that their use is imminent.

Second, the preemptive action must be proportionate to the threat. Only a truly mammoth threat would be proportionate to the use of a nuclear weapon. Since no threat of the magnitude of a nuclear weapon’s devastation had been made public, the administration’s proposed strategic doctrine suggested a lowering of this legal standard. It seemed to assert that the United States had an exclusive privilege to step outside the law.

3. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Under the 188-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nations without nuclear weapons pledged not to pursue them, in exchange for a commitment by five nuclear-weapons states -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China -- to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament.

Hans Blix, chairman of the Swedish government-sponsored Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, cited double standards on non-proliferation treaty. On the one hand, he said, the United States castigated Iran and North Korea for proliferating their nuclear weapons programs. Yet, the Bush administration and other nuclear-weapon states moved too slowly toward disarmament. (Associated Press, May 10, 2005)

Blix also charged that Undersecretary of State John Bolton, by questioning the value of treaties and international law, had also damaged the United States position. (Associated Press, May 10, 2005)

4. THE UNITED STATES’ NUCLEAR ARSENAL

The Bush administration received a setback in late December 2001 when the Energy Department’s inspector concluded that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, had become a “most serious challenge area” for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex. Inspector General Gregory Friedman announced that one review his office conducted turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile. Another review showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems.

The report showed that, since 1997, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which was carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles. Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems had developed in components such as radars showing delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests -- which included looking at “pits” or nuclear triggers and detonators -- were also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period. When successful testing over four years fell below 75 percent of planned tests, “there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed,” according to the inspector general.

The report also said that part of the problem was that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex had been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. When testing showed a defect or malfunction, department procedures required immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab was supposed to determine whether the problem was significant. If so, the lab had 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved.

According to the report, about 10 percent of significant findings had resulted in “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile.” Nevertheless, the IG found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days. After the determination had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” according to the IG’s report.

Only a small number of engineers and experts carried out these investigations and they often were involved in other projects, according to a former top Pentagon official. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage. (Washington Post, January 2, 2002)

DEVELOPING LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DEVELOPING LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Bush’s decision to begin research on developing low-yield weapons -- known as mini-nukes precision atomic weapons -- threatened to undermine international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms and to damage recent successes. The weapons were designed to penetrate underground bunkers presumed to conceal weapons of mass destruction or command centers. Pentagon planners said the low yield would limit nuclear fallout. (Los Angeles Times, December 23, 2003)

Low-yield nuclear weapons consisted of warheads of less than five kilotons -- or about a third of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II. The ban was part of a bill authorizing $400.5 billion in 2004 defense activities. The bill also directed the Defense Department to act to avoid friendly fire incidents by developing technology to track and identify friendly forces. It authorized $3.5 billion for 20 F/A-22 Raptor jets, which had been plagued by delays and cost overruns. It required the Pentagon to develop ethics standards for members of the advisory Defense Policy Board and Defense Science Board. (San Francisco Chronicle, May 9, 2003)

Anger over Bush’s policy increased steadily since the spring of 2003, when the administration requested funding for research on mini-nukes. That meant a reversal of a 1993 ban on research and development of low-yield atomic weapons. In November, Congress approved the bill and granted $7.5 million which was half of what the administration had sought. (Los Angeles Times, December 23, 2003)

In an attempt to frighten Americans, Bush accelerated the United States’ weapons-of-mass-destruction program. In May 2003, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved ending a 10 year-old ban on developing atomic battlefield weapons and endorsed moving ahead with creating a nuclear “bunker-buster” bomb. They also rubber-stamped the administration’s request for funds to prepare for a quick resumption of nuclear weapons testing. By escalating the United States’ weapons’ programs, efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms around the globe was jeopardized. (San Francisco Chronicle, May 9, 2003)

In addition, the bill eased environmental restrictions. It authorized $9.1 billion for missile defense as well as an increase in military pay by an average 4.15 percent. It exempted the military from the Endangered Species Act’s requirement that it had set aside undisturbed “critical habitat” important to the recovery of a rare animal or plant battling extinction. (San Francisco Chronicle, May 9, 2003)

In October 2005, Congress decided not to provide any funds for research on a new nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration had asked for $4 million for research on RNEP, also known as “nuclear bunker busters” and “mini-nukes” for Fiscal 2006 -- but the House rejected it. The bunker buster had an explosive yield of 5,000 tons of TNT, or one-third the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. (OneWorldNet, October 28, 2005)

In 2007, the Nuclear Weapons Council announced designs from two weapons laboratories in an approach that some experts argue is untested and risky. The new weapon would not add to but replace the nation’s existing arsenal of aging warheads. The goal was to develop more reliable and safer weapons from accidental detonation and more secure from theft by terrorists. The estimated cost was placed at more than $100 billion. (New York Times, January 6, 2006)

After a battle for three decades, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 158 to 3 -- with 5 nations abstaining and 19 others absent. The three states actively opposed were India, Bhutan, and Libya. Eventually, the treaty was signed by 161 nations and ratified by 31 of the 44 nuclear- capable, or potentially capable, states. A test ban organization was established in Vienna to verify the operations of the treaty. A global seismological network was set up to detect violations.

In September 1996, President Clinton signed the treaty. Three years later, the Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48. Senate debate was delayed by the Republican leadership, and the vote was influenced by Republicans' agenda to pay back Clinton for winning the impeachment battle.

In May 2000, as part of a regular review conference, the United States along with the four other acknowledged nuclear-weapons states declared that it remained unequivocally committed to "the ultimate goal of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons." The Clinton administration agreed to 13 steps toward nuclear arms control, including aggressive advocacy of the test ban treaty. (New York Times, July 13, 2001)

After a nine-year moratorium on testing nuclear weapons, the Bush administration indicated that it favored a resumption of nuclear tests. There were signs that the White House planned to allow CTBT to die in the Senate. The administration initially wanted to kill the CTBT, but State Department lawyers warned that a president could not withdraw a treaty from the Senate once it was presented for ratification. (The Guardian, July 11, 2001)

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz hinted that the Bush administration might resume nuclear testing. An administration official told Agence France-Presse that the treaty "has no support within the administration." General John Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, recently informed Congress that he is looking hard at "improving test site readiness." (New York Times, July 13, 2001) As another indication that Bush chose to ignore CTBT, the administration commissioned a study in July on how quickly nuclear test sites in the Nevada desert could be returned to action. But White House officials insisted that the United States had "no plans" to break the moratorium on nuclear tests.(The Guardian, July 11, 2001)

The Bush administration's unilateral approach was misguided and irresponsible. CTBT would be dead. The intention of the White House to kill the test ban treaty had serious consequences for nuclear arms control. It constituted a major renunciation by the United States of tremendous progress which it had made during the peak of the Cold War. The position of the White House reflected the extremist views of international law held within the administration. By ignoring CTBT and resuming nuclear testing, the Bush administration paved the road for other nuclear- weapons states to follow -- and other states would likely consider acquiring nuclear weapons. When India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, they were condemned by the United States. But once the Bush administration would start testing, it will no longer be able to claim the moral high ground and others will invariably follow its lead, including Russia and China. Coming on the heels of Bush's threat to abrogate SALT I, the world be made a much more dangerous place and one where the credibility of the United States would be meaningless.

Democratic senators attacked Bush's anti-missile plans. They challenged the president's wisdom of a program that could require withdrawal from an arms control treaty signed 29 years earlier. Some accused him of withholding key details of its plans and suggested that it was concealing its intention to quickly deploy a system that would conflict with SALT I.

Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz at a hearing that he had repeatedly pressed administration officials to answer whether their development plans would require withdrawal from the treaty. But the administration provided no answers and failed to conduct a legal analysis on whether a new round of tests would violate the treaty. (Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2001)

In the spring of 2001, the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee held hearings to discuss the physical condition of the United States' nuclear weapons complex known as Y-12. The nation's facilities included three design labs, four manufacturing plants, and 63,000 separate buildings. Two-thirds of them were more than 25 years old, and one-fourth dated back to the 1940s. At the most run-down plant, Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, structures from WWII's Manhattan Project were still in use. Testifying before the Senate, General John Gordon, Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, called the Oak Ridge plant "inadequate." And former Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger told the committee that Y-12's ability to fulfill its production mission was ‘fragile.' Both witnesses noted a recent report that some workers at Y- 12 must wear hard hats on the job -- not because of the work they were performing, but because of where they were performing it.

As administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Gordon proposed a new "Recapitalization Initiative" that would invest $300 million to $500 million annually in the repair and modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. Gordon was given a green light to deal directly with Senators Harry Reid of Nevada -- home of the nuclear-test site -- and Pete Domenici of New Mexico -- home to two nuclear-weapons labs. Together, the pair inserted $800 million into the defense budget for 2002 to begin upgrading nuclear facilities. Then Rumsfeld proposed a 10-year, multibillion-dollar program to implement the "Recapitalization Initiative" to modernize nuclear power plants. (Newsweek, August 20, 2001)

The Bush administration received a setback in December 2001 when the Energy Department’s inspector concluded that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, had become a “most serious challenge area” for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex. Inspector General Gregory Friedman announced that one review his office conducted turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile. Another review showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems.

The report showed that, since 1997, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which was carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles. Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems had developed in components such as radars showed delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests -- which included looking at “pits” or nuclear triggers and detonators -- were also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period. When successful testing over four years fell below 75 percent of planned tests, “there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed,” according to the inspector general.

The report also said that part of the problem was that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex had been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. When testing showed a defect or malfunction, department procedures required immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab was supposed to determine whether the problem was significant. If so, the lab had 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved.

According to the report, about 10 percent of significant findings had resulted in “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile.” Nevertheless, the IG found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days. After the determination had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” according to the IG’s report.

Only a small number of engineers and experts carried out these investigations and they often were involved in other projects, according to a former top Pentagon official. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage. (Washington Post, January 2, 2002)

Over 33,000 tons of nuclear waste filled over 100 interim dump sites in 41 states throughout the country. Since the 1950s, nuclear sites had been plagued with problems.

*In 1966, Fermi plant, near Detroit, had a partial meltdown and was permanently closed. At Brown’s Ferry (Alabama) a fire destroyed 1,600 cables. When Comanche Peak (Texas) was built, the construction company had no prior nuclear experience. There were 46 deficiencies in pipe supports, and perhaps 1,000 more deficiencies went unseen or unreported. Diablo Canyon in California was constructed three miles from an earthquake fault, and one of its units was built with the blueprints reversed.

*The Savannah (Georgia) nuclear weapons plant discharges cooling water, which reach temperatures of nearly boiling, into a nearby river. In this 300 square mile nuclear reservation, nearly all the trees are barren.

*At Browns Ferry in Alabama, human and mechanical error in 1975 led to the first significant problem in the United States. A worker used a candle to search for air leaks, a fire was ignited, and five emergency core cooling devices were knocked out. A meltdown was barely averted.

*In 1970, a series of errors at South Carolina’s Savannah River Plant led to a partial meltdown of fuel rods. The Savannah River Plant stores 35 million gallons of radioactive sludge, dating back to 1981, when the DOE began designing a treatment plant in South Carolina. From 1950 to 1990, this federal weapons complex produced an average of four nuclear bombs a day, leaving behind the waste in 9,000 buildings, tank farms, ponds, burial pits, and other storage sites. Much of this radioactive waste was disseminated throughout the country for storage. The radiation was so deadly that a human can be killed in minutes. In 1993, Westinghouse Corporation was contracted to begin cleaning up the radioactive materials but fell over a year behind schedule as well as being over one billion dollars over budgeted.

*In June 1999, the GAO reported that, since 1996, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore labs were assessed fines which reached into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This included safety violations which included exposing employees to radiation. The report also criticized Los Alamos for “inadequate monitoring of radiological contamination.” Lawrence Livermore was cited for “radiation exposure of personnel exceeding limits” and “repeated violations of safety procedures designed to prevent uncontrolled nuclear reactions.”

*The 560 square mile Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington was called the “most polluted place on earth.” Producing plutonium for nuclear weapons since the 1950s, it ranks among one of the largest sites in the United States.

The Hanford plant was contaminated with 53 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste stored in underground tanks that are so old they have leaked one million gallons of the stuff. Some of it leaked into the groundwater and flowed into the river. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

Ground water is contaminated with radioactivity and chemicals, and 177 unlabeled tanks leak radioactive materials, primarily strontium 90. Farmers and development hungry entrepreneurs want to reclaim thousands of acres that residents were forced to cede to the government beginning in 1943. In May 1997, chemicals that were improperly stored in a 400 gallon tank, exploded, leading to the release of plutonium and other hazardous chemicals. The storage tank contained a plutonium stripping agent, hydroxylamine nitrate and gaseous nitric acid. The release of plutonium occurred when a broken water line swept over the contaminated chunks. Since there was a breakdown in emergency response, no one was aware of the lethal conditions until hours after the explosion. The manager of the nuclear plant made an extraordinary admission when he disclosed that there had been a series of failures in almost every link of the emergency response chain of command. However, contractors at the labs never had to pay the fines because the law exempts non profit nuclear weapons facilities to. Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos are both run by the University of California without a profit.

Most of the plant’s 177 underground tanks were built for the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. They contained 750,000 gallons of “high-level” waste. Project managers planned to pump the waste out of the tanks and route it through miles of pipes to construct to a pre-treatment facility in order to convert the radioactive waste into glass logs. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

New construction began in 2002. But after three years of welding, pouring cement, and laying miles of pipes and tons of steel, construction came to a halt because the Energy Department underestimated by 40 percent how strong the building must be to withstand an earthquake. In that three-year span, costs increased by more than 150 percent. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

Nevertheless, the Energy Department and the contractor, Bechtel, went ahead with the plant knowing their seismic standard was wrong. Just as construction was about to begin in July 2002, an independent safety board sent a letter, warning the department. Because they did factor in some margin of safety, the contractor, Bechtel, told the Energy Department there was no restructuring required on the foundation or the walls. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

*In June 1999, the GAO reported that since 1996 Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore labs were assessed fines which reached into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This included safety violations which included exposing employees to radiation. The report also criticized Los Alamos for “inadequate monitoring of radiological contamination.” Lawrence Livermore was cited for “radiation exposure of personnel exceeding limits” and “repeated violations of safety procedures designed to prevent uncontrolled nuclear reactions.” However, contractors at the labs never had to pay the fines because the law exempts non profit nuclear weapons facilities to. Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos are both run by the University of California without a profit.

*In June 1999, the DOE launched an investigation into charges that from 1953 to 1976 thousands of unsuspecting employees at Kentucky’s Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant were exposed on the job to cancer causing plutonium. In addition to plutonium, workers contended that other radioactive materials entered the plant in shipments of used uranium from military nuclear reactor fuel. The Paducah plant manufactures bombs and processes uranium for both the bombs and nuclear reactors. In 1976, the plutonium shipments stopped, but contaminants remained scattered over hundreds of acres of buildings and grounds. The workers at Paducah did not learn of the problems until at least 1990, and others claimed that they were never told of the dangers.

In 1997, Congress directed a nation-wide study to determine a potential burial ground for the nation's highly 77,000 tons of radioactive waste. It also said Nevada could veto the president’s decision. The Department of Energy began focusing on Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only viable site to be investigated. After all, Nevada was a sparsely populated state. Clinton administration officials thought there would be little if any resistance.

According to a January 1999 study, it was revealed that traces of plutonium from a 30 year old Yucca Mountain blast in the Nevada desert migrated nearly a mile through water found underground. Scientists from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico agreed that the amount of radioactivity was too small to endanger the public. The DOE maintained that seepage would not begin for 10,000 to 100,000 years. Researchers concluded that minute amounts of plutonium had flowed downstream on particles of debris suspended in water. The DOE has lobbied to build a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain where over 80,000 tons of used reactor fuel remain. It will remain deadly for 300,000 years.

The law firm hired by the Bush administration to advise the Energy Department on how to open a nuclear-waste dump at Yucca Mountain was simultaneously lobbying Congress and the administration on behalf of the nuclear power industry about crucial decisions involving the project. The law firm, Winston & Strawn, was paid by the Energy Department and one of its contractors to help determine if the site was suitable, while also taking money from the industry to assure that the site was approved.

As the Bush administration prodded ahead to push for Yucca Mountain as the nation’s burial site, there was consensus among scientists that radiation at Yucca Mountain would leak. The only question was how long it would take. Highly radioactive nuclear waste would remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. Half of the plutonium stored in the mountain, for example, would still be radioactive 380 million years. Just one-millionth of an ounce of plutonium was enough to virtually assure cancer in someone who came in contact with it.

Scientists pointed to two other nuclear sites that officials once had said would be leak-free for hundreds or thousands of years: the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory near Pocatello and the Hanford Site in eastern Washington. Both were leaking already, and radioactive material could make its way into groundwater in just 10 years, according to a report by the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences. (Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2002)

Even if a 10,000-year leak-free promise could be guaranteed, critics of Yucca Mountain said society has a responsibility to civilizations far in the future not to expose them to lethal waste that we generate.

The plan to bury nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain was easily approved by the House Energy and Commerce Committee in April, signaling easy passage by the full House to override the state’s objections. (Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2002) In May, the House overwhelmingly approved the Nevada burial site by a 306-to-117 vote, overriding Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s objection to the proposal. (New York Times, May 9, 2002)

Weeks later, the Senate voted 60-to-39 in approving the Yucca Mountain site. Fifteen Democrats joined 45 Republicans in approving the project. Of interest was the position of two Utah archconservative senators. Orrin Hatch and Robert Bennett were concerned that an Indian reservation in Utah’s Skull Valley, about 40 miles from Salt Lake City, could become a privately developed waste repository if Yucca was rejected. They implied that they would have supported the dump site anywhere except on Utah territory. (Washington Post, July 10, 2002)

Democratic Senator Harry Reid of Nevada said, “Of course it’s a conflict. What would happen if, when I was practicing law, somebody came to me and had a problem and I took money from them, and somebody else gave me money to sue them?” But Jill Schroeder, speaking for the DOE, immediately supported the decision by saying, “We found them eminently qualified. We have not found a conflict of interest.” She described Winston & Strawn’ role as helping the DOE decide “whether or not it could be licensed.” (New York Times, July 27, 2001)

The plan to bury nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain was easily approved by the House Energy and Commerce Committee in April, signaling easy passage by the full House to override the state’s objections. (Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2002) In May, the House overwhelmingly approved the Nevada burial site by a 306-to-117 vote, overriding Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s objection to the proposal. (New York Times, May 9, 2002)

Weeks later, the Senate voted 60-to-39 in approving the Yucca Mountain site. Fifteen Democrats joined 45 Republicans in approving the project. Of interest was the position of two Utah archconservative senators. Orrin Hatch and Robert Bennett were concerned that an Indian reservation in Utah’s Skull Valley, about 40 miles from Salt Lake City, could become a privately developed waste repository if Yucca was rejected. They implied that they would have supported the dump site anywhere except on Utah territory. (Washington Post, July 10, 2002)

In May 2003, Cogema Incorporated was awarded a $29.7 million contract to design robots to handle heavy packages of nuclear waste targeted for burial at the planned Yucca Mountain respository. This was the first contract for the design and construction of the nuclear waste dump. (San Francisco Chronicle, May 10, 2003)

Many conservative critics opposed the contract, because France did not support Bush’s war against Iraq. Cogema was a subsidiary of a French-owned consortium, the AREVA Group.

THE HANFORD SITE.

The Hanford plant in Washington was contaminated with 53 million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste stored in underground tanks that are so old they have leaked one million gallons of the stuff. Some of it leaked into the groundwater and flowed into the river. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

Most of the plant’s 177 underground tanks were built for the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. They contained 750,000 gallons of “high-level” waste. Project managers planned to pump the waste out of the tanks and route it through miles of pipes to construct to a pre-treatment facility in order to convert the radioactive waste into glass logs. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

Construction began in 2002. But after three years of welding, pouring cement, and laying miles of pipes and tons of steel, construction came to a halt because the Energy Department underestimated by 40 percent how strong the building must be to withstand an earthquake. In that three-year span, costs increased by more than 150 percent. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

Nevertheless, the Energy Department and the contractor, Bechtel, went ahead with the plant knowing their seismic standard was wrong. Just as construction was about to begin in July 2002, an independent safety board sent a letter, warning the department. Because they did factor in some margin of safety, the contractor, Bechtel, told the Energy Department there was no restructuring required on the foundation or the walls. (CBS, 60 Minutes, April 30, 2006)

An international treaty dating back to 1967 banned weapons of mass destruction in space. Since that time, the 65-member Geneva forum stood steadfast behind that accord. (Reuters, June 13, 2006)

In January 2001, a commission led by Donald Rumsfeld, then the newly nominated defense secretary, recommended that the military should “ensure that the president (George W. Bush) will have the option to deploy weapons in space.” (New York Times, May 18, 2005)

The recommendation said that “explicit national Seurity guidance and defense policy is needed to direct development of doctrine, concepts of operations and capabilities for space, including weapons systems that operate in space.” In 2002, Bush withdrew from the 30-year-old Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which banned space-based weapons. (New York Times, May 18, 2005)

Meanwhile, the Air Force sought a new presidential policy officially ratifying the concept of seeking American space superiority. The Air Force claimed it needed a secure space to protect the nation from attack and called for offensive and defensive space weapons. (New York Times, May 18, 2005)

Weapons scientists, physicists, and engineers said the cost of a space-based could be anywhere from $220 billion to $1 trillion. In the March issue of IEEE Spectrum, the professional journal of electric engineering, the estimate for “a space-based laser would cost $100 million per target, compared with $600,000 for a Tomahawk missile.” (New York Times, May 18, 2005)

In the spring of 2006, Bush had spent over $400 billion on his war in Iraq. Nevertheless, he had the audacity to request millions of dollars for an obscure space program. In March 2006, the Pentagon requested hundreds of millions of dollars for a variety of tests on offensive and defensive weapons in space. Those funds were earmarked for:

*Missiles that would be launched at a small satellite in orbit.

*Testing a small space vehicle that could disperse weapons while traveling at 20 times the speed of sound.

*Determining whether high-powered ground-based lasers could effectively destroy enemy satellites. (Boston Globe, March 14, 2006)

In mid-2006, the Bush administration once again reasserted its right to develop weapons for use in outer space. The State Department informed the Conference on Disarmament that such weapons systems would be purely defensive. (Reuters, June 13, 2006)

In October 2006, Bush announced that he had the authority to deny access to space to any adversary hostile to United States interests. He proclaimed domination in space was crucial to America’s defenses as air or sea power. His order also opposed the establishment of arms control treaties that would restrict United States access to space, or set limits on its use of space. It called for the development of space capabilities to support United States intelligence and defense initiatives. (The Guardian, October 19, 2006)

Plutonium 238 had no central role in nuclear arms. Instead, it was used for the ability to generate steady heat that could be turned into electricity. Nuclear batteries -- made of plutonium -- were used for powering spacecraft that could go where sunlight was too dim to energize solar cells. Scores of them powered satellites, planetary probes, and spy devices, at times with disastrous results. (New York Times, June 27, 2005)

In 1964, a rocket failure led to the destruction of a navigation satellite powered by plutonium 238, spreading radioactivity around the globe and starting a debate over the event's health effects. In 1965, in the Himalayas, an intelligence team caught in a blizzard lost a plutonium-powered device meant to spy on China. And in 1968, an errant weather satellite crashed into the Pacific, but federal teams managed to recover its plutonium battery intact from the Santa Barbara Channel, off California. (New York Times, June 27, 2005)

Then came the Bush administration. The White House planned the government’s first production of plutonium 238 since the Cold War. Federal officials said the program would produce a total of 330 pounds over 30 years at the Idaho National Laboratory. It could cost $1.5 billion and generate more than 50,000 drums of hazardous and radioactive waste. Most if not all of the new plutonium was intended for secret missions. (New York Times, June 27, 2005)

The Bush administration planned to develop a new hydrogen bomb. This would likely spark production of new nuclear weapons by other countries, including several foes of the Bush administration. (OneWorldNet, March 7, 2007)

In March 2007, the Department of Energy announced it was seeking to develop a new hydrogen bomb that would replace the existing W76 warhead that was deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. (OneWorldNet, March 7, 2007)

In March 2006, Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the world’s two largest democracies signed an unprecedented nuclear weapons agreement. The accord meant a major expansion in ties between the United States and India after decades of strained relations. It would end India’s status as a nuclear renegade and clear the way for United States companies to sell civilian nuclear equipment to India.

The pact mandated that India would have to be exempted from a 1978 law banning nuclear trade with nations that conducted nuclear test explosions or did not accept comprehensive safeguards as mandated by the IAEA. (Washington Post, March 3, 2006)

According to the agreement, the United States recognized the New Delhi government as a nuclear military power. In return, India would declare 14 of 22 reactors part of its civilian program and place them under international monitoring. (Washington Post, March 3, 2006)

But vital parts of the country’s nuclear program were excluded from safeguards. Eight reactors would not be covered by the safeguards and could remain sources of plutonium for weapons. The facilities included several civilian power plants and a fast-breeder reactor that would produce large amounts of plutonium. Safeguards also would not cover existing spent reactor fuel, which contained enough plutonium for more than 1,000 weapons, and a facility for enriching uranium, which also could used to make nuclear weapons. (Washington Post, March 3, 2006)

In attempting to justify the agreement, Bush claimed the United States would benefit because increased use of nuclear power in India would reduce global demand for oil. One of the world’s fastest growing economies, India consumed a large share of global energy supplies that helped escalate oil prices. (Washington Post, March 3, 2006)

However, the agreement undermined the global system designed to halt the spread of nuclear arms. This made it more difficult to negotiate with Iran and North Korea in their alleged nuclear weapons programs. (Washington Post, March 3, 2006)

The Bush administration received a setback in late December 2001 when the Energy Department’s inspector concluded that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, had become a “most serious challenge area” for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex. Inspector General Gregory Friedman announced that one review his office conducted turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile. Another review showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems.

The report showed that, since 1997, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which was carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles. Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems had developed in components such as radars showed delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests -- which included looking at “pits” or nuclear triggers and detonators -- were also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period. When successful testing over four years fell below 75 percent of planned tests, “there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed,” according to the inspector general.

The report also said that part of the problem was that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex had been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. When testing showed a defect or malfunction, department procedures required immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab was supposed to determine whether the problem was significant. If so, the lab had 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved.

According to the report, about 10 percent of significant findings had resulted in “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile.” Nevertheless, the IG found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days. After the determination had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” according to the IG’s report.

Only a small number of engineers and experts carried out these investigations and they often were involved in other projects, according to a former top Pentagon official. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage. (Washington Post, January 2, 2002)