THE GROWING INSURGENCY

CONTENTS

10. INSURGENTS INFILTRATE IRAQ’S POLICE

1. INFLUENCE FROM IRAN

United States State Department officials estimated that 98 percent of insurgents were Iraqis: Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The other two percent entered Iraq particularly from Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Yet in 2006, United States intelligence officials claimed that Iran was training Hezbollah fighters that were headed for Iraq. An estimated 1,000 and 2,000 fighters to help the Mahdi Army. (New York Times, November 28, 2006)

The most powerful Shi’ite political party and militia in Iraq -- the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution -- and its affiliated paramilitary force, the Badr Brigade, were not only based in Iran but was set up by the Bush administration’s old arch-foe, Ayatollah Khomeini. It also fought on the side of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war and was recognized by Teheran as the government in exile of Iraq. (Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2005)

In addition, Ahmad Chalabi, who helped coax into war, became one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers. He managed to maintain ties to Iran while gaining the devoted support of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, as he charmed and manipulated Pentagon policymakers and led the United States media into believing that Iraq was armed with WMD. (Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2005)

According to United States military-intelligence, Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, an Iranian, headed a network of insurgents created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Before Bush’s March 2003 invasion, as many as 46 Iranian infantry and missile brigades moved to its border with Iraq. They were positioned with units of the Badr Corps that were formed in the 1980s as the armed wing of the Iraqi Shi’ite (SCIRI) group. (Time, August 29, 2005)

Al-Sheibani’s goal was to strike against the United States and coalition forces in Iraq. By 2005, al-Sheibani had mastered a new roadside bomb that was designed by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. It had the capacity to penetrate a battle tank’s armor. (Time, August 29, 2005)

After the United States invasion in March 2003, Badr’s mission was to move into Iraq amidst the chaos that Bush created and to seize towns and government offices. As many as 12,000 armed men, along with Iranian intelligence officers, swarmed into Iraq. According to the White House, al-Sheibani brokered a partnership between Iraqi Shi’ite militants and Hezbollah and facilitated the import of sophisticated weapons used against United States forces. (Time, August 29, 2005)

The Bush administration believed al-Sheibani's team consisted of 280 members, divided into 17 bomb-making teams and death squads. They reportedly trained in Lebanon and in Baghdad's predominantly Shi’ite Sadr City district. In the first half of 2005, they detonated at least 37 bombs against United States forces in Baghdad alone. Al-Shebani also imposed restrictions on the daily lives of Iraqis, banning alcohol and curbing the rights of women. (Time, August 29, 2005)

Iran funded various political parties in Iraq. Al-Sheibani’s forces allied themselves with fundamentalist Shi’ite militias, some of which were funded and armed by Iran. Documents from Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps files indicated that from August 2004 Iran was paying the salaries of at least 11,740 members of the Badr Corps. (Time, August 29, 2005)

Iran held some al Qaeda operatives who tried to flee Afghanistan. In early 2002, Iran detained about 290 al Qaeda fighters. Despite being branded “an axis of evil” by Bush, Iran responded by releasing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who had been a ruthless warlord and on the payroll of the CIA during the 1980s. He later criticized the Bush administration for its invasion on Afghanistan. (James Risen, State of War)

After the fall of Baghdad in April, Iran reached out to the United States, offering to release one of the al Qaeda lieutenants. Saif al-Adel was chief of operations for al Qaeda, and Saad bin Laden, one of Osama’s sons.

In return, Teheran asked for the release of members of the Mujahadeen-e Khalq (MEK), an exile terrorist organization that supported Saddam and was based in Iraq since 1986. After United States forces entered Baghdad, thousands of MEK fighters were arrested and two thousand of their tanks, artillery pieces, armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles were seized. (James Risen, State of War)

Despite Iran’s overtures to Washington, hard-liners in the Bush administration refused to negotiate. One argument was that the Pentagon was too busy fighting the war. Bush lost the opportunity to get the two operatives including Osama’s son. (James Risen, State of War)

A 2003 Supreme National Security Council memo, smuggled out of Iran, suggested even the Iranian Red Crescent society -- similar to the Red Cross -- coordinated its activities through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The memo instructed officials that “the immediate needs of the Iraqi people should be determined” by the Guard’s al-Quds Force. (Time, August 29, 2005)

In 2004, a British army inquiry concluded that the Badr organization and another militia were so powerful in Amarah in southern Iraq that the United States military needed to work with them to ensure a secure environment in the province. In the southern city of Majarr al-Kabir, Iranian-funded militias helped organize a mob attack on June 24, 2003, resulting in the execution of six British military-police officers. Other targets included former members of the Iran section of Saddam’s intelligence services. (Time, August 29, 2005)

In southern cities, Thar-Allah (Vengeance of God) was one of a number of militant groups suspected of assassinations. In October 2004, the chief of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, General Mohammed Abdullah al-Shahwani, blamed agents in Iran’s Baghdad embassy of coordinating assassinations of up to 18 of his people, claiming that raids on three safe houses uncovered a trove of documents linking the agents to funds funneled to the Badr Corps for the purposes of “physical liquidation.” (Time, August 29, 2005)

Saddamists could easily cross over into Iraq from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Increasing numbers of Saudi Arabian Islamists crossed into Iraq in preparation for a Jihad, against American and British forces. A Saudi dissident noted that “up to 3,000 Saudi men have gone ‘missing’ in the kingdom in two months.” (New York Times, August 20, 2003)

In 2005 -- after two years of Bush’s war -- the Bush administration changed course and signaled that it was willing to engage in limited discussions with Iran about the prospect of maintaining peace in Iraq. But the Teheran regime viewed Bush’s war as a windfall for its ruling Shi’ite party. Consequently, Iran initially rebuffed the overtures to open dialogue. (Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2006)

Finally in March 2006, Iraq’s ruling Shi’ite majority and Iran’s Sha regime announced the beginning of direct talks with the Bush administration. But Iraqi Sunni leaders denounced the talks, saying they would amount to “unjustified interference” by foreign nations in the country’s domestic affairs. (New York Times, March 17, 2006)

Soon after the new government assumed “power” in Baghdad, Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari supported Iran’s right to use nuclear technology for peaceful means. He also stressed a diplomatic solution to the standoff between the Islamic Republic and the United States over uranium. (Bloomberg, May 26, 2006)

In 2007, Iran continued to increase arms shipments to both Iraq’s Shi’ites and Afghanistan’s Taliban in an apparent attempt to pressure American and other Western troops operating in its two strategic neighbors. (Washington Post, June 3, 2007)

Weapons included Iranian 240mm rockets -- with a range of up to 30 miles -- that were used by Shi’ite extremists against United States and British targets in Basra and Baghdad. These weapons targeted United States facilities in the Green Zone. The 240mm rocket was the biggest and longest-range weapon in the hands of Shi’ite extremist groups. Remnants of the rockets had the markings of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and were dated 2007. The Iran government supplied the same weapon, known as the Fajr-3, to the Hezbollah in Lebanon. (Washington Post, June 3, 2007)

Iranian 240mm rockets -- with a range of up to 30 miles – were exported to Shi’ite extremists and used against United States and British targets in Basra and Baghdad. These weapons targeted United States facilities in the Green Zone. The 240mm rocket was the biggest and longest-range weapon in the hands of Shi’ite extremist groups. Remnants of the rockets had the markings of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and were dated 2007. The Iran government supplied the same weapon, known as the Fajr-3, to the Hezbollah in Lebanon. (Washington Post, June 3, 2007)

These arms supplies reflected an increasing boldness by Iran. The secretive Quds Force, the branch of the elite Revolutionary Guard in charge of Iran’s special operations abroad, allegedly was behind the arms flow to militants in both Iran and Afghanistan. The Quds Force was commanded by General Qassem Soleimani. (Washington Post, June 3, 2007)

2. THE INSURGENCY MOVEMENT FROM WITHIN

From the outset of Bush’s war, various Shia and Sunni Muslims, as well as Kurds, spoke out against American occupation. From the beginning, insurgents were autonomous cells operating individually. They drew their ranks from members of Hussein’s dissolved security organs, a smattering of foreign Islamic militants, and Sunni Arab tribesmen opposed to Iraq’s emergence as a pro-United States nation run by Shi’ite Arabs and Kurds. (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006)

The deep divisions within the Sunni community weakened its ability to form a strong base with commonalities. The Sunnuis were divided among new tribal leaders and old politicians; Ba’athists and anti-Ba’athists; fundamentalist mosque-goers and secular pro-Westerners who indulged in alcohol. (Newsweek, December 10, 2007)

The Sunnis held the high-level government positions. The Iraqi Islamic Party was led by exiles who opposed Saddam’s regime and who joined the United States early in 2003. They controlled the local governments and -- more important -- their budgets) in Sunni-dominated areas like Anbar province. (Newsweek, December 10, 2007)

Divisions between old guard and new Sunnis were sharpest in Anbar which was the heartland of Sunni control. In mid-2007, the Anbar provincial council was expanded to give the former insurgents about 20 percent of the seats. That only exasperated the friction between the sect’s two divisions. In November, a conference was called to discuss how to spend public-works money in Anbar. The Sunni tribesmen angrily accused their rivals of monopolizing projects and pulled out of the council. (Newsweek, December 10, 2007)

Some of the takfiris (Islamic extremists) and others had formal ties to the Ba’athist Party. Others believed in the political process and who were qualified to participate in the new government. These groups wanted to force a new political situation on the country. They strove to weaken Shi’ites and Kurds. (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006)

The Bush administration distrusted many Sunni political groups, clerics, and community leaders. Some had tribal and ideological ties to the militants. Many publicly issued political demands in exchange for stopping the violence. (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006)

Bush repeatedly vowed never to negotiate with insurgents. But as the war progressed, American officials said they would welcome any political compromise that would help draw down the insurgency. Even United States Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in February 2006 acknowledged holding a series of talks with tribal leaders close to elements in the insurgency in an attempt to bring them into the political process. (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006)

As the war progressed, insurgents were able to develop a coordinated political agenda as they reached out to Sunni Arab politicians and distancing themselves from foreign fighters whose attacks against civilians alienated possible allies in a new government. At the outset of the war, Sunni Arab politicians reached out to the insurgents. Gradually, it became the insurgents who began reaching out to politicians. (Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2006)

By the spring of 2003, the Bush administration’s greatest fear was The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and Moqtada al-Sadr. The SCIRI, based in Iran during the Hussein regime, had a 15,000-man militia called the Badr Brigades in Iraq. After the assassination of Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir in July, the brigades became more militant. Consequently, the American command in Najif called for the disbanding of their militias.

On April 8, 2003, Kadhem al-Husseini al-Haeri, an Iranian cleric born in Iraq, issued a religious edict issued that was distributed to Shi’ite mullahs in Iraq. The “fatwa” called on Shi’ites “to seize the first possible opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the administration of Iraqi cities.” Sadeq Abu Jafaar, an aide to Sheik Muhammad al-Fartusi, said, “We are in control of all of Iraq, especially central and southern Iraq, not only Baghdad.

The fatwa said that Shi’ite leaders had to “seize as many positions as possible to impose a fait accompli for any coming government.” The edict urged the Shi’ite clergy to work against American influence among Shi’ites. It read in part: “People have to be taught not to collapse morally before the means used by the Great Satan if it stays in Iraq. It will try to spread moral decay, incite lust by allowing easy access to stimulating satellite channels and spread debauchery to weaken people’s faith.”

The fatwa also instructed the cleric’s followers to “raise people’s awareness of the Great Satan's plans and of the means to abort them.” Following that order, Shi’ite mullahs in the holy city of Najaf began dispensing money and appointing clerics to administer several key Iraqi cities, Shi’ite leaders said. Those clerics, in turn, appointed officials to run everything from civil defense militias to post offices. (New York Times, April 26, 2003)

On April 18, 50,000 Shi’ites held evening prayer at the Al-Hikma mosque in Baghdad, where they protested the presence of American troops and mourned the assassination of a prominent cleric Mohammad Sadeq Sadr. Sheikh Mohammad Fartusi said the Shi’ites would not accept a brand of democracy “that allows Iraqis to say what they want but gives them no say in their destiny. … This form of government would be worse than Saddam Hussein.” He also urged the faithful to follow the Hawza in Najaf. (Al Jazeera, April 19, 2003)

Days later, hundreds of thousands of Shi’ites protested “foreign occupation” in Iraq, as they walked on a pilgrimage to Karbala, 50 miles south of Baghdad. They had been denied the pilgrimage during Saddam Hussein’s 24 years of rule. They proceeded to the grave of Hussein, the grandson of Mohammed. Many entered Hussein’s mausoleum crawling, in a sign of humility and guilt because the imam’s followers abandoned him in the battle against the Omeyyads. They commemorated the 40th day after the anniversary of Hussein’s death.

The crowd called for unity between Shi’ites and Sunnis, and between Shi’ite political groups, represented by Iraq-based Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr and Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, and by Iran-based Sayyid Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim. (Al Jazeera, April 22, 2003)

Speaking to thousands of fellow Shi’ites at the mausoleum of Hussein, cleric Sheikh Kaazem al-Abahadi al-Nasari denounced the presence of United States troops, saying it amounted to imperialism by “unbelievers.” He said, “We reject this foreign occupation, which is a new imperialism. We don’t want it anymore. We don’t need the Americans. They’re here to control our oil. They’re unbelievers, but as for us, we have the power of faith.” (Al Jazeera, April 23, 2003)

Even the Kurds wanted American forces out of Iraq. Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani said there would be “no justification” for United States forces to remain in Iraq once an interim Iraqi government had taken over ahead of general elections. He said, “If matters stabilize and the national authority takes over and fills the security and administrative vacuum, there will no longer be any justification for the coalition forces to remain, and their (presence) would then be regarded as an occupation.” (Al Jazeera, April 27, 2003)

As the war lingered on, the increasing power wielded by the militias deepened the country’s divide along ethnic and sectarian lines. Shi’ite and Kurdish militias, that frequently operated as part of Iraqi government security forces, carried out a wave of abductions, assassinations, and other acts of intimidation. They consolidated their control over territory across northern and southern Iraq. The militias defended their tactics as a way of ensuring security in the lawless Iraq. (Washington Post, August 21, 2005)

In Basra in the south, dominated by the Shi’ites, and Mosul in the north, ruled by the Kurds, residents were powerless to contend with the militias. In northern Iraq, Kurdish parties employed a network of five detention facilities to incarcerate hundreds of Sunni Arabs. (Washington Post, August 21, 2005)

3. MUQTADA AL-SADR

Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr was assassinated in 1999 after speaking out against the Saddam Hussein regime. After his death, Muqtada, operated from the slums of Baghdad, where he repeatedly called for an immediate United States withdrawal. He accused American soldiers of blasphemy and of spreading pornography, and he demanded an Islamic republic on the Iran model with clerical rule. (Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2003)

In April 2004, a second warrant was issued for al-Sadr. Eight months earlier, a sealed warrant for his arrest had been issued but it was later canceled. The April 2004 warrant only led to more anti-American sentiment, particularly among Shia Muslims. Al-Sadr was hiding in the holy city of Najaf and was protected by hundreds of his armed supporters. (Newsweek, April 19, 2004)

Hatred towards the United States intensified, when al-Sadr’s newspaper was shut down in April. In addition, al-Sadr’s top lieutenant, Sheik Yacoubic and 11 followers were arrested for the murder of al-Khoei that occurred one year earlier. (Newsweek, April 19, 2004)

After the United States military pounded al-Sadr’s men in August 2004, the cleric apparently decided that instead of facing American tanks, he would use the Americans’ plans to build Iraqi security forces to rebuild his own militia. (McClatchy Newspapers, February 7, 2007)

While Iraq's other main Shiite militia, the Badr Brigade, concentrated in 2005 on packing Iraqi intelligence bureaus with high-level officers who could coordinate sectarian assassinations, al-Sadr went after the rank and file. Al-Sadr‘s recruits began flooding into the Iraqi army and police, receiving training, uniforms and equipment either directly from the United States military or from the American-backed Iraqi Defense Ministry. (McClatchy Newspapers, February 7, 2007)

The infiltration by al-Sadr’s men, coupled with his strength in Iraq’s parliament after United States-backed elections, gave him leeway to operate death squads throughout the capital. Some United States-trained units carried out sectarian killings themselves, while others, manning checkpoints, allowed militiamen to pass. (McClatchy Newspapers,

Al-Sadr became under pressure from several sources. One was his popular Shi’ite base, which demanded protection from devastating Sunni attacks. Another was Iran, with which he had had long but difficult ties. Then there were renegade factions of his own militia that resented his move into the political mainstream. (New York Times, February 24, 2007)

Iran allegedly supplied al-Sadr and other Shi’ite militias with a deadly roadside bomb known as an explosively formed projectile, (EFP), which killed an increasing number of American soldiers in 2006 and 2007. (New York Times, February 24, 2007)

The Mahdi. The idea of the coming of a Mahdi (“the guided”) has roots in Islamic traditions, both Shia and Sunni, even though the Mahdi is not mentioned in the Koran. The Mahdi prepares the way for the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus) and the impending end of the world. Eventually the awaited Imam will appear, and the Divine Aim will reach its fulfillment.

In anticipation of Judgment Day, it is essential that the people return to a simple and rigorous, even puritanical Islam. The Islamic belief in the second coming of Christ is the creed of Sunni and Shia Islam in its generality. For Muslims, there is no question about the forthcoming Armageddon, following which war technology will become unusable. The Mahdi will defeat the remaining third of the Jews (the other two-thirds having already perished at Armageddon.

When the Mahdi’s Army receives word of the Antichrist, they will go to fight the Antichrist, but he will besiege them in Jerusalem. Jesus will descend, and perform the dawn prayer behind the Mahdi, then Jesus will go out and kill the Antichrist. After that, he will take over the Caliphate. Upon the return of Jesus, he will not accept that Christians and Jews live with any other religion than Islam, and so will unite all the believers as Muslims.

The Awaited Mahdi is absolutely central to the belief system of the twelve Imami’ah Shias, and constitutes one of the core principles of their religion. The Mahdi also figures in Sunni belief, as events in the Sudan in the late 19th Century reveal.

The Mahdi Army, also known as the Mehdi Army or Jaish al Mahdi, was created by al-Sadr in June 2003. The militants rose to prominence on April 4, 2004 when it spearheaded the first major armed confrontation against the United States forces in Iraq from the Shi’ite community in an uprising that followed the banning of al-Sadr’s newspaper and attempts to arrest him.

By 2004, the Mahdi Army was estimated to consist of about 500 to -1000 trained combatants along with another 5,000 to 6,000 active participants. According to a Defense Department estimate in April 2004, the Mahdi Army was estimated to consist of about 3,000 lightly armed devotees of al-Sadr.

The most notable attack by the Mahdi Army was a mob killing of a pro-United States cleric, Abd al-Majid al-Khoi, shortly after his return from exile in London in April 2004. Al-Khoi was himself the son of another extremely powerful former grand ayatollah, Abolqassem al-Khoi. Al-Khoi was murdered as he emerged from the city’s Imam Ali Mosque in a gesture of reconciliation with the mosque’s custodian, who was popularly considered to have collaborated with Saddam’s regime. The custodian was killed along with al-Khoi. It was unclear whether al-Khoi was an assassination target or was struck down because he tried to defend the other man.

Immediately after al-Khoi’s murder, supporters of al-Sadr surrounded the house of another grand ayatollah in Al-Najaf, Ali al-Sistani, in what was taken to be a gesture of intimidation. Al-Sistani -- who said that Shi'a leaders should limit themselves to religious questions and stay out of politics -- went into hiding and only re-emerged after tribesmen loyal to him raced to Al-Najaf.

Al-Sadr’s group denied it had anything to do with the April 2003 attempt on the elder al-Hakim, and said Saddam loyalists were to blame. But in 2004, an Iraqi judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Sadr in connection with the killing of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoi in 2003.

Mustafa Al-Yaqubi was detained on April 3, 2004 in connection with the April 2003 murder of Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Majeed al-Khoei. An Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Mr. Yaqubi's arrest as a result of an Iraqi criminal investigation and indictment. He was taken into custody at his home in An Najaf.

United States forces and al-Sadr militants continued to clash. Violence increased in the spring of 2004. After a seven-week stand-off in April and May of 2004, American forces and al-Sadr agreed to pull back from the holy city of Najaf, where hundreds of Iraqis were killed. The agreement reached in late May called for the Mahdi Army, whose fighters held Najaf since April 5, to return home -- and for the American forces to pull most of their forces out of the city. (New York Times, May 27, 2004)

Once the Bush administration promised to turn over sovereignty to Iraq at the end of June, al-Sadr announced he would cooperate with the interim government but only if it worked to end the U.S. military presence. (Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2004)

Al-Sadr announced he would cooperate with the interim government but only if it worked to end the U.S. military presence. But when the end of June came, Sadr warned that the United States occupation had not ended, and he called on his followers to continue resisting the large presence of foreign troops in the country. (Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2004; Washington Post, July 2, 2004)

Jabir Khafaji, a top Sadr lieutenant, demanded that the new Iraqi government defer to the Shi’ite religious leadership based in Najaf. He asserted that the Mahdi Army, al-Sadr’s militia was “the army of Iraq.” (Washington Post, July 2, 2004)

As a Shia Muslim, al-Sadr naturally was pitted against Sunnis. Still he knew that to strengthen his base, he needed to play up to Iraq’s Sunnis. During the siege of Fallujah in 2004, al-Sadr allied himself with his Sunni counterparts, even though some Sunni extremists called for the extermination of the Shi’ites.

In the spring and summer of 2004, American forces wrecked the headquarters of al-Sadr located in Sadr City -- that was named for his martyred father. The holy cities of Najaf and Karbala were also attacked by American troops. On May 23, Riyadh Nouri, another young cleric and al-Sadr’s brother-in-law, was arrested by the United States military. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

In 2004, six of al-Sadr’s senior leaders were arrested. Four were later released: Araji, Nouri, Yaqoubi, and Mohammed Tabatabai. Of those, Nouri, Yaqoubi, and Tabatabai were the most influential. In the years between the assassination of Sadr's father in 1999 and the ascendance of al-Sadr himself after Saddam’s fall, they kept the movement alive, working underground. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Both Nouri and Araji called the emphasis on social demands the movement’s priority. They said it reflected the ministry of al-Sadr’s father, whose grass-roots movement in the 1990s catered to the poorest and most disenfranchised Shi’ites. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Clashes erupted between al-Sadr’s militia and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The Supreme Council, allied to the United States military, was led by Abdul Aziz Hakim, the oldest surviving son of Muhsin Hakim and one of Iraq’s most respected grand ayatollahs. Police officers fired on al-Sadr’s men. Troops from the Interior Ministry, controlled by the Supreme Council, were called in and four of al-Sadr’s followers were killed. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Al-Sadr’s followers believed the Supreme Council had ties to Iran. It was based in exile, and its members lived in relative security while the al-Sadr group suffered in Iraq under Saddam. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Iraq's Kurdish president personally appealed to al-Sadr to intervene. Al-Sadr called his forces back and asked the ministers and parliament members to resume their duties. For his part, Hakim denounced the attack on the office in Najaf and, in a rare acknowledgment, praised al-Sadr’s restraint. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Al-Sadr’s militia clashed with a rival in Najaf in August 2005. His armed followers left for Baghdad and at least six other cities. Twenty-one members of parliament and three cabinet ministers loyal to him suspended their work in protest. Two days later, al- Sadr’s followers organized the largest demonstration of the war, ostensibly protests over government services. (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

While delegates to the National Assembly met to hammer out a draft constitution, 1,500 of al-Sadr’s followers convened in Tikrit, the home to Saddam Hussein, and shouted, “Yes, yes to Sadr!” (Washington Post, August 29, 2005)

Al-Sadr’s gunmen got another boost in 2005 and 2006 when American commanders handed over many Baghdad neighborhoods east of the Tigris River to Iraqi units, transitions that often were accompanied by news releases that contained variations of the phrase “Iraqis in the lead.” (McClatchy Newspapers, February 7, 2007)

Two of al Sadr’s commanders created DVDs of their men killing Sunnis in Baghdad. They allegedly received money from Iran. In early 2007, al Sadr responded by suspending them and stripping them of power. He might have done so to cooperate with the new security plan to quell the sectarian violence. (New York Times, February 24, 2007)

In December 2005, the Sadrist Party won 30 seats in the new assembly. It allied with a larger Shia coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance. As a result, the coalition received enough votes to cast the deciding vote making Ibrahim al-Jaafari the choice of the UIA for prime minister.

Just as al-Sadr had allied himself with Sunnis during the siege of Fallujah, so he reached out to Kurdish leaders, among the biggest critics of his deal with al-Jaafari. Al-Sadr initiated meetings in Baghdad and Najaf with Kurdish legislator Mahmoud Othman.

In April 2006, American unit attacked a compound in the Baghdad neighborhood of Ur. The Pentagon claimed it broke up a kidnap ring -- killing 16 insurgents and arresting 18.

Al-Sadr immediately claimed the Ur complex was a mosque, and the victims innocent worshippers. The next day, Baghdad’s Sadrist governor, Hussein al-Tahan, announced he was breaking off relations with the Americans over the “cowardly attack.” (Newsweek, April 10, 2006)

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, al-Sadr staged demonstrations in Baghdad to protest Israel’s incursion and to support the Hezbollah.

Maliki refused to crack down on Shi’ite militias such as al-Sadr’s, even going so far as to consider a limited amnesty that would include guerrillas who had attacked United States troops. (Washington Post, August 6, 2006)

In August, United States forces conducted a raid in the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City that was home to al-Sadr. Maliki immediately chastised the United States for the violence and charged that American forces used weapons that were unreasonable to detain suspects. Maliki apologized to the Iraqi people for the operation, saying, “This won’t happen again.” The raid killed three and wounded over 18 people, including an American soldier. (Washington Post, August 6, 2006)

In July, at least 1,815 bodies were delivered to Baghdad’s morgue, the highest number since the February 2006 bombing of a Shi’ite shrine that sparked a wave of sectarian killings.

Just before Bush ordered a surge in the number of troops, particularly in Baghdad, a Pentagon report declared that the Mahdi Army was the greatest threat to stability in the capital. But dismantling Sadr’s forces obviously poses its own problems. In some towns, locals offered $50 each to lay IEDs. These payouts quickly helped destabilize some towns. (Newsweek, May 7, 2007)

All across central and southern Iraq, al-Sadr loyalists coexisted uneasily with partisans of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its former Badr militia, as well as a few other Shi’ite groups like the Fadhila Party, which had a strong presence in Basra. All competed for power and a piece of the region’s massive oil revenues. (Newsweek, May 7, 2007)

4. GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI

Ali al-Sistani was raised in Iran and was educated in the holy city of Qom. After Hussein was deposed in the spring of 2003, al-Sistani entered Iraq where he immediately became the country’s leading Shi’ite cleric.

Al-Sistani favored a democratic Islamic state, a parliamentary system whose laws reflected Muslim principles. He would favor the de facto separation of church and statebut where politicians would operate under the umbrella of religious values. (Newsweek, October 25, 2004)

However, since a majority of Iraq’s population was Sunni Muslim, al-Sistani realized that the philosophy of Shia Islam could not be imposed on most of the country’s citizens. However, if Shias Muslims could eventually become the majority, then al-Sistani foresaw the time when Islamic laws could be legislated. (Newsweek, October 25, 2004)

Originally, Bush favored indirect Iraqi elections, since candidates could be chose by the White House. But al-Sistani repeatedly denounced Bush’s plan and demanded direct elections. Al-Sistani’s legitimate fear was that the goal of the Bush administration was to control the selection of a government so that the Shia Muslims -- the majority group in Iraq -- would be excluded in the process.

As time elapsed, al-Sistani‘s relationship with the Bush administration slowly crumbled.

First, he issued a fatwa in March 2003, stating that Iraqis should not interfere with American forces.

Second, he objected to the Bush administration’s unilateral policy of choosing the 25 members of the Governing Council.

Third, he issued a second fatwa, declaring that the Bush administration’s transition policy to Iraqi sovereignty was unacceptable and that it failed to provide legitimacy.

Fourth, he opposed the Bush administration’s plan for a new Iraqi government with a three-person presidency. He demanded that the new constitution should have a provision allowing for amendments.

Fifth, he opposed veto power that was given to the Kurds.

Al-Sistani’s demand for fast and direct elections created a serious split in the Governing Council, further undermining Bush’s plan for a political transition in Iraq. Many Shi’ite Arab council members supported direct elections, while Sunni Arab and Kurdish members said it was impossible to hold them. Jalal Talabani, the Governing Council president and leader of one of the two main Kurdish parties, agreed with the criticism. (Chicago Tribune, November 29, 2003; Washington Post, December 2, 2003; New York Times, January 25, 2004)

In January 2004, al-Sistani put more pressure on the Bush administration, demanding that members of an interim assembly had to be chosen through direct elections. Al-Sistani said that an interim constitution being drafted by the Governing Council would have to be approved by a directly elected assembly for it to have legitimacy. (New York Times, January 11, 2004)

One month later, al-Sistani changed his timetable, saying that he would wait to the end of 2004 before free elections should be held. He also insisted that an interim government scheduled to assume sovereignty from the United States have sharply curtailed powers and that it should focus on preparing for that election. (Washington Post, February 26, 2004)

In March 2004, al-Sistani intensified his opposition to the interim constitution. He threatened to boycott meetings with United Nations involved in charting the transition from American occupation, if the constitution was endorsed by the Security Council. (Washington Post, March 22, 2004)

Also in March, the Governing Council initially refused to sign the interim constitution because of objections raised by the five Shia Muslim members of the council, including its acting president. Their main concern was a fear that the Kurds would be allowed to veto a permanent constitution to be written in 2005 if it did not include their demands for autonomy. After three days, al-Sistani gave the go-ahead and all 25 members approved the 60-article temporary constitution. It included a bill of rights guaranteeing individual freedoms and tolerance – to be in effect between July 1 and December 2005, allowing time for the election of a parliament that would then frame a permanent constitution. (New York Times, March 8, 2004)

Al-Sistani still refused to endorse the law, saying it was an obstacle to agreeing a permanent constitution. Other Shi’ite leaders warned that the interim constitution could cause problems in the long term, with one senior cleric saying a clause on federalism had the potential to provoke civil war. They also said they were unhappy with the law -- especially a clause they fear could give minority Kurds too much leverage -- and would seek to introduce changes further down the line. (Common Dreams, March 9, 2004)

5. ABU MOUSAB AL-ZARQAWI

Since the fall of Saddam in early 2003, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the key Al Qaeda operant in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi came from an impoverished Palestinian family in Jordan. He grew up in Zarqa, a poor factory town with several Palestinian refugee camps and major breweries. A high school drop-out, he became a burglar and drinker as a teenager. At age 17, family members said he dropped out of school and started drinking heavily and getting tattoos -- both discouraged under Islam. Al-Zarqawi was jailed in the 1980s for sexual assault. (Center for Research on Globalization, June 11, 2004)

By the time he was 20 years old, he began looking for a religious cause, and two years later, he made the decision to travel to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets. He became a reporter for a small jihadist magazine, Al Bonian al Marsous, whose name means “The Strong Wall.” (Center for Research on Globalization, June 11, 2004)

In the late 1980s, he joined a mosque that introduced him to Salafism, a stringent brand of Islam that exhorts followers to model their behavior after the life of the Prophet Mohammed. He soon headed to Afghanistan but arrived too late to taste combat in the jihad against the Soviets. (Time, December 27, 2004)

Al-Zarqawi spoke out against Jordan's secular rulers, plotting their overthrow. His gang recruited jailmates to join their struggle and denounced as anti-Muslim those who failed to do so. Al-Zarqawi returned to Zarqa in 1992 and became heavily involved in the militant Islamic group Bayaat al Imam, or “Loyalty to the Imam.” He was arrested in 1993 after the Jordanian authorities discovered assault rifles and bombs stashed in his house. Al-Zarqawi was sent to Swaqa prison, where he met other political prisoners. He sat for hours reading the Koran, trying to memorize all 6,236 verses. (Center for Research on Globalization, June 11, 2004)

In 1994, after returning to Jordan, Al-Zarqawi was arrested for possessing explosives, which he allegedly intended to smuggle into the West Bank. While in prison, he devoted himself to memorizing the Koran and became the leader of his cellblock of 20 political prisoners. (Time, December 27, 2004)

When al-Zarqawi was released in 1999, he returned to Afghanistan where he met Bin Laden and set up an al Qaeda training camp in the western city of Herat. While Bin Laden was willing to tolerate Muslims who did not share his extremism, al Zarqawi viewed moderate Muslims as enemies of the faith. But he also proved to be a valuable asset for al Qaeda, a hard networker with a particular interest in attaining weapons of mass destruction. (Time, December 27, 2004)

One of al-Zarqawi’s specialties was the study of poisons. He concocted a plot to kill Israeli and American tourists in Jordan. He was suspected of various terrorist attacks on four continents. (Weekly Standard, May 24, 2004)

Al-Zarqawi was the master-mind of several bombings:

1. The Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004.

2. The bombardment of Shi’ite worshippers in Iraq the same month.

3. The April 24 suicide attack on the port of Basra.

4. The kidnapping and beheading of American contractor Paul Berg in Saudi Arabia. (Center for Research on Globalization, June 11, 2004)

After a vacuum was created after the American invasion of Iraq, militants turned the resistance into an international jihadist movement. Foreign fighters began integrating as cells or complete units with Iraqis. The goal of many of Saddam’s former secret police and Republican Guard officers became more than simply forcing the United States to leave. Their objective was to transform Iraq into the Afghanistan of the 1980s: a training ground for young jihadists who would form the next wave of recruits for al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist groups. (Time, July 5, 2004)

Al Zarqawi viewed the United States invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to wage a jihad as well as his chance to make up for missing the Afghan war in the 1980s. He spent the months leading up to the war moving through Iran and northern Iraq, where he attached himself to the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam. (Time, December 27, 2004)

Nearly all the jihadist groups in post-Saddam Iraq claimed to be receiving inspiration, if not commands, from al-Zarqawi. A major group in al-Zarqawi’s network was Kata’ib al-Jihad al-Islamiyah, or Battalions of Islamic Holy War. It was founded by frontline officers from Saddam’s intelligence services and the Republican Guard who once shunned terrorist attacks that killed innocent Iraqis. Numerous followers of al-Zarqawi spent their time in jail studying Salafi Islam and received lessons in jihad from Iraqis and detainees who came from Syria and Saudi Arabia. (Time, July 5, 2004)

Through the use of the Internet, al-Zarqawi promoted himself and his group, Attawhid wal Jihad, or Unity and Holy War. According to insurgents who were interviewed by Time (July 5, 2004), al-Zarqawi did not direct daily operations but instead guided strategy and was involved in the planning of major operations.

Al-Zarqawi solidified his position during the siege of Fallujah in April 2004. Foreign fighters from throughout the Middle East, including Syria and Saudi Arabia, arrived in Fallujah to man the barricades alongside Iraqi fighters during the Marines’ offensive.

In the fall of 2004, Bush claimed that he did everything possible to track down al-Zarqawi. (Bush’s remarks to the General Conference of the National Guard Association of the United States, The White House, September 14, 2004)

Yet in 2002 and 2003, Bush rejected three plans to strike and to neutralize al-Zarqawi, because he believed a successful strike would undermine the public case for targeting Hussein. Before Bush launched his war against Iraq, he had several chances to wipe out al-Zarqawi and perhaps kill him as well. (Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 2004)

In June 2002, the Pentagon drafted plans to attack a camp, that was home to al-Zarqawi, with cruise missiles and airstrikes. The plan was killed by the Bush administration. Four months later, as al-Zarqawi planned to use ricin in terrorist attacks in Europe, the Pentagon drew up a second strike plan. Once again, the Bush administration rejected the plan. In January 2003, the Pentagon drew up still another attack plan, --and for the third time, the Bush administration killed it. (NBC News, March 2, 2004)

6. ABU HAFS AL-MASRI

After al-Zaqqawi’s death in June 2006, Abu Hafs, known as Masri meaning ‘the Egyptian’ in Arabic, ascended to al Qaeda’s leadership role in Iraq.

Masri was a terrorist since the early 1980s when he joined Ayman al-Zawahri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Masri was a core member of the Islamic Jihad group, which successfully carried out the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

Masri joined bin Laden in the early 1980s and both spearheaded the formation of al Qaeda when the two were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a former Egyptian police officer, Masri took charge of al Qaeda’s security. He assumed control of the training camps after the former commander Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri was drowned in Victoria lake, Uganda, in 1996. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

While al Qaeda was based in Sudan in 1992 and 1993, Masri allegedly took part in attacks on United States forces operating under the international military force – known as Operation Restore Hope -- in Somalia. In 1997, Masri and another top bin Laden aide, Dr Ayman al-Dhawahiri, allegedly orchestrated the killing of 58 tourists in al-Uxur, Egypt. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

In 1999, Masri arrived in Afghanistan where he trained and lectured other militants. He allegedly met Zarqawi at the al-Farouk camp in Afgahnistan in 2001 or 2002. In 1999, the FBI announced evidence of Masri’s links to the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in which 250 people were killed. He was charged with killing American citizens. Following the 9/11 attacks, United States authorities put Masri’s name on top of the list of wanted people. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

In 2003, it was believed that Masri helped establish the first al Qaeda cell in the Baghdad area. He allegedly manufactured explosives in Iraq, particularly car and truck bombs. He also helped foreign fighters move from Syria to Baghdad, and oversaw al Qaeda’s activities in southern Iraq. Masri was believed to have fled Fallujah during the United States offensive into the city which started in November 2004. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

In February 2005, the United States Central Command and Iraqi government issued a warrant for his arrest and offered a reward of $50,000 for information leading to his capture. (Al Jazeera, March 13, 2004)

7. HARITH AL-DHARI

Harith al-Dhari emerged as a leading jihadist as a result of the prolonged stand-off between American forces and insurgents in Fallujah in April 2004. He headed the Association of Muslim Scholars, Iraq’s most significant Sunni organization. Operating out of the Mother of all Battles Mosque, al-Dhari played a key role in mobilizing fighters during the uprising in Fallujah in April 2004. Al-Dhari built support among both Iraqi and foreign insurgents who looked to him as a future Osama bin Laden. (Time, July 5, 2004)

8. ABU ALI

Another jihadist leader, Abu Ali, was a ballistic-missile specialist in Saddam’s Fedayeen militia. He fought against American troops during the invasion and served as a resistance commander ever since, organizing rocket attacks on the Green Zone, the headquarters of the United States administration in Baghdad.

9. NEGOTIATING WITH THE ENEMY

In the first months of the war, Iran reached out to the Bush administration to resolve the Iraqi conflict. On May 4, 2003, a Swiss diplomat conveyed to the State Department an Iranian proposal for a “grand bargain.” This would result in coordination of Iranian and United States policy toward Iraq, support for a two-state Palestinian-Israeli solution, and an end to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. As part of the quid pro quo, the Bush administration would normalize of relations and drop “regime change” from United States policy. That proposal was solidly rejected by the Bush administration. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

After more than two years, the Bush administration all but conceded failure in Iraq. The White House sought the help of two major enemies -- the Sunni insurgents and the government of Iran. The objective was to gain their cooperation in overcoming otherwise seemingly insurmountable obstacles to success in Iraq. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

The Bush administration finally recognized that, without the help of Iran and the Sunni insurgent leaders, it faced the likelihood of spiraling sectarian violence with continuous Sunni armed resistance as well as Al Qaeda terrorist havens and predominant Iranian political influence. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

Ba’athist Sunni insurgent leaders strongly opposed to the al-Zarqawi organization’s ideology and tactics, and have even clashed with the Al Qaeda-related groups on some occasions. Furthermore, Sunni political leaders were strongly opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

But dialogue with both Sunni and Iranian leaders failed, since the Bush administration was unwilling to approve concessions required to reach a deal benefiting both sides. Neoconservatives in the administration, led by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, hoped for the collapse of the Iranian regime. Consequently, the White House rejected the proposal. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

United States Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad was not allowed to negotiate with Teheran. Then Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki immediately said Iran had no intention of negotiating with the United States. (Inter Press Service, January 17, 2006)

10. INSURGENTS INFILTRATE IRAQ’S POLICE

The bodies of Sunni men -- bound, shot in the head and left in dumpsters, on side streets and in patches of desert -- turned up frequently beginning in mid-2005. That was shortly after the Shi’ite-led government was named in the spring of 2005. Such discoveries were made almost daily. (Washington Post, February 16, 2006)

By the end of 2005, Sunni leaders estimated that 1,600 people had been killed in this campaign of sectarian violence. Survivors often said their attackers were dressed in police uniforms and drove police vehicles. Interior Ministry officials countered that the clothes were easily available on the street and suggested that the killings were committed by criminals or militiamen posing as police. (Washington Post, February 16, 2006)

However, in January 2006, it was discovered that a death squad was operating within the Shia-dominated Interior Ministry. It was a clear-cut case. The investigation centered around a 1,500-member Iraqi police force and its highway patrol with close ties to Shi’ite militia group. Iraq’s national highway patrol was established largely to prevent insurgent attacks on roadways. But United States military officials said they suspected the patrol of being deeply involved in illegal detentions, torture, and extrajudicial killings. (Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2006)

Four ringleaders in the group of men, who posed as special police commandos, were taken into custody along with 18 others. The four men ringleaders were apparently loyal to the Badr Organization, which was affiliated with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the most powerful party in the country’s ruling Shi’ite coalition. (Washington Post, February 16, 2006)