MORE OF BUSH’S LIES ABOUT IRAQ

CONTENTS

10. HOW PRIME MINISTER BLAIR WAS SUCKED INTO BUSH’S WAR: THE DOWNING STREET MEMOS

1. MISLEADING AND LYING TO THE WORLD

Bush and seven of his administration's top officials, including Vice President Cheney, National Security Adviser Rice, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false statements in the two years following 9/11 about the national security threat posed by Saddam.

Nearly five years after Bush’s invasion of Iraq, records showed that the statements were part of an orchestrated campaign that effectively gained public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses.

In at least 532 separate occasions (in speeches, briefings, interviews, testimony, and the like), Bush and these three key officials, along with Secretary of State Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, and White House press secretaries Fleischer and McClellan, stated unequivocally that Iraq had WMD or was trying to produce or obtain them, links to al Qaeda, or both. This concerted effort was the underpinning of the Bush administration’s case for war.

But Iraq did not possess any WMD or have meaningful ties to Al Qaeda. This was the conclusion of numerous bipartisan government investigations, including those by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2004 and 2006), the 9/11 Commission, and the multinational Iraq Survey Group, whose “Duelfer Report” established that Saddam had terminated Iraq’s nuclear program in 1991 and made little effort to restart it.

In short, the Bush administration led the nation to war on the basis of erroneous information that it methodically propagated and that culminated in military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003. Not surprisingly, the officials with the most opportunities to make speeches, grant media interviews, and otherwise frame the public debate also made the most false statements, according to this first-ever analysis of the entire body of prewar rhetoric.

Ron Suskind, author of The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism, wrote that Bush was informed unequivocally in January 2003 that Saddam had no WMD. Nonetheless, Bush decided to invade Iraq three months later -- with the forged letter from the head of Iraqi intelligence to Saddam bolstering the United States rationale to go into war.

“It was a dark day for the CIA. It was the kind of thing where (the CIA) said, ‘Look, this is not our charge. We’re not here to carry forth a political mandate -- which is clearly what this was -- to solve a political problem in America.’ And it was a cause of great grievance inside of the agency.” (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

Suskind claimed that Bush’s action was “one of the greatest lies in modern American political history” and suggested it was a crime of greater impact than Watergate.

A July 1, 2001 letter from the head of Iraqi intelligence, Tahir Jalil Habbush, stated that Atta had trained for his mission in Iraq. War supporters touted this story as further justification for the Bush administration’s war. That same day, Fox News host Bill O’Reilly proclaimed, “Now, if this is true, that blows the lid off al Qaeda/Saddam.” (London Sunday Telegraph, December 14, 2003)

However, as the 9/11 Commission proved, there were no pre-war ties between Saddam’s regime and the al Qaeda organization. So what happened?

The Bush administration fabricated the letter and paid Habbush $5 million to stay quiet. Additionally, officials ignored Habbush’s warnings that Iraq had no WMD. This was more evidence that the Bush administration deliberately misled the public to launch its war. (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

In January 2003, Michael Shipster, the head of Iraqi operations for the British intelligence service MI6, began secret talks with Habbush. According to Nigel Inkster, a former senior British intelligence official, Habbush confirmed that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. Hussein was “more concerned with threats from regional enemies like Iran than a United States invasion.” (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

Senior White House officials were well-informed about these discussions. The British intelligence services prepared a final report on Shipster’s meetings with Habbush, which Tenet used to brief Bush and Rice. The report stated that according to Habbush, Saddam had ended his nuclear program in 1991, the same year he destroyed his chemical weapons stockpile. Iraq had no intention, Habbush said, of restarting either program.” (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

Around the time that it hushed Habbush, the White House decided to use the Iraqi’s name to forge the bogus letter, backdated to July 2001. The letter was meant to show “that there was an operational link between Saddam and al Qaeda, something Cheney’s office had pressed the CIA to prove since 9/11 as a justification to invade Iraq. (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

Suskind said officials remembered seeing the forgery order on “creamy White House stationery.” Furthermore, they concluded that the letter must have come from the “highest reaches of the White House.” The fake letter was then strategically leaked to Telegraph reporter Con Coughlin. Coughlin noted that in the memo, Habbush said that Atta “displayed extraordinary effort” and would be able to attack “the targets that we have agreed to destroy. The second part of the memo, headed “Niger Shipment,” detailed an unspecified shipment -- presumably uranium -- that was allegedly shipped to Iraq via Libya and Syria. In his article, Coughlin wrote, Iraqi officials refused to disclose how and where they had obtained the document.” Dr. Ayad Allawi, then a member of Iraq’s Presidential Committee, nevertheless “said the document was genuine.” (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

When Tenet was informed of the findings in early February, he said, “They’re not going to like this downtown.” Bush’s reaction to the report was: “Why don’t they ask him to give us something we can use to help make our case?” Ron Suskind, author of The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism, wrote that Bush was informed unequivocally in January 2003 that Saddam had no WMD. Nonetheless, Bush decided to invade Iraq three months later -- with the forged letter from the head of Iraqi intelligence to Saddam bolstering the United States rationale to go into war.

“It was a dark day for the CIA. It was the kind of thing where (the CIA) said, ‘Look, this is not our charge. We’re not here to carry forth a political mandate -- which is clearly what this was -- to solve a political problem in America.’ And it was a cause of great grievance inside of the agency.” (Ron Suskind, The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism)

Suskind claimed that Bush’s action was “one of the greatest lies in modern American political history” and suggested it was a crime of greater impact than Watergate.

Two years after McClellan stepped down as press secretary, he wrote a surprisingly scathing memoir in which he said Bush “veered terribly off course,” was not “open and forthright on Iraq,” and took a “permanent campaign approach” to governing at the expense of candor and competence. (Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

McClellan charged that Bush relied on “propaganda” to sell the war.

• He said the White House press corps was too easy on the administration during the run-up to the war.

• He admitted that some of his own assertions from the briefing room podium turned out to be “badly misguided.”

• He suggested that two top aides held a secret West Wing meeting to get their story straight about the CIA leak case at a time when federal prosecutors were after them -- and McClellan was continuing to defend them despite mounting evidence they had not given him all the facts.

• He claimed that the aides – Rove and Libby “had at best misled” him about their role in the disclosure of former CIA operative Valerie Plame’s identity.

• McClellan suggested that Libby and Rove secretly colluded to get their stories straight at a time when federal investigators were hot on the Plame case.

• Steve Hadley, then the deputy national security adviser, said about the erroneous assertion about Saddam Hussein seeking uranium, included in the State of the Union address of 2003: “Signing off on these facts is my responsibility. … And in this case, I blew it. I think the only solution is for me to resign.” The offer “was rejected almost out of hand by others present,” McClellan wrote.

• Bush was “clearly irritated, … steamed,” when McClellan informed him that chief economic adviser Larry Lindsey had told The Wall Street Journal that a possible war in Iraq could cost from $100 billion to $200 billion: “‘It’s unacceptable,’ Bush continued, his voice rising. ‘He shouldn’t be talking about that.’ ”

• “As press secretary, I spent countless hours defending the administration from the podium in the White House briefing room. Although the things I said then were sincere, I have since come to realize that some of them were badly misguided.”

• “History appears poised to confirm what most Americans today have decided: that the decision to invade Iraq was a serious strategic blunder. No one, including me, can know with absolute certainty how the war will be viewed decades from now when we can more fully understand its impact. What I do know is that war should only be waged when necessary, and the Iraq war was not necessary.”

• McClellan described his preparation for briefing reporters during the Plame frenzy: “I could feel the adrenaline flowing as I gave the go-ahead for Josh Deckard, one of my hard-working, underpaid press office staff, … to give the two-minute warning so the networks could prepare to switch to live coverage the moment I stepped into the briefing room.”

• McClellan said, “There is only one moment during the leak episode that I am reluctant to discuss. … It was in 2005, during a time when attention was focusing on Rove and Libby, and it sticks vividly in my mind. … Following (a meeting in Card’s office), Scooter Libby was walking to the entryway as he prepared to depart when Karl turned to get his attention. ‘You have time to visit?’ Karl asked. ‘Yeah,’ replied Libby.

“I have no idea what they discussed, but it seemed suspicious for these two, whom I had never noticed spending any one-on-one time together, to go behind closed doors and visit privately. At least one of them, Rove, it was publicly known at the time, had at best misled me by not sharing relevant information, and credible rumors were spreading that the other, Libby, had done at least as much.

“The confidential meeting also occurred at a moment when I was being battered by the press for publicly vouching for the two by claiming they were not involved in leaking Plame’s identity, when recently revealed information was now indicating otherwise. I don’t know what they discussed, but what would any knowledgeable person reasonably and logically conclude was the topic? Like the whole truth of people’s involvement, we will likely never know with any degree of confidence.”

McClellan repeatedly embraced the rhetoric of Bush’s liberal critics and even charges: “If anything, the national press corps was probably too deferential to the White House and to the administration in regard to the most important decision facing the nation during my years in Washington, the choice over whether to go to war in Iraq.

“The collapse of the administration’s rationales for war, which became apparent months after our invasion, should never have come as such a surprise. … In this case, the ‘liberal media’ didn’t live up to its reputation. If it had, the country would have been better served.”

Decrying the Bush administration’s “excessive embrace of the permanent campaign approach to governance,” McClellan recommends that future presidents appoint a “deputy chief of staff for governing” who “would be responsible for making sure the president is continually and consistently committed to a high level of openness and forthrightness and transcending partisanship to achieve unity.

“I frequently stumbled along the way. My own story, however, is of small importance in the broad historical picture. More significant is the larger story in which I played a minor role: the story of how the presidency of George W. Bush veered terribly off course.”

Even some of the chapter titles are brutal: “The Permanent Campaign,” “Deniability,” “Triumph and Illusion,” “Revelation and Humiliation” and “Out of Touch.” (Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

“Bush wanted to go to war in Iraq from the very first days he was in office. Nothing was going to stop that. Bush made 232 false statements about WMD in Iraq. He made another 28 false statements about Iraq's links to al Qaeda.

Secretary of State Powell made 244 false statements about WMD in Iraq and 10 about Iraq's links to al Qaeda.

Rumsfeld and Fleischer each made 109 false statements, followed by Wolfowitz (with 85), Rice (with 56), Cheney (with 48), and McClellan (with 14).

These were numerous false public statements made in the run-up to war:

1. On August 26, 2002, in an address to the national convention of the Veteran of Foreign Wars, Cheney flatly declared: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” In fact, former CIA Director George Tenet later recalled, Cheney’s assertions went well beyond his agency's assessments at the time. Another CIA official, referring to the same speech, told journalist Ron Suskind, “Our reaction was, ‘Where is he getting this stuff from?’ “

2. In the closing days of September 2002, with a congressional vote fast approaching on authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, Bush told the nation in his weekly radio address: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. … This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” A few days later, similar findings were also included in a much-hurried National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD -- an analysis that had not been done in years, as the intelligence community had deemed it unnecessary and the White House hadn’t requested it.

3. In July 2002, Rumsfeld had a one-word answer for reporters who asked whether Iraq had relationships with al Qaeda terrorists: “Sure.” In fact, an assessment issued that same month by the Defense Intelligence Agency (and confirmed weeks later by CIA Director Tenet) found an absence of “compelling evidence demonstrating direct cooperation between the government of Iraq and al Qaeda.” What's more, an earlier DIA assessment said that “the nature of the regime's relationship with al Qaeda is unclear.”

4. On May 29, 2003, in an interview with Polish TV, Bush declared: “We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories.” But as journalist Bob Woodward reported in State of Denial, days earlier a team of civilian experts dispatched to examine the two mobile labs found in Iraq had concluded in a field report that the labs were not for biological weapons. The team’s final report, completed the following month, concluded that the labs had probably been used to manufacture hydrogen for weather balloons.

5. On January 28, 2003, in his annual State of the Union address, Bush asserted: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” Two weeks earlier, an analyst with the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research sent an email to colleagues in the intelligence community laying out why he believed the uranium-purchase agreement “probably is a hoax.

6. On February 5, 2003, in an address to the United Nations Security Council, Powell said: “What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.” As it turned out, however, two of the main human sources to which Powell referred had provided false information. One was an Iraqi con artist, code-named “Curveball,” whom American intelligence officials were dubious about and in fact had never even spoken to. The other was an al Qaeda detainee, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who had reportedly been sent to Egypt by the CIA and tortured and who later recanted the information he had provided. Libi told the CIA in January 2004 that he had “decided he would fabricate any information interrogators wanted in order to gain better treatment and avoid being handed over to (a foreign government)."

The false statements dramatically increased in August 2002, with congressional consideration of a war resolution, then escalated through the mid-term elections and spiked even higher from January 2003 to the eve of the invasion.

It was during those critical weeks in early 2003 that Bush delivered his State of the Union address and Powell delivered his memorable United Nations presentation. In addition to their patently false pronouncements, Bush and these seven top officials also made hundreds of other statements in the two years after 9/11 in which they implied that Iraq had WMD or links to al Qaeda. Other administration higher-ups, joined by Pentagon officials and Republican leaders in Congress, also routinely sounded false war alarms in the Washington echo chamber.

The truth of the Iraq war itself eventually forced the president to grudgingly backpedal. In a 2004 appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press, for example, Bush acknowledged that no WMD had been found in Iraq. And on December 18, 2005, with his approval ratings on the decline, Bush told the nation in a Sunday-night address from the Oval Office: “It is true that Saddam Hussein had a history of pursuing and using weapons of mass destruction. It is true that he systematically concealed those programs, and blocked the work of U.N. weapons inspectors. It is true that many nations believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. But much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong. As your president, I am responsible for the decision to go into Iraq. Yet it was right to remove Saddam Hussein from power”

Bush stopped short, however, of admitting error or poor judgment. Instead, his administration repeatedly attributed the stark disparity between its prewar public statements and the actual truth regarding the threat posed by Iraq.

Bush administration officials continued to mislead the world:

Reality: It was far from certain that Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds. It might be accepted as conventional wisdom, but back when it was first claimed there was great skepticism. The evidence was far from conclusive. A 1990 study by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College had great doubts on the claim that Iraq used chemical weapons on the Kurds. Following were the two gassing incidents as described in the report:

In September 1988, however – a month after the war (between Iran and Iraq) had ended -- the State Department abruptly, and in what many viewed as a sensational manner, condemned Iraq for allegedly using chemicals against its Kurdish population. The incident could not be understood without some background of Iraq’s relations with the Kurds. Through out the war, Iraq effectively faced two enemies -- Iran and elements of its own Kurdish minority. Significant numbers of the Kurds launched a revolt against Baghdad and in the process teamed up with Tehran. As soon as the war with Iran ended, Iraq announced its determination to crush the Kurdish insurrection. It sent Republican Guards to the Kurdish area, and in the course of the operation -- according to the State Department -- gas was used, with the result that numerous Kurdish civilians were killed. The Iraqi government denied that any such gassing had occurred. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Schultz stood by United States accusations, and Congress, acting on its own, sought to impose economic sanctions on Baghdad as a violator of the Kurds’ human rights.

It was impossible to confirm the State Department’s claim that gas was used in this instance. There were never any victims produced. International relief organizations who examined the Kurds -- in Turkey where they had gone for asylum -- failed to discover any. Nor were there ever any found inside Iraq. The claim rested solely on testimony of the Kurds who had crossed the border into Turkey, where they were interviewed by staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Congress was influenced by another incident that occurred five months earlier in another Iraqi-Kurdish city, Halabjah. In March 1988, the Kurds at Halabjah were bombarded with chemical weapons, producing many deaths. Photographs of the Kurdish victims were widely disseminated in the international media. Iraq was blamed for the Halabjah attack, even though it was subsequently brought out that Iran too had used chemicals in this operation and it seemed likely that it was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds. (Time, April 17, 2006)

2. Claim: Iraq must be attacked because it ignored Security Council resolutions. These resolutions must be backed up by the use of force

Reality: Iraq was but one of the many countries that have not complied with Security Council resolutions. In addition to the dozen or so resolutions violated by Iraq, a conservative estimate revealed that there were an additional 91 Security Council resolutions by countries other than Iraq that were also currently being violated. Adding in older resolutions that were violated would mean easily more than 200 Security Council resolutions were violated with total impunity. Countries in violation include: Israel, Turkey, Morocco, Croatia, Armenia, Russia, Sudan, Turkey-controlled Cyprus, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. None of these countries was threatened with force over their violations. (Time, April 17, 2006)

3. Claim: Iraq had anthrax and other chemical and biological agents.

Reality: That might be true. However, according to UNSCOM’s chief weapons inspector 90-95 percent of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and capabilities were destroyed by 1998. Those that remained have likely degraded in the intervening four years and were likely useless. A 1994 Senate Banking Committee hearing revealed some 74 shipments. (Time, April 17, 2006)

4. Claim: The Policy Counter-Terrorism Group after 9/11 makes a case for war.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz developed the Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group shortly after 9/11. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith ran the unit that inappropriately produced “alternative” intelligence. The unit wrongly concluded that Saddam’s regime had cooperated with al Qaeda. Cheney and other high-level Bush administration officials used Feith’s work to help make their case for the war. (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

The Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group was one of three offices that received intelligence on Iraq as the Bush administration made its case for ousting Saddam. An

Iraqi exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, fed one unit. The Office of Special Plans, exaggerated and bogus claims that Saddam was hiding illegal nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and was training Islamic terrorists. (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

According to Edelman, in August 2002, the Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group gave three different briefings on its findings:

1. The one for Rumsfeld, in August 2002, cited “one indication of Iraqi coordination with al Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.

2. One the same month for senior CIA officials cited “one possible indication of Iraqi coordination with al Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.”

3. The third version, given to the White House in September 2002, cited “some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.” (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

Feith’s unit found that there were “multiple areas of cooperation” between Iraq and al Qaeda, “more than a decade of numerous contacts” and “shared interest and pursuit of WMD.” (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

The unit cited as its strongest evidence a purported April 2001 meeting in the Czech capital of Prague between a senior Iraqi intelligence officer and Mohamed Atta, one of the hijackers on 9/11. (February 9, New York Times)

In February 2007, Senator Carl Levin, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee found the findings “are about as damning a statement as one can hear, and I think the American people will be absolutely furious. The policy office has been smeared for years by allegations that its pre-Iraq war work was somehow ‘unlawful’ or ‘unauthorized’ and that some information it gave to congressional committees was deceptive or misleading.” (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

Feith might have violated the 1947 National Security Act. The act required the heads of all departments and agencies of the United State’ government involved in intelligence activities to keep the congressional oversight committees informed. (New York Times, February 9, 2007)

CHANGING THE RATIONALE FOR GOING TO WAR. By 2008, the Bush administration had changed its rationale for going to war against Iraq. First, it was Saddam’s WMD. Second, it was the threat from al Qaeda.

Then in the spring of 2008, the administration’s third rationale was Bush’s claim that Iran was a “threat.” (Agence France Presse, April 14, 2008)

In April 2008, Bush said, “Iraq is the convergence point for two of the greatest threats to America in this new century: Al-Qaeda and Iran. If we succeed in Iraq after all that al Qaeda and Iran have invested there, it would be a historic blow to the global terrorist movement and a severe setback for Iran.” (Agence France Presse, April 14, 2008)

Bush said that with Saddam dead and al Qaeda weakened, Iranian-financed extremists emerged as a key reason for maintaining United States troop levels in Iraq. (Agence France Presse, April 14, 2008)

Bush said that with Saddam dead and al Qaeda weakened, Iranian-financed extremists emerged as a key reason for maintaining United States troop levels in Iraq. (Agence France Presse, April 14, 2008)

A GOP congressional leader who was wavering on giving Bush authority to wage war in late 2002 said Cheney misled him by saying that Saddam had direct personal ties to al Qaeda terrorists and was making rapid progress toward a suitcase nuclear weapon. (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

Cheney’s accusations about Saddam, described by former House Majority Leader Richard Armey, came in a highly classified one-on-one briefing in Room H-208, the vice president’s hideaway office in the Capitol Building. The threat Cheney described went far beyond public statements that have been criticized for relying on “cherry-picked” intelligence of unknown reliability. (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

There was no intelligence to support the vice president’s private assertions, Gellman reports, and they “crossed so far beyond the known universe of fact that they were simply without foundation.” Armey had spoken out against the coming war, and his opposition gave cover to Democrats who feared the political costs of appearing to be weak. Armey reversed his position after Cheney told him, he said, that the threat from Iraq was actually “more imminent than we want to portray to the public at large.” (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

Cheney said, according to Armey, that Iraq’s “ability to miniaturize weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear,” had been "substantially refined since the first Gulf War,” and would soon result in "packages that could be moved even by ground personnel.” Cheney linked that threat to Saddam’s alleged personal ties to al Qaeda, Armey said, explaining that “we now know they have the ability to develop these weapons in a very portable fashion, and they have a delivery system in their relationship with organizations such as al Qaeda.”

Armey said, “Did Dick Cheney ... purposely tell me things he knew to be untrue?” Armey said. “I seriously feel that may be the case. ..Had I known or believed then what I believe now, I would have publicly opposed (the war) resolution right to the bitter end, and I believe I might have stopped it from happening.” (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

Cheney was never the shadow president alleged by critics. Cheney began the first term with “a brief so wide-ranging and autonomous that he was the nearest thing we have had to a deputy president.” But after the near-meltdown at the Justice Department in March 2004, Bush “came to see disadvantages in the arrangement, and over time it changed.” (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

Even when Cheney lost some of his influence, he remained effective at slow-rolling initiatives he did not like. One senior foreign policy adviser, Aaron Friedberg, described the tactics as “rope a dope.” (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

Angler said a meeting in the Situation Room in which the frustrated president, jamming a finger toward Rumsfeld, demanded the start of long-delayed criminal proceedings against terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo Bay. Bush said, “We are going to have a trial, and the proceedings are going to start by the end of January (2004).” Cheney and Rumsfeld failed to turn up for three consecutive meetings called by Rice to carry out the Bush’s command. (Barton Gellman Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency)

STUDIES BY THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND THE FUND FOR INDEPENDENCE OF JOURNALISM. A study by two nonprofit journalism organizations found that President Bush and top administration officials issued hundreds of false statements about the national security threat from Iraq in the two years following 9/11. (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

The study concluded that the statements “were part of an orchestrated campaign that effectively galvanized public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war under decidedly false pretenses.” (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

The study counted 935 false statements in the two-year period. I t found that in speeches, briefings, interviews, and other venues, Bush and administration officials stated unequivocally on at least 532 occasions that Iraq had WMD or was trying to produce or obtain them, or had links to al Qaeda, or both. (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

Named in the study along with Bush were top officials of the administration during the period studied: Cheney, Rice, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Powell, Wolfowitz, Fleischer, and McClellan. (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

Bush led with 259 false statements, 231 about WMD in Iraq and 28 about Iraq’s links to al Qaeda. That was second only to Powell’s 244 false statements about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and 10 about Iraq and al Qaeda. (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

The center said the study was based on a database created with public statements over the two years beginning on 9/11 and information from more than 25 government reports, books, articles, speeches, and interviews. (Center for National Integrity; Fund for Independence of Journalism, January 23, 2008)

THE RAND REPORT OF 2005. In 2005 and after 18 months of research, the RAND Corporation issued a report entitled “Rebuilding Iraq.” The report said, “Throughout the planning process, tensions between the Defense Department and the State Department were never mediated by the president or his staff.” It went on to identify problems with nearly every organization that had a role in planning Bush’s war. The Army sought to keep the entire report classified. (New York Times, February 11, 2008)

The study criticized Bush as well as a wide range of high-level administration officials:

1. In planning the war, Bush and National Security Adviser Rice failed to resolve differences among rival agencies.

2. Defense Department Rumsfeld was given the lead in overseeing the postwar period in Iraq despite its “lack of capacity for civilian reconstruction planning and execution.”

3. Secretary of State Powell produced a voluminous study on the future of Iraq that identified important issues but was of “uneven quality” and “did not constitute an actionable plan.”

4. General Tommy Franks, whose Central Command oversaw the military operation in Iraq, had a “fundamental misunderstanding” of what the military needed to do to secure postwar Iraq, the study said. (New York Times, February 11, 2008)

2. IRAQ’S CENTRIFUGE TUBES

George W. Bush maintained that Iraq was seeking tubes to be used for centrifuges to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb. However, the IAEA concluded it had strong evidence that Iraq was using them for conventional rockets.

In April 2001, a junior analyst at the CIA contended that Iraq was stockpiling thousands of aluminum tubes in an effort to build a nuclear arsenal. Then in the fall of 2002, senior members of the Bush administration gave a series of speeches and interviews in which they asserted that Hussein was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program. Speaking to a group of Wyoming Republicans in September, Cheney said the United States now had “irrefutable evidence” that Iraq possessed thousands of tubes made of high-strength aluminum, tubes. He said they were destined for clandestine Iraqi uranium centrifuges. That was the only “evidence” that the Bush administration could brandish of Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. (New York Times, October 3, 2004)

Yet, one year earlier in 2001, National Security Advisor Rice’s staff had been told that the government’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons. The experts at the Energy Department believed the tubes were likely intended for small artillery rockets. Nevertheless, the Bush administration embraced the disputed theory that the tubes were for nuclear centrifuges. (New York Times, October 3, 2004)

Bush also alleged that Hussein held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists that included three top gas centrifuge experts. However, they were not employed in the area of manufacturing nuclear weapons. One scientist operated a copper factory which extracted graphite from oil and a mechanical engineering design center at Rashidiya. (Washington Post, August 10, 2003)

In August, Rice appeared on CNN’s Late Edition and claimed that Hussein was “actively pursuing a nuclear weapon” and that the tubes -- described repeatedly in United States intelligence reports as “dual-use’ items -- were only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. … There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons, but we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” (Washington Post, August 10, 2003)

In a nationally televised address on October 7, Bush maintained that Iraq had attempted to import hardened aluminium tubes “for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.” (New York Times, October 8, 2002)

Powell described the use of such tubes for rockets as an implausible hypothesis, even after American analysts collected and photographed in Iraq a virtually identical tube marked with the logo of the Medusa’s Italian manufacturer and the words, in English, “81mm rocket. (Washington Post, August 10, 2003)

However, experts in the field of gas centrifuge consulted by the United States government and said repeatedly for more than one year that the aluminum tubes were not suitable or intended for uranium enrichment. An anonymous official said the “diameter, thickness, and other technical specifications” of the tubes -- precisely the grounds for skepticism among nuclear enrichment experts -- showed that they were “intended as components of centrifuges.” (New York Times, September 8, 2003)

David Albright, a physicist and former United Nations weapons inspector, who was consulted on the purpose of the aluminum tubes, said it was far from clear that the tubes were intended for a uranium centrifuge. Albright, who headed the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington think tank, said: “There’s a catfight going on about this right now. On one side you have most of the experts on gas centrifuges. On the other you have one guy sitting in the CIA.”

Albright said skeptics at the Energy Department’s Lawrence Livermore national laboratory in California had been ordered to keep their doubts to themselves. He quoted a colleague at the laboratory as saying: “The administration can say what it wants and we are expected to remain silent.”

3. URANIUM FROM NIGER – JOSEPH WILSON AND VALERIE PLAME

The Bush administration hoped to use the claim that Saddam was seeking to buy “yellowcake” uranium from Niger as justification to march to war. However, the White House was warned by two European intelligence agencies that such evidence did not exist. Furthermore, agencies within the United States intelligence community for the most part concluded that the information was bogus.

But Bush ignored the warnings. War was inevitable.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION. Since mid-2001, the French spy service Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure began repeatedly warning the CIA in secret communications that there was no evidence to support the allegation that Saddam was trying to procure “yellowcake” uranium from Niger. (Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2005)

The French spy service reached its conclusions after extensive on-the-ground investigations in Niger and other former French colonies, where the uranium mines were controlled by French companies. (Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2005)

Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure was contacted by the CIA in the summer of 2001 -- shortly before 9/11 -- as intelligence services in Europe and North America became more concerned about chatter from known terrorist sympathizers. CIA officials asked their French counterparts to check that uranium in Niger and elsewhere was secure. (Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2005)

Twice in 2002, the CIA contacted the French again for similar help. By mid-2002, the request was more urgent and more specific. The CIA was asking questions about a particular agreement purportedly signed by Nigerian officials to sell 500 metric tons of uranium to Iraq. (Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2005)

The head of Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure dispatched a five- or six-man team to Niger to double-check any reports of a sale or an attempt to purchase uranium. The team found none. His staff noticed that the details of the allegation matched those in fraudulent documents that an Italian informant earlier had offered to sell to the French. (Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2005)

THE ITALIAN CONNECTION. The director of France’s Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure, the country’s spy service, also tried to warn the CIA that there was no evidence to support Bush’s claim that Saddam was trying to purchase “yellowcake” from Niger. (Agence France Presse, December 12, 2005)

The CIA sought France’s help in 2001 and 2002, because French firms dominated the uranium business internationally and former French colonies led the world in production of the strategic mineral. As a result, France was particularly interested in Bush’s claim that Saddam had tried to obtain nuclear materials from its former colonies.

The Italian intelligence service, SISME, helped produce the forged documents delivered to the United States embassy in Rome in early October 2003 that purported to show a deal with Niger to buy uranium. SISME provided the CIA with three separate intelligence reports that Iraq had reached an agreement with Niger to buy 500 tons of yellow cake uranium (October 15, 2001; February 5, 2002; and March 25, 2002; Tom Paine Common Sense, October 19, 2005)

The forged documents of Niger’s uranium, originated with the Italian government. Nicolo Pollari, chief of Italy’s military intelligence service. He fabricated the story that Iraq sought yellowcake in 2001 and 2002. (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

In 2001, Polari attended secret meeting with three employees of the Office of Special Plans, Harold Rhode, Michael Ledeen and Larry Franklin. Franklin subsequently pleaded guilty to passing information about United States policy towards Iran to Israel through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

The purpose of the meetings, which violated protocol because the CIA was in attendance, was to set up direct contact between the Pentagon and Iranian dissidents. One Iranian in attendance was arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar. The CIA believed Ghorbanifar was a serial “fabricator” and forbade its officers from having anything to do with him. (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

Pollari met secretly in Washington D.C. on September 9, 2002, with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. Subsequently in 2005, Hadley was promoted to National Security Adviser. The meeting occurred at a critical moment in the White House campaign to convince Congress and the American public that war in Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam from developing nuclear weapons. . (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

One month later, the forged documents were cabled from the United States embassy in Rome to Washington after being delivered to embassy officials by an Italian reporter. (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

National Security Counsel spokesman Fredrick Jones said that during the Hadley-Pollari meeting, the subject of Iraq’s supposed uranium deal with Niger is not believed to have come up. Jones described the meeting as “a courtesy call that lasted fewer than 15 minutes.” He added, “No one present has any recollection of ‘yellowcake’ being discussed.” (American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

THE CIA AND DIA. The CIA’s report, Iraq: Nuclear-Related Procurement Efforts, quoted many of the Italian report’s claims, but added that the report of a completed deal was not corroborated by any other sources. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

After talks with senior Nigerien officials and French executives in the uranium mining operations, along with a still wider investigation by the embassy, including the CIA, Wilson reported back that there is no evidence of such dealings, and no reason to suspect them.

On February 5, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report including “verbatim text” of an agreement, supposedly signed July 5 and 6, 2000 for the sale of 500 tons of “yellowcake” per year. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also corroborated the allegation that Saddam was seeking “yellowcake.” On February 12, 2002, the agency concluded: “Iraq is probably searching abroad for natural uranium to assist in its nuclear weapons program.” Cheney read this report and asked for the CIA’s analysis. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

In February 2002, Cheney heard “about the possibility of Iraq trying to acquire uranium from Niger,” according to what his chief of staff Scooter Libby later told Time magazine. In his daily intelligence briefing by the CIA, as Libby related, Cheney asked about “the implication of the (Niger) report.”

VALERIE PLAME AND JOSEPH WILSON. A few days later, Cheney through Libby asked the CIA to look into the matter further. The agency had no experts in Niger, so it asked a mid-level CIA veteran named Valerie Plame. She was working under “NOC” or “non-official cover” for the CIA’s Directorate of Operations -- as an employee for a front called Brewster-Jennings & Associates.

Responding to inquiries from Cheney’s office, the State Department, and the Defense Department, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations’ Counterproliferation Division (CPD) sought more information. They considered having Joseph Wilson, Plame’s husband, return to Niger to investigate.

Wilson had served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad between 1988 and 1991. Then he was named ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. From there, Wilson was assigned political adviser to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Europe. It was at this time that he met Valerie Plame who was living in Brussels.

In June 1977, Wilson returned to Washington to serve as senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. Plame moved back to the United States in part because the CIA suspected her name was leaked to the Russians. They were married on April 3, 1998. (Vanity Fair, January 2004)

Wilson left government service to open a consulting firm specializing in assisting international investment in Africa. He arrived in Niger in 1999 on behalf of the CIA with the mission of investigating “uranium-related matters” with Iraq.

One of Plame’s colleagues later told Senate investigators that she “offered up his (Wilson) name for the trip. She said that her agency made the decision and she only later approached her husband on the CIA’s behalf. Plame wrote a memo to a superior saying, “My husband has good relations with both the PM (prime minister) and the former Minister of Mines, both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

On February 19, 2002, Wilson met with officials from CIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. According to a State Department intelligence analyst’s notes, the meeting was convened by Plame. He said the United States embassy in Niger and European intelligence agencies had already disproved the story of an Iraqi purchase. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

Despite State Department objection, the CIA decided to go ahead with the Wilson mission to satisfy the Cheney’s request. Wilson was sent to CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia for an orientation. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

One week later, Wilson arrived in Niger. After a few days of interviews, he concluded that “it was highly unlikely that anything was going on.” Wilson reported back to two CIA officers at his home. Plame was present but did not participate. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004)

On February 24, the United States ambassador in Niger met with Marine General Carlton Fulford, deputy commander of the United States-European Command, which was responsible for military relations with sub-Saharan West Africa. Fulford then met with Niger’s president and other senior officials and afterward confirmed the ambassador’s earlier findings that there was no evidence of the sale of “yellowcake” to Iraq and that Niger’s uranium supply was “secure.”

Around the same time, Wilson met with several Nigerien officials and sources over a ten-day visit and they likewise denied the uranium charge. On March 5, Wilson returned to Washington and briefed the CIA. That information was forwarded to Rice, Powell, and Cheney.

In the spring of 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld established the Office of Special Plans, under the direction of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. Rumsfeld believed the CIA, FBI, and other agencies “failed” to find existing evidence of Iraq’s WMD and Saddam’s ties to al Qaeda. So Rumsfeld directed Wolfowitz to gather and interpret its own “intelligence” on Iraq.

BUSH IGNORES WARNINGS – CLAIMS SADDAM WAS ATTEMPTING TO PROCURE URANIUM FROM NIGER. The intelligence community as a whole did not put much credibility in the reports about the Niger-Iraq connection. Officials repeatedly told policy makers that these reports were not reliable. Intelligence agencies also dismissed as unreliable reports from Great Britain, which also were derived from the faulty Italian intelligence reports. (Tom Paine Common Sense, October 19, 2005)

In closed-hearing testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 26, Powell referred to “reports” of an Iraqi purchase of Nigerien uranium as “further proof” of Saddam’s WMD.

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released on October 1, 2002. It stated in part that Niger planned to send several tons of “pure uranium” to Iraq, possibly up to 500 tons a year. “We do not know the status of this arrangement,” the NIE said. The Office of Special Plans seized on the NIE report to lobby for war.

In late 2002, the assumption of the Niger-Iraq uranium connection began to appear regularly in the President's Daily Brief, the CIA intelligence briefing which was also drafted under the influence of the Office of Special Plans.

But these warnings were ignored by hawks in the administration. Hadley was told three separate times by the CIA not to push the claim that Saddam was seeking “yellowcake.” Another CIA memo sent to Hadley the following day warned that the Africa uranium story was one of two issues that differed with the British intelligence that claimed Saddam was after uranium.

The written warning was accompanied by a phone call to Hadley from Tenet requesting that any reference to Iraq’s attempt to purchase uranium be deleted from a speech the president gave in Cincinnati in October. Bush said there was “facing clear evidence of peril. … We cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. The earlier draft -- with a reference to an Iraqi purchase of 500 tons of uranium from Niger -- was dropped. White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett and Hadley acknowledged that the CIA intervened to remove references to the African uranium charge. (Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2003; American Progress Action, November 1, 2005)

By now, the State Department concluded that the sale of “yellowcake” was “unlikely.” The report said that a variety of economic, diplomatic, and logistical obstacles precluded Saddam from obtaining nuclear materials. The State Department’s intelligence analysts also concluded that it would have required Niger to send “25 hard-to-conceal 10-ton tractor-trailers” filled with uranium across 1,000 miles and at least one international border. (New York Times, January 18, 2006)

The State Department’s report also said that Niger was “probably not planning to sell uranium to Iraq,” in part because France controlled the uranium industry in the country and could block such a sale. It also cast doubt on an intelligence report indicating that Niger’s president, Mamadou Tandja, might have negotiated a sales agreement with Iraq in 2000. According to the report, Tandja and his government were reluctant to do anything to endanger their foreign aid from the United States and other allies. The State Department review also said it would be nearly impossible for Niger to deliver 500 tons of uranium even if the sale were attempted. The review said, “Moving such a quantity secretly over such a distance would be very difficult, particularly because the French would be indisposed to approve or cloak this arrangement.” (New York Times, January 18, 2006)

Despite all these misgivings, Bush still went ahead and claimed in the February 2003 State of the Union that Iraq tried to buy “yellowcake” from Niger: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

Two weeks later, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told the Security Council that, after a “thorough analysis” with “concurrence of outside experts,” that the Italian documents were not authentic. (Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq, March 2003)

On March 7, the State Department finally hands over to the IAEA copies of the Niger letters. United Nations experts promptly dismissed them as “not authentic” and “blatant forgeries.” The following day, a State Department spokesman acknowledged that the United States government “fell for it. It was the information that we had. We provided it.”

On June 8, Rice admitted that Bush had used a forged document in his State of the Union speech to prove Iraq represented a nuclear threat. (Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2003; July 21, 2003) The following month, Bush absolved himself of any responsibility by shifting the blame on Tenet. (New York Times, July 11, 2003)

On July 11, Tenet conceded that the State of the Union claims about Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa were a mistake and that the “16 words should never have been included in the text written for the president.”

REVEALING PLAME’S IDENTITY. On May 6, 2003, a New York Times columnist wrote the first account of Wilson’s trip, but not naming him: “I’m told by a person involved in the Niger caper that more than a year ago the vice president’s office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal, so a former U.S. ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger. In February 2002, that envoy reported to the CIA and State Department that the information was unequivocally wrong.” (New York Times, Op-ed, May 2003)

On May 29, Libby allegedly requested information from Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman regarding Wilson’s trip to Niger. The State Department provided Libby with a report on the trip. Libby was told for the first time that the ambassador is Wilson, according to a federal indictment of Libby that was released by the Office of the Special Counsel in October 2005.

The following month, British parliamentary inquiry concluded otherwise, delivering a scathing critique of Blair’s role in promoting the story. With no ally left, the Bush administration discussed whether it should abandon the uranium claim, and so it became embroiled in a debate as to who was responsible for the error. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

At about the same time, State Department intelligence officials reportedly prepared a memo on the Niger affair mentioning Wilson’s trip to Niger and Plame’s role in selecting her husband for the mission. The memo identified her as the wife of Wilson. Neither did it cite her status as a covert agent nor use the name Valerie Plame. According to one account, the memo was classified and the paragraph containing information about Valerie Wilson was marked with “(S)” to indicate that the information was classified at the “secret” level. (New York Times, July 16, 2005; Bloomberg.com, July 18, 2005; Washington Post, July 21, 2005; Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

On June 9, documents from the CIA allegedly were faxed to the office of the Vice President, and were addressed to Libby. They documented Wilson’ trip to Niger, without mentioning Wilson by name. The documents were marked as classified. Libby or somebody else in his office wrote the names “Wilson” and “Joe Wilson” on the documents. (Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

Two days later, Libby allegedly speaks with a “senior CIA officer” about Wilson ’s trip and his wife. The officer confirmed that Wilson ’s wife was employed by the CIA and was believed to have been involved in planning the trip. Grossman also spoke with Libby, allegedly advising him that Wilson ’s wife did work at the CIA and that State Department personnel were saying that she played a part in organizing Wilson ’s trip to Niger. (Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

The New Republic (June 19, 2003) published “The Selling of the Iraq War: The First Casualty.” The article mentioned an unnamed ambassador (Wilson) was sent to Niger per the request of the Vice President’s office delivered via the CIA. The article quoteed the unnamed ambassador as saying the administration “knew the Niger story was a flat-out lie.” It also accused the Bush administration of suppressing dissent from the intelligence community regarding pre-war intelligence.

After the story is published, Libby allegedly spoke with his principal deputy on the phone and says that public disclosure of information rebutting the article’s claim that the Vice President sent Wilson could cause problems at the CIA. (Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

New York Times reporter Miller interviewed Libby on June 23. She later said that during the interview Libby “placed blame for intelligence failures on the CIA,” accusing them of “selective leaking.” Libby also mentioned Wilson ’s wife to Miller for the first time. (New York Times, October 16, 2005.)

On July 6, Wilson published “What I Didn’t Find in Africa” in the New York Times, identifying himself for the first time as the unnamed “envoy.” He wrote, “I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq 's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.”

Contrary to later statements by White House officials, Wilson did not claim that Cheney sent him on the Niger trip, only that he was sent to answer questions from Cheney’s “office.” He also did not claim that Cheney was told of his findings, only that it would be “standard operating procedure” for the CIA to brief Cheney’s office on the results of his mission. (New York Times July 6, 2003)

On July 7, Secretary of State Powell reportedly received a copy of the State Department memo prepared in June about the purported Niger-Iraq uranium deal, which mentioned Plames’s role in her husband’s trip. (New York Times, July 2005; Wall Street Journal, July 2005)

On July 8, conservative columnist Robert Novak of the Chicago Sun-Times reportedly called Rove. Novak told Rove he had heard that Wilson’s wife, who worked for the CIA, played a role in his trip to Niger. Rove confirmed the story to Novak without mentioning Plame’s name or covert status, saying “I heard that, too.” (New York Times, July 2003)

Four days later, Libby allegedly met with the Counsel to the Vice President David Addington and asked what paperwork the CIA would have if an employee’s spouse traveled overseas. Libby was also advised by the Assistant to the Vice President for Public Affairs Catherine Martin, who had spoken with “another government official,” that Wilson ’s wife worked for the CIA. (Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

Cheney, in a conversation with Libby in July, reportedly described Wilson’s CIA-sponsored trip to Niger. There was no evidence to suggest Libby made any such disclosure with Cheney's knowledge. But according to Libby’s grand jury testimony, Cheney “specifically directed” Libby in late June or early July 2003 to pass information to reporters from two classified CIA documents: an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate and a March 2002 summary of Wilson’s visit to Niger. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

The decision by Cheney and Libby to share this information with reporters was disproved months before. United Nations inspectors had exposed the main evidence for the uranium charge as crude forgeries in March 2003, but the Bush administration and British Prime Minister Blair maintained they had additional, secret evidence they could not disclose. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

Around the same time, Libby allegedly spoke with a White House senior official - referred to as “Official A” in the indictment. That official was widely reported to be Rove. The official allegedly told Libby that earlier that week he had a conversation with Novak and that they had discussed Wilson’s wife, her employment at the CIA, and her involvement in Wilson’s trip to Niger. The official also advised Libby that Novak would be writing a story about Wilson’s wife. (Washington Post. November 3, 2005; Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

In July, Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper called Rove, who cautioned him to be careful of Wilson ’s story. “’Don’t get too far out on Wilson,’ he told me.” Rove allegedly later told Cooper that Wilson ’s wife worked for the CIA on WMD and that it was she, not Cheney or the CIA’s director, who was “responsible” for sending Wilson to Africa. Cooper said that Rove never used her name. ((Matthew Cooper, “What I Told the Grand Jury, Time, July 2005)

That same month, Libby and Cheney flew to Norfolk, Virginia. The vice president allegedly advised Libby that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA. Libby believed that Cheney received that information from the CIA. Then Libby spoke by telephone with Cooper about Wilson’s wife and confirmed for Cooper that he was aware of her involvement in sending Wilson to Niger. Later that day, Libby discussed Wilson’s wife and her work for the CIA with Judith Miller of the New York Times. (Patrick Fitzgerald, Department of Justice, October 28, 2005)

NOVAK IDENTIFIES VALERIE PLAME. Novak’s story of Plame’s CIA identity broke on July 14. Writing in the Chicago Sun-Times, Novak wrote: “Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me Wilson’s wife suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report. The CIA says its counter-proliferation officials selected Wilson and asked his wife to contact him.” The column did not describe her as a covert agent, then, but it does name her as “Valerie Plame.” (Novak, “The Mission to Niger,” July 2003)

It was not until more than three years later that the identity of the leak was revealed. In September 2006, Michael Isikoff and David Corn claimed Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State in 2003, was the missing link in exposing Plame’s identity. Armitage told several reporters about her role with the CIA. With one month of these allegations, Armitrage himself acknowledged that he had been the “leaker.” (Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War; New York Times, September 4, 2006)

On October 3, 2003, Secretary of State Powell received an urgent phone call from Armitage who had just read Novak’s column that exposed Plame’s identity. According to Isikoff, Armitage immediately knew that he was the “leaker” and told Powell, “I’m sure he’s (Novak’s) talking about me.” (Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War)

Within hours, William Howard Taft IV, the State Department’s legal adviser, notified a senior Justice official that Armitage had information relevant to the case. The next day, a team of FBI agents and Justice prosecutors investigating the leak questioned Armitage who acknowledged that he had passed along to Novak information contained in a classified State Department memo that Wilson’s wife worked on WMD issues at the CIA. The memo made no reference to her undercover status. (Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War)

Novak was not the only person Armitage talked to about Plame. Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward also said he was told of Plame’s identity in June 2003. According to three government officials, a lawyer familiar with the case and an Armitage confidant, Armitage told Woodward about Plame three weeks before talking to Novak. (Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War)

The Plame leak was part of a broader White House effort to mislead and manipulate United States public opinion as part of an orchestrated effort to go to war. The Bush administration organized and executed a disinformation campaign from intelligence that was manufactured by the Italians. Policymakers, such as Cheney, Rice, and Rumsfeld ignored intelligence analysts’ reports that Saddam was not after Niger’s yellow-cake. (Tom Paine Common Sense, October 19, 2005)

On July 17, Cooper wrote “A War by Wilson?” in Time. Cooper quoted “government officials” as saying “that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These officials have suggested that she was involved in her husband’s being dispatched Niger (sic) to investigate reports that Saddam Hussein’s government had sought to purchase large quantities of uranium ore.”

Five days later, in article headlined “Columnist Blows CIA Agent's Cover,” Newsday published a story as saying, based in part on Wilson’s assertions, that senior administration officials “violated the law and may have endangered her (Mrs. Wilson’s) career and possibly the lives of her contacts in foreign countries.” The newspaper said Wilson would not confirm that his wife was a covert agent.

After two and one-half years of silence, Novak acknowledged for the first time that he identified three confidential administration sources during testimony in the CIA leak investigation. He said he did so because they had granted him legal waivers to testify and because Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald already knew of their role. (Washington Post, July 12, 2006)

In early 2004, Novak said he told Fitzgerald that Rove and CIA spokesman Bill Harlow had confirmed for him, at his request, information about Plame. Novak said he also told Fitzgerald about another senior administration official who originally provided him with the information about Plame, and whose identity he refused to reveal. (Washington Post, July 12, 2006)

THE WHITE HOUSE DEFENDS ITSELF. A White House official said that Rove was rebuked by an angry Bush after the president learned of his role. This came shortly after the Justice Department informed the White House that a criminal investigation had been launched. (New York Daily News, October 18, 2005)

On October 7, 2003 -- after rebuking Rove -- Bush said, “I mean this town is a -- is a town full of people who like to leak information. And I don’t know if we’re going to find out the senior administration official. … This is a large administration, and there’s (sic) a lot of senior officials. I don’t have any idea. I’d like to. I want to know the truth.” (New York Daily News, October 18, 2005)

But Rove told Bush and others that he never engaged in an effort to disclose a CIA operative’s identity to discredit her husband’s criticism of the administration’s Iraq policy, according to people with knowledge of Rove’s account in the probe. (Associated Press, October 18, 2005)

Since Plame’s exposure, the White House line had been: “No one wants to get to the bottom of this investigation more than the President of the United States. (White House Press Release, October 6, 2004) Yet, Bush apparently failed to even demand that White House officials sign documents permitting reporters to reveal the contents of any discussions they had regarding Plame.

Reacting to the leak, Bush of all people mandated that high-level White House officials attend an ethics class. Neither Bush nor Cheney attended. The class was led by White House counsel Harriet Miers who had just withdrawn her name as a Supreme Court justice nominee.

Bush continued to condemn leaks of classified information and promised that anyone involved in such improprieties would be prosecuted. But according to Libby, it was Bush himself who ordered the leak. Libby testified before a grand jury that Cheney told him to pass on information. Libby said it was Bush who authorized the disclosure. (Washington Post, April 6, 2006)

October 7, 2003: “I’ve constantly expressed my displeasure with leaks, particularly leaks of classified information.”

September 30, 2003: “I don’t know of anybody in my administration who leaked classified information. If somebody did leak classified information, I’d like to know it, and we'll take the appropriate action.”

September 30, 2003: “There are too many leaks of classified information in Washington. “If there is a leak out of my administration, I want to know who it is. And if the person has violated law, the person will be taken care of. … I have told our administration, people in my administration to be fully cooperative. I want to know the truth. If anybody has got any information inside our administration or outside our administration, it would be helpful if they came forward with the information so we can find out whether or not these allegations are true and get on about the business.”

October 28, 2003: I’d like to know if somebody in my White House did leak sensitive information.”

October 28, 2003: “I want to know the truth. …I have no idea whether we'll find out who the leaker is, partially because, in all due respect to your profession, you do a very good job of protecting the leakers.”

June 10, 2004: Reporter: “Do you stand by your pledge to fire anyone found to have done so?”

Bush: “Yes. And that’s up to the U.S. Attorney to find the facts.”

August 18, 2005: “If someone committed crime, they will no longer work in my administration.”

White House spokesman Scott McClellan also denied any White House leaks. He dismissed the idea that Rove was Novak’s anonymous source as “totally ridiculous.” (White House Press Briefing, September 16, 2003) On September 29, 2003, McClellan said he had spoken to Rove and he had denied he was involved in the leak. McClellan added, “If anyone in this administration was involved in it (the leak), they (sic) would no longer be in this administration.” (White House Press Briefing, September 29, 2003)

McClellan also denied that Rove was implicated in leaking Plame’s name. On October 1, McClellan said, “There’s an investigation going on.” He also spoke openly about Rove, saying, “It’s simply not true that he was involved in leaking classified information. ”Yet, when evidence suggested that Rove was the source of the leak, McClellan changed directions. In July 2005, McClellan said that while the investigation is ongoing, “the White House is not going to comment on it.” (Washington Post, July 13, 2005)

Soon after the leak was made public, McClellan was asked questions at the White House press briefing on September 29, 2003:

Q: You said this morning, quote, “The president knows that Karl Rove wasn’t involved.” How does he know that?

A: Well, I’ve made it very clear that it was a ridiculous suggestion in the first place. ... I’ve said that it’s not true. ... And I have spoken with Karl Rove.

Q: It doesn’t take much for the president to ask a senior official working for him, to just lay the question out for a few people and end this controversy today.

A: Do you have specific information to bring to our attention? ... Are we supposed to chase down every anonymous report in the newspaper? We’d spend all our time doing that.”

Q: When you talked to Mr. Rove, did you discuss, “Did you ever have this information?”

A: I’ve made it very clear, he was not involved, that there's no truth to the suggestion that he was. (Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2005)

McClellan was asked more questions at a press briefing on October 7, 2003:

Q: You have said that you personally went to Scooter Libby (Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff), Karl Rove and Elliott Abrams (NSC official) to ask them if they were the leakers. Is that what happened? Why did you do that? And can you describe the conversations you had with them? What was the question you asked?

A: Unfortunately, in Washington, D.C., at a time like this there are a lot of rumors and innuendo. There are unsubstantiated accusations that are made. And that’s exactly what happened in the case of these three individuals. They are good individuals. They are important members of our White House team. And that’s why I spoke with them, so that I could come back to you and say that they were not involved. I had no doubt with that in the beginning, but I like to check my information to make sure it’s accurate before I report back to you, and that’s exactly what I did. (Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2005) Three days later-- on October 10, 2003 -- McClellan was asked more questions about the leak:

Q: Earlier this week you told us that neither Karl Rove, Elliot Abrams nor Lewis Libby disclosed any classified information with regard to the leak. I wondered if you could tell us more specifically whether any of them told any reporter that Valerie Plame worked for the CIA?

A: I spoke with those individuals, as I pointed out, and those individuals assured me they were not involved in this. And that’s where it stands.

Q: So none of them told any reporter that Valerie Plame worked for the CIA? A: They assured me that they were not involved in this.

Q: They were not involved in what?

A: The leaking of classified information. (Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2005)

At a White House press conference in 2003, McClellan told reporters that Rove and Libby were “not involved” in the leak involving Plame. Four years later, McClellan conceded, “There was one problem. It was not true. I had unknowingly passed along false information. And five of the highest-ranking officials in the administration were involved in my doing so: Kark Rove, Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney, Bush’s chief of staff Andrew Card, and Bush himself.” (Scott McClellan, What Happened)

McClellan’s flat denials gave way to a steady drumbeat of “no comment.” And Bush’s original pledge to fire anyone involved in the leak became a promise to fire anyone who “committed a crime.” (Scott McClellan, What Happened)

At a June 27, 2005 White House press briefing, a journalist began to ask what specific steps Bush had taken to get to the bottom of the leak. McClellan interrupted him mid-sentence and directed all questions to the special prosecutor. (White House Press Release, June 27, 2005)

After the Cooper e-mail from Rove was released in July 2005, McClellan appeared at another press conference. He noted 23 times yesterday that he could not comment because there was an “ongoing investigation.” But McClellan previously had cited on several occasions that same investigation and then gone on to answer the questions as they pertained to Rove. (New York Times, July 12, 2005)

Two weeks later – on July 11, 2005 – McClellan was the target of more questions at a press briefing:

Q: Do you want to retract your statement that Rove, Karl Rove, was not involved in the Valerie Plame expose?

A: I appreciate the question. This is an ongoing investigation at this point. The president directed the White House to cooperate fully with the investigation, and as part of cooperating fully with the investigation, that means we're not going to be commenting on it while it is ongoing.

Q: But Rove has apparently commented, through his lawyer, that he was definitely involved.

A: You’re asking me to comment on an ongoing investigation. Q: I’m saying, why did you stand there and say he was not involved?

A: Again, while there is an ongoing investigation, I’m not going to be commenting on it nor is …

Q: Any remorse?

A: Nor is the White House, because the president wanted us to cooperate fully with the investigation, and that’s what we’re doing. (Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2005)

Since the fall of 2003, high-level White House officials denied they had knowledge of who leaked Plame’s identity. Bush was asked on June 10, 2004 whether he stood by his pledge to “fire anyone” involved in the leak case. He answered, “Yes.” Bush also had said, “When the president says something, he better mean it.” (New York Times, June 11, 2004)

DICK CHENEY’S POWER TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS. Libby accused his “superior” (Cheney) of authorizing the leak. But perhaps Cheney declassified that information. Bush’s unprecedented executive order in 2003 gave vice presidents the authority to declassify documents.

Eight years before the Plame leak -- on April 17, 1995 -- President Clinton issued Executive Order, 12958 that specified the president had classification authority. Eight years later on March 25, 2003, Bush signed Executive Order 13292 that focused first and foremost on the president, but also included the vice president. (National Review, February 16, 2006)

Executive Order 12958 under Clinton stated: “(1) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by the president; and (2) by agency heads and officials designated by the president in the Federal Register.”

In the Bush order, that section was changed to: “(1) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by the president and, in the performance of executive duties, the vice president; and (2) agency heads and officials designated by the president in the Federal Register.”

In another part of the original Clinton order, there was a segment dealing with who was authorized to delegate the authority to classify material. In the Clinton order, the passage read: “ ‘Top Secret’ original classification authority may be delegated only by the President or by an agency head or official designated; (2) ‘Secret’ or ‘Confidential’ original classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated.”

In the Bush order, that segment was changed to read: “(1) ‘Top Secret’ original classification authority may be delegated only by the president; in the performance of executive duties, the vice president; or an agency head or official designated...

(3) “Secret” or “Confidential” confidential classification authority may be delegated only by the president; in the performance of executive duties, the vice president; or an agency head or official designated.”

Both executive orders contained extension sections defining the terms used in the order. One of those terms was “original classification authority;” that is, who in the government has the power to classify documents.

In the Clinton order, the definition read: “ ’Original classification authority’ means an individual authorized in writing, either by the president, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the president.”

In the Bush executive order, the definition was changed to read: “’Original classification authority’ means an individual authorized in writing, either by the president, the vice president in the performance of executive duties, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the president.”

THE FBI BEGINS ITS INVESTIGATION. Libby was interviewed by FBI special agents on October 14 and then on November 26. He allegedly told them that he received information on Plame from NBC’s Tim Russert and that he did not recall having learned about her from Cheney.

Libby also said he did not discuss Wilson’s wife with Miller and that he told Cooper that reporters were telling the administration that Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA but that he did not know if it was true.

Refusing to invoke an independent counsel, Bush said Attorney General Ashcroft “can do a good job” in investigating the criminal activity. Rove had served as a consultant to Ashcroft and had campaigned for him beginning in 1985 in both his gubernatorial and senatorial bids in Missouri. Rove also had lobbied for Ashcroft’s nomination as attorney general. (San Francisco Chronicle, September 30, 2003)

Finally on December 30, Ashcroft recused himself from the investigation because of a conflict of interest. Rove had served as a consultant to Ashcroft and had campaigned for him beginning in 1985 in both his gubernatorial and senatorial bids in Missouri. Rove also had lobbied for Ashcroft’s nomination as attorney general. (San Francisco Chronicle, September 30, 2003)

PATRICK FITZGERALD. In the mid-1990s, Fitzgerald began his career in law with the United States attorney’s office in Manhattan. He gained respect by successfully prosecuting mobsters such as Gambino. Fitzgerald also indicted Osama bin Laden and brought in convictions of the blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of the terrorists who bombed the United States embassies in Africa.

After transferring to Chicago’s United States attorney’s office, Fitzgerald was labeled “Eliot Ness with a Harvard Law degree” when he indicted Governor George Ryan, a Republican, and two aides to Mayor Richard Daley, a Democrat.

On July 18, 2005, Bush said he would fire anyone who leaked: “If someone committed a crime, they will no longer work in my administration.” (Press conference with the Prime Minister of India, July 18, 2005) But McClellan was not succinct, declining to say whether a firing would be triggered by an indictment or would require a conviction. (White House Press Briefing, July 18, 2005)

FITZPATRICK’S INTERVIEW WITH BUSH. As a result of Wilson’s revelation that Saddam never sought “yellowcake” from Niger, Bush took a personal interest in discrediting the former ambassador, according to people familiar with the president’s interview with Special Prosecutor Fitzpatrick. (National Journal, July 3, 2006)

Bush reportedly told Fitzpatrick on June 24, 2004 that he directed Cheney to discredit Wilson after the latter’s allegations that the administration had misrepresented intelligence information to make the case to go to war. (National Journal, July 3, 2006)

Bush was very anxious to use classified information to counter Wilson’s charges, telling the vice-president: “Let’s get this out.” However, the president told investigators that he never directed anyone to disclose Plame’s identity. (National Journal, July 3, 2006)

Bush also said during his interview with prosecutors that he had never directed anyone to disclose the identity of Plame. Bush said he had no information that Cheney had disclosed Plame’s identity or directed anyone else to do so. (National Journal, July 3, 2006)

REFUSING TO INDICT KARL ROVE. The Bush administration was hit by a bombshell in July 2005, when Newsweek reported that Rove indeed had spoken about the leakage. An e-mail sent by Matt Cooper of Time on July 11, 2003 revealed that Rove did disseminate classified information. The e-mail stated, “It was, KR (Karl Rove) said, Wilson’s wife, who apparently works at the agency on WMD issues who authorized the trip.” (Newsweek, July 18, 2005)

Cooper’s e-mail contradicted Rove’s previous denial that he “had any knowledge” of who in the White House leaked the classified, covert identity of Plame. It also disputed earlier assertions by the White House that Rove was not involved in the outing of the agent and forces Bush to come to terms with his previous pledge to take this action “very seriously” and “hold someone to account.” (Newsweek, July 18, 2005)

In September 2003. Rove was asked if he “had any knowledge” of who had leaked Plame’s name or if he himself had done it. Rove simply answered, “No.” Then one and one-half years later -- on July 4, 2005 -- Rove appeared on CNN and slightly amended his previous statement. He said, “I’ll repeat what I said to ABC News when this whole thing broke some number of months ago. I didn’t know her name and didn't leak her name.” (CNN, July 4, 2005)

Rove’s defense was that he never used the name “Plame.” Instead, he referred to her as “Wilson’s wife.” Rove insisted on speaking to Cooper only on “double super secret background.” (National Review, July 12, 2005)

In the summer of 2006 -- after a three-year investigation, -- Fitzpatrick elected not to indict Rove. The decision came despite a July 2003 conversation between Rove and Cooper -- a conversation that Rove insisted be kept on “deep background.” Rove instructed Cooper, “Don’t get too far out on Wilson.” Rove then gave out classified information when he identified Valerie Plame as Wilson’s wife who “works at the agency on WMD.” (Time, July 25, 2006)

Additionally, Rove told Cooper that further information discrediting Wilson and his findings would soon be declassified and ended the phone conversation by saying, “I’ve already said too much.” Rove also confirmed Plame’s identity to Novak. That came one week before Novak published the column that exposed Plame. (New York Times, July 15, 2005)

JUDITH MILLER. Judith Miller of the New York Times was subpoenaed by Fitzgerald to testify before the grand jury as to her knowledge of the case. However, she refused to divulge the identity of the person who, she claimed, had identified the source of the Plame leak. As a result, in the summer of 2005, Miller was convicted of obstruction of justice and was incarcerated for nearly three months.

After her release from prison, Miller claimed she had been given permission to speak publicly of her source. She suggested that Libby might have obstructed justice during the course of the investigation. In 2004, according to an account by Miller, Libby’s lawyer Joseph Tate sought assurances from Miller’s lawyer Floyd Abrams that Miller’s testimony would exonerate his client. Abrams described his conversation with Tate to Miller: “When I wouldn’t give him an assurance that you would exonerate Libby, if you were to cooperate, he then immediately gave me this, ‘Don’t go there, or, we don’t want you there.’ ” This was a denial that a conversation ever occurred. (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

Miller also believed that Libby wrote to her in September in an effort to influence her testimony. Libby wrote, “The public report of every other reporter’s testimony makes clear that they did not discuss Ms. Plame’s name or identity with me.” (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

Miller said the letter surprised her because “it might be perceived as an effort by Mr. Libby to suggest that I, too, would say we had not discussed Ms. Plame’s identity. Yet my notes suggested that we had discussed her job.” (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

In two instances, Miller wrote the name of Wilson’s wife in her notes. Miller was sure they did not come from Libby, but “can’t remember” anything else about where she learned the information. Miller wrote, “As I told Mr. Fitzgerald, I simply could not recall where Flame (sic) came from, when I wrote it or why the name was misspelled.” (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

When the Wall Street Journal pressed Miller on the issue, she said, “I don’t remember who told me the name.” She grew agitated and said, “I wasn’t writing a story, remember?” When the reporter asked Miller if she had spoken about the issue to Rove, she replied, “I’m not going to discuss anyone else that I talked to.” (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

Miller’s account was contradicted by her own lawyer. Floyd Abrams minimized Miller’s assertion that another source may have given her the name ‘Valerie Flame.’ Abrams said others might have mentioned Plame only in passing. (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

Miller wrote that, during an interview, Libby asked “to modify our prior understanding that I would attribute information from him to a 'senior administration official.” During the discussion of Wilson, Libby asked to be described as a “former hill staffer.” Miller agreed and Libby then proceeded through a lengthy and sharp critique of Wilson that included the role of Plame. (Washington Post, October 18, 2005)

SCOOTER LIBBY’S INDICTMENT. On October 31, 2005, Libby was indicted on five counts: one count of obstruction of justice, two counts of making false statements, and two counts of perjury. Nobody was charged with leaking Plame’s name to the press.

ccording to Libby’s grand jury testimony, Cheney “specifically directed” Libby in late June or early July 2003 to pass information to reporters from two classified CIA documents: an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate and a March 2002 summary of Wilson’s visit to Niger.

Lawyers for Libby repeatedly questioned whether Plame really had covert status when her identity was exposed by in July 2003. But Fitzgerald found that Plame had indeed done “covert work overseas” on counter-proliferation matters over the previous five years. Fitzgerald also determined that the CIA “was making specific efforts to conceal” her identity. (Newsweek, February 13, 2006)

A legal brief filed for Libby in March 2006 said that “certain officials at the CIA, the White House, and the State Department each sought to avoid or assign blame for intelligence failures relating to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.” (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

It was at that moment that Libby, allegedly at Cheney’s direction, sought out at least three reporters to bolster the discredited uranium allegation. Libby made careful selections of language from the 2002 estimate, quoting a passage that said Iraq was “vigorously trying to procure uranium” in Africa. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

The first of those conversations, according to the evidence made known thus far, came when Libby met with Bob Woodward of the Washington Post on June 27, 2003. In sworn testimony for Fitzgerald, according to a statement Woodward released on November 14, 2005, Woodward said Libby told him of the intelligence estimate’s description of Iraqi efforts to obtain “yellowcake” from Niger. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

Libby’s next known meeting with a reporter, according to Fitzgerald’s office, was with Judith Miller of the New York Times on July 8, 2003. Libby spoke again to Miller, and to Time magazine’s Matt Cooper on July 12. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

Libby’s grand jury testimony drove a wedge between himself and Cheney. Libby testified that he had been “authorized” by Cheney and other White House “superiors” in the summer of 2003 to disclose classified information to journalists to defend the Bush administration’s use of prewar intelligence in making the case to go to war with Iraq. Libby specifically claimed that in one instance he had been authorized to divulge portions of a highly classified National Intelligence Estimate regarding Saddam’s purported efforts to develop nuclear weapons. (New York Times, February 10, 2006)

Although Cheney did not testify to the grand jury under oath, he was interviewed under oath by Fitzgerald in 2004. Cheney was reportedly asked last year whether he knew of any concerted effort by White House aides to name the officer. (New York Times, October 25, 2005)

When Wilson alleged that it was Cheney’s office that did a “work-up” on him in 2003 in order to smear him, a spokesman in Cheney’s office responded, “That is false.” (American Progress Action, October 25, 2005)

When Cheney was asked about his involvement in smearing Wilson on Meet the Press, the vice president said, “I don’t know Mr. Wilson.” But Libby’s notes revealed that Cheney knew about Wilson and his wife a month before Novak outed her. (American Progress Action, October 25, 2005)

In November 2005, Washington Post Assistant Managing Editor Bob Woodward told Fitzgerald that he had discussed Plame with a senior administration official. Woodward said the official was someone other than Libby. (Washington Post, November 29, 2005)

At the same time, Time reported Viveca Novak was called to testify. This came after Luskin, Rove’s attorney, told Fitzgerald about a conversation he had with her. Luskin presented evidence, including details of his own conversations with Novak, to Fitzgerald at a secret meeting at a downtown law office shortly before Libby was indicted. (Washington Post, November 29, 2005)

In April 2006, Fitzgerald for the first time described a “concerted action” by “multiple people in the White House” -- using classified information -- to “discredit, punish or seek revenge against” a critic of President Bush's war in Iraq. Citing grand jury testimony from Libby, Fitzgerald placed Cheney at the center of that campaign to divulge Plame’s identity. (Washington Post, April 9, 2006)

LIBBY’S TRIAL AND CONVICTION. In January 2007, Libby’s trial began with charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. It was an embarrassment to the Bush administration. Libby did not plan the war, but he did enable the administration to set out on that course. He was the facilitator. (New York Times, January 16, 2007)

Libby helped assemble a dossier on Saddam and unconventional weapons and ties to al Qaeda for Secretary of State Powell’s speech to the United Nations on February 5, 2003. Cheney fought to keep in the speech evidence that Powell found questionable. It was Libby, at Cheney’s direction, who repeatedly spoke to reporters to rebut Joe Wilson’s accusation that Saddam was NOT acquiring “yellow cake” uranium from Niger. (New York Times, January 16, 2007)

According to the 2004 grand jury audiotapes played at the trial, Libby said he learned about a CIA officer from Cheney. Then Libby claimed he forgot it but learned again from NBC News reporter Tim Russert a month later. (New York Times, February 6, 2007)

The explanation that Libby offered Cheney was virtually identical to one that Libby later told the FBI and testified to before the 2004 grand jury. Libby said he had only passed along to reporters unsubstantiated gossip about Plame that he had heard from Russert. (National Journal, February 20, 2007)

When the trial commenced in January 2007, notes of Libby’s entered into evidence during his trial indicated that Libby learned that Plame was a CIA officer from Cheney during a June 12, 2003 telephone conversation, almost a month before Libby spoke with Russert. In addition, a senior aide to Cheney testified during Libby’s trial that, after learning herself from a senior CIA official that Plame worked for the CIA, she shared that information with both Cheney and Libby during a meeting she had with both men. And Cheney himself told the special prosecutor that he regularly shared any information he learned about Plame with Libby as well. (National Journal, February 20, 2007)

Libby later told very much the very same story he told Cheney during two FBI interviews in the fall of 2003 and later during two appearances before the federal grand jury hearing evidence in the CIA leak case on March 5, 2004 and March, 24, 2004. (National Journal, February 20, 2007)

Libby’s assertion that the information came from Russert and was only gossip was central to his claims that he did nothing wrong because, if he instead had learned the information from government officials, he might be in trouble for leaking classified information. (National Journal, February 20, 2007)

At Libby's trial, several government witnesses -- among them an under secretary of State, a senior CIA official, Libby's CIA briefing officer, and a senior aide to Cheney -- said they informed Libby that Plame was a CIA officer. (National Journal, February 20, 2007)

Additionally, during Libby’s trial, his testimony to the 2004 grand jury contradicted that of former White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. Testifying under immunity, Fleischer said Libby told him over lunch on July 7, 2003 that the wife of a critic of Bush’s Iraq policy worked for the CIA. This was three days before he told a grand jury that he first learned her name. (New York Times, January 29, 2007)

Fleischer said he had lunch with in the White House mess that Monday, July 7, and that they had a general conversation before Libby brought up the subject of Plane. Fleischer testified that Libby said, ”She works at the CIA’ she works in the counter-proliferation division.” (New York Times, January 29, 2007)

The following day, New York Times journalist Judith Miller testified that Libby disclosed the identity of a CIA gent to her more than two weeks before Libby had said he learned of the agent’s identity. Miller said that Libby made the disclosure to her in a June 23, 2003, meeting in the Old Executive Office Building, near the White House. (New York Times, January 30, 2007)

Miller said that Libby was “agitated and frustrated and angry” during the meeting, because he thought the CIA was beginning to “back-pedal to try to distance itself” from discredited assessments of Iraq’s weapons capabilities in the buildup to the American-led military campaign. (New York Times, January 30, 2007)

Miller testified that Libby told her that the CIA was waging “a perverted war of leaks.” Earlier, she had told a grand jury that on June 23, Libby discussed how “a clandestine guy” had gone to Africa in the winter of 2002 to investigate reports that Iraq was trying to buy uranium from Niger to further its nuclear programs. Then, according to Miller, Libby began to refer to the “clandestine guy” by name – Joseph Wilson. (New York Times, January 30, 2007)

In March, Libby was convicted of lying to the FBI and the grand jury about his role in the leak. The trial portrayed Cheney as more intimately involved in orchestrating the campaign to slam Wilson. Testimony and evidence revealed that the vice president dictated precise talking points he wanted Libby and other aides to use to rebut Wilson’s accusations against the White House. Cheney helped select which journalists would be contacted and worked with Bush to declassify secret intelligence reports on Iraqi weapons that he believed would contradict Wilson’s claims. (Washington Post, March 6, 2007)

But because Libby refused to tell the whole truth, the public still did not Cheney’s full role. For example, Libby destroyed a note from Cheney about their conversations about how the vice president wanted the Wilson matter handled. Perhaps more important, this case offered a glimpse of the lengths to which Cheney went to push faulty intelligence about the Iraq war to the American people. (Washington Post, March 6, 2007)

Testimony by Catherine Martin, who was Cheney’s top press aide at the time illustrated how doggedly the vice president insisted that the administration had significant evidence that Iraq was trying to acquire WMD. This came even after the White House had backed off that claim and admitted it was not solid enough for the president to have cited it in his 2003 State of the Union address. Cheney also told Martin to alert the media that a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) indicated no doubts about Iraq’s efforts to buy “yellowcake,”.even though intelligence analysts concluded that the uranium claim was never a key finding of the NIE and that there were doubts about it. (Washington Post, March 6, 2007)

Wilson and Plame said that Cheney, Rove, and other administration officials knowingly lied and abused their power to get revenge. In July 2006, Wilson and his wife filed a civil lawsuit accusing Cheney, Rove, Libby, and other unnamed government officials of violating their constitutional rights, invading their privacy, endangering their children and ruining their careers. (Washington Post, July 14, 2006)

In June, Libby was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for lying to a grand jury and FBI. Additionally, he was fined $250,000. (New York Times, June 5, 2007)

The following month, Bush acknowledged for the first time that “somebody” in his administration leaked the name of an undercover intelligence officer but declined to say whether he was disappointed in such an action and contended that it was time to move on. (Washington Post, July 13, 2007)

Libby never served a day in prison for his felony convictions of perjury and obstruction of justice. In July, Bush commuted his 2.5 year prison sentence just hours after an appeals court ruled that he could not delay serving his jail time.

4. IRAQI DRONES

In September 2002, Bush claimed that Iraq was building a fleet of drones that were capable of reaching American soil. He said Iraq’s drones were capable of disseminating chemical and biological weapons on American troops, if Bush were to launch an invasion. Bush claimed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) “could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. … We’re concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States. (Washington Post, October 22, 2002)

Florida Democratic Senator Bill Nelson said the Bush administration told him and 75 other senators on October 7, 2002 that Iraq not only had WMD, but it had the means to deliver them to East Coast cities. Nelson said the senators were told Iraq had both biological and chemical weapons, notably anthrax, and it could deliver them to cities along the Eastern seaboard via unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones. (Florida Today, December 15, 2003)

American military experts confirmed that Iraq had been converting eastern European trainer jets, known as L-29s, into drones, but said that with a maximum range of a few hundred miles they were no threat to targets in the United States. “It doesn’t make any sense to me if he meant United States territory,” said Stephen Baker, a retired United States Navy rear admiral who assessed Iraqi military capabilities at the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. (The Guardian, October 9, 2002; MSNBC, September 11, 2003)

5. IRAQ’S TIES TO AL QAEDA

The Bush White House hoped to link al Qaeda to Saddam and use that connection to sell his war. However, captured Iraqi documents and intelligence interrogations of Saddam and two former aides “all confirmed” that Saddam was not directly cooperating with al Qaeda before Bush’s invasion of Iraq. The report also gave details about the intelligence community’s prewar consensus that the Iraqi government and al Qaeda had only limited contacts. (Defense Department report; declassified in February 2007; New York Times, April 5, 2007)

The Bush administration based a crucial pre-war assertion about ties between Iraq and al Qaeda on detailed statements made by a prisoner while in Egyptian custody. But he later said he fabricated them to escape harsh treatment. (New York Times, December 9, 2005)

Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi provided his most specific and elaborate accounts about ties between Iraq and al Qaeda only after he was secretly sent to Egypt by the United States in January 2002. (New York Times, December 9, 2005)

The Bush administration used Libi’s accounts as the basis for its prewar claims, no discredited, that ties between Iraq and al Qaeda included training in explosives and chemical weapons. (New York Times, December 9, 2005)

Libi later recanted after the American invasion of Iraq and that intelligence based on his remarks was withdrawn by the CIA in March 2004 had been public for more than one year. But American officials had not previously acknowledged either that Libi made the false statements in foreign custody or that he contended that his statements had been coerced. (New York Times, December 9, 2005)

On numerous occasions, Bush administration officials claimed that Saddam had links with al Qaeda. On July 30, 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld changed gears, saying, “Are there al Qaeda in Iraq? Yes.”

On September 11, 2003, the second anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Deputy Defense Sectretary Wolfowitz told ABC, “We know (Iraq) had a great deal to do with terrorism in general and with al Qaeda in particular and we know a great many of Bin Laden’s key lieutenants are now trying to organize in cooperation with old loyalists from the Saddam regime.” (ABC, September 11, 2003)

Rice accused Iraq of sheltering Al Qaeda members in Baghdad and helping Bin Laden’s operatives develop chemical weapons. “We clearly know that there ... have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al Qaeda. We know too that several of the (al Qaeda) detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al Qaeda in chemical weapons.” (PBS’ NewsHour, September 25, 2002)

On September 29, Rumsfeld reiterated Rice’s claims. The secretary of defense said, “We do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior-level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical- and biological-agent training.” Rumsfeld said reports of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda had been increasing since 1998. (New York Times, September 29, 2002)

In December, Bush claimed he received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq. The White House said government analysts suspected that the transaction involved the nerve agent VX and that a courier managed to smuggle it overland through Turkey. (Washington Post, December 12. 2002)

The next day Wolfowitz was forced to admit it. He told Associated Press that his remarks referred not to a “great many” of Bin Laden’s lieutenants but rather to a single Jordanian, Abu Musab Zarqawi. Wolfowitz conceded, “ should have been more precise.” (Associated Press, September 13, 2003)

Wolfowitz told a Senate committee on September 16 that there was no evidence of connections between Ansar al Islam and Saddam’s regime after the United States invasion. In addition, Vincent Cannistraro, formerly the CIA’s director of counter-terrorism operations and analyses, testified before the committee: “There was no substantive intelligence information linking Saddam to international terrorism before the war. Now we’ve created the conditions that have made Iraq the place to come to attack Americans.”

Cheney refused to rule out suggestions that Iraq was somehow to blame for 9/11. Throughout the war, he repeatedly claimed Saddam had harbored an al Qaeda leader and had ties to the group. But Cheney never conceded that his statement was in error. Yet in September 2006, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its report stating there was no connection between Saddam and al Qaeda. The report was only declassified because two liberal Republicans voted with the Democrats to release the findings.

After five years of claiming a direct or indirect connection between al Qaeda and Saddam, the Senate Intelligence Committee declassified documents of October 2005. Released one year later, the memos showed that the CIA had repudiated the claim that there were pre-war ties between Saddam and al Qaeda and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (New York Times, September 9, 2006)

The Senate report said that Saddam “was distrustful of al Qaeda and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime. It quoted a FBI report from June 2004 in which former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said in an interview that “Saddam only expressed negative sentiments about bin Laden.” (New York Times, September 9, 2006)

Saddam himself was quoted in an FBI summary as acknowledging that the Iraqi government had met with bin Laden but denying that he had colluded with the al Qaeda leader. Claiming that Iraq opposed only United States policies, Saddam said that “if he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the U.S., he would have allied with North Korea or China.” (New York Times, September 9, 2006)

Bush also hoped to convince Americans that a link existed between Saddam and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 2002, prior to marching off to war, Bush referred to a “very senior al Qaeda leader (al-Zarqawi) who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year.” After being arrested in Jordan in 2001 for his part in the “millennium plot” to bomb tourist sites, al-Zarqawi was released and eventually made his way to Iraq in search of medical treatment. However, intercepted telephone calls did not mention any cooperation with the Iraqi government.

Bush claimed Iraq was planning to provide WMD to terrorist groups. On October 7, 2002 – five months before he launched his war -- Bush warned that Iraq could provide WMD to terrorists. However, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) showed that at the time of Bush’s speech, the intelligence community was more concerned that, if attacked by the United States, Hussein might give weapons to al Qaeda terrorists. This never occurred.

None of the stories, that the Bush administration had trumped up, were credible. The CIA, FBI, and Czech intelligence concluded there was no evidence that a Prague meeting between September11 hijacker Mohamed Atta with an Iraqi intelligence official took place in the spring of 2000. (The Nation, September 11, 2002)

The State Department’s own annual study, Patterns of Global Terrorism, could not list any serious act of international terrorism connected to the government of Iraq. A CIA report indicated that the Iraqis were consciously avoiding any actions against the United States or its facilities abroad, presumably to deny Washington any excuse to engage in further military strikes against their country. (The Nation, September 11, 2002)

On June 16, 2004, the congressional 9/11 Commission issued its report, saying there was “no credible evidence” that Saddam’s government in Iraq collaborated with the al Qaeda terrorist network on any attacks on the United States. The 9/11 Commission concluded:

1. Although bin Laden briefly explored the idea of forging ties with Iraq in the mid-1990s, the terrorist leader was hostile to Saddam’s secular government, and Iraq never responded to requests for help in providing training camps or weapons. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

2. Al Qaeda originally envisioned as an even more spectacular assault involving 10 jetliners on the east and west coasts, but the plan was scaled back and was nearly derailed on several occasions by setbacks and squabbling among senior al Qaeda officials. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

3. The government of Sudan, which gave sanctuary to al Qaeda from 1991 to 1996, persuaded Bin Laden to cease supporting anti-Hussein forces and “arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda.” However, the contacts did not result in any cooperation. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

4. The date for the attacks was uncertain until weeks before they were carried out. There was evidence that as late as September 9, 2001 Mohamed Atta had not decided whether the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania would target the United States Capitol or the White House. One of the hijacking pilots apparently came close to abandoning the plot altogether. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

5. Cheney did not issue orders to shoot down hostile aircraft on September 11, 2001, until long after the last hijacked airliner had already crashed. The order was never passed along to military fighter pilots searching for errant aircraft that morning. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

6. Authorities with NORAD repeatedly misinformed the 9/11 Commission about its scrambling of fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. NORAD officials indicated at the time that the jets were responding to either United 93 or American Airlines 77, which struck the Pentagon. They were chasing “a phantom aircraft,” American 11, which had already struck the World Trade Center. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

7. Air defense agencies “were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never encountered and had never trained to meet.” (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

8. In one breakdown, American Airlines Flight 77, which was hijacked after taking off from Dulles International Airport, flew undetected by anyone for 36 minutes as it turned and headed back east toward the Pentagon. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

9. The FAA never asked for any military assistance or notified the military about either Flight 77 or United Airlines Flight 93 before they crashed. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

10. Bush and Cheney spoke via telephone before 10:10 a.m. or 10:15 a.m. Bush authorized Cheney to order jet pilots to shoot down hostile aircraft. Cheney’s general shoot-down orders were issued to NORAD at 10:31 a.m., but clear instructions were never passed along to pilots in the air. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

11. While White House officials believed the fighters circling above them had been instructed to ‘take out’ hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the Langley pilots were to ‘ID type and tail.’ ” (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

12. The Langley pilots were never told why they were scrambled or that hijacked commercial airliners were a threat. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

13. Cheney mistakenly informed Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that United States fighters had shot down a couple of hijacked aircraft on his orders. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

14. While visiting an elementary school in Florida at the time of the hijackings, Bush was first informed by presidential advisor Karl Rove that a small, twin-engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. Bush’s reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

15. Faced with advice from Cheney and the Secret Service that he not return to Washington immediately, Bush reluctantly agreed to board Air Force One and fly to a destination that had not yet been determined. (New York Times; Washington Post, June 17, 2004)

THE ASHCROFT TERRORIST CONNECTION. A 27-page “white paper” entitled “A Decade of Deception and Defiance” and released in the fall of 2002, made no mention of any links between Saddam and al Qaeda. However, the paper made a reference to Hussein’s backing of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an obscure Iranian dissident group that had gathered surprising support among members of Congress since 2000. (Newsweek, September 26, 2002)

The Clinton administration first designated the MKO a “foreign terrorist organization” in 1997. It accused the Baghdad-based group of a long series of bombings, guerilla cross-border raids and targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders. By 2000, the MKO consisted of an army of 30,000 people who operated inside Iraq. (Newsweek, September 26, 2002)

Back in the United States, the MKO operated under the name the National Council of Resistance of Iran. According to “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” one of the MKO’s supporters was Attorney General Ashcroft who became involved with the group while a Republican senator from Missouri. When the National Council of Resistance staged a September 2000 rally outside the United Nations to protest a speech by Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, Missouri’s two Republican senators -- Ashcroft and Chris Bond -- issued a joint statement of solidarity. A delegation of 500 Iranians from Missouri attended the MKO event. The group used a picture of a smiling Ashcroft at its rally to promote its cause on Capitol Hill. (Newsweek, September 26, 2002)

Also in 2000, Ashcroft wrote a letter to Attorney General Janet Reno protesting the detention of an Iranian woman, Mahnaz Samadi, who was a leading spokeswoman for the National Council of Resistance. INS agents had arrested Samadi at the Canadian border, charging her with failing to disclose her past “terrorist” ties as an MKO “military commander” -- including spending seven months in a MKO military-training camp inside Iraq -- when she sought political asylum in the United States several years earlier. (Newsweek, September 26, 2002)

Once Bush began to beat the war drums in anticipation of an attack on Iraq in 2002, Ashcroft began distancing himself from the MKO. The administration decided to emphasize the connections between MKO and the Hussein regime in Baghdad -- as well as an Iraqi-al Qaeda link. (Newsweek, September 26, 2002)

However, the American intelligence community was unable to develop a case tying Iraq to global terrorism at all, much less the attacks on the United States on September 11. None of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqi. In fact, 15 of the 19 were Saudi nationals. In addition, no al Qaeda’s money trail could be traced to Iraq.

Even former CIA counter-terrorism chief Vincent Cannistraro said there was no confirmed evidence of Iraq’s links to terrorism. And the CIA, FBI, and Czech intelligence concluded there was no evidence that a Prague meeting between September11 hijacker Mohamed Atta with an Iraqi intelligence official took place in the spring of 2000. (The Nation, September 11, 2002)

It was highly unlikely that the secular Ba’athist regime -- which had savagely suppressed Islamists within Iraq -- would be able to maintain close links with bin Laden and his followers. Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, his country’s former intelligence chief, had noted that Bin Laden viewed Hussein “as an apostate, an infidel, or someone who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim.” In fact, bin Laden offered in 1990 to raise an army of thousands of mujahedeen fighters to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

There were credible reports of extremist Islamist groups operating in northern Iraq, but these were exclusively within Kurdish areas, which had been outside Baghdad’s control since the end of the Gulf War. Iraq’s past terrorist links were limited to such secular groups as the one led by Abu Nidal, a largely defunct Palestinian faction opposed to Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization. Ironically, at the height of Iraq’s support of Abu Nidal in the early 1980s, Washington dropped Iraq from its list of terrorism-sponsoring countries so the United States could bolster Iraq’s war effort against Iran. Baghdad was reinstated to the list only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, even though United States officials were unable to cite increased Iraqi ties to terrorism.

6. CHARGING THAT IRAQ IS A MILITARY THREAT

Bush charged that Iraq could attack its Middle Eastern neighbors. Yet, Iraq’s armed forces were barely one-third their pre-Gulf War strength. Even though Iraq was not required to reduce its conventional forces, the destruction of its weapons and the country’s economic collapse had led to a substantial reduction in men under arms.

Iraq’s navy was virtually nonexistent, and its air force was just a fraction of what it was before the war. Military spending by Iraq was estimated at barely one-tenth of what it was in the 1980s. The Bush administration was unable to explain why in 2002 -- with Iraq at a tiny percentage of his once-formidable military capability -- was considered such a threat that war was mandatory.

7. DEMOCRATIZING IRAQ

Throughout the 2000 campaign, Bush promised on several occasions to pursue a “humble foreign policy” if elected president. He repeatedly said that he opposed nation building. On the day before the 2000 election, Bush launched his final attack on Al Gore. Bush said, “I’m worried about an opponent who uses nation building and the military in the same sentence.” (Time, November 24, 2003)

As president, Bush repeatedly claimed that, after Saddam would be toppled, democracy would be established in Iraq and eventually the rest of the Middle East would follow. Yet, all of the Middle Eastern nations -- except for the state of Israel -- had deep-seeded roots in right-wing authoritarian regimes. The establishment of democratic institutions in the Middle East had failed in nearly every country. Iraq was home to three diverse groups: Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites. The democratization of Iraq would lead to a nationalistic anti-American society in which American economic interests would be excluded.

While wars were waging in Afghanistan and Iraq, more violence erupted between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Bush falsely claimed that accused terrorist groups of trying to thwart democracy. Hamas -- which was responsible for some violence in Gaza -- won the Palestinian territory’s parliamentary elections. Hezbollah held a substantial minority of 30 seats in Lebanon’s parliament and was destined to win many more seats.

Bush said, “It’s in our interests that we help reformers across the Middle East achieve their objectives.” But who were these reformers? What were their objectives? And how could the United States effectively help them?

Bush claimed he wanted to help Lebanon’s democratic government survive. In August, he promised a $230 million aid package. But Secretary of State Rice pledged $50 million the week before. Neither compared with the $1 billion-plus than Iran funneled to the Hezbollah.

American history proved that Bush’s objective was impossible to achieve. Since World War II, the United States has toppled 23 countries. Subsequently, right-wing dictatorships were established. These included China 1945-46; Korea 1950-53; China 1950-53; Guatemala 1954; Indonesia 1958; Cuba 1959-60; Guatemala 1960; Congo 1964; Peru 1965; Laos 1964-73; Vietnam 1961-73; Cambodia 1969-70; Guatemala 1967-69; Chile 1970-73; Grenada 1983; Libya 1986; El Salvador 1980s; Nicaragua 1980s; Panama 1989; Iraq 1991-2003; Sudan 1998; Afghanistan 1998 and 2001; and Yugoslavia 1999.

Part of the Arab Middle East unsuccessfully tested democratic institutions in the 20th century. Both the French and British tried to create liberal democracies that would protect and promote their interests in the region. However, the political systems could never overcome European colonialism.

British mandates created at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Iraq and Jordan fell under the jurisdiction of London. Both countries became a de jure constitutional monarchy with political parties, an elected parliament, and a liberal constitution. But the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 established Britain autonomy over Iraq’s foreign affairs, economy, and education system.

Local politics in Iraq were controlled by the countries’ merchant, industrial, and landowning elites. But poverty and illiteracy prevented the masses from gaining political influence. The ruling elite remained sectarian, because political power was mainly held by Arab Sunni families from Baghdad in a country with a Shi’ite majority and a large Kurdish minority. These sharp ethnic divisions precipitated political instability, forcing the country to be dependent on their former colonial master for survival.

American companies received large concessions to exploit Iraq’s oil resources, while a few families of the local elite owned most of the country’s fertile land. Popular protests about poverty and the corruption of the state were usually channeled through nationalist political organizations such as the Ba’athist party.

Bush obviously ignored Iraq’s history of strong nationalism and authoritarianism, when he called for the democratization of Iraq. A large chunk of Iraqis demanded the withdrawal of American troops after the toppling of the Hussein regime. Iraqis feared that the United States would follow its past economic ventures by exploiting their countries’ natural resources.

Furthermore, Iraqis knew well that in a truly democratic Iraq, the Shi’ites, who made up the majority of the population, would control politics. This would mean closer ties with Iran that would be unacceptable to the Bush administration. In addition, if the Bush administration allowed the Kurds to have considerable influence in Iraq, that would be unacceptable to Turkey.

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research report expressed doubt that installing a new regime in Iraq would foster the spread of democracy. The report indicated significant divisions within the Bush administration over his so-called “democratic domino theory.” (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2003)

In July 2004, the National Intelligence Counsel spelled out “a dark assessment of prospects for Iraq.” The estimate outlined three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war. The most favorable outcome described was an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic, and security terms. (New York Times, September 16, 2004)

Yet, Bush said on August 5, “Iraq is on the path to lasting democracy and liberty.” (The White House, August 5, 2004)

On August 24, Cheney told voters in Iowa that “We’re moving in the right direction (in Iraq.)” (The White House, August 24, 2004) Rumsfeld said Iraqis were “working at making a success out of that country. ... And I think they’ve got a darned good crack at making it.” (U.S. Department of Defense, September 14, 2004)

Wolfowitz said that Iraq could be “the first Arab democracy” and that even modest democratic progress in Iraq would “cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran but across the whole Arab world.” (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2003)

Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, said that a reformed Iraq “has the potential to transform the thinking of people around the world about the potential for democracy, even in Arab countries where people have been disparaging of their potential.” (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2003)

As one studied the Middle East, it was obvious that Bush was dead wrong when he promised that a democratic Iraq would lead to other pluralistic societies in the region. Bush even acknowledged that he had no historical curiosity. So it was evident that he failed to understand the Middle Eastern Arab nations that were largely led by monarchies and authoritarian governments.

Egypt. President Mubarak allowed a contested presidential election in 2005. But he delayed municipal elections by two years after the Muslim Brotherhood made large gains in parliamentary elections later that year. In December 2005, an Egyptian court sentenced the political opposition leader Ayman Nour to five years in prison on charges that had been widely viewed as politically motivate.

Jordan. Since Bush launched his war on Iraq, King Abdullah II made a political change that weakened the possibility of democratization.

Qater. During the war in Iraq, parliamentary elections in Qatar were postponed to 2007.

Yemen. Yemen’s government cracked down on the news media ahead of presidential elections in 2006. That intimidated journalists who had been considered overcritical of the government.

Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah denied elections in the Consultative Council. In 2006, the Saudi government arrested Muhsin al-Awaji, a government critic.

Bahrain. The Sunni-dominated authoritarian state did allow municipal and parliamentary elections in 2006. But it was only to prevent members of the Shia minority from gaining any foothold in the government. (New York Times, April 9, 2006)

8. PROMISING THAT IRAQI OIL WILL PAY FOR BUSH’S WAR

Another promise to gain support for the invasion was the assertion that Iraqi oil would provide adequate funds for Bush’s war. During the Saddam era, 2.5 million barrels were being pumped daily. But then oil production plummeted.

According to the International Energy Agency, Iraqi oil production continued to plummet. By 2005 – nearly three years into the war – its output dropped by 8 percent to 1.83 million barrels. That was almost half the 3 million barrels envisaged by the Bush administration three years earlier at the outset of the war. (Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2006)

Because of the pipeline attacks, exports to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea via Iraq’s northern pipeline averaged only 40,000 barrels a day in 2005, compared with an 800,000-barrel-a-day average reached during some months before the war. (Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2006)

In July 2005, Iraqi officials said attacks had cost the nation $11 billion in revenue. Kidnappings and killings of oil officials -- the oil minister barely escaped an assassination attempt in October 2005 -- and of oil field workers slowed down the pace of repairs. In January 2006, two German engineers were kidnapped from the Bayji refining complex 125 miles north of Baghdad. (Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2006)

9. LYING ABOUT DESTROYING AMERICAN COMPUTERS

Bush attempted to hype up American and global support for a war with claims that Hussein was capable of dealing a major blow to the American economy. According to retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardner, Bush falsely claimed that Iraq had the capability of destroying major American computer systems. (MSNBC, October 2, 2003)

910 HOW PRIME MINISTER BLAIR WAS SUCKED INTO BUSH’S WAR

BUSH’S SECRET WAR IN 2002 AND 2003. General Michael Moseley, one of the commanders during the Iraq war, briefed American and British officers that coalition aircraft waged a secret war prior to the Bush invasion. On July 17, 2003, Moseley said that allied raids took place under cover of patrols of the southern “no-fly zone.” Their purpose was ostensibly to protect the ethnic minorities. (Britain’s Sunday Times, June 26, 2005)

A leaked memo detailed a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Blair and attended by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary, and Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of Defence staff, indicated that the United States was carrying out the bombing. (Britain’s Sunday Times, June 26, 2005)

Moseley said that in 2002 and early 2003, allied aircraft flew 21,736 sorties and dropped more than 600 bombs on 391 “carefully selected targets” before the war officially started.

The bombings began four and one-half months before Congress abdicated war-making power to Bush. Moseley said the bombing raids “laid the foundations” for the American invasion in the spring of 2003. (Britain’s Sunday Times, June 26, 2005)

THE DOWNING STREET MEMO. In a March 12, 2002 memorandum, labeled “secret -- strictly personal,” Blair's chief foreign policy advisor, David Manning, described to Blair a dinner he had had with Rice. (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Manning wrote, “We spent a long time at dinner on Iraq. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your (Blair’s) support and has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was different from anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option. (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Manning told Blair that given Bush’s eagerness for British backing, the prime minister would have “real influence” on the public relations strategy, on the issue of encouraging the United States to go first to the United Nations and on any United States military planning. Manning said it could prove helpful if Hussein refused to allow renewed United Nations weapons inspections. (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Manning wrote Blair, “The issue of weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that would persuade Europe and wider opinion that the U.S. was conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal basis. Renewed refusal by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument.” (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Four days after the Manning memo, Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador in Washington, wrote to Manning about a lunch he had with Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Meyer said in the memo that he had told Wolfowitz that United Nations pressure and weapons inspections could be used to trip up Hussein. (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Meyer wrote that he had argued that Bush could go to war alone. “But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through the need to wrong-foot Saddam on the inspectors and the Security Council resolutions and the critical importance of the Middle East peace process as an integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skillfully, we were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.” (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

Another memo, from British Foreign Office political director Peter Ricketts to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on March 22, 2002, stated that the case against Hussein was weak, because the Iraqi leader was not accelerating his weapons programs and there was scant proof of links to al Qaeda. Ricketts wrote, “What has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs, but our tolerance of them post-11 September. Attempts to claim otherwise publicly will increase skepticism about our case. … U.S. scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and al Qaeda is so far frankly unconvincing.” (Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2005)

After Blair’s April meeting with Bush, the prime minister got nervous about his pledge to support war. So he sent the chief of British intelligence, Richard Dearlove, to Washington to sound out his counterpart: CIA Director Tenet.

Dearlove returned to London on July 23. He told Blair:

“Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy.” (London’s Sunday Times, May 1, 2005)

Tenet was reluctant to receive Dearlove, but acquiesced when the British made it clear that Blair considered the back-channel meeting urgent. According to James Risen, author of State of War, Tenet then quoted a former senior CIA official who claimed: “The quality of the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction didn’t really matter.” -- since war was inevitable.

A former CIA official told Risen that after the conversation with Tenet, Dearlove could certainly “figure out what was going on; plus, the MI6 station chief in Washington was in CIA headquarters all the time, with just about complete access to everything.” (James Risen, State of War)

Also in April, Blair made his decision to support Bush in his imminent war, when the two met Crawford, Texas in April 2002. According to the secret Blair memo, Blair said, “The UK would support military action to bring about regime change.” Blair set one condition. Efforts must be made to try to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through weapons inspectors and to form a coalition and “shape” public opinion. (London Sunday Times, May 01, 2005)

Thus, it was clear for the first time that Blair was signed up to oust Saddam by force if other methods failed. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. This presented a problem because there were no clear legal grounds for war. Bush had refused to sign on to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on July 1, 2002, because Americans could be charged with war crimes. (London Sunday Times, May 01, 2005)

In April, Foreign Minister Straw told MPs in London that no decisions about military action “are likely to be made for some time.” Then Blair said in the Commons: “We will ensure the house is properly consulted.” On July 17 he told MPs: “As I say constantly, no decisions have yet been taken.” (London Sunday Times, May 01, 2005)

Six days later, Blair met with John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. Scarlett said, “Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action.” But Scarlett said Saddam did not pose a threat by his alleged WMD. (London Sunday Times, May 01, 2005)

Blair claimed that he was a restraining influence on Bush as plans were being made to march off to war. But according to British human rights lawyer Philippe Sands, professor of Law at London University, Blair offered his total support for the war at a secret White House summit. The two world leaders decided to go to war regardless of whether they obtained United Nations backing. (Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

THE JANUARY 2003 MEETING. Less than two months before going to war -- on January 31, 2003 -- Bush and Blair privately met for two hours at the White House. Bush made clear to Blair that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons. This fait accompli to march off to war was confirmed in a confidential memo by David Manning, Blair’s top foreign policy adviser. The five-page stamped “extremely sensitive” memo was circulated among a handful of Blair’s most senior aides. (New York Times, March 27, 2006)

Manning wrote: “Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning. The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March. This was when the bombing would begin.” (New York Times, March 27, 2006)

The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after the Bush-Blair meeting, Secretary of State Powell was scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons. (New York Times, March 27, 2006)

At their meeting, Bush and Blair candidly expressed their doubts that chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons would be found in Iraq in the coming weeks. Bush also said, “The U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam’s WMD.” (New York Times, March 27, 2006)

Bush spoke as if an invasion was unavoidable. The two leaders discussed a timetable for the war, details of the military campaign and plans for the aftermath of the war. (New York Times, March 27, 2006)

The prime minister urged Bush to seek a second United Nations resolution giving specific backing for the war. The meeting was attended only by Blair, his Downing Street foreign policy adviser Sir David Manning, Bush National Security Adviser Rice, plus an official note-taker. (Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

The two leaders were worried by the lack of hard evidence that Saddam had broken United Nations resolutions. But privately, they hoped or were convinced that he had. Bush and Blair met in Washington on January 31, 2003. Other participants in the meeting were National Security Adviser Rice; her deputy, Dan Fried; Chief of staff Andrew Card; Blair’s Security Adviser Sir David Manning’ his foreign policy aide Matthew Rycroft; and his Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell. (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Bush spoke about provoking a war with Saddam by flying a United States spyplane over Iraq bearing United Nations colors. Bush hoped this would entice the Iraqis to shoot at it, giving Bush justification to go off to war. (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Bush said, “The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colors. If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach.” He added: “It was also possible that a defector could be brought out who would give a public presentation about Saddam’s WMD, and there was also a small possibility that Saddam would be assassinated.” (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

The leaders also discussed the prospects for a second resolution, but Bush said: “The U.S. would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even threaten.” But he had to say that “if ultimately we failed, military action would follow anyway.” Bush added that he had a date, March 10th pencilled in for the start of military action. The war actually began on March 20. (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Blair replied that he was “solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam.” But he also insisted that “a second Security Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with the Arabs.” (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

There was also a discussion of what might happen in Iraq after Saddam had been overthrown. Bush said that he “thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups.” Blair did not respond. (Britain’s The Independent, February 3, 2006; Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Immediately afterward the January 2003 meeting, the two leaders gave a press conference in which a nervous-looking Blair claimed the meeting had been a success. Bush gave qualified support for going down the United Nations route. (Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Observers noted the awkward body language between the two men. Bush never planned to obtain a genuine endorsement to go to war. Bush was only going through the motions. And Blair not only knew it, but he went along with it. (Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

Britain’s former ambassador to Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer was excluded from the private session between Blair and Bush. Meyer was puzzled by Blair’s behavior when the two leaders emerged to join other aides. Blair refused to comment perhaps because he had just committed himself to going to war no matter what the United Nations did. (Philippe Sands, Lawless World)

In June 2005, Blair traveled to Washington to discuss his priorities -- global warming and economic relief for poor nations in Africa. He was the main link in Bush’s coalition in Iraq, and the American president could have reciprocated and supported him. But instead Bush only shunned him.

It was no surprise that Bush offered no help to Blair to tackle humanitarian problems. And it was no surprise that Blair appeared unhappy with the response he received from Bush. At their joint press conference, Blair was unsmiling and appeared subdued. (Boston Globe, June 8, 2005)

Blair’s ambitious plan was to double aid to Africa to $50 billion. It would have freed 18 countries, most of which were in Africa, from any obligation to repay the estimated $16.7 billion they owed the international lenders. The debts would be written off by the lenders in an effort to allow the debtor countries to start fresh. They could eventually be able to borrow again for economic development, health, education, and social programs, -- rather than simply to repay existing loans. (New York Times, June 9, 2005)

The United Nations estimated that combating root causes of humanitarian problems in Africa would require an additional $3.5 billion in aid. The international forum appealed for a total of $4.5 billion in resources for humanitarian emergencies in Africa, to help 44 million people obtain basic human requirements of food, water, shelter, health care, and sanitation. (Inter Press, June 9, 2005)

Some 4.8 million children in sub-Saharan Africa died before the age of five every year -- nine deaths per minute -- accounting for 45 percent of all child deaths in the world. Africa is also the only region where the number of child deaths is rising. Of 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 10 have actually gone backward since 1990, while another 19 countries progressed so slowly that the target on child mortality would be missed by more than 35 years. (Inter Press, June 9, 2005)

Studies by the World Bank, the IMF, and several expert commissions said it would work. The world’s major donors pledged their support. But the one hold-out was Bush who said the United States would chip in $674 million. But this amount already had been approved by Congress. (New York Times, June 8, 2005; Inter Press, June 9, 2005)

BLAIR IS WARNED OF BUSH’S INCOMPETENCE. Two months after Bush marched off to his war -- in the spring of 2003 -- senior British diplomatic and military staff gave Blair explicit warnings that the Bush administration was disastrously mishandling the occupation of Iraq. John Sawers, Blair’s envoy in Baghdad, sent a series of confidential memos to Downing Street in May and June 2003. The memos were entitled “What’s Going Wrong,” written on May 11. They cataloged numerous failures by the Bush administration:

One memo read, “No leadership, no strategy, no coordination, no structure, and inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis.”

1. The United States’ administration in Iraq, led by General Jay Garner, was “an unbelievable mess. … Garner and his top team of 60-year-old retired generals were well-meaning but out of their depth.”

2. A series of Bush administration failures led to the eventual insurgency and anarchy.

3. General Tommy Franks lacked interest in the post-invasion phase.

4. The United States Third Infantry Division in Baghdad took a heavy-handed approach to security.

5. The Bush administration squandered an opportunity to gain the sympathy of Iraqis.

6. The Bechtel Corporation moved too slowly to reconnect basic services -- such as electricity and water.

7. The Bush administration failed to deal with health hazards, such as 40 percent of Baghdad’s sewage pouring into the Tigris and rubbish piling up in the streets.

8. There was no attempt to prevent sacking by many members of Saddam’s Ba’thist Party, even though many of them held relatively junior posts. (The Guardian, March 14, 2006)

In January 2008, the British government declassified a 32-page document that originally was used to justify going to war in Iraq. It was written by the director of communications at the Foreign Office who cited intelligence sources to state that Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and could easily use them since it had done so before. (Reuters, February 18, 2008)

Yet the document, amended in the margins, makes no mention of Saddam being capable of launching WMD within 45 minutes, a false claim later used in another government dossier to make the case for going to war. (Reuters, February 18, 2008)

Britain had sought to prevent Williams’ draft being released because it argued that those who drafted policy documents should not fear that their ideas might end up being made public. But a freedom of information tribunal eventually ruled against them and in early 2008 ordered the draft to be released. (Reuters, February 18, 2008)