BUSH’S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

CONTENTS

Before and after the Iraq war commenced, the Bush administration sought to manipulate the media. The first effort failed after one year of warfare. Before 2001, the Office of Broadcasting Services, a branch of the State Department, acted in a nonpartisan manner. It acted as a clearinghouse for video from news conferences. But in 2002, it changed as it began producing fake news segments to back up Bush’s rationale for going to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The office produced nearly 60 segments, which were then distributed around the world for local stations to use as actual news footage. (New York Times, March 13, 2005)

In 2002, the Pentagon was forced to shut down its Office of Strategic Influence, which had been created the previous year, after reports surfaced that it intended to plant false news stories in the international media. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2005)

The Bush administration continued to manipulate public opinion through the media. During his first term in the White House, he spent $254 million on fake segments and other public relations ploys to spread positive propaganda about his policies. (Washington Post, January 31, 2005)

Twenty different federal agencies were involved in producing hundreds of fake television news segments. They included the Defense Department and the Census Bureau that made and distributed hundreds of television news segments between 2001 and 2005. Many were subsequently broadcast on local stations across the country without any acknowledgement of the government's role in their production. (New York Times, March 13, 2005)

The Army and Air Force Hometown News Service fielded 40 reporters, producers, and public affairs specialists to create ”good military news” to be beamed to home audiences via local news stations. The service’s ”good news” segments reportedly reached 41 million Americans via local newscasts -- in most cases, without the station acknowledging their source. (Inter Press, March 29, 2005)

Although the Bush administration claimed ignorance about the use of fake news, it was well aware this was happening. A White House memo in January 2003 actually said segments the State Department disseminated about the liberation of Afghan women were “a prime example” of how White House led efforts to facilitate strategic, proactive communications in the war on terror. (White House Release, January 21, 2003)

The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized the Bush administration’s role in creating phony news three separate times in 2004. The GAO said unless viewers were aware that what they were watching was government produced, it constituted “covert propaganda.” The GAO also forbade federal agencies from creating prepackaged news reports that concealed or did not clearly identify for the television viewing audience that the agency was the source of those materials.

On March 12, 2005, the Justice Department and the Office of Management and Budget circulated a memorandum instructing all executive branch agencies to ignore the GAO findings. Criticizing the GAO memo, Joshua Bolten, director of the Office of Management and Budget, said White House lawyers disagreed with the GAO’s conclusions. (Cox News Service, March 15, 2005)

The Smith Mundt Act of 1948 prohibited the spread of government propaganda in the United States. Federal law warned federal agencies away from doing exactly that. The United States Code prohibited appropriated funds from being used to pay a publicity expert unless specifically appropriated for that purpose. The responsibility to enforce government propaganda lay with Congress and the White House. (Washington Post, January 30, 2005)

Bush fought his propaganda campaign on another front. United States relations with much of the rest of the world gradually deteriorated during his first four years in office. After four years of meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, Bush all but admitted that his relations with much of the Muslim world had deteriorated. In March 2005, he named longtime advisor Karen Hughes to Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs to repair the United States’ image abroad. (New York Times, March 14, 2005)

LINCOLN GROUP: CONTROLLING THE “INDEPENDENT” IRAQI NEWSPAPERS. As part of its propaganda campaign, the Pentagon secretly paid Iraqi newspapers to publish stories written by American troops in an effort to improve the image of the United States mission in Iraq. The operation was designed to mask any connection with the United States military. The Pentagon paid independent Iraqi newspapers to print articles that presented only one side of events, never reflecting poorly on the United States or Iraqi governments. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2005)

The Pentagon offered contracts to several companies, one of which was Lincoln Group and formerly known as Iraqex. Lincoln Group carried out “strategic communications” in countries where large numbers of United States troops were assigned. Based in Tampa, Florida, In 2005, Lincoln Group developed a strategic communications campaign that was coordinated with special operations troops stationed around the globe. The contract was worth up to $100 million over five years. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2005)

The articles were written by United States military “information operations” troops. They were translated into Arabic and placed in Baghdad newspapers with the help of a defense contractor. The stories boasted of the superior work of United States and Iraqi troops, touted the United States efforts to rebuild Iraq, and denounced insurgent. Iraqi newspapers ran dozens of such articles with headlines such as “Iraqis Insist on Living Despite Terrorism.” (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2005)

The Lincoln Group’s Iraqi staff, or its subcontractors, sometimes posed as freelance reporters or advertising executives when they delivered the stories to Baghdad media outlets. For example, Lincoln Group ran an animated public service campaign on Iraqi television that spotlighted the Iraqi civilians killed by roadside bombs planted by insurgents. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2005)

A 2004 Chicago Tribune report found that Lincoln Group’s workers in Iraq were conservative campaign operatives with no apparent experience in Iraq” “When (Jonathan Blessing) and another political consultant (Brian Swift) who had been working for the Bush campaign in Illinois heard about an opportunity to work for a company doing public relations in Iraq, the two jumped at the chance. ... Swift worked for the Bush-Cheney campaign in Illinois, and Blessing worked for the state GOP.” (American Progress Action, December 1, 2005)

The Lincoln Group also doled out money to Sunni religious scholars in Iraq in return for assistance with its propaganda work. In 2005, the Pentagon told the Lincoln Group to identify religious leaders who could help produce messages that would persuade Sunnis in Anbar Province to participate in national elections and reject the insurgency. Subsequently, the Lincoln Group retained three or four Sunni religious scholars to offer advice and write reports for military commanders on the content of propaganda campaigns. (New York Times, January 2, 2006)

’PSY OPS’

In 2005, the Pentagon earmarked $300 million for a Psychological Operations (“psy ops”) program that included placing pro-American messages in foreign media outlets without disclosing the United States government as the source. Run by psychological warfare experts at the United States Special Operations Command, the media campaign was designed to counter terrorist ideology and sway foreign audiences to support American policies. The goal was to fight the information war against Al Qaeda through newspapers, websites, radio, television, and miscellaneous items such as T-shirts and bumper stickers. (USA Today, December 14, 2005)

While the United States was disseminating its propaganda, it was incarcerating a number of journalists. The United States tied with Myanmar, the former Burma, for sixth place among countries that imprisoned most journalists. The United States and Myanmar each jailed five journalists during 2005. The United States held four Iraqi journalists in detention centers in Iraq and one Sudanese, a cameraman who worked for Al Jazeera, at Guantánamo Bay. None of the five was charged with a specific crime. (New York Times, December 14, 2005)

3. PAYING OFF ANALYSTS TO PROMOTE THE WAR

By early 2002, Bush was making plans to invade Iraq. However, many Americans, polls showed, were uneasy about invading a country with no clear connection to 9/11. Pentagon and White House officials believed the military analysts could play a crucial role in helping overcome this resistance. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Torie Clarke, the former public relations executive who oversaw the Pentagon’s dealings with the analysts as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, had come to her job with ideas about achieving what she called “information dominance.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Even before 9/11, Clarke built a system within the Pentagon to recruit “key influentials” -- movers and shakers from all walks who with the proper ministrations might be counted on to generate support for Rumsfeld’s priorities. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

In the months after 9/11, as every network rushed to retain its own all-star squad of retired military officers, Clarke and her staff sensed a new opportunity. The military analysts were the ultimate “key influence” to Clarke’s team. They were authoritative, most of them decorated war heroes, all reaching mass audiences. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

These analysts often got more airtime than network reporters, and they were not merely explaining the capabilities of Apache helicopters. They began framing how viewers ought to interpret events. But they were not attached to the media. Instead, they were pro-Bush military men as well as important players in a military industry anticipating large budget increases to pay for an Iraq war. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The Pentagon’s regular press office was kept separate from the military analysts. The analysts were instead catered to by a small group of political appointees, with the point person being Brent Krueger, another senior aide to Clarke. The decision recalled other administration tactics that subverted traditional journalism. Federal agencies, for example, paid columnists to write favorably about the administration. They had distributed to local TV stations hundreds of fake news segments with fawning accounts of administration accomplishments. The Pentagon itself has made covert payments to Iraqi newspapers to publish coalition propaganda. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Over time, the Pentagon recruited more than 75 retired officers, although some participated only briefly or sporadically. T he largest contingent was affiliated with Fox News, followed by NBC, and CNN, the other networks with 24-hour cable outlets. But analysts from CBS and ABC were included, too. Some recruits, though not on any network payroll, were influential in other ways -- either because they were sought out by radio hosts, or because they often published op-ed articles or were quoted in magazines, Web sites and newspapers. At least nine of them have written op-ed articles for the New York Times. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The group was heavily represented by men involved in the business of helping companies win military contracts. Several held senior positions with contractors that gave them direct responsibility for winning new Pentagon business. James Marks, a retired Army general and analyst for CNN from 2004 to 2007, pursued military and intelligence contracts as a senior executive with McNeil Technologies. Still others held board positions with military firms that gave them responsibility for government business. General McInerney, the Fox analyst, for example, sits on the boards of several military contractors, including Nortel Government Solutions, a supplier of communication networks. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Several were defense industry lobbyists, such as Dr. McCausland, who worked at Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, a major lobbying firm where he is director of a national security team that represents several military contractors. Joseph Ralston, a retired Air Force general, was named vice chairman of the Cohen Group, a consulting firm headed by a former Defense Secretary William Cohen. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Two of NBC’s most prominent analysts, Barry McCaffery and Wayne Downing, were on the advisory board of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, an advocacy group created with White House encouragement in 2002 to help make the case for ousting Saddam. Both men also had their own consulting firms and sat on the boards of major military contractors. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Paul Vallely, a Fox News analyst from 2001 to 2007 and a retired Army general, accused American news organizations of failing to defend the nation from “enemy” propaganda during Vietnam. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

In the fall and winter leading up to the invasion, the Pentagon gave its analysts talking points portraying Iraq as an urgent threat. The basic case became a familiar mantra: Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, was developing nuclear weapons, and might one day slip some to al Qaeda: an invasion would be a relatively quick and inexpensive “war of liberation.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

On April 12, 2003, with major combat almost over, Rumsfeld drafted a memorandum to Clarke: “Let’s think about having some of the folks who did such a good job as talking heads in after this thing is over.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

By summer, though, the first signs of the insurgency had emerged. An internal Pentagon strategy memorandum urged military analysts to “re-energize surrogates and message-force multipliers.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The memorandum led to a proposal to take analysts on a tour of Iraq in September 2003, timed to help overcome the sticker shock from Bush’s request for $87 billion in emergency war financing. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The group included four analysts from Fox News, one each from CNN and ABC, and several research-group luminaries whose opinion articles appeared regularly in the nation’s op-ed pages. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The analysts met personally with Rumsfeld at least 18 times, but that was just the beginning. They had dozens more sessions with the most senior members of his brain trust and access to officials responsible for managing the billions being spent in Iraq. Other groups of “key influentials” had meetings, but not nearly as often as the analysts. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

An internal memorandum in 2005 helped explain why. The memorandum, written by a Pentagon official who had accompanied analysts to Iraq, said that based on her observations during the trip, the analysts “are having a greater impact” on network coverage of the military. She wrote, “They have now become the go-to guys not only on breaking stories, but they influence the views on issue.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Other branches of the administration also began to make use of the analysts. Gonzales, then the attorney general, met with them soon after news leaked that the government was wiretapping terrorism suspects in the United States without warrants. When General Petraeus was appointed the commanding general in Iraq in January 2007, one of his early acts was to meet with the analysts. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

The analysts’ news media appearances were being closely monitored. The Pentagon paid a private contractor, Omnitec Solutions, hundreds of thousands of dollars to scour databases for any trace of the analysts, be it a segment on The O’Reilly Factor or an interview with The Daily Inter Lake in Montana, circulation 20,000. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Omnitec evaluated their appearances using the same tools as corporate branding experts. One report, assessing the impact of several trips to Iraq in 2005, offered example after example of analysts echoing Pentagon themes on all the networks. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

In April 2006, after several of Mr. Rumsfeld’s former generals -- none of them network military analysts -- went public with devastating critiques of his wartime performance. Some called for his resignation. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

On Friday, April 14, with what came to be called the “Generals’ Revolt” dominating headlines, Rumsfeld instructed aides to summon military analysts to a meeting with him early the next week, records show. When an aide urged a short delay to “give our big guys on the West Coast a little more time to buy a ticket and get here,” Rumsfeld’s office insisted that “the boss” wanted the meeting fast “for impact on the current story.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

That same day, Pentagon officials helped two Fox analysts, General McInerney and General Vallely, write an opinion article for The Wall Street Journal defending Rumsfeld. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Soon after, analysts hit the airwaves. The Omnitec monitoring reports, circulated to more than 80 officials, confirmed that analysts repeated many of the Pentagon’s talking points: that Rumsfeld consulted “frequently and sufficiently” with his generals; that he was not “overly concerned” with the criticisms; that the meeting focused “on more important topics at hand,” including the next milestone in Iraq, the formation of a new government. (New York Times, April 20, 2008)

Days later, Mr. Rumsfeld wrote a memorandum distilling their collective guidance into bullet points. Two were underlined:

“Focus on the Global War on Terror -- not simply Iraq. The wider war -- the long war.”

“Link Iraq to Iran. Iran is the concern. If we fail in Iraq or Afghanistan, it will help Iran.” (New York Times, April 20, 2008)