CONTENTS

ESCALATING THE PENTAGON BUDGET AFTER 9-11

Evidence of unauthorized personal purchases was uncovered in the summer of 2001 by Government Accounting Office investigators auditing the Navy Publics Works Department in San Diego. Approximately 1.7 million Pentagon employees had government charge cards. The case was also referred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, but an assistant United States attorney in San Diego declined to prosecute. (Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2002)

David H. Hackworth was one of the most decorated soldiers in the United States Army. His career spanned nearly a dozen wars and conflicts, from the end of World War II to the Kosovo war. The Pentagon got into a credit-card giveaway program without even a minimal credit check for its cardholders because, so they thought, the cards would reduce paperwork and thus save money. On August 7, 2001, Hackworth wrote about the stealing that occurred as a result of the mass issue of Pentagon credit cards:

** A Marine sergeant ran up a $20,000 bill on clothes and other personal goodies. He even made his overdrawn sea bag.

** An Army soldier blew $3,100 in a nightclub. A champagne-and- caviar night for the perp and pals on the taxpayers.

**A dead sailor somehow spent $3,565 that was not accounted for.

** A soldier's wife spent $13,053 during a shopping spree and a holiday in Puerto Rico.

** Other scams include a $13,000 Nordstorm designer briefcase, expensive computer monitors, Palm Pilots, cosmetics and gift certificates.

**Tanya Mays, a Navy employee, who allegedly charged nearly $12,000 in personal expenses on her government credit card, was promoted to a key Army financial management office at the Pentagon and placed in charge of “cash integration.” According to testimony given before the House Government Reform subcommittee, Tanya Mays was never disciplined and was never been asked to repay the government for any of the purchases. They included a computer, a kitchen appliance, clothing, and groceries. (Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2002)

More than 46,000 Defense Department employees had defaulted on $62 million in official travel expenses charged to the government cards as of November 2001, according to the panel. Banks were forced to write off the bad debts at a rate of $1 million a month.

Investigating the fraud, the House Government Reform subcommittee was given a confidential list of the 713 officers who had been unpaid for seven months or more and included individual balances of up to $8,000. Officers ranged from junior lieutenants to senior colonels and a Navy captain. (Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2002)

David H. Hackworth was one of the most decorated soldiers in the United States Army. His career spanned nearly a dozen wars and conflicts, from the end of World War II to the Kosovo war. The Pentagon got into a credit-card giveaway program without even a minimal credit check for its cardholders because, so they thought, the cards would reduce paperwork and thus save money. On August 7, 2001, Hackworth wrote about the stealing that occurred as a result of the mass issue of Pentagon credit cards:

FISCAL 2002. Throughout Campaign 2000, Bush made implicit promises that would be nearly impossible to keep. While faulting the Clinton administration for sparsely funding the armed forces, he campaigned to improve the morale of the military and pledged to increase the Pentagon's budget. And he pledged to implement new systems including the National Missile Defense System (NMD). The president earmarked $45 billion for defense, and a significant portion of that was targeted for research and development.

But Bush left several areas either unaddressed or under-funded. It was not until his third week in the White House that he sketched out a defense proposal for the first time. In his first speech, he said he would cut many of the armed services' priority projects without solving any of the military's current problems. But he pledged to improve the morale in the armed forces personnel by increasing their pay. He said that he would seek an additional $5.7 billion in the fiscal 2002 budget for military people: $3.9 billion for health benefits, $400 million to improve housing, and $1.4 billion for pay raises. This came less than a week after he had proposed a gigantic $1.6 trillion tax slash over 10 years, making it virtually impossible to allocate more funds to federal programs after promising the largest tax cut in American history.

Only a few days later, Bush shocked the nation when he announced that he planned to break with Pentagon orthodoxy and create "a new architecture for defense of our people," investing in new technologies and weapons systems, rather than make what he called "marginal improvements" in systems in which America's arms industry had already invested billions of dollars. (New York Times, February 14, 2001)

Much of Bush's comments were from a speech which aides had prepared for him during the 2000 Campaign when he spoke at the Citadel in South Carolina. His rehashed remarks were only generalizations: "We do not know yet the exact share of our future military, but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be lighter, our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain. In the air, we will be able to strike across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems." (Washington Post, February 14, 2001)

For the first time, Bush he spoke of the threat of terrorist attacks into the United States and remained silent on the National Missile Defense System which had been a centerpiece of his campaign. He addressed the issue of terrorist weapons that might enter American territory, but he never suggested any solution. His only comment -- mundane and simplistic -- was to work with allies.

Several European ambassadors, who viewed Bush as a novice and unknown quantity, heard him speak of risking the investment in entirely new technologies and weapons systems. The shift away from the military-industrial complex alarmed military contractors who had already received contracts in the billions from the Pentagon. But, as usual, Bush once again offered no specifics except for saying that he had given Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld " a broad mandate to challenge the status quo." He only added that he would provide just $2.6 billion in additional money for research and development in the budget for fiscal 2002. That represented an increase of only about 6 percent over the existing levels. He acknowledged that was hardly the kind of money needed to rethink an entire arsenal, but said "before we make our full investment, we must know our exact priorities."

Bush also said that he would "modernize some existing weapons and equipment." The administration seemed skeptical about moving ahead with three new fighter planes that had been under development since the days of the Clinton administration. They included the F-22 which was projected to cost $180 billion per plane and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, as well as the Navy's DD-21 stealth destroyer and the Army's Crusader artillery system. (Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2001)

In late May, Bush asked Congress for an additional $5.6 billion for Pentagon for fiscal 2001. It did not include any new money for his anti-missile defense system which was the centerpiece of his defense budget. The largest single item in the Bush request was $1.9 billion for improved salaries, health insurance, housing, and other personnel benefits that were authorized but not funded in the federal budget for fiscal 2001. (New York Times, May 31, 2001)

A month later, the Bush administration amended fiscal 2002 budget in hopes of securing more funds to build the anti-missile system. The White House called for defense spending of $329 billion, which was $18.4 billion more than the president had requested earlier. Rumsfeld hoped to accrue funds to build the anti-missile defense system by cutting other Pentagon programs.

Rumsfeld asked Congress for authority to cut the Air Force B-1 bomber fleet by a third. Under his plan, the Air Force would have B-1 bombers based at only two bases: Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota and Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. He would move B-1s from the 116th Bomb Wing at Robins Air Force Base in central Georgia and those assigned to the Kansas Air National Guard's 184th Bomb Wing at McConnell Air Force Base in Wichita to Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho. (Washington Post, June 27, 2001)

The decision drew immediate complaints from the Georgia and Kansas congressional delegations, which accused the administration of playing politics. Democratic Senator Zell Miller of Georgia said, "This is absolutely unbelievable. This is wrong. It stinks." He said that it could mean the elimination of 800 to 900 jobs in Georgia. Kansas GOP Senator Pat Roberts, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, accused the Air Force of playing politics. He said, "South Dakota is the home of the majority leader of the Senate. Texas is the home of the president. I have a little feeling about this." Senator Max Cleland, Democrat of Georgia, said, "I couldn't believe it on policy grounds, couldn't believe the way it was handled, so secretly. There was no consultation with the Congress, no prior briefing, no transition plan, no economic plans for the communities. It looked like the Air Force was pressured into this decision by higher-ups." (Washington Post, June 27, 2001)

THE LARGEST MILITARY BUDGET IN 20 YEARS. In June, the House approved $355 billion in defense spending, the largest military funding increase in two decades. The House spending plan, sponsored by Armed Services Committee Chairman Jerry Lewis, fully funded Bush’s $7.6-billion proposal to create a system to defend the nation against long-range missile attacks. But Democratic leaders in the Senate, arguing that a foreign missile attack was less likely than a nuclear or chemical terrorist attack, successfully diverted $878 million from the program to shipbuilding and other programs. (Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2002)

Meanwhile, in a 97-to-2 vote, the Senate authorized an overall military funding outline of $393.3 billion for Fiscal 2003. The bill included a 4.1 percent raise for military personnel as well as funding for new weapons and the next phase of the war on terrorism. (Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2002)

The two houses clashed over abortion at overseas military clinics and compromised on the Crusader cannon and missile defense programs. And the number two Pentagon official threatened to recommend a veto over red tape in the Senate's proposal for funding a missile defense system.

FISCAL 2003 PENTAGON BUDGET. In October, Bush signed into law the biggest military spending increase since the Reagan administration -- a $355.5-billion package giving the wartime Pentagon “every resource, every weapon and every tool they need.” Overwhelmingly approved by Congress, the measure contains a 4.1 percent salary increase for military personnel, $7.4 billion to keep developing a ballistic missile defense system, and $72 billion for new weapons.

The budget came at a time when Bush had been lobbying Congress and the United Nations to back an American invasion of Iraq. And it came at a time when American troops were spread across the globe in an effort to fight terrorism. The budget increased Pentagon spending in almost every area by a total of more than $34 billion, or 11 percent, over fiscal 2002. It was the biggest increase in 20 years. . (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2002)

From the outset, a tug-of-war developed among White House national security leaders. Secretary of State Powell and Rumsfeld clashed over a NATO force that excluded American troops as well as deployment of NMD. And disagreements between Vice President Cheney and Powell may be traced back to the Gulf War where they had major differences of opinion as to how to oppose Hussein near the end of the war and afterwards. Now in the Bush administration, a power struggle emerged over jurisdiction of key foreign policy issues.

Bush expected Cheney and the vice presidential advisers to be full participants in national security policy. The administration contemplated that the NSC and Cheney's staff would be treated as one and would exercise more influence than vice presidents in previous administrations. The vice president emerged as the winner because of his closeness to Bush and his handpicked selection of Rumsfeld to head the Pentagon. Rumsfeld was a mentor of Cheney's extending back to the Ford administration days where Cheney was chief of staff and Rumsfeld was secretary of defense. Initially, it had been believed that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge or Senator Dan Coats of Indiana were the leading candidates for the position. But Cheney vetoed Ridge, who was close to Bush and who was endorsed for the position by Powell. A chief concern of Cheney's was that neither Ridge nor Coats had the experience or stature to keep Powell from rolling right over them. Quite possibly Cheney was concerned about his inability to deal with foreign administrations issues because historically vice presidents have been primarily known for presiding over the Senate and breaking ties when necessary. As a result, Cheney handpicked Rumsfeld because he was someone whom he could trust.

Furthermore, Cheney tried to consolidate his position as a member of the national security team by choosing Paul Wolfowitz as deputy defense secretary. Wolfowitz was a hard-core hawk and Cold Warrior who detested Powell's dove-like conciliatory approach to conflict resolution. Wolfowitz was also extremely loyal to Cheney and Rumsfeld.

Powell countered by selecting Richard Armitage as his deputy secretary of state. Armitage was a loyalist and one of Powell's closest friends. It was rumored that Powell initially pushed for Armitage to fill the deputy secretary of defense slot but that Cheney and Rumsfeld rejected the idea, in part, due to Armitage's closeness to Powell.

National Security Adviser Rice was the fourth player in the power struggle. The Washington Post (February 18, 2001) reported that she indicated her "must-have" areas of influence and allowed the rest to be transferred to other agencies -- most obviously to the vice-president and to a lesser extent to the State Department. Rice's key role was preeminent adviser on Russia, a position that some derisively referred to as "President Bush's foreign policy tutor." The Cheney-Rumsfeld- Wolfowitz wing prevailed over Powell-Armitage. But if Rice were to her throw her weight behind Powell-Armitage it could be a draw or even result in a majority of victories for Powell on important issues like Iraq, the Middle East peace process, and even Africa.

Since 1993, the Pentagon's strategy was to be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously, for instance against Iraq and North Korea. Eight years later -- in July 2001 -- the Pentagon announced that it was abandoning this policy. The DOD ordered the armed forces to "win decisively" in a single major conflict, defend American territory against new threats and, at the same time, conduct a number of holding actions elsewhere around the globe. (New York Times, July 12, 2001)

The new approach was explained in a 29- page document known as the "terms of reference," which the Pentagon used to guide specific policy and budget requests for personnel and weapons -- the numbers of everything from carrier battle groups to jet fighters to troops on the ground. The strategy required the American military to maintain capabilities so that it could, "concurrently" carry out four broad missions: (1) Defend United States territory; (2) Prevent aggressors from taking hostile action by making them afraid of a response from American forces in Europe, the Middle East, southwest Asia, northeast Asia, and along the East Asian rim; (3) "Win decisively" in one major conflict; and (4) Conduct "small-scale contingencies of limited duration in other areas of the world." (New York Times, July 12, 2001)

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SETBACK. The Bush administration received a setback in late December 2001 when the Energy Department’s inspector concluded that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, had become a “most serious challenge area” for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex. Inspector General Gregory Friedman announced that one review his office conducted turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile. Another review showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems.

The report showed that, since 1997, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which was carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles. Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems had developed in components such as radars showed delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests -- which included looking at “pits” or nuclear triggers and detonators -- were also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period. When successful testing over four years fell below 75 percent of planned tests, “there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed,” according to the inspector general.

The report also said that part of the problem was that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex had been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. When testing showed a defect or malfunction, department procedures required immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab was supposed to determine whether the problem was significant. If so, the lab had 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved.

According to the report, about 10 percent of significant findings had resulted in “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile.” Nevertheless, the IG found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days. After the determination had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” according to the IG’s report.

Only a small number of engineers and experts carried out these investigations and they often were involved in other projects, according to a former top Pentagon official. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage. (Washington Post, January 2, 2002)

USING 9-11 AS A PRETENSE TO ESCALATE THE PENTAGON BUDGET. Riding high on his high popularity as a war-time president, Bush all but demanded an record-breaking astonishing Pentagon budget of $379 billion, -- an increase of $48 billion since the September 11 terrorist attacks. That was $600 billion more than was anticipated before September 11. The 2003 budget was supposed to be $379 billion. Bush refused to junk such Cold War relics as the M-1 Abrams tank.

Bush still clung to missile defense, asking for $7.8 billion, even though a new study by the Congressional Budget Office pegged the cost for a full-scale system at $68 billion or more. When the president called for more funds for the National Missile Defense system, the Democrats remained silent, refusing to question how an anti-missile system would thwart terrorism. When the president asked for unprecedented Pentagon spending, the Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill again rolled over. It was not until the end of February 2002 that congressional Democrats finally challenged Bush’s request for a $379 billion budget request. And for the first time, some questioned Bush’s strategy in Afghanistan.

Democratic Senator Robert Byrd, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, grilled top defense officials at a budget hearing about the lack of an “exit strategy” in Afghanistan and their failure to capture Osama Bin Laden. Byrd also questioned the administration’s widening global campaign against terrorists that seemed to have “no end in sight.” (Washington Post, February 29, 2002)

Byrd said the Pentagon had sent him documents estimating that the war would cost $30 billion in 2002 fiscal year. That meant Congress would be asked to provide an extra $12.6 billion in addition to $17.4 billion in supplemental spending that was approved in late 2001.