CONTENTS

13. UZBEKISTAN

Once secure in the White House, Bush raised the likelihood of a return to the Cold War. Perhaps influenced by his father, the unseasoned and arrogant president pursued a unilateral path, as he defiantly disregarded other heads of state. It was remarkable that the non-intellectual and inexperienced president -- born into wealth and power -- possessed was the audacity to take on highly educated and experienced heads of state. The only commonality with them was his quest for globalization as a pawn of corporate America. But in other areas -- ranging from environmentalism to a new star wars program -- he simply ignored his colleagues.

His first major foreign policy decision was to bomb Iraq, while he was in the midst of his first state visit with Mexican President Vincente Fox. The Bush Administration immediately adopted a laissez faire attitude in the Middle East and the Balkans where the United States previously had played a pivotal role. After Bush assured allies in Europe that his administration would not proceed with the development of the National Missile Defense system (NMD) without consulting them, he dispatched Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Europe to declare that he would proceed no matter what they thought.

Bush sent out clear signals that Russia, China, and North Korea were "competitors" rather than "partners." He terminated talks with North Korea after progress had been made for the first time by the Clinton administration. He embarrassed South Korean President Kim Dae-jung during his visit to Washington D.C. Bush pushed him into a corner with his hardline stance on North Korea and his reluctance to encourage Kim to engage in dialogue with Pyongyang. In the space of one week alone, he expelled 50 Russian diplomats; he trained America's guns on China after the emergency landing of the EP-3 spy plane in Hainan; and he unilaterally torpedoed the Kyoto protocol. The president not only shunned Tokyo -- as well as the rest of the industrialized world -- by ignoring the Kyoto protocol, but he also pressured the Japanese government to take more of an active security role in the East.

While the Clinton Administration attempted to develop a post-Cold War role as a central player in world problems from Northern Ireland and AIDS, Bush seemed disinterested in solutions requiring international co-operation that could require sacrifices by the United States.

Two months before Inauguration Day, Bush spoke on foreign policy and echoed his views on "American internationalism." The Washington Post (February 7, 2001) described his foreign policy as one of "regime change" rather than one of "coexistence." It resembled the Cold War hard core tactics carried out by John Foster Dulles. Soon after Bush moved into the White House, he received a letter from a group of self-described leading conservatives. They urged Bush to reject the traditional jargon of "stability" and "national interest" as criteria in shaping foreign policy. Instead they advocated the use of stronger military power to flex America's muscle overseas.

Bush's hegemonist approach to foreign policy clashed with that of Secretary of State Powell. Experienced in fighting wars but lacking diplomatic skills, Powell began his tenure by developing a moderate philosophy. He called for a clear and simple way to determine when military force should be implemented. According to the "Powell Doctrine," American military commitment abroad was justified but only as a last resort. Powell asserted that any deployment of troops needed the full support of the American people, and he added that the United States needed a viable exit strategy.

During the heated 2000 campaign, Bush campaigned for a stronger American military, a tougher line on Russia and China, a scaled-down peacekeeping role, and a missile defense system to protect America. But Jonathan Stevenson, a research fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, claimed that Bush would not get his way. Quoted in the Los Angeles Times (December 17, 2000), Stevenson said, "He faces a very divided Congress and one in which the Democrats are still stinging. He probably will find it somewhat difficult to implement any radical changes in foreign policy terribly quickly. There will be gridlock."

From Europe to Asia, from allies to ideological rivals, world leaders raised deep concerns about Bush and his legitimacy. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat congratulated Bush, but there were undercurrents of fear in the Middle East that Bush had neither the experience nor the interest to help end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political scientist Gerald Steinberg in Jerusalem said in the Los Angeles Times(December 15, 2000), "The emphasis is going to be different in a Bush administration. To the degree that Bush will be involved in foreign policy, he will be reasserting American dominance and hegemony."

Foreign leaders continued to voice their concerns about Bush's campaign pledge to implement an anti-missile system. Quoted in the Los Angeles Times (December 17, 2000), British Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain said that his government recognized American concerns over possible threats by so-called rogue states. But he hoped that Bush would pay attention to other nations' concerns about the missile defense system. Hain told British Broadcasting Corporation, "What we don't want to see is any unilateral steps by Washington which could breach the Anti- Ballistic Missile treaty, especially in terms of Russian interests."

Europeans were particularly concerned about Bush's pledge to reduce America's involvement in NATO. The Balkans would be a key test of Bush's promise to downsize the 9,000-member American military contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. While campaigning for the presidency, Bush had acknowledged that a Balkan withdrawal was not imminent, but he had made it clear that European allies should play a greater role in policing the continent.

Britain's media were critical of the American election process. Columnist Hugo Young of The Guardian, one of Britain's most respected newspapers, wrote, "The election has been a calamity without precedent. Its result is unacceptable and will not be accepted by large numbers of Americans. What they see before them is the brute fact of several thousand uncounted votes that would have made a difference. Democracy, quite simply, was poisoned to put George W. Bush in the White House." A front-page cartoon in The Guardian showed a stock trader reacting to news of the Bush victory by screaming into the phone: "Buy lethal injections!" The cover of London's The Mirror proclaimed: "Congrats on becoming the president, Dubya." Beneath it was a picture of the planet Earth with an arrow designating Britain with the headline: "P.S. We are here."

Longin Pastusiak, a member of the Polish Parliament's foreign relations committee, commented, "People are asking themselves how a country that presents itself as a model of democracy could not handle the question of counting the votes more efficiently." And Stephen Haseler, a professor of government at London Guildhall University, charged, "The Supreme Court decision is contrived, politically biased and very injurious to the whole legal system."

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and British Prime Minister Tony Blair also officially congratulated Bush, but they knew well that he was inexperienced. Some Europeans expressed concern that Bush would insist on building a national missile defense shield for the United States, while leaving North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies exposed to Russian anger over a revitalized arms race. Italian Senator Tana De Zulueta said in the Times, "There is widespread concern in NATO that the Republican administration would combine disengagement in Europe with a return to the anti-missile project as a centerpiece of national defense. That would be very divisive for the alliance." At the German Society for Foreign Policy in Berlin, analyst Michaela Hoenicke feared that the missile shield could provoke new friction with Russia. But she saw a reduced American role in military activities on the continent as "highly compatible" with the European Union's expressed desire to take on more responsibility for peace and security by creating its own rapid-reaction forces.

Some noted authorities believed that Bush, as inexperienced as he was, would not pose a global threat, since his power would be limited by the deeply flawed American election. The Dutch newspaper, Het Financieele Dagblad, commented, "A weak president forces the political parties to make compromises," particularly since Bush's moral authority was restricted by the legal and political manipulations of the election. An article in the Italian La Repubblica read, "At the end of its labyrinth, America finds itself with a president it did not elect. From today, (Bush) must begin a campaign to justify his victory, which is more legal than real, to put a halt to a decline in the status of the American presidency."

Asian leaders feared that with his narrow and disputed mandate, Bush would lack the clout to rush to their aid during fiscal and political unrest. Desmond Supple, director of economic research at Barclays Capital in Singapore, said, "He doesn't have a perceived mandate. Official reaction by Chinese President Jiang Zemin was that his country and the United States would "shoulder a common responsibility" to foster peace and stability. But comments among the lower rung of the political ladder were disingenuous. The common people referred to the American president as "Little Bush."

Moeko Tawara, a prominent Japanese writer and feminist, commented in the Los Angeles Times, "I have been so confused, and the system does not match my understanding of democracy." Political science professor Minoru Tada at Nishogakusha University added that Florida's voting machines might not be as outdated as those in developing nations, "but for the country that leads the world, they are unthinkable."

African newspapers greeted news of Bush's victory with anxiety that he would further isolate their continent. An editorial in Kenya's Daily Nation read, "Because of Bush's linguistic deficiencies, inability to grasp complex issues and a deeply right-wing disposition unlikely to favor Africa ... most people were not excited by his imminent declaration as the next president." Many Africans also feared that Bush's promised tax cuts would mean less foreign aid and slower debt relief.

Two weeks before Inauguration Day, Bush began to back down from his campaign promise to reduce American military presence in Europe. He met with a bipartisan delegation of defense experts from the Senate and House and appeared reluctant to make dramatic shifts in American defense policy and spending priorities. But he showed no inclination to step back from his support for a national missile defense program. The January 8 meeting with approximately a dozen members of the House and Senate armed services committees and defense appropriations subcommittees -- the legislators whose budget votes give them considerable authority over defense policy -- offered Bush his first direct look at the choices he must make. He had campaigned to modernize the armed forces -- particularly implementing NMD -- but again refused to offer any specifics. He also had promised an estimated 7 percent pay raise to American troops.

2. CHENEY'S SHADOW GOVERNMENT

From the outset, a tug-of-war developed among White House national security leaders. Secretary of State Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld clashed over a NATO force that excluded American troops as well as deployment of NMD. And disagreements between Vice President Cheney and Powell may be traced back to the Gulf War where they had major differences of opinion as to how to oppose Hussein near the end of the war and afterwards. Now in the Bush administration, a power struggle emerged over jurisdiction of key foreign policy issues.

Bush expected Cheney and the vice presidential advisers to be full participants in national security policy. The administration contemplated that the NSC and Cheney's staff would be treated as one and would exercise more influence than vice presidents in previous administrations. The vice president emerged as the winner because of his closeness to Bush and his handpicked selection of Rumsfeld to head the Pentagon. Rumsfeld was a mentor of Cheney's extending back to the Ford administration days where Cheney was chief of staff and Rumsfeld was secretary of defense. Initially, it had been believed that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge or Senator Dan Coats of Indiana were the leading candidates for the position. But Cheney vetoed Ridge, who was close to Bush and who was endorsed for the position by Powell. A chief concern of Cheney's was that neither Ridge nor Coats had the experience or stature to keep Powell from rolling right over them. Quite possibly Cheney was concerned about his inability to deal with foreign administrations issues because historically vice presidents have been primarily known for presiding over the Senate and breaking ties when necessary. As a result, Cheney handpicked Rumsfeld because he was someone whom he could trust.

Furthermore, Cheney tried to consolidate his position as a member of the national security team by choosing Paul Wolfowitz as deputy defense secretary. Wolfowitz was a hard-core hawk and Cold Warrior who detested Powell's dove-like conciliatory approach to conflict resolution. Wolfowitz was also extremely loyal to Cheney and Rumsfeld.

Powell countered by selecting Richard Armitage as his deputy secretary of state. Armitage was a loyalist and one of Powell's closest friends. It was rumored that Powell initially pushed for Armitage to fill the deputy secretary of defense slot but that Cheney and Rumsfeld rejected the idea, in part, due to Armitage's closeness to Powell.

National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice was the fourth player in the power struggle. The Washington Post (February 18, 2001) reported that she indicated her "must-have" areas of influence and allowed the rest to be transferred to other agencies -- most obviously to the vice- president and to a lesser extent to the State Department. Rice's key role was preeminent adviser on Russia, a position that some derisively referred to as "President Bush's foreign policy tutor." The Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz wing prevailed over Powell-Armitage. But if Rice were to her throw her weight behind Powell-Armitage it could be a draw or even result in a majority of victories for Powell on important issues like Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and even Africa.

Throughout Campaign 2000, Bush promised a “humble foreign policy.” Instead, he chose to take a hard line approach on the world stage. The Bush administration was off to a faltering start. The president chose to cool relations with Russia, as a result of President Vladimir Putin’s decision to sell arms to Iran. He chose to cool relations with China on the heels of military technology sales to Saddam Hussein. Then Bush’s chilly war exploded when an American EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese jet and was forced to land in Hainan with its crew of 24 Americans. The president also chose to cool relations with North Korea, as Kim Dae Jung continued to threaten to test ballistic missiles. Perhaps it was not highly unusual for the Bush administration to play hardline politics with three countries. But what cannot be explained is that White House made the decision to do it all at once in Bush’s 100 first days.

The president’s summit with Mexican President Vincente Fox was overshadowed by air strikes against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell did not achieve any semblance of peace while in Israel and Ireland. Nor could he gain support for sanctions against Iraq. Bush’s insistence of implementing an anti-missile system was met with criticism from friends and adversaries alike. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s proposal of a European rapid reaction force at the Munich Conference received lukewarm approval.

Throughout Campaign 2000, Bush made implicit promises that would be nearly impossible to keep. While faulting the Clinton administration for sparsely funding the armed forces, he campaigned to improve the morale of the military and pledged to increase the Pentagon’s budget. And he pledged to implement new systems including the National Missile Defense System (NMD). The president earmarked $45 billion for defense, and a significant portion of that was targeted for research and development.

But Bush left several areas either unaddressed or under-funded. It was not until his third week in the White House that he sketched out a defense proposal for the first time. In his first speech, he said he would cut many of the armed services’ priority projects without solving any of the military’s current problems. But he pledged to improve the morale in the armed forces personnel by increasing their pay. He said that he would seek an additional $5.7 billion in the fiscal 2002 budget for military people: $3.9 billion for health benefits, $400 million to improve housing, and $1.4 billion for pay raises. This came less than a week after he had proposed a gigantic $1.6 trillion tax slash over 10 years, making it virtually impossible to allocate more funds to federal programs after promising the largest tax cut in American history.

Only a few days later, Bush shocked the nation when he announced that he planned to break with Pentagon orthodoxy and create “a new architecture for defense of our people,” investing in new technologies and weapons systems, rather than make what he called “marginal improvements” in systems in which America’s arms industry had already invested billions of dollars. (New York Times, February 14, 2001)

Much of Bush’s comments were from a speech which aides had prepared for him during the 2000 Campaign when he spoke at the Citadel in South Carolina. His rehashed remarks were only generalizations: “We do not know yet the exact share of our future military, but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be lighter, our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain. In the air, we will be able to strike across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems.” (Washington Post, February 14, 2001)

For the first time, Bush he spoke of the threat of terrorist attacks into the United States and remained silent on NMD which had been a centerpiece of his campaign. He addressed the issue of terrorist weapons that might enter American territory, but he never suggested any solution. His only comment -- mundane and simplistic -- was to work with allies.

Several European ambassadors, who viewed Bush as a novice and unknown quantity, heard him speak of risking the investment in entirely new technologies and weapons systems. The shift away from the military-industrial complex alarmed military contractors who had already received contracts in the billions from the Pentagon. But, as usual, Bush once again offered no specifics except for saying that he had given Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld “ a broad mandate to challenge the status quo.” He only added that he would provide just $2.6 billion in additional money for research and development in the budget for fiscal 2002. That represented an increase of only about 6 percent over the existing levels. He acknowledged that was hardly the kind of money needed to rethink an entire arsenal, but said “before we make our full investment, we must know our exact priorities.” (Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2001)

Bush also said that he would “modernize some existing weapons and equipment.” The administration seemed skeptical about moving ahead with three new fighter planes that had been under development since the days of the Clinton administration. They included the F-22 which was projected to cost $180 billion per plane and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, as well as the Navy’s DD-21 stealth destroyer and the Army’s Crusader artillery system. (Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2001)

4. THE BUSH-COLIN POWELL FEUD

As Secretary of State Colin Powell became more entrenched in Bush’s Cabinet, he became increasingly dissatisfied with his role. Bush surrounded himself with his father’s cronies, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney. Soon it became clear to Powell that he was the outsider.

In his third year, Powell was interviewed by GQ Magazine. He himself had little to say -- but none of his friends made any pretense of speculating about his feelings. Some of Powell’s top aides suggested that he was frustrated and isolated.

Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, described United States sanctions policy against countries such as Pakistan and Cuba as “the dumbest policy on the face of the Earth.” Wilkerson commiserated about Powell’s role in the Bush Cabinet: “He (Powell) has spent as much time doing damage control and, shall we say, apologizing around the world for some less-than-graceful actions as he has anything else.”

Wilkerson also criticized Bush’s inner circle, comparing their desire for military conflict with their reluctance to serve as young men: “I make no bones about it. I have some reservations about people who have never been in the face of battle, so to speak, who are making cavalier decisions about sending men and women out to die.” Wilkerson spoke of the conservative former adviser Richard Perle: “Thank God (he) tendered his resignation and no longer will be even a semi-official person in this administration."

Wilkerson accentuated the departmental rivalry on the Taiwan issue. Powell recommended that the president recognize the official independence of China. But the Bush administration sided with Taiwan. Wilkerson said, “Taiwan is another place where you get a lot of tension because there are literally people from the Defense Department on that island every week. Every week. And have been for three years. And many of those people are delivering messages to Taiwan that Taiwan needn’t worry. Meanwhile, we’re trying to maintain a more balanced attitude.”

Other friends of Powell were explicit about the secretary of state’s distrust and disdain for the hawks in the administration. Powell’s deputy, Richard Armitage, spoke of the secretary of state’s despair at the damage to his credibility following his speech to the United Nations in 2003 when he made the case for war and insisted there were weapons of mass destruction.

Powell’s mentor from the National War College, Harlan Ullman, described National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice as a “jerk.” He said: “This is, in many ways, the most ideological administration Powell’s ever had to work for. Not only is

After Bush chose Mexico for his first state visit, he drew much criticism from allies in Europe who believed that they had more pressing issues with which to deal. Bush needed to explain to his counterparts in Europe his anti-missile shield; his waffling policy on American troops in Kosovo; and his refusal to buy into the Kyoto accords. Yet, when the American president met with President Vincente Fox, it was merely a social gathering that was overshadowed by his decision to conduct air strikes against Iraq. In fact, Bush erroneously called the attacks "routine" and added, "Our intention is to make sure that the world is as peaceful as possible." (New York Times, February 19, 2001) Fleischer used the word "routine" five times, and Rice spoke of the missions as "routine" or "routinely" four times. This led policy analysts and congressional leaders to question whether the pattern was more indicative of an exceptionally disciplined politician, or one with a shallow grasp of the issues at hand.

In September, Fox was invited to the White House where he unloaded a bombshell. He insisted that Mexico and the United States needed to reach agreement on immigration reform by the end of 2001. Deeply concerned about the plight of Mexicans who were trying to attain a better life north of the border, Fox declared that legalizing the status of undocumented Mexican workers could be achieved. He made no mention of the fierce opposition to such a move in Congress, including among members of Bush's own party. Fox's demand unexpectedly put Bush on the spot and appeared to have complicated the American president's position on illegal immigration. Bush avoided the immigration issue, simply citing that migration was a "complex issue" that no breakthrough would come during Fox's three-day visit. The Mexican president's remarks overshadowed other issues on Bush's agenda that included environmental cleanup, education exchange programs, and cooperation on drug trafficking and organized crime. (New York Times, September 6, 2001)

As Bush hoped to squelch the immigration issue, Fox aggressively continued with his proposal before a national television audience on the White House lawn. The Mexican president said, "The time has come to give migrants and their communities their proper place in the history of our bilateral relations. Both our countries owe them a great deal. And working together, both of us can build new conditions of fairness for them, as well as for the development and prosperity of our two nations. For this reason, we must, and we can, reach an agreement on migration before the end of this very year." Such an agreement, Fox said, would ensure legalization of Mexican immigrants by the end of his term of office -- and at the same time would "make sure that there are no Mexicans who have not entered this country legally in the United States, and that those Mexicans who come into the country do so with proper documents." Bush looked on with a blank expression.

Fox implied that in return for a deal legalizing existing migrants and creating a flow of legal temporary workers, Mexico would somehow end the flow of undocumented immigrants leaving for the United States by the end of Fox's term. That would be a major concession from Mexico, which in the past has argued it cannot constitutionally limit the free movement of Mexican citizens who decide to leave. (New York Times, September 6, 2001)

Bush was caught in a quandary on the immigration issue. If he supported limited or total amnesty to the estimated three to four million undocumented immigrants already in the United States, he would gain more support from the Latino community. On the other hand, the American president would receive severe criticism from most GOP congressional members as well as the conservative wing of the Republican Party.

DRESSING DOWN BEIJING. The Bush administration's decision to distance itself from China became clear when Powell met with Taiwanese and reaffirmed American ties to Taipei. Powell made a glaring and embarrassing mistake, twice referring to Taiwan as the "People's Republic of China." Meanwhile, Senator Jesse Helms pressed the administration to increase the American commitment to defending the island. Specifically, conservative congressional Republicans hoped to offer Taiwan the Aegis battle management system, which could track more than 100 targets simultaneously. Then when Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen planned to meet with Bush, the White House shifted ground. It urged Qian to put off his visit for a couple of days because the president wanted to meet Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori first. (New York Times, March 15, 2001)

Beijing retaliated by reiterating in sharp language its warning to the United States not to pursue plans for a national missile defense system. Sha Zukang, China's top arms control negotiator, said such plans would touch off an arms race and upset the delicate global strategic balance that took years to achieve. China's growing concerns about the anti-missile system were also mirrored by North Korea which stepped up its own criticism of the Bush administration. Sha lashed out at Bush, charging that he could not justify building the system "under the absurd pretext of a ‘threat.' " (Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2001)

THE EP-3 SPY PLANE. On April 7, Bush met with his first major foreign policy challenge. A Navy EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese MIG, forcing the American plane to make an emergency landing with its crew of 24 on the island of Hainan. Bush immediately called for the release of the crew and the return of the plane. China immediately called for an apology. The White House appeared to be in a quandary.

The inexperienced president was caught in a vice. He had no experience in the international arena. His foreign policy team was deeply divided. Two of the most conservative officials, Powell and Rice, were not hawkish enough for Cheney and Rumsfeld. Bush called upon his father who had embarrassing moments with the Chinese and had displayed anti-Chinese sentiment. As the United Nations ambassador in 1971, he was leading a fight to keep Taiwan from being expelled from the United Nations, even as Henry Kissinger was making the first overtures toward Beijing. As president, the senior Bush castigated the Tiananmen Square violence, even as Nixon and Kissinger warned him not to tarnish the two countries' fragile relationship.

Furthermore, the Bush administration did not receive much empathy from allies particularly in Europe. Dominique Moisi, a French political analyst, told the New York Times, "The Americans and the Chinese are playing Cold War with each other, which is very strange. No one wants to support the Chinese. But they don't want to encourage the United States either. The silence is partly a measure of indifference and partly a measure of the embarrassment of the diplomatic elite." (Salon, April 6, 2001)

This response was typical among many European politicians who were highly critical of Bush's ability to govern. Furthermore, Europeans were outraged at the United States less than a year before when details emerged on Echelon, a massive American surveillance system operated by the National Security Agency. Echelon gave Americans the ability to monitor European phone calls, faxes, and e-mails. Just a week before the EP-3 incident, Europeans castigated Bush after he pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol and destabilizing global security in China, Korea, the Middle East, and Russia.

China's handling of the EP-3 incident was quite similar to others handled by the United States. In 1976, a Soviet defector flew his MIG-25 fighter plane to Japan. American intelligence officers spent nine weeks taking it apart and inspecting it, despite Soviet protests, before sending it back to Moscow, in packing boxes. During the Korean War, the United States offered gold to North Korean and Chinese defectors who defected with MIG fighters.

The Bush administration stressed that the EP-3 mission was a "routine" exercise. But the White House could not deny that spying on China was a regular occurrence. The United States would not tolerate that close surveillance of American territory. In fact, the United States has a 200-mile defense zone around its coast, and any foreign military aircraft flying inside this boundary must report or risk retaliation. China's zone reaches only 12 miles beyond its shore.

The 11-day stand-off ended as a result of negotiations between the State Department and the Chinese government -- not by Bush. Perhaps the president realized that he needed to distance himself from the crisis in order to resolve the differences between the United States and China.

The amateur American president once again showed his inexperience a few weeks later, this time on the issue of arms' sales to Taiwan. Earlier, the president showed his inexperience when he shut down missile talks with North Korea that President Clinton had begun. Additionally, the American president had boxed South Korea President Kim Dae Jung into a corner when he took a harder line toward the Pyongyang, resulting in freezing peace talks between North and South Korea.

THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. Bush exhibited the same behavior regarding the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Passed the same year that President Carter recognized China, the law mandated that the United States provide defensive weapons for Taipei. For 22 years, four American presidents followed a policy of "strategic ambiguity" by refusing to divulge if military forces would be deployed in the event of an attack on Taiwan by Beijing. The purpose of the policy was to keep the peace by keeping both sides guessing. Presidents from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton have wanted Beijing to believe that the United States would defend Taiwan, but also to leave Taiwan wondering about the extent of that commitment. Washington has always feared that if the Taiwanese believed the United States would protect their sovereignty, then perhaps they would provoke a conflict with China.

On April 25, Bush announced on ABC's "Good Morning America" that the United States would react in the event of an invasion. The president said that he would order "whatever it took" to help Taiwan defend itself. But he did not go so far as to say he would send American forces into battle with China. Bush added, "Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would ... (with) whatever it took to help Taiwan defend theirself (sic)."

Bush's comments triggered confusion on Capitol Hill and among China experts over what the president meant and what signal he was sending to Taiwan. National Security Council Adviser Rice, claiming that she was not changing policy, said, "A secure Taiwan will be better able to engage in a cross-straits dialogue." (New York Times, April 26, 2001)

Furthermore, Bush's poorly thought-out comments to sell military equipment on the heels of the downed EP-3 espionage plane further outraged China. Approving Aegis radar aircraft for Taiwan was sure to inflame the United States' tense relations with Beijing, but the Bush administration wanted to show that it was not capitulating to China either. And so the White House settled on submarines as a middle ground. The Pentagon had said Taiwan needed them, and China had not voiced a concern about submarines as it had with the Aegis.

Barely three months after taking office, Bush reversed three decades of American foreign policy in Asia by opening the way for Taiwan to buy eight diesel submarines. He also promised to sell destroyers, helicopters, and other military hardware to Taiwan, creating further hostility between the United States and China.

It appeared as if the president was making good on his campaign promise to help Taiwan defend itself. But as it turned out, Bush had no submarines to sell to Taipei. Some of the information on which the administration relied turned out to have been wrong. The United States had not manufactured diesel submarines since the 1950s, when the Navy decided to rely exclusively on nuclear submarines. The United States continued to produce nuclear submarines but never exported them.

When the White House made the announcement, the Bush administration had little or no idea how it could carry through on its promise. Officials never checked with either the Germany or Holland which might have reversed policy and allowed Taiwan to obtain their submarines.

The White House struggled to find another way to provide submarines for Taiwan. At stake was not only billions of dollars in defense contracts but also the military balance between China and Taiwan. If Taiwan did not get new submarines, the United States would have to come up with some other way to offset China's growing naval power -- or else face the prospect that China might be able to impose a blockade on Taiwan's ports. One possibility was to pressure Germany and Holland to sell submarines to Taipei. A second option was to have Taiwan's submarines built in the United States. Conservatives on Capitol Hill supported the idea, but the Navy feared that important secrets -- such as the technology that makes American submarines hard to detect -- might be leaked and become available around the world. The United States could build new "old" submarines based on blueprints of the 1950s, but that would be more costly. A third option was to find a roundabout way to build a diesel submarine based on the Dutch or German designs, even though these European governments had not licensed the plans for use in Taiwan. The United States could ask an American company to build Taiwan a submarine based on blueprints of another country -- and not ask any questions about where the design came from. But that scenario could prove to be illegal. (Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2001)

A WISHY-WASHY POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In early September, "senior administration officials" suggested that they were not opposed to China's increasing its nuclear stockpile. (New York Times, September 2, 2001) Then the White House backpedaled. Three days later, the administration issued a new set of statements, declaring that it would not "seek to overcome China's opposition" to NMD by dropping any objections to the modernization of China's nuclear forces. The White House concluded that China would begin replacing its estimated 20 to 24 long-range nuclear missiles, built in the 1950s and 1960s, with mobile, solid- fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. (New York Times, September 5, 2001; September 7, 2001)

The article quoted officials and outside analysts as saying that once China had more missiles in its arsenal, it should be less concerned about Bush's missile defense system -- because China would have a sufficient number of missiles to overwhelm any American missile defense now being contemplated. The article prompted criticism of the administration's position by Democrats, and some Republicans, who said they worried that China would interpret it as a go-ahead to build more nuclear weapons. In response, White House officials said that the administration recognized the strategic reality and was not offering China any kind of a deal in which American approval of the buildup would be traded for Chinese approval of a missile defense plan. (New York Times, September 5, 2001)

Bush administration officials also charged that as China built up its nuclear arsenal, it may want to resume underground nuclear tests as a way to determine the safety and reliability of the weapons. White House officials also had said that the United States also may want to resume testing in the future. But a Chinese diplomat said that it had no plans to test its nuclear weapons. He said that China was a signer of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and as such would stand by the intent of the treaty. (New York Times, September 5, 2001)

Even though Chinese missiles may be pointed at American cities, the nuclear balance between the two countries remained strategically stable. Neither side would dare initiate a nuclear attack against the other for fear of the damage the other would inflict in response. The overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States -- a single American nuclear- armed submarine carries more warheads than the entire inventory of Chinese warheads capable of reaching the United States -- meant that even if China were to triple its current number of nuclear missiles, the strategic balance would not be fundamentally altered.

RENEWING CORPORATE CONTRACTS WITH BEIJING. After the EP-3 spy plane incident was resolved, Rumsfeld reversed course and permitted the Pentagon to resume military-to-military contacts with China. He approved future contacts with Beijing that required advance planning. (New York Times, June 6, 2001)

The Republicans did an about-face regarding corporate contracts with Beijing. During Clinton's second term, the GOP bashed the president for approving the export of satellites to China, and in 1999 the Republican-dominated Congress passed legislation that made it difficult for American companies to sign contracts with Beijing. Congress reclassified satellites as military items, making them covered by the tighter rules of the State Department's munitions list. Congress also. transferred authority over satellite exports from the Commerce Department to the State Department which was less sympathetic to business and unlikely to approve contract, since national security considerations would be cited.

But two years later, the Bush administration made an abrupt change, after profits in the American satellite sector began to falter. The White House hoped to renew sales to China so American companies, that employ over 25,000 workers in Southern California, could have their satellites launched on Chinese rockets again. American satellite corporations also are at risk of losing millions of dollars in penalties if licensing delays resulted in a postponement of a launch. One firm said that it would have to refund $134 million and pay $11 million in penalties if it could not win approval from the State Department. Republicans in Congress considered introducing a new bill that would reverse the old law. (Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2001)

In the spring of 2001, the State Department reviewed several applications for satellite launches in China. One involved Loral Space and Communications Corporation which was at the center of the Clinton administration controversy. In 1995, Loral Space and Communications -- along with Hughes Space and Communications which later became Boeing Satellite Systems -- offered some technical assistance to Beijing after incidents in which Chinese rockets failed, resulting in the loss of the American-made satellites. The destruction of the American satellites led to an investigation. Christopher Cox, chair of the nine-member Select Committee on the Peoples Republic of China Technology Transfers, convened in June 1998. After a six month probe, the panel determined that American national security was damaged. Additionally, in December 1998, the Defense Department concluded that Hughes provided China with information that was potentially damaging to American national security. Furthermore, an investigation was conducted by the Justice Department and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2001)

Throughout Campaign 2000, Bush appeared uninterested in African problems. Once elected, he allowed over four months to elapse before addressing problems in Africa. In late May, the White House made a token gesture to the African continent, hoping to dismiss the impression that it was not of strategic importance to the United States.

Secretary of State Powell made a four-nation swing beginning in Kenya. He met with President Daniel arap Moi in an attempt to find a solution to end Sudan's 18-year old civil war. Powell also urged Kenya to pass anti-corruption, anti-crime, and ethics reforms so that the International Monetary Fund and World Bank could restore suspended loans. But he refused to suggest that Moi, in power since 1978, should abdicate power.

In South Africa, the secretary of state focused on the continent's country with the largest number of people with AIDS and the deadliest projected toll from the disease. He called on its leaders to do more publicly to prevent the continent from losing decades of political and economic progress. South African President Thabo Mbeki had done little to tackle his country's primary disease which neared an epidemic level. The rate of HIV infection in South Africa was 25 percent among the sexually active, and AIDS deaths in South Africa were expected to reach 6 million by 2010. Life expectancy was expected to fall to 40 years from 60 years. Powell criticized Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe for blocking democratic reforms and called on him to resign after more than 20 years in office. (New York Times, May 26. 2001)

Colombia has been at war with itself for 40 years while the government has fought thousands of rebels in four main leftist guerilla groups. The rightist government has alternately fought or supported approximately 500 self-defense and paramilitary groups.

The State Department's 1997 Human Rights report noted that Colombia's pattern of violence included indiscriminate killings of unarmed citizens, torture, kidnappings, displacement, and disappearances caused by all sides, including the government. Nevertheless, in 1999 the Clinton administration waived a 20 year ban on selling advanced weapons systems to Latin America, a restriction imposed because of the region's rampant human-rights violations. Clinton agreed to help fund a 1,000-man counternarcotics brigade. In mid-2000, Congress appropriated $1.6 billion as a one-time "emergency" measure to eliminate the narcotics business.

But it was very doubtful that this amount -- five times the size of previous allotments -- would resolve the problem. The $1.6 billion was a one-time "emergency" measure that provided Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters, machine guns, and ammunition to combat the drug traffickers. The aid was supposed to strengthen Colombia's capacity to fight narcotics traffickers and the leftist guerrillas who protected them. According to Mother Jones (April 7, 2000), American interest in Colombia's drug production is well known. Government sources claimed that Colombian traffickers have supplied as much as 90 percent of the cocaine flowing into the United States, plus a large proportion of the heroin sold in the eastern third of the country.

Clinton targeted leftist guerrillas who were part of the drug trafficking infrastructure, but refused to allow American helicopters and other assistance to be used against the rebels. Many Democrats believed that the Clinton administration was too deeply involved in Colombia, citing shortcomings in the human rights record of the Colombian military and its continuing links with rightist paramilitary groups that also had a reputation for brutality. Critics believed that the Clinton policy gave the Colombian armed forces too much leeway to divert American aid to right wing death squads waging a largely unchecked war against the guerrillas. Death squads carried out three-quarters of the 4,000 annual political killings.

International human-rights groups said that right wing paramilitary groups have been responsible for over 70 percent of the estimated 3,000 extrajudicial executions per year in Colombia. In January 1999, 150 soldiers entered the village of El Tigre about 25 miles northwest of Puerto Asis. They forced several Puerto Asis residents at gunpoint to drive them to El Tigre along this road. That night, paramilitaries slaughtered some two dozen people in the village. Meanwhile, the 24th Brigade established a check-point nearby and allowed the suspects to escape. Colombian human-rights observers said that both the El Tigre and the El Placer cases were typical of the way in which the Colombian military has collaborated with the paramilitaries.

In February 2000, Human Rights Watch reported that half of the army's 18 brigades maintained systematic ties to the right-wing militias. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights in Colombia came to a similar conclusion three months later. As human rights violations have escalated, the United States has ignored right wing AUC leader, Carlos Castano, as death squads have continued to murder trade union members, environmental, and human rights activists, and indigenous people.

Human Rights Watch (November 29, 2000) estimated that the FARC has been holding hundreds of civilians hostages in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. According to Human Rights Watch's information, the FARC seized Grosch-Garces at his residence at La Bocana on May 28, 1999. Subsequently, the family received several ransom calls from a man identifying himself as a representative of the FARC's 30th Front. The kidnappers also forwarded letters to the family reputedly from Mr. Grosch-Garces, pleading for money. In one of the last calls, the kidnappers told the family that Grosch-Garces was seriously ill.

Another hostage who was briefly held with Grosch-Garces confirmed that the captors were members of the FARC. After his release, this hostage told the family that he had seen Grosch- Garces briefly in October 1999, and reported that he appeared near death.

As the Clinton administration began peace talks with the leftist FARC in early 2000, Colombia's human rights record continued to plummet. Throughout 2000, right-wing paramilitary gunmen slaughtered 111 known victims in a series of massacres. Many were killed while partying at a discotheque, and others were shot as they walked out of church. (Mother Jones, January 20, 2001) According to Human Rights Watch, government forces were responsible for at least 21 extrajudicial killings; government forces also collaborated with right- wing paramilitary groups responsible for killing at least another 573 civilians. Human Rights Watch reported that paramilitary units committed 78 per cent of all human rights violations in Colombia in 2000.

In early 2001, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) reported that Colombia failed to meet a single human rights condition required by the aid package. The report strongly recommended that the United States neither certify nor waive Colombia's compliance with the conditions. The organizations noted that the human rights situation in Colombia had deteriorated since the White House waived all but one human rights condition in August 2000. They also argued that the Colombian government was farther from meeting the conditions set by Congress than it was less than a year before. Human Rights Watch (January 2001) reported on human rights violations by the Colombian government.

The military had not suspended personnel facing credible allegations of human rights violations. The military continued to challenge civilian jurisdiction over human rights cases involving military personnel. The government had not apprehended known paramilitary leaders, such as Carlos Castaño, or dismantled known paramilitary bases. Paramilitary groups continued to operate unhindered -- often in collusion with security force personnel -- throughout the country, including in areas in which American-financed Colombian military units were operating. And the president of Colombia had not issued a directive requiring civilian jurisdiction over human rights cases based on the 1997 ruling of Colombia's Constitutional court.

Most interesting about American-Colombian relations has been the silent role played by White House aides and Capitol Hill legislators. They have remained moot on the United States' economic objective. Washington officials refused to comment on the increasing importance of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela. The United States had the largest untapped pool of petroleum in the Western Hemisphere in that region. Although Colombia's current production did not measure up to that of other OPEC giants, Colombia had 2.6 billion barrels of untapped petroleum and perhaps ten times this amount in possible reserves.

According to the Department of Energy, American oil consumption rose by 15 percent between 1990 and 1999, rising from 17 million to 19.5 million barrels per day. During the same period, Colombia's oil production rose by about 78 percent, with most of the added amount going to the United States, making it the nation's seventh largest supplier of oil. American consumption was expected to rise by another five million barrels per day over the next 20 years, and most of this oil would have to come from foreign sources. These quantities could easily be provided by the Persian Gulf countries, since Washington has been reluctant to increase America's dependence on the unstable states of the Middle East.

Some analysts speculated that American aid would be used against rebels rather than narcotics traffickers. The Washington Post reported that the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), one of the leading leftist guerrilla groups, earned an estimated $500 million a year protecting Colombian drug lords who traffic in heroin and cocaine. But Washington failed to disclose that the FARC has attacked American pipelines in Colombia. In 1999, for example, the pipeline from the Cano Limon field -- operated by American-based Occidental Petroleum and Royal Dutch/Shell -- was bombed 79 times. And Washington failed to mention that one goal of the FARC has been to expel foreign interests and to use future oil profits to improve the lot of Colombia's impoverished masses.

During Campaign 2000, Bush took a tough stance on Colombia. In an August 25, 2000 address he said that American assistance "will help the Colombian government protect its people, fight the drug trade, halt the momentum of the guerrillas and bring about a sensible and peaceful resolution to this conflict." Bush castigated both narco-traffickers and guerrillas, while the Clinton administration had given prominence to the counter-drug aspect of the problem.

Robert Zoellick, a top international policy adviser to Bush, suggested that future American support for Colombia would depend on Colombian willingness to confront enemies of all stripes. According to London's The Guardian (December 28, 2000), Zoellick said in October that the "forces of democracy" must join hands to combat "new threats to security," such as that which existed in Colombia. He also said, "If the Colombian people are willing to fight for their own country, then the United States should offer serious, sustained and timely financial, material and intelligence support." Zoellick's comments made no reference to human rights problems of which Democrats were concerned.

His speech, which was delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations a week before the November 7 presidential election, suggested a big shift in Washington's policy on Colombia, just as President Andres Pastrana appears to be on the verge of making peace with the country's second-biggest left wing rebel force, the National Liberation Army (ELN).

When Bush entered the White House, he faced a collision with Democrats over Colombia policy, since he perceived drug trafficking as a threat to the United States. Unlike his predecessor, Bush favored cozying up to the Colombian right wing death squads. The inexperienced president handed over the problem to Secretary of State Powell. He called for military involvement only as a last resort, with the full support of the public, and with a well- planned exit strategy. As a result, he faced a dilemma in Latin America. America's $1.3 million military engagement in Colombia never met the criteria laid out in his well-articulated Powell Doctrine. The secretary of state was on a collision course with the Powell Doctrine.

When Bush was inaugurated, Colombia President Andres Pastrana's government was teetering on the verge of collapse. Pastrana could no longer protect Colombian citizens in its 36 year civil war. Inside Colombia, there was escalating instability, commonplace corruption, and widespread violations of human rights, according to the San Francisco Chronicle (December 21, 2000). Every year, 25,000 Colombians died from violence. The country's homicide rate was among the highest in the world. More than half of the world's kidnapping takes place inside Colombia -- it was an important source of funds for the two major armed guerrilla forces. The result of the deadly chaos was that 1.5 million people fled their homes.

The goal of the American military was to cut off the supply of cocaine. To accomplish that, the United States needed to train soldiers in counterinsurgency tactics against armed guerrillas who protected coca-growing peasants. But such military attacks -- especially from helicopters -- increased the level of violence for ordinary citizens. Aerial fumigation of coca fields frequently destroyed edible crops as well, leaving peasants without a secure food supply. Peasants had little choice: either flee and join the displaced or else take up arms with rebel forces.

To have a real impact on the traffic in drugs, the United States needed to wage a war against the giant narco-agriculturalists and the paramilitary forces that protect them. But this was not part of "Plan Colombia." The battle was against those who wanted land reform, not those who already owned huge coca plantations. The struggle was also to secure access to oil and gas, which the United States regarded as vital to this country's national interest. Powell also lacked an exit strategy. The goal of the Colombian army was to destroy farmers' coca fields and to defeat guerrilla forces, both of which could move deeper into the rain forests.

In May 2001, with Bush supporting Colombia's right wing government, members from the 8,000-member paramilitary force, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, kidnapped as many as 190 farmers, as they returned home from a canning plant in the eastern town of Villanueva. Colombian military and town officials gave contradictory accounts of the number of those abducted. General Fernando Tapias, head of Colombia's armed forces, initially put the number at 27, but as many as 190 residents appeared to be missing. The kidnapping was the largest in Colombia since members of the National Liberation Army seized 160 people attending a Sunday church service in 1999 in Cali. (Washington Post Foreign Service, May 17, 2001)

IRAN-CONTRA CONNECTIONS. During the Contra war in the 1980s, Eagle Aviation Service and Technology (EAST) helped Oliver North covertly fly guns to Nicaraguan rebels after the Boland Amendment cut off congressional funding. North turned to General Richard Secord to set up an illegal private arms pipeline to the Contras. Secord hired Richard Gadd, founder of EAST, in 1985 to oversee the weapons delivery. North also arranged for another of Gadd's companies to win a State Department contract to deliver legal, humanitarian aid. Through EAST, Gadd helped acquire planes to carry arms and ammunition from Portugal to Central America, and to make airdrops directly to Contra fighters. EAST also built an airstrip in Costa Rica near the Nicaraguan border. EAST received $550,000 for its covert work, according to the Iran-Contra report. (New York Times, June 5, 2001)

During the Iran-Contra hearings, Gadd testified under a grant of immunity from prosecution, and neither he nor EAST was accused of illegalities. In his testimony, Gadd said EAST was one of several companies he formed after retiring in 1982 as a lieutenant colonel from the Air Force, where he specialized in covert operations.

Two decades later, that same company was used by the State Department to fly on dangerous drug eradication missions in Colombia. The work of EAST, as the company is known, has received little attention, even as lawmakers scrutinize the use of contractors in the Latin American drug fight.(New York Times, June 5, 2001)

EAST was not directly contracted by the State Department. It was hired by DynCorp Aerospace Technology which the State Department hired to fly and maintain aircraft for counterdrug missions in Colombia. EAST pilots sprayed herbicide on coca, the raw material for cocaine. They frequently faced gunfire, sometimes from guerrillas protecting drug traffickers. The company also worked for the Defense Department. In 1999 and 2000, EAST received more than $30 million under several Defense contracts, which included providing engineering, supplies, and other services for Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas, according to Pentagon records. EAST's president, retired Air Force Colonel Thomas Fabyanic, declined to discuss the company's work. (New York Times, June 5, 2001)

Plan Colombia was launched in 2000 with a $1.3-billion American contribution. It reflected a gradual escalation in the United States' drug eradication effort in Colombia. Congress limited to 300 the number of civilian contract workers participating in Plan Colombia. By the middle of 2001, there were nearly 300 American citizens working on the program in Colombia. Then in August 2001, the State Department expanded to 400 the number of private pilots that could be hired by the Pentagon's private contractor to fight the drug war. It was an attempt by the Bush administration to circumvent Congress' attempt to keep the United States from becoming more involved into Colombia's civil war.

The House allowed a total of 800 American military and civilian personnel in Colombia. The Senate insisted on maintaining the civilian cap at 300, with a separate cap of 500 American military personnel. State Department officials defended the move to not count foreign employees, especially since many are Colombians working as secretaries and drivers and in other low-level jobs traditionally given to host country citizens.

The largest employer was DynCorp, which had 335 civilians on the payroll. Fewer than one- third were American citizens. An estimated 60 to 80 American citizens worked for other contractors, including Bell Helicopter Textron, Sikorsky Aircraft, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin. State Department officials said that they were not required to inform Congress that they had ordered DynCorp to hire as many as 50 pilots from Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and other countries to transport Colombian army forces into cocaine-growing zones. The pilots, most of them former Central and South American air force members who flied the most dangerous anti- drug missions there, also were hired to reduce the risk that an American would be shot down and killed in the drug war. The private contract workers did everything from flying crop dusters to transporting troops to staffing radar stations.

The State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau, which oversaw most of the United States' activities in the region, debated whether to count the former employees. At one point, the State Department acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue and initially discussed being "totally virtuous" and counting the foreign employees in its reporting to Congress. The department subsequently decided to not count foreign employees after what the official called a "hotly debated" discussion. (Los Angeles Times, August 19, 2001)