THE DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS IN IRAQ AND THE U.S.

1. DEPLORABLE LIVING CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

After United States troops rolled into Baghdad in April 2003, the city quickly developed into one colossal a mess. Living conditions improved at a dismal rate in the months and years to come.

The Bush administration botched efforts to improve public health Iraq after the invasion. Initial efforts focused on things like redesigning medical training programs and designing disease-tracking systems, which did not help most Iraqis. Efforts to rebuild the crumbling and aging system moved too slowly amid security problems and looting. Reuters. April 20, 2006)

*Forty percent of Baghdad’s water network was damaged.

*

Forty percent of Baghdad’s sewage poured untreated into the Tigris River.

*Garbage piled up in the streets.

*A mobile phone system was desperately needed.

*There was no potable water.

*Electrical power was intermittent.

*There was no television with which to convey messages to the public.

*Projects that were contracted to the Bechtel Corporation moved too slowly.

*The Bush administration failed to adequately provide funds for reconstruction efforts.

*Confiscated Iraqi funds were not used to pay government workers. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II; Reuters. April 20, 2006)

United States civilian administrator Jay Garner placed General Carl Strock in charge of rebuilding Iraq’s electrical grid. The country’s power plants and generators were comprised of a mixture of parts manufactured in Europe and Asia. Furthermore, they were damaged as a result of economic sanctions during the 1990s. The lack of electricity also encouraged more crime across the country. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The country’s electrical system was in disarray across the country for a number of reasons:

1. Even though American warplanes never targeted Iraq’s infrastructure, the bombings undermined the system. Fuel lines to the power plants and electrical transmission lines were inadvertently damaged or destroyed by American warplanes. That led to a multitude of power surges across the country.

2. When the chief engineer of the south Baghdad plant shut down his site as a precautionary measure, the entire grid collapsed.

3. Iraq always had undergone spring maintenance on its plants. Some of its machinery already had been disassembled and was undergoing repairs.

4. The United States Army Corps of Engineers was trained in dealing with a different type of electrical system.

5. Looters stripped bare Baghdad’s computerized control center. Even the transmission lines, which contained copper and aluminum, were stolen. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

General David McKiernan placed General Steven Hawkins in charge of forming a task force to restore the country’s electrical system. But Hawkins had no funds or equipment for his assignment. He was slowly able to restore power on a part-time basis, but electricity across Iraq remained vulnerable to sabotage and blackouts. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

After one year, Iraq was generating less electricity than before Bush’s invasion. That left most Iraqis with only 12 to 14 hours of power a day. One year later, the average Iraqi was without electricity just 8.5 hours of electricity a day, with some provinces getting as little as five hours. (Miami Herald, March 17, 2005; Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2005)

There was little cooperation between Bechtel, which was responsible for electricity, and Halliburton, which had an open-ended contract to secure fuel. Halliburton said it was not asked to supply fuel for restarting the refineries. (Newsweek, November 3, 2003)

Disputes between United Nations and United States authorized companies obstructed the reconstruction progress. At the key port of Umm Qasr, Bechtel and its subcontractors pulled out, when a Turkish company -- contracted through the United Nations – claimed it had been authorized to do the work. (Newsweek, November 3, 2003)

Iraq’s water and sewage systems were hardest hit. Of more than 40 such plants run by the Iraqis, not one was operated properly. An internal memo by coalition officials in Iraq said that throughout the country, renovated plants “deteriorate quickly to an alarming state of disrepair and inoperability.” (Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2005)

Across the country, schoolchildren had to step over rancid brown puddles on their way to classrooms. Drinking water is obtained from the polluted Tigris and Euphrates rivers, leading to high rates of child mortality and water-borne illnesses. People rigged pumps in their homes to increase water flow -- poisoning the water further by sucking sewage through cracks in the lines. (Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2005)

Retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardner said between 15 and 20 million Iraqis had lost access to drinkable water. In Basra, desperate Iraqis were forced to drink “garden water” normally used for irrigation-water unsafe to wash in, let alone drink. During the summer, temperatures frequently exceeded 120 degrees, resulting in cholera outbreaks and the likelihood of water-borne disease epidemics. (ABC, April 8, 2005)

Due to the sanctions before Bush’s war, 60 percent of Iraqis (16 million people) depended for survival on monthly food rations distributed by government and humanitarian agencies. The war collapsed this food distribution system. The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization reported that Iraqi agriculture was on the brink of collapse. (War Times, July 2003, September 2003)

Five months after Bush declared major combat operations over, senior British officials described the reconstruction effort as “in chaos” and suffering from “a complete absence of strategic direction.” (Britain’s Daily Telegraph, June 16, 2003)

London’s The Guardian (October 4, 2003) reported that after five months, lawlessness had increased. Murder rates increased, 80 percent of workers remained idle, and hospitals had severe shortages of IV sets and basic antibiotics. Police were seen as thugs and thieves, and the American and British forces were more concerned with protecting their troops than providing security to ordinary Iraqis.

As a result of stepped up attacks on Iraq’s infrastructure, the Bush administration in October postponed awarding two contracts to repair Iraq’s oil refineries and pipelines, saying sabotage and dilapidated conditions meant the task would cost twice as much as the government has anticipated. The value of the contracts, which had been $500 million each, was increased to $1.2 billion for Iraq’s southern oil fields and $800 million for the northern fields. (Washington Post, October 31, 2003)

In the fall of 2003, Congress approved a quick-fix appropriations bill of $18.4 billion for Iraqi reconstruction. But one year later, only 2 percent of the money had been spent, according to the Pentagon report called “Iraq Status.” The report showed the status of reconstruction efforts that included how the money was spent. Nothing was spent on construction, health care, sanitation, or water projects. Instead, the funds were funneled to administration costs. (Washington Post, July 30, 2004)

Major contractors like General Electric and Siemens AG scaled back their efforts because of the unsafe environment. Money and energy that were meant to go into new schools and new water-treatment plants were diverted toward rebuilding bombed police stations and retraining Iraqi troops. (CNN, April 30, 2004; Time, May 3, 2004)

In 2003, the White House repeatedly harped on the fact that 1,595 schools – out of 10,000 -- had opened. But that only 15 percent of all schools in Iraq. (Newsweek, November 3, 2003)

In April 2004 -- slightly more than one year since Bush launched his war -- Bush claimed that electricity in Iraq “is now more widely available than before the war.” However, Iraqi officials said the power supply in their country has not yet been repaired to pre-war levels. Bush made the claim in his May 1, 2004 speech commemorating the one-year anniversary of the “Mission Accomplished” address he delivered from aboard the USS Lincoln.

In 2004, $200 million was allocated to the construction giant Parsons Incorporated for the construction of 142 primary health centers. One year later, plans were scaled back to build 142 primary clinics by December 2005. By that time, only four had been completed. (Washington Post, April 3, 2006)

However, by the spring of 2006, only 20 clinics were completed. Parsons threatened to walk away from more than 120 other clinics it was contracted to build. Only two-thirds were finished. (Washington Post, April 3, 2006)

Electricity output continued to slip as the war dragged on. During the first three years of Bush’s war, more than $4 billion -- and tens of thousands of man-hours -- were spent to build or rehabilitate electric-generating capacity totaling just over 2,000 megawatts. (Bahrain’s Daily News, March 14, 2006)

Electricity production remained below pre-war levels by the end of 2004. This was largely because of sabotage by insurgents, with just 6.7 hours of power daily in Baghdad by the end of 2004. Iraq was pumping 500,000 barrels a day fewer than its pre-war peak of 2.5 million barrels per day. (Knight Ridder, January 26, 2005)

The White House allocated over $4.4 billion in United States and Iraqi funds to increase Iraq’s electricity production. However, GAO reports said that electricity production was lower in May 2005 than in March 2003. In March 2003, Iraq generated about 100,000-megawatt hours of electricity per day. By May 2005, electricity production levels were as low as 51,000 megawatt hours per day and never exceeded 99,800 megawatt hours per day. (The World Fact Book; May 2005)

Iraq’s power system generated less electricity in June 2005 than in June 2004. Crude oil production was down as were revenues for oil exports. Many Baghdad neighborhoods continued to have little or no water supply. (Time, July 11, 2005)

During the first three years of the war, the Bush administration shifted over $2.5 billion in funds that had been allocated specifically for reconstruction. Originally, that sum was earmarked for Iraq’s decrepit electrical, education, water, sewage, sanitation, and oil networks.

In May 2005, both the United States and the United Nations published a report that said Iraq’s unemployment rate was at 27 percent. However, many experts said the actual number was probably closer to 50 percent or more because the survey was not conducted in some of the least stable parts of the country and because many Iraqis work unreliable part-time jobs. (Washington Post, June 20, 2005)

Iraq’s water system was never upgraded to safe conditions. In 2005, $15 billion was allocated to repair a dilapidated water system crippled by war and neglect. Water Resources Minister Latif Rashid said the country was struggling with recurrent water shortages, poor sanitation, and a shattered irrigation network. (Al Jazeera, June 28, 2005)

In May 2005, Iraq’s Acting Minister of Electricity, Ra’ad Al-Haris, said that Iraq’s supply of electricity produced in Iraq measures between 3,600-4,000 MW (The New Standard, May 14, 2004)

By 2005, the Bush administration had earmarked over $4.4 billion in United States and Iraqi funds in an effort to produce more electricity in Iraq. However, GAO reports said that electricity production was lower in May 2005 than in March 2003. In March 2003, Iraq generated about 100,000 megawatt hours of electricity per day. By May 2005, electricity production levels were as low as 51,000 megawatt hours per day and never exceeded 99,800 megawatt hours per day. (The World Fact Book; May 2005)

Iraqi civilians nationwide received on average less than 12 hours of power a day. For residents of Baghdad, it was six hours a day. The Bush administration had promised a steady supply of 6,000 megawatts of electricity and a return to oil production output of 2.5 million barrels a day. That never happened. (Washington Post, January 2, 2005)

Iraq’s Acting Minister of Electricity, Ra’ad Al-Haris, said that Iraq’s supply of electricity produced in Iraq measured between 3,600 and 4,000 megawatts. (The New Standard, May 14, 2004)

By the end of 2005, only 19 percent of Iraqis had working sewer connections. That was down from 24 percent before the war, according to United States government figures. (Associated Press, April 30, 2006) In addition, just six of 150 health centers proposed for Iraq had been completed by a United States contractor, in spite of 75 percent of the $186 million allocated having been spent. (The Guardian, May 1, 2006)

Beginning in mid-2006, insurgents were able to isolate Iraq electrically. They succeeded in cutting critical high-voltage lines and cutting off the capital from the major power plants to the north, south, and west. (Los Angeles Times, December 18, 2006)

The battle waged in the remotest parts of the open desert, where the great towers that supported thousands of miles of exposed lines are frequently felled with explosive charges in increasingly determined and sophisticated attacks. Crews that arrived to repair the damage were often attacked and sometimes killed. (Los Angeles Times, December 18, 2006)

By 2008, one of three sewage treatment plants in Baghdad was out of commission. Sewage pipes remained clogged, creating foul odors. The water pipes -- where they existed -- were so old that it was not possible to pump water at a sufficient rate to meet demands. Neighborhoods were left with a scarcity of drinking water. (Agence France Presse, February 4, 2008)

A sharp deficit of 3,000 megawatts of electricity forced residents left homes dark and cold.

In 2008, there were 76 new health clinics -- 21 of them in Baghdad. Also, 1,885 new schools were constructed countrywide and another 1,604 repaired. (Agence France Presse, February 4, 2008)

To compound the horrendous living conditions, unemployment across Iraq officially ranged between 60 and 70 percent.

The intermittent electricity supply -- since Bush’s war – continued into 2008. This continued despite repeated and empty promises of reconstruction by western contractors. In some cities, homes got electricity just an hour or two a day. Sometimes, there was no electricity for a week. Meanwhile, Iraqis struggled to get alternative source of electricity. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008)

More wealthy residents purchased generators and gave outlets to others who took what they needed. In Baghdad, that meant a high bill for electricity in addition to paying for scarce and costly food. In many homes the entire income could not cover the cost of electricity needs. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008)

The failure of power across Iraq fed anger with the government. Some believed that if the government were serious about fixing electricity, they could do it easily. Businesses were down. Only those who could pay for big generators could operate their factories or keep shops open. But most businesses shut shop. As a result, the number of jobs became more limited, adding to extreme unemployment. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008)

Compounding the problem was the rising cost of fuel. Simple generators were too expensive. Fifteen liters of petrol cost $12-15 -- or sometimes up to $25. This could operate the generator for just one or two days. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008)

Beyond numbers and hours, the stoppage of electricity made Iraqis anxious and bitter. It brought little reassurance to hear the sound of generators at night in other people’s homes. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008),?P>

The winter of 2007-08 was hard without electricity. Many Iraqis used wood fire to warm up the houses. Electric heaters became useless. They began to use metal containers of 50 by 20 centimeters in which to burn wood. (Inter Press Service, February 16, 2008)