1. PLANNING PHASE IV

2. A PLAN DESTINED TO FAIL

3. THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR

4. FAILING TO PROTECT AMERICAN TROOPS

5. CHAOS AND ANARCHY IN 2003

6. IRAQ’S INTERIM GOVERNMENT: JAY GARNER

7. PAUL BREMER

8. THE NEW IRAQI ARMY

9. REFUSING TO SAFELY PROTECT UNITED STATES FORCES

10. CULTURAL GENOCIDE

11. THE MISSING 380 TONS OF MUNITIONS

12. AMBASSADOR JOSEPH NEGROPONTE

13. MOVING UP THE TIMETABLE TO TRANFER POWER

14. THE RIYADH CONFERENCE

15. CONVENING THE GOVERNING COUNCIL

16. SELECTING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

17. THE “OIL-FOR-FOOD” SCANDAL

18. IRAQ’S $200 BILLION DEBT

In one passage, for example, Secretary of State Powell was quoted as saying that in the months after the 2003 invasion, the Defense Department “kept inventing numbers of Iraqi security forces — the number would jump 20,000 a week! ‘We now have 80,000, we now have 100,000, we now have 120,000.’ ” (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

Powell’s assertion that the Pentagon inflated the number of competent Iraqi security forces is backed up by General Sanchez and Paul Bremer. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

The manuscript indicated that the United States government had in place neither the policies and technical capacity nor the organizational structure that would be needed to undertake such a program on anything approaching this scale. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

By mid-2008, $117 billion had been spent on the reconstruction of Iraq, including some $50 billion in United States taxpayer money. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

The history contains a catalog of revelations that show the chaotic and poisonous atmosphere that occurred in the reconstruction effort:

When the OMB balked at the American occupation authority’s abrupt request for about $20 billion in new reconstruction money in August 2003, a veteran Republican lobbyist working for the authority made a bluntly partisan appeal to OMB Director Joshua Bolten who later became the White House chief of staff. “To delay getting our funds would be a political disaster for the President,” wrote the lobbyist, Tom Korologos. “His election will hang for a large part on show of progress in Iraq and without the funding this year, progress will grind to a halt.” With administration backing, Congress allocated the money later that year. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

In an illustration of the hasty and haphazard planning, a civilian official at the United States Agency for International Development was at one point given four hours to determine how many miles of Iraqi roads would need to be reopened and repaired. The official searched through the agency’s reference library, and his estimate went directly into a master plan. Whatever the quality of the agency’s plan, it eventually began running what amounted to a parallel reconstruction effort in the provinces that had little relation with the rest of the American effort. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

Money for many of the local construction projects still under way was divided up by a spoils system controlled by neighborhood politicians and tribal chiefs. “Our district council chairman has become the Tony Soprano of Rasheed, in terms of controlling resources,” said an American Embassy official working in a dangerous Baghdad neighborhood. “ ‘You will use my contractor or the work will not get done.’ ” (New York Times, December 14, 2008)

3. THE EARLY MONTHS OF BUSH’S WAR

George W. Bush only made plans to bring United States troops home. He never drew up plans to fight a counter-insurgency. The Bush administration committed five grievous errors:

1. Bush administration officials underestimated their opponent and failed to understand the ethnic groups in Iraq. They largely viewed the invasion as a continuation of the first Gulf War. The Pentagon mistook the Republican Guard as its principal enemy and thought American forces would easily destroy Saddam’s units. It was the paramilitary Fedayeen that represented the main challenge to the Pentagon. They fought tenaciously against United States forces in Nasiriyah, Samawah, Kifl, and Diwaniyah.

The CIA was dead-wrong in several areas. It was certain Saddam possessed WMD. It failed to identify the importance of the Fedayeen. It failed to uncover tons of arms in caches in cities across southern Iraq. It falsely claimed that the Iraqi military would capitulate and that United States soldiers would be greeted as liberators.

2. Bush administration officials failed to use the proper strategy and weapons, and they and placed too much emphasis on technology. They incorrectly thought Special Operations forces and that clandestine operations would play a larger role in Iraq. Military technology was relatively unsuccessful against an enemy that could easily slip away and disappear in the cities.

Moreover, the Bush administration refused to allocate enough troops for the war. That made it impossible to seal Iraq’s borders, allowing pro-Saddamists to enter the country. An insufficient number of troops also made it difficult to find and secure weapons caches.

3. The Bush administration failed to adapt to developments on the ground and refused to waiver from their pre-war strategy. General Franks never understood the enemy. He viewed the Fedayeen as a minor obstacle that could be easily overcome.

When Baghdad was seized, Rumsfeld and Franks never focused on the looting and crime, the rise of the insurgency, and securing important sites. Just one week after the fall of Baghdad, the Bush White House, the Defense Department, and CENTCOM refused to acknowledge or foresee new threats. Instead, they focused on withdrawing United States troops and replacing them with less capable foreign units

4. Cheney and Rumsfeld dominated the planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff merely was their sounding board. General Richard Myers was picked to head the JCS because of his record as a company man. Cheney and Rumsfeld presided over a system where various or dissenting opinions were discouraged. Even General Shinseki, who called for doubling or tripling the number of troops, never pushed the issue with the JCS. Moreover, Cheney and Powell differed over the importance of marching to war. Once the war commenced, the two squabbled over strategy. Later Powell told Bush that the policy-making machinery was broken.

5. The Bush administration failed in nation-building efforts, refusing to learn lessons from history from Kosovo and other areas that were occupied by peace-keeping troops. The war planning took 18 months. Post-war planning took only a few months before the invasion. The White House failed to adequately prepare and organize a civilian administration in Iraq. It rejected recommendations from the Justice and State departments. Moreover, the Bush administration miscalculated the cost of reconstruction at $3 billion.

Before he launched the invasion, Bush claimed he was on a mission from God. He commented on his religious fervor when he met a Palestinian delegation during the Israeli-Palestinian summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, four months after the war with Iraq commenced. (The Guardian, October 6, 2005)

One of the delegates, Nabil Shaath, said, “President Bush said to all of us: ‘I am driven with a mission from God.’ God would tell me, ‘George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan.’ And I did. And then God would tell me ‘George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq.’ And I did.”

Bush went on: “And now, again, I feel God’s words coming to me, ‘Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East.’ And, by God, I’m gonna do it.” (The Guardian, October 6, 2005)

DORA FARMS. The CIA’s Iraq Operation Group recruited a number of agents who were dubbed “Rockstars.” They were paid huge sums of money in return for what they claimed was insider information. On March 19 -- two days before the United States military was scheduled to attack Iraq -- a Rockstar agent claimed there was unusual activity at Dora Farms, a compound outside Baghdad which Saddam allegedly visited quite frequently. (James Risen, State of War)

The CIA told the White House that it was 99.9 percent positive that Saddam and both his sons were at Dora Farms, a compound outside Baghdad where Saddam allegedly spent much time. Bush had to act quickly if he was going to order an attack. His 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam was to expire in six hours – at 4:00 a.m. Bush gave the order to launch airstrikes, but CENTCOM had only a few hours to scramble. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The warplanes were positioned at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The F-117 fighters were equipped with Cruise missiles, but they did not have the capability to penetrate the underground bunkers at Dora Farms. However, the warplanes did carry 2,000-pound bunker-busting bombs that, if dropped in pairs, could destroy the underground sanctuary. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

For several days before, hundreds of American warplanes flew over Iraq, so this mission, CENTCOM believed, would not lead Saddam to believe that an attack was imminent. Timing was crucial. Sunrise in Baghdad was at 5:35 a.m. The F-117s were painted black, so a dark sky was essential to mask their presence. They had to hit Dora Farms and be heading out of Iraq before sunrise. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Maintenance crews rushed to prepare the planes. That took 40 minutes. Meanwhile, the squadrons were receiving the coordinates at Dora Farms. Saudi Arabia complicated the issue. The warplanes had to fly from Qatar over Saudi Arabia in order to fly a direct route to Dora Farms. But their flight plans were not cleared by the Saudis, and they had to fly around Saudi Arabia. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Then word came that the aircraft would be delayed by 45 minutes. The F-117s were protected by Marien and Navy EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft. They flew north into Iraq to jam Baghdad’s radars. He F-16CJs were equipped with HARM antiaircraft radiation missiles. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The warplanes reached Dora Farms precisely at sunrise to drop the bunker-busting bombs. The same day, Iraq launched an Ababil-100, a surface-to-surface missile at Thunder Road, home to the 101st Airborne Division in northern Kuwait. Another missile headed for McKiernan’s headquarters at Camp Doha, where the ground war was launched several days later. Both Iraqi missiles were intercepted and destroyed by Patriots. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Forty-five minutes after the attack, Bush went on television to address the nation from the Oval Office. Several hours later, Saddam appeared on television for seven minutes to condemn the attack. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The attack at Dora Farms had failed. Once again, the CIA had failed. Three months into the war, Saddam’s presidential secretary, Abid Hamid Malmud al-Tikriti, was captured by United States forces. He had been in charge of Saddam’s security. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Al-Tikriti did not tell American interrogators what they wanted to hear. First, he told United States interrogators that Saddam had not been to Dora Farms since 1995. Second, he said that Saddam did not have WMD and that it had been destroyed after the 1991 war. (James Risen, State of War) (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

“SHOCK AND AWE.” The “shock and awe” campaign consisted of Tomahawk missiles, F-117 stealth fighters, and B-2 bombers simultaneously striking in and around Baghdad. B-52 bombers were ready in case Saddam and his top lieutenants were located. On that day, 28,000 bombs rained down on Baghdad. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The “Southern Focus” plan called for attacks on the network of fiber-optic cable that Iraq used to transmit military communications, as well as airstrikes on key command centers, radars, and other important military assets. (New York Times, July 20, 2003)

Weeks later, United States troops entered Baghdad. Bush thought it would be an easy victory. Iraqis would welcome American troops as liberators. They would be dancing in the streets. None of this proved to be true.

After American tanks rolled into Baghdad, the military launched an artillery barrage on the Baghdad Hotel on April 8. At least three journalists that included a reporter for Al Jazeera. An Al Jazeera reporter -- Tariq Ayoub, a Jordanian -- was standing on the roof of the station’s office just after dawn, doing a live broadcast of the warfare in Baghdad when the building was hit, by two air to surface missiles. (New York Times, April 8, 2003)

After the 3rd Infantry troops entered Baghdad, they were never given specific orders how to proceed. Subsequently, the Bush administration was not only confronted with an infrastructure in turmoil but it was also unprepared to deal with the political turmoil that followed. (PBS, May 6, 2004)

Subsequently, charges were made that the United States had violated the Geneva Conventions, having targeted an area inhabited by journalists. An Iraqi cameraman, Zouhair al-Iraqi, who had started work with the station several days earlier, was wounded. Additionally, two other journalists, both of them television cameramen, were killed in the attack. The Pentagon claimed that their forces had been fired on first from the hotel. General Buford Blount said that an American tank had fired a single round at the hotel. (New York Times, April 8, 2003)

But some reporters challenged the Pentagon’s account. A British reporter, David Chater of Sky Television, based at the Palestine Hotel said he saw a United States tank aiming at the building before the explosion. He said he did not hear any shots coming from within or around the hotel. He said he was on a hotel balcony directly before the explosion and noticed the tank pointing its muzzle directly at the hotel. He said he turned away just before the blast. (New York Times, April 8, 2003)

In another incident in Baghdad on the same day, the office of another Arab satellite channel, Abu Dhabi Television, was hit by small arms fire, as its crew filmed two American tanks positioned on a bridge over the Tigris river. The two cameras were taking live shots of the tanks on the bridge when one camera was hit and fell to the ground. One employee with injuries was taken to a hospital. (New York Times, April 8, 2003)

Once United States forces rolled in Baghdad, Chalabi was able to organize an indigenous mercenary group in northern Iraq. Chalabi paid them $5,000 each. Even though the CIA informed the Bush administration that some were Iranians, they were allowed to be flown south to Baghdad. But they were of no use to CENTCOM. The mercenaries were poorly trained and supervised by United States Special Forces. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

On April 9, Saddam made his last public appearance. The next day, he and his two sons, his personal secretary, and his bodyguards left in a convoy of about 12 vehicles. They headed for Anbar Province, a Sunni-dominated region west of Baghdad. Saddam found refuge in a safe house in Ramadi. On the next day, the home next to his was destroyed by American bombs. They left and spent the night sleeping in their vehicles in an orchard. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Saddam and his sons split up. Qusay and Uday made their way to Syria, hoping to find asylum in Damascus. But the Syrian government turned them down, and they were forced to retreat into Iraq. This time, the two brothers made it to Mosul in northern Iraq, while Saddam sought refuge in the western town of Hit. Saddam’s sons were killed in a shoot-out and later Saddam himself was captured. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Disinformation and misinformation was regularly being disseminated by the Bush administration:

*Bush repeatedly claimed that care was being taken to protect innocent Iraqi civilians. The reported, “American guns, bombs, and missiles killed more civilians in the recent war in Iraq than in any conflict since Vietnam, according to preliminary assessments carried out by the United Nations, international aid agencies, and independent study groups. Despite the Bush administration boasting that the invasion was the fastest, most clinical campaign in military history, between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi non-combatants died in the course of the hi-tech blitzkrieg.” (The Herald of Scotland, May 23, 2003)

*The Bush administration bragged that the populace of Baghdad and of Iraq generally turned out in masses to greet American troops as liberators. But there were only scattered expressions of thanks when United States divisions arrived in Baghdad. Within a day or two of the Saddam government’s fall, the scene in the Baghdad streets turned to wholesale ransacking and vandalism. Within the week, large-scale protests of the United States occupation had already begun occurring in every major Iraqi city.

A spontaneous crowd of cheering Iraqis showed up in a Baghdad square to celebrate the toppling of Saddam’s statue. However, a long-distance shot of the same scene showed only one or two hundred people, contrary to the impression given by all the close-up TV news shots of what appeared to be a massive gathering. It was later reported that members of Ahmed Chalabi’s local entourage made up most of the throng.

*Bush claimed the United States was obeying the Geneva conventions in its treatment of terror-related suspects, prisoners, and detainees. But it was the Bush administration that branded suspects as “unlawful combatants” in order to skirt the Geneva conventions on treatment of prisoners. They were made out to be something other than POWs. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said, “We have indicated that we do plan to, for the most part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva conventions to the extent they are appropriate.” Meanwhile, the administration treated its prisoners in a manner that blatantly violated several key Geneva provisions regarding humane treatment and housing.

*The Pentagon boasted about its daring “rescue” of Private Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital. Officials claimed that Lynch and her comrades were taken after a firefight in which Lynch battled back bravely. Later they announced that United States Special Forces had rescued Lynch from her captors. They reported that she had been shot and stabbed. Later yet, they reported that the recuperating Lynch had no memory of the events.

The Pentagon’s claim was false. Lynch’s injuries occurred when the vehicle she was riding in crashed. She did not fire on anybody and she was not shot or stabbed. The Iraqi soldiers had abandoned the hospital where she was staying the night before United States troops came to get her. Her “rescuers” were aware of that. Her doctor tried to return her to the Americans the previous evening after the Iraqi soldiers left. But he was forced to turn back when American troops fired on the approaching ambulance. As for Lynch’s amnesia, her family told reporters that her memory was perfectly fine.

*Cheney predicted Iraq’s troops would “step aside” and that the conflict would be “weeks rather than months.” He also said Iraqi soldiers would “throw in the towel” and Hussein would collapse like “a house of cards.” (Washington Post, March 29, 2004)

*Rumsfeld downplayed the importance of a large standing American army in Iraq. However, General John Abizaid, the top American commander for Iraq, contradicted that claim. He encouraged Muslim allies like Turkey and Pakistan to send peacekeepers and said accelerating the training of a new Iraqi army should be considered. Abizaid said, “You can’t underestimate the public perception both within Iraq and within the Arab world about the percentage of the force being so heavily American.” (New York Times, August 29, 2003)

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged in 2005 that the United States could not fight a two-front war. In an annual classified report required by Congress, Air Force General Richard Myers conceded that the United States military’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan had constrained its ability to fight another war. Myers boasted by predicting that American armed forces would “succeed” in any future major conflict, but they “may be unable to meet expectations for speed or precision.” (New York Times, May 3, 2005)

4. FAILING TO PROTECT AMERICAN TROOPS

The Army began the Iraq war with an estimated $56 billion equipment shortage. Since then, soldiers and their families complained that troops on the ground had not been provided with the protective gear and equipment they need. (The Army Times, March 2007)/P>

Thousands of United States troops who invaded Iraq in March 2003 were not equipped with body armor that could stop rifle bullets. The Pentagon also failed to properly equip its tanks, most of which rolled into Iraq from Kuwait. Soldiers assigned to tanks combed Kuwaiti scrap iron yards and junkyards, spending their own money to purchase proper armor for their tanks.

As the war progresses, the military repeatedly assured American soldiers that they would be provided with adequate body armor. It was another broken promise. As a result, before being shipped off to Iraq, soldiers spent thousands of their own dollars to purchase their own body armor. In many cases, their families bought it for them. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

Gradually, the Pentagon began to properly equip its soldiers. By October 2004, 25 percent of American troops serving in Iraq did not have ceramic plated body armor, which could stop bullets fired from assault rifles and shrapnel. (USA Today, March 28, 2005),/P>

General John Abizaid, chief of the United States Central Command, told Congress six months after the invasion, “I can’t answer for the record why we started this war with protective vests that were in short supply.” Abizaid asked for quick approval of Bush’s request for $87 billion in new funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, which included $300 million for body armor and $177 million to upgrade Humvees with chassis armor. (www.defensetech.org, September 30, 2003)

The military repeatedly assured American soldiers that they would be provided with adequate body armor. It was another broken promise. As a result, before being shipped off to Iraq, soldiers spent thousands of their own dollars to purchase their own body armor. In many cases, their families bought it for them. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

Shortages in body armor for troops were a constant problem, forcing many families to buy the armor on their own despite assurances from the military that the gear would be in hand before they were in harm’s way. (USA Today, February 26, 2007) A Defense Department audit released in January found that many soldiers were sent to Iraq without enough guns, ammunition, and other necessary supplies to effectively complete their missions. They had to cancel and postpone some assignments while waiting for the proper gear. (Business Week, January 2007)

In August 2003, just six months after the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon sought to deny the 157,000 troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan a promised pay increase of $75 a month in “imminent danger pay” and $150 a month in “family separation allowances.” The Defense Department at the time defended cutting the added benefits, saying its budget could not sustain the higher payments amid a host of other priorities. (Common Dreams, May 22, 2007)

Gradually, the Pentagon began to properly equip its soldiers. By October 2004, 25 percent of American troops serving in Iraq did not have ceramic plated body armor, which could stop bullets fired from assault rifles and shrapnel. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

In 2004, Rumsfeld was famously confronted at a townhall discussion by an active-duty soldier in Kuwait, who asked him, “Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to uparmor our vehicles?” (The Army Times, March 2007)

By June 2005, the Marine Corps provided 9,000 sets of side plates -- with 28,000 slated for delivery in mid-2006. Nevertheless, United States military personnel continued to be under-equipped by the end of 2005. (Yahoo News, January 11, 2006)

In January 2006, the Army promised ceramic body armor plates to its soldiers who had been complaining for over a year. The Army planned production on 230,000 sets of armor that included 3 1/2 pound ceramic side plates as well as the Velcro-attached pouches into which the plates would fit on the vest. (Yahoo News, January 11, 2006)

A secret Pentagon study made public in January 2006 revealed that as many as 80 percent of the Marines who had been killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have survived if they had had extra body armor. By the end of 2005, 340 American troops had died from torso wounds in Iraq, about one-fifth of all combatant-related fatalities. (New York Times, January 10, 2006)

The armor had been available since 2003, but the Pentagon failed to supply it despite numerous complaints. In September 2005, the Marine Corps ordered additional plates, but only 2,200 of the more than 28,000 sets of plates on order and the Army was still deciding what to purchase. (New York Times, January 10, 2006)

Even the Army’s so-called “ready brigade” found that with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan sapping resources, they are no longer quite so ready. For decades, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division had been ready to respond to a crisis anywhere in 18 to 72 hours, but during the Iraq war, its soldiers were not fully trained and much of its equipment, including the cargo aircraft -- that was supposed to carry it to emergency -- was disbursed elsewhere. (New York Times, March 20, 2007)

The weapon of choice by insurgents were rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) since they were inexpensive, easy to operate, and very deadly. In early 2005, American commanders in Iraq began asking the Pentagon for a new system to counter RPGs and other anti-tank weapons. A special Pentagon unit thought it found a solution in Israel -- a high-tech system that shoots RPGs out of the sky. The system was called “Trophy.” It was designed to fit on top of tanks and other armored vehicles like the Stryker now in use in Iraq. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

Trophy operated by scanning all directions and automatically detecting when an RPG was launched. The system then would fire an interceptor -- traveling hundreds of miles a minute -- that could destroy the RPG safely away from the vehicle.

The system was designed by Rafael, Israel’s Armament Development Authority which found that the system had “well above a 90 percent” probability of killing RPGs and even more sophisticated anti-tank weapons. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT), created in 2001 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, agreed to buy several Trophies -- which cost $300,000 to $400,000 each -- for battlefield trials on Strykers in Iraq in 2007. But the Army objected and considered the Israeli system a threat to an Army program to develop an RPG defense system from scratch. Instead, the $70 million contract was awarded to the United States corporation Raytheon which could not develop the program until 2011. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

In February 2007, Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked more than 4,000 of the latest Humvee armor kit, known as the FRAG Kit 5, which was specifically designed to reduce United States troop deaths from roadside bombs ... that are now inflicting 70 percent of the American casualties in Iraq. (Washington Post, February 11, 2007)

5. CHAOS AND ANARCHY IN 2003

Chaos swept across the country. On April 10, a mob in Najaf killed religious leader Abdel Majid Khoei, whose late father was Iraq’s supreme religious leader for nearly four decades. Khoei had supported Bush’s war. Crowds besieged the residence in Najaf of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual heir to Khoei’s father, who had urged his followers not to resist the invasion of Iraq. The crowd demanded that Sistani leave the country. (Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2003)

On April 13, demonstrators gathered outside the Palestine Hotel and raised anti-American slogans, as they protested the breakdown of essential services ever since the start of the war. The protestors yelled that the United States troops were doing nothing to help restore normal life in the city.

Stunned by the pitch of the protests, United States soldiers quickly set up barricades round the hotel to keep the protestors at bay. But the soldiers could do little to silence the protestors. They shouted slogans in praise of Iraq and warned against any attempt to thrust upon the Iraqis a military of a “foreign” government. “Iraq, you are our beloved country and your sun will never set,” they chanted. (Al Jazeera, April 13, 2003)

Anti-American protests continued to intensify throughout Iraq, as the Pentagon was unable to restore public services and had failed to stop the civil unrest. Exasperated United States military officials tried to prevent the media from covering new demonstrations in Baghdad, while some 20,000 people in the Shi’ite Muslim city of Nasiriyah railed against a United States-staged meeting on Iraq’s future.

Hundreds of Iraqis continued to demonstrate outside the Palestine Hotel, where the Marines have set up an operations base. On April 14, visibly angered United States military officials sought to distance the media from the protest, moving reporters and cameras away from the entrance to the hotel. The American military failed to provide answers to media personnel who wanted answers regarding the United States reconstruction effort. (Associated Press, April 15, 2003)

Sporatic shootings continued across Iraq. At least 10 people were killed and scores wounded in shooting in Mosul, as other witnesses alleged United States troops had opened fire. Three witnesses said United States troops had fired on the crowd that was becoming increasingly hostile towards the city’s new governor, as he was making a pro-United States speech. (Agence France Presse, April 15, 2003)

On the same day, hundreds of protesters blocked Marines from entering the city of Kut’s city hall to meet a radical anti-American Shi’ite cleric who had declared himself in control. The Marines were confronted by 1,200 protesters who chanted, “No, No Chalabi!” referring to the exiled Iraqi whom the Pentagon hoped to place in power. (Agence France Presse, April 15, 2003)

On April 17, Muslims poured out of mosques and into the streets of Baghdad, calling for an Islamic state to be established, after the first Friday prayers since American forces took control of the Iraqi capital. Tens of thousands of people marched in the city’s biggest protest since the toppling of the regime. The organizers were members of the Iraqi National United Movement and said they represented both Iraq’s majority Shi’ite Muslims and powerful Sunnis.

“Leave our country, we want peace,” read one banner aimed at the Americans. “No Bush, No Saddam, Yes Yes to Islam,” read another. “No Shi’ites, No Sunnis, Yes Yes for United Islam,” another banner read. Demonstrators chanted anti-United States slogans and waving banners that read “No to America. No to Secular State. Yes to Islamic State” and “We reject American hegemony.” (New York Times, April 18, 2003)

The next day, violence erupted again. United States soldiers opened fire on marchers protesting the previous day’s violence. About 1,000 residents marching down Fallujah’s main street and stopped in front of a battalion headquarters of the United States Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. Protesters threw rocks and shoes at the compound, and troops opened fire, scattering the demonstrators. Two protesters were killed and 14 were wounded. A United States Army officer claimed some Iraqis shot at soldiers in a convoy passing the demonstrators. The protesters, however, said the shootings came as a result of the rock-throwing. (New York Times, April 30, 2003)

Bush failed to realize the role that various Muslim factions would play in Iraq after the fall of Hussein. During Gulf War II, the Bush administration claimed that Iranian-trained agents crossed into southern Iraq since the fall of Saddam and began working in the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Basra to promote friendly Shi’ite clerics. Their objective was to advance Iranian interests, according to defense and other United States government officials. (New York Times, April 23, 2003)

The Bush administration claimed that Iranian-trained agents crossed into southern Iraq. One included members of a special unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The other were members of the Badr Brigade, the armed force of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shi’ite group, with headquarters in Tehran. (New York Times, April 23, 2003)

The White House charged that the Iranian government was responsible for the anti-American sentiments in Iraq that were voiced by Shi’ites and some Sunnis in Iraq. The White House also claimed that Iranian agents had crossed into Iraq to promote anti-American sentiment among Shi’ites.

The Iranian government responded by denying that it was interfering in Iraq, saying that the United States was the one occupying the country and should be looking to cooperate with Tehran rather than rebuking it. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi said, “It is very interesting that the Americans have occupied Iraq but they accuse Iraq’s neighbor of interfering into its affairs. Instead of raising accusations, the United States should adopt cooperation with Iran.” (New York Times, April 24, 2003)

The Bush administration feared the establishment of an Iranian model of government, an Islamic republic headed by a Shi’ite cleric who would function as both the supreme religious as well as political leader. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that an Iranian model of government would not be consistent with the democratic and pluralistic principles the United States.

In fact, Rumsfeld claimed he was speaking for the majority of Iraqis when he said, “I think there are an awful lot of people in Iran who feel that that small group of clerics that determine what takes place in that country is not their idea of how they want to live their lives.” (New York Times, April 23, 2003)

Iran Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi responded to the Bush administration accusations that Teheran was working to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq. He said Bush’s charge was an effort to cover his failure to establish order in Iraq. Kharazi suggested that the chaos in Iraq would end only after Iraqis were able to choose their own government. However, the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Teheran needed to temper its remarks for fear that Iran would be the next target of the Bush administration. (New York Times, May 31, 2003)

After the seizure of Baghdad, American soldiers admitted they left wounded Iraqi fighters to die and even shot injured enemy soldiers. They said they were frequently confronted by fighters dressed as civilians, including women. Their response was often to shoot first and ask questions later, even when it meant killing genuine civilians. (Washington Post, June 20, 2003; The Evening Standard, June 19, 2003)

After Bush declared victory, soldiers complained that they had been insufficiently equipped for peacekeeping and too thinly deployed in areas where they were under attack from Hussein loyalists. Others questioned whether the armed opposition to the United States presence in Iraq might be deeper and more organized than military commanders had acknowledged. (Washington Post, June 20, 2003; The Evening Standard, June 19, 2003)

A sergeant stationed with the Army’s 4th Infantry Division asked, “What are we getting into here? The war is supposed to be over, but every day we hear of another soldier getting killed. Is it worth it? Saddam isn’t in power anymore. The locals want us to leave. Why are we still here?” (Washington Post, June 20, 2003; The Evening Standard, June 19, 2003)

Soon after American forces toppled Saddam in 2003, Franks surprised senior Army officers by revamping the Baghdad-based military command. The decision reflected the assumption by Franks that the major fighting was over. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

But according to a new Army history, the move put the military effort in the hands of a short-staffed headquarters led by a newly promoted three-star general, and was made over the objections of the Army’s vice chief of staff. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

In 2005, the RAND Corporation submitted a report to the Army, called “Rebuilding Iraq,” that identified problems with virtually every government agency that played a role in planning the postwar phase. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

Colonel Paul Yingling, a division planner with the Second Infantry Division prior to his deployment, ignited a debate when he wrote that the United States general corps needed to be overhauled because it failed to anticipate the post-invasion insurgency in Iraq. He also wrote that the Bush administration refused to admit the onset of such an insurgency in 2004. (Paul Yingling, “Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007)

Yingling criticized American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq. The study was based on 200 interviews conducted by military historians and includes long quotations from active or recently retired officers. (Paul Yingling, “Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007)

Yingling’s report focused on the 18 months after Bush’s May 2003 announcement that major combat operations in Iraq were over. It was a period when the Army took on unanticipated occupation duties:

1. Developing new intelligence-gathering techniques.

2. Arming its Humvees.

3. Revising its tactics.

4. Reviewing its detention policies after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.

5. Developing a postwar phase since virtually no detailed plans were drawn before the war. (Paul Yingling, “Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007)

Other United States top-military officers echoed Yingling’s assertions.

Colonel Thomas Torrance, commander of the Third Infantry Division’s artillery, said, “I can remember asking the question during our war gaming and the development of our plan, ‘O.K., we are in Baghdad, what next?’ No real good answers came forth.”

The allied land war command, which was led by General David McKiernan and which reported to Franks, did additional work on the postwar phase. However, its plan was not formally distributed to the troops until April 2003, when the ground invasion was under way.

Inadequate training was also a factor. Colonel Troy Perry, the operations officer of the First Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, told Army historians that his unit trained extensively, but not for the sort of problems that it would encounter in setting up “stability operations” for securing Iraq once Saddam’s government fell. General William Wallace, who led the V Corps during the invasion, said, “We had the wrong assumptions and therefore we had the wrong plan to put into play.”

Before the fall of Baghdad, Colonel Kevin Benson, a planner at the land war command, developed a plan that called for using about 300,000 soldiers to secure postwar Iraq, about twice as many as were deployed. But Franks disagreed. On April 16 – just weeks after the invasion -- he instructed his officers to be prepared to reduce forces rapidly during an “an abbreviated period of stability operations. The report said that Franks continued to plan for a very limited role for United States ground forces in Iraq. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

In May, Franks directed General McKiernan, then the senior officer in Baghdad, to leave Iraq, along with the staff of his land war command, which had helped plan the invasion and had overseen the push to Baghdad. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

A new headquarters would be established to command the military forces in Iraq and was to be led by General Sanchez. He had led the First Armored Division into Iraq before being promoted and picked to succeed Wallace as the head of the Army’s V Corps, which was to serve as the nucleus of the newly established command. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

When General Jack Keane, the vice chief of staff of the Army, learned of the move, he was upset. Keane had helped McKiernan assemble his headquarters, which had long been focused on Iraq and had more high-ranking officers than V Corps, which had been deployed from Europe. Keane assumed that McKiernan’s headquarters would oversee what was fast becoming a troubled occupation. (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

Keane said, “I think we did not put the best experienced headquarters that we had in charge of that operation. It took us months, six or seven or eight months, to get some semblance of a headquarters together so Sanchez could at least begin to function effectively.” (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

Asked about the decision to establish a new headquarters, Franks told Army historians that he had told the Pentagon what was needed and that it was the Defense Department’s responsibility to ensure that the headquarters was rapidly installed. He said he told the Pentagon leadership that a new headquarters was needed and that it was up to them to “figure it out.” (New York Times, June 28, 2008)

“MISSION ACCOMPLISHED.” On May 1, while on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of San Diego, Bush declared major combat operations over in Iraq. He not only promised that a regime change in Iraq would reduce world terrorism but that a democratic Iraqi government would be necessary to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Neither of the statements proved to be accurate.

The Bush administration continued to fail to establish stability across Iraq. On May 1, seven American soldiers were wounded when Iraqis, using grenades and small arms, attacked a walled compound in Fallujah. As has been the policy, American forces returned fire. And as has been the policy, no estimates of Iraqi casualties were released. (New York Times, May 1, 2003)

Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir Hakim returned to Iraq on May 12, after 23 years of exile in Iran. The leader of the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Hakim entered the holy city of Najif, as he received a hero’s welcome from tens of thousands of Shia supporters. (Washington Post, May 12, 2003)

The strongest demonstrations occurred on May 19. Approximately 10,000 Sunnis and Shi’ites, an unlikely combination, marched in Baghdad as they called for the end of United States control.

Robbers and looters still terrorized the capital, preying on anything of value and anyone with money. Bremer claimed that restoring order was the top priority, but he had little to show for that. He called 10,000 Iraqi police back to duty across the country. (San Francisco Chronicle, May 21, 2003)

There were overriding complaints from former Iraqi opposition leaders hoping to step quickly into positions of power. As part of the reorganization plan, the Bush administration also recalled Zalmay Khalilzad, the White House envoy to exile groups in Baghdad and the main organizer of two inconclusive postwar political conferences. (Washington Post, May 24, 2003)

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw lambasted the failure to improve the situation in Iraq, claiming that chaos was rampant in the majority of the country. At the same time of Garner’s dismissal, International Development Secretary Clare Short, Britain’s cabinet secretary overseeing reconstruction, resigned in protest. Short accused the United States and Britain of usurping the proper role of the United Nations. She condemned a draft to the Security Council resolution by the Bush administration and Prime Minister Blair’s government. (Washington Post, May 12, 2003)

Short charged that Britain ignored its commitment to support a major United Nations role in Iraq and colluded with the United States “in trying to bully the Security Council into a resolution that gives the coalition the power to establish an Iraqi government and control the use of oil.” She condemned Bush and Blair for providing “only a minor role for the United Nations.” (Washington Post, May 12, 2003)

Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, a participant in the interim government, also castigated the Bush administration for allowing chaos and anarchy to run unchecked. Barzani chastised Garner for his longtime association with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whom the Kurds blamed for their betrayal in the intelligence wars between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. (New York Times, May 12, 2003)

Russia directed more criticism to the Bush administration. Putin openly mocked Bush’s failed efforts to find chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Iraq. The Euroleft proclaimed the coalition's rationale for invading the country -- the presence of WMD -- a fraud. (Washington Post, May 11, 2003)

In its May annual report, Amnesty International reported that Bush’s “war on terror” made the world more dangerous and left people feeling less secure and that human rights had been threatened in Iraq. The international human rights organization also concluded that international laws were undermined and governments were shielded from scrutiny as a result of Bush’s fight against terrorism.

Amnesty International also said that lack of security in Iraq since Bush declared victory posed a threat to human rights and development. Amnesty urged the Security Council to focus on human rights and justice issues and to verify the human rights and other responsibilities of the occupying powers in Iraq.

Issuing its report on May 28, 2003, the report said: “The USA continued to detain prisoners from the war in Afghanistan in defiance of international humanitarian law, turned a blind eye to reports of torture or ill-treatment of suspects by its officials and allies, and sought to undermine the International Criminal Court through bilateral agreements. In the process, it undermined its own moral authority to speak out against human rights violations in other parts of the world.

“Bring them on,” Bush bragged in July. He embarrassed himself again when he dared for militants to attack United States troops in Iraq. On the defensive again, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said Bush was only expressing his faith in the strength and capability of American forces when, talking about militant attacks. Fleischer said, “The president expressed it, said it, because he views it as a way to express confidence in the forces.” (CNN.com, July 4, 2003)

By mid-July, Bush’s overall job approval continued to dip. A CNN-Time poll indicated that 52 percent of Americans said the president was doing a poor job of handling the economy, and just four in 10 said the Iraqi war had been a success. That was down from 52 percent from four months earlier in late March. Fifty-five percent of Americans said they approved of the way Bush handled the reconstruction of Iraq. (CNN, July 21, 2003)

While the Bush administration continued a litany of charges of torture and murders against the Hussein regime, the White House remained silent on how the American military treated Iraqis. Children as young as 11 were claimed to be among those locked up for 24 hours a day in rooms with no light, or held in overcrowded tents in temperatures as high as 122 degrees. On the edge of Baghdad Airport, the United States military built a tent city that human rights groups compared to the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. (www.timesonline.co.uk, July 10, 2003)

The military even constructed another detention camp in the grounds of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad. Many thousands of Iraqis were taken there during the Saddam years and never seen again. Every day, relatives plead in vain for information about the whereabouts of the missing.

Amnesty International claimed that 80 minors had been detained, accused of petty offenses including writing anti-American graffiti or, in the case of two teenage boys, climbing on the back of an American troop carrier to hitch a lift through a main street in Baghdad. Sufiyan Abd al-Ghani, 11, who was with his uncle in a car that was stopped near his home in Hay al-Jihad on May 27. American soldiers held a rifle against his neck and shouted that someone in the car had shot at them. Sufiyan was made to stay on the ground for three hours, while more than 100 soldiers poured into the neighborhood, searching houses and cars. Eventually, he was taken away with his hands tied behind his back and a hood over his head. No weapon had been found. (www.timesonline.co.uk, July 10, 2003)

An upsurge of violence against American forces and its allies occurred in August 2003. When it appeared that violence and chaos could not increase, matters got worse. Attacks of sabotage against key installations such as pipelines and water mains also escalated. Additionally, American soldiers opened fire on innocent civilians in separate incidents in August.

United States military personnel in Baghdad sent an e-mail to interrogators in the field on August 14, stating that the “gloves are coming of” and asking them to develop “wish lists” of tactics they would like to use. An interrogator with the 66th Military Intelligence Company wrote back with suggestions in August, including the use of “close confinement quarters,” sleep deprivation and using the fear of dogs. … I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off.” (Washington Post, August 3, 2005)

Another e-mail exchange from interrogators with the 4th Infantry Division based in Tikrit also suggested “close quarter confinement” in extremely claustrophobic situations, because “discomfort induces compliance and cooperation.” (Washington Post, August 3, 2005)

Low-level detainees were handed over to members of Operational Detachment Alpha 531, soldiers with the 5th Special Forces Group, the CIA, or a combination of the three. The personnel were dressed in civilian clothes and wore balaclavas to hide their identity. If they did not get what they wanted, the interrogators would deliver the detainees to a small team of the CIA-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary squads, code-named “Scorpions.” They went by nicknames such as Alligator and Cobra. After the fall of Baghdad, they worked with their CIA handlers to infiltrate the insurgency and as interpreters. (Washington Post, August 3, 2005)

In August, the United States military took out Uday and Qusai Hussein and Bush declared that the Hussein regime would never return to Iraq. Yet, the number of American deaths increased. By the end of July, the American death toll since Bush declared victory was 49.

In September 2003, the Bush administration ignored an urgent warning from a top Iraq adviser who said that thousands of additional American troops were desperately needed to quell the insurgency there. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

According to Woodward, dysfunction and division in the White House emerged over the war. Later in November 2003, Bush said, “I don’t want anyone in the cabinet to say it is an insurgency. I don’t think we are there yet.” (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

Robert Blackwill, the top Iraq adviser on the NSC, issued a warning about the need for more troops in a lengthy memorandum sent to Rice. Blackwill’s memorandum concluded that more ground troops, perhaps as many as 40,000, were desperately needed. It said that Blackwill and Bremer later briefed Rice and Hadley, her deputy, about the pressing need for more troops during a secure teleconference from Iraq. The Bush White House did nothing in response. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

When it seemed that matters could not get worse, a suicide bomber detonated a truck full of explosives at the United Nations compound in Baghdad. Over 30 people were killed. The bombing left little doubt that a campaign of violence was overwhelming the ability of United States occupation forces to reconstruct Iraq. (Washington Post, August 20, 2003)

In October, a United Nations seven-member panel, investigating the attack against its Baghdad compound, charged that its system for ensuring protection had fundamentally “failed in (its) mission to provide adequate security.” (Washington Post, October 22, 2003)

Rumsfeld continued to downplay the importance of a large standing American army in Iraq. But General John Abizaid, the top American commander for Iraq, contradicted that claim. He encouraged Muslim allies like Turkey and Pakistan to send peacekeepers and said accelerating the training of a new Iraqi army should be considered. Abizaid said, “You can’t underestimate the public perception both within Iraq and within the Arab world about the percentage of the force being so heavily American.” (New York Times, August 29, 2003)

On October 16, 2003, Rumsfeld sent a two-page memo to other high-ranking Pentagon officials: Air Force General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz; Marine General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Feith, undersecretary of Defense for policy. Rumsfeld’s memo revealed significant doubts about the progress in the two-year struggle against terrorists.” (USA Today, October 22, 2003)

For the first time, Rumsfeld acknowledged that the United States had made “no made truly bold moves” in fighting al Qaeda and other terror groups. Rumsfeld also conceded for the first time that the United States was engaged in a “long, hard slog” in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld’s memo included the following:

• The United States was “just getting started” in fighting the Iraq-based terror group Ansar Al-Islam.

• The war was hugely expensive. “The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions.”

• Post-war stabilization efforts were very difficult. “It is pretty clear the coalition can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it will be a long, hard slog.” (USA Today, October 22, 2003)

An internal Army evaluation showed that United States military intelligence gathering operation in Iraq was undercut by a series of problems in using technology, training intelligence specialists, and managing them in the field.

The report offered a scathing report in several areas:

1. Commanders reported that young officers and soldiers were unprepared for their assignments, “did not understand the targeting process” and possessed “very little to no analytical skills.”

2. Reserve troops specializing in civil affairs and psychological operations received “marginally effective” training before their deployment.

3. Intelligence teams were far less productive than the Army expected them to be. The 69 “tactical human intelligence teams” in Iraq should have been producing “at least” 120 reports a day, but instead were delivering an average total of 30. This was due to ]“the lack of guidance and focus” from the intelligence office overseeing the teams’ work.

4. Some key intelligence machinery were misused in Iraq, raising questions about the high-tech solutions that some at the Pentagon had advocated to improve the military’s performance.

5. Only one “unmanned aerial vehicle: (UAV) was assigned to find buried aircraft. A major UAV system known as the Hunter was kept idle for 30 days because it had not been assigned an operational frequency on which to operate.

6. There was no network to link intelligence teams and convey time-sensitive information among them -- as well as permit them to tap into an evolving database.

7. The report recommended that the teams be provided with satellite telephones.

Between March and November:

9,675 United States troops were killed.

2,401 troops were wounded.

2, 464 suffered non-battle injuries.

4,397 were evacuated from Iraq to United States military hospitals -- usually in Germany -- for treatment of medical problems not related to wounds or injuries. They included 290 treated for urological problems such as kidney stones possibly caused by drinking large quantities of high-mineral bottled water during the blistering summer in Iraq.

299 were treated for heart problems and 249 for gastrointestinal illnesses.

504 troops were evacuated for treatment of psychiatric problems.

17 troops committed suicide in Iraq.

The cause of at least two dozen other non-combat deaths was not determined. (Orlando Sentinel, November 29, 2003)

Twenty-two American soldiers took their lives in 2003. That represented a rate of more than 13.5 per 100,000 troops, about 20 percent higher than the recent Army average of 10.5 to 11. The number did not include cases under investigation, so the actual number could be higher. It also excluded the suicides by soldiers who had returned to the United States. For instance, two soldiers undergoing mental health treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington D.C. reportedly committed suicide there, in July 2003 and January 2004. But Walter Reed Hospital never mentioned suicide. Instead, the deaths were “suspected” suicides under investigation. (Washington Post, February 19, 2004)

6. IRAQ’S INTERIM GOVERNMENT: JAY GARNER

General Jay Garner was placed in charge of assembling an interim government. The retired general had handled a refugee crisis in the Kurdish north of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Garner wanted a quick victory in Iraq. He criticized General Franks’ estimate of a “prolonged war” of lasting 60 to 90 days. Then he criticized Franks for taking 12 days to reach Baghdad.

Garner’s duties included recruiting his staff and administering the reconstruction of Iraq. His team included three regional coordinators and coordinators for reconstruction, civil administration, and humanitarian assistance. They were to oversee everything from emergency relief and refugees to long-term planning for roads, rail, and waterways as well as economic development and weeding out senior officials of the ruling Ba’athist Party. (New York Times, March 25, 2003)

The day before Garner arrived in Iraq, the overbearing Rumsfeld ordered him to reduce his staff by four. Eventually, only one of the 16 State officials was restored to Garner’s reconstruction team. Even before a team of physicians was to be sent to Iraq, one was recalled because he was not pro-life. Then Rumsfeld ordered Garner to drop a State Department official named Thomas Warrick from his reconstruction team. Warrick was the author of a $5 million study, “The Future of Iraq.” Garner protested. Yet his aide was recall. (PBS, May 6, 2004)

Plans were made to elect Iraqi expatriates to serve on an advisory council. The Bush administration hoped to obtain retired diplomats with a history in the area. Barbara Bodine, who was ambassador to Yemen in 2000 when the destroyer Cole was attacked, was picked to serve in central Iraq. George Ward, the former ambassador to Namibia, was tabbed to oversee humanitarian aid. Others included Kenton Keith, the former ambassador to Qatar and director of the Coalition Information Center in Islamabad, Pakistan, during the Afghanistan war; Robin Raphel, the former ambassador to Morocco, and Timothy Carney, former ambassador to the Sudan. (New York Times, March 25, 2003)

On March 31, 2003, a senior military commander at Central Command said the United States, through its past acts, was largely to blame for the failure of Iraq’s Shi’ite majority to rise in revolt against Saddam Hussein. He said millions of leaflets and round-the-clock radio broadcasts into Iraq had failed to convince the Iraqi population that the United States and its allies were fully committed to overthrowing the Baghdad government. He also said years of repression and a succession of what he called barbarous acts against civilians by government agents and militia, since the start of the current war, had caused the Iraqi people to largely refrain from acts of rebellion. (New York Times, March 31, 2003)

The officer also said cultural misunderstandings and a failure to learn the lessons of recent history contributed to miscalculations by American military and civilian leaders. He said those planning and prosecuting the war might have failed to appreciate how deeply Hussein’s personality and organs of repression pervade Iraqi society. He added that on some days at least, Baghdad was winning the public relations war in the Arab world by showing pictures of wounded children and devastated public marketplaces, while American officials were showing antiseptic videotapes of precision weapons hitting buildings. Furthermore, Bush’s fragile coalition had not effectively shown skeptical audiences in the Arab world and around the globe the brutality of the Iraqi war effort. The high-level American official said that Middle Easterners tended to discount, even distrust, American promises of liberation and relief aid. He said Iraq was not, as the Bush administration boasted, a “house of cards” that would topple quickly if given a modest push. (New York Times, March 31, 2003)

The Bush administration failed to establish law and order on the streets and achieved only mixed results in restoring electricity, water, sanitation, and other essential needs. Some administration officials and defense experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.

Bush badly underestimated the potential for looting and lawlessness after the collapse of the Iraqi government, lacking forces capable of securing the streets of Baghdad in the transition from combat to postwar reconstruction. (Washington Post, May 19, 2003)

It was not until mid-May that some administration officials finally acknowledged publicly these miscalculations. They described continued lawlessness as a serious problem in Baghdad and called for more American forces on the ground to end a wave of violence.

The Bush administration watched the chaotic images on television and immediately blamed Garner. White House officials chastised him for wearing short sleeve shirts and talking to Iraqi civilians. Bush wanted a tougher supervisor.

After only three weeks on the job, Garner was fired. Bush hoped to absolve himself of any wrong-doings, and he could point to Garner as the person who had failed. Garner’s dismissal demonstrated the administration’s failure.

7. PAUL BREMER

The Bush administration realized it needed a hard-liner, and so it dumped Garner and replaced him with J. Paul Bremer, the administration’s counterterrorism chief. But Bremer’s unilateral and tough actions not only infuriated members of the interim government but also helped fuel the insurgency.

James Dobson, special envoy in Afghanistan, had worked for the RAND Corporation and was highly experienced in nation-building. RAND had done an extensive study on peace-keeping forces and concluded that large forces were necessary if reconstruction was to be successful. Furthermore, the study showed that a higher rate of casualties had occurred in areas where the United States had relatively few troops. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Dobbins and Rumsfeld ‘s vastly differed on their opinions of reconstruction. Dobbins was convinced that the Bush administration had not learned from the Kosovo war. On the other hand, one month earlier in February, Rumsfeld had delivered a speech entitled “Beyond Nation-Building” where he criticized NATO operations in the Balkans. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Just before he was to relieve Garner, Bremer sent a copy of the RAND report to Rumsfeld. Bremer never received a response from the Defense secretary. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

When Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12, he was appalled by the scarcity of United States troops and what appeared to him as their lackadaisical attitude in the patrolling the streets. He immediately ordered his staff to take a no nonsense hard-line approach, even ordering troops to shoot looters. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

In early 2001 -- six months before the 9/11 attacks -- Bremer said that the Bush administration was “paying no attention” to terrorism. Speaking to the McCormick Tribune Foundation conference on terrorism on February 26, 2001, Bremer said, “What they will do is stagger along until there’s a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn’t we be organized to deal with this.’ ” He added, “If you call it a war, you suggest there’s a victory. I would argue there is no final victory in the war against terrorism any more than there is in the so-called war against crime.” (ABC News, April 29, 2004)

Bremer’s remarks came shortly after he had chaired the National Commission on Terrorism, a bipartisan body formed by the Clinton administration to examine United States counterterrorism policies. (ABC News, April 29, 2004)

On May 20 -- his fourth day in Baghdad -- Bremer issued Order No. 1: “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.” The top four levels of the Ba’athist Party were barred from all government jobs. Bremer ordered the dismissal of all senior members from their government posts. Bremer’s order, the first he issued as the top American in Iraq, led to the firing of 30,000-plus ex-Ba’athists from various ministries. Bremer only changed numerous potential American allies into enemies of the Bush administration. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II; Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

Before issuing his order, Bremer had been warned by the CIA’s Baghdad station chief that the move would drive tens of thousands of Ba’athists underground. But Bremer said: “It’s not open for discussion.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

Days after issuing his initial de-Ba’athification directive, Bremer issued a second order dissolving Iraq’s 500,000-member military and intelligence services. This pair of orders helped sink Iraq into chaos, as it "crippled Iraq’s institutions of governance and security and created half a million angry and jobless people in the process," ripe "for recruitment by insurgent and militia groups.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

In April 2004, as the Iraqi insurgency intensified, "Bremer announced that de-Ba’athification had been “poorly implemented and applied unevenly and unjustly.” Bremer said he supported a plan to allow “vetted senior officers from the former regime” back into the military services.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

But the decision to bring Ba’athists back into the government, spearheaded by Ayad Allawi, infuriated some Iraqis, particularly ethnic Kurds and Shi’ite Arabs. These were groups systematically oppressed by Saddam and the Sunni-dominated Ba’athist government. (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

A power struggle immediately emerged over the de-Ba-athification policy. The De-Ba’athification Commission, which was headed by neconservative Chalabi, was used to seek revenge on the Sunnis. Reversing Bremer’s original de-Ba’athification became a key political benchmark used by the Bush administration that created a schism within Iraq’s parliament. (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

Years later in 2006, Bremer tried to justify his decision in his decision to implement de-Ba’athification. Bremer told NBC correspondent Brian Williams, “It wasn’t me. .. The decision was discussed by my advisers with the senior civilians in the Pentagon for weeks before I made my recommendation, which was approved in Washington.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

But according to Rajiv Chandrasekaran, who served as the Washington Post’s Baghdad Bureau Chief at the time of de-Ba’athification -- after Bremer was briefed on the concept of de-Ba’athification, it struck him “as just the sort of bold intiative that he wants to implement.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

The decision to disband the Iraqi army also came from Bremer, though he later denied it. In February 2004, General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Bremer “ordered the army to disband on his own authority” and that the Joint Chiefs “were not asked for a recommendation, or for advice.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)

Ba’athists comprised 1.5 million elite members and supporters in Iraqi society. Only one or two percent -- or 25,000 to 30,000 people -- was active. Many Iraqis joined the Ba’athist Party in order to obtain a reasonable job and not because they had any allegiance to Saddam. Nevertheless, they were removed and barred from any role in the new government. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The de-Ba’athification process came back to haunt the Bush administration. A large chunk of civilians and military personnel were unable to find other work. Outraged at being disenfranchised by the United States, many gravitated over to the insurgency camp.

At the outset of the war, Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, advised Bush that it would be reckless to purge the 300,000 soldiers in the Iraq army. He advised the president that it would be preferable to screen the military personnel and to identify and fire the Saddam loyalists. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

At the urging of Rumsfeld, Feith recommended Walter Slocombe -- a Democrat who had held a policy position in the Pentagon in the Clinton administration -- fill the slot as Iraq’s new Ministry of Defense. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Feith’s recommendation to keep Saddam’s army was ignored. Bremer and Slocombe both agreed that that a Sunni-dominated army would outrage Kurds and Shi’ites alike. Moreover, the dismantling of Saddam’s army would relieve the United States of paying its soldiers and officers. Bremer and Slocombe believed it was ludicrous to pay soldiers who had fled their posts. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Hoping to receive back-pay, some former Iraqi military officers -- calling themselves the Independent Gathering -- met with Colonel Paul Hughes. The officers were promised compensation if they would cooperate with Coalition Provisional Authority. They provided a list of 50,000 to 70,000 names of potential recruits for a new Iraqi army and police force. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

On May 23, Order No. 2 -- “The Dissolution of Entities – formerly abolished Saddam’s army. Days later, Rumsfeld sent Bremer instructions on establishing the New Iraqi Corps. The Defense secretary said the new army would consist of three divisions and 40,000 personnel to be divided into three areas: northern, central, and southern Iraq. . (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Bremer refused to consult Governing Council members when he made the unilateral decision to shut down a pro-al-Sadr newspaper. In response, al-Sadr’s loyalists staged a revolt in Baghdad and across much of southern Iraq, locking down cities and in the process turning many previously neutral Iraqi Shi’ites firmly against the United States occupation. (Time, June 28, 2004)

He alienated the Governing Council, when he interfered with its choice of a president for Iraq’s new interim government. Governing Council members accused Bremer of trying to railroad them into accepting Bush’s choice for the post. Bremer abruptly cancelled a council meeting in an attempt to interfere with the selection process. Some council members referred to Bremer as “Bush’s dictator.” (Chicago Tribune, June 2, 2004)

Before the war, the Bush administration had approved a plan to maintain several hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers to provide security, repair roads, and prepare for unforeseen postwar tasks. But Bremer issued an order to completely disband the Iraqi military. The results were disastrous. Immediately, 30,000 to 50,000 Ba’athists became sworn enemies of the Bush administration and went underground. Furthermore, 200,000 still armed soldiers went unemployed -- with their weapons in their hands. (Time, June 28, 2004) Bremer’s decision was opposed by United States experts and exiled Iraqi military officers who had spent months preparing detailed plans for the Bush administration that called for giving the Iraqi army a key role in winning the peace. Senior American officials tried to talk Bremer out of these decisions. Bremer replied, “No, I’m issuing this today.” A senior official confronted Bremer about the order to disband the army. "What the hell are you doing this for? Bremer replied, “We don’t need them.” (Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2003; Time, June 28, 2004)

The decision to dissolve Iraq’s armed forces contributed to the escalating post-war violence in Iraq. It helped to create the chaotic atmosphere that allowed daily attacks on water mains, oil pipelines, electric towers, military convoys, and allied buildings. In fact, Bremer’s edict might have alienated former Hussein soldiers and might have encouraged them to promote anti-American attacks. Meanwhile, the Bush administration scrambled to create a new Iraqi army, while most of old army personnel collected stipends of $50 to $150 a month.

Bremer reversed himself in June, but by then the occupation had lost not merely time and momentum but also credibility among former soldiers and their families. (Washington Post, November 19, 2003)

Bremer also ordered Iraqis to disarm by mid-June, part of a high-profile effort to get weapons off the streets and return public security to cities under American occupation. Anyone found with unauthorized weapons after June 14 would be detained and face criminal charges. (New York Times, May 24, 2003)

In October, the Bush administration tried to recover from its tactical mistakes. It began rehiring some of the same soldiers they demobilized. “This was a mistake, to dissolve the army and the police,” said Ayad Alawi, head of the security committee of the Iraqi Governing Council. “We absolutely not only lost time. The vacuum allowed our enemies to regroup and to infiltrate the country.” (Washington Post, November 19, 2003)

Former Iraqi special forces Major Mohammed Faour said, “Instead of us using these personnel against terrorism, terrorists are using them against us. … This is a tragedy. We could use these people. They are military people. They are professionals. They are used to obeying orders. They need money. They need the lives they had before.” (Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2003)

The Bush administration attempted to defend the decision to dissolve the former army. Bremer said, “By the time the conflict was over, that army, so-called, didn’t exist anymore. There was nothing to disband.” He said the ranks of top officers “had been in the army so long they were essentially not going to be retreadable into the new army.” (Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2003)

Iraqi soldiers complained of the dissolution of the country’s armed forces, with some threatening to take up arms against occupying American and British troops unless their salaries were continued. About 50 Iraqi soldiers marched to one of Hussein’s former palaces in Baghdad to air their grievances. (New York Times, May 24, 2003)

A rift between Bremer and the White House developed over the incarceration of Iraqis. Bremer was “kicking and screaming” in the fall of 2003 that “the United States was detaining too many Iraqis for too long and in poor conditions.” He raised his serious concerns “both in one-on-one meetings with Rumsfeld and other administration leaders, and in group meetings with the president's inner circle on national security.” (Washington Post, May 7, 2004)

Just two months later, American security forces at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib Prison began torturing and humiliating dozens of detainees. It was not until January 2004 that the International Red Cross warned Bremer about the conditions at Abu Ghraib, and it was not until May that the horrendous treatment of prisoners was made public.

Months after he stepped down, Bremer made it clear that the Bush administration failed to provide sufficient American forces in Iraq. In October 2004, he said, “We never had enough troops on the ground in Iraq.” (Washington Post, October 5, 2004) Then four days later, he attempted to limit the damage to the administration. In an op-ed piece entitled “What I Really Said About Iraq,” Bremer claimed he only said it “would have been helpful to have had more troops early on to stop the looting.” (New York Times, October 9, 2004)

But Bremer made similar comments in a September 16, 2004 speech at DePauw University, saying, “The single most important change -- the one thing that would have improved the situation -- would have been having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout.” (Washington Post, October 5, 2004)

Even though a senior Defense Department spokesperson said, “Bremer never asked for more troops.” (CNN, October 5, 2004) But on July 1, 2003, Bremer did ask for more American troops.” (Mercury News, July 1, 2003)

8. THE IRAQI ARMY

Once United States forces secured part of Baghdad, one of the Bush administration’s first decisions was to dissolve the Iraqi army.

A number of issues contributed to the failure of the Bush administration to train the new Iraqi Army:

Rumsfeld failed to take the advice of numerous officials who realized that Iraq’s army was necessary to maintain order. Even Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, encouraged the Bush administration to retain the Iraqi military. In addition, he urged the White House to give three months pay to the military personnel as an incentive. That would have amounted to only $200 million, a small fraction of the $4 billion each month that the United States occupied Iraq. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

When General Paul Eaton arrived, the administration was sending mixed messages to its own forces and to the people of Iraq. It was not a priority to rebuild the Iraqi military. (New York Times, February 11, 2006)

Eaton said he never was given sufficient support to carry out his objective. He was sent to Baghdad and given a staff of six. He was promised a staff of 250 but never had more than half that number. In addition, a substantial number of troops assigned to the streets of Baghdad were reassigned to the reconstruction effort. (New York Times, February 11, 2006; The Oregonian, February 14, 2006)

Looting had stripped military facilities, so Eaton had to spend time and resources to rebuild bases and barracks to make them usable. Saddam’s army had been, disbanded, and the Bush administration refused to recall any officers or units. That left Eaton with little to build on when he set out to create an army.

Controversy over the training of Iraqi forces among senior Pentagon and Bush administration officials slowed the process. (New York Times, February 11, 2006)

With the failure to form a new Iraq army, in the fall of 2003 the Pentagon expedited the training of troops and intensified sweeps and patrols through dangerous neighborhoods in the “Sunni Triangle.” (Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2003)

In October 2003, Bush administration officials reiterated progress when Iraq’s first post-war battalion -- known as Freedom Battalion -- completed a nine-week basic training course. Bremer said the battalion would be the core “of an army that will defend its country and not oppress it.” But one-third -- 250 of 700 soldiers – quit. Most of the recruits said they were angry after comparing their pay with that of other forces. Iraqi police were paid $60 a month and members of the Civil Defense Corps received a monthly salary of $50. (Chicago Tribune, December 9, 2003; Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2003; Time, May 3, 2004)

In July 2005, General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that Iraqi forces were nowhere near battle ready and only a small number were capable of fighting the insurgency on their own. Pace said about half of Iraq’s new police battalions were still being established and were not in a position to conduct operations. The other half of the police and two-thirds of the new Iraqi army battalions were only “partially capable” of carrying out counter-insurgency missions. Pace conceded that they needed help from the United States military. (London’s The Guardian, July 22, 2005)

In the fall of 2005, the number of Iraqi army battalions that could fight insurgents without United States and coalition help dropped from three to one. General George Casey, who was in charge of American forces in Iraq, said there were fewer Iraqi battalions at “Level 1” readiness than there were a few months ago. (New York Times, September 30, 2005)

By the end of 2005, close to 100 Iraqi army battalions and 100 Iraq Security Force battalions were operational at levels two or three. The security force operations were under the direction of the Iraqi government. (CNN, February 25, 2006)

However, only one army battalion was capable of fighting with out United States support. But in February 2006, that sole Iraqi battalion was downgraded to a level requiring them to fight with American troops. The battalion was comprised of 700 to 800 Iraqi Army soldiers. (CNN, February 25, 2006)

9. REFUSING TO SAFELY PROTECT UNITED STATES FORCES

FAILING TO PROVIDE ARMOR TO U.S. TROOPS. Thousands of United States troops who invaded Iraq in March 2003 were not equipped with body armor that could stop rifle bullets. The Pentagon also failed to properly equip its tanks, most of which rolled into Iraq from Kuwait. Soldiers assigned to tanks combed Kuwaiti scrap iron yards and junkyards, spending their own money to purchase proper armor for their tanks.

As the war progresses, the military repeatedly assured American soldiers that they would be provided with adequate body armor. It was another broken promise. As a result, before being shipped off to Iraq, soldiers spent thousands of their own dollars to purchase their own body armor. In many cases, their families bought it for them. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

Gradually, the Pentagon began to properly equip its soldiers. By October 2004, 25 percent of American troops serving in Iraq did not have ceramic plated body armor, which could stop bullets fired from assault rifles and shrapnel. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

General John Abizaid, chief of the United States Central Command, told Congress six months after the invasion, “I can’t answer for the record why we started this war with protective vests that were in short supply.” Abizaid asked for quick approval of Bush’s request for $87 billion in new funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, which included $300 million for body armor and $177 million to upgrade Humvees with chassis armor. (www.defensetech.org, September 30, 2003)

The military repeatedly assured American soldiers that they would be provided with adequate body armor. It was another broken promise. As a result, before being shipped off to Iraq, soldiers spent thousands of their own dollars to purchase their own body armor. In many cases, their families bought it for them. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

Gradually, the Pentagon began to properly equip its soldiers. By October 2004, 25 percent of American troops serving in Iraq did not have ceramic plated body armor, which could stop bullets fired from assault rifles and shrapnel. (USA Today, March 28, 2005)

By June 2005, the Marine Corps provided 9,000 sets of side plates -- with 28,000 slated for delivery in mid-2006. Nevertheless, United States military personnel continued to be under-equipped by the end of 2005. (Yahoo News, January 11, 2006)

In January 2006, the Army promised ceramic body armor plates to its soldiers who had been complaining for over a year. The Army planned production on 230,000 sets of armor that included 3 1/2 pound ceramic side plates as well as the Velcro-attached pouches into which the plates would fit on the vest. (Yahoo News, January 11, 2006)

A secret Pentagon study made public in January 2006 revealed that as many as 80 percent of the Marines who had been killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have survived if they had had extra body armor. By the end of 2005, 340 American troops had died from torso wounds in Iraq, about one-fifth of all combatant-related fatalities. (New York Times, January 10, 2006)

The armor had been available since 2003, but the Pentagon failed to supply it despite numerous complaints. In September 2005, the Marine Corps ordered additional plates, but only 2,200 of the more than 28,000 sets of plates on order and the Army was still deciding what to purchase. (New York Times, January 10, 2006)

REFUSING TO PURCHASE SAFE MILITARY VEHICLES. The weapon of choice by insurgents were rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) since they were inexpensive, easy to operate, and very deadly.

In early 2005, American commanders in Iraq began asking the Pentagon for a new system to counter RPGs and other anti-tank weapons. A special Pentagon unit thought it found a solution in Israel -- a high-tech system that shoots RPGs out of the sky. The system was called “Trophy.” It was designed to fit on top of tanks and other armored vehicles like the Stryker now in use in Iraq. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

Trophy operated by scanning all directions and automatically detecting when an RPG was launched. The system then would fire an interceptor -- traveling hundreds of miles a minute -- that could destroy the RPG safely away from the vehicle.

The system was designed by Rafael, Israel’s Armament Development Authority which found that the system had “well above a 90 percent” probability of killing RPGs and even more sophisticated anti-tank weapons. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

The Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT), created in 2001 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, agreed to buy several Trophies -- which cost $300,000 to $400,000 each -- for battlefield trials on Strykers in Iraq in 2007. But the Army objected and considered the Israeli system a threat to an Army program to develop an RPG defense system from scratch. Instead, the $70 million contract was awarded to the United States corporation Raytheon which could not develop the program until 2011. (NBC News, September 5, 2006)

10. CULTURAL GENOCIDE

The 3rd Infantry was placed in charge of guarding several hundred sites in Baghdad. They included hospitals, clinics, hospitals, clinics, government offices, banks, refineries, palaces, and shopping centers.

This took a large number of personnel away from the division responsible for the capital city of seven million residents. Even when members of Garner’s team needed to travel, they had to be protected by soldiers and at least two Humvees.

The United States military failed to prevent looting. The greatest blow to Iraq’s cultural history occurred when looters pilfered priceless treasures -- dating back to early civilization -- from Baghdad’s museum. The pillaging ravaged the irreplaceable Babylonian, Sumerian and Assyrian collections that chronicled ancient civilization in Mesopotamia. The losses triggered a tremendous outcry in cultural circles.

Consequently, The head of Bush’s cultural advisory committee reigned in protest over the United States failure to stop the looting of Baghdad’s National museum. Martin Sullivan said in a letter to Bush dated on April 14 he was resigning as chairman of the President’s advisory committee on cultural property, a position he had held since 1995.

Sullivan wrote, “The reports in recent days about the looting if Iraq’s National Museum of Antiquities and the destruction of countless artifacts that document the cradle of Western civilization have troubled me deeply, a feeling that is shared by many other Americans.” Describing the looting as a tragedy, Sullivan said that it was not prevented “due to our nation’s inaction.” (Al Jazeera, April 17, 2003)

The United Nations Cultural Agency called for an international meeting that was comprised of 30 art experts and cultural historians. Some experts said many looters appeared highly organized and even had keys to museum. One expert said he suspected the looting was organized outside the country. Although much of the looting was haphazard, they said some of the thieves clearly knew what they were looking for and where to find it, suggesting they were prepared professionals.

“It looks as if part of the looting was a deliberate planned action,” said McGuire Gibson, a University of Chicago professor and president of the American Association for Research in Baghdad. “They were able to take keys for vaults and were able to take out important Mesopotamian materials put in safes. I have a suspicion it was organized outside the country, in fact I’m pretty sure it was.” (Yahoo News, April 17, 2003)

United States customs and immigration officials seized paintings taken from the palace of one of Saddam Hussein’s sons, found a cache of gold-plated weapons taken from an Iraqi government facility and confiscated Iraqi bonds, knives, and other spoils of war.

Most of the people caught smuggling the items were reporters returning from covering the war in Iraq. But the gold-plated weapons were believed to have been looted by a member of the United States military and were in a shipment bound for an American military base in Fort Stewart, Georgia. (Yahoo News, April 17, 2003)

United States officials charged one former Fox News employee and were investigating some returning journalists after seizing 15 paintings, gold-plated guns, and other items taken from Iraq and smuggled into the United States.

Rumsfeld downplayed the widespread looting of hospitals, libraries, and museums in Iraq. He inferred that it was simply further proof the United States invasion represented liberation. Rumsfeld said, “Freedom's untidy. And free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes.” Rumsfeld’s comments suggested that he was vindicating the looters for the errors the White House and the Pentagon had made. He seemed to imply that the Bush administration was justified in alienating allies, killing civilians, handpicking pro-American leaders. (Yahoo News, April 17, 2003)

Nearly three years later, Iraqi authorities and police forces throughout the world still could not locate thousands of stolen items, including a handful of the most famous artifacts in history. The Iraqi government had no systematic way of investigating the missing objects, and the United States military said it could not provide its scarce manpower to guard sites in the countryside, where widespread looting has continued unchecked since the March 2003 invasion. (Washington Post, November 8, 2005)

11. MISSING 380 TONS OF MUNITIONS

It was George W. Bush -- not Saddam Hussein -- who put hundreds of tons of explosives into the hands of terrorists. And it was Bush who created the vacuum that was quickly filled by insurgents in Iraq. The United States military found more than 10,000 weapons caches in Iraq after the March 2003 invasion. But the military failed to protect hundreds of tons of other weapons and explosives.

For years, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors monitored the munitions site at Al Qaqaa, approximately 50 miles south of Baghdad. The weapons were sealed and monitored by international nuclear inspectors before the United States invasion. The explosives were monitored because they could be used to detonate a nuclear bomb, although Iraq was allowed to keep them because they also have civilian and conventional military uses. (Boston Globe, October 27, 2004)

In January 2003, IAEA inspectors conducted a full inventory of the Al Qaqaa munitions site, 50 miles south of Baghdad. They inspected 56 bunkers and subsequently alerted United Nations and United States officials that there were 377 tons of high explosives inside. (Time, November 8, 2004)

The IAEA publicly warned about the danger of these explosives before the war, and after the invasion it specifically told Bush administration officials about the need to keep the explosives secured. Little if anything was done. (New York Times, October 25, 2004)

On March 15, four days before the war began, IAEA inspectors returned to the site for a final visit and confirmed that the seals they had used two months earlier to secure the bunkers containing the munitions were still secure. (Time, November 8, 2004)

The explosives, stored at Al Qaqaa, consisted mainly of HMX (high melting point explosive) and RDX (rapid detonation explosive). They could be used to produce bombs strong enough to shatter airplanes or tear apart buildings. The explosives were the strongest and fastest in common use by militaries around the globe. The missing explosives contained 194.7 metric tons of HMX, 141.2 metric tons of RDX, and 5.8 metric tons of PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate). (New York Times, October 25, 2004)

The explosives could be used to demolish buildings, make missile warheads, and detonate nuclear weapons. They could also have been used in major bombing attacks against American or Iraqi forces. (New York Times, October 25, 2004)

Other HMX bunkers were untouched. Some were damaged but not devastated. IAEA experts said they assumed that just before the invasion the Iraqis followed their standard practice of moving crucial explosives out of buildings, so they would not be tempting targets. If so, Iraqis must have broken seals from the arms agency on bunker doors and moved most of the HMX to nearby fields, where it would have been lightly camouflaged. (New York Times, October 25, 2004)

On April 18, troops from the 101st Airborne Division stopped at Al Qaqaa on their way to Baghdad and entered some of the secured bunkers with bolt cutters, as documented by a camera crew from an ABC affiliate in Minneapolis. The 101st found thousands of five-centimeter by 12-centimeter boxes, each containing three vials of white powder. Officials who tested the powder said it was believed to be explosives. (Associated Press, April 5, 2003)

The 101st did not resecure the bunkers when they left Al Qaqaa, nor did they destroy the ordnance, in part because their orders were to get to Baghdad and find evidence of Hussein’s purported arsenal of WMD. In addition, the Bush administration refused to allow IAEA inspectors back into Iraq to verify the status of the stockpile. Looters soon descended on Al Qaqaa and pilfered the remaining weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. (Time, November 8, 2004)

Peter Galbraith, a high-level official with the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, spent several weeks in Iraq when American troops marched into Baghdad in March 2003. (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

According to Galbraith, the Bush administration never anticipated the breakdown in law and order once the Hussein regime was toppled. The only ministry that American troops protected was the oil ministry, while the other locations that had valuable intelligence -- including intelligence on potential insurgencies – were ignored. (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

Galbraith witnessed the looting of the Iraqi equivalent of the Center for Disease Control. This was a very sensitive facility that had some of the most dangerous materials in Iraq. Looters walked off with live HIV virus and live Black Fever virus. At the same time, looters went into the Tuwaitha nuclear facility, while American troops were there and removed yellow cake, raw uranium. The American troops were present at these locations, but nobody had told them what was there. (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

The lieutenant next to the biological facility said he was dismayed. He said, “I hope I’m not responsible for Armageddon, but nobody told me what was in that building.” (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

When Galbraith returned to Washington, he met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Galbraith described his Iraq experience in great detail, telling Wolfowitz that if he would not protect these sensitive facilities, they would be looted. (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

During their one-hour meeting, Wolfowitz became more angry by the minute. According to Galbraith, “I wished he was getting angry at what I was describing that was going on in Iraq, but it became very clear he was getting angry at me for saying it.” Wolfowitz failed to act. The looting continued. (Lou Dobbs, CNN, November 5, 2004)

In late 2003, arms agency experts obtained commercial satellite photos of Al Qaqaa, showing that two of roughly 10 bunkers that contained HMX appeared to have been leveled by titanic blasts, apparently during the war. They presumed some of the HMX had exploded. (New York Times, October 25, 2004)

In May 2004, inspectors warned Paul Bremer, the American administrator, that Al Qaqaa had probably been looted. But the Bush administration was preoccupied with the transfer of authority to Iraq, and the insurgency was gaining strength. An internal IAEA memo warned that terrorists could be looting “the greatest explosives bonanza in history.” (New York Times, October 25, 2004; Time, November 8, 2004)

More than 18 months after the United States invasion -- on October 10, 2004 -- Iraq’s interim government warned the Bush administration and international nuclear inspectors that 380 tons of explosives were missing at Al Qaqaa. The interim Iraqi government notified the agency that Al Qaqaa had been stripped clean. One month later, it was made public. (New York Times, October 25, 2004; Time, November 8, 2004)

The embarrassed Bush administration claimed that the 380 tons of munitions were taken before the American invasion.

Administration spokesman Dan Senor said, “There’s a very high probability that those weapons weren’t even there before the war.” (White House transcripts, October 26, 2004)

Press Secretary Scott McClellan tried to minimize the importance of the 380 tons of explosives that went missing, saying, “400,000 tons of munitions have been seized or destroyed by coalition forces.” (White House Press Release, October 27, 2004)

But the 400,000 tons, that the White House cited, referred to munitions -- including guns and ammunition. Pound for pound, the 380 tons of explosives are much, much more powerful. For example, the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 used less than a pound of the same type of material. By that math, the size of the explosives cache looted would be enough to bring down 760,000 planes. (New York Times, October 24, 2004)

However, evidence proved otherwise:

A group of Army reservists said that in the weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Iraqi looters loaded powerful explosives into pickup trucks and drove the material away from the Al Qaqaa. The soldiers said about a dozen United States troops guarding the facility could not prevent the theft, because they were outnumbered by looters. The 317th Support Center unit said they sent a message to commanders in Baghdad requesting help to secure the site but received no reply. (Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2004)

On October 25, 2004, an official who monitored developments in Iraq confirmed that United States troops searched Al Qaqaa in the immediate aftermath of the March 2003 invasion. They confirmed that the explosives, which had been under IAEA seal since 1991, were intact. (Associated Press, October 25, 2004)

Video shot in Iraq by a Minneapolis news team provided further proof that the Bush administration’s theory was invalid. After the invasion -- on April 18, 2003 -- the Minneapolis ABC news crew was stationed just south of the Al Qaqaa facility. (Channel 5 Eyewitness News video, KSTP, October 28, 2004)

That day, they drove 2 to 3 miles north with the 101st Airborne Division. Members of the 101st Airborne Division showed the 5 Eyewitness News team crew bunker after bunker of material labeled ‘explosives.’ Some of the boxes were marked “Al Qaqaa.” One soldier told the crew, “We can stick (detonation cords) in those and make some good bombs.” (Channel 5 Eyewitness News video, KSTP, October 28, 2004)

Iraq’s top science official, Mohammed al-Sharaa, said, “It is impossible that these materials could have been taken from this site before the regime’s fall. The officials that were inside this facility (Al Qaqaa) beforehand confirm that not even a shred of paper left it before the fall.” (ABC News, October 27, 2004)

A Pentagon official said, “United States-led coalition troops had searched Al Qaqaa in the immediate aftermath of the March 2003 invasion and confirmed that the explosives, which had been under IAEA seal since 1991, were intact.” (Associated Press, October 25, 2004)

Three Iraqi witnesses and a regional security chief said they were eyewitnesses, when looters stormed the weapons site at Al Qaqaa in early April 2003. Two witnesses were employees of Al Qaqaa -- one a chemical engineer and the other a mechanic -- and the third was a former employee, a chemist. They returned to Al Qaqaa to retrieve records, since they were determined to keep them out of American hands. (New York Times, October 28, 2004)

As American troops continued on to Baghdad, the eyewitnesses said they watched looters, while they gutted office buildings, carried off munitions, and dismantled heavy machinery. (New York Times, October 28, 2004)

The Iraqi eyewitnesses described the thefts so extensive that residents rented their trucks to looters. They said some looting was clearly indiscriminate, with people grabbing anything they could find and later heaving unwanted items off the trucks. (New York Times, October 28, 2004)

MORE MISSING EXPLOSIVES AT MUTHANNA WEAPONS SITE. Looters also entered the Muthanna military bunker shortly after the March American invasion. All of the sealed structures at the Muthanna site, 35 miles northwest of Baghdad, were broken into. It was unknown if usable chemical warheads were in the bunker. (New York Times, October 31, 2004)

The Muthanna site was placed under the control of the United Nations in early 1991 after it was damaged by an American bomb in the Persian Gulf war. At the time, Iraq said 2,500 sarin-filled artillery rockets had been stored there. The United Nations teams sealed the bunker with brick and reinforced concrete, rather than immediately attempt the risky job of clearing weapons or remnants from under a collapsed roof and neutralizing them. (New York Times, October 31, 2004)

The Muthanna site. Looters entered another large military bunker shortly after the March American invasion. All of the sealed structures at the Muthanna site, 35 miles northwest of Baghdad, were broken into. It was unknown if usable chemical warheads were in the bunker. (New York Times, October 31, 2004)

The Muthanna site was placed under the control of the United Nations in early 1991 after it was damaged by an American bomb in the Persian Gulf war. At the time, Iraq said 2,500 sarin-filled artillery rockets had been stored there. The United Nations teams sealed the bunker with brick and reinforced concrete, rather than immediately attempt the risky job of clearing weapons or remnants from under a collapsed roof and neutralizing them. (New York Times, October 31, 2004)

FAILING TO SECURE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. A Government Accountability Office report released in September 2005 said that the Pentagon failed to secure sources of radiological material in Iraq for six months after the invasion in 2003. It was during that period that some were looted or scattered. (Center for American Politics, September 8, 2005)

12. AMBASSADOR JOHN NEGROPONTE

In April 2004, Bush chose John Negroponte, the United States representative to the United Nations, to become thew first ambassador from the United States to Iraq scheduled for the end of June. Negroponte became notorious during the 1980s when he served as ambassador to Honduras. (New York Times, April 20, 2004)

Negroponte was a central player in the paramilitary war when the Contras were operating out of Honduras, just to the north of Nicaragua. He was known during his 1981-85 tenure as ambassador as “the Proconsul,” a title implying that Honduras was his country. It was said that three people ran Honduras: Negroponte, military chief General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, and the president. But the president wielded no power.

During his tenure as ambassador, the United States launched a covert war against Nicaragua and trained Honduran military to support the Contras. Negroponte worked closely with Alvarez to enable the training of Honduran soldiers in psychological warfare, sabotage, and many types of human rights violations, including torture and kidnapping. Honduran and Salvadoran military were sent to the School of the Americas to receive training in counter-insurgency directed against people of their own country. The CIA created the infamous Honduran Intelligence Battalion 3-16 that was responsible for the murder of many Sandinistas. General Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, a graduate of the School of the Americas, was a founder and commander of Battalion 3-16. In 1982, the US negotiated access to airfields in Honduras and established a regional military training center for Central American forces, principally directed at improving fighting forces of the Salvadoran military. (Sister Laetitia Bordes, Our Hearts Were Broken)

In 1994, the Honduran Human Rights Commission outlined the torture and disappearance of at least 184 political opponents. It also specifically accused Negroponte of a number of human rights violations. Operation Olancho, carried out by Honduras’ Battalion 316, led to the arrest of 96 guerrillas and the disappearance of James Francis Carney, an American Jesuit priest. Battalion 316 captured Carney’s group, and many were displayed for the media at a news conference September 19, 1983. In a letter to Negroponte, Alvarez thanked the ambassador for the “aerial transport offered to our troops” in Olancho. It was unclear whether Negroponte ever received the letter, but the Los Angeles Times (May 7, 2001) received a copy of the memo and confirmed its contents. The fate of Carney and his entourage never became known. (Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2001)

Negroponte also refused to act on kidnapping of 33 women who had come to Honduras to escape El Salvador death squads after the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980. One of them had been Romero’s secretary. In 1981, they were kidnapped from their living quarters in Tegucigalpa. (Los Angeles Times, September 14, 2001)

Negroponte always denied that he suppressed information about human rights violations. However, he did acknowledge that there were hundreds of articles in local papers about state-sponsored kidnappings and killings as well as regular demonstrations in the capital by relatives of missing people. (Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2001)

13. MOVING UP THE TIMETABLE FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER

After 40 Americans were killed in 10 days in November, the Bush administration drew up emergency plans to accelerate the transfer of power in Iraq. The abrupt change in policy clearly revealed that the Bush administration knew its program in Iraq was failing.

The announcement came on the heels of a devastating CIA report, warning that the guerrilla war was escalating to a new height. The report, an “appraisal of situation” commissioned by CIA Director Tenet and written by the CIA station chief in Baghdad, said that the insurgency continued to increase and had reached about 50,000. The report concluded that the United States could be defeated and that they supported the insurgents. (Philadelphia Enquirer, November 12, 2003; The Herald, London, November 13, 2003; The Guardian, November 13, 2003)

The Iraqi Governing Council purposely stalled the process of drafting a new constitution. With this major policy shift, the Bush administration handed the Governing Council its wish of becoming an autonomous provisional government. In return, the council promised to set a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding democratic national elections. (New York Times, November 14, 2003)

Nearly seven months after Bush declared victory, he finally hinted that more American troops might be needed. During a November 19 press conference, Bush contradicted the Pentagon when he indicated that more troops could be sent to Iraq. The president said, “Whatever is necessary to secure Iraq.” Immediately, Secretary of State Powell and National Security Advisor Rice looked at the press corps as if to suggest that there might be some clarification. (Washington Post, November 20, 2003)

As violence against American troops continued to escalate, a bipartisan group of nine senators visiting Iraq in July warned that American forces there are stretched thin. They warned that forces would face continuing attacks from organized Iraqi guerrilla. (New York Times, July 4, 2003)

For the first time, Bremer acknowledged that it would take a high price tag to reconstruct Iraq. In August, he announced “several tens of billions” of dollars would be required to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. (Washington Post, August 27, 2003)

Bremer also said Iraqi revenue would not nearly cover the bill for economic needs “almost impossible to exaggerate.” He said Iraq’s electrical demand alone would cost $2 billion, while a national system to deliver clean water would cost an estimated $16 billion over four years. (Washington Post, August 27, 2003)

14. THE RIYADH SUMMIT

All six of Iraq’s neighbors met in Saudi Arabia on April 19 to discuss the fate of Iraq. The Riyadh meeting consisted of Iraq’s neighbors -- Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia -- along with Egypt and Arab League chairman Bahrain. The group of eight affirmed that the Iraqi people should administer and govern their country by themselves, and any exploitation of their natural resources should be in conformity with the will of the legitimate Iraqi government and its people. (Al Jazeera, April 22, 2003)

The foreign ministers called on American troops to leave Iraq “as soon as possible.” even as they disagreed on other key points. However, they disagreed on some points such as the status of the Kurds in the north, Turkish demands on oil from the city of Kirkuk, and the identity of certain figures that the Bush administration had picked to become members of a future Iraqi government.

Egypt and Syria asked the United States and Britain to end their occupation of Iraq immediately and to pave the way for a government chosen by Iraqis. Turkey, however, said it would focus on reconstruction efforts given United States reluctance to give the United Nations and the international community a voice in Iraq’s political future. All the countries represented feared the United States would install a puppet regime in Iraq which would ally itself with Israel. (New York Times, April 18, 2003)

However, while the Bush administration was condemned for invading Iraq, several Middle Eastern countries indicated that they would cooperate with the United States for fear that they, too, might be targets of Washington. After threatening the Syrian regime, President al-Assad chose to deny asylum to fleeing Iraqi leaders, warning a refusal would be tantamount to a hostile action.

Several Middle Eastern airlines also capitulated to the demands of the Bush administration. Syrian Arab Airlines turned away Iraqi passengers who did not carry valid visas on flights to Damascus. Egyptair refused to allow Iraqis on flights before receiving permission from the country of their destination. Lebanese authorities asked Cairo airport officials to apply such measures on Iraqi passengers bound for Beirut. (Al Jazeera, April 22, 2003)

15. CONVENING THE GOVERNING COUNCIL

American-sponsored talks on the future of Iraq opened on April 14 near Nasiriya in the ancient city of Ur. About 60 Iraqis -- Shia and Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and supporters of the country’s former monarchy -- attended the meeting. American officials invited the groups, but each picked their own representatives. (New York Times, April 15, 2003)

Bush pledged to the representatives that it would never attempt to rule Iraq. However, nothing was said of influence or pressure that the White House might use in choosing Iraqi leaders. The representatives agreed to meet ten days later.

Very conspicuous was the absence of thousands of Shi’ite Muslims whose representatives boycotted the meeting demonstrated in Nasiriya. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq was among several Iraqi opposition allowed to participate, even though the Bush administration viewed with deep suspicion, because of close ties with the Iranian government. Badr Brigade, a force of about 10,000 men, received training and support from the Iranian government.

Nevertheless, the group declined two American invitations to participate in sessions intended to lead to the formation of an interim government. Hamid al-Bayati, the group’s representative in London, said he mistrusted the American sponsorship role. Bayati said, “If they are talking about democracy, they should leave the Iraqi people to organize themselves.” (New York Times, April 23, 2003)

Many of those who did not attend said they opposed United States plans to install the retired Lieutenant. General Jay Garner to run an interim administration in Iraq. Garner opened the conference by saying, “A free and democratic Iraq will begin today.” He added, “What better place than the birthplace of civilization could you have for the beginning of a free Iraq?” White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad told delegates that the United States had “no interest, absolutely no interest, in ruling Iraq.” (Associated Press, April 15, 2003)

Two hundred delegates met for a second time on April 28 in Baghdad. Only a handful of Iraqi Shia and Sunni Muslims as well as Kurds generally supported United States cooperation in setting up a new government, while Iraqi exiles, for the most part, sought a diminished role for the United States.

Although the Bush administration refused to disqualify former Ba’athist leaders, it was apparent that they would not be welcome in the new interim government. Garner said that its members would not in itself disqualify Iraqis from retaining their administrative jobs, but that close associates of Hussein and known violators of human rights would be barred. Chalabi said that he had concerns about admitting Ba’athist figures with Zalmay Khalilzad, Bush’s representative to the Iraqi opposition. (New York Times, April 30, 2003)

None of the major candidates hoping to lead the transitional government -- including Chalabi -- attended the meeting. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a group with strong ties to Iran that boycotted the previous meeting in Nasiriya, was invited. Outside the hall, several thousand protesters affiliated with a Shi’ite theological college in the holy city of Najaf denounced the meeting as unrepresentative of religious Shi’ism. (New York Times, April 29, 2003)

Five powerful Iraqi politicians back from exile met with an American envoy, as they attempted to secure their roles in an interim government. Chalabi, the Bush administration’s choice to lead Iraq, met alongside Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, whose elder brother headed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Saad al-Bazzaz, a prominent exile, said a number of delegates had discussed the possibility of a presidential council rather than naming a single leader for Iraq (New York Times, May 1, 2003; Los Angeles Times, April 28, 2003)

As the administration was failing in its reconstruction efforts, Iraq politicians became increasingly agitated by Bush’s announcement to delay the implementation of an interim government hurt the mood of Iraqi politicians. Earlier, they had been optimistic at the signs of forming an all-Iraqi provisional government. Hamid al-Bayati of the main Shiite Muslim group under Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim advocated pressuring the United States and Britain by organizing demonstrations against the indefinite occupation.

Chalabi was waiting in the wings to be handed a high-level government position, until Bremer announced Bush’s promises had been rescinded. Chalabi’s “Free Iraqi Forces,” about 700 paramilitary fighters who briefly cooperated with the United States in the late stages of Bush’s war, were abruptly dissolved. (New York Times, May 26, 2003)

The blame for continued turmoil was directed at the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Fears mounted that its failures could threaten the transition to an interim Iraqi government by causing an erosion of public confidence and increased demands for the United States to get out altogether.

On July 7, the main Iraqi political groups supported by the Bush administration said they would join the first postwar interim government and press for greater powers under the occupation authority. This marked the final stage of a two-month-long exercise between former Iraqi opposition leaders and Bremer over how much power and authority the Iraqi leadership body will be given. (New York Times, July 7, 2003)

In Baghdad, Shi’ites from central and southern Iraq met for the first time to discuss how they could help create a united Iraqi nation. Opposition leaders Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish leader, and Chalabi of the INC urged United States military commanders in Iraq to allow the creation of an Iraqi national security force to help thwart attacks that are destabilizing the country.

On July 13 -- three months after Hussein had been deposed -- the Bush administration finally accepted a representative governing council that was dominated by the Shi’ites. Superficially, the council was given the power to name ministers and approve the 2004 budget. But in reality, final control of Iraq still rested with Bremer. The Bush administration hand-picked 25 members to run the Governing Council. The council was stacked with ex-exiles and was largely disliked by Iraqi nationals. It consisted of a Shi’ite Muslim from a party banned by Hussein as its first president. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, chief spokesman for the Islamic Dawa Party, was tabbed to run the council only for the month of August. The president’s power was severely limited, since the 25-member Governing Council decided to rotate the presidency alphabetically among nine members. (Washington Post, July 13, 2003; San Francisco Chronicle, July 23, 2003)

On September 1, the Governing Council named a 25-member cabinet that was intended to take over the day-to-day running of the government from the Americans. Yet, the Bush administration still refused to give any indication as to when it would turn government operations over to the Iraqis.

The Governing Council questioned why the American occupation authority had issued a $20 million contract to buy new revolvers and Kalashnikov rifles for the Iraqi police when the U.S. military was confiscating tens of thousands of weapons every month from Hussein’s abandoned arsenals. (San Francisco Chronicle, October 4, 2003)

One month later -- on October 1 -- the Governing Council challenged a Bush administration decision to spend $1.2 billion to train 35,000 Iraqi police officers in Jordan when such training could be done in Iraq for a fraction of the cost. Germany and France have offered to provide such training free. (San Francisco Chronicle, October 4, 2003)

The Governing Council members said that the lack of competition encouraged corruption. They said they believed that many contracts had been inflated beyond the reasonable cost for the work, creating opportunities for kickbacks between primary contractors and subcontractors.

A number of Iraqi businessmen said they believe it was necessary to pay kickbacks to win contracts. A spokesman for Bechtel said his company had neither paid any kickbacks nor been approached by Iraqis seeking to pay kickbacks. (San Francisco Chronicle, October 4, 2003)

The Bush administration lobbied unsuccessfully to gain support from the international community for sending aid and troops to Iraq. The White House, however, did boast when Turkey announced it would send 10,000 troops into Iraq. The White House had hoped for months to convince big Muslim countries like Turkey and Pakistan to contribute troops to the occupation, both to lighten the burden on American soldiers and to dispel the perception that mostly Christian troops were occupying a Muslim country.

However, the decision by Ankara was met with strong resistance by the Governing Council members who disliked Turkey. For years, the Turkish government carried out a harsh war against its own Kurdish independence movement. Iraq and Turkey had opposed the dams that Turkey had built on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In November, Turkey withdrew its promise to send troops. (New York Times, October 8, 2003)

In all but acknowledging failure, the Bush administration in October announced a major reorganization of reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The National Security Council created the “Iraq Stabilization Group” (ISG) as a result of all the setbacks in Iraq and the absence of progress in Afghanistan.

This was the closest the administration had come to an admission that its plans for nation-building in those countries had proved insufficient and that they were unprepared for the guerrilla war that had resulted.

The objective of the ISG, headed by National Security Adviser Rice, was to strengthen economic, political, and counterterrorism efforts. State Department officials had complained bitterly that they had been shut out of decision-making about Iraq. As a result, Rumsfeld’s Defense Department was forced to relinquish some power in running the affairs of Iraq and Afghanistan. The White House denied that the reorganization plan was implemented as a result of Rumsfeld’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. (San Francisco Chronicle, October 6, 2003)

When asked about his role in the policy shift, Rumsfeld appeared shocked and irritated that he was not told in advance about the reorganization. He did not learn of the new ISG, he said, until he received a classified memo about it from Rice after it already had been put into motion. (Washington Post, October 8, 2003)

By November, it was apparent that the Governing Council was stymied by personal agendas, ethnic rivalries, and differences over visions for a new Iraq. In addition, attacks on Americans increased to over 30 each day. After 40 Americans were killed in 10 days in November, the Bush administration drew up emergency plans to accelerate the transfer of power in Iraq. The abrupt change in policy clearly revealed that the Bush administration knew its program in Iraq was failing.

Bremer made a hurried return to the White House officials where he held an urgent round of meetings to discuss ways of speeding up the transfer of power to Iraqis. CIA Director Tenet warned that the guerrilla war in Iraq had escalated to a new height. The report -- an “Appraisal of Situation” and written by the CIA station chief in Baghdad -- said that the insurgency continued to increase and had reached about 50,000. The report concluded that the United States could be defeated and that they supported the insurgents. (New York Times, November 12, 2003; Philadelphia Enquirer, November 12, 2003; The Herald, London, November 13, 2003; The Guardian, November 13, 2003)

On November 16, Bremer announced that the Governing Council would be dissolved when a new constitution was to be ratified in June 2005. A new interim government would replace the Governing Council and would consist of local councils throughout the governorates. An Iraqi constitution would be drafted in 2005. Elections would be held in 2006 at which time Iraq would be granted full sovereignty with a democratically-elected government. (Iraq Today, November 18, 2003; Chicago Tribune, November 29, 2003)

In Iraq, the Governing Council purposely stalled the process of drafting a new constitution. With this major policy shift, the Bush administration handed the Governing Council its wish of becoming an autonomous provisional government. In return, the council promised to set a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding democratic national elections. (New York Times, November 14, 2003)

Ayatollah al-Sistani issued a legal judgment that rejected an unelected constitutional assembly. The Shia pronouncement along with the chaos in Iraq convinced the Bush administration that the democratic participation of the Iraqi people in a constitutional assembly would be counterproductive. Senior White House officials and in the Coalition Provisional Authority warned that a new constitution should be the product of a small unelected committee. Introducing democracy this early would undermine the focus of the Coalition Authority and the Governing Council. (New York Times, November 14, 2003)

Several high-level Americans and Iraqis announced their opposition to the revised reconstruction proposal. Former administrator Garner acknowledged that failures by the Bush administration attracted foreign terrorists to Iraq. Reflecting on Bush’s appalling comments, Garner said, “That’s not all bad. Bring them all in there and we will kill them there.” In a BBC radio interview, Garner said, “Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi army, effectively throwing hundreds of thousands of breadwinners out of work and providing potential recruits for insurgency, was a mistake.” (London’s The Herald, November 25, 2003)

A majority the Governing Council supported the American plan. However, the Bush administration received resistance from some key Iraqi figures. Nevertheless, White House officials denied the existence of friction within the Governing Council.

On February 20, under pressure from Shias, the Bush administration abandoned its plan to hold regional caucuses. Instead, the White House chose to work with the United Nations and Iraqis to develop yet another plan for the transfer of political power by June 30. (Washington Post, February 20, 2004)

16. SELECTING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

CHOOSING LEADERS FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. The Governing Council chose the top officials in the new government, but Bush administration advisors were right in the middle giving their input. Officials waited until the end of May -- just one month before the turnover of government -- to make their selections.

The White House pressed for Hussein Shahristani, an independent Shi’ite Muslim, for the prime minister slot. Shahristani was an Iraqi nuclear chemist and spent 11 years in prison after refusing to help Hussein build a nuclear bomb. Shahristani escaped from Abu Ghraib prison in February 1991. Perhaps he was chosen because of his close ties to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. Since he lacked political parties and without a constituency, it meant he would have trouble getting things done in a government already being divided along sectarian lines -- with many key players linked to parties. The day the story was leaked by the White House, Shahristani turned down the offer. (Washington Post, May 27, 2004)

Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and President Adnan Pachachi. Ayad Allawi was first groomed in exile by Britain's intelligence service, M.I.6, then by the CIA, to take power from Saddam. However, repeated coup attempts failed. He was a paid Mukhabarat agent for the Iraqis and was part of a “hit team” that sought out and killed Ba’athist Party dissenters throughout Europe. After Allawi was dropped by the Baghdad regime, the Ba’athists organized a series of attempts on his life. The third attempt, by an axe-wielding assassin near London in 1978, resulted in a one-year hospital stay. (Washington Post, May 27, 2004; The New Yorker, June 21, 2004; Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2004)

Allawi headed the Iraqi National Accord (INA), an exile group supported for years by the CIA. The INA was a rival to the Chalabi’s INC. In the 1990s, Allawi was financed by the CIA and used car bombs and other explosive devices smuggled into Iraq in an attempt to sabotage and destabilize Hussein’s regime. In 1996, one of Allawi’s top officers and his group’s self-proclaimed chief bomb maker detailed the mechanics behind Allawi’s murderous actions in a videotape. (Washington Post, May 27, 2004; Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2004)

Allawi said, “No one had any problem with sabotage in Baghdad back then. … I don’t think anyone could have known how things could turn out today.” Allawi’s following included secular Shi’ite Muslims, Sunnis, and Kurds. (Washington Post, May 27, 2004; Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2004)

The Bush administration did not approve of Allawi’s selection, partially because he had criticized the United States occupation of Iraq. Allawi had close connections the British MI6 intelligence agency. Allawi made the controversial claim was channeled that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction could be operational in 45 minutes. That claim was pushed by British intelligence and then by Bush. (www.independent.co.uk, June 2, 2004; New York Times, May 29, 2004)

However, Allawi was the choice of the Governing Council, and its members feared they would lose power if they did not select one of its own. His Iraqi National Accord, an exile grouping, had little support inside Iraq, but as a secular Shi’ite, Allawi proved acceptable to both the Shi’ite majority and to Sunnis. (New York Times, May 31, 2004; Washington Post, June 1, 2004)

The Bush administration supported an 81-year-old former foreign minister and Sunni, Adnan Pachachi. However, he was unable to win the support of five of the Council members. (New York Times, May 31, 2004; Washington Post, June 1, 2004)

After Allawi was tabbed to fill the slot for prime minister, a rift emerged between the Governing Council and the Bush administration over the nomination of the president. Governing Council members accused Bremer of trying to railroad them into accepting Bush’s choice for the post. Bremer abruptly cancelled a Council meeting in an attempt to interfere with the selection process. White House officials naturally denied that Bremer prevented the meeting to go forward. (Chicago Tribune, June 2, 2004)

Some members of the Council complained that they were being sidelined. They suggested the decision-making process revolved around the Bush administration, Brahimi, and prominent Council members. Brahimi was so disgusted with the unilateralism of the Bush administration that he called Bremer a “dictator.” (New York Times, May 31, 2004; June 3, 2004)

Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish Governing Council member, said, “Mr. Bremer won’t let the council vote, and he says if we vote, he won’t accept the result. He is a dictator. I don’t know how he can behave like that. He’s imposing his will on everybody.” (Chicago Tribune, June 2, 2004)

The Bush administration eventually backed down, enabling the Council to name Allawi for the position of prime minister. Despite opposition from the Bush administration, the Council selected the current head of the Council, Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, an American-educated civil engineer and a Sunni Muslim. With the appointment of the new Iraqi government, the Governing Council immediately dissolved itself. (Washington Post, May 27, 2004; June 1, 2004)

17. THE OIL-FOR-FOOD SCANDAL

After the First Gulf War, the United Nations imposed an oil embargo on Baghdad. Then in the late 1990s, the Security Council began relaxing the oil-for-food program. It no longer was simply an “Oil-for-food” effort, as an emphasis shifted from simple humanitarian relief to broader economic assistance and the rebuilding of infrastructure that included oil production, power generation, water and sanitation, agriculture, transportation, and telecommunications. Still the Security Council controlled the funds in an escrow account, setting aside nearly 30 percent for war reparations and United Nations costs.

In 1998, the Security Council raised the limits on permitted oil sales, and in 1999 it removed the ceiling altogether. Production began rising to approximately 2.6 million barrels per day, levels approaching those before the Gulf War. Oil revenues during the last six months of 2000 reached nearly $10 billion.

Mismanagement, corruption, and manipulation of the program by Hussein allowed his regime to amass at least $21 billion outside the United Nation’s control. This estimate was made in 2004 by the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004) Iraq obstructed and undermined the aid program. Baghdad periodically halted oil sales as a way of protesting sanctions. During the first half of 2001, oil sales were approximately $4 billion less than in the previous 180-day period. According to the United Nations, the “Oil-for-food” program “suffered considerably because ... oil exports ... (Have) been reduced or totally suspended by the government of Iraq.” In June and July 2001, as the Security Council considered a new “smart sanctions” plan, Iraq again withheld oil exports to register its disapproval of the proposal. The result was a further loss of oil revenues and a reduction of the funds available for humanitarian needs. (The Nation, December 3, 2001)

Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the exiled Iraqi National Congress (INC), was on the CIA payroll since the late 1990s. It was Chalabi who helped convince the Bush administration that Hussein still had WMD. In fact, the celebrated Chalabi was a guest of the Bush administration at the State of the Union in 2003.

However, one year later, Chalabi fell out of grace with the Bush administration. When no WMD were found in Iraq, Bush administration officials figured they were funneled those reports to encourage Bush to go to war.

One year into Bush’s war, the Pentagon began was investigating members of Chalabi’s INC. Allegations against at least 15 INC members included abduction, stealing eleven Iraqi government vehicles, assaulting police by firing on them during a search, impersonating police officers, and breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. Four INC operatives were arrested during the spring of 2004, and an arrest warrant was issued for the INC’s chief of intelligence. The INC confirmed its offices were searched six times and 11 cars seized. (NBC News, April 28, 2004; World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

In addition, Chalabi was charged with passing classified information to the Iranian government, telling Teheran officials that the United States had broken Iran’s secret code. (Washington Post, June 7, 2004) (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2003)

Then Chalabi himself was investigated for embezzling millions of dollars from the “Oil-for-food” program. The list of those involved in the scandal included 270 people who allegedly slashed funds for the Hussein regime and increased profits for themselves. Those included international politicians including Benon Sevan, the United Nations bureaucrat who administered the “Oil-for-food” program. (Newsweek, April 26, 2004)

Another suspect in the “Oil-for-food” program was on Kojo Annan, the 29-year son of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Kojo Annan once worked for Cotecna Inspection SA, a Swiss company hired by the United Nations to monitor and inspect “Oil-for-food” shipments from February 1999 until November 2003. (Newsweek, October 18, 2004)

Kojo Annan left Cotecna Inspection SA before it was retained by the United Nations. He was paid a “non-compete” fee by the company after it began work on the Oil-for-Food program. He received $2,500 a month for more than five years from Cotecna Inspection SA. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004)

Cotecna and Annan claimed that Kojo Annan stopped working for the company in 1998. The company said it had paid him the monthly stipend through 1999 to keep him from working for competitors and that he never worked on a project related to Iraq. Yet, there was no evidence Kojo Annan’s connection with Cotecna influenced its receipt of the Iraq contract. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004)

Unlike the United Nations, which spearheaded this independent investigation of the “Oil-for-food” program, the Bush administration failed to properly investigate $8.8 billion in Iraqi oil revenues. That was twice the amount Hussein was thought to have gained from “Oil-for-food” kickbacks that the United States-led Coalition Provisional Authority could not account for. (Associated Press, January 30, 2005)

Robert Massey, the managing director of Cotecna, was indicted in June 1998 by a Swiss magistrate. He was charged with making illicit payments by Cotecna to former Pakistan prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

In April 2004, Annan appointed Paul Volcker, former Federal Reserve Board chairman, to head the Independent United Nations Inquiry Committee and to lead an inquiry into allegations that senior United Nations officials profited from the “Oil-for-Food” program. (Washington Post, August 9, 2005)

The Independent United Nations Inquiry Committee found no evidence that Annan himself was involved in improprieties. The March 2005 report said there was “no evidence that the selection of Cotecna in 1998 was subject to any affirmative or improper influence of the secretary general in the bidding or selection process.” (Washington Post, March 29, 2005)

Volcker’s first charges came down 16 months later -- in the summer of 2005. The committee brought charges against Alexander Yakovlev, a former Russian procurement officer, accusing him of receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes from companies doing business with the United Nations. The charges included three counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and money laundering. Volcker alleged that Yakovlev received more than $950,000 in an offshore bank account from contractors doing other types of business with the United Nations. (Washington Post, August 9, 2005)

Yakovlev was charged with faxing privileged bidding information in 1996 to a company pursuing business through the oil program. Yakovlev was also charged with creating a front company, Moxyco Ltd., “to facilitate the illicit and secret payment of money to him by foreign companies” trying to do business with the United Nations. (Washington Post, August 9, 2005)

At the same time, the panel accused Benon Sevan, the program’s former director, of receiving nearly $150,000 in kickbacks from a company run by relatives of former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Volcker accused Sevan of engaging in a “grave conflict of interest” by asking senior Iraqi officials to give business to Africa Middle East Petroleum Co. (AMEP), a Panamanian-registered company controlled by Fakhry Abdelnour, Boutros-Ghali’s cousin. AMEP bought 7.3 million barrels of Iraqi oil from 1998 to 2001 and sold them for more than $1.5 million in profit. (Washington Post, August 9, 2005)

Sevan was accused of accepting cash from Abdelnour and Boutros-Ghali’s brother-in-law, Efraim “Fred” Nadler, an officer at the company. The evidence against Sevan included telephone and bank records and was largely circumstantial. The report cited Nadler’s withdrawal of $257,500 from a Geneva bank in November 1998 and October 2001, when Sevan was in the Swiss city. Shortly after his return to New York, Sevan and his wife, Micheline, made deposits totaling $147,184. (Washington Post, August 9, 2005)

In May 2005, a Senate subcommittee released a report that found that United States oil purchases accounted for 52 percent of the kickbacks paid to the Saddam Hussein regime in return for sales of cheap oil -- more than the rest of the world put together. (The Guardian, May 17, 2005; Washington Post, May 17, 2005)

The Bush administration was made aware of illegal oil sales and kickbacks paid to Baghdad but did nothing to stop them. The report said: “The United States was not only aware of Iraqi oil sales which violated United Nations sanctions and provided the bulk of the illicit money Saddam Hussein obtained from circumventing U.N. sanctions.” (The Guardian, May 17, 2005; Washington Post, May 17, 2005)

The Senate report made several allegations against the Bush administration:

1. The United States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) -- which managed the import of more than 200 million barrels of Iraqi crude into the United States between 2000 and 2002 -- failed to take action against Houston-based Bayoil Corporation which facilitated payment of $37 million in illegal surcharges to the Hussein regime.

2. The surcharges or kickbacks were a violation of the “Oil-for-food” program. Saddam was allowed to choose which companies were given the highly lucrative oil contracts. Between September 2000 and September 2002 -- when the practice was stopped -- the regime demanded kickbacks of 10 to 30 cents a barrel in return for oil allocations.

3. The United States military and the State Department gave a green light for shipments of nearly 8 million barrels of oil bought by Jordan, entirely outside the United Nations-monitored “Oil-for-food” program. Jordan was permitted to buy some oil directly under strict conditions but these purchases appeared to be under the counter.

4. United Nations monitors made efforts to obtain information about Bayoil’s oil shipments in 2001 and 2002. However, no help was provided by the United States Treasury Department. Also, repeated requests for assistance were made to the State Department over a span of eight months. (The Guardian, May 17, 2005; Washington Post, May 17, 2005)

The Jordanian oil purchases were shipped in the weeks before Bush attacked Iraq. They were sent from the Iraqi port of Khor al-Amaya, which was operating without United Nations approval or surveillance. (The Guardian, May 17, 2005; Washington Post, May 17, 2005)

Odin Marine Incorporated, a United States company, chartered the seven tankers which picked up the oil at Khor al-Amaya. Correspondence indicated that Odin Marine repeatedly sought and received approval from United States military and civilian officials that the ships would not be confiscated by Navy vessels in the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) that was enforcing the embargo. (The Guardian, May 17, 2005)

18. IRAQ’S $200 BILLION DEBT

Bush had to deal with Iraq’s $200 billion foreign debt. Over 75 percent of the non-United States pledges came from just three sources -- Japan, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The 15-country European Union promised $236 million. However, the EU staunchly opposed to the Bush war, offered no financial assistance. That meant the United States would likely carry most of the international burden for rebuilding Iraq. (Washington Post, October 25, 2003)

The pledges came in the form of concessionary loans, export credits, project financing, grants, and other forms of assistance. The money was also a combination of previously committed funds and new cash promised over several years. Spanish officials said it would take several days, and additional follow-up meetings, to determine the precise mix and amounts. (Washington Post, October 25, 2003)

Contributions from Iraq's wealthy Persian Gulf neighbors were far below what the Bush administration had hoped. Saudi Arabia extended $500 million in loans and $500 million in export credits -- but none came in the form of grants. Qatar gave $100 million, the United Arab Emirates offered $215 million, and Kuwait pledged $500 million. (Washington Post, October 25, 2003)

As a result, the Bush administration was disappointed. First, the $33 billion fell far short of the $56 billion that the World Bank and the United Nations said Iraq would need over five years. Second, the White House hoped that all the money would be in the form of grants -- that there would be no loans. (Washington Post, October 25, 2003)

THE JAMES BAKER MISSION. Bush chose President Reagan’s secretary of state James Baker to help restructure Iraq’s $200 billion national debt, most of which came from the 1991 Gulf War. Baker’s goal was to meet with heads of state and persuade them to forgive the debts owed to them by Iraq. If Iraq were forced to pay even a quarter of these claims, its debt would still be more than double its annual GDP, severely undermining its capacity to pay for reconstruction or to address the humanitarian needs of its war-ravaged citizens.

Baker’s clients and potential future clients were easily affected by the decisions made about Iraq’s debt. Baker was senior counselor to the Carlyle Group, one of the world’s largest defense contractors. Carlyle also did business with the Saudi royal family. (New York Times, December 12, 2003)

Baker was also a partner in Baker Botts, a Houston law firm whose client list included Halliburton. One of Baker Botts’ offices was in Riyadh. Baker Botts formed an alliance with a United Arab Emirates company that used Baker’s name to solicit Middle East business. (New York Times, December 12, 2003)

Carlyle sought to secure an extraordinary $1 billion investment from the Kuwaiti government. The secret deal involved a complex transaction to transfer ownership of as much as $57 billion in unpaid Iraqi debts. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

The debts owed to the government of Kuwait would be assigned to a foundation created and controlled by a consortium in which the key players were the Carlyle Group, the Albright Group (headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright), and several other well-connected firms. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

Under the deal, the government of Kuwait would also give the consortium $2 billion up front to invest in a private equity fund devised by the consortium, with half of it going to Carlyle. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

The consortium’s objective was to pressure the Kuwaiti government into forgiving Iraq $30 billion in sovereign debt and $27 billion in war debt from the 1991 Gulf War. In a letter dated August 6, 2004, the consortium informed Kuwait’s foreign ministry that the country’s unpaid debts from Iraq “are in imminent jeopardy” and that world opinion was in favor of debt forgiveness. In addition, the consortium warned that Kuwait was unlikely to see either the $30 billion or $27 billion. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

When Baker returned to the United States in January 2003, he made a speech in which he made this distinction for the first time: “My job is to deal with Iraqi debt to sovereign creditors, not with war reparations.” Baker also said that reparations were outside his authority. He said they were “under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council and subject to resolutions it has passed.” (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

However, Baker’s goal of maximizing Iraq's debt payments directly contradicted the objective of the Bush administration. Baker’s role was obviously a conflict of interest. He was to represent the interests of the United States, while he was a senior counselor at Carlyle. And Carlyle wanted to get paid to help Kuwait recover its debts from Iraq. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

Baker’s statement on reparations also placed him at odds with several other members of the Bush administration. The United States civilian administrator to Iraq, Paul Bremer, said, “I think there needs to be a very serious look at this whole reparations issue.” He compared the Iraq situation to that of Germany after World War I, when the 1921 Reparations Commission forced the Weimar Republic to pay $33 billion. Bremer warned, “The massive reparations contributed directly to the morass of unrest, instability and despair which led to Adolf Hitler’s election.” (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

Yet, Iraq continued to make regular reparations payments for Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In the eighteen months since the United States invasion, Iraq paid out a staggering $1.8 billion in reparations. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

Most of the payments went to the wealthy corporate state of Kuwait that had six consecutive budget surpluses. Kuwaiti citizens averaged purchasing power of $19,000 a year. Iraqis, by contrast, lived on an average of just over $2 a day, with most of the population dependent on food rations for basic nutrition. Yet reparations payments continued to flow into Kuwait. (The Nation, October 12, 2004)

FORGIVING PART OF IRAQ’S DEBT. In November 2004, Bush administration reached a deal for forgiving 80 percent of Iraq’s foreign debt. Germany reached an agreement under which Iraq’s creditors would write off up to 80 percent of the war-ravaged country’s debt. (Al Jazeera, November 23, 2004)

Wolfowitz’s rationale for punishing the anti-war countries seemed nonsensical. As if American security was based on who provided funds for the reconstruction effort, Wolfowitz said that it was necessary “for the protection of the essential security interests of the United States” to limit the competition. (Washington Post, December 9, 2003)

Senator Joseph Biden, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reacted by saying the action was a “totally gratuitous slap that does nothing to protect our security interests and everything to alienate countries we need with us in Iraq.” (Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2003)

United Nations Secretary General Annan called Bush’s policy “unfortunate” and suggested that he might be violating international law. Diplomats warned that Bush’s policy -- which barred countries that did not support the invasion of Iraq from getting prime contracts there -- could be problematic. (Washington Post, December 12, 2003)

Even high-ranking Republicans echoed the same concerns. GOP House Majority Leader Bill Frist was puzzled that he decided to support a policy that he had flatly rejected only months earlier. (Washington Post, December 12, 2003)

While the United States was stuck with paying off Iraq’s debt, there were accusations on Capitol Hill that the war was costing American taxpayers more than what they had been told.

House Democrats accused Paul Wolfowitz of concealing internal administration estimates on the cost of fighting and rebuilding the country. He called the estimate by General Shinseki as “wildly off the mark.” (New York Times, February 28, 2003)

Pentagon officials have put the figure closer to 100,000 troops. Wolfowitz dismissed estimates from Pentagon budget specialists that put the cost of war and reconstruction at $60 billion to $95 billion annually. (New York Times, February 28, 2003)

19. THE RISE AND FALL OF AHMAD CHALABI

A Shia Muslim, Ahmad Chalabi left Iraq in 1956 and had lived mainly in the United States and London. In 1992, he was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court for bank fraud after the 1990 collapse of Petra Bank which he had founded in 1977. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison with hard labor for bank. (CI Press News Monitor, April 9, 2003)

Chalabi’s proponents in the Pentagon claimed the CIA’s dislike for him dated back to a failed coup backed by the CIA against Saddam in 1995. Saddam prevented the coup and executed the plotters. Some intelligence officials suspected that Hussein set a trap. Chalabi let it be publicly known that he had warned the CIA, in advance, that the coup plot had been compromised. When it failed, he proclaimed, “I told you so.” The CIA thereafter regarded Chalabi as a boastful meddler, according to Chalabi’s friends at the Pentagon. (Newsweek, February 10, 2003)

Another source of intelligence about Hussein was the Kurdish community in northern Iraq. The CIA had a rocky relationship with the Kurds. Many Kurds castigated the CIA for initiating -- then backing out of -- various attempts to rise up against Baghdad over the past 40 years. CIA officials distrusted Kurdish tribal leaders for selling out to the highest bidder. When the CIA organized a rebellion against Hussein in 1996, one of the two Kurdish tribes leading the insurrection suddenly switched sides and attacked the other tribe. Washington quickly pulled out. (Newsweek, February 10, 2003)

In the mid-1990s, Chalabi became head of the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), and in1996 he planned an INC offensive in northern Iraq. Chalabi assembled about 1,000 fighters who were half-heartedly backed by the CIA. Not only did Iraqi troops not defect as predicted by Chalabi. (CI Press News Monitor, April 9, 2003)

While heading the INC, Chalabi provided misinformation to the United States intelligence community. In return, the INC and Chalabi received $340,000 a month from the Pentagon. He fabricated stories to indicate that Iraq posed a threat to the world. INC officials told at least eight Western intelligence services that Saddam possessed secret weapons. A military defector, who later was revealed to be a relative of a top INC official, claimed Iraq had mobile labs for making biological toxins. His testimony was cited by Secretary of State Powell in his February 5, 2003, presentation to the Security Council. (World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

In December 2001, Chalabi named a defector who told the New York Times that he had seen biological- and nuclear weapons laboratories in Baghdad -- including one beneath a hospital. The defector also became a source for the Defense Intelligence Agency. (Newsweek, May 31, 2004) Chalabi also named a second defector to Vanity Fair. He reportedly was a former general in Iraq’s secret police and told of a secret training site near Baghdad where terrorists trained in hijacking airplanes (Newsweek, May 31, 2004)

Days after United States troops marched into Baghdad in April 2003, the Pentagon flew Chalabi and his 600-man militia -- the Free Iraqi Forces -- into southern Iraq. A crowd of cheering Iraqis appeared in a Baghdad square to celebrate the toppling of Saddam’s statue. However, a long-distance shot of the same scene showed only one or two hundred people, contrary to the impression given by all the close-up TV news shots of what appeared to be a massive gathering. The rest of the plaza was sparsely populated. The carefully orchestrated event was close to the Palestine Hotel where the international media were based. It was later revealed that Chalabi had orchestrated the event, bringing in hundreds of Kurds from northern Iraq. (Time, April 26, 2004)

The Bush administration rewarded Chalabi by giving him a seat on the Iraqi Governing Council, and he became one of the nine rotating presidents. Chalabi and other Governing Council members asked for more political and financial control over the $20.3 billion in United States reconstruction money. He headed the De-Baathification Commission and acquired massive files of Ba’athist Party records, including memberships and records of payments made and services rendered. With those tools, American investigators alleged that Chalabi was able to extort and blackmail in order to maintain his powerful position on the Council. (The Guardian, October 1, 2003; Newsweek, May 31, 2004)

Chalabi’s operatives helped United States forces track down members of Hussein’s regime and collect valuable documents. Chalabi’s forces laid claim to houses, buildings, document caches, and vehicles in Baghdad that belonged to the former regime.

Bush invited him to the State of the Union in January 2004 where he was the special guest of First Lady Laura Bush. When introduced by the president, Chalabi received a rounding ovation. But the Bush-Chalabi relationship with the Bush administration began to crumble. Allegations against at least 15 INC members included abduction, stealing eleven Iraqi government vehicles, assaulting police by firing on them during a search, impersonating police officers, and breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. Four INC operatives were arrested during the spring of 2004, and an arrest warrant was issued for the INC’s chief of intelligence. The INC confirmed its offices were searched six times and 11 cars seized. (NBC News, April 28, 2004; World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

Chalabi convinced the Governing Council to award a lucrative contract for Iraq’s mobile phone system to a close friend. After months of delays in deploying a mobile network the Pentagon launched an investigation of “suspect license awards” into the Chalabi-connected company. (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2003)

One INC official, Sabah Nouri, was arrested in the spring of 2004 on corruption charges. Auditors found a $22 million shortfall in the unit of the INC that oversaw Iraq’s changeover to a new currency -- the dinar. Nouri was also accused of stealing 12 cars from the ministry. (World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

Other INC members allegedly kidnapped a Baghdad cardiologist in April. He claimed that he recognized INC members who blindfolded and tortured him until he arranged to pay ransom. The Iraqi police said, “They bound him, took him to an unknown place and after he got back to his house he discovered they took $20,000. We caught the suspects and they said they were from the INC.” (NBC News, April 28, 2004; World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

Chalabi conducted his own investigation into the United Nations’ old “Oil-for-Food” program that provided humanitarian supplies to Baghdad in the 1990s. By identifying Iraqi businessmen and political figures who allegedly embezzled money from the humanitarian program, Chalabi could resort to blackmail. (Newsweek, May 31, 2004)

It was not until May that the Bush administration finally cut off the $340,000 per month payments to Chalabi and raided his luxurious home in Baghdad. Over the four previous years, he had pocketed $27 million. United States soldiers and Iraqi police seized computers, dozens of rifles, and files. (New York Times, May 19, 2004; Washington Post, May 20, 2004)

Chalabi was charged with passing classified information to the Iranian government. In addition, United States officials claimed that Chalabi tried to block the corruption investigation against him. His nephew, Salem Chalabi, was accused of offering, through an intermediary, one of the main Iraqi investigative magistrates a seat on the tribunal to try Saddam Hussein. (New York Times, May 24, 2004; Newsweek, May 31, 2004)

Chaalbi was accused of telling Teheran officials that the United States had broken Iran’s secret code. He allegedly told the Baghdad station chief of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security that the United States was reading the communications traffic of the Iranian spy service. Chalabi was allegedly given that information by a drunken United States official. (Washington Post, June 7, 2004)

Appearing on NBC’s Meet the Press in May, Chalabi said, “There are intercepts -- anyone who has intercepts, who has information, any documents -- I am prepared to go and face all of this in the United States Congress. … These are allegations that are put forward and directed by the CIA.” Chalabi also said, “Indeed, I have had many meetings with the Iranian government, but we have passed no secret information, no classified documents to them from the United States because principally we are allies of the United States and we do nothing to harm the United States.” (Meet the Press, May 23, 2004)

After the raid, Chalabi brandished a framed picture on which the glass was shattered. He accused troops and police of getting him from his bed, ransacking his office, removing documents and a valuable copy of the Koran, and vandalizing his belongings. (New York Times, May 19, 2004; Washington Post, May 20, 2004)

The National Security Council and other D.C. agencies also knew a couple of weeks in advance that Iraqi authorities had issued arrest warrants for some INC officials and were planning some sort of police action. However, the White House apparently did not know that authorities in Baghdad were planning to raid Chalabi’s house. Pentagon intelligence agencies -- including the DIA -- sent out confidential “referrals” asking the FBI to investigate the alleged INC leak of classified information to Iran. (Newsweek, June 7, 2004)

After Chalabi fell out of grace with the Bush administration, he attempted to build a grass-roots coalition of Shi’ite groups who lacked power. He reached out to the country’s most prominent anti-American Shi’ite cleric, Muqtada Sadr. (Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2004)

In July, Iraq’s interim government arrested special tribunal head Salem Chalabi, on murder charges, and charged Ahmad Chalabi on counterfeiting charges. (Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2004)

In September, Chalabi won a major victory, when a senior Iraqi judge dropped charges, thus closing the case on the former exile. The judge, Zuhair al-Maliky, said that he took the action because he had decided “the evidence was not enough to bring the case to trial.” (New York Times, September 28, 2004)