THE WORLD LASHES OUT AT BUSH’S AGGRESSION

CONTENTS

1. EUROPE -- 2002

4.WORLD OPINION TURNS AGAINST BUSH

Bush’s presumptuous and unilateralist approach to foreign policy could be translated into cowboy language: “I walk alone.” But that anti-global impulse was only half the problem. The other half was the substance of the policies that his advisers chose.

As Bush began making plans to extend American military might across the globe, he received a barrage of complaints from his allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. None wanted the American “war-president” to divide the world into good and evil nations. None supported his policy that bordered on brinkmanship.

Several European leaders charged that the Bush administration was moving unavoidably toward a military clash with Iraq. Of equal or more concern, they wondered whether the inexperienced Bush even cared what they thought. European heads of state condemned the American president’s belligerent and unilateral approach to foreign policy. The seasoned European leaders claimed this would undermine -- if not destroy -- the solidarity created in the aftermath of September 11. (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine called the Bush State of the Union message “simplistic.” He was joined by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, a pro-American politician who risked the political future of his party, the historically pacifist Greens, to support the United States campaign in Afghanistan. Fischer added, “The international coalition against terror is not the basis to take action against someone -- least of all unilaterally. All European foreign ministers see it that way. That is why the phrase ‘axis of evil’ leads nowhere. … The president’s State of the Union speech is best understood in the context of the midterm elections in November.” (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

Josef Joffe, a German foreign policy analyst and editor of the weekly Die Zeit, said, “Will Europe do anything to hinder it if the U.S. goes ahead? No. Will they deny things like overflight rights? No. … But active political support? None.” Joffe added, “In Afghanistan, people watched with amazement as this (U.S.) global military machine meshed. And there is fear of that power.” (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

British Foreign Minister Jack Straw continued the diatribe against the unilateral foreign policy implemented by the Bush administration. Straw said, “The president’s State of the Union speech is best understood in the context of the midterm elections in November, it seems to me.” (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

The British Labor Party of Prime Minister Tony Blair, an ardent supporter of Bush in his war on terrorism, was deeply concerned about a possible American attack on Iraq. Party members insisted that if Iraq were to be confronted, it would have to be a multinational United Nations action. (Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2002)

The British media also hurled a blitz of criticism at the Bush administration. The Times of London (March 14, 2002) reported that Cheney’s attempts to win Arab support for military action against Baghdad “will be greeted … by a solid wall of resistance in the nine Arab capitals he visits.” If Bush tried to tear down the Hussein regime in Baghdad, The Times said, “what if Egyptian or Saudi citizens also decided on a little ‘regime change’ of their own?”

The Guardian (March 11, 2002) said the Bush administration had “broken every rule in the playbook” from Gulf War I: “That campaign had a clear, unarguable provocation and justification: the invasion of Kuwait. There is no such cause here, only the fear of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons -- a fear that’s been lurking for years and not gained any special urgency now.” Two days later, The Guardian (March 13, 2002) reported that the United States “is orchestrating secret contacts between Iraqi opposition factions with the aim of finding agreement on a new leader to replace Saddam Hussein. A grand opposition conference has been provisionally scheduled for May, and it is hoped to hold it in Bonn, symbolically echoing the Bonn meeting that set up the Afghan interim government.”

Britain’s Daily Mirror (March 14, 2002) called Bush the equivalent of: ‘Come on, big boy, let’ see how tough you are.’ The Daily Mirror predicted that “Hussein will either force the United States to back down or suffer such terrible destruction of his country that Arab sympathy will be with him.”

Britain’s Financial Times focused the practical difficulties of bringing down Hussein. “Policy experts” claimed that a ground operation would involve at least 200,000 troops, bringing the risk of extensive losses on both sides. Also, there was no obvious candidate to replace Hussein. The Financial Times reported that the Kurdish and Shi’ite opposition in Iraq was too weak to participate in a coup and that Hussein’s 400,000-strong army was well-equipped and well-trained.

Criticism of Bush continued in the British media. The Economist (March 15, 2002) reported that Europeans were reluctant to join Bush’s attempt to overthrow Hussein, but some EU nations might decide it was the only way to prevent Iraq from using the chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons it had or was still seeking.

Chris Patten, the European Union’s external affairs commissioner, said, “The stunning and unexpectedly rapid success of the military campaign in Afghanistan was a tribute to American capacity. But it has perhaps reinforced some dangerous instincts: that the projection of military power is the only basis of true security; that the U.S. can rely only on itself; and that allies may be useful as an optional extra but that the U.S. is big enough to manage without them if it must.” Patten also said, “We have to do all we can to bolster weak or failing states and prevent them from falling into the clutches of the Bin Ladens of this world.” Fischer said that Iraq should be pressed to allow U.N. inspectors to return to the country and that “the sanctions regime must be further developed so that Iraq cannot produce or bring on line weapons of mass destruction.” (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

Russian President Vladimir Putin the anti-foreignism approach carried out by the United States. The Russian president said, “We know which nations’ representatives and citizens were fighting alongside the Taliban and where their activities were financed from. Iraq is not on this list.” (Washington Post, February 17, 2002)

Several Arab nations also chimed in, warning the United States to stay out of Iraq. Moderate leaders King Abdullah of Jordan and King Muhammad of Morocco indicated their unequivocal opposition to war with Iraq. Sheik Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates said that he opposed an American strike against Iraq and urged efforts to quell the fighting between the Israelis and the Palestinians. And Prime Minister Bulent Evecit of Turkey said, “Iraq should not be the subject of military attacks because it would upset the whole Middle East.” (New York Times, March 16, 2002)

In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah said the Bush administration should put aside any plans for a military campaign against Iraq. Abdullah told ABC News, “I do not believe it is in the United States’ interests, or the interest of the region, or the world’s interest to do so. And I don’t believe it will achieve the desired result.” Abdullah condemned terrorism and suggested that Bin Laden had been financing terrorist operations by dealing in narcotics. That claim might have been an attempt to deflect criticism of Saudi Arabia over reports that Al Qaeda had received money from groups based in Saudi Arabia. Yet, the prince offered the Bush administration little on military cooperation against Iraq. (New York Times, March 16, 2002)

Meanwhile, Bush was dealt another blow -- this time by Saddam Hussein himself. The Iraqi leader’s popularity was increasing, since he ordered payments of $25,000 to each Palestinian family that lost a “martyr.” (The Times of London, March 15, 2002)

Finally, the question arose as to whether a dialogue between the United States and other nations was even possible any more, after Bush began beating the war drums.

Meanwhile, in Asia, Bush was met with difficult, if unanswerable questions. Why for instance, is the United States so eager to engage China and isolate -- if not attack -- North Korea, when both were repressive communist dictatorships that oppressed their own people and sold advanced missile technology to rogue nations like Iran? Why did the administration continue to insist on repeatedly humiliating the pro-American Kim Dae Jung of South Korea to protect its $250-billion proposed missile defense scheme allegedly justified by the “threat” from North Korea? And what about the escalating Israeli-Palestinian tensions?

AN EMBARRASSMENT IN JAPAN. Bush traveled launched a six-nation trip to Asia in February. His tour had been orchestrated for months. White House officials nervously hoped that their president could pull it off without a hitch. But a few things still went awry.

As Bush's motorcade sped through Beijing, the motorcade suddenly stopped for what appeared to be a blown tire on Bush’s car. Frantic Secret Service agents rummaged through the trunk for a spare. But the problem was mechanical, Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, explained. Bush’s spare limousine was swiftly brought to the disabled car, and the president continued his ride to meet Chinese officials for lunch.

Then Bush misspoke during a joint news conference. Answering a question about discussions between the two leaders over the ailing Japanese economy, Bush said the prime minister had just told him that he had things under control. Bush said, “And he talked about non-performing loans, the devaluation issue and regulatory reform. And he placed equal emphasis on all three.”

Bush had not meant to say “devaluation” but “deflation,” to describe Japan’s falling prices, which Fleischer said was written on a note card that the president took to the lectern. By saying “devaluation,” Bush inadvertently alluded to discussions in the international marketplace suggesting that a way out of Japan’s economic crisis would be to devalue the yen against the dollar, making Japanese products cheaper in other countries. If Bush was briefed on the Japanese economy before the trip, both words probably came up.

After the news conference, Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, called the mistake to Bush’s attention. “Did I say that?” Fleischer quoted the president as saying. “My card says ‘deflation.’”

The next day, Bush had trouble pronouncing a Japanese word in a speech to the Diet. He pronounced the Japanese word “kyoso,” which meant competition, as “kyo-sho,” which meant, appropriately, “big speech.”

Bush also had trouble pronouncing the name of a Japanese scholar and statesman, Inazo Nitobe, who said in the 1880s that he wanted to be Japan’s bridge to the West. Bush pronounced the name as “Ni-toy-bay,” rather than “Ni-to-bay.”

When Bush arrived in Beijing, he failed to refer to Liu Yongqing, the wife of Hu Jintao, the future Chinese leader. Although the name appeared in his prepared text, Bush breezed past it, referred only to Mr. Hu’s “gracious wife.”

At another point in Beijing, Bush used the word “apoplectic” and the phrase “chomping at the bit” in a high-level meeting, causing some confusion among his hosts and their interpreters. Secretary of State Powell later told reporters on Air Force One that it took him some time to explain to the Chinese vice foreign minister exactly what “apoplectic” meant, and even longer to explain “chomping at the bit,” which could not be interpreted into Chinese. (New York Times, February 25, 2002)

AN EMBARRASSMENT IN SOUTH KOREA. Bush’s trip to Seoul brought back memories of the unseasoned president who had humiliated South Korean President Kim Dae Jung a year before. In early 2001, Bush had publicly embarrassed and repudiated Kim. Bush had criticized his “sunshine policy” of rapprochement with North Korea. In fact, Kim had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his effort to break down the barriers between Kim Jong Il and the right-wing Seoul regime.

Arriving in Seoul, Bush was hit by a plethora of anti-American protests. To prevent disruptions, the South Korean government deployed 12,000 riot police to guard the American embassy and other sites. On the streets of Seoul, police in riot gear stood watch over Koreans who protested Bush’s visit. Students, labor unions and left-wing political activists staged demonstrations against Bush for several days leading up to the visit. The student demonstrators played cat-and-mouse games with police, using surprise tactics to keep officers off-guard. The uproar spread into the South Korean parliament, where a senior politician from the ruling party called Bush “evil incarnate.” (Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2002)

Numerous hunger strikes indicated signs of anger, anxiety, and frustration with Bush’s meddling policy. Chonnam University students Chung Jong Sung and Kim Gyong Joo went on a eleven day hunger strike. Kim charged that “President Bush is preparing, step by step, to create a mood for war in the Korean peninsula. We are living on only water and salt to protest this action. The fate of the Koreas should be left in the hands of Koreans.” (Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2002)

At Kwangwoon University, activist Hong Keun Soo led several hundred students in a demonstration. Protesters shouted, “Let’s stop Bush’s visit to Korea. Bush is a cheap gangster.” Banners proclaimed, “No War, No Bush” and “American Arrogance Is Inviting Isolation.” About one million students participated in a one-day fast during Bush’s talks with Kim.

Bush may have had an ulterior motive for his harsh remarks about North Korea. According to a Seoul television poll, a majority of South Koreans believed that Bush chose – or his advisers told him to use -- tough rhetoric, in hopes of selling more American arms and warplanes to South Korea. The most popular of several conspiracy theories circulating in Seoul contended that the Bush administration used the threatening language against North Korea to heighten the fear of conflict--and convince Seoul to buy F-15 fighter jets. (Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2002)

After three weeks of threatening talk about the “axis of evil,” White House advisers apparently told the president to tone down his harsh, threatening, and confrontational remarks. While addressing American troops along the DMZ in South Korea, Bush was surprisingly tame -- even mild-mannered – as he talked of gestures of goodwill, not guns. He said, “We have no intention of invading North Korea. We would be happy to have a dialogue with the North Koreans. I wonder out loud why the North Korean president won’t accept the offer.” Later, Bush added, “We’re prepared to talk with the North about steps that would lead to a better future that is more hopeful and less threatening.” (Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2002)

By the end of 2006, the United States was seen as a threat to world peace by its closest neighbors and allies, according to an international survey that included London’s The Guardian, Israel’s Haaretz, Canada’s La Presse, Toronto’s Star, and Mexico’s Reforma. (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

According to the survey, Bush was seen as a greater danger to world peace than either the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, or the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Both countries were cited by Bush as part of an “axis of evil.” (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

In Britain, 69 percent of those questioned say they believe United States policy made the world less safe since 2001, with only 7 percent thinking action in Iraq and Afghanistan increased global security. (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

In Canada and Mexico, 62 percent of Canadians and 57 percent of Mexicans said the world became more dangerous because of Bush’s policies. In Israel, 25 percent said that Bush made the world safer, outweighed by the number who thought he added to the risk of international conflict, 36 percent to 25 percent. A further 30 percent said that at best he has made no difference. (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

Bush was outranked by bin Laden in all four countries. 87 percent thought the al Qaeda leader was a great or moderate danger to peace, compared with 75 percent who thought this of Bush. (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

Bush was viewed in Britain as a more dangerous man than the president of Iran (62 percent thought he was a danger), the North Korean leader (69 percent) and the leader of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah (65 percent). (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)

Only 10 percent of British voters thought that Bush posed no danger at all. Israeli voters remained much more trusting of him, with 23 percent thinking he represented a serious danger and 61 percent thinking he does not. (The Guardian, November 3, 2006)