IRAQGATE: REAGAN AND BUSH BUILD UP SADDAM’ WAR MACHINE IN THE 1980s

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. Saddam Hussein had ample cause to purchase military weapons before going to war with Iran just a year after the Islamic revolution toppled America’s ally, the Shah, and ushered into power Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1980, war broke out with Iran. In this period of eight years, Hussein looked to the United States which was an ardent supporter of his in bid to unseat Iran as the power broker in the Middle East. Hundreds of villages were destroyed and one million lives were lost. The White House could not have been more pleased in supplying Iraq with a variety of weapons.

The primary cause of the Iran-Iraq War revolved around Ayatollah Khomeini’s quest for Baghdad’s rich oil reserves. From a legal point of view, Iraq and Iran had been in dispute over Shatt-al-Arab which separated the two countries. In 1937, a treaty between Iraq and Iran gave Iraq full control of the Shatt. In 1969, Iran declared these 1937 provisions void and sent naval craft up the Shatt to restate its claims. All naval craft along the Shatt-al-Arab flew the Iraqi flag with navigation fees paid to Iraq.

In 1975, Iraq abandoned its claims to the center of the waterway as part of the Algiers Agreement . In return for this shared sovereignty, the Shah terminated Iranian aid to the Kurdish rebels in the north. A few days before the 1980 war, Iraq abrogated this treaty, claiming full sovereignty. There were claims that Iraq violated the Algiers Agreement 187 times, with border skirmishes between 1975 and 1980.

Hussein had ample cause to purchase military weapons. During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, Hussein looked to the United States which was an ardent supporter of his in bid to unseat Iran as the power broker in the Middle East. Hundreds of villages were destroyed and one million lives were lost. The White House could not have been more pleased in supplying Iraq with a variety of weapons.

The Reagan-Bush administration sold military equipment and technology to Iraq, as well as to other countries which passed them on to the Hussein regime. The White House secretly allowed Saudi Arabia to provide American-made weapons to the Iraqi regime over a period of nearly ten years. This series of illegal actions, carried out by the Reagan-Bush administration, became known as Iraqgate.

DONALD RUMSFELD’S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN IN 1984. On December 19, 1983, Reagan dispatched his Middle East envoy -- Donald Rumsfeld -- to Baghdad with a hand-written offer of a resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been severed during the 1967 Arab-Israel war. On March 24, 1984, Rumsfeld was again in Baghdad. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

Rumsfeld told Hussein that the United States would assist in building an oil pipeline from Iraq to Aqaba, Jordan. He made no mention of chemical weapons, even though United States intelligence only months earlier had confirmed that Iraq was using such illegal weapons almost daily against Iranians and Kurds. (Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2003; http://www.nsarchive.org)

On that same day, the UPI reported: “Mustard gas laced with a nerve agent has been used on Iranian soldiers … a team of U.N. experts has concluded. … Meanwhile, in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, U.S. presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld held talks with foreign minister Tariq Aziz.” (United Press International, March 24, 1984)

The day before, Iran had accused Iraq of poisoning 600 of its soldiers with mustard gas and Tabun nerve gas. There was no doubt that the Reagan administration knew Iraq was using chemical weapons. On March 5, 1984, the State Department had stated that “available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons.” (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

After Rumsfeld’s talks in Baghdad, United States officials said they were “themselves satisfied with relations between Iraq and the U.S. and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been restored in all but name.” (New York Times, March 29, 1984)

Documents found by the National Security Archive showed evidence that Rumsfeld was not honest about his prior dealings with Iraq. The NSA documents showed that Rumsfeld assured Hussein that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons would not endanger the two countries’ relations. (Washington Post, December 18, 2003)

When Rumsfeld was asked about his trip to Iraq in September 2002, he told CNN that he had “cautioned” Saddam Hussein about the use of chemical weapons. Rumsfeld said, “I have no knowledge of (the United States government) being involved in assisting Iraq develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.” (Washington Post, December 18, 2003)

However, Rumsfeld’s account of his communications with Hussein differed from the declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting, which did not mention such a “caution.“ Rumsfeld’s comments also conflicted with the new documents which showed that he was sent to Iraq by President Reagan specifically “to improve bilateral relations” and “that the United States’ public criticism of Iraq for using chemical weapons would not derail Washington’s attempts to forge a better relationship.” (Washington Post, December 18, 2003)

Additionally, a Newsweek article, entitled “How We Helped Create Saddam” detailed the Reagan administration’s sales of computer databases to Hussein to allow him to track political opponents and shipments of “bacteria/fungi/protozoa” (Newsweek, September 23, 2002; Washington Post, December 18, 2003)

PROVIDING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. Hussein used chemical weapons in the Iraqi city of Halabja in Kurdistan province. 5,000 civilians were killed, and 200,000 total casualties were incurred. Beginning in 1984, United Nations teams investigated and determine that mustard and nerve gases were used. However, no sanctions were brought against Iraq.

The Reagan administration provided critical battle planning assistance at a time when American intelligence knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war. Classified documents showed a long pattern of personal efforts by George Herbert Bush -- both as president and vice president -- to support and placate the Iraqi dictator. (Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1992; New York Times, August 18, 2002)

The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan’s top aides -- Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell, then the national security adviser -- were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988. During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States sided with Baghdad to prevent the Ayatollah Khomeini regime from gaining control of the important oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf. (New York Times, August 18, 2002; Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

Senior military officers in the Reagan administration with direct knowledge of the program publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and other poisonous agents. Yet, President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and senior national security aides never withdrew their support. The program continued under more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that was secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for air strikes, and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq. (New York Times, August 17, 2002)

Senior intelligence officers, who spoke anonymously, told the New York Times (August 18, 2002) about the nature of gas warfare on both sides of the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1988. Iraq’s use of gas in that conflict was repeatedly cited by President Bush and National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice as justification for “regime change” in Iraq.

However, senior Reagan administration officials publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and other poisonous agents. Although National Security Advisor Powell declined to discuss any specifics, Richard Armitage, a senior defense official, denied that the United States supported Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. (New York Times (August 18, 2002)

Not only did the Reagan White House ignore Iraq’s repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Iraq’s Kurdish minority, but it helped Iraq develop its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

According to reports of a Senate Committee in 1994, the United States government allowed firms to export a variety of biological materials to Iraq from 1985 -- if not earlier -- through 1989 pursuant to application and licensing by the Department of Commerce. As documented in Rogue State by author William Blum, the materials included bacillus anthracis which causes of anthrax; clostridium botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin; histoplasma capsulatam, a cause of a disease attacking the lung, brain, spinal cord, and heart; brucella melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs; clostridium perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria which causes systemic illness; clostridium tetani, a highly toxigenic chemical; and escherichia coli (E.coli).

Dozens of other pathogenic biological agents were shipped to Iraq during the 1980s. The Senate Report pointed out that “These biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction.” The committee reported that it learned later “that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi biological warfare program.” The report also noted that American exports to Iraq included the precursors to chemical warfare agents, plans for chemical and biological warfare production facilities and chemical warhead filling equipment.

These exports continued to at least November 28, 1989 despite the fact that Iraq had been reported to be engaging in chemical warfare and possibly biological warfare against Iranians, Kurds, and Shi’ites since the early 1980s as part of its war with Iran.

Iraqi chemical attacks on Iranian troops -- and United States assistance to Iraq -- continued throughout the Iran-Iraq war. In a parallel program, the Defense Department also provided intelligence and battle-planning assistance to Iraq. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

Using its allies in the Middle East, the Reagan administration funneled huge supplies of arms to Iraq. Classified State Department cables described covert transfers of howitzers, helicopters, bombs, and other weapons to Baghdad in 1982 and 1983 from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Conventional military sales to Iraq began in December 1982. The following year, the Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 Hughes helicopters to Iraq for civilian use. However, these aircraft could be “weaponized” within hours of delivery. Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Commerce George Baldridge also lobbied for the delivery of Bell helicopters equipped for “crop spraying.” Very likely, the United States helicopters were used in the 1988 chemical attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja, which killed 5000 people. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

United States intelligence officials believed they had incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and has almost finished extensive sites for mass producing the lethal chemical warfare agent.” (New York Times, March 30, 1984)

In 1984, the CIA began to secretly supply Iraq with intelligence that was used to “calibrate” mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. Beginning in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with data from sensitive United States satellite reconnaissance photography … to assist Iraqi bombing raids.” (Bob Woodward, Washington Post, December 15, 1986)

Iraq’s chemical weapons were used in the war’s final battle in early 1988, in which Iraqi forces retook the Fao Peninsula from the Iranian army. Another retired DIA officer, Walter Lang, said “the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern.” (New York Times, August 17, 2002)

It was not only the Reagan administration that initiated the sale of arms to Baghdad. Billions of dollars worth of raw materials, machinery and equipment, missile technology, and other “dual-use” items were also supplied by West German, French, Italian, British, Swiss and Austrian corporations. German firms even sold Iraq entire factories capable of mass-producing poison gas. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

The destination of most of these materials was Saad 16, near Mosul in northern Iraq. Western intelligence agencies had long known that the sprawling complex was Iraq's main ballistic missile development center. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

The Reagan administration also asked other countries to fuel the Iraqi war machine. In 1983, Reagan asked Italy’s Prime Minister Guilo Andreotti to sell weapons to Iraq early in its war with Iran. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

On March 16, 1988, Iraqi forces, with the benefit of American intelligence, launched a poison gas attack on the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja, killing 5000 people. An American intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, was sent to tour the battlefield with Iraqi officers.

Francona reported that Iraq had used chemical weapons to assure a victory, one former DIA official said. Colonel Francona saw zones marked off for chemical contamination, and containers for the drug atropine scattered around, indicating that Iraqi soldiers had taken injections to protect themselves from the effects of gas that might blow back over their positions. CIA officials supported the program to assist Iraq, though they were not involved. Separately, the CIA provided Iraq with satellite photography of the war front.

Colonel Walter P. Lang, the senior defense intelligence officer, said that both DIA and CIA officials “were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose” to Iran. “The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern.” What Reagan’s aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Lang asserted that the DIA “would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival.” Senior Reagan administration officials did nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the program said.

Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, but the intelligence officers said they were not involved in planning any of the military operations in which those assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major Iranian troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq’s military command wanted assistance were on the southern war front. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

The Pentagon well knew that Iraqi military commanders had integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal. A senior DIA official publicly condemned Iraq’s use of gas, while privately he acquiesced to its use. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Just four months after the attack on the Kurds, the Reagan administration awarded Bechtel Corporation with a contract to build a huge petrochemical plant that would give the Hussein regime the capacity to generate chemical weapons. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

On September 8, 1988, the Senate passed the Prevention of Genocide Act, which would have imposed sanctions on the Hussein regime. Immediately, the Reagan administration announced its opposition to the bill, calling it “premature.” The White House used its influence to stall the bill in the House of Representatives. When Congress did eventually pass the bill, the White House refused to implement it. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

In 2002 and 2003, the George W. Bush administration repeatedly cited Iraq’s use of chemical weapons “on his (Saddam Hussein) own people” at Halabja as a clear example of why Hussein needed to be toppled. (In These Times, December 16, 2003)

However, the New York Times reported in 2002, after Halabja, the United States government covertly increased its support of Hussein, knowing full well that “Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons” again. The story added, “The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan’s top aides were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja.” In addition, the Los Angeles Times reported in 1991 “that American-built helicopters were among those dropping the deadly bombs” at Halabja. (In These Times, December 16, 2003)

EXPORTING MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT. According to Commerce Department export-import control documents obtained by Newsweek (September 23, 2002), the United States sold several types of equipment which helped bolster Iraq’s military machine. They included:

A computerized database for Hussein’s Interior Ministry to track political opponents.

Helicopters to transport Iraqi officials.

Television cameras for “video surveillance applications.”

Chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).

Numerous shipments of “bacteria/fungi/protozoa” which could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax.

The shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors for use against the effects of chemical weapons -- but the Pentagon blocked the sale. (Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

Eighteen American corporations provided Saudi Arabia with military hardware which included TOW missiles. The Saudis delivered MK-84 2,000 pound bombs to Iraq in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Iraqi loans from American banks totaling $5.5 billion were ignored. Iraq received $5 billion in loans guaranteed by the Agricultural Department to promote American farm exports. Even Vice President Bush admitted that American materials had been sold to Iraq for commercial purposes and then illegally switched for military uses.

Two major Bay Area corporations allegedly sold technology that helped Iraq in the 1980s, according to a German journalist with access to the 12,000-page document on Iraqi weapons that was turned over to the United Nations. Hewlett-Packard Corporation sold about $1.7 million worth of computers and testing equipment that the Middle Eastern country used to build missiles and a military infrastructure when it was a United States ally against Iran, according to Andreas Zumach, a journalist for Die Tageszeitung, a Berlin newspaper.

According to Zumach, the Iraqi document said that during the 1980s, HP sold the Iraqis:

$25,000 worth of computers and electronic testing calibration and graphics equipment for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

$599,257 worth of frequency synthesizers, electronic testing equipment, radio spectrum analyzers and computers to Saad 16, Iraq’s main missile research project.

$1,045,500 worth of computers used for making molds, frequency synthesizers and other equipment for security military communications systems.

According to the General Accounting Office in 1986, the United States sold an undisclosed number of TOW anti-tank missiles. In return, the Saudis sold 1,500 bombs to Iraq. These included 300 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs. This was directly in violation of the Arms Export Control Act which prohibited the transfer of American weapons to other nations without the written approval of Washington.

Billions of dollars in fraudulent loans were made by the Atlanta branch of an Italian bank to help provide Iraq with weapons for the Gulf War. As much as $5.5 billion in loans were ignored by the American government. Italian Bank (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) in Atlanta illegally sent these funds to Iraq for the purchase of military weapons. In October 1989, FBI agents raided the Atlanta bank and found evidence of over $5 billion in loans guaranteed by the Agricultural department through its Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to promote American farm exports. Investigators found that food was being replaced for weapons. Even Bush admitted that American materials had been sold to Iraq for commercial purposes and then illegally switched for military uses.

The State Department disclosed that between 1986 and 1989, 73 transactions took place with Iraq. Items included bacteria cultures, advanced computers, and equipment to repair jet engines and rockets. Even after the Gulf War erupted, American corporations illegally sold technology to Iraq. For example, Delft Instruments in New York sold night-vision equipment to both Iraq and Jordan four months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in December 1991. It was disclosed in 1989 that XYZ Options, an Alabama firm which manufactured carbide tools, was part of Iraq’s nuclear capability market. They furnished valves for nuclear weapons. In addition, a $40 million brass-casting factory and a $26 million ductile-pipe plant sold materials to Iraq.

The Reagan administration also supplied Iraq with photo intelligence that showed Iranian deployments. In 1986, Vice President Bush acted as an intermediary when he sent strategic military advice to Hussein during a critical point of the Iran-Iraq War. Bush used Egyptian President Mubarak to relay the information to Baghdad.

More than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency secretly provided detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for air strikes, and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

EXPORTING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. The Agriculture Department’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guaranteed that it would cover the sale of commodities such as wheat and rice, if Baghdad defaulted. However, the loan guarantees amounted to a massive United States subsidy that allowed Hussein to launch a military buildup. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

$402 million in Agriculture Department loan guarantees were approved in 1983. The following year, this amount was increased to $503 million, and it reached $1.1 billion in 1988. Between 1983 and 1990, CCC loan guarantees freed up more than $5 billion. Some $2 billion in bad loans, plus interest, ended up having to be covered by United States taxpayers. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

A similar taxpayer-funded, though smaller scale, scam operated under the federal Export-Import Bank. In 1984, Vice President Bush personally intervened to ensure that the bank guaranteed loans to Iraq of $500 million to build an oil pipeline. Export-Import Bank loan guarantees grew from $35 million in 1985 to $267 million by 1990. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

From 1985 until 1990 the United States government approved 771 licenses for the export to Iraq of $1.5 billion worth of biological agents and high-tech equipment with military application. Only 39 of the 771 requests were rejected. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

In August 1989, FBI agents raided the Atlanta branch of the Rome-based Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and uncovered massive fraud involving the CCC loan guarantee scheme and billions of dollars worth of unauthorized “off-the-books” loans to Iraq. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

BNL Atlanta manager Chris Drougal had used the CCC program to underwrite programs that had nothing to do with agricultural exports. Using this covert set-up, Iraq tried to buy the most hard-to-get components for its nuclear weapons and missile programs on the black market. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

On October 2, 1989, President George Herbert Bush signed the top-secret National Security Decision 26, which declared: “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our influence with Iraq. … We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for United States firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

As public and congressional pressure mounted on the Agriculture Department to end Iraq’s access to CCC loan guarantees, Secretary of State James Baker insisted that Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter drop his opposition to their continuation. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

In November 1989, Bush approved $1 billion in loan guarantees for Iraq in 1990. In April 1990, more revelations about the BNL scandal convinced the Department of Agriculture to halt Iraq’s CCC loan guarantees. On May 18, National Security Adviser Scowcroft personally intervened to ensure the delivery of the first $500 million transaction of the CCC subsidy for 1990. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

From July 18 to August 1, 1990, the Bush administration approved $4.8 million in advanced technology sales to Iraq. This included Saad 16 and the Iraqi ministry of industry and military industrialization. On August 1, $695,000 worth of advanced data transmission devices were approved. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

On August 2, 1990, The Agriculture Department officially suspended the CCC loan guarantees to Iraq. On that very day, Iraqi tanks and troops attacked Kuwait. (Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine)

A 1994 Senate report revealed that United States companies were licensed by the Commerce Department to export a “witch’s brew” of biological and chemical materials, including bacillus anthracis (the cause of anthrax) and clostridium botulinum (the source of botulism). The American Type Culture Collection made 70 shipments of the anthrax bug and other pathogenic agents. (Norm Dixon, Australia’s Green Left Weekly, August 30, 2002)

By the end of the decade, over 40 percent of Iraq’s food were imported from the United States, and the Hussein government received one billion in loan assurances.

Iraq defaulted on American loans and was still given a $270 million credit to buy more products. Not only was the United States helping to subsidize Iraq in agricultural products but also sold military equipment and technology directly to Baghdad as well as to other countries which in turn peddled them on to Iraq.

GEORGE HERBERT BUSH’S PRESIDENCY. Shortly after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, Vice President Bush met several times with Iraqi officials to continue to play up to Hussein’s government. Bush sought to influence the Exchange-Import Bank to provide loans to Iraq. Two months after Bush moved into the White House, he continued to patronize Hussein’s government. The newly inaugurated president attempted to influence the Exchange-Import Bank to provide loans to Iraq.

However, in the summer of 1989, American attitude towards Iraq began to shift. Secretary of State James Baker informed President George Herbert Bush that Iraq was procuring nuclear weapons technology. Yet Bush pushed forward with his own agenda to provide more weapons and agricultural credits to Iraq. Only two days after American intelligence warned Bush of the Hussein’s buildup, the United States granted Iraq $1 billion in agricultural credits. Bush insisted that he never knowingly helped Hussein develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

In June, the Defense Intelligence Agency warned of high level administration officials in the White House that “Iraq had developed a major European procurement network in defense industries.” On September 3, Secretary of State Baker issued a top secret warning to Bush. He stated that Iraq was procuring nuclear weapons technology to counter perceived military threats from Israel and Iran. Baker’s report included such items as sophisticated computers and X-ray machines.

The next day, the CIA issued a report that Iraq was serious in its bid to build nuclear weapons. Despite repeated warnings about Iraq’s arms build-up, Bush pushed forward with his own agenda to provide more weapons and credits to Iraq. Despite these warnings to Bush by American intelligence groups, just two days later Bush granted Iraq $1 billion in agricultural credits.

On September 2, Bush issued National Security Directive 26. This stated that “the United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.” Among the incentives for expanded trade with Iraq included non-lethal military assistance. Bush insisted that he never “knowingly” helped Hussein develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, both Baker and National Security adviser Brent Scowcraft admitted that they had seen several memorandums which warned the administration of Hussein’s bid to proliferate its military arsenal. Nevertheless, NSD 26 was Bush’s official stamp of approval on his Iraq policy. Four days later, Baker met with Foreign Minister Aziz and, according to the minutes, informed him that the White House would not restrict the sale of high technology equipment to Iraq.

Congressman Henry Gonzalez of Texas lobbied the House to launch an investigation into Iraqgate. In a series of speeches, Gonzalez documented how American policy helped Iraq develop weapons of mass destruction before the Gulf War. Gonzalez believed Bush was using the CIA to taint the Iraqgate investigation. Bush asked the CIA to investigate Gonzalez for revealing allegedly secret intelligence information which harmed American national security interests

The House Judiciary Committee, after several hearings, considered the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate Iraqgate. However, the investigation merely revolved around the fact that the Commerce Department allegedly altered information on 66 export licenses for Iraq which were turned over to congressional investigators. The export licenses were simply changed from “Vehicles designed for military use” to “Commercial utility cargo trucks.” The House Judiciary Committee ultimately agreed that it was too “vague” to justify an independent counsel. As a result, no further investigations into Iraqgate were conducted.