TORTURE AND MURDER IN IRAQ

When troops of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division occupied a school in the center of Fallujah shortly after Baghdad fell in April 2003, the city’s residents were upset. A rumor even circulated that the soldiers were using their night-vision goggles to see through the clothes of women in the city. Five days after the American soldiers arrived, demonstrations erupted against the United States occupation. Seventeen Fallujans were killed and 70 injured in the clash with troops. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

Soon after, Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator, dissolved the Iraqi army, along with the intelligence service, the Republican Guard and half a dozen other security services that had worked for Hussein. Thousands of men lost their jobs and their pensions. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

Throughout 2004, skirmishes continued in Fallujah, even after United States troops moved their camps outside the city limits. In March 2004, he 1st Marine Expeditionary Force replaced the Army. The Marines deployed a minimal-force strategy and offered help in the form of money and aid. But the violence did not end. On March 27, four Fallujans died in a confrontation with Marines. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

As it became obvious that American forces could not subdue Fallujah, Bush issued a statement reaffirming his determination to defeat the insurgents. “We will not be intimidated. We will finish the job.” (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On April 1, Rumsfeld and Abizaid briefed Bush on plans for attacking Fallujah. Rumsfeld’s decision not to inform Bush about the Marines’ dissenting recommendation. One day later, the Marines began preparing their attack, named Operation Valiant Resolve. Initially, the Marines estimated that they would need two battalions, a total of 2,500 troops, and that the mission would take 10 days. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On April 5, the Marine operation was underway. The following day, they pushed farther into the city and ran into stiffer resistance. The insurgents came up with a strategy to slow the American advance. They blocked streets with buses and trucks to try to force the Marines onto routes where insurgents lay in wait. They ferried fighters from place to place in cars and even in city buses. They used an antiaircraft gun to fire on United States helicopters. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On April 7, American troops killed 60 people. Then a family was killed in a car parked behind the mosque. Twenty-five members of a family were killed when their house was hit. By early April, Bush’s overall job approval reached a new low of 43 percent. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

In Baghdad, the Iraqi Security Committee met at least once a day. The committee consisted of a handful of Iraqi Governing Council members, the Iraqi national security advisor, and the heads of the Iraqi Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and the intelligence service. The American civilian administrator, Paul Bremer, also attended the meetings. American officials were divided over what course to take in Fallujah. Bremer was convinced that continuing the military offensive in Fallujah would create a political disaster, and he supported the idea of a cease-fire to allow the council members to try to negotiate a deal. General Ricardo Sanchez were reluctant, participants said, but finally came around to Bremer’s side. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

At the White House, the new strategy for Fallujah was to give negotiations a try. But officials at the National Security Council did not want the negotiations to continue for more than a few weeks. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On April 9, the Bush administration ordered a cease-fire. It came at a time when the Marines estimated that they had taken a third of the city with relatively modest American losses of 11 dead. The Marines were unhappy. They never wanted to attack Fallujah, but once their advice was ignored, their only goal was to crush the enemy. They felt they were being called off just when victory was possible. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On May 10, the Marines made their first and only patrol in Fallujah. When it was over, Iraqi national guard and Fallujah Brigade members waved their guns in the air chanting, “From Fallujah to Kufa,” a suggestion that the Iraqis should free their cities from American domination from central to southern Iraq. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

Knowing full well that they themselves could not occupy Fallujah, the United States military command chose to retreat and to use Iraqi surrogates to patrol the city of 350,000. The Fallujah brigade, as it was known, was incapable of securing the city. Soon afterwards, the brigade simply disbanded and disappeared, as insurgents continued to control the city. (PBS, November 5, 2004)

In June, insurgents began to push outside the city limits. They staked out the nearby Marine bases and targeted people entering and leaving. On June 5, six Shi’ite truck drivers became frightened at an insurgent checkpoint and rushed to the police station for help. The police took them to a mosque, where they were handed over to insurgents. They were executed, and their bodies were mutilated. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

By mid-June, the U.S. military believed that many of the bombings of civilian targets and other terrorist acts throughout Iraq were being directed by al-Zarqawi from Fallujah. On June 19, the United States launched airstrikes there on what were believed to be safe houses used by al-Zarqawi. At least two homes were destroyed and 18 to 24 people killed. It was the beginning of an effort to use precision bombing to go after al-Zarqawi’a network and other insurgents. But the scenes Iraqis saw on Arab television told a different story. Emergency room doctors again said that many of the dead were women and children. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

On June 28, Bremer transferred sovereignty to the new interim Iraqi government and then flew home. Fallujah was completely in the grip of insurgent forces, and the insurgency continued to spread. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

In August, signs emerged that insurgents from Fallujah were aiding the Shi’ite insurgency 100 miles away in Najaf, where rebel cleric al-Sadr and his Al Mahdi militia had occupied the revered Imam Ali Mosque. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

At the same time, attacks on foreigners, including beheadings, became almost commonplace. By the end of August, more than 100 people had been kidnapped. Most of them by groups thought to be based in the Fallujah area. At least 20 were killed. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

The insurgents also were trying to eliminate anyone in Fallujah or Ramadi -- the two cities account for 70 percent of Al Anbar province’s population -- who represented the interim government. The targets included members of the police, the national guard, ministerial appointees in the provincial offices, governors, and their deputies. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

One such target was Colonel Suleiman Marawi, the head of one of two Iraqi national guard battalions based in Fallujah and a key ally of the Americans. Marawi was attacked as he returned to the guardsmen’s base outside the city. He was soon turned over to the rebels, tortured, and killed. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

In September and October, American warplanes bombed Fallujah in hope of killing al-Zarqawi and his followers, and in hope of forcing Fallujah’s remaining residents to plead for peace. The United States failed, as the terrorist operations continued. Fallujah’s ruling council negotiated with the Baghdad government, agreeing to expel foreign fighters and welcome the Iraqi national guard. Then the deal fell through. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

In October, Allawi ordered Fallujans to hand over al-Zarqawi or face a new assault. The leader of Iraq’s hard-line Sunni clergy, Sheik Harith Dhari, charged that an attack would prompt a Sunni boycott of elections scheduled for January 2005. That would be a death blow to the Bush administration’s timetable for Iraqi elections. (Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2004)

Just prior to the November presidential election, the Bush administration planned a massive attack on what was left of the 350,000 inhabitants in Fallujah. When Bush narrowly won reelection, it became more apparent that he would flex his power and attack the city, despite the results being no more than a pyhrric victory.

Thousands of British troops were transferred from southern Iraq to the Baghdad area in order to allow American forces to concentrate on the Sunni Triangle -- and particularly Fallujah. Roads leading into the city were sealed. Many families fled the city of 300,000 long before the offensive began. As many as 4,000 insurgents were suspected of hiding in the city. (New York Times, November 7, 2004)

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned Bush that a major assault on Fallujah would result in more resentment towards the United States. Annan also said that an attack would further jeopardize the January 2005 elections. (New York Times, November 5, 2004)

Just prior to the American offensive, the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), an influential group, urged Iraqi security forces not to fight alongside United States troops once the offensive commenced. The edict read, “We call on the Iraqi forces, the National Guard, and others who are mostly Muslims ... to beware of making the grave mistake of invading Iraqi cities under the banner of forces who respect no religion or human rights. Beware of being deceived that you are fighting terrorists from outside the country, because by God you are fighting the townspeople and targeting its men, women and children, and history will record every drop of blood you spill in oppressing the people of your nation.” (Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

“Psy Ops.” Before the American invasion, Marine spokesman Lieutenant Lyle Gilbert was near Falloujah when he appeared on CNN. On October 14, he said, “Troops crossed the line of departure. It’s going to be a long night.” (Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2004)

However, the Falloujah offensive did not begin for three weeks. Gilbert’s announcement was an example of psychological operation (“psy-ops”) that was intended to dupe insurgents in Falloujah. The Pentagon hoped the disinformation would allow United States commanders to see how the insurgents would react if they believed American troops were entering the city. (Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2004)

Officials at the Pentagon and other United States national security agencies admitted that “psy-ops” were part of a broad effort underway within the Bush administration to use information to its advantage in the war on terrorism. (Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2004)

The price for attacking Fallujah. On the eve of the attack, United States air raids destroyed a clinic funded by an Islamic relief organization in the center of Fallujah and a nearby warehouse used to store medical supplies. (Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

After weeks of waiting, 10,000 American troops launched their attack on Fallujah on November 8. When the offensive was launched, only about 60,000 people remained. American warplanes and helicopter gunships pounded suspected insurgent areas in the city. United States soldiers entered residential areas considered to be the center of insurgent activities. (New York Times, November 9, 2004; Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

Residents said scores of civilians were killed or wounded in 24 hours of fighting. Doctors said people brought in at least 15 dead civilians at the main clinic in Fallujah on the first day of the invasion. By the next day, there were no clinics open, and there was no way to count casualties. (Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

United States bombardments hit a clinic inside Fallujah, killing doctors, nurses, and patients, according to residents in the city. But United States military authorities denied the reports. Allawi accused doctors of exaggerating civilian casualties. Not a single surgeon in Fallujah, and its one ambulance was hit by United States fire. Scores of injured civilians were confined to their homes. (Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

On November 8 -- the day that United States forces attacked Fallujah -- the Islamic Party, Iraq’s official Sunni Muslim political group, quit the coalition. On the day before, top party officials met with Allawi to demand he stop the Fallujah offensive and to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement with fighters. When the talks failed, the party saw no justification to remain a part of the interim government and subsequently quit. (Al Jazeera, November 9, 2004)

When the intense fighting stopped after one week, much of Fallujah was in ruins. Concrete houses were flattened. Electricity was out. Power and phone lines lay in the streets. Rubble and human remains littered the empty streets. The Jolan district, once an insurgent stronghold, looked like a ghost town. Half the mosques in Fallujah were destroyed by United States warplanes and tanks. A 500-pound bomb, dropped by an American plane, slammed into the Khulafa Al Rashid mosque, the city’s most celebrated religious building. (Al Jazeera, November 14, 2004; New York Times, November 15, 2004)

The invading forces consisted of 6,000 United States military personnel, along with about 2,000 allied Iraqi troops. Seventy-one United States troops died in the November battle to retake the city of Falloujah. An additional 623 American troops were wounded. Another 3,500 United States and Iraqi troops maintained a cordon outside the city. Seven Iraqi troops were killed and 43 wounded. An estimated 1,600 insurgents were killed. Over 800 of Fallujah’s civilians were killed. (Al Jazeera, November 15, 2004; Common Dreams, November 16, 2004; Los Angeles Times, December 2, 2004)

American troops prevented a Red Crescent convoy of emergency aid from reaching helpless residents inside Fallujah. The convoy carried emergency food, water, and medical supplies into the Fallujah hospital. Al Jazeera, November 14, 2004; November 15, 2004; New York Times, November 15, 2004)

Finally on November 25, the first Red Crescent team was allowed by the United States military to deliver food and water to five families in a northern Fallujah neighborhood. (Al Jazeera, November 26, 2004)

The International Committee of the Red Cross sharply criticized the “utter contempt” for humanity shown by all sides in Iraq during the United States invasion of Fallujah. “We are deeply concerned by the devastating impact that the fighting in Iraq is having on the people of that country,” said Pierre Kraehenbuehl, the ICRC’s director of operations. (France’s AFP A La Carte, November 19, 2004)

The Pentagon estimated that approximately five percent of the insurgents were foreigners. The overwhelming majority of insurgents consisted of tens of thousands of former government employees whose sympathies lie with sympathized with the Hussein regime. Those included Iraqi Islamic fundamentalists and others who were paid to carry out terrorist plots. One was paid about $500 to lay roadside bombs. (Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2004)

The battle for Fallujah had significant political repercussions that haunted the interim government as well as the Bush administration. The decision to attack the city’s insurgents strained military resources, enraged prominent Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and unleashed fresh violence throughout the country. (Knight Ridder, November 15, 2004)

Lieutenant-General John Sattler claimed that his forces broke the back of the resistance in Fallujah. Meanwhile, attacks by insurgents in other areas of Iraq continued to escalate. Prime Minister Allawi conceded that many of the city’s resistance had dispersed, posing threats elsewhere. Furthermore, a Marine officers in Fallujah warned of the “outstanding resilience” of fighters opposed to the presence of United States troops in Iraq. (Al Jazeera, November 19, 2004)

5. THE MASSACRE AT HADITHA

A unit of Marines from Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment was assigned to the city of Haditha, 150 miles northwest of Baghdad. Several members of the unit were on their second tour of Iraq; one was on his third. They were veterans of ferocious house-to-house fighting in Fallujah. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

One morning in November 2005, several members of the Kilo Company went on a rampage, killing 24 civilians in cold blood in at least two homes. Among those killed included women and children. (Washington Post, March 27, 2006; May 22, 2006)

At about 7:15 in the morning on November. 19, a string of four Humvees were on routine patrol in a residential area when a white taxicab approached from the opposite end of the street. The Marines made hand and arm signals for the taxi to stop. But as the taxi halted near the first Humvee, a bomb under the fourth Humvee exploded, killing its driver -- Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas -- wounding two of his comrades and shattering windows 150 yards away. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

Marines said the convoy almost immediately began to take fire from several houses on either side of the road. Iraqi civilians in the area disputed that account. They claimed the only firing after the explosion was by the Marines. Suspecting that the four students in the taxi either triggered the bomb or were acting as spotters, the Marines ordered the men and the driver, who by then had exited the taxi, to lie on the ground. Instead, they ran, and the Marines shot and killed them. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

After fleeing the taxi, a few members of Kilo Company moved through four homes along nearby streets, killing 19 men, women and children. The Marines contended they took small-arms fire from at least one house, but only one of the 19 victims was found with a weapon. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

Some of the Marines and the corpsman allegedly doctored the scene to make look like the man was an insurgent. The military’s initial report stated that Terrazas and 15 civilians were killed in a roadside blast and that shortly afterward, the Marines came under attack and returned fire, killing eight insurgents. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

The next day, Captain Jeffrey Pool, a Marine spokesman in Iraq, released a terse statement: Fifteen Iraqis “were killed yesterday from the blast of a roadside bomb in Haditha. Immediately after the bombing, gunmen attacked the convoy with small arms fire. Iraqi army soldiers and Marines returned fire, killing eight insurgents and wounding another.” (Washington Post, June 4, 2006)

Despite what Marine witnesses saw when they arrived, that official version was allowed to stand for six months. Who lied about the killings, who knew the truth and what, if anything, they did about it were at the core of one of the potentially most embarrassing and damaging events of the Iraq war.

The massacre was kept classified by the Pentagon for four months. In March 2006, Time magazine broke the story after interviews with 28 individuals, including military officials, the families of the victims, human-rights investigators, and local doctors. (Time, March 27, 2006; May 28, 2006)

From the beginning, Iraqi civilians in Haditha said Marines deliberately killed 15 unarmed Iraqi civilians, including seven women and three children. One young Iraqi girl said the Marines killed six members of her family, including her parents. “The Americans came into the room where my father was praying,” she said, “and shot him.” (War Crimes Watch Blog, May 18, 2006)

According to the wife of a battalion sergeant involved in the massacre, the marine unit in Haditha last November had suffered a “total breakdown” in discipline and had drug and alcohol problems after the unit was pulled out of Fallujah in early 2005. (The Guardian, June 5, 2006)

She said, “There were problems in Kilo company with drugs, alcohol, hazing (violent initiation games), you name it. I think it’s more than possible that these guys were totally tweaked out on speed or something when they shot those civilians in Haditha.” (The Guardian, June 5, 2006)

The gung-ho battalion had staged a chariot race, complete with captured horses, togas and heavy metal music, before the battle for Fallujah in late 2004. The Marines were given loose rules of engagement in the vicious urban warfare that followed. One of the commanders said, “If you see someone with a cellphone, put a bullet in their fucking head.” (Newsweek, June 12, 2006)

At one point in the battle at Fallujah, a Marine from the 3rd battalion was caught on camera shooting a wounded, unarmed man as he lay on the ground. However, the Marine involved was later exonerated. The third battalion lost 17 men in 10 days in Fallujah and by the time the troops arrived in Haditha, in the fall of 2005, it was clear morale had plummeted. (The Guardian, June 5, 2006)

A Daily Telegraph reporter who visited the Kilo Company’s headquarters in early 2006 described the scene as a “feral place” where discipline was “approaching breakdown.” He reported that some Marines had left the official living quarters and had set up separate encampments with signs ordering outsiders to keep out. (The Guardian, June 5, 2006)

Dr. Salam Ishmael, projects manager with the organisation Doctors for Iraq, was in Haditha during the massacre at Haditha. He said that the United States military cut electricity and water to the entire city, attacked the hospital, and burned the pharmacy. (Inter Press Service, June 7, 2006)

Ismael said, “The hospital has been attacked three times. In November 2005 the hospital was occupied by the American and Iraqi Army for seven days, which is a severe breach of the Geneva Conventions. In one of these attacks, the U.S. soldiers used live ammunition inside the hospital. They handcuffed all the doctors and destroyed the entire contents of the medical storage. It ended with the killing of one of the patients in his bed.” (Inter Press Service, June 7, 2006)

At the same time, the Iraqi Red Crescent reported that nearly 1,000 families had been forced to flee their homes in Haditha following the launch of the United States military operation. (Inter Press Service, June 7, 2006)

After the story broke in March, three military officers were relieved for their role in the incident. The Marine command in western Iraq requested a Navy criminal investigation and General Eldon Bargewell was appointed to conduct an investigation of the chain of command of the Marine Corps to determine if there was a cover-up of the incident. (Veterans for Common Sense, May 22, 2006)

Two investigations were ordered. The first inquiry was conducted by Army General Eldon Bargewell whose role was to determine whether Marines had lied about the incident and whether senior Marine commanders had investigated the incident properly.

Bargewell concluded that two failures occurred in reporting the Haditha incident up the Marine chain of command. The first was that Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich, a squad leader alleged to have been centrally involved in the shootings, made a false statement to his superiors when he reported that 15 Iraqi civilians had been killed in the roadside bombing that killed a Marine and touched off the incident. That report was entered into an official database of “significant acts” maintained by the United States military in Iraq. (Washington Post, June 1, 2006)

A second failure occurred later in the day when a Marine human exploitation team, which helped collect the dead, should have observed that the Iraqis were killed by gunshot, not by a bomb. The team’s reporting chain lay outside that of the other Marines -- who were members of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines -- and went up through military intelligence channels directly to the 1st Marine Division. Had this second unit reported accurately what it witnessed, that would have set off alarms and prodded commanders to investigate. (Washington Post, June 1, 2006)

Bargewell ordered that all United States and allied troops in Iraq undergo new “core values” training in how to operate professionally and humanely. The training focused on how to treat civilians under the rules of engagement. Small units also were ordered to go through training scenarios to gauge their understanding of those rules.

Bargewell also concluded that the training of troops for Iraq had been flawed and that too much emphasis had been placed on traditional war-fighting skills and insufficient focus on how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign.

The second inquiry was carried out by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service that involved more than 45 agents.

6. THE MASSACRE AND MURDER IN SAMARRA

United States commanders said their troops killed at least 54 Iraqis in a massacre in the northern city of Samarra on November 30, 2005. Townspeople in Samarra said far fewer died. (Pacific News Service, December 2, 2005)

Located in the “Sunni Triangle,” Samarra was a not only a Sunni Arab stronghold but a shrine city sacred to the Shi’a population of Iraq. As a result, the attack by United States forces offended almost everyone in Iraq. (Pacific News Service, December 2, 2005)

The United States troops allegedly were provoked into the attack by members of the Fedayeen, the elite guards loyal to Saddam. It appeared that insurgents attempted to attack a United States military convoy carrying new Iraqi bank notes designed to replace those bearing Saddam’s portrait. Radio Free Europe reported that the Fedayeen were wearing their uniforms on purpose in order “to send a message to the local population that the Fedayeen remained a fighting force able to carry out complex operations.” (Pacific News Service, December 2, 2005)

In May 2006, Nabiha Nisaif Jassim, a mother of two, was killed in firing along with her 57-year-old cousin Saliha Mohammed Hassan when they were being transported to Samarra General Hospital for Nabiha to give birth. (Inter Press Service, June 13, 2006)

The United States military’s version was that soldiers fired on the car after it entered a “clearly marked prohibited area near an observation post” after failing to stop despite “repeated visual and auditory warnings.” The military sa*id that “shots were fired to disable the vehicle.” (Inter Press Service, June 13, 2006)

But the United States military refused to report that both women were shot in the back of the head by United States snipers. An investigator said, “I investigated this incident myself, and both of these women were shot from behind. Nabiha’s brains were splattered on her brother who was driving the car, since she was in the back seat.” (Inter Press Service, June 13, 2006)

The brother of the pregnant woman, Redam Nisaif Jassim, who was driving the car, told investigators that he neither saw nor heard any warnings by the United States military. Two men who witnessed the incident from a nearby home also said they saw no signs of any warning. (Inter Press Service, June 13, 2006)

The next day Redam Jassim was summoned to a local police station. He said, “The Americans offered me 5,000 dollars, and told me it wasn’t compensation but because of tradition.” The United States usually paid $2,500 dollars for killing an Iraqi. Jassim refused the payment. (Inter Press Service, June 13, 2006)

7. THE MASSACRE AT ISHIAQI

Another cover-up allegedly occurred in Ishaqi, north of Baghdad. In March 2006, four people died when they attacked from the ground and air a house suspected of holding an al Qaida operative. The house was destroyed. (Washington Post, June 2, 2006)

Local Iraqis said there were 11 total dead -- including five children -- and charged that they were killed by United States troops before the house was leveled. The video shot by an Associated Press Television News cameraman at the time showed at least five children dead. (Washington Post, June 2, 2006)

The video showed at least one adult male and four young children with obvious entry wounds to the head. One child has an obvious entry wound to the side caused by a bullet. The video included an unidentified man saying, “Children were stuck in the room, alone and surrounded. After they handcuffed them, they shot them dead. Later, they struck the house with their planes. They wanted to hide the evidence. Even a 6-month-old infant was killed. Even the cows were killed too.” (Washington Post, June 2, 2006)

The initial statement by the United States military was that one guerrilla, two women, and a child were killed in the attack. Three months later, a United States military probe exonerated American troops in the deaths at Ishaqi, stating that they followed standard procedures and committed no misconduct. The military said the allegations that United States troops “executed a family … and then hid the alleged crimes by directing an air strike, are absolutely false.” (Al Jazeera, June 3, 2006; Reuters, June 3, 2006)

The military said its troops were fired on as they raided a house to arrest an al Qaeda suspect. They returned fire and called in air support, which destroyed the building, killing one militant and resulting in “up to nine collateral deaths.” (Al Jazeera, June 3, 2006; Reuters, June 3, 2006)

8. MURDER AT A BAGHDAD MOSQUE

On March 26, 2006, United States troops and Iraqi commandos raided a Shi’ite mosque in Baghdad. The next day, Iraqi security minister Abd al Karim al Enzi told Reuters: “At evening prayers, American soldiers accompanied by Iraqi troops raided the Mustafa mosque and killed 37 people. They were unarmed.” Enzi said that all of the victims had been tied up and executed. (Green Left Weekly, April 5, 2006)

The United States military issued a statement claiming that 16 “insurgents” had been killed in a fire fight when Iraqi commandos and United States Special Forces “advisers” conducted a raid on a “terrorist cell.” (Green Left Weekly, April 5, 2006)

An Associated Press videotape of the scene taken on the night of March 26 showed a tangle of dead bodies with gunshot wounds on the floor of what was said to be the living quarters of the mosque’s imam. The tape showed 5.56 mm shell casings scattered about the floor. United States forces used that caliber ammunition. A grieving man in white Arab robes stepped among the dead bodies strewn across a bloody floor.” (Associated Press, March 27, 2006)

Iraqi police said some of the dead were identified as members of anti-occupation Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al Sadr’s movement. A number of others were carrying membership cards of Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al Jaafari’s Dawa party. (Green Left Weekly, April 5, 2006)

9. MURDER IN HAMANDIYAH

On April 26, 2006, Hashim Ibrahim Awad al-Zobaie was shot dead by Marines of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment in the small central Iraqi village of Hamdaniyah. There was no dispute that he was killed by Marines, but there were differing accounts of his death. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Approximately one dozen members of the Marine foot patrol said they came upon al-Zobaie digging a hole for a bomb near his home in the Sunni Arab village of about 30 homes near Abu Ghraib. The Marines said they killed al-Zobaie in a brief gun battle and that they found an AK-47 assault rifle and a shovel by his side. (Los Angeles Times, May 28, 2006; Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Al-Zobaie’s neighbors and members of his family, with the support of photographs, disputed the Marines’ account. They said the Marines banged on the door at al-Zobaie’s home at 2:00 a.m. One of al-Zobaie’s sons said the Marines grabbed Hashim by the front of his cotton robe as soon as he came to the door, pulling him from the house. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

One hour later, the family heard shots but they were fearful to go outside to investigate. Al-Zobaie was shot four times in the face. Witnesses said the Marines planted an assault rifle and shovel, that had been borrowed from a villager, next to al-Zobaie’s body. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Several hours later at daylight, the family found a wide hole in the dirt road about 500 yards from their home, wet with bloodstains and littered with discarded plastic gloves.

Al-Zobaie said the family was told that Marines had brought his body to a local police station. The family eventually recovered their father’s corpse from a hospital at Abu Ghraib.(Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Al-Zobaie’s neighbor, Farhan Ahmed Hussein, said the Marines had stopped at his house first that night, before going to al-Zobaie’s. Hussein said the Marines took a shovel and an AK-47 from his house. Iraqi and United States military forces allowed each Iraqi household to keep one weapon for protection. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

After al-Zobaie’s killing, Hussein collected his shovel and the rifle from Iraqi police. Hussein said, “They asked me several questions to be sure whose weapon it was. Then they gave me the rifle.” (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Al-Zobaie’s family claimed that a small group of United States servicemen came to them one month later and offered the family money to support the Marines’ version of the killing. Al-Zobaie’s brother quoted the American serviceman: “We are ready to compensate you with the money you want, on one condition, which is when the investigation committee comes back, you tell them that your brother worked with the insurgents and had connections with the insurgents, and that he used to go out at night to places you don't know.” (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

The American soldier did not specify an amount, saying only that it would be “more than the American military will give you” in standard compensation for killings that commanders later deemed to be wrongful. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Al-Zobaie’s brother refused the offer. He said, “I told them I will tell them what I know. "And all the money in the world wouldn’t compensate for the loss of a brother and the loss to the 13 members of his family.” The American then consulted briefly with another American service member with him and left. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Iraqis Awad’s neighborhood said that the Marines shot him four times in the face before planting an AK-47 rifle and a shovel near his body to make it appear as though he had been trying to bury a roadside bomb. He was known in the village as “Awad the Lame “because a metal bar was inserted in his leg several years ago. (Washington Post, June 21, 2006)

Al-Zobaie’s body was examined at the morgue. Photographs showed at least four bullet holes -- two in one cheek, one in the chin. and one in the lip. Exit wounds from the shots had distorted the head, which was lying in a pool of blood caught by the plastic sheeting. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

The Marines told another story. They claimed al-Zobaie was an insurgent who had been shot after he fired on the foot patrol. Their statement said: “On 60425 at aprox 0300 we spotted a man digging on the side of the road from our ambush site. I made the call and engaged. He was pronounced dead at the scene with only a shovel and AK-47.” The statement was signed Lawrence Hutchins and noted that he was a sergeant. A staff sergeant named Bowen signed as a witness; his first name was not legible. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

The statement said the body brought to police by the Marines was that of a man spotted by coalition forces “digging a place for the (explosive) charge and with him was his weapon, a rifle with full clip, plus a shovel.” (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

After the killing, Marines distributed leaflets in the area. They described al-Zobaie as an insurgent and a “saboteur” who had been shot after he fired on the foot patrol. The leaflets said the Marines had found him at about 11 p.m. on April 26 digging a hole in the road to place a bomb. The leaflets also said, “The Marines fired at him and he returned fire from the AK-47 he had, which forced the Marines to fire back and kill him.” (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

Family members insisted al-Zobaie was not an insurgent and said they did not know why he was killed. Local police, who were Shi’ite Muslims although the area is Sunni, also said al-Zobaie was not known to have connections to the insurgency. (Washington Post, June 5, 2006)

In June 2006, seven Marines and one Navy corpsman of Kilo were charged with murder and kidnapping of Awad. (Washington Post, June 21, 2006)

10. MURDER AND RAPE IN MAHMOUDIVA

In thee summer of 2006, four soldiers were charged with the rape of the 15-year-old girl and three members of her family in Mahmoudiyah, a city south of Baghdad. A fifth soldier, not directly involved in the attack, was charged with dereliction of duty for failing to report it. One of the accused, Marine Private Kevin Green of the 502nd Infantry Regiment, was discharged shortly thereafter from the military on a “personality disorder.” (Los Angeles Times, July 9, 2006)

The soldiers allegedly were drinking alcohol -- a prohibited activity for United States troops in Iraq -- while manning a checkpoint on the night of March 11. They started talking about having sex with the woman, whom they had seen during a visit to her house. The house was about 650 feet from the checkpoint, one soldier told investigators. The affidavit said that four of the soldiers then grabbed three rifles and a shotgun and headed to the house. The fifth soldier was said to have stayed behind at the checkpoint. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

The incident received attention the following day when Iraqis told soldiers at the checkpoint that four members of their family had been killed and the house had been set on fire. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

Green and the other soldier allegedly were drinking alcohol -- a prohibited activity for United States troops in Iraq -- while manning a checkpoint on the night of March 11. They started talking about having sex with the woman, whom they had seen during a visit to her house. The house was about 650 feet from the checkpoint, one soldier told investigators. The affidavit said that four of the soldiers then grabbed three rifles and a shotgun and headed to the house. The fifth soldier was said to have stayed behind at the checkpoint. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

After the decision was made to rape the woman, three of the soldiers changed out of their uniforms and into dark clothes. One soldier told investigators that Green covered his face with a brown T-shirt. One of the soldiers told investigators he changed clothes so he “wouldn’t be seen.” (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

According to FBI agent Gregor Ahlers, two of the soldiers described themselves as mainly standing watch outside the civilians’ house while Green and another soldier -- identified as Known Participant 1 -- allegedly raped the 20-year-old woman. The third soldier interviewed said he was told to stay behind to monitor the radio while the others went to the woman’s house. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

After the decision was made to rape the woman, according to the FBI affidavit, three of the soldiers changed out of their uniforms and into dark clothes. One soldier told investigators that Green covered his face with a brown T-shirt. One of the soldiers told investigators he changed clothes so he “wouldn’t be seen.” According to the affidavit, four of the soldiers then grabbed three rifles and a shotgun and headed to the house. The fifth soldier was said to have stayed behind at the checkpoint. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

According to the accounts of the two who stood guard, Green went into a back bedroom, closed the door and shot three family members. An Army official said the three were believed to be the woman’s mother, father, and sister, approximately age 5. The FBI report said, “Green came to the bedroom door and told everyone: ‘I just killed them, all are dead.’ ” (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

Around the same time, the soldier identified as Known Participant 1 grabbed the woman and threw her on the floor, the affidavit said. The two soldiers acting as guards told investigators that Green and the other soldier raped the woman before Green picked up an AK-47 assault rifle he had found at the house and killed her. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

One of the soldiers who stood watch said Green later told him to dispose of the AK-47 in a canal across the street from the checkpoint. All four soldiers, who returned to the checkpoint with bloody clothes, burned what they were wearing, according to the soldier who said he monitored the radio during the attack. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

Army investigators took at least 15 photos of the scene, the FBI affidavit said, which showed three dead Iraqis, including the young girl, with bullet wounds. Other photos showed the burned body of what appeared to be a woman with blankets thrown over her upper torso. (Los Angeles Times, July 4, 2006)

Abu Firas Janabi told the story of the murders of his cousin Fakhriya Taha Muhsen; her husband, Kasim Hamza Rasheed; and their two daughters who were slain. Janabi said, “Kasim’s corpse was in the corner of the room, and his head was smashed into pieces. The 5-year-old daughter, Hadel, was beside her father, and Janabi said he could see that Fakhriya’s arms had been broken.” (Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2006)

In another room, Janabi said he found 15-year-old Abeer, naked and burned, with her head smashed in “by a concrete block or a piece of iron.” Her dress was pushed up around her neck. A fire had been set in the room, burning a pillow and the girl’s hair. (Washington Post, July 7, 2006)

Janabi continued, “There were burns from the bottom of her stomach to the end of her body, except for her feet. I did not believe what I was seeing. I tried to fool myself into believing I was in a dream. But the problem was that we were not dreaming. We put a piece of cloth over her body. Then I left the house together with my wife.” (Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2006)

11. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT VOWS TO INVESTIGATE

Perhaps assuming that the Bush administration would exonerate most or all military personnel involved in the deaths in various cities, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said his government would move ahead with its own investigation. In addition, al-Miliki demanded an apology from the United States and compensation for the victims in several cases. (Reuters, June 3, 2006)

12. IRAQ’S DEATH SQUADS

On November 13, 2005, United States soldiers found 173 incarcerated men with indications that they had been tortured. They were imprisoned in a secret bunker in an Interior Ministry compound in central Baghdad. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

The United States official involved in the inspection described in an e-mail the abuse found during some of the visits since the November 13 raid: “Numerous bruises on the arms, legs and feet. A lot of the Iraqis had separated shoulders and problems with their hands and fingers too. You could also see strap marks on some of their backs.” (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

The United States military refused to transfer most of them to safe locations. Instead, only a handful of the most severely abused detainees at a single site were removed for medical treatment. Prisoners at other sites were removed to alleviate overcrowding. United States and Iraqi authorities left the rest at the facilities where many had been tortured. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

The torture continued despite the pledge by General Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that United States troops would attempt to stop inhumane treatment if they saw it. On November 29, 2005, Rumsfeld and Pace held a press conference:

Pace: “It is absolutely the responsibility of every U.S. service member, if they see inhumane treatment being conducted, to intervene to stop it.”

Rumsfeld: “I don’t think you mean they have an obligation to physically stop it; it’s to report it.”

Pace: “If they are physically present when inhumane treatment is taking place, sir, they have an obligation to try to stop it.” (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

At the insistence of United States officials, Iraq agreed to the joint inspections of all of Iraq’s more than 1,000 detention centers. Both American and Iraqi officials said that abuse of prisoners was found at all the sites. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

The first inspections included an Interior Ministry detention center in Baghdad; a Defense Ministry site near the Green Zone; an Interior Ministry site in the city of Kut; an Interior Ministry site in the Muthanna neighborhood of Baghdad; and a “maximum crimes facility” in Baghdad. At three of those sites, prisoners were being held by the Wolf Brigade, one of the Interior Ministry commando forces most feared by Sunnis. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

At the detention sites, some detainees showed signs of abuse that required immediate medical care. The signs of abuse included broken bones, indications that they had been beaten with hoses and wires, signs that they had been hung from the ceiling, cigarette burns, evidence of scars, missing toenails, dislocated shoulders, and severe bruising. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

Sunni leaders accused the Interior Ministry of hiring members of militias belonging to the Shi’ite religious parties. In addition, the Shia-controlled Interior Ministry was charged with operating death squads that targeted Sunnis. (Washington Post, April 24, 2006)

It took months for the Iraqi regime to acknowledge that death squads were operating within the government. Finally, in March, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr confirmed for that for first time: “The deaths squads that we have captured are in the defense and interior ministries.” (Knight Ridder, March 13, 2006)

13. THE MURDERS CONTINUE

In February 2005, four former security contractors said they watched as innocent Iraqi civilians fired upon by United States troops. One was crushed by a truck. The four contractors were all retired military veterans: Captain Bill Craun, Army Rangers; Sergeant Jim Errante, military police; Corporal Ernest Colling, United States Army; and Will Hough, United States Marines. All went to Iraq as private security contractors. (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

The contractors worked for the American company, Custer Battles that was hired by the Pentagon to conduct dangerous missions guarding supply convoys. Craun said, “What we saw, I know the American population wouldn’t stand for.” (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

They claimed that heavily armed security operators on Custer Battles’ missions were poorly trained young Kurds with historical resentments against other Iraqis. They terrorized civilians, shooting indiscriminately as they ran for cover, smashing into and shooting up cars. (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

On a mission on November 8, 2005 -- while escorting ammunition and equipment for the Iraqi army -- a Kurd guarding the convoy allegedly shot into a passenger car to clear a traffic jam. Colling said, “He sighted down his AK-47 and started firing. It went through the window. As far as I could see, it hit a passenger. And they didn’t even know we were there.” (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

Later, the convoy came upon two teenagers by the road. One allegedly was gunned down. Colling recalled, “The rear gunner in my vehicle shot him. Unarmed, walking kids.” (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

In another traffic jam, they claimed a Ford 350 pickup truck smashed into, then rolled up and over the back of a small sedan full of Iraqis. Craun said, “The front of the truck came down. I could see two children sitting in the back seat of that car with their eyes looking up at the axle as it came down and pulverized the back. I said, ‘Wow, what hit this car?’ ” (MSNBC, February 17, 2005)

14. TORTURE AT CAMP CROPPER

Various torture techniques were also carried out at Camp Cropper, the United States military’s maximum-security detention site in Baghdad. In the spring of 2005, American guards periodically opened the cell door where detainee No. 200343 was incarcerated. The guards shackled his hands and feet, blindfolded him, and took him to a padded room for interrogation. After an hour or two, he was returned to his cell, fatigued but unable to sleep. He said the fluorescent lights in his cell were never turned off. At most hours, heavy metal or country music blared in the corridor. He was rousted at random times without explanation and made to stand in his cell. Even lying down, he said, he was kept from covering his face to block out the light, noise and cold. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

The detainee was released after 97 days. He was exhausted, depressed, and scared. He was among thousands of people who had been held and released by the American military in Iraq. Not only he, but dozens or hundreds of his relatives and friends had turned bitterly against the United States. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

Another detainee was Donald Vance, a 29-year-old Navy veteran who went to Iraq as a security contractor, became a whistle-blower. He passed information to the FBI about suspicious activities at the Iraqi security firm at Camp Cropper where he worked. He made claims of possible illegal weapons trading. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

Vance said the company had a growing cache of weapons it was selling to suspicious customers, including a steady flow of officials from the Iraqi Interior Ministry. The ministry had ties to violent militias and death squads. He said he had also witnessed another employee giving American soldiers liquor in exchange for bullets and weapon repairs. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

On a visit to Chicago in October 2005, Vance met twice with an F.B.I. agent who set up a reporting system. Weekly, Mr. Vance phoned the agent from Iraq and sent him e-mail messages. “It was like, ‘Hey, I heard this and I saw this.’ I wanted to help,” Vance said. A government official familiar with the arrangement confirmed Vance’s account. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

But when American soldiers raided the company at his urging, Vance and his co-worker Nathan Ertel were detained as suspects by the military. Officials claimed they did not know the two were informers. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

At Camp Cropper, Vance took notes on his imprisonment and smuggled them out in a Bible. On July 3, 2006, he wrote, “Sick, very. Vomited. The next day: “Told no more phone calls ‘til leave.” (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

Ertel brought away military records that shed further light on the detention camp and its secretive tribunals. Those records included a legal memorandum explicitly denying detainees the right to a lawyer at detention hearings to determine whether they should be released or held indefinitely, perhaps for prosecution. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

In April 2005, Ertel and Vance said, they felt increasingly uncomfortable at the company. Ertel resigned and company officials seized the identification cards that both men needed to move around Iraq or leave the country. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)

On April 15, feeling threatened, Vance phoned the United States Embassy in Baghdad. A military rescue team rushed to the security company. Again, Vance described its operations. (New York Times, December 18, 2006)