LOSING SUPPORT FOR WAR IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD

AN AMBIGUOUS FOREIGN POLICY. Bush came to office expressing his opposition to nation-building. Two years later, it appeared that he still was not concerned with the future of the world. He waited until the latter part of 2002 to assemble a national security team to make final plans for administering and democratizing Iraq if Hussein was ousted.

While many Europeans and Arabs continued to urge Bush to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict his first priority for the region, the president continued to claim that the upheaval of Hussein as the key to peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Where democracy was alien to a vast majority of the Middle Eastern countries, Bush envisioned a “free and peaceful Iraq” that would serve as a “dramatic and inspiring example” to the entire Arab and Muslim. He claimed that a democratic Iraq would stabilize influence in the Middle East and even help end the Arab-Israeli conflict. (New York Times, February 27, 2003)

But Bush rarely attempted to sell that idea to the American people. In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, he described an undertaking that resembled American efforts in post-World-War-II Japan and Germany.

Bush’s plans called for a heavy American military presence in the country for at least 18 months, military trials of only the most senior Iraqi leaders, and quick takeover of the country's oil fields to pay for reconstruction. (New York Times, January 5, 2003)

A civilian administrator -- perhaps designated by the United Nations -- ran the country’s economy, rebuilt its schools and political institutions, and administered aid programs. Placing those powers in non-military hands, administration officials hoped, would quell Arab concerns that a military commander would wield the kind of unchallenged authority that General Douglas MacArthur exercised as supreme commander in Japan.

Only key senior officials of the Hussein government “would need to be removed and called to account,” according to an administration document summarizing plans for war trials. People in the Iraqi hierarchy who helped bring down the government mighty be offered leniency.

The administration plan said, “Government elements closely identified with Hussein’s regime, such as the revolutionary courts or the special security organization, would be eliminated, but much of the rest of the government would be reformed and kept.”

While publicly saying Iraqi oil would remain what one senior official called “the patrimony of the Iraqi people,” the administration continued to debate how to protect oil fields during the conflict and how an occupied Iraq would be represented in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, if at all. (New York Times, January 5, 2003)

Within one year of a series of failures in the reconstruction process, the Bush administration made several significant reversals:

1. The White House stubbornly insisted that it did not need more troops in Iraq. But later, 20,000 additional troops were added.

2. From the outset, the Bush administration refused to give the United Nations a key role in the reconstruction effort. But it turned to the international organization to form an interim government that took over on June 30.

3. The administration disbanded the Iraqi Army and de-Ba’athicized Hussein’s former party. But later the Bush White House turned to former Ba’athists to play a role in forming the new government.

In July 2004, the National Intelligence Counsel spelled out “a dark assessment of prospects for Iraq.” The estimate outlined three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war. The most favorable outcome described was an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic, and security terms. (New York Times, September 16, 2004)

Yet, Bush said on August 5, “Iraq is on the path to lasting democracy and liberty.” (The White House, August 5, 2004)

On August 24, Cheney told voters in Iowa that “We’re moving in the right direction (in Iraq.)” (The White House, August 24, 2004)

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said Iraqis were “working at making a success out of that country. ... And I think they’ve got a darned good crack at making it.” (United States Department of Defense, September 14, 2004)

In late 2004, the Pentagon’s Strategic Support Branch, designed to operate without detection and under Rumsfeld’s direct control, collected human intelligence (or HUMINT). Its recommendations were never publicized – not even given to Congress.

The group coordinated its efforts with the CIA while operating in Iraq and Afghanistan -- as well as in unnamed “friendly countries” with which the United States was not at war. The group worked with the United States Special Forces, such as Delta Force, as well as recruited outside agents, including “notorious figures” whose “links to the United States government would be embarrassing if disclosed.” (Washington Post, January 12, 2005)

By invading Iraq without a plan for stabilizing the country and with too few troops, the Bush administration created a haven for terrorists where none existed before.

In May 2004, the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies reported that “Al Qaeda’s recruitment and fundraising efforts had been given a major boost by the U.S. invasion of Iraq.” Bin Laden’s network commanded some 18,000 men, of which about 1,000 were inside Iraq. (Time, May 26, 2004)

SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES. George W. Bush continued to hear bad news through the fall and winter of 2002. During the summer, he saw his approval rating for war against continue to tumble, despite his continuous pleas to the American people that Hussein was an “evil” leader.

By the end of August, only 53 percent of Americans favored sending United States troops into Iraq, compared to 74 percent in November 2001. At the same time, European and Arab allies continued to drop their allegiance to the Bush administration. Even Britain, the European country usually closest to American foreign policy, said its aim in Iraq was to return United Nations weapons inspectors.

Only 20 percent of those surveyed said they would support the United States sending troops to Iraq even without support from its allies. A vast majority of the respondents, 83 percent, said they believed Iraq has or was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction and 86 percent said they believed Saddam supported terrorist groups.

Americans were evenly split over whether they think the United States would be at war with Iraq by the end of the year. (Reuters, August 23, 2002)

ording to the Los Angeles Times poll conducted in the late summer poll, over 50 percent of Americans said the economy -- rather than the war on terrorism -- was the most important issue in determining their vote for Congress. And Democrats opened a 44 percent to 38 percent advantage on the critical measure of which party could do a better job of handling the economy.

Thirty-seven percent said they were more likely to vote for a congressional candidate who would help Bush implement his agenda, compared with 17 percent who said they would be less likely. Forty-two percent said it would not affect their vote).

Sixty-seven percent said they approved of Bush’s overall job performance, and he received good grades on handling the terrorist threat (74 percent), foreign policy (61 percent), the economy (56 percent) and even corporate fraud (55 percent). Only for his handling of the federal budget, which had fallen back into deficit after four years of surpluses, did the president fall below majority support, with 48 percent.

Yet Bush’s scores on those measures were down from the stratospheric heights he reached in a Times poll in February. At that point, his overall approval rating hit 80 percent. (Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2002)

A CNN/Gallup poll published in mid-September found only 37 per cent of the public backed an invasion without the endorsement of a Security Council resolution, while 46 per cent believed Bush should secure United Nations approval. A further 14 per cent said that under no circumstances should United Nations ground troops be deployed in Iraq.

A month later, a New York Times/CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans were concerned that the nation’s economy was in its worst shape in nearly a decade and that Bush and congressional leaders were spending too much time talking about Iraq while neglecting problems at home. (New York Times, October 6, 2002)

Nearly half of all Americans were worried that they or someone in their household would be out of a job within a year. The number of Americans who said they believed the economy was worse than it was just two years ago had increased markedly since the summer. The number of Americans who approved of the way Bush had handled the economy -- 41 percent -- was the lowest it has been in his presidency. Many people said they worried that a war in Iraq -- which most Americans view as inevitable -- would disrupt an already unsettled economy.

The poll found that despite the emphasis by Bush since Labor Day on the need to move against Saddam, support for such a policy had not changed appreciably since the summer. While 64 percent of Americans backed a Bush war against Iraq, the sentiment was expressed with reservations and signs of apprehension about its potential repercussions.

Americans said they feared a long and costly war that could spread across the Middle East and encourage more terrorist attacks in the United States. They said they did not want the United States to act without support from allies and did not want the United States to act before United Nations weapons inspectors had an opportunity to enter Iraq. (New York Times, October 6, 2002)

Public support for a Bush administration war continued to dwindle in October. According to a Pew Center poll, the support level had dropped from 64 percent to 55 percent. Thirty-three percent opposed military action, up from 28 percent earlier in October and 21 percent in late August.

The public’s leading concern arising from a possible conflict was that Iraq would deploy chemical or biological weapons against United States forces. Fifty-nine percent said they worried a great deal about this. A 52 percent majority expressed concern about the general prospect of heavy military casualties. And compared with the first Persian Gulf War, many more Americans feared a conflict with Iraq would raise the risk of terrorism in the United States. Fifty-one percent expressed that concern, compared with just a third in late January 1991, after the Gulf War began.

As in previous surveys, support for using force against Iraq declined markedly in the absence of allied backing for such an operation. Only twenty-seven percent said they would favor military action against Baghdad if the allies did not go along, down from 33 percent in mid-September.

By mid-January 2003, Bush’s approval rating had slipped to 59 percent, according to a Time/CNN poll. Nearly 50 percent of the public expressed disapproval of how Bush was handling the economy, while 41 percent expressed disapproval of his management of foreign policy. (New York Times, January 23, 2003)

A majority of the poll’s respondents -- including 49 percent of Republicans -- said reducing the deficit would be more likely to revive the economy than would cut taxes. Sixty-three percent said things were going worse in the country that they were five years earlier. Only 44 percent of respondents said they approved of how Bush was managing the economy. That figure was almost identical to the 42 percent of respondents who said they approved of the way that Bush’s father was handling the economy at a similar point in what proved to be his first and only term in the White House. (New York Times, January 23, 2003)

In late January, a Los Angeles Times poll showed Americans remained unconvinced of the need for war with Iraq. But respondents indicated they would support military action if Bush chose to do so. Seventy-two percent said the president had not provided enough evidence to justify starting a war. But 58 percent said they would back a ground attack if Bush ordered one.

A CBS News-New York Times poll found that 63 percent of those queried wanted Bush to reach a diplomatic solution, but if military action was necessary, 64 percent said they would support it.

Almost unanimously, the Arab world believed that war with Iraq would produce more terrorism against the United States and greater instability in the Middle East and would worsen prospects for settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to a Zogby Poll conducted in pro-American countries, six of them found that only a small minority of respondents had a favorable opinion of the United States. American popularity in Saudi Arabia was the lowest at only 4 percent. It was only 6 percent in Jordan and Morocco; 8.8 percent in the United Arab Emirates; 13 percent in Egypt; but 33 percent in Lebanon. Among the entire Arab world, anywhere from 60 percent of Jordanians to 91 percent of Saudis think that a new conflict will create greater instability, the survey found. (Los Angeles Times, March 16, 2003)

WORLD-WIDE PROTESTS HAUNT THE WHITE HOUSE. Protests across the globe in early 2003 reached numbers unparalleled in history! Global peace rallies took place in each of the first two months of 2003.

The February 15 demonstrations brought out millions:

Rome: 2.5 million, London: 1.5 million, Barcelona: 1 million, Madrid: 1 million, Paris: 800,000, New York City: 500,000, Berlin: 500,000, Seville: 250,000, Melbourne: 200,000, Athens: 200,000, Oviedo, Spain: 200,000, Montreal: 150,000, Dublin: 100,000, Los Angeles: 100,000, Brussels: 100,000, Lisbon: 100,000, Las Palmas, Spain: 100,000, Cadiz, Spain: 100,000, San Francisco: 300,000,

With the Afghanistan war slowing down and with the Bush administration on the brink of war with Iraq, anti-Americanism escalated just about everywhere in the world -- except in Canada. American popularity around the globe had plunged amid mounting perceptions that the United States was running over other nations and doing too little to help poor countries. That trend was particularly acute across the Muslim world, where growing numbers of people saw the anti-terror campaign as a way for the United States to bully its Islamic foes.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press conducted a survey in 44 countries around the world, asking how their attitudes toward the United States had changed over the past two years. The Pew Center’s 150-page survey showed that, while much of the world empathized with the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks, overall favorability ratings for the country had slipped significantly over the past two years.

Despite a brief period of sympathy after the September 11 attacks, anti-United States views increased significantly in Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea as well as across Eastern Europe and Latin America. In the Muslim world, feelings had gone from negative to outright hostile. Even among its staunchest Middle East allies, including Egypt and Jordan, solid majorities were increasingly down on the United States. An extremely high 75 percent of Jordanians opposed an American war on Iraq.

In Pakistan, just 10 percent of the public had a favorable view of the United States, down from 23 percent two years before. In Turkey, public support for the United States had plunged to 30 percent from 52 percent two years before. In addition, a mere 13 percent approved of theg United States using its bases. In Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, United States favorability had receded to 61 percent. It was 75 percent over the previous two years.

Over the previous two years, support for the United States had fallen to 61 percent in Germany, down from 78 percent; and to 75 percent in Britain, down from 83 percent. A few countries had bucked the trend. In Russia, 61 percent of the public had a favorable view of the United States, up from 37 percent two years before. (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 4, 2002)

But in Canada, seven out of 10 Canadians had a favorable view of the United States, virtually unchanged from two years earlier. Yet, 68 per cent of Canadians blamed the United States for economic disparities.

Bush refused to take any responsibility for the negative image that other nations had of the United States. Instead, the president blamed the trend on “propaganda machines” bent on casting the United States “in a bad light.” He said, “We’ll do everything we can to remind people that we've never been a nation of conquerors; we’re a nation of liberators.”

But former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who was chairwoman for the Pew survey, contradicted Bush’s claims. She said part of the problem was a tendency by Bush to muscle other countries into going along with his views. She added, “Basically, we tell other people what to do, rather than try to get consensus. That ultimately will have a cost.” (Cox News Service, December 5, 2002)

According to a Los Angeles Times poll, conducted almost two years into Bush’s presidency, revealed that 60 percent of Americans gave him a positive job approval rating, while 33 percent disapproved. The survey showed, however, that the non-partisan nature of the public’s support for Bush was beginning to crack. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

Four months earlier, in August, the Times poll found Democrats divided in their opinion of the president with members of that party giving him a bare plurality of overall job approval, of 49 percent to 46 percent. Subsequently, Democratic sentiment began to harden against Bush. Democrats said they disapproved of the job he was doing by a margin of 20 percentage points -- 57 percent to 37 percent. Just over two-thirds gave him low marks for his handling of the economy; 58 percent disapproved of his handling foreign affairs; and 48 percent said they disapproved of his handling of the environment. Fifty-five percent said they approved of the way he had been dealing with terrorism. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

Independents and especially Republicans still firmly supported the job Bush had been doing as president, with 63 percent of independents and 97 percent of Republicans gave him an overall positive approval rating. However, the level of support among independents slipped downward eight points from 71 percent measured four months earlier. Independents were split. Sixty percent of that group approved of Bush’s handling of foreign affairs. And 75 percent approved of his handling of terrorism. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

Forty-eight percent approved to 46 percent disapproved his handling of the economy. Three times as many Democrats as Republicans said the economy was in very bad shape, and three quarters of Democrats said that the economy was at least in fairly bad shape compared to 36 percent of Republicans. Independents were more closely divided. Forty-six percent said it is doing well, compared with 54 percent who said badly. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

Sixty percent said the country was in an economic recession. Republicans were much less likely to see it that way than were others. Fifty-one percent of Republicans said the country was not currently in even a mild recession, compared to73 percent of Democrats and 61 percent of independents who said that it was. One in four Democrats, compared with more than double that number of Republicans, saw a rosier economic future heading our way in the following six months. Forty-three percent of independents said the economy will neither improve nor worsen, 40 percent predicted better times ahead, and 14 percent predicted things would get worse. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

The December Los Angeles Times poll also surveyed the public on war with Iraq. A majority of the American public believed Bush was not getting a balanced view of whether to go to war or not from his advisors, but rather a more hawkish view favoring military action in Iraq. They also believed Bush and his administration were dealing with the war on terrorism as a reaction to events, rather than from a clear, formulated policy. The American public was not in a rush to go to war, and they were very clear in their opinions that they wanted hard, concrete evidence before supporting any military action. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

Still, almost 75 percent of Americans approved of the way Bush was handling the threat of terrorism in the country, and nearly60 percent also approved of his handling the country’s foreign affairs. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

A mere 51 percent believed that Bush was only listening to the advisors who advocated war, rather than receiving a balanced perspective (20 percent) or even a view opposing the war (11 percent). Yet, almost two-thirds of the public supported a preemptive strike philosophy when the United States was under threat (including 47 percent who strongly supported it). Roughly about half each of political liberals and Democrats also endorsed the right of the United States to engage in a preemptive strike. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

Almost 70 percent agreed -- including 44 percent who agreed strongly) that the country should take military action against Iraq only with the support of the international community. This result was basically the same as was found in the Los Angeles Times poll three months earlier. At that time, 65 percent of respondents thought the United States should not act without the support of a multi-national coalition (including 43 percent who agreed strongly). This idea was supported by half of political conservatives and 52 percent of Republicans. Virtually all believed that the 12,000-page weapons declaration submitted by Iraq to the United Nations was not truthful. Sixty-seven percent of the public had no confidence at all that the Iraqis would give a complete and truthful list of their weapons. Another 26 percent said they were not too confident (for a combined 92 percent who had no confidence). But more than 60 percent surveyed did not think war would be justified, unless there were serious violations in the weapons declaration. Still, more than 20 percent said the United States and its allies would be justified if only there were a few things left out. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

Although most of those interviewed said it was likely that the Iraqis were currently developing weapons of mass destruction -- including 59 percent who said very likely and 31 percent who said somewhat likely. Almost 60 percent of those surveyed also believed that it was highly unlikely that the United Nations weapons inspectors would find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Thirty-eight percent believed the inspectors would likely find something. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

However, about 50 percent thought that if the United Nations inspectors did not find any evidence of these weapons in Iraq, they then would be opposed to invading the Middle East country with United States ground troops. Women were divided over this idea (45 percent) favored going to war even without evidence, 43 percent opposed the war), while men were more inclined to oppose war without concrete evidence. Fifty-five percent (versus 37 percent) were in favor of war even without clear proof. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

More than half each of those politically conservative and self identified as Republicans were in favor of going to war without hard evidence, while 60 percent of Democrats, moderates, and liberals were opposed --as well as independents (53 percent). Along with opposition to the war without any clear evidence of Iraq manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, the American public also wanted the president to show them concrete evidence that Iraq was lying to them. Seventy-two percent said that Bush had not provided enough evidence to go to war with Iraq, while 23 percent said that the president had provided enough evidence. Also, a large plurality (45 percent) thought the war with Iraq would be a bad thing for the economy, while 28 percent thought the war would be good. About 20 percent believed it would make no difference one way or the other on the economy. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

However, 58 percent of the public said they would support Bush’s war once initiated, while 35 percent said they would oppose him. Among those who would support a ground troop attack against the Iraqis, a sizeable minority, 43 percent, would still support it if 5,000 or more troops were killed. The respondents also cited protecting the United States (27 percent), removing Saddam from power (27 percent), and ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (23 percent) as their top reasons why they would support the war. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

However, put another way, 42 percent of all Americans (not just those supporting the war) supported the war and would also support the war if there were major casualties among the military; 10 percent would support the war, but would oppose it if there were casualties; and 6 percent would support the war, but were not sure if they would support it if there were casualties. Thirty-five percent said they are opposed to war no matter what scenario. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

These results showed a nation that was slightly more against war with Iraq than when the question was posed in four months earlier in a Los Angeles Times poll. In August, 45 percent supported the war and also supported the war if there were casualties among the military. Twenty-eight percent said they always were opposed to war. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

In addition to an Iraqi war, the American public was also ambivalent about the Department of Homeland Security. Just 45 percent of those surveyed thought this department would make the United States safer from terrorist attacks, while 43 percent thought it will make no difference. Six percent believed the department would make the United States less safe. Republicans (62 percent) and conservatives (53 percent) were more hopeful about this department. They thought it would help make the nation safer from attacks. On the other side, more than half of Democrats and 55 percent of liberals believed it will make no difference whether this department was created or not.

“GO IT ALONE, GEORGE.” ALIENATING AMERICAN ALLIES. As United Nations inspectors continued their search of potential sites of weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration announced that it would resist returning to the Security Council before going to war with Iraq. The White House further suggested that it could decide in favor of military action even if weapons inspectors did not turn up concrete new evidence against Hussein. (New York Times, January 15, 2003)

But Blix frustrated the Bush White House by continuing to announce that the inspectors failed to find any “smoking guns” and wanted more cooperation from Iraq, especially on allowing private interviews with scientists who possibly had knowledge of Iraqi weapons programs. (Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2002)

Then the Bush administration appeared delighted in mid-January, the inspectors found empty warheads designed to carry chemical agents. Eleven empty 122-millimeter chemical warheads, all in excellent condition, were discovered at a military storage area 75 miles south of Baghdad, along with another warhead that required further testing.

The Iraqi government asserted that the weapons were not banned and were disclosed in its report to the United Nations last month. General Hossam Mohammed Amin, the chief Iraqi liaison officer to the inspection teams, told reporters in Iraq that the warheads were short-range shells imported in 1988 and had been mentioned in his government’s December declaration. (New York Times, January 16, 2003)

While Bush continued to step up his rhetoric against Baghdad, Saddam insisted that the White House needed alone to “seek a way out of what is regarded as a mess.” He accused the United Nations weapons inspectors of engaging in espionage. He also lambasting the United States as “wicked assistants of Satan,” “a small midget,” and a country pursuing “reckless policies of greed and expansionism.” (Washington Post, January 7, 2002)

At the same time Bush was drumming up support for war, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld created a war for himself. First, he infuriated American veterans by saying draftees added “no value” to the United States military.

Then Rumsfeld outraged French and German officials by labeling their countries “old Europe” in view of their opposition to a quick military strike on Iraq. Later, he added, “You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members.” (Washington Post, January 23, 2003)

Martine Aubry, a former Socialist labor minister, said Rumsfeld’s remarks “show once again a certain arrogance of the United States.” French ecology minister Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin stopped herself from commenting on Rumsfeld’s remarks, saying the word she wanted to use would be too offensive for radio. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also said Rumsfeld should tone down his rhetoric. (New York Times, January 23, 2003)

With the growing sentiment against the United States, the Bush administration further antagonized its allies by announcing on January 23 that it would not have to act alone against Iraq. The White House brushed aside opposition from France and Germany to war, saying those states could sit on the sidelines if they chose. That statement contradicted promises made by the Bush administration to France earlier in the fall. (New York Times, January 23, 2003)

It had appeared that Bush was winning overwhelming support in the days following the September 11 attacks on American soil. But that support slowly evaporated as the months rolled by. The Bush administration missed an historic opportunity to forge a broad international coalition and to revamp its increasingly negative image.

Riding high in the polls with a record-high approval rating as a result of September 11, Bush chose to take a unilateral course in the international arena. Slowly, support for the American president throughout the world began to dissipate. Bush’s “axis of evil” decree mandated that the world powers were compelled to be with him or against him. He incarcerated “enemy” suspects and denied them due process. He opposed international treaties and coalitions that were supported by nearly every global power. Bush opposed the international criminal court, the Kyoto treaty, the treaty to ban chemical and biological weapons, and the scrapping of land mines.

In the months after September 11, the world witnessed Bush suddenly switch to a bilateral approach, as he tried to reach out and gain global support for his war on terrorism. In 2002, Bush began beating the war drums again, as he tried but failed to gain both world and homeland support in his quest to topple the Iraqi regime. Once corporate scandals surfaced in the United States, much of the world perceived the American economy as an example of corporate greed prevailing over an impotent work force.

While there was little question that most of Iraq’s neighbors and most Iraqis themselves would be pleased to see Iraq under new leadership, regime change imposed by invading United States military forces would not be welcome. Most American allies in the region supported the Gulf War, since it was widely viewed as an act of collective security in response to aggression by Iraq against its small neighbor.

Furthermore, containment of the Soviet Union was a success between 1945 and 1989. During that time span, the Washington and Moscow accumulated over 70,000 nuclear warheads. Twenty thousand of those were equipped on delivery systems -- SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers -- with the capability of hitting the other country’s soil within 35 minutes. Even at that high level, containment did work. Iraq neither possessed such weapons nor the delivery systems to reach American territory.

The United States never bombed the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, because Washington knew it could retaliate. Yet Bush seemed incensed on bombing Iraq, despite the fact that he knew Hussein could not retaliate.

FAILING TO BUILD A COALITION. In the 1991 Gulf War, 32 countries joined the United States in combat, providing 160,000 troops, more than 500 combat aircraft, and more than 60 naval vessels. NATO countries contributed 70,000 troops (including 18,000 from France); much of the remainder came from Arab countries. And even those who did not participate on the ground (such as Germany and Japan) helped by defraying the cost to the United States of ousting Iraq from Kuwait.

Foreign contributions to the 1991 Gulf War amounted to $54 billion, covering all but $7 billion of the United States costs. In 1991, only Cuba, Yemen, Jordan, and the Palestinians openly condemned a war that the Security Council voted to authorize (China abstained in the vote). Even Libya was then on our side.

Bush was able to rally together just 38 countries that contributed merely 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers -- about 11 percent -- of the foreign troops performing security operations in Iraq. Only three countries actually contributed combat troops and capabilities -- 2,000 Australian troops, a Danish submarine and naval escort, and 200 Polish troops and refueling ship. That amounted to less than one percent of the total number of troops in the region. The rest of the list merely provided lip-service to the Bush administration: Afghanistan, Albania, Macedonia, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. Some of the United States’ major allies opposed Bush’s war: Canada, France, Germany, and Mexico.

Only Britain offered meaningful support. Even Prime Minister Blair was hit with a barrage of criticism for following Bush to war. Blair was warned one year before invading Iraq that a stable post-war government would be impossible without keeping large numbers of troops there for “many years.” (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004; Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw predicted an ensuing chaos and told Blair that there was a risk of the Iraqi system “reverting to type” after a war, with a future government acquiring the very weapons of mass destruction that an attack would be designed to remove. Straw predicted in March 2002 that post-war Iraq would cause major problems, telling Blair in a letter marked “Secret and personal” that no one had a clear idea of what would happen afterwards. (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004)

Blair was advised that he would have to “wrong foot” Hussein into giving the allies an excuse for war, and that British officials believed that Bush merely wanted to complete his father's “unfinished business” in a “grudge match” against Hussein. (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004)

After Bush declared victory mid-April 2003, France, Germany, and Russia held a summit in St. Petersburg to discuss post-war plans for Iraq where the United Nations would play the lead role. The heads of state of the three European nations vehemently opposed Bush and Blair’s envision of the United States and Britain alone running the new Baghdad government. The Bush-Blair plan called for three stages after war: military occupation in the immediate aftermath, an interim government mixing United States and British officials with Iraqi locals.

Eventually in the fall of 2004, Blair offered his Labor Party and the British electorate a partial apology for waging war on Iraq. He said, “The evidence about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons ... has turned out to be wrong. The problem is, I can apologize for the information that turned out to be wrong but I can’t, sincerely at least, apologize for removing Saddam. The world is a better place with Saddam in prison not in power.” (New York Times, September 26, 2004)

This came at a time when the Bush administration desperately wanted to avoid opening a new diplomatic battlefront after failing to obtain support for war from the United Nations. The widespread fear was that Bush would in fact do whatever he wished in Iraq.

French President Jacques Chirac said, “We are no longer in an era where one or two countries can control the fate of another country.” In Italy, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini appealed to European Union members to mend their split over the war to ensure the bloc will play a key role in a future Iraq. In Turkey, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said: “We believe the United Nations should have a leading and determining role in strengthening stability and peace in Iraq and the Middle East.” (Al Jazeera, April 9, 2003)

Iran was one of the first Middle Eastern nations to condemn Bush’s war. Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that a United States military ruler in Iraq, even if only temporary, was an “aggression against Islam.” He called on Iraqi opposition groups not to commit an “historic disgrace” by collaborating with United States-led invading forces in the country. Khamenei added, “Our position is the same as that of the Iraqi nation. The Iraqi nation is happy about Saddam Hussein’s departure and we are happy about Saddam Hussein’s departure. Happiness about Saddam’s departure has nothing to do with the arrival of the occupier.”

Khamenei also called on the Iraqi opposition to prevent “any situation of chaos or acts of vengeance that would give foreign forces a pretext to stay in Iraq.” He said Bush and Blair had lied when stating that they had attacked Iraq to liberate its people. Khamenei said, “They are looking after their own interests (and their troops) should “immediately leave Iraq. You have toppled Saddam, so if you respect democracy and liberty you should leave.” (Al Jazeera, April 11, 2003)

A member of the Security Council, Syria also denounced Bush’s war. Early in the war, the Bush administration charged that Damascus had supported Iraq and had harbored “weapons of mass destruction.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accused Syria on March 28 of sending military aid to Iraq, notably night-vision goggles. Damascus repeatedly denied helping Iraq during the war. Syrian ambassador to the United States Rostom Zohbi protested what he called a “concerted campaign” by the United States and Israel against Damascus over its alleged support for Iraq. “It’ a concerted campaign of accusations against Syria,” Rostom Zohbi told Al Jazeera (April 11, 2003)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called for American troops to withdraw from Iraq. “The withdrawal of occupation forces would allow the Iraqi people to decide their own destiny, it’s the only way to build a better future,” al-Assad said. (Al Jazeera, April 11, 2003)

On June 30, 2003, a group of Japanese lawyers unveiled documents “indicting” Bush for war crimes allegedly committed against the Afghan people since the United States-led coalition began its antiterrorism campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001. The charges against Bush included aggression, attacks against civilians, and nonmilitary facilities and the torturing and execution of prisoners.

“This is an act that breaks international rules, such as the idea of (honoring) human rights, that have been formed over so many years,” said Koken Tsuchiya, former president of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and head of the 11-member prosecutors’ team in the tribunal. “We decided this case has sufficient reason to be brought to court.” (Japan Times, July 1, 2003)

In the spring of 2003, France and Germany were willing to provide support for the reconstruction effort -- but only under the auspices of the United Nations. Prime Minister Blair was futile in his efforts to convince Bush that the United Nations should oversee the reconstruction of Iraq.

Bush should never have had difficulty in keeping other national forces in Iraq. Most were stationed in relatively safe areas, while American troops patrolled the Sunni Triangle and other hostile areas.

In April, over 200 Spaniards were killed and 1,500 others wounded in the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 that was attributed to Al Qaeda. Just prior to national elections, Prime Minister José María Aznar, a supporter of Bush’s war in Iraq, was the favorite to win. With 90 percent of Spaniards opposing Bush and his unilateral actions in Iraq, they went to the polls and picked Socialist Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, a critic of Bush’s unilateral actions in Iraq, was elected.

Spain’s voters sent a series of dramatic messages that resonated far beyond Spain, affecting relations within Europe, with the United States, and in general with the “war on terror.” They reminded the world that regime change was best achieved through the ballot box; and that violence must not be allowed to win.

Zapatero immediately promised to withdraw his nation’s 1,300 troops from Iraq by June 30 if Bush failed to make an effort to turn over Iraq’s reconstruction to the United Nations. Zapatero called the war “an error” based on “lies.” (Washington Post, March 15, 2004) An embarrassed Bush administration merely shrugged off the upset, stressing that the two nations shared the goal of defeating terrorism.

Poland, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Singapore, and Thailand embarrassed the Bush administration by pulling troops out of Iraq. In March 2004, Poland announced the withdrawal of 2,400 troops. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski announced he was “misled” about Iraq’s WMD. In 2004, He said, “I feel uncomfortable (about Iraq) due to the fact that we were misled with the information on weapons of mass destruction.” (Yahoo News, March 19, 2004; Al Jazeera, April 20, 2004)

As “sovereignty” was being turned over to the Iraqis in mid-2004, almost a dozen countries had already pulled out of the coalition or had announced plans to leave. In February 2005, Portugal pulled out its 150 soldiers. In March, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,700 troops, one of the largest contingents. In March, Ukraine began phasing out its 1,600 soldiers. Also in March, Italy announced it was pulling out its 3,000 troops within six months. This announcement came just weeks after an Italian journalist, who had been held captive for one month, was released and then killed by American soldiers at as her car approached a Baghdad checkpoint. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

During Bush’s June 2004 European trip, he met with the Pope who lectured him on his war policy. Two days later, Bush traveled to France to commemorate the 60th anniversary of D-Day. When Bush met with French President Chirac, it was apparent that their relations remained strained, since the American president refused to engage the United Nations before his Iraq war, and he continued to refuse to engage the global community for after one entire year. After Bush declared “MISSION ACCOMPLISHED” aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in March 2003, the conditions in Iraq took a spiral dive.

Two days later at a joint news conference with the French president, Bush was asked if he would invite Chirac to visit him at his Texas ranch. Bush’s inexperience and incompetence as a diplomat once again was unveiled. The American president replied, “Yes, if he wants to see cows.” Obviously shunned and chastised by Bush, Chirac replied, “France has the best cows in the world.”

After rejecting the United Nations in 2002 and early 2003, Bush desperately returned to the global community. But it was too late, since most of his allies already had rejected his unilateral policies in the past.

Just hours after Bush expressed hope that NATO could play an expanded role in providing security for Iraq, Chirac immediately rejected the idea. The French president said, “I do not think that it is NATO's job to intervene in Iraq.” (Washington Post, June 9, 2004)

Even Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a guest at the summit, later agreed with Chirac. Asked whether NATO, which included Turkey as a member, should have a role in Iraq, Erdogan said: ”The concept we’ve been emphasizing is the role of the United Nations.” (Washington Post,, June 9, 2004)

Bush also failed to win support from the other leaders for writing off the vast majority of Iraq’s $120 billion in debt, after France and Germany refused to give the new Iraqi government a discount of more than 50 percent. (Washington Post, June 9, 2004)

By the summer of 2004, almost a dozen countries had withdrawn from Iraq or announced plans to leave. In February 2005, Portugal pulled out its 150 soldiers. In March, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,700 troops, one of the largest contingents. In March, Ukraine began phasing out its 1,600 soldiers. Also in March, Italy announced it was pulling out its 3,000 troops within six months. This announcement came just weeks after an Italian journalist, who had been held captive for one month, was released and then killed by American soldiers at as her car approached a Baghdad checkpoint. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

By early 2005, Australia had withdrawn most of its forces, with its original 2,000-troop deployment down to 900. Most of the Aussies remaining forces were outside Iraq. They were deployed in neighboring countries or on ships nearby, leaving about 200 in Iraq and almost none in combat deployments. Other countries were down to two dozen or three dozen troops in Iraq. All of Singapore’s 180 deployed troops were on a ship offshore. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

THE MIDDLE EAST. Even among the Middle Eastern countries themselves, containment seemed to be a success. Several Middle East experts and American academics charged that “an attack on Iraq would be lawful.” John Quiqley, professor of law at Ohio State University, argued that the only basis for one state to use military force unilaterally against another is self-defense against an “armed attack.” He added, “The United States is not being attacked by Iraq. And under the U.N. charter, an armed attack must be ongoing and present. Speculation about a future attack is not sufficient for a state to use armed force against another state.” (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

Chris Toensing, editor of the Washington-based Middle East Report, commented that it was “illegitimate” for the United States to launch a pre-emptive strike on Iraq in the name of international peace and security without an express mandate from the Security Council. No existing resolution, he said, provided for “a regime change. … It would be equally illegitimate for the Security Council to grant such a mandate under heavy pressure from the United States, as may occur.” Toensing said Iraq must either attack the United States or threaten to imminently attack the United States -- and neither condition existed. “With its talk of a pre-emptive strike on Iraq, the Bush administration is undermining the very notion that international law should regulate the behavior of nation states, and advocating instead the law of the jungle.” (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

Asked if any Security Council resolutions provided for a member state to use military means to change a regime in another state, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “This is not a U.N. policy, and the Security Council has not taken any decision of the kind.” Annan also said that he did not support pre-emptive strikes against Iraq. “My position has always been very clear -- that I think it would be unwise to attack Iraq, given the current circumstances of what’s happening in the Middle East.” (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

Phyllis Bennis, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, argued that if the United States were serious about weapons of mass destruction, it would jump on any opportunity to follow through on serious investigations. She said the refusal to even test Iraqi intentions on these invitations -- and particularly Rumsfeld’s “cavalier dismissal” of the invitation as “a joke” -- gave further evidence that the Bush administration was far less interested in real evidence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs than they are in going to war. (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

Mouin Rabbani, director of the Palestinian-American Research Center in Ramallah, said double standards existed in American thinking on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. He said, “Evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction in violation of international law is as convincing as the evidence that Israel possesses weapons of mass destruction in violation of the relevant treaty obligations. This is something about which the United States is wholly silent. My opinion would be that where a state is accused of violating an international treaty, the remedy should be determined by the international community, and not by a single state acting on the basis of ulterior motives which it has publicly enunciated, and which are very clearly in gross violation of international law.” (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

Ali Abunimah, vice-president of the Arab-American Action Network in Chicago, said there was overwhelming consensus that, with or without Security Council backing, a United States attack on Iraq “would be wholly unwarranted and unjustified aggression. It is unthinkable that the right of self defense stretches to include an unprovoked invasion of a country half way around the world for reasons that no one in the U.S. administration can coherently articulate.” (Common Dreams News Center, August 15, 2002)

As war appeared more imminent in early 2003, tensions increased in northern Iraq, as the Kurds feared a Turkish invasion from the west once Hussein was overthrown. Meanwhile, Turkey lobbied the Bush administration to permit tens of thousands of its troops to occupy most of Iraqi Kurdistan after a successful American coup. In addition, Turkey demanded $15 billion in loan guarantees and grants as a pay-off to allow 40,000-plus American troops and hardware in its country. (Newsweek, March 3, 2003)

Many of the tensions in northern Iraq centered on Kirkuk, the oil capital, which both Kurds and the Turkoman minority in the north claimed as their ethnic birthright. In the 1990s, Iraq carried out an “Arabization” campaign that displaced thousands of Kurds and Turkomans from Kirkuk. If Hussein were overthrown, many would return to stake their claim, and Ankara was likely to side with its ethnic brothers.

Turkish officials were concerned the Kurds would attempt to claim sole ownership of the oil. For their part, the Kurds feared that political pressure from Turkey might prevent them from claiming Kirkuk as their capital as well as Mosul, its sister oil city.

The Bush administration claimed it would have an understanding with Ankara that American troops would control those cities. But Washington intended to pull United States forces out of Iraq as quickly as possible. The Turks could stay on longer.

United States officials were irritated at the Turkish demands. “The Turks have this extraordinary $90 billion estimate of their potential losses” from an Iraq war, says a senior State Department official. “It’s a theoretical extrapolation … without any reflection of the fact that the Turks will be a hell of a lot better off with a stable neighbor. I am sure we could cook the numbers so they would end up owing us money.” (Newsweek, March 3, 2003)

Newsweek reported that approximately 5,000 troops, belonging to the Shi’ite-dominated Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) -- an opposition group with close ties to Tehran -- crossed the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in February. Abdul Aziz al Hakim, SCIRI’s military chief of staff, denied that but added that SCIRI troops were cooperating with the peshmerga, and that many more of its Iran-based troops, known as the Badr brigade, would cross as soon as the Iranian government approves it. (Newsweek, March 3, 2003)

At the Beirut summit of the Arab League at the end of March, the Arab nations unanimously endorsed a strongly worded resolution opposing an attack against Iraq. Even Kuwait reconciled with Iraq since Baghdad formally recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty and international borders. Twenty Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo in early September unanimously expressed their “total rejection of the threat of aggression on Arab nations, in particular Iraq.”

Turkey. Turkey posed two problems for the Bush administration. Militarily, the Pentagon needed Turkish soil from which to stage an invasion of Iraq from the north. The Bush administration was so desperate to bribe Turkey into its coalition that it was willing to allow tens of thousands of Turkish troops into Iraq’s Kurdish areas.

Second, northern Iraq was home to the Kurds which comprised approximately 20 percent of the country’s population. Nothing better could have pleased the Turkish government than to sweep down into the vast oil fields in northern Iraq.

Historically, the world had turned its back on the Kurds on numerous occasions. According to one Kurd, “The Turkish government has been far worse to the Kurds than Saddam has.” Other Kurds described past Turkish military techniques like raping wives in front of husbands, or assembling villagers to watch men being tied and dragged to their death behind tanks, and they noted that Turkey had been less tolerant of Kurdish language and culture than Saddam. (New York Times, March 14, 2003)

Turkey also forced at least 500,000 Kurds to leave their villages at gunpoint. Human Rights Watch reported that some refugees who had tried to return to their homes and had been shot by government-armed thugs.

In March 2002, the American administration began examining its military options for Iraq. Intelligence officers angered Turkey by investigating which weapons systems were in the hands of the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.

The Bush administration was dealt a blow in November when the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party won Turkey’s election. Days later, party leaders refused to commit to allowing United States warplanes to use Turkish bases in any war with Iraq. The party urged the Bush administration to seek a peaceful resolution to the standoff with Baghdad.

Turkey’s military, however, still remained the de facto element in foreign affairs. Its generals still agreed to provide logistical support in a war against Iraq. Armed forces chief General Hilmi Ozkok said that the United States should avoid a war in Iraq but that Turkey’s differences with Washington over the issue could be ironed out. (Los Angeles Times, November 7, 2002)

Turkey opposed anything that resembled a step toward Kurdish statehood. The Turks had been battling Kurdish nationalism within its own borders for decades. Turkey warned that if the Kurds occupied Kirkuk, a city surrounded by rich oil resources, they could face an invasion by Turkish troops.

During a meeting in October in Ankara, the Turks asked General Tommy R. Franks, who headed the United States Central Command that covered Iraq, not to use the Kurds in military action. The Kurds boasted a militia of 50,000 troops and their leaders expressed hope that an alliance with the United States would ensure an autonomous northern Iraq. (Washington Post, November 12, 2002)

Turkey, as a longtime strategic American ally that bordered northern Iraq, was a crucial base for United States ground troops and warplanes in almost any military scenario in the region. But its leadership was wary of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey, which was home to 13 million ethnic Kurds, had spent much of the last two decades fighting Turkish Kurd separatists. (Washington Post, September 26, 2002)

Bush issued a presidential directive that damaged his chances to bring Turkey into his already questionable coalition. Marking a major change in policy in September, the directive ended more than four years of White House prohibitions on “lethal” assistance to the Iraqi opposition.

The Turkish government responded immediately to the policy shift. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued a warning to Iraqi Kurdish groups who approved a constitution that envisions replacing Hussein with a “federal Iraq.” The prospect alarmed Turkish leaders, who feared an American military campaign in Iraq would unleash ethnic Kurds’ ambitions to create an independent state. Turkish officials threatened to send troops into northern Iraq to thwart Kurdish ambitions there.

Finally in December, Turkey announced it would allow the United States to use military bases and use its airspace but only if the Security Council approved military action against neighboring Iraq. But the Turkish government said that it would not allow the United States to deploy substantial numbers of ground troops on its territory. (Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2002; New York Times, December 4, 2002)

Pakistan. Bush played up to autocratic General Pervez Musharraf who had just seized power two years earlier. Musharraf consented to allow the United States to use Pakistan as a springboard from which to Bush could stage his war on terrorism. Before September 11, 84 percent of Pakistanis opposed a military assault on Al Qaeda. As the war intensified, the number of those resenting American imperialism had grown to well over 90 percent.

But when Bush lobbied the Pakistani military regime for support in a war against Iraq, Musharraf warned that an American attack would cause more turmoil in the Muslim world. He said in an interview on British Broadcasting Corporation, “We are on their side with whatever is happening. But that doesn’t mean that we can start operating or participating in activities all around the world. Let’s deal with what is happening around our country. We have got too much on our hands here in this region to get involved in anything else, especially when one is very conscious that this shall have very negative repercussions in the Islamic world.”(New York Times, August 29, 2002)

Jordan. Bush’s greatest failures in the Middle East came in Jordan and Egypt, two countries which had been traditional allies. Many Arabs simply did not believe that Osama Bin Laden was behind the September 11 attacks. Instead, they believed that Israel carried out the attacks to undermine the Palestinian uprising, and they viewed America’s war on terrorism as part of a broad Zionist conspiracy.

Of the United States’ allies in the Arab world, Jordan, wedged between Iraq to its northeast and Israel to its west, stood to suffer the most from an American attack on Baghdad. King Abdullah II and his advisers asked the Bush administration for assurances, including not using Jordan as a base from which to strike Iraq. Jordan also asked for help to secure a flow of oil, which the country had been buying at preferential prices from Iraq.

Bush had hoped to convince Jordan’s King Abdullah II to use his territory as a base from which to launch a preemptive attack on Iraq. Bush was dead wrong. The king charged that many officials in the Bush administration were “fixated” on attacking Iraq and that only Secretary of State Powell understood the true dimensions of the challenge. Abdullah also warned that the Bush Administration “should not strike Iraq, because such an attack would only raise animosity in the region against the United States.”

Abdullah also expressed frustration with what he called “the splits in the way they look at the Middle East” in Washington and said he despaired at talking administration hawks out of their determination to attack Iraq without moving forward on Mideast peace. Abdullah said, “You can talk until you’re blue in the face and they (the Bush administration) are not going to get it.” (New York Times, July 30, 2002)

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had allowed the United States to deploy thousands of troops in the first Gulf War. But the House of Saud was secretive and wanted to have a less visible role with the United States. The Bush administration asked the Saudis for permission to store a division’s worth of equipment at King Khalid Military City. It wanted to continue to use the Prince Sultan command center and to bring in warplanes to conduct strikes into Iraq. The White House also hoped to launch Special Operations missions into Iraq from Ar’ar in western Saudi Arabia. And it asked to send ground forces into Iraq from the Saudi port of Al Jubayl. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Bush was dealt a similar blow by Saudi Arabia while meeting with Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar ibn Sultan at the president’s ranch in Crawford Texas. The ambassador indicated opposition to any military effort to overthrow Hussein, calling instead for a concerted diplomatic effort.

In fact, Saudi Arabia moved to improve relations with the Baghdad regime. In July, Jordan’s trade minister, Salah Albashir, returned from Iraq and publicly declared Amman’s intention of opening a free trade zone between Iraq and Jordan. Iraq invited Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb to continue discussing trade ties between the two countries. (Ha’Aretz Daily, English edition, July 31, 2002)

However, in mid-September, the Saudi foreign minister indicated a shift in posture, saying that his country would let the United States use its military bases in a United Nations-backed attack on Iraq. Saudi minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said that if there was a Security Council resolution backing military action, all United Nations members would have to honor it.

But Prince Saud said he remained opposed in principle to the use of military force or a unilateral attack by the United States, but his remarks seemed to indicate an important shift in Saudi Arabia’s posture. (New York Times, September 15, 2002)

During the fall, the Saudi government continued to lash out at the Bush administration as its drumbeats sounded louder. Interior Minister Prince Nayif ibn Abdulaziz charged that it was the United States -- not Iraq – that posed a serious and imminent military threat to regional stability and security. (Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2002)

Abdulaziz said, “The United States may know something about the existence of chemical weapons in Iraq, but we are not sure.” He added that an American attack on Iraq would create problems in the region “faster than any Iraqi operation against its neighbors.” (Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2002)

In November, the Saudi royalty made it clear that the United States was unwelcome to use its bases in an attack against Iraq. According to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal, the Pentagon would not be granted flyover rights to American military planes even if the United Nations sanctioned an invasion. (Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2002)

The Saudi policy was the strongest rejection of any assistance to a possible United States attack on Iraq. Although the Pentagon said the United States was able to launch such an attack without Saudi assistance, military officials agreed that having to do so would constrain the strategic options open to war planners.

But once Bush marched off to war, Saudi Arabia allowed American special operations forces to initiate attacks from its territory. The House of Saud allowed the Delta Force and other American Special Operations Forces to mount attacks in Iraq from a secret base at Arar, Saudi Arabia. (New York Times, February 27, 2006)

Qatar. As Bush scurried desperately to drum up support to forge an international coalition, he turned to Qatar. State Department and Pentagon officials examined the possibility of using Qatar and Saudi Arabian military bases. Even Iran’s attitude toward an assault on Iraq was checked via European emissaries, including Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy coordinator.

The Al Udeid base, 20 miles from the Qatari capital, Doha, was completed by the end of the summer, and it could have provided a home base for squadrons of American and British warplanes. The base had a12,500-foot runway and with hangars -- fortified against chemical and biological attacks -- for up to 120 warplanes. The base had also been supplied with satellite links that enabled the command center to co-ordinate air strikes and download reconnaissance footage from unmanned aircraft.

The United States hoped to deploy F-16 and F-15E fighter bombers at the base, as well as unmanned Predators and Global Hawks. The British contribution would be RAF Tornado strike aircraft, TriStar, and VC-10s to provide air-to-air refuelling, and Awacs, Nimrods, and Canberras for reconnaissance. (www.independent.co.uk, August 8, 2002) U.S. forces are rapidly massing in the Arabian Gulf to invade Iraq. Four heavy brigades were positioned near Iraq, and a huge new air complex was operational in Qatar.

Egypt. At a time when Bush was desperately attempting to build a coalition, he chose to distance himself from the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt. In a surprise shift in policy, the Bush administration announced that it would oppose any additional foreign aid for Egypt. It was startling, inasmuch the Bush administration had a record of supporting right-wing regimes in the Middle East.

Mubarak indicated his opposition to an American attack on Iraq. He said, “I told the American government: If you strike at the Iraqi people because of one or two individuals and leave the Palestinian issue, not a single ruler will be able to curb the popular sentiments. There might be repercussions, and we fear a state of disorder and chaos may prevail in the region.”

Mubarak quietly allowed United States aerial refueling tankers to be based at an Egyptian airfield. The tankers were used to refuel Navy aircraft in the Mediterranean and land-based warplanes on their missions to and from Iraq. United States warplanes also flew through Egyptian airspace to carry out missions over Iraq. United States nuclear-powered vessels were allowed to quickly move through the Suez Canal, and cruise missiles were fired at targets in Iraq from the Red Sea. (New York Times, February 27, 2006)

A White House spokesman said the administration was protesting Egypt’s prosecution of human rights campaigner Saad Eddin Ibrahim and its poor treatment of pro-democracy organizations. According to a White House official, the Ibrahim case made it “impossible” for the administration to contemplate extra money for Egypt. The administration’s refusal to respond to Ibrahim’s July 29 conviction made it clear that Bush had no intent on advocating democratic governments throughout the Arab world. Previously, the Bush White House had quietly lodged protests to the Egyptians, as Mubarak tightened the government’s grip on organizations that sought to expand individual freedoms. (New York Times, August 15, 2002)

The Ibrahim case, according to a State Department official, was “the last straw.” Egyptian authorities charged that Ibrahim embezzled funds, tarnished Egypt’s image, and received foreign funds without permission. The European Union, which gave money to Ibrahim, said it is satisfied the funds were used as intended. Observers from foreign governments and human rights organizations considered the charges politically motivated. (New York Times, August 15, 2002)

Ibrahim, a university professor who held Egyptian and American passports, wrote and lectured about democratic values, including rights for Egyptian minorities. He had organized teams to monitor elections and had taught people how to vote. He was arrested soon after he suggested that Mubarak might be preparing to anoint his son to replace him. (New York Times, August 15, 2002)

Ironically, the Bush administration received support from Syria which ranked on the State Department’s list of terrorism sponsors. Syrian security forces helped capture and interrogate Al Qaeda suspects. Another unexpected surprise came from Pakistan, a regime that had been struggling with strong anti-American fundamentalist groups.

Kuwait. Kuwait represented another Middle Eastern nation that opposed an American invasion. It was true that eleven years earlier, the elder Bush ran Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. But most Kuwaitis feared that if the United States invaded Iraq, Hussein would retaliate by attacking Kuwait, possibly with missiles carrying chemical or biological weapons or by sabotaging the oil fields. (Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2002)

United States officials, who viewed Kuwait as a launch site for a possible attack on Iraq, argued that no country in the region would benefit as much from Hussein’s ouster. That might be true, but no country was more nervous about suffering collateral damage either.

Israel. Israel remained the lone Middle Eastern nation that gave total support to the Bush administration in its quest to overthrow Baghdad. Bush sided overwhelmingly with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the conflict with the Palestinian Authority and all but abandoned Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. The Bush administration hoped to persuade Sharon not to take advantage of a war to push Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan. In July, Sharon upset the Bush administration, when he said that an attack on Iraq was a “ludicrous” idea, finally accepted the inevitability of war. (New York Times, September 14, 2002)

Just months prior to Bush’s war, Israeli officials warned the White House that an invasion of Iraq would be destabilizing to the region and urged the United States to instead target Iran as the primary enemy. (Inter Press Service, August 29, 2007)

Lawrence Wilkerson served as member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and later chief of staff for Secretary of State Powell. Wilkerson said the Israelis reacted immediately to indications that the Bush administration was thinking of war against Iraq. After the Israeli government picked up the first signs of that intention, Wilkerson said, “The Israelis were telling us Iraq is not the enemy -- Iran is the enemy.” (Inter Press Service, August 29, 2007)

Wilkerson described the Israeli message to the Bush administration in early 2002 as being, “If you are going to destabilize the balance of power, do it against the main enemy.” The warning against an invasion of Iraq was “pervasive” in Israeli communications with the administration. The Israeli advice against using military force against Iraq was apparently triggered by reports reaching Israeli officials in December 2002. (Inter Press Service, August 29, 2007)

DISUNITY AMONG IRAQ’S ETHNIC GROUPS. The Bush administration officially recognized six opposition organizations. One was the INC, an amalgam of anti-Hussein groups. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party represented the Kurdish population, based in northern Iraq. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI), an Iranian-based fundamentalist group, claimed to represent the majority Shi’ite Muslim population. The Iraqi National Accord was composed of former army officers and defectors from Hussein’s Ba’athist party. Also thrown into the mix was a monarchist party that embodied the aspirations of Sharif Ali bin Al Hussein, an exiled aristocrat, to restore the Hashemite throne to Iraq. Bush also authorized expansion of the opposition organizations to include groups representing other former military officers and Turkish, Assyrian, and Christian minorities. (Washington Post, November 12, 2002)

But three months after the Bush administration encouraged them to unite, Iraq’s exile factions became locked in an ethnic, religious, and political power struggle. One of the major factions, the INC, continued to feud with the State Department over $8 million in funding for propaganda, humanitarian, and other programs it was supposed to oversee. The Bush administration was still uncertain about the INC’s ability to get and relay useful intelligence, as well as competing views within the Washington bureaucracy.

Also stalled were the preparations for a pan-opposition conference that was meant to project a vision for democratic rule if Hussein were overthrown. The conference was originally scheduled for late September, but hd been repeatedly postponed. The next possible date was November 22, in Brussels, but the INC threatened a boycott. The State Department sent a delegate to London to meet with opposition officials in an attempt to end the infighting that has blocked the conference.

The INC leader, Ahmed Chalabi, boycotted the conference because of its agenda, the number of delegates, and the quotas given invited organizations. Chalabi had wanted the conference to endorse a provisional government, with him as its leader. He also wanted upwards of 300 delegates chosen partly on the basis of profession, gender and politics, not solely because of ethnicity or religion.

The Kurdish parties, SCIRI, and the Iraqi National Accord combined to squash the provisional government idea and other Chalabi proposals, and to limit the conference to about 180 participants. Fundamentalist Shi’ite Muslim representatives would make up about 35 percent of the delegates, a quota that offended secular Iraqis such as Chalabi. The Kurds would make up 25 percent, Turks and Assyrians 10 percent. The remaining delegates would be Sunni Muslims, the group that has traditionally ruled Iraq.

In November, Chalabi walked out of a meeting of conference organizers after SCIRI delegates criticized him for opposing the meeting. Kurdish officials involved insist the conference will go on as scheduled.

Meanwhile, the PUK and KDP made proposals that have upset their nominal opposition partners. The Kurdish parties presented a constitution for Iraq that would grant the Kurds autonomy in an expanded territory in the country’s north. The city of Kirkuk was designated as the Kurdish capital. The central government would control only foreign affairs, the military, and economic planning. In effect, the Kurds wanted a federated Iraq divided between Arabs and Kurds.

Bush received another setback when Iraqi Kurdish leaders, viewed as crucial allies in any military campaign, said flatly that they would be reluctant to join American military operations that put Kurds at risk of an onslaught by Iraqi troops. The Kurds suffered a massive onslaught 11 years earlier during the Gulf War under the elder Bush, when the American president refused to intervene as thousands of Kurds were killed. (New York Times, July 7, 2002)

The Kurds were well aware that under Saddam’s regime since the late 1970s, they lost thousands of lives. The most noted one -- used by Bush to help justify An American invasion -- involved Iraqi use of poison gas at Halabja and dozens of other towns and villages in the northern Kurdish districts during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that ended in 1988.

Bush signed a presidential directive that called the training of Kurds. The Defense Department immediately made plans to train at least 1,000 Iraqi opponents of Hussein to serve as battlefield advisers, scouts, guides, and translators for American military units during an American attack on Iraq.

The Defense Department compiled a list of about 1,000 likely recruits, taken from names submitted by Iraqi opposition groups, of those who could assist American units on the ground, as well as provide guards and supervisors for Iraqi government troops in prisoner-of-war camps. In a second training phase, additional recruits would be prepared to occupy forward positions inside Iraq, where they would “light” targets for laser-guided weapons during United States airstrikes and to undertake other support tasks. The Bush administration, however, had no plans to provide full combat training and sophisticated weaponry to the opposition. (Washington Post, September 26, 2002)

The Turkish government responded immediately to Bush’s policy shift. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued a warning to Iraqi Kurdish groups who approved a constitution that envisions replacing Hussein with a “federal Iraq.” The prospect alarmed Turkish leaders, who feared an American military campaign in Iraq would unleash ethnic Kurds’ ambitions to create an independent state. Turkish officials threatened to send troops into northern Iraq to thwart Kurdish ambitions there.

Bush’s directive caused another problem in attempting to forge a coalition. Turkey, as a longtime strategic American ally that bordered northern Iraq, would be a crucial base for United States ground troops and warplanes in almost any military scenario in the region. But its leadership was wary of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey, which was home to 13 million ethnic Kurds, had spent much of the last two decades fighting Turkish Kurd separatists. (Washington Post, September 26, 2002)

In what appeared to be staged to show unity, Iraqi opposition groups in December agreed to create a joint coordinating committee and a plan to establish democracy in Hussein were toppled. Leaders announced the accord negotiations at a two-day conference that brought together more than 320 delegates from Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. (Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2002)

Shi’ites, who made up about 60 percent of Iraq’s population, would get about 16 seats on the committee. But the group clashed with other Shi’ites over control of appointments and asked for more time to come up with the names.

The long-time rifts among the Iraqi exiles forced them to negotiate over some of the appointments to the new committee. Comprising about 50 members, the committee would try to represent an array of political parties and independent activists who were divided by ethnicity, religion, ideology, and tragic history. It was designed a blueprint for an eventual transitional government in which the opposition hoped to play a significant role. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002)

But the White House remained moot on any role the opposition groups would play in a post-Hussein era, presumably because the Bush administration had no plans to incorporate them into a new government.

HATRED TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES ESCALATES. The disapproval rating of the United States continued to increase from 2002 to 2004:

*Egypt: From 85 percent to 98 percent

*Morocco: From 38 percent to 89 percent

*Saudi Arabia: From 88 percent to 96 percent

Jordan: From 66 percent to 85 percent

Lebanon: From 74 percent to 80 percent

Only in the United Arab Emirates did the favorable rating rise from 11 percent to 14 percent.

Over 80 percent of Arabs in the Middle East perceived Bush as their enemy, while a high percentage of Arabs admired bin Laden as their hero.

Over 75 percent of people around the globe believe United States and Israel present the biggest threat to world peace and security. (Albert M. Jabara, The United States Biggest Fear Is Not Terrorism, July 17, 2004; Los Angeles Times, July 25, 2004; Al Jazeera, July 25, 2004)

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. With Bush’s “Go-it-alone” attitude, angry Europeans became increasingly more concerned that contemplated the growing gap between themselves and the Bush administration. The major cause in the fall was Bush’s resolution of declaring preemptive attacks on hostile nations.

But anti-American feelings ran much deeper. They feared that the Bush administration, in the name of countering threats from terrorists and from rogue states since the September 11 attacks, was abandoning the post-World War II system of multilateral institutions and coalitions -- such as the United Nations Security Council and the NATO alliance -- that the United States helped build, and which helped preserve peace and stability for nearly 60 years.

Furthermore, Europeans witnessed a novice president who almost immediately ignored his allies across the Atlantic. He shunned them on almost every international treaty -- the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Treaty, the United Nations Small Arms Agreement, and the banning of land mines. (Washington Post, September 30, 2002)

As the Bush administration lobbied its NATO allies to support an American-led invasion of Iraq, European investigative magistrates, prosecutors, police, and intelligence officials who have been fighting al Qaeda in Europe said they were concerned about attempts by Bush and his aides to link Saddam to a bin Laden’s terror network. They found no American proof or confirmation that Iraqi-al Qaeda relations existed. European leaders agreed that Bush’s premise was deeply flawed partially due to the fact that Hussein embodied the kind of secular Arab dictators whom Bin Laden had sworn to bring down.

FRANCE. France pursued a diplomatic offensive to tone down a proposed United States resolution at the United Nations mandating aggressive weapons inspections in Iraq, while asserting that it could accept military action approved by the United Nations.

According to Jean-Louis Bruguiere, the French judge who is the dean of the region’s investigators after two decades fighting Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorists, “We have found no evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda. And we are working on 50 cases involving al Qaeda or radical Islamic cells. I think if there were such links, we would have found them. But we have found no serious connections whatsoever.” (Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2002)

In January 2003, the French government rejected mounting American pressure for an early decision to back Bush’s war. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said: “It is important that Europe speak on this issue with a single voice. We are mobilized, we believe war can be avoided. … We see no justification today for an intervention, since the inspectors are able to do their work. We could not support unilateral action.” (New York Times, January 21, 2002)

BRITAIN. During the fall, Prime Minister Blair slowly distanced himself from the inexperienced American president. In fact, Britain’s Labor Party consistently opposed Bush’s passion to topple Saddam’s regime. According to the Washington Post (September 1, 2002), Blair told colleagues he felt no real rapport with Bush. The Bush White House embarrassed Blair when it imposed steel tariffs that harmed British exports, and Blair began to pay a domestic political price for administration actions in such areas as the Middle East, the environment and the International Criminal Court.

A survey reported in the London Times (August 30, 2002) said most governing Labor Party officials in 100 districts opposed Britain participating in a United States-led military attack against Iraq. The survey said 60 of the party chairmen expressed strong opposition, with only five saying they would support Blair if he decided to commit British troops.

Bush received a boost in July when Prime Minister Blair privately told him that Britain would support an American attack on Iraq, if Hussein refused to accept resumed United Nations weapons inspections. The agreement between the leaders came as diplomatic, military, and intelligence sources revealed details of Bush’s plan for the invasion of Iraq.

However, it remained difficult to find any top-level government officials who linked al Qaeda to the Iraqi regime. In fact, European counter-terrorist veterans who were working with American counterparts worried that an attack on Iraq, especially a unilateral United States invasion, would worsen the threat of radical Islamic terrorism worldwide and impede their work.

SPAIN> Baltasar Garzon, Spain’s best-known investigative magistrate, said, “A war on Iraq will not diminish the terrorist threat. It will probably increase it. It could radicalize the situation in the Middle East. ... As for the investigations of September 11, doors would close in the Arab world that have helped in the fight against al Qaeda. And a war would do nothing to bolster the investigation into the attacks in the United States.” (Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2002)

GERMANY. Among the European Community powers, Germany was the most vocal in lashing out at Bush. Chancellor Schröder issued his strongest warning so far against an invasion of Iraq, saying it could “destroy the international alliance against terrorism.”

Bush made it clear in September 2002 that he was unhappy with Germany’s refusal to support a war. After Schröder won a narrow re-election, the American president broke from protocol and refused to congratulate him. Schröder had spoken during the campaign of a “German way,” a phrase that alienated the Bush administration. In addition, Schröder had been won on an antiwar ticket critical of the Bush administration. (New York Times, September 24, 2002)

In January 2003 -- two months before the Iraq invasion -- Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also made plain that Germany would refuse to back an Iraq war resolution in the Security Council. He said, “Don’t expect Germany to approve a resolution legitimizing war, don’t expect it.” (New York Times, January 22, 2003)

Yet behind the scenes, Germany did provide intelligence and military support for the United States despite his vow not to participate in the war effort. As the Pentagon prepared to invade Iraq, the German intelligence agents operated in Baghdad. Among their tasks, they sought to obtain Hussein’s plan to defend Baghdad. (New York Times, February 27, 2006)

For years, the Iraqi military had relied on a strategy that called for deploying Iraqi forces along the invasion route to Baghdad in the hope of weakening an invading army before it arrived at the capital. But on December 18, 2002, Saddam summoned his commanders to a strategy session where a new plan was unveiled. Among those attending were Qusay Hussein, the Iraqi leader’s son who oversaw the Republican Guard; General Sayf al-Din Fulayyih Hasan Taha al-Rawi, the Republican Guard chief of staff, and other Republican Guard generals. Saddam’s instructions were to mass troops along several defensive rings near the capital, including a “red line” that Republican Guard troops would hold to the end. (New York Times, February 27, 2006)

As CENTCOM prepared to invade Iraq, two German intelligence agents operated in Iraq. Two German intelligence agents in Baghdad obtained a copy of Saddam’s “Ring Plan” to defend the Iraqi capital. It explained Iraq’s top-level deliberations, including where and how Hussein planned to deploy his most loyal troops. Much of Germany’s contributions were restricted to identifying civilian sites, so they would not be attacked by mistake.

In February 2003, a German liaison officer handed over a copy of Saddam’s plans to United States officials in Qatar. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II; New York Times, February 27, 2006)

The German government gave other assistance to the United States. Schroeder agreed to guard American bases in Germany, thus allowing more American forces to be deployed to the Middle East. Germany also provided the Turkish government with Patriot anti-missile interceptors for protection against an Iraqi attack.

In addition, German ships helped protect United States vessels, assigned to Task Force 150, by guarding sea lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The patrols helped safeguard the waterways the United States used to build up its forces in the Persian Gulf for the invasion of Iraq. (New York Times, February 27, 2006; Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

German troops were also part of a “consequence management” team, at the United States military base at Camp Doha, Kuwait, which was charged with protecting Kuwaitis after a chemical attack. The measure was justified as defensive. German personnel also guarded American military bases in Germany, freeing United States soldiers to go to Iraq. (New York Times, February 27, 2006; Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II; New York Times, February 27, 2006)

When NATO debated whether to send AWACS radar planes and Patriot missile batteries to Turkey -- a move the United States was promoting to help persuade Ankara to open a northern front in Iraq -- Germany initially was opposed. But it soon dropped its objections. Germany later provided the missiles for the Patriot batteries sent to Turkey. (New York Times, February 27, 2006)

RUSSIA AND CHINA. It was not unusual that Russia and France -- along with Germany – opposed Bush’s war. After all, these three countries had witnessed first hand the colossal consequences of military fascism.

In a series of blows to the United States, China and Russia announced they would not support an American invasion of Iraq. Initially, Russia appeared to be one of the strongest supporters of Bush’s war on terrorism. President Vladimir Putin accepted American troops on former Soviet soil in Uzbekistan and other parts of Central Asia in an enormous geopolitical shift. It marked the end of Russia’s domination of a region that it had considered its backyard since colonial times of the 1700s. However, hard-line conservatives in the Russian security forces and bureaucracy were alarmed by the United States presence in Central Asia and vehemently opposed Putin’s policy.

After September 11, the Russian people supported Bush’s war on terrorism. But in late 2001, 74 percent of the population was positive, and only 10 percent was sharply anti-American. By February, however, Russian support had sunk to 48 percent, and it continued to diminish.

To win Putin’s support for an American invasion of Iraq, Bush suddenly stopped admonishing Moscow for its human rights abuses in Chechnya, even though the 2000 Republican Party platform harshly criticized the Clinton administration for ignoring Russian actions. The United States placed troops and formed ties in Central Asian states run by Soviet-era autocrats.

Throughout 2002, Russia continued to strengthen ties with all three of the countries branded the “axis of evil” by Bush: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Russia played a particularly important role in the future of Iraq. Russia had long been one of Iraq’s chief benefactors in the international arena and a major trading partner and military supplier.

Putin also needed a guarantee from the United States that it would be able to keep the lucrative oil-field development rights that Russian oil firms negotiated with the Iraqi president’s government. Iraq’s reserves were second in size only to Saudi Arabia’s. “Russian companies are worried the new regime may discard previously signed agreements and favor the U.S. oil industry,” said Fred Mutalibov, an oil-field services analyst for SWS Securities in Dallas. “To get Russia's support, or at least their silent agreement, the United States has to assure that Russian oil interests will be considered once the regime change has occurred.” (Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2002)

In July, Russia announced a plan calling for increased nuclear cooperation with Iran, A month later, Bush received more bad news when Putin signed a new five-year economic cooperation agreement worth $40 billion with Baghdad. That came as the Bush administration had been lobbying its allies to isolate Iraq, making it even more difficult for the United States to rally Russian and other skeptical world leaders behind any invasion. (New York Times, August 17, 2002)

The five-year agreement called for cooperation in a variety of fields -- foremost oil, but also electrical energy, chemical products, irrigation, railroad construction, and transportation. Soviet or Russian specialists built much of the infrastructure in Iraq, and so Baghdad wanted Russian expertise to help repair or upgrade it.

By late November, Putin reached an agreement with Bush on Russia’s economic interests in Iraq, including concerns about the plummeting price of oil as a result of an Iraqi oil boom should Hussein be overthrown. But Bush administration officials contradicted their president, vigorously denying that there had been a specific agreement.

Bush told the independent Russian television station NTV, “We understand that Russia has got interests there, as do other countries. And of course those interests will be honored.”

Russian and United States officials both stated that Putin was anxious to protect the contracts of Russian oil companies in Iraq, including a $3.5 billion deal for the state-owned Lukoil to develop a giant oil field in southern Iraq, and would like to recover up to $12 billion in old Iraqi debts. Perhaps Bush offered Putin a quid pro quo. Moscow would use a portion of Iraqi oil proceeds to pay off part of its debt. (Washington Post, November 22. 2002

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE Latin Americans felt they had been abandoned by the Bush administration. Mexican President Vicente Fox had especially high hopes vanish. After Bush was inaugurated, he had made Mexico a priority. Days before the terrorist attacks, Fox visited Bush and made great strides toward an accord that would make Mexican immigration to the United States safer and more orderly. Fox asked Washington to grant legal status to some of the millions of undocumented Mexicans who work in the United States and preferential visa status to aspiring immigrants. But Bush placed the United States-Mexican agenda on the backburner.

IRAQ CANCELS AN OIL CONTRACT WITH RUSSIA. A month after Russian President Putin joined the United States in approving a Security Council war resolution, Iraq announced that it was canceling a $3.7-billion deal with Russia’s biggest oil company. It came at a time after Moscow began hardening its attitude toward Iraq which had failed to pay back any of its $7-billion Soviet-era oil debt to Russia. (Los Angeles Times, December 16, 2002)

Moscow had been one of Baghdad’s strongest international supporters -- both because of that debt and because of Russian oil interests in Iraq. But the decision by the Kremlin to support the tough United Nations resolution became intolerable to the Hussein regime.

BUSH’S FAILED COALTION. In the 1991 Gulf War, 32 countries joined the United States in combat, providing 160,000 troops, more than 500 combat aircraft, and more than 60 naval vessels. NATO countries contributed 70,000 troops (including 18,000 from France); much of the remainder came from Arab countries. And even those who did not participate on the ground (such as Germany and Japan) helped by defraying the cost to the United States of ousting Iraq from Kuwait.

Foreign contributions to the 1991 Gulf War amounted to $54 billion, covering all but $7 billion of the United States costs. In 1991, only Cuba, Yemen, Jordan, and the Palestinians openly condemned a war that the Security Council voted to authorize (China abstained in the vote). Even Libya was then on our side.

Bush was able to rally together just 38 countries that contributed merely 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers -- about 11 percent -- of the foreign troops performing security operations in Iraq. Only three countries actually contributed combat troops and capabilities -- 2,000 Australian troops, a Danish submarine and naval escort, and 200 Polish troops and refueling ship. That amounted to less than one percent of the total number of troops in the region. The rest of the list merely provided lip-service to the Bush administration: Afghanistan, Albania, Macedonia, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. Some of the United States’ major allies opposed Bush’s war: Canada, France, Germany, and Mexico.

Only Britain offered meaningful support. Even Prime Minister Blair was hit with a barrage of criticism for following Bush to war. Blair was warned one year before invading Iraq that a stable post-war government would be impossible without keeping large numbers of troops there for “many years.” (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004; Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw predicted an ensuing chaos and told Blair that there was a risk of the Iraqi system “reverting to type” after a war, with a future government acquiring the very weapons of mass destruction that an attack would be designed to remove. Straw predicted in March 2002 that post-war Iraq would cause major problems, telling Blair in a letter marked “Secret and personal” that no one had a clear idea of what would happen afterwards. (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004)

Blair was advised that he would have to “wrong foot” Hussein into giving the allies an excuse for war, and that British officials believed that Bush merely wanted to complete his father's “unfinished business” in a “grudge match” against Hussein. (Michael Smith, London’s The Telegraph, September 18, 2004)

After Bush declared victory mid-April 2003, France, Germany, and Russia held a summit in St. Petersburg to discuss post-war plans for Iraq where the United Nations would play the lead role. The heads of state of the three European nations vehemently opposed Bush and Blair’s envision of the United States and Britain alone running the new Baghdad government. The Bush-Blair plan called for three stages after war: military occupation in the immediate aftermath, an interim government mixing United States and British officials with Iraqi locals.

Eventually in the fall of 2004, Blair offered his Labor Party and the British electorate a partial apology for waging war on Iraq. He said, “The evidence about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons ... has turned out to be wrong. The problem is, I can apologize for the information that turned out to be wrong but I can’t, sincerely at least, apologize for removing Saddam. The world is a better place with Saddam in prison not in power.” (New York Times, September 26, 2004)

This came at a time when the Bush administration desperately wanted to avoid opening a new diplomatic battlefront after failing to obtain support for war from the United Nations. The widespread fear was that Bush would in fact do whatever he wished in Iraq.

French President Jacques Chirac said, “We are no longer in an era where one or two countries can control the fate of another country.” In Italy, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini appealed to European Union members to mend their split over the war to ensure the bloc will play a key role in a future Iraq. In Turkey, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said: “We believe the United Nations should have a leading and determining role in strengthening stability and peace in Iraq and the Middle East.” (Al Jazeera, April 9, 2003)

Iran was one of the first Middle Eastern nations to condemn Bush’s war. Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that a United States military ruler in Iraq, even if only temporary, was an “aggression against Islam.” He called on Iraqi opposition groups not to commit an “historic disgrace” by collaborating with United States-led invading forces in the country. Khamenei added, “Our position is the same as that of the Iraqi nation. The Iraqi nation is happy about Saddam Hussein’s departure and we are happy about Saddam Hussein’s departure. Happiness about Saddam’s departure has nothing to do with the arrival of the occupier.”

Khamenei also called on the Iraqi opposition to prevent “any situation of chaos or acts of vengeance that would give foreign forces a pretext to stay in Iraq.” He said Bush and Blair had lied when stating that they had attacked Iraq to liberate its people. Khamenei said, “They are looking after their own interests (and their troops) should “immediately leave Iraq. You have toppled Saddam, so if you respect democracy and liberty you should leave.” (Al Jazeera, April 11, 2003)

A member of the Security Council, Syria also denounced Bush’s war. Early in the war, the Bush administration charged that Damascus had supported Iraq and had harbored “weapons of mass destruction.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accused Syria on March 28 of sending military aid to Iraq, notably night-vision goggles. Damascus repeatedly denied helping Iraq during the war. Syrian ambassador to the United States Rostom Zohbi protested what he called a “concerted campaign” by the United States and Israel against Damascus over its alleged support for Iraq. “It’ a concerted campaign of accusations against Syria,” Rostom Zohbi told Al Jazeera (April 11, 2003)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called for American troops to withdraw from Iraq. “The withdrawal of occupation forces would allow the Iraqi people to decide their own destiny, it’s the only way to build a better future,” al-Assad said. (Al Jazeera, April 11, 2003)

On June 30, 2003, a group of Japanese lawyers unveiled documents “indicting” Bush for war crimes allegedly committed against the Afghan people since the United States-led coalition began its antiterrorism campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001. The charges against Bush included aggression, attacks against civilians, and nonmilitary facilities and the torturing and execution of prisoners.

“This is an act that breaks international rules, such as the idea of (honoring) human rights, that have been formed over so many years,” said Koken Tsuchiya, former president of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and head of the 11-member prosecutors’ team in the tribunal. “We decided this case has sufficient reason to be brought to court.” (Japan Times, July 1, 2003)

In the spring of 2003, France and Germany were willing to provide support for the reconstruction effort -- but only under the auspices of the United Nations. Prime Minister Blair was futile in his efforts to convince Bush that the United Nations should oversee the reconstruction of Iraq.

Bush should never have had difficulty in keeping other national forces in Iraq. Most were stationed in relatively safe areas, while American troops patrolled the Sunni Triangle and other hostile areas.

In April, over 200 Spaniards were killed and 1,500 others wounded in the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 that was attributed to Al Qaeda. Just prior to national elections, Prime Minister José María Aznar, a supporter of Bush’s war in Iraq, was the favorite to win. With 90 percent of Spaniards opposing Bush and his unilateral actions in Iraq, they went to the polls and picked Socialist Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, a critic of Bush’s unilateral actions in Iraq, was elected.

Spain’s voters sent a series of dramatic messages that resonated far beyond Spain, affecting relations within Europe, with the United States, and in general with the “war on terror.” They reminded the world that regime change was best achieved through the ballot box; and that violence must not be allowed to win.

Zapatero immediately promised to withdraw his nation’s 1,300 troops from Iraq by June 30 if Bush failed to make an effort to turn over Iraq’s reconstruction to the United Nations. Zapatero called the war “an error” based on “lies.” (Washington Post, March 15, 2004) An embarrassed Bush administration merely shrugged off the upset, stressing that the two nations shared the goal of defeating terrorism.

Poland, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Singapore, and Thailand embarrassed the Bush administration by pulling troops out of Iraq. In March 2004, Poland announced the withdrawal of 2,400 troops. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski announced he was “misled” about Iraq’s WMD. In 2004, He said, “I feel uncomfortable (about Iraq) due to the fact that we were misled with the information on weapons of mass destruction.” (Yahoo News, March 19, 2004; Al Jazeera, April 20, 2004)

As “sovereignty” was being turned over to the Iraqis in mid-2004, almost a dozen countries had already pulled out of the coalition or had announced plans to leave. In February 2005, Portugal pulled out its 150 soldiers. In March, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,700 troops, one of the largest contingents. In March, Ukraine began phasing out its 1,600 soldiers. Also in March, Italy announced it was pulling out its 3,000 troops within six months. This announcement came just weeks after an Italian journalist, who had been held captive for one month, was released and then killed by American soldiers at as her car approached a Baghdad checkpoint. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

During Bush’s June 2004 European trip, he met with the Pope who lectured him on his war policy. Two days later, Bush traveled to France to commemorate the 60th anniversary of D-Day. When Bush met with French President Chirac, it was apparent that their relations remained strained, since the American president refused to engage the United Nations before his Iraq war, and he continued to refuse to engage the global community for after one entire year. After Bush declared “MISSION ACCOMPLISHED” aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in March 2003, the conditions in Iraq took a spiral dive.

Two days later at a joint news conference with the French president, Bush was asked if he would invite Chirac to visit him at his Texas ranch. Bush’s inexperience and incompetence as a diplomat once again was unveiled. The American president replied, “Yes, if he wants to see cows.” Obviously shunned and chastised by Bush, Chirac replied, “France has the best cows in the world.”

After rejecting the United Nations in 2002 and early 2003, Bush desperately returned to the global community. But it was too late, since most of his allies already had rejected his unilateral policies in the past.

Just hours after Bush expressed hope that NATO could play an expanded role in providing security for Iraq, Chirac immediately rejected the idea. The French president said, “I do not think that it is NATO's job to intervene in Iraq.” (Washington Post, June 9, 2004)

Even Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a guest at the summit, later agreed with Chirac. Asked whether NATO, which included Turkey as a member, should have a role in Iraq, Erdogan said: ”The concept we’ve been emphasizing is the role of the United Nations.” (Washington Post,, June 9, 2004)

Bush also failed to win support from the other leaders for writing off the vast majority of Iraq’s $120 billion in debt, after France and Germany refused to give the new Iraqi government a discount of more than 50 percent. (Washington Post, June 9, 2004)

By the summer of 2004, almost a dozen countries had withdrawn from Iraq or announced plans to leave. In February 2005, Portugal pulled out its 150 soldiers. In March, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,700 troops, one of the largest contingents. In March, Ukraine began phasing out its 1,600 soldiers. Also in March, Italy announced it was pulling out its 3,000 troops within six months. This announcement came just weeks after an Italian journalist, who had been held captive for one month, was released and then killed by American soldiers at as her car approached a Baghdad checkpoint. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

By early 2005, Australia had withdrawn most of its forces, with its original 2,000-troop deployment down to 900. Most of the Aussies remaining forces were outside Iraq. They were deployed in neighboring countries or on ships nearby, leaving about 200 in Iraq and almost none in combat deployments. Other countries were down to two dozen or three dozen troops in Iraq. All of Singapore’s 180 deployed troops were on a ship offshore. (Washington Post, February 25, 2005)

THE FIRST DIPLOMAT TO RESIGN OVER BUSH’S OBSESSION WITH WAR. The political counselor at the American Embassy in Athens became the first diplomat to resign over Bush’s Iraq policy. In a letter to Secretary of State, John Brady Kiesling, said, “Our fervent pursuit of war with Iraq is driving us to squander the international legitimacy that has been America’s most potent weapon of both offense and defense since the days of Woodrow Wilson. … Too much has been invested in the war.” Kiesling was a career diplomat for 20 years and had served in United States embassies from Tel Aviv to Casablanca to Yerevan. (New York Times, February 26, 2003)