PRESSURE MOUNTS ON BUSH TO END THE WAR

1. LEGISLATORS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL SPEAK OUT AGAINST BUSH

4. AMERICANS AND IRAQIS OPPOSE BUSH’S WAR

1. LEGISLATORS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL SPEAK OUT AGAINST BUSH

After more than two years of war, the Bush administration still refused to admit any mistakes in Iraq and continued to paint a rosy picture of the war. White House officials had always warned that it would “never negotiate with terrorists.” Yet, in June 2005, Rumsfeld said the United States had been negotiating with terrorists. (MSNBC, June 27, 2005)

Bush’s approval rating hit an all-time low of 35 percent in November 2005. Americans opposing his war topped 60 percent. The Senate finally challenged Bush. With Democrats and some Republicans, acknowledging that Bush’s war was not proceeding in the manner he had promised, took the initiative for the first time. They adopted a resolution that called for the Bush administration to hasten the transition of full sovereignty to Iraq and speed the eventual withdrawal of United States troops. (Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2005)

The Senate called on the administration to turn over to Iraqis more control of their country to hasten the eventual withdrawal of United States troops. The resolution passed with broad bipartisan support, 79 to 19. The Republican-sponsored measure stopped short of urging a firm date to begin bringing troops home. Yet, it did signal a more active role by Congress in pushing for an end to United States involvement in Iraq. (New York Times, November 16, 2005)

The resolution mandated that within one year to be a “a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty.” This would create conditions for “the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.” (Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2005)

By mid-2005, the Bush administration was in deeper trouble. The president was in a free-fall. By the summer of 2005, his approval rating plummeted to the mid-40 percent range. With his ratings at an all-time low, a classified British document indicated that the White House was ready to drastically reduce American forces in Iraq prior to the November 2006 mid-term congressional elections.

The secret memo, written for Blair by Defense Secretary John Reid, was marked “Secret -- UK Eyes Only.” It stated that the United States and Britain were drawing up plans to withdraw the majority of their troops from Iraq mid-2006. (The Guardian, July 11, 2005)

The classified memo said, “Emerging U.S. plans assume that 14 out of 18 provinces could be handed over to Iraqi control by early 2006.” That allowed a reduction in overall United States-led forces in Iraq to 66,000 troops from the 160,000, including 138,000 American troops, when the memo was released. (The Guardian, July 11, 2005)

On July 27 -- two weeks after the secret memo was made public -- General George Casey, the top ground commander in Iraq, said he hoped to sharply reduce United States forces by the middle of 2006. (New York Times, July 27, 2005)

Meanwhile, the Army planned for the possibility of keeping the same number of soldiers in Iraq through 2009 -- for four more years. General Peter Schoomaker said the Army was prepared for the “worst case” in terms of the required level of troops in Iraq. (Associated Press, August 20, 2005)

General George Casey, commander of United States forces in Iraq, testified before Congress. He revealed that “the number of Iraqi army battalions that can fight insurgents without United States and coalition help has dropped from three to one.” That meant only 700 Iraq Security forces were rated as “Level 1” on a four-point scale created by the United States military. (American Progress Action, November 30, 2005)

Two months later, pressured officials in the Bush administration dismissed that measure of readiness, saying more Iraqi units were able to conduct advanced operations each day. On November 24, Secretary of State Rice said that the training of Iraqi soldiers had advanced so far that the current number of United States troops in the country probably would not be needed much longer. Five days later, Bush also boasted of the improved readiness of Iraqi troops. (Los Angeles Times, November 25, 2005; November 30, 2005)

In 2006, Major General John Batiste said, “I think the current administration repeatedly ignored sound military advice and counsel with respect to the war plans. ... And military leaders of all ranks, particularly the senior military, have an obligation in a democracy to say something about it."

In mid-November, the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed an amendment calling on the Bush administration to provide a “schedule” for meeting United States objectives in Iraq. The resolution called for Bush to provide “information regarding variables that could alter that schedule, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that schedule.” (New York Times, November 16, 2005)

By 2007, more than 20 retired United States generals had broken ranks with their colleagues and spoke publicly against the war.

*In October 2007, retired General Sanchez blasted the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq war, calling it a “nightmare with no end in sight.” Sanchez had received praise from Bush for his “strong leadership” and for doing “a fabulous job.” (Democracy in Action, October 2007)

Sanchez said. “There has been a glaring unfortunate display of incompetent strategic leadership” within our national leaders. ... There is no question that America is living a nightmare with no end in sight. … Who will demand accountability for the failure of our national political leaders involved in the management of this war? They have unquestionably been derelict in the performance of their duty.” (Democracy in Action, October 2007)

*Two other retired generals agreed with Sanchez’s main indictments of the Bush administration’s war policy. “This war has been done on the cheap from the very beginning,” retired Army Brigadier General David Grange said. “So I think yes, the whole country, all the leadership in the country is at fault for not putting the nation at war to accomplish this mission.” (Democracy in Action, October 2007)

*In the fall of 2007, former Federal Reserve president Alan Greenspan wrote, “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil.” (Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World

Greenspan also harshly criticized Bush for “abandoning fiscal constraint,” and he praised Bill Clinton’s anti-deficit policies during the 1990s as “an act of political courage.” He also wrote of Clinton’s sharp and ‘curious’ mind, and ‘old-fashioned’ caution about the dangers of debt. (Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World)

“NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ.” On November 30, Bush spoke at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, where there was no possibility of protesters. The White House had announced that he would be promoting for the first time a comprehensive strategy for victory in Iraq.

But Bush’s “plan” contained the same rhetoric that he always had used. Once again, he declared that the United States would stay the course until the war on terror had been won. And again he boasted that Iraqi forces were improving and, as they stand up, United States forces will stand down. (New York Times, November 16, 2005)

Bush touted a 35-page document titled “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” (NSVI) that called for “the broad strategy the president set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.” (New York Times, November 30, 2005)

The president boasted that the United States was winning the war. But evidence proved otherwise:

1. United States troops’ fatalities steadily were increasing. 2,107 soldiers had died in Iraq and over 15,500 had been wounded. Almost 94 percent of those deaths came after Bush stood below a banner declaring “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq. Of the total, nearly 60 percent -- 1,246 troops -- had died since the United States handover of “sovereignty” in June 2004. Approximately three American soldiers died each day as Bush was delivering his November 30 speech. That was roughly at the same pace as last month and at some of the highest casualty rates since the war began. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

2. Daily attacks by insurgents were at an all-time high. Even Pentagon officials acknowledged that, in the previous month of October, there were about 100 attacks a day in Iraq compared with 85 to 90 attacks a day in September -- and about half of all attacks involved homemade bombs. This was the highest recorded level of daily attacks since the Iraq war began.

By comparison, in January 2005, it was reported that attacks in Baghdad regularly numbered in the dozens every day, with nationwide figures hovering around 50 to 70 attacks per day.

Also, more than 225 foreigners were kidnapped since 2004 and at least 38 were killed. On November 20 -- just ten days before Bush delivered his November 30th speech -- a suicide bomber killed 100 people in Baghdad. These attacks were the deadliest since September 14, 2005, when at least 14 insurgent bombings in Baghdad killed more than 160 people. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

3. Bush boasted that the Iraqi military was steadily improving. Yet, in February 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claimed, “There are over 210,000 Iraqis serving in the security forces. That’s an amazing accomplishment.” Seven months later -- in September 2004 -- Rumsfeld said that 95,000 trained Iraqi troops were taking part in security operations, less than half the number the administration had been publicizing. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

Two months before Bush gave his November 30th speech, General Casey testified before Congress. He said the number of Iraqi battalions rated at the highest level of readiness had dropped from three to one. That number never changed. Two months later, the Bush administration claimed there were 212,000 trained and equipped Iraqi security forces. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

Bush was losing his coalition that had been minimal at best. The coalition consisted of 37 countries at its peak, and it steadily shrunk amid waning public support and rising violence on the ground. When Bush spoke on November 30, there were just 27 countries that were part of the Multinational Forces.

In May 2003, there were approximately 150,000 United States troops in Iraq. When Bush spoke on November 30, there were approximately 155,000. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

4. The reconstruction of Iraq was continuing to fail. The cost of Bush’s war exceeded $250 billion, and there was little indication that the standard of Iraqi life had improved. Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, reported, that the Bush administration promised to use $18 billion Congress allocated to rebuild water, electricity, health, and oil networks to prewar levels or better are running into cold reality. Bowen said, “We are going to provide something less than that. As the money runs out on the $30 billion American-financed reconstruction of Iraq, the officials in charge cannot say how many planned projects they will complete, and there is no clear source for the hundreds of millions of dollars a year needed to operate the projects that had been finished.” Two months earlier in October, the London-based Centre for Global Energy reported that Iraqi oil production had fallen below prewar levels to its lowest point in a decade. Unemployment rates hovered near 40 percent. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

5. Iraqi sectarian tensions continued to rise:

*Shi’ite Iraqi security services carried out executions in predominantly Sunni neighborhoods.

*American officials, who were overseeing the training of the Iraqi Army and the police, acknowledged that police officers and Iraqi soldiers, and the militias with which they are associated, might be carrying out killings and abductions in Sunni communities.

*Death squads undermined the United States efforts to stabilize the nation, and train and equip Iraq’s security forces. (American Progress Action, November 29, 2005)

Bush rejected the Senate’s resolution for a timetable, saying, “We will not put a date certain on when each stage of success will be reached, because the timing of success depends upon meeting certain conditions, not arbitrary timetables.” (New York Times, November 30, 2005)

The NSVI dropped the rating system that had been used by Casey two months earlier. The NSVI said: “Now more than 120 Iraqi army and police battalions are in the fight.” It also said as of November 2005, there were more than 212,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces, compared with 96,000 in September 2004. The NSVI failed to mention that in February 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claimed there were 210,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces and a “thousand more that are currently in training.” (American Progress Action, November 30, 2005)

Much of the 35 pages of the NSVI described the progress of the war. Page 5 declared that “Our Strategy Is Working.” It concluded that:

1. “Economically, “Our restore, reform, build, strategy is achieving results.”

2. Politically, “Our Isolate, Engage, and Build strategy is working.”

3. On the security front: “Our clear, hold, and build strategy is working.” (American Progress Action, November 30, 2005)

SENDING MORE TROOPS TO IRAQ. In January 2007, Bush announced he was sending 21,500 more troops to Iraq. Subsequently, a panel of retired generals told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that more troops would do little to solve the underlying political problems in the country. (New York Times, January 19, 2007)

*General Joseph Hoar, former chief of the Central Command, told the committee, “Too little and too late.” He added that American leaders had failed to understand the political forces at work in the country. He said, “The solution is political, not military.” (New York Times, January 19, 2007)

*General Barry McCaffery, who commanded troops in the first Gulf War, said, “A fool’s errand.” He said other countries had concluded that the effort in Iraq was not succeeding, noting that “our allies are leaving us and will be gone by summer.” Describing the situation in Iraq as “desperate but not terminal,” he said Iraqis had to try to make political deals domestically and negotiate for stability with neighboring nations, particularly Syria and Iran. (New York Times, January 18, 2007)

*Marine General Greg Newbold, the Pentagon’s top operations officer, challenged Rumsfeld’s role as secretary of defense. Newbold suggested that the Secretary of Defense had badly mismanaged the war.

*Bush’s former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, agreed, saying “badly overstretched American forces in Iraq were losing the war there, and that a temporary increase in troop levels probably would not help.” (Washington Post; December 19, 2006)

*One general warned that even a plan to start withdrawing American forces from the country carried the risk that the armed Iraqi population will step up the level of attacks. “We will be shot at as we are going out.” said General Jack Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the Army. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*In January 2007, a panel of retired generals told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that sending 21,500 additional troops to Iraq would do little to solve the underlying political problems in the country.

General Joseph Hoar, a former chief of the Central Command, said, “Too little and too late.” Hoar said American leaders had failed to understand the political forces at work in the country. “The solution is political, not military.” (New York Times, January 18, 2007)

*General William Odom, a former director of the National Security Agency, charged the effort in Iraq had gone badly because the United States did not understand the consequences of deposing Saddam. Odom said the principal beneficiary of the war was Iran and al Qaeda, not the United States. (New York Times, January 18, 2007)

*Marine General Greg Newbold, the Pentagon’s top operations officer, challenged Rumsfeld’s role as secretary of defense. Newbold suggested that the Secretary of Defense had badly mismanaged the war.

*Bush’s former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, agreed, saying “badly overstretched American forces in Iraq were losing the war there, and that a temporary increase in troop levels probably would not help.” (Washington Post; December 19, 2006)

*One general warned that even a plan to start withdrawing American forces from the country carried the risk that the armed Iraqi population will step up the level of attacks. “We will be shot at as we are going out.” said General Jack Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the Army. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*In January 2007, a panel of retired generals told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that sending 21,500 additional troops to Iraq would do little to solve the underlying political problems in the country.

*General Joseph Hoar, a former chief of the Central Command, said, “Too little and too late.” Hoar said American leaders had failed to understand the political forces at work in the country. “The solution is political, not military.” (New York Times, January 18, 2007)

*While on active duty, Colonel Paul Yingling wrote a scathing attack on United States generals for their role in the war in Iraq. He accused them of misleading Congress and the public about the situation there. He said the “United States repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. Yingling charged that “U.S. generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq, namely failing to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq.” (Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007)

Yingling predicted that after going into Iraq in 2003 with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, United States generals did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. He said that while for more than three years American generals insisted the United States was making progress in Iraq, for Iraqi civilians each year has been more deadly than the one before. (Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007),/P>

Yingling added, “For reasons that are not yet clear, America’s general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq’s government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq.” (Armed Forces Journal, April 27, 2007)

*In the spring of 2007, retired British General Sir Michael Rose said Iraq’s insurgents were justified in opposing the occupation, arguing that the United States and its allies should “admit defeat” and leave Iraq before more soldiers are killed. (London’s The Guardian, May 4, 2007)

Rose said, “It is the soldiers who have been telling me from the frontline that the war they have been fighting is a hopeless war, that they cannot possibly win it and the sooner we start talking politics and not military solutions, the sooner they will come home and their lives will be preserved.” Asked if that meant admitting defeat, the general replied: “Of course we have to admit defeat. The British admitted defeat in North America and the catastrophes that were predicted at the time never happened. (London’s The Guardian, May 4, 2007)

Ignoring advice from the experts, Bush spoke to the American people and announced a “new strategy.” But in reality, it seemed likely to remain entirely unchanged. He said he was sending 21,500 more troops into Baghdad and Anbar Province, even though they were overstretched across the globe.

Bush’s philosophy and decisions ran counter to those of most experts:

*He set no timetable for when troop levels would be drawn back down.

*He refused to engage in talks with Iran and Syria.

*He only intensified United States efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence in Iraq.

*He said he would increase United States military presence in the region and keep the United Nations active in Iraq.

*Bush said Iraqis should dedicate $10 billion for reconstruction efforts, deliver three brigades for Baghdad effort, and crack down on all insurgents and extremists, regardless of sect or religion.

Bush provided mere lip-service to the Iraq regime to set benchmarks to complete oil profit-sharing law, reintegrate Ba’athists into the government, hold provincial elections, and transfer security to Iraqi forces.

He announced he would spend $814 million to double the number of United States civilian workers helping coordinate reconstruction and to provide quick-response funds for local rebuilding projects; and spend another $350 million on a program that gives field commanders money to solve local problems and quickly improve Iraqis’ lives. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

Ignoring advice from other groups, Bush spoke to the American people and announced a “new strategy.” But in reality, it seemed likely to remain entirely unchanged. He said he was sending 21,500 more troops into Baghdad and Anbar Province, even though they were overstretched across the globe.

Bush set no timetable for when troop levels would be drawn back down.

Bush refused to engage in talks with Iran and Syria. He only intensified United States efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence in Iraq.

He urged Arab states to support the Iraqi government. He said he would increase United States military presence in the region and keep the United Nations active in Iraq.

Bush said Iraqis should dedicate $10 billion for reconstruction efforts, deliver three brigades for Baghdad effort, and crack down on all insurgents and extremists, regardless of sect or religion.

He set benchmarks for Iraqis: complete oil profit-sharing law, reintegrate Ba’athists into the government, hold provincial elections, and transfer security to Iraqi forces.

He announced he would spend $814 million to double the number of United States civilian workers helping coordinate reconstruction and to provide quick-response funds for local rebuilding projects; and spend another $350 million on a program that gives field commanders money to solve local problems and quickly improve Iraqis’ lives. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

Bush’s decision to increase the number of American troops ran into intense congressional opposition Thursday from Democrats and from moderate Republicans who expressed profound skepticism. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

Secretary of State Rice appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The reception she received suggested that Bush’s address to the nation had done little to build political support for sending additional troops to Baghdad. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*Democrats were scathing in their criticism, and in both the House and the Senate, Democratic leaders moved ahead with plans to oppose Bush’s plan through non-binding resolutions. While saying they did not plan any immediate effort to try to thwart the Bush plan by cutting off funds, some Democrats said they would continue to consider placing limitations on the administration when Congress considers a war spending measure later in the year. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*Moderate Republicans such as Senator Chuck Hagel, member of the Foreign Relations Committee, was critical of Bush’s handling of the war, calling his new plan “dangerous foreign policy blunder,” and vowed to oppose them. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*GOP Senator Norm Coleman echoed Hagel’s sentiments, saying, “Why put more American lives on the line now in the hope that this time they’ll make the difficult choice?” Other Republicans questioned the Bush plan without rejecting it outright, but their call for greater detail made it clear they remained unconvinced. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*Senator John Sununu of New Hampshire agreed that approving new legislation in Iraq on sharing oil revenue would be central to weaving estranged Sunni Arabs into the political process. (New York Times, January 11, 2007)

*Republican Senator Richard Lugar noted that he had raised questions about the effort in Iraq as long ago as 2003, and said, “Today, I don’t have an understanding about how it will work militarily.” (New York Times, January 18, 2007)

Newspapers also voiced skepticism and even derision over Secretary of State Rice’s Middle East tour aimed at rallying support for Bush’s Iraq plan. Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani chastised Washington for failing to consult the Gulf Cooperation Council of which it was a member over its “harmful” Iraq policy. (Agence de France, January 15, 2007)

In Jordan, another key United States regional ally, the independent Al-Arab Al-Yawm also dismissed the chance of Rice winning support for Bush’s plans for Iraq. (Agence de France, January 15, 2007)

One year later, she set up camp outside Bush’s ranch at Crawford, asking once again to meet with the president. During Bush’s five-week vacation in July and August of 2005, Sheehan maintained a vigil near the Bush ranch, asking to meet with the president. She hoped to ask him, “Explain for what noble cause did my son die?” This was a question that Bush could not easily answer. Of course, Bush ignored Sheehan’s request.

Partially due to the anti-war movement, his approval ratings plummeted to just 36 percent -- three points lower than President Nixon’s approval ratings during the height of the Watergate scandal in the summer of 1973. According to Gallup, “Americans have become negative about the war in Iraq more quickly than they did for the Vietnam War.” Fifty percent of Americans said it was a mistake to send troops. In the comparable quarter for the Vietnam War, Gallup found 41 percent saying the conflict was a mistake. (Gallup Poll, August 23, 2005)

Sheehan joined other moms and families who had lost loved ones in the conflict to tell Americans about the true costs of the war. Their group, Real Voices ran television ads featuring the voices of Americans like Cindy speaking directly to Bush about the impact of his failed policies and lies.

Bush administration officials dared not denigrate Sheehan. But they happily stood by as the right-wing media attacked her. From Bill O’Reilly to Rush Limbaugh, Sheehan was attacked for being unpatriotic and out of the main stream. They castigated her for damaging the morale of American troops in Iraq.

Bush took the offensive. In the span of one week, he spoke to carefully screened pro-war groups in Salt Lake City, Utah; Nampa, Idaho; and San Diego, California. And he found plenty of time to vacation at plush reports where he could bicycle, fish, and golf. (Washington Post, August 26, 2005)

MORE AND MORE CHRISTIANS OPPOSE THE WAR. Two months after Bush declared major combat in Iraq completed in May 2003, most Christians agreed with the president’s decision to march to war.

But after two years of failing to make progress, more Christians began condemning military involvement in Iraq. Reverend Bob Edgar, general secretary of the National Council of Churches -- a coalition of mainline Protestant and Orthodox denominations -- was one of them. He said, “We had no plan for making the peace. We continue as a superpower to be arrogant. … And we have acted as though all is well, when, in fact, daily we have reports of suicide bombings and more disruptions in Iraq. Just like with Hurricane Katrina, (Bush) doesn’t want to hear people say ‘It didn’t go well.’ ” (San Bernardino County Sun, September 12, 2005)

In July 2005, a Pew Center poll showed that 56 percent of White mainline Protestants and 54 percent of white Roman Catholics supported military involvement. Even among evangelicals, who helped Bush win re-election, support had fallen by 11 percentage points. (San Bernardino County Sun, September 12, 2005)

TEN NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS CALL ON BUSH TO END THE WAR. In September 2006, ten Nobel Peace Prize laureates called for world peace and demanded that the United States pull back its military, spread its wealth and offer aid to developing countries. (Associated Press, September 17, 2006)

INCREASED ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS. By the end of 2006, the Pentagon’s domestic surveillance program monitored at least 186 anti-war protests in the United States. (OneWorldNet, January 25, 2007)

Additionally, the Defense Department collected more than 2,800 reports involving Americans in a single anti-terrorism database. The internal Defense Department documents showed it monitored the activities of a wide swath of peace groups, including Veterans for Peace, Iraq Veterans Against the War, Military Families Speak Out, Code Pink, the American Friends Service Committee, the War Resisters League, and the umbrella group United for Peace and Justice. (OneWorldNet, January 25, 2007)

4. THE JAMES BAKER PROPOSAL IN 2006

A commission formed to assess the Iraq war and recommend a new course ruled out the prospect of victory for the United States. The 10-member commission -- headed by former Secretary of State James Baker -- considered two option papers, “Stability First” and “Redeploy and Contain.” Both ruled out any prospect of making Iraq a stable democracy in the near term. (New York Times, October 12, 2006)

“Stability First” advocated minor fixes to the Bush war plan but kept intact the long-term vision of democracy in Iraq with regular elections. The memo argued that the military should focus on stabilizing Baghdad while the American Embassy should work toward political accommodation with insurgents. The goal of democracatizing Iraq was dropped. (New York Times, October 12, 2006)

“Redeploy and Contain” proposed that coalition forces focus their attacks only on al Qaeda and not the wider insurgency. This option called for the phased withdrawal of American soldiers from Iraq. (New York Times, October 12, 2006)

4. AMERICANS AND IRAQIS OPPOSE BUSH’S WAR