BUSH GRABS MORE POWER

CONTENTS

5. BUSH’S CALL FOR ‘DEMOCRACY’ IS HYPOCRITICAL

Riding high in the polls after September 11, Bush reverted to his unilateral and nationalistic approach to foreign policy. In early February, he began lashing out at Iraq, Iran, and North Korea -- collectively calling them the “axis of evil.” He insinuated that the three “evil” countries were conspiring to support a war of terrorism against the world’s industrial powers. The president charged that these “rogue” countries failed to comply with his mandate to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism.

Little did the president understand that Iran and Iraq had been archrivals since the 1980s. The two fought for eight years (1980 to 1988) over ideological differences between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini as well as a territorial dispute involving the Shatt al-Arab. Little did Bush know that signs of rapprochement slowly had been emerging between Iran and the United States. Now he had shot any chance of reconciliation between Teheran and Washington to pieces. Bush even placed North Korea in an “axis of evil” with Iraq and Iran. Little did he understand that Kim Sung Il’s regime stood isolated -- for the most part -- in northeastern Asia and had little communication with the other two “evil” powers.

After a year of internal divisions, the Bush administration made it clear that it was seriously considering an attack against Iraq. The policy review conducted by the White House consisted of two critical areas. First, the Iraq problem needed to be fully resolved. Containment would no longer be tolerated. The administration would no longer allow Hussein to inflict damage to the region. Second, the White House was prepared to go beyond the limitations imposed by the United Nations. (Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2002)

The Bush administration considered three scenarios. First, it would work through the United Nations to pass new “smart sanctions” and press Hussein’s regime to allow the return of inspectors who would look for and dismantle any chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Second, it considered a military campaign, which probably would rely heavily on air power and potential defections within the Iraqi military. Third, the United States would tighten the political noose around Baghdad as well as other countries which cooperated with Baghdad. (Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2002)

Bush’s presumptuous and unilateralist approach to foreign policy could be translated into cowboy language: “I walk alone.” But that anti-global impulse was only half the problem. The other half was the substance of the policies that his advisers chose. No European nation wanted Bush to divide the world into good and evil nations. None supported his policy that bordered on brinkmanship. No European leaders supported a war with either Iraq or Iran. Similarly, no Asian country wanted an American war with North Korea.

On the six-month anniversary of the September 11, Bush detailed the start of the counter-terrorism war’s second phase, promising “a sustained campaign … anywhere in the world” to deny sanctuaries for those seeking to launch attacks. (Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2002).

Still riding high in the polls as a result of the war, the president spoke of moving on from Afghanistan to other parts of the globe. He emphasized two key components. The United States would not tolerate any nation that did not work to eradicate terrorism, and any country which posed a threat with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be confronted. (Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2002).

THE NATIONS ON THE “TERRORIST” LIST

Of the seven countries that Bush branded as sponsoring terrorism, a State Department report indicated that some were showing signs of cooperating with the United States. Libya and Sudan made the largest strides, while Iran, North Korea and Syria took modest steps to join in the international effort against terrorism. But Iran remained “the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001.” And Cuba and Iraq made no progress of cooperating with American efforts. (New York Times, May 21, 2002)

These conclusions were included in the State Department’s survey of global terrorism for 2001. After the devastating attacks on New York and Washington in September and the subsequent launch of Bush’s war on terrorism, this annual report took on a new significance.

According to the State Department’s report, it was the second year in a row that the annual evaluation had noted positive actions by Sudan. The report said that the United States discussions that began in 2000 with Khartoum about fighting terrorism intensified in 2001. The State Department concluded that Sudan also condemned the September 11 attacks and stepped up its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, investigating and arresting suspected militants. Administration officials had previously said Sudan had increased its sharing of intelligence about extremist groups with the United States. But the report said Sudan also remained a haven for militants aligned with several groups, including Al Qaeda and Egyptian and Palestinian organizations. (New York Times, May 21, 2002),/P>

The State Department noted that Libya had also strongly condemned the September 11th attacks and repeatedly had denounced terrorism since then. Libya reduced its support for international terrorism and “sought to recast itself as a peacemaker.” (New York Times, May 21, 2002)

The State Department still held Libya responsible for being a state sponsor of terrorism, because of its earlier involvement in attacks, such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988. The State Department said Libya needed to comply with United Nations Security Council requirements that it accept responsibility for the action of its officials in connection with the downing of the airplane, fully disclose what it knows about the incident, and pay appropriate compensation to the victims’ families. (New York Times, May 21, 2002)

The report said that Iran, North Korea, and Syria “have, in some narrow areas, made limited moves to cooperate with the international community's campaign against terrorism.” The State Department said, “Iran and Syria, however, seek to have it both ways.” While these governments had provided some cooperation in the American-led campaign against Al Qaeda, they continued to support militant groups such as the Palestinian organization Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. (New York Times, May 21, 2002)

Although North Korea had made public statements opposing terrorism, Kim Il Sung’s regime had not backed these up with effective actions. The report also said that Fidel Castro had “vacillated” over the counter-terrorism effort and had accused his government of harboring fugitives, including Basque militants. Finally, the State Department charged that Iraq failed to condemn the Sept. 11 attacks and provided a base to several militant groups. (New York Times, May 21, 2002)

CHANGING POLICY: FROM DETERRENCE TO PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS

In June 2002, Bush announced that the United States would not deter attacks from other nations by threatening massive retaliation. Instead, the president announced that he would strike enemies first. This policy shift ran counter to what Bush had said as a presidential candidate two years earlier, when he emphasized the need to limit American intervention to regions with immediate bearing on the nation’s strategic interests.

Bush said the United States “must uncover terror cells in 60 or more countries,” or roughly one-third of the world. He promised to “confront regimes that sponsor terror,” even though he had found few American allies to endorse his desire to overthrow the Iraqi regime. The president said, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.” (Washington Post, June 3, 2002)

Since 9/11, the Bush administration increased arms sales to some of the world’s most repressive and undemocratic regimes. World military spending rose in 2004, growing by 5 percent to $1.04 trillion. The United States funneled a record $455 billion into military hardware. (Reuters, June 7, 2005)

The report by the Arms Trade Resource Center at New York-based New School University’s World Policy Institute said increased weapons sales and grants were used by the White House to reward countries that have either joined the “war on terror.” (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The study concluded that the increased weapons transfers were aimed at rewarding coalition partners and ensuring continued United States military access to overseas bases. The Arms Trade Resource Center said the strategy risked undermining -- not enhancing – United States security. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Between 1992 and 2003, the United States sold $177.5 billion in arms to foreign nations. In 2003 alone, the Pentagon and State Department delivered or licensed the delivery of $5.7 billion in weaponry to countries that could not afford advanced weaponry. Almost half of these weapons went to countries plagued with ongoing conflict and governed by undemocratic regimes with poor human rights records. In 2003, $2.7 billion in weaponry went to governments branded as “undemocratic” by the State Department. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The Bush administration delivered weapons to 18 of 25 countries embroiled in “active conflicts,” or warfare against domestic or foreign foes. These included Angola, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Israel, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Additionally, the Bush administration exported arms to Uzbekistan. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The sales included Saudi Arabia ($1.1 billion in 2003), Egypt ($1.0 billion), Kuwait ($153 million), United Arab Emirates ($110 million), and Uzbekistan ($33 million). The largest United States military aid program--known as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) -- grew by 68 percent from 2001 to 2003. This was a rise from $3.5 billion to nearly $6.0 billion. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Under FMF, recipients received outright United States grants on condition they use the money to buy United States weapons systems. The foreign countries received nearly-free weapons. The largest FMF increases went to countries engaged as United States allies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They included Jordan ($525 million increase from 2001 to 2003), Afghanistan ($191 million), Pakistan ($224 million), and Bahrain ($90 million). (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Uruguay were among two dozen countries that either became first-time FMF recipients or were allowed back into the program after long absences. In all, the number of countries receiving FMF aid increased from 48 to 71 from 2000 to 2004. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Since 9/11, the Bush administration increased arms sales to some of the world’s most repressive and undemocratic regimes. World military spending rose in 2004, growing by 5 percent to $1.04 trillion. The United States funneled a record $455 billion into military hardware. (Reuters, June 7, 2005)

The report by the Arms Trade Resource Center at New York-based New School University’s World Policy Institute said increased weapons sales and grants were used by the White House to reward countries that have either joined the “war on terror.” (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The study concluded that the increased weapons transfers were aimed at rewarding coalition partners and ensuring continued United States military access to overseas bases. The Arms Trade Resource Center said the strategy risked undermining -- not enhancing – United States security. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Between 1992 and 2003, the United States sold $177.5 billion in arms to foreign nations. In 2003 alone, the Pentagon and State Department delivered or licensed the delivery of $5.7 billion in weaponry to countries that could not afford advanced weaponry. Almost half of these weapons went to countries plagued with ongoing conflict and governed by undemocratic regimes with poor human rights records. In 2003, $2.7 billion in weaponry went to governments branded as “undemocratic” by the State Department. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The Bush administration delivered weapons to 18 of 25 countries embroiled in “active conflicts,” or warfare against domestic or foreign foes. These included Angola, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Israel, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Additionally, the Bush administration exported arms to Uzbekistan. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

The sales included Saudi Arabia ($1.1 billion in 2003), Egypt ($1.0 billion), Kuwait ($153 million), United Arab Emirates ($110 million), and Uzbekistan ($33 million). The largest United States military aid program--known as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) -- grew by 68 percent from 2001 to 2003. This was a rise from $3.5 billion to nearly $6.0 billion. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Under FMF, recipients received outright United States grants on condition they use the money to buy United States weapons systems. The foreign countries received nearly-free weapons. The largest FMF increases went to countries engaged as United States allies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They included Jordan ($525 million increase from 2001 to 2003), Afghanistan ($191 million), Pakistan ($224 million), and Bahrain ($90 million). (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Uruguay were among two dozen countries that either became first-time FMF recipients or were allowed back into the program after long absences. In all, the number of countries receiving FMF aid increased from 48 to 71 from 2000 to 2004. (Arms Trade Resource Center, May 25, 2005)

In 2005, the United States provided nearly half of the weapons sold to militaries in the developing world, as major arms sales to the most unstable regions, many of them already engaged in conflict, grew to the highest level in eight years. American topped the list at 45.8 percent of total arms sales -- $8.1 billion -- to developing companies. Russia ran a distant second at 15 percent. (Boston Globe, November 13, 2006)

In 2006, the United States continued to be the leading supplier of weapons to the developing world in 2006, followed by Russia and Britain, according to a Congressional study to be released Monday. Pakistan, India, and Saudi Arabia were the top buyers. (New York Times, October 1, 2007)

The report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations,” was produced by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, a division of the Library of Congress,

The global arms market reached nearly $28.8 billion in 2006. That sales total was a slight drop from the 2005 figure of $31.8 billion, a trend explained by the strain of rising fuel prices that prompted many developing states -- except those that produce oil -- to choose upgrading current arsenals over buying new weapons. (New York Times, October 1, 2007)

In February 2007, the Bush administration rejected an international call to abandon the use of cluster bombs. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “We ... take the position that these munitions do have a place and a use in military inventories, given the right technology as well as the proper rules of engagement.” (Agence de France, February 24, 2007)

At the same time, 46 countries meeting in Oslo pledged to seek a treaty banning cluster bombs by next year. The 46 countries agreed to “commit themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that will prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” Agence de France, February 24, 2007)

The Bush administration planned to develop a new hydrogen bomb. This would likely spark production of new nuclear weapons by other countries, including several foes of the Bush administration. (OneWorldNet, March 7, 2007)

In March 2007, the Department of Energy announced it was seeking to develop a new hydrogen bomb that would replace the existing W76 warhead that was deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. (OneWorldNet, March 7, 2007)

In Bush’s January 2005 inaugural address, he promised to spread democracy around the world. However, his grand project failed because of a bureaucratic and geopolitical mess that included White House aides. Many in his administration never adopted his plan; and some undermined it, including his own vice president. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

In a speech, Bush vowed to order United States ambassadors in despotic countries to meet with dissidents. He boasted that he had created a fund to help embattled human rights defenders. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

First, the State Department did not send out the cable directing ambassadors to meet with dissidents until two months later in August.

Second, no funds were transferred to the fund he touted.

While the Iraq war distracted Bush, he compromised the idealism of that speech in the reality of guarding other U.S. interests.

After Bush’s reelection in November 2004, he began mapping his second term. He read The Case for Democracy by Natan Sharansky, an Israeli politician and a neoconservative. Bush was so impressed that nine days after the election, the two talked about the nature of democracy and how to advance it. Bush was struck by a metaphor in the book comparing a tyrannical state to a soldier pointing a gun at a prisoner until his arms tired; he lowered the gun and the captive escaped. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

Soon, Bush met with his chief speechwriter, Micheal Gerson, to discuss using his second inaugural address. Bush wanted to emphasize the need to democratize the world. After all, other presidents had promoted liberty or human rights, from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy to Jimmy Carter. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The 9/11 attacks offered Bush an opportunity to gain support for the “war on terror.” Furthermore, Bush already had made democracy in the Middle East a cornerstone of his response to 9/11. Now he wanted to broaden the goal. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

At first, world events tended to provide impetus for Bush’s goal. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians protested a stolen election and. In Georgia, the old regime was pressured into calling for a new vote the day after Christmas. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The Bush team consulted conservative scholars. Gerson, Bartlett, Rove, Peter Wehner, and other aides met at the White House on January 10, 2005, with a group of academics. Yale University historian John Lewis Gaddis suggested that Bush promise to work toward “ending tyranny” by a date certain in 20 or 25 years. Some objected -- but Gerson liked the idea. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

It first appeared that Bush’s call for democracy was beginning to work after his 2005 State of the Union:

Eight million Iraqis went to the polls to elect an interim parliament.

A political assassination in Lebanon triggered demonstrations that toppled a pro-Syrian government and forced Damascus to end a three-decade occupation.

Protests over a stolen election in Kyrgyzstan ousted another entrenched leader in the Tulip Revolution.

Bush met with Russia’s Putin for a tense discussion about the Kremlin’s crackdown on dissent.

When Egypt arrested opposition leader Ayman Nour, Secretary of State Rice canceled a trip to Cairo. Two weeks later, Egypt released Nour.

In May, the Uzbekistan regime massacred hundreds of protesters in the town of Andijan. The Pentagon, which maintained a base in Uzbekistan, resisted making a strenuous protest, but even the restrained criticism provoked Uzbekistan enough to expel United States troops.

Bush aides tried to establish an interagency group divided nations into three categories: newly democratic with weak institutions, such as Ukraine and Georgia; authoritarian with reformist tendencies, such as Pakistan; and reform-resistant, such as Belrus and Uzbekistan. Altogether, they identified 49 countries for attention. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

In 2007, Bush’s budget slashed money for democracy programs in Russia and other former Soviet Union states where civil society was in retreat. Some officials tried to redefine existing development projects as democracy promotion. They argued that road construction counted because voters need to reach polling stations. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The first pushback came in August 2005. Russian officials warned authoritarian governments around the world that Bush wanted to foster revolutions as in Ukraine and Georgia. Nongovernmental organizations promoting civil society were harassed and evicted. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

In September, Mubarak held Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential election, but it turned out to be an exercise in preserving power. The manipulated contest gave Mubarak 88.6 percent of the vote to 7 percent for Nour, his main challenger. By Christmas, Nour was back in prison and sentenced to five years. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

That winter, Rice and NSA Stephen Hadley considered a pressing question: Should Palestinian parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2006 be canceled?

Israeli leaders, including Tzipi Livni, later chosen foreign minister, had implored Bush advisers to not let the vote proceed. Hamas, considered by Bush to be a terrorist group, could easily win. Bush urged that elections be postponed, arguing that democracy was about building institutions and civil society, not just holding elections. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

But Palestinian President Malmoud Abbas told the Americans that his Fatah party needed the vote for credibility and it had to include his opposition. Rice and Hadley agreed. The “free elections” went forward, and Hamas won by a landslide. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

Bush was caught in a dilemma: What was more important, free elections -- or the outcome? Now Bush was stuck with an avowed enemy of Israel governing the Palestinian territories.

In the summer of 2007, Bush announced the sale of military weapons to Israel and seven Arab nations: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The package was worth $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and five other Gulf states, plus $30 billion in military assistance to Israel, and $13 billion in similar grants to Egypt, mostly for purchases of United States-made weapons systems. The package included:

M60A3 and M1A1 Abrams battle tanks to Egypt.

The TOW-2A and Hellfire anti-tank missiles to Israel.

McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. (Inter Press Service, August 5, 2007)

The United States increased its global military by 3.5 percent -- to $1.2 trillion -- in 2006. United States costs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan increased the most. The estimated war in Iraq – beginning in 2003 and projected to 2016 – will have cost approximately $2.267 trillion.

The United States spent $529 billion, slightly less than the entire GDP of the Netherlands, on military operations in 2006 -- up 5 percent over 2005. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2007)

After Bush’s reelection in November 2004, he began mapping his second term. He read The Case for Democracy by Natan Sharansky, an Israeli politician and a neoconservative. Bush was so impressed that nine days after the election, the two talked about the nature of democracy and how to advance it. Bush was struck by a metaphor in the book comparing a tyrannical state to a soldier pointing a gun at a prisoner until his arms tired; he lowered the gun and the captive escaped. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

Soon, Bush met with his chief speechwriter, Micheal Gerson, to discuss using his second inaugural address. Bush wanted to emphasize the need to democratize the world. After all, other presidents had promoted liberty or human rights, from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy to Jimmy Carter. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The 9/11 attacks offered Bush an opportunity to gain support for the “war on terror.” Furthermore, Bush already had made democracy in the Middle East a cornerstone of his response to 9/11. Now he wanted to broaden the goal. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

At first, world events tended to provide impetus for Bush’s goal. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians protested a stolen election and. In Georgia, the old regime was pressured into calling for a new vote the day after Christmas. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The Bush team consulted conservative scholars. Gerson, Bartlett, Rove, Peter Wehner, and other aides met at the White House on January 10, 2005, with a group of academics. Yale University historian John Lewis Gaddis suggested that Bush promise to work toward “ending tyranny” by a date certain in 20 or 25 years. Some objected -- but Gerson liked the idea. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

In his 2005 Inaugural Address, Bush unequivocally commitment to the “ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” He particularly spoke of those in the Islamic world. Bush preached about bringing democracy to the world. But reality proved he lied.

Bush’s grand project failed because of a bureaucratic and geopolitical mess that included White House aides. Many in his administration never adopted his plan; and some undermined it, including his own vice president. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

Bush again called for democracy was beginning to work after his 2005 State of the Union:

1. Eight million Iraqis went to the polls to elect an interim parliament.

2. A political assassination in Lebanon triggered demonstrations that toppled a pro-Syrian government and forced Damascus to end a three-decade occupation.

3. Protests over a stolen election in Kyrgyzstan ousted another entrenched leader in the Tulip Revolution.

4. Bush met with Russia’s Putin for a tense discussion about the Kremlin’s crackdown on dissent.

In his speech, Bush vowed to order United States ambassadors in despotic countries to meet with dissidents. He boasted that he had created a fund to help embattled human rights defenders. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

First, the State Department did not send out the cable directing ambassadors to meet with dissidents until two months later in August. Second, no funds were allowed to be transferred to the fund.

Bush’s idealism quickly vanished. Federal funding was minimal. Bush’s budget slashed money for democracy programs in Russia and other former Soviet Union states where civil society was in retreat. Some officials tried to redefine existing development projects as democracy promotion. They argued that road construction counted because voters need to reach polling stations. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The first pushback came in August 2005. Russian officials warned authoritarian governments around the world that Bush wanted to foster revolutions as in Ukraine and Georgia. Nongovernmental organizations promoting civil society were harassed and evicted. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

The following month, Mubarak held Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential election, but it turned out to be an exercise in preserving power. The manipulated contest gave Mubarak 88.6 percent of the vote to 7 percent for Nour, his main challenger. By Christmas, Nour was back in prison and sentenced to five years. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

That winter, Rice and NSA Stephen Hadley considered a pressing question: Should Palestinian parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2006 be canceled?

Israeli leaders, including Tzipi Livni, later chosen foreign minister, had implored Bush advisers to not let the vote proceed. Hamas, considered by Bush to be a terrorist group, could easily win. Bush urged that elections be postponed, arguing that democracy was about building institutions and civil society, not just holding elections. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

But Palestinian President Malmoud Abbas told the Americans that his Fatah party needed the vote for credibility and it had to include his opposition. Rice and Hadley agreed. The “free elections” went forward, and Hamas won by a landslide. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)

Bush was caught in a dilemma: What was more important, free elections -- or the outcome? Now Bush was stuck with an avowed enemy of Israel governing the Palestinian territories. Bush’s call for “democracy” was hypocritical:

In the spring of 2006, Bush and Cheney entertained some autocratic world leaders at the White House:

1. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s heir-apparent, his son Gamal were invited to White House receptions.

2. Cheney praised Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev during a recent visit to Almaty.

3. Moammar Gadhafi was vindicated and relations with Libya were restored. (Inter Press Service, May 24, 2006)

With all of its talk about human rights and democracy programs, the Bush administration cut millions of dollars from the federal budget. Burma, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were victims of drastic cuts. The administration allotted less democracy money for Russia than for Liberia. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007),/P>

In March 2006, Bush administration aides drafted a National Security Strategy. It included language castigating Putin for refusing to move towards democracy. Despite some aides hoping to soften the strong language directed at Moscow, Bush kept the wording.

Less than two months later, Cheney went to Lithuania and delivered the toughest United States indictment of Putin’s leadership. ,/P>

But the following day, Cheney flew to oil-rich Kazakhstan and embraced its autocratic leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, with not a word of criticism.

Also in May, Bush met with dissidents from around the world. He was scheduled to host several Chinese religious rights activists. But Clark Randt Jr., a Bush friend serving as ambassador to China was incensed, warning it would damage relations with Beijing. Bush aides compromised by moving the meeting from the Oval Office to the White House residence. Ultimately, Bush suspended $24 million in military aid only to watch China replace it.

In the fall of 2006, a military coup overthrew Thailand’s elected prime minister. Bush was at the United Nations and delivered a speech on democracy. However, he refused to defend the ousted Thai leader. The NSC pushed for a stronger response, but the State Department and the Cheney resisted. By May 2007, the United States conducting exercises with the Thai military. Three months later, the Thai military pushed through a new constitution that limited the role of elected officials once civilian rule is restored.

When Egypt arrested opposition leader Ayman Nour, Secretary of State Rice canceled a trip to Cairo. Two weeks later, Egypt released Nour.

Also in May, the Uzbekis new regime massacred hundreds of protesters in the town of Andijan. The Pentagon, which maintained a base in Uzbekistan, resisted making a strenuous protest, but even the restrained criticism provoked Uzbekistan enough to expel United States troops.

Bush aides tried to establish an interagency group divided nations into three categories: newly democratic with weak institutions, such as Ukraine and Georgia; authoritarian with reformist tendencies, such as Pakistan; and reform-resistant, such as Belrus and Uzbekistan. Altogether, they identified 49 countries for attention. (Washington Post, August 20, 2007)