CHAPTER 24
THE CIVIL WAR IN 2007 AND 2008
CONTENTS
1. THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
2. GRASPING FOR STTRAWS AS BUSH’S POPULARITY DROPS IN 2007
3. THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY
4. CIVILIANS FLEE IRAQ
5. CIVIL WAR CONTINUES IN 2007
6. THE CIVIL WAR IN 2008
By 2007 Iraqis had “turned their backs on their would-be liberators.”
1. First came the “monumental ignorance” of those in the Bush administration pushing for war in 2002 without “the faintest idea” of Iraq’s realities.
2. That was followed by the “rank amateurism and swaggering arrogance” of the occupation, under Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which took big steps with little consultation with Iraqis.
3. The Americans disbanded Iraq’s army, which helped quell a rising insurgency in 2003. Instead, hundreds of thousands of demobilized, angry men became a recruiting pool for the resistance.
4. Tens of thousands of members of the Ba’athist party -- from government, school faculties, and elsewhere -- left Iraq short on experienced hands at a crucial time.
5. An order consolidating decentralized bank accounts at the Finance Ministry bogged down operations of Iraq’s many state-owned enterprises.
6. The CPA’s focus on private enterprise allowed the “commercial gangs” of Saddam’s day to monopolize business.
7. Its free-trade policy allowed looted Iraqi capital equipment to be spirited away across borders.
8. The CPA perpetuated Saddam’s fuel subsidies, selling gasoline at giveaway prices and draining the budget.
9. Bremer contended his authority was undermined by “micromanagement” from Washington, where he thought officials in the administration tried “to set me up as a fall guy” for problems in Iraq.
10. Though United States generals in Iraq repeatedly asked the administration to reinstate dismissed officers from Saddam’s army, Bremer consistently refused at the highest levels.
11. Senior Defense Department officials sought to distance themselves from the decision to disband the old Iraqi army, and it became “etched into America’s consciousness” that it was Bremer who “had made a grave error in demobilizing the Iraqi forces.” (Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq)
By 2007, Americans viewed the war in Iraq more negatively than at any time since the war began. Sixty percent said the United States should have stayed out of Iraq. More than three in four said things were going badly there -- including nearly half who said things were going very badly. (New York Times/CBS Polls, May 24, 2007)
Thirty percent approved of Bush’s job overall, while 63 percent disapproved. Majorities of those polled disapproved of Bush’s handling of the situation in Iraq, foreign policy, immigration, the economy, and the campaign against terrorism. (New York Times/CBS Polls, May 24, 2007)
Sixty-one percent of the poll’s respondents said the United States should never have taken military action against Iraq. This was up from 51 percent in a CBS News poll one month earlier and 58 percent since the beginning of 2007. Seventy-six percent said things were going badly in the effort to bring stability and order to Iraq, including 47 percent who said they were going very badly. (New York Times/CBS Polls, May 24, 2007)
Meanwhile, American, European and Middle Eastern government officials and militant leaders in Lebanon, Jordan, and London concluded that the Iraq war drew militants from around the world. Subsequently, Iraqis began to export fighters and the tactics they had employed in the insurgency to neighboring countries. Some of the fighters left Iraq as part of the waves of Iraqi refugees escaped from their war-torn country. Others were dispatched from Iraq for specific missions. (New York Times, May 29, 2007)
Examples of the export of terrorism from Iraq to other countries in 2007 included:
*In the Jordanian airport plot, the bomb maker flew from Baghdad to prepare the explosives. The Lebanese Army battled the militant group, Fatah al Islam, whose ranks included as many as 50 veterans of the war in Iraq, and more than 30 Lebanese soldiers were killed fighting the group at a refugee camp near Tripoli.
*In Saudi Arabia, government officials arrested 172 men who had plans to attack oil installations, public officials and military posts. Some appeared to have trained in Iraq.
*Small numbers of Muslims returned home after traveling for short periods to Iraq, where they were likely to have fought alongside insurgents. One was an Iraqi-born Dutch citizen who allegedly made repeated trips to Iraq from his home in the Netherlands to prepare instructional videos on making roadside bombs. He was extradited to the United States in January 2007 and charged with conspiring to kill American citizens, possessing a destructive device and teaching the making or use of explosives.
*The United States government claimed battle-hardened militants from Iraq posed a greater threat to the West than extremists who trained in Afghanistan because Iraq had become a laboratory for urban guerrilla tactics.
*Militants in Iraq turned out instructional videos and electronic newsletters on the Internet that lay out their playbook for a startling array of techniques, from encryption to booby-trapped bombs to surface-to-air missiles. Those manuals circulated freely in cyberspace.
Tactics common in Iraq showed up in other parts of the world. In Somalia and Algeria, suicide bombings were accompanied by the release of taped testimonials by the bombers, a longtime terrorist practice embraced by insurgents in Iraq. (New York Times, May 29, 2007)
1. THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
On November 13, 2006, members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG) met in the White House and listened to Bush. The ISG was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats, and it was co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton.One panel member called a “Churchillian” vision of “victory” in Iraq and to defend al-Maliki. (Washington Post, July 13, 2007)
In effect, the bipartisan group sent an urgent message to the Bush administration to change the direction of its Iraq policy. Among the 79 specific recommendations the ISG made to Bush included:
1. Withdrawing support for the al-Maliki government unless it showed “substantial progress” on security and national reconciliation.
2. Changing the primary mission of United States forces from combat to training Iraqis so that combat units could be withdrawn by early 2008.
3. A gradual pullback of the 15 United States combat brigades. It was assembled to discuss a solution to the increasing civil war in Iraq. (New York Times, November 30, 2006)
4. The report said, “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.. … There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.” (New York Times, December 8, 2006)
5. It called for the United States to engage with Iran and Syria, whom United States officials accused of fomenting the insurgency in Iraq, in an effort to stabilize the country. The White House resisted such talks. (Reuters, December 6, 2006)
6. It recommended that the United States military launch a rapid effort to train Iraqi forces to defend their country and said American forces should gradually move to a supporting role. (Reuters, December 6, 2006)
7. The report set no hard timetable for the transition but said, by the first quarter of 2008, depending on conditions, United States combat troops not needed for “force protection” could be out of Iraq.
8. It stressed that Iraqis needed to take on a larger share of the military role and suggested the United States should begin to withdraw support if Iraq’s government did not make major progress toward national reconciliation, improved security, and better governance. (Reuters, December 6, 2006)
9. A legislative proposal whereby the central government would have the authority to distribute oil revenues to the country’s provinces. The plan included political autonomy for the three factions, but the Sunnis feared they would not receive a fair share of the oil revenues. (New York Times, December 9, 2006)
Bush refused to embrace any of the key recommendations, although bipartisan groups in the House and Senate have recently introduced legislation that would make them official United States policy. His reaction was diametrically opposed to what the ISG had decided. Bush distanced himself from the ISG and announced he would not withdraw American combat troops over a span of 15 months. He also rebutted the suggestions of the bipartisan committee to hold direct talks with Iran and Syria. (New York Times, December 8, 2006)
In January 2007, Bush announced that he was sending more troops to Iraq as part of a “surge,” which he said would lead to the victory that had so far eluded United States forces. (Washington Post, July 13, 2007)
Bush and General Petraeus, commander of forces in Iraq, repeatedly said that there was no military solution to Iraq and that the sectarian strife and the insurgency could be resolved only by the Iraqi government. Yet Bush said he took the report “very seriously” after meeting with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group composed of five Republicans and five Democrats. But the White House made clear it would not be bound by its conclusions and began its own review of Iraq policy. Bush’s realism in diplomacy differed sharply from the arrogant position that he had continually called for the United States to “stay the course.” (New York Times, December 8, 2006)
Later, CIA Director Hayden painted a different picture. He told at least four participants: “The inability of the government to govern seems irreversible” and added that he could not “point to any milestone or checkpoint where we can turn this thing around.” Hayden concluded, “The government is unable to govern. We have spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a government that is balanced, and it cannot function.” (Washington Post, July 13, 2007),/P>
Hayden’s bleak assessment, which came just a week after Republicans had lost control of Congress and Bush had dismissed Rumsfeld. This was a pivotal moment in the study group’s intensive examination of the Iraq war, and it helped shape its conclusion in its final report that the situation in Iraq was “grave and deteriorating.” (Washington Post, July 13, 2007)
2. GRASPING FOR STRAWS AS BUSH’S POPULARITY DROPS IN 2007
DOMESTIC DISCONTENT. With his dismal ratings hovering around 30 percent, Bush made a desperate appeal to the American people. On January 10, 2007, he disregarded the opposition of United States commanders, lawmakers of both parties, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), and the American public. The day before his speech, Bush consulted members of Congress from both parties. He ignored Congress.
Only 18 percent of Americans supported an escalation of American troops in Iraq. (CBS Poll, Think Progress, January 10, 2007)
According The Progress Report, a majority of lawmakers opposed the escalation of American troops.
The ISG recommended a temporarily increase by about 16,000 the number of troops devoted to training and equipping the Iraqi forces.
The group called for a gradual withdrawal of United States combat troops with a goal of bringing the bulk home by early 2008.
The ISG urged Bush to quickly engage Syria, Iran, and the leaders of insurgents in negotiations on Iraq’s future.
The group called for resolving the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict to ease hostility throughout the Middle East.
The ISG report called for similar benchmarks for security, government, and reconciliation progress, and said the United States should make it clear that American support would be reduced if these milestones were not met.
The report said the United States should provide $5 billion a year in economic aid and work faster to implement assistance programs, giving American officials more flexibility to quickly fund or eliminate programs. It encouraged greater international investment in Iraq’s oil industry, its management and its security.
Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently thought Bush’s plan was delusional. The JCS report said: “The Joint Chiefs think the White House ... still does not have a defined mission and is latching on to the surge idea in part because of limited alternatives. … The Pentagon has warned that any short-term mission may only set up the U.S. for bigger problems when it ends. The service chiefs have warned that a short-term mission could give an enormous edge to virtually all the armed factions in Iraq -- including al Qaeda’s foreign fighters, Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias -- without giving an enduring boost to the U.S military mission or to the Iraqi army.” (Washington Post; December 19, 2006)
INTERNATIONAL DISCONTENT. As the war continued, more people around the globe had an unfavorable opinion of the Bush administration’s policies than at any time in recent history. The survey was conducted with more than 26,000 people in 25 countries in the beginning of 2007. (BBC, January 22, 2007)
Forty-nine percent overall believed the United States was playing a “mainly negative” role in the world, compared to 32 percent who said Washington’s influence was “mainly positive.” In the 18 countries where respondents were asked the same question in 2004 and 2005, this BBC poll found a substantial drop in the percentage who said they viewed United States influence as positive, from 40 percent in 2005, to 36 percent in 2006, to 29 percent in 2007. (BBC, January 22, 2007)
Germany and Indonesia, where nearly 75 percent of respondents said they had a mainly negative opinion of United States influence, were the least favorable, while 69 percent of French and Turkish respondents agreed. (BBC, January 22, 2007)
The sharpest drops in positive ratings in 2007 were found in Poland (62 percent in 2006 compared to 38 percent in 2007), Indonesia (40 percent to 21 percent), the Philippines (85 percent to 72 percent), and India (44 percent to 30 percent). (BBC, January 22, 2007)
The findings of the BBC poll reflected negative feelings towards the United States government. The June 2006 survey was conducted in 14 foreign countries released by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. It found that Washington’s global image had slipped from 2005, particularly in Europe and Asia, as well as predominantly Muslim countries, and that Washington’s continuing intervention in Iraq appeared to be the main cause. (BBC, January 22, 2007)
Seventy-three percent said they disapproved of Washington’s role in the Iraq war. Opposition was particularly intense in Egypt, France, and Lebanon where more than 75 percent respondents said they “strongly disapproved. (BBC, January 22, 2007)
Respondents in the United States also showed greater opposition to their government’s policies than in previous years. In January 2007, a Washington Post-ABC News poll found that 65 percent of respondents oppose the so-called “surge” of more than 21,000 additional United States troops to Iraq, while 48 percent called the war the most important issue in 2007. (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
At the same time, 68 percent overall said the United States military presence in the Middle East provoked more conflict than it prevented. More than four out of five respondents in three Latin American countries -- Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico -- and in two mainly Muslim countries -- Egypt and Indonesia -- took that position. (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
Conversely, only 17 percent overall said they thought Washington’s military presence exercised a stabilizing influence in the Middle East. The most positive views on this question were found in Nigeria, the only country where a plurality (49 percent) said it was stabilizing, the Philippines (41 percent), and Kenya (40 percent). (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
Sixty-seven percent of all respondents said they disapproved of the Bush administration’s handling of detainees at Guantanamo, while only 16 percent, concentrated in Kenya, Nigeria, India, the Philippines and the United States, said they approved. (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
Sixty percent of respondents overall said they disapproved of Washington’s handling of Iran's nuclear program, while 28 percent, including majorities in Kenya, Nigeria the Philippines and a plurality in India, said they approved. Disapproval was most intense in Argentina and three predominantly Sunni countries -- Egypt, UAE, and Turkey -- while opinion was most polarized in Lebanon where 26 percent “strongly approved” of Bush’s policies and 54 percent “strongly disapproved.” (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
Disapproval among all respondents of United States policies on Middle East issues ranged from 60 percent (Iran’s nuclear program) to 73 percent (the Iraq war). Disapproval of Bush’s handling of North Korea’s nuclear program (54 percent) and global warming (56 percent. (Inter Press Service, January 23, 2007)
3. THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY
It appeared that Bush had no intentions of pulling American troops out of Iraq. The United States embassy, that opened in mid-2007, cost American taxpayers $592 million. Over 1,000 Americans were employed at the embassy, more than any other mission around the globe. Just 33 of them were Arabic speakers, and just six were fluent in Arabic.
The embassy was built on a 104-acre site within the Green Zone, the only secure area in Iraq. The compound had its own power and water plant system the size of a small town. The perimeter wall was 15 feet thick. (USA Today, April 19, 2006; Britain’s Times on Line, May 30, 2006)
The embassy was constructed by 900 non-Iraqi foreign workers who were housed nearby and under the supervision of a Kuwaiti contractor. The site included residences for the ambassador and his deputy, six apartments for senior officials, and two huge office blocks for 8,000 staff to work in. The site also included the biggest swimming pool in Iraq, a state-of-the-art gymnasium, a cinema, restaurants offering delicacies from favorite United States food chains, tennis courts, and a swish American Club for evening functions. (Britain’s Times on Line, May 30, 2006)
4. CIVILIANS FLEE IRAQ
By 2006, one out of every seven Iraqis was fleeing his or her home or sought refuge abroad, according to United Nations officials. This was the largest movement of people in the Middle East since the war that followed Israel’s creation in 1948. Every day in Iraq, violence displaced an estimated 1,300 more of the country’s civilians, and every month at least 40,000 fled their homes. Of all the refugees, 202 refugees from Iraq were allowed to resettle in the United States. (McClacthy Newspapers, February 8, 2007)
In early 2007, a high-level State Department task force was created to evaluate the refugee crisis. Meanwhile, Bush gave special attention for immigration of Iraqis who might be at risk, because they worked for the United States government. But the administration admitted a maximum of 20,000 Iraqis a year. (McClacthy Newspapers, February 8, 2007)
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report, as many as two million Iraqi refugees left for neighboring countries, primarily in Syria and Jordan. Another 1.7 million people are displaced within Iraq. Syria and Jordan reacted by threatening to close their doors, while Saudi Arabia denied entrance to any Iraqi. (McClacthy Newspapers, February 8, 2007)
5. CIVIL WAR CONTINUES IN 2007
The civil war escalated in 2007. In 2000, Bush stated, “To point out that our military has been overextended, taken for granted and neglected, that’s no criticism of the military. That is criticism of a president and vice president and their records of neglect.” (Think Progress, July 31, 2006)
According to the Failed States Index, produced by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, Iraq deteriorated in 2005 as one of the world’s most unstable governments. Iraq ranked fourth in 2006. (Reuters, June 18, 2007)
Iraq gained the dubious honor of being the second worst -- behind Sudan. The country’s deterioration in 2006 with diminished results across a range of social, economic, political, and military indicators. Afghanistan, another war-torn country, ranked eighth in 2007. (Reuters, June 18, 2007)
With the number of new recruits diminishing, the Pentagon began accepting young men with criminal records. Nearly 12 percent of Army recruits who entered basic training in 2007 needed a special waiver for those with criminal records. This was a dramatic increase over 2006 and 2 1/2 times the percentage in 2003, when Bush launched his war. (Boston Globe, July 13, 2007)
In 2007, 11.6 percent of new active-duty and Army Reserve troops in 2007 received a so-called “moral waiver.” This was up from 7.9 percent in fiscal year 2006, according to figures from the Army Recruiting Command. In fiscal 2003 and 2004, soldiers granted waivers accounted for 4.6 percent of new recruits; in 2005, it was 6.2 percent. (Boston Globe, July 13, 2007)
Army officials acknowledged this was a result of the difficulty of signing up sufficient numbers of recruits to sustain an increasingly unpopular war in Iraq. The Army fell short of its monthly recruiting goals in 2007. (Boston Globe, July 13, 2007)
Since October. 1, 2006, more than 8,000 of the roughly 69,000 recruits were granted waivers for offenses ranging in seriousness from misdemeanors such as vandalism to felonies such as burglary and aggravated assault. (Boston Globe, July 13, 2007)
When Bush announced the “surge” in January 2007, one of the "critical areas" in which he said the increased security would create a “breathing space" for political progress was for “the government” to “ reform de-Ba’athification. Laws.” (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)
Days later on January 12, 2007, the Iraqi parliament passed the Justice and Accountability Law, a nominal re-Ba’athification law said to “allow thousands of former Ba’athists who were not involved in past crimes against Iraqis to fill posts in the Shi’ite-dominated government. (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)
However, the legislation was actually spearheaded by the most anti-Ba-athist groups and opposed by former Ba’athists. The session of parliament in which it was narrowly passed was attended by only 150 members of the 275-seat parliament, meaning the vote count could have been as low as 72. (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)
Days after the legislation passed, the United States embassy was “notably conscious in commenting until it finished reviewing the draft.” The legislation was confusing and controversial. The document was riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunnis and Shi’ite officials said it could actually exclude more former Ba’athists then it allowed to participate -- particularly in the crucial security ministries. (Democracy in Action, January 15, 2008)
In January, a combined force of British and Iraqi troops assaulted a police station in Basra and rescued 127 prisoners from fetid conditions. Some of the prisoners had been tortured. The most significant recent case involved a secret Baghdad prison run by the Shi’ite-controlled Interior Ministry, known as Site 4. It was discovered by American and Iraqi troops in 2006. More than 1,400 prisoners were discovered and where some had been subjected to systematic abuse.
In February, Britain announced plans for a significant reduction in its forces because of improved stability. The British announced the gradual withdrawal of 1,600 of its 7,200 troops. London decided that Iraqi forces were strong enough to manage the security of the region on their own. In announcing the reduction Blair said that while the Basra area remained dangerous, British troops faced far less violence than Americans farther north. The prime minister also said “the next chapter in Basra’s history can be written by Iraqis.” (New York Times, March 5, 2007)
The Air Force gradually brought more hardware into Iraq. Squadrons of attack planes were added to the in-country fleet. The air reconnaissance arm has almost doubled between 2006 and 2007. In addition, the B1-B bomber was recalled to action over Iraq. (Associated Press, July 15, 2007)
Air Force and Navy aircraft dropped 437 bombs and missiles in Iraq in the first six months of 2007. This was a fivefold increase over the 86 used in the first half of 2006, and three times more than in the second half of 2006. (Associated Press, July 15, 2007)
The “Kingpin,” the Air Force’s air traffic control center 50 miles north of Baghdad, continued to grow in size. The facility tracked an daily average of more than 100 aircraft crisscrossing Iraqi air space at any one time. (Associated Press, July 15, 2007)
The Air Force sent a squadron of A-10 “Warthog” attack planes -- a dozen or more aircraft -- to Al-Asad Air Base in western Iraq. At the same time, it added a squadron of F-16C Fighting Falcons here at Balad. Although some had flown missions over Iraq from elsewhere in the region, the additions doubled to 50 or more the number of workhorse fighter-bomber jets available at bases inside the country, closer to the action. (Associated Press, July 15, 2007)
The Navy stationed a second aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, and the reintroduction of B1-Bs added the ability to carry 24 tons of bombs. The B1-Bs were moved from distant Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to an undisclosed base in the Persian Gulf. (Associated Press, July 15, 2007)
The Bush administration continued to hammer away in an attempt to convince the American people that al Qaeda was the enemy in Iraq. In June, the president called al Qaeda “the main enemy” in Iraq, even though that assertion was rejected by his administration’s senior intelligence analysts. (New York Times, June 28, 2007)
Speaking at the Naval War College, Bush referred to al Qaeda at least 27 times, hoping to convince the public that 9/11 was connected to Iraq and lobbying for support for his war in Iraq. (New York Times, June 28, 2007)
The GOP revolt against Bush’s war strategy accelerated as two of the party’s most respected voices on national security proposed legislation envisioning a major realignment of United States troops in Iraq within six months – by January 2008. Senators John Warner and Richard Lugar defied Bush’s handling of the war and introduced a measure requiring the Bush administration to draw up plans to redeploy United States forces from frontline combat to border security and counterterrorism. However, the legislation was useless, since it did not force Bush to implement the plans at this point. (Washington Post, July 13, 2007)
The GOP proposal fell short of Democratic demands to set a firm timetable for withdrawal but underscored the continuing erosion of Bush’s position among Republicans on Capitol Hill. Democrats offered a resolution that would “require the president to begin reducing the number of American troops in Iraq within four months and to transition the mission of our remaining military forces there to force protection, training of Iraqi Security Forces, and counter-terrorism missions.” (Washington Post, July 15, 2007)
Since Bush launched his war, all signs indicated pointed to a military that was overextended. The Bush administration tried to deflect criticism and claimed that the military’s readiness was “unprecedented.” The Army’s preparedness for war eroded to levels not witnesses by the United States in decades. Virtually all of the United States-based Army combat brigades were rated unready to deploy. (Think Progress, February 27, 2007)
Army officials and a 2007 Pentagon survey found that troops in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from chronic shortages of armored vehicles, heavy weapons, and communications equipment. Army and Marine Corps officials said it would take years for their forces to recover from a “death spiral” in which rapid war rotations consumed 40 percent of their total gear, wearied troops, and left no time to train to fight anything other than the insurgencies now at hand. (Think Progress, July 31, 2006)
In March, al-Maliki ordered the arrest and removal of senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shi’ite militias. Over 16 army and national police commanders were fired, detained, or pressured to resign. At least nine of them were Sunnis. (Washington Post, April 29, 2007)
In April, six cabinet members loyal to al-Sadr resigned. This led to a negative impact on al-Maliki’s government. The supporters of al-Sadr’s radical Shi’ite party resigned in protest against al-Maliki’s refusal to set a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops. (Washington Post, April 16, 2007)
Some the officers appeared to have been fired for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or corruption. Several were considered to be among the better Iraqi officers in the field. The dismissals angered Bush administration and Iraqi leaders who said the Shi’ite-led government was sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals. Al-Maliki was criticized for failing to target Shi’ite militias, in particular al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. (Washington Post, April 29, 2007)
On May 1, 2003, in a carefully orchestrated photo-op, Bush landed aboard the USS Lincoln dressed in full fighter gear and announced to the nation and the world that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” Standing under a banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished,”Bush declared, “In the battle of Iraq, the United Sates and our allies have prevailed.”
Four years later -- in April 2007 -- 146,000 American soldiers stuck in the middle of Iraq’s anarchic civil war, the battle of Iraq rages on with deadly consequences. In April 2007, 104 United States soldiers were killed in Iraq, marking the deadliness month of 2007 and the sixth deadliest month of the entire war.
In the four years since Bush declared “Mission Accomplished,” the war in Iraq cost America and its allies dearly in both lives lost and resources spent. When Bush made his speech, 139 members of the military had lost their lives. There were 3,337 military fatalities in Iraq. Five hundred twenty-four Americans were wounded in Iraq by this date in 2003, while 26,188 Americans were injured in the war zone, many of whom have in turn received sub-par treatment in over-taxed military hospitals. In 2003, there was an average of eight insurgent attacks a day. In 2007, American soldiers face a daily death toll of 148.9 attacks. At the time of Bush’s victory speech in 2003, America had spent $53 billion on the war. In 2007, $448 billion had been spent. With another $124 billion set to be spent in the war funding supplemental passed by Congress. (Think Progress, April 2007)
Meanwhile, conditions continued to deteriorate in Basra. Iraqi Special Forces and British troops stormed the offices of an Iraqi government intelligence agency in Basra, and British officials said they discovered about 30 prisoners, some of whom showed signs of torture. The raid caught the caught al-Maliki’s central government by surprise and raised new questions about the rule of law in the Shi’ite-dominated south. (New York Times, March 5, 2007)
After the British began pulling out of Basra, the United States built a base and fortified checkpoints at the border with Iraq. (Britain’s The Independent, September 12, 2005)
After four years, the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning deployed troops with serious injuries and other medical problems. These included GIs, who doctors said, were medically unfit for battle. Some were too injured to wear their body armor, according to medical records. In March 2007, the 3,900-strong 3rd Brigade, some with medical problems, left for Iraq for a third time. (Salon, March 10, 2007)
In May, Congress passed a comprehensive $646 billion defense spending bill that authorized more than $100 billion in military procurement. That included money to buy new protective vehicles and body armor for troops, and an additional $142 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Democracy in Action, May 22, 2007)
Bush threatened to veto the bill because it objected to, among other things, a recommended 3.5 percent military pay raise for 2008, with further increases in 2009 through 2012. The increases were intended to reduce the gap between military and civilian pay that stands at about 3.9 percent in 2007. (Democracy in Action, May 22, 2007)
Fighting intensified in the Armooshiya district in 2007. The Sunni and anti-occupation Muslim Scholars Association issued a warning to the Bush administration. The statement confirmed the assaults and condemned the “ugly crimes” of occupation forces in Samarra. The Association accused the United States military of attempting to break the spirit of Iraqis who reject the United States occupation. (Inter Press Service, September 6, 2007)
After the British handed over security to local forces in Basra province, General Jalil Khalaf, the new police commander, said the occupation had left him with mayhem. He said, “They left me militia, they left me gangsters, and they left me all the troubles in the world.” Khalaf also said well-armed militias were strong enough to overpower security forces and brutal enough to behead women considered not sufficiently Islamic. (The Guardian, December 17, 2007)
But the British painted a totally different picture of security in Basra province. Major General Graham Binns, who led British troops into the city in 2003, conceded there was a problem but that Iraqis had “begun to regain its strength” … I came to rid Basra of its enemies and I now formally hand Basra back to its friends.” (The Guardian, December 17, 2007)
The British unintentionally rearmed Shia militias by failing to recognize that Iraqi troops were loyal to more than one authority. In the last months of 2007, Basra became so lawless that 45 women were killed for being “immoral” because they were not fully covered or because they may have given birth outside wedlock. (The Guardian, December 17, 2007)
THE UNITED STATES ADOPTS INSURGENTS’ TACTICS. The United States military began resorting to some of the insurgents’ tactics in late 2007. A Pentagon group encouraged some United States military snipers in Iraq to target suspected insurgents by scattering pieces of “bait,” such as detonation cords, plastic explosives, and ammunition, and then killing Iraqis who pick up the items. (Washington Post, September 24, 2007)
The classified program was described in investigative documents related to recently filed murder charges against three snipers who are accused of planting evidence on Iraqis they killed. (Washington Post, September 24, 2007)
Members of the United States military’s Asymmetric Warfare Group passed along ammunition boxes filled with the “drop items” to be used “to disrupt the AIF (Anti-Iraq Forces) attempts at harming Coalition Forces and give us the upper hand in a fight. (Washington Post, September 24, 2007)
Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice, said such a baiting program should be examined “quite meticulously” because it raised troubling possibilities, such as what happens when civilians picked up the items. (Washington Post, September 24, 2007)
Soldiers said that about a dozen platoon members were aware of the program and that numerous others knew about the “drop items” but did not know their purpose. Two soldiers who had not been officially informed about the program came forward with allegations of wrongdoing after they learned they were going to be punished for falling asleep on a sniper mission. (Washington Post, September 24, 2007)
On October 21, a major gun battle between United States forces and insurgents erupted during an early-morning raid in the Iraqi capital’s Shi’ite Muslim district of Sadr City. The Iraqi government claimed that as 49 people were killed in the fighting. Many of the victims were civilians and protested the action. (Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2007)
A freelance correspondent said he saw the corpses of a woman and two small children. The wounded included two boys, 8 and 11 years. Another man said his 18-month-old son was killed, as well as a neighbor’s son. (Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2007)
Al-Maliki issued a statement demanding that the United States not use such overwhelming force in pursuing targets, and that it further coordinate its efforts with Iraqi forces. He said the government would conduct an investigation of the Sadr City incident. (Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2007)
AN INCREASE IN OPIUM PRODUCTION IN IRAQ. In 2007, farmers in southern Iraq started to grow opium poppies in their fields for the first time. This sparked fears that Iraq might become a serious drugs producer along the lines of Afghanistan. Rice farmers along the Euphrates, to the west of the city of Diwaniya, south of Baghdad, stopped cultivating rice, for which the area was famous, and were instead planting poppies. (London’s The Independent, May 23, 2007)
The shift to opium cultivation was still in its early stages but there was little the Iraqi government could do about it because rival Shia militias and their surrogates in the security forces control Diwaniya and its neighborhood. (London’s The Independent, May 23, 2007)
Opium production prospered in the well-irrigated land west and south of Diwaniya around the towns of Ash Shamiyah, al Ghammas and Ash Shinafiyah. The farmers had problems in growing the poppies because of the intense heat and high humidity. (London’s The Independent, May 23, 2007)
Drug smugglers had for long used Iraq as a transit point for heroin, produced from opium in laboratories in Afghanistan, being sent through Iran to rich markets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saddam’s security apparatus in Basra was reportedly heavily involved in the illicit trade. Opium poppies never were grown in Iraq and the fact that they were being planted is a measure of the violence in southern Iraq. (London’s The Independent, May 23, 2007)
In August, more than half of top 108 United States foreign policy experts, including Republicans and Democrats, announced their opposition to Bush’s troop increase as a strategy for stabilizing Baghdad. They said the plan harmed United States national security, according to a new survey.
Fifty-three percent of the experts polled by Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress said they opposed Bush’s troop build-up. This was a 22 percentage point jump since the strategy was announced in early 2007. (Reuters, August 20, 2007)
PETREAUS AND CROCKER TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS. In September, General Petreaus testified before the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. He called for the withdrawal of 30,000 troops within one year. Incredibly, he painted a positive picture of Iraq and claimed, “We will be able to reduce our forces” because significant “progress” had been made in Iraq. Petraeus cited the reduced violence in the Anbar province as evidence that Bush’s “surge” was working.
Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s testimony was less positive. He told the committee that he was “frustrated every day I am in Iraq.” He also “acknowledged that political reconciliation in the form of legislation in Baghdad was at a standstill.” But neither Petraeus of Crocker’s comments failed to jive with the majority of those knowledgeable of conditions in Iraq:
1. General Ray Odierno, a key Petraeus aide, acknowledged a month earlier, “We know we'll have to start to reduce in April of 2008 at the latest.”
2. Army Chief of Staff George Casey added, “If the demands don’t go down over time, it will become increasingly difficult for us to provide the trained and ready forces.” (Democracy in Action, September 12, 2007)
In addition, none of none of Petraeus’s charts that purported to show a decline in sectarian violence in Baghdad between December 2006 and August 2007 made brought up the fact that the ethnic character of many of the neighborhoods had changed in that same period from majority Sunni Muslim or mixed to majority Shi’ite Muslim. (Democracy in Action, September 12, 2007)
4. Neither Petraeus nor Crocker talked about the fact that since the troop “surge” began the pace by which Iraqis were abandoning their homes in search of safety had increased.
5. Neither mentioned that 86 percent of Iraqis who fled their homes said they had been targeted because of their sect, according to the International Organization for Migration.
6. While Petraeus stressed that civilian casualties were down the month before, he drew no connection between that statement and a chart he displayed that showed that the number of attacks rose during at least one of those weeks.
7. Petraeus did not highlight the fact that his charts showed that “ethno-sectarian” deaths in August, down from July, were still higher than in June, and he did not explain why the greatest drop in such deaths, which peaked in December 2006, occurred between January and February of 2007. That was before the “surge” began.
8. And while both officials said that the Iraqi security forces were improving, neither talked about how those forces had been infiltrated by militias, though Petraeus acknowledged that during 2006 some Iraqi security forces had participated in the ethnic violence. (New York Times, September 13, 2007)
In November, United States forces said they killed 25 suspected insurgents in operations targeting al Qaeda militants near Baghdad. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders accused them of killing pro-United States fighters. (Reuters, November 15, 2007)
The head of a Sunni Arab tribal group that turned against al Qaeda and joined forces with the United States military said American aircraft bombed his men as they manned checkpoints just north of Baghdad. (Reuters, November 15, 2007)
United States forces formed alliances with Sunni Arab tribes in western Iraq and in provinces around Baghdad, offering mostly paid employment to nearly 70,000 tribal fighters and former insurgents as part of its strategy to combat al Qaeda. One of the most influential tribes, Taji “Awakening Council” was aligned with United States forces. (Reuters, November 15, 2007)
On November 26, Bush committed America to a long-term military presence in Iraq, pledging to protect the government in Baghdad from internal coup plots and foreign enemies. (The Guardian, November 27, 2007)
The cooperation pact between Bush and al-Maliki set the agenda for a future American relationship with Iraq. The military, economic, and diplomatic agreement committed United States forces to defending the government of Iraq from internal and external threats as well as fighting al Qaeda and “all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation.” (The Guardian, November 27, 2007)
Gradually, some Iraqis returned to their homeland. Towards the end of 2007, 1,600 Iraqis were returning daily from Syria to Iraq. According to a survey, 46 percent left Iraq because they could not afford to stay. Twenty-five percent said they fell victim to a stricter Syrian visa policy. Only 14 percent said they returned because they had heard about improved security. (New York Times, November 26, 2007)
The Iraq Displacement Ministry offered 1 million Iraqi dinar, about $800, to internally displaced families who could prove they had returned home with a letter from the police and their neighborhood council. (New York Times, November 26, 2007)
December emerged as possibly the safest month for U.S. forces in Iraq since the 2003 invasion and the least deadly for Iraqi civilians in the last 12 months. However, overall 2007 was the bloodiest year of the war. (Los Angeles Times, January 1, 2007)
The Iraqi Ministry of Health said 481 civilians died nationwide in December in war-related violence such as bombings, mortar attacks, and sectarian slayings. It said 16,232 civilians died in 2007 as compared to 12,320 in 2006. (Los Angeles Times, January 1, 2007)
During 2007, at least 899 American troops deployed to Iraq died. That was the highest annual toll since the American-led invasion in March 2003. (Los Angeles Times, January 1, 2007)
Nearly three years after United States troops decimated Fallujah in 2004, the “city” remained crippled. Unemployment, lack of medical care, and safe drinking remained a continuous problem. Freedom of movement was still curtailed. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
any of the buildings were destroyed, or heavily damaged. Several collapsed under the heavy bombing, and were never rebuilt. The heaps of concrete slabs and piles of rubble remained. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
The city remained tense as power struggles and turf wars evolved between tribal chiefs and Awakening group commanders -- former resistance fighters that the United States paid to be now on its side. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
A study conducted by two civil society organizations and the administration of Fallujah General Hospital over a two-year period was submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on March 4, 2008. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
The hospital administration and the two groups, the Conservation Centre of Environment and Reserves in Fallujah and the Monitoring Net of Human Rights in Iraq, said that in 2006 they found “5,928 new illness cases that were unknown before in Fallujah,” over 70 percent of which were “cancers and abnormalities” in children below 12 years of age. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
“In the first six months of 2007 there were 2,447 cases, more than 50 percent of these cases were children. Simply, this means that most of the victims are children, and this will threaten the new generation in this city. Now we face death of all kinds. In addition to all known diseases, new ones are invading us. Blackwater fever for instance was an unknown disease in our area, but now it is spreading like fire in a forest. We have no medicines to give our patients, and the black market is flourishing.
“Our best doctors fled the city for fear of being detained by American and police forces just because they helped civilians during the two sieges of 2004. They are now considered terrorists or at least terrorist supporters, when they should have been decorated with medals for their heroic work in helping their people.” (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
Dr. Kamal said, “ The siege is total,” as he spoke of the lack of drugs, oxygen, electricity, and clean water at Fallujah General hospital. (Inter Press Service, April 14, 2008)
In March 2007, the Democratic-led House of Representatives voted 218-to-212 to set a timetable for bringing American troops home from Iraq. The bill died, and nothing concrete was set for over one year. (New York Times, August 22, 2008)
On July 12, al-Maliki demanded that the United States set a timetable for withdrawing military forces. The next month, the United States agreed to remove combat troops from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and from the rest of the country by the end of 2011 if conditions in Iraq remained relatively stable. Both Iraqi and American officials negotiated the security accord governing American forces there. (New York Times, August 22, 2008)
Bush’s plan included a commitment to withdraw all American forces by the end of 2011. While in Baghdad in mid-December with al-Maliki, an Iraqi journalist hurled his shoes at Bush’s head and denounced him on live television as a “dog” who had delivered death and sorrow here from nearly six years of war. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)
The Iraqi journalist, Muntader al-Zaidi, 28, a correspondent for Al Baghdadia, an independent Iraqi television station, stood up about 12 feet from Mr. Bush and shouted in Arabic: “This is a gift from the Iraqis; this is the farewell kiss, you dog!” He then threw a shoe at Bush, who ducked and narrowly avoided it. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)
Also in December, General Petraeus and General Ray Odierno recommended for the first time the withdrawal of troops under an Obama’s presidency. The plan called for withdrawing two more brigades, or some 7,000 to 8,000 troops, from Iraq in the first six months of 2009. But that would leave 12 combat brigades in Iraq by June 2009, but some would not be sent home until after May 2010 which was Obama’s target. (New York Times, December 14, 2008)
However, the Bush administration reneged on its plan.
United States military and Pentagon officials made it clear through public statements and deliberately leaked stories that they plan to violate a central provision of the United States-Iraq withdrawal agreement requiring the complete withdrawal of all combat troops from Iraqi cities by mid-2009 by reclassifying combat troops as support troops. (Inter Press Service, December 19, 2008)
The scheme to engage in chicanery in labeling American troops represents both open defiance of an agreement which the United States military never accepted and a way of blocking President-elect Obama’s proposed plan for withdrawal of all combat troops from Iraq within 16 months of his taking office. (Inter Press Service, December 19, 2008)
The determination of the military leadership to ignore the United States-Iraq agreement and to pressure Obama on his withdrawal policy was clear from remarks made by JCS chair Michael Mullen in a news conference on November 17. That was after Ambassador Ryan Crocker had signed the agreement in Baghdad. (Inter Press Service, December 19, 2008)
Mullen declared that he considered it “important” that withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq “be conditions-based.” That position directly contradicted the terms of the agreement, and Mullen was asked whether the agreement required all United States troops to leave Iraq by the end of 2011, regardless of the security conditions. He answered “Yes,” but then added, “Three years is a long time. Conditions could change in that period of time.” (Inter Press Service, December 19, 2008)
In the spring of 2007, three noncommissioned United States Army officers, including a first sergeant, a platoon sergeant, and a senior medic, killed four Iraqi prisoners with pistol shots to the head as the men stood handcuffed and blindfolded beside a Baghdad canal, two of the soldiers said in sworn statements. (New York Times, August 27, 2008) After the killings, the first sergeant - the senior noncommissioned officer of his Army company - told the other two to remove the men’s bloody blindfolds and plastic handcuffs, according to the statements made to Army investigators. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
After removing the blindfolds and handcuffs, the three soldiers shoved the four bodies into the canal, rejoined other members of their unit waiting in nearby vehicles and drove back to their combat outpost in southwest Baghdad. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
The soldiers, all from Company D, First Battalion, Second Infantry, 172nd Infantry Brigade, were never charged with a crime. However, lawyers representing other members of the platoon who said they witnessed or heard the shootings, which were said to have occurred on a combat patrol west of Baghdad, said all three would probably be charged with murder. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
Sergeant Joseph Mayo, the platoon sergeant, and Sergeant Michael Leahy, Company D's senior medic and an acting squad leader, each described killing at least one of the Iraqi detainees on instructions from Sergeant John Hatley, who the soldiers said killed two of the detainees with pistol shots to the back of their heads. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
In another case, four other soldiers from Hatley’s unit were charged with murder conspiracy for agreeing to go along with the plan to kill the four prisoners, in violation of military laws that forbid harming enemy combatants once they are disarmed and in custody. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
The soldiers claimed that, after taking small-arms fire, the patrol chased some men into a building, arresting them and finding several automatic weapons, grenades, and a sniper rifle. On the way to their combat outpost, Hatley’s convoy was informed by Army superiors that the evidence to detain the Iraqis was insufficient. The unit was told to release the men. (New York Times, August 27, 2008)
6. THE CIVIL WAR IN 2008
As the war reached its fifth year, the decline of America continued to spiral downward. In March, the 4,000th members of the military died.
April brought the worst month of violence in six months. The escalated fighting launched a crackdown against Shi’ite militias in Basra. But it quickly spread to Baghdad’s Sadr City. (Associated Press, April 30, 2008)
As Bush’s war entered its fifth year, the Iraqi government distanced itself from United States over accusations towards Iran. Al Maliki ordered the formation of a committee to look into foreign intervention in Iraq. Its objective was to to find “tangible information” about foreign intervention, specifically Iran’s role in Iraq rather than “information based on speculation.” (McClatchy Newspapers, May 5, 2008)
After al-Maliki ordered al-Sadr to disband the Mahdi Army, the cleric radical leader gave a “final warning” to the government to halt a United States-Iraqi crackdown against his followers or he would declare “open war until liberation.” (Associated Press, May 20, 2008)
In his April statement, al-Sadr lashed back, accusing the government of selling out to the Americans and branding his followers as criminals. He said, “So I am giving my final warning … to the Iraqi government … to take the path of peace and abandon violence against its people. If the government does not refrain … we will declare an open war until liberation.” (Associated Press, May 20, 2008)
Al-Sadr’s statements came as al Qaeda in Iraq announced a one-month offensive against United States troops.
Once again, al-Sadr supporters increased rallies in May 2008. Thousands of supporters of the Shi’ite cleric demonstrated in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq to denounce a government deal with the Bush administration’s level of United Statestroops. (Agence France Presse, May 30, 2008)A key member of the Sadrist movement, Sheikh Mohannad Al-Gazawi, denounced the proposed deal that will extend the United States troop presence in Iraq beyond 2008. (Agence France Presse, May 30, 2008)
After nearly four years of war, the real number of the dead is far higher than even the highest declared in death tolls by the United States government:
More funds for Bush’s war were moved around in the summer of 2008. The Pentagon shifted $9.7 billion of its overall budget to pay for war operations but warned it will run out of money if Congress did not approve more funding by mid-July. (Reuter, May 29, 2008)
The Defense Department, with major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, sought to transfer $5.7 billion to the Army’s personnel account from the personnel accounts of other branches of the armed services. The DOD also asked Congress for permission to move $4 billion from the services’ operations and maintenance accounts to the Army and Special Operations Command, whose troops train local security forces and conduct counterterrorism missions. (Reuter, May 29, 2008)
In mid-summer, Iraq’s national security adviser said his country will not accept any security deal with the United States unless it contained specific dates for the withdrawal of United States forces. Then al-Maliki again set a setback for bush when he proposed a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops by the END OF 2008. This was part of negotiations over a new security agreement with Washington. (Reuters, July 7, 2008)
During an official visit to Abu Dhabi of United Arab Emirates, al-Maliki told several Arab ambassadors, “Today we are looking at the necessity of terminating the foreign presence on Iraqi lands and restoring full sovereignty.” (Reuters, July 7, 2008)
By mid-2008, al-Maliki won over more Sunnis with offensives to curb Shi’ite militias in southern cities such as Basra and Amara and in Baghdad’s Sadr City. He then turned his security forces north to gain control of Mosul and Diyala province from Sunni extremists. United States forces provided strong backing, and except for Basra and Sadr City, the operations were announced in advance so that militants and insurgents had a chance to escape. (McClatchy Newspapers, September 1, 2008)
The Bush administration became concerned that al-Maliki’s success had gone to his head. The White House feared that his tough bargaining on a long-term security agreement with the United States was a sign that he could act alone. (McClatchy Newspapers, September 1, 2008)
In August, al-Maliki showed his strength at a public meeting with tribal sheikhs where he insisted that a firm date for United States withdrawal was required in a security agreement that had been under intense negotiations for weeks. He set the date as the end of 2011. The agreement would replace a United Nations mandate set to expire at the end 2008. (McClatchy Newspapers, September 1, 2008)
However, al-Maliki’s gains with some Sunnis soon tumbled. A military operation that targeted al Qaeda ended up targeting Sunni Muslims instead. This created more sectarian tensions. The United States-backed security operation only targeted cities with majority Sunni populations such as Buhriz, Tahreer, Qatoon, Mafraq, and Hay in Diyala province, north of Baghdad. The operation included more than 50,000 Iraqi soldiers. (Inter Press Service, August 26, 2008)
After five years of war, estimates of Iraqi deaths from the violence ranged from 90,000 to 650,000. Two million Iraqis fled the country to seek refuge abroad. Another two million were displaced within Iraq.(Al Jazeera, May 31, 2008)
A study by doctors from the Johns Hopkins School of Health in conjunction with Iraqi doctors from al-Mustanceriya University in Baghdad, estimated the number of excess deaths as a result of the occupation at above 655,000. (Britain’s The Lancet, October 2006)
On September 14, 2007, Opinion Research Business (ORB), an independent polling agency located in London, produced a figure of 1,220,580 deaths as a result of the invasion. (Opinion Research Business, September 2007)
Foreign Policy, an independent organization estimated the number of dead at 1,213,716 by the summer of 2008. (Inter Press Service, June 2, 2008)