CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 2

IRAQGATE: REAGAN AND BUSH BUILD UP SADDAM’ WAR MACHINE IN THE 1980s

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. Saddam Hussein had ample cause to purchase military weapons before going to war with Iran just a year after the Islamic revolution toppled America’s ally, the Shah, and ushered into power Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1980, war broke out with Iran. In this period of eight years, Hussein looked to the United States which was an ardent supporter of his in bid to unseat Iran as the power broker in the Middle East. Hundreds of villages were destroyed and one million lives were lost. The White House could not have been more pleased in supplying Iraq with a variety of weapons.

The primary cause of the Iran-Iraq War revolved around Ayatollah Khomeini’s quest for Baghdad’s rich oil reserves. From a legal point of view, Iraq and Iran had been disputing over Shatt-al-Arab which separated the two countries. In 1937, a treaty between Iraq and Iran gave Iraq full control of the Shatt. In 1969, Iran declared these 1937 provisions void and sent naval craft up the Shatt to restate its claims. All naval craft along the Shatt-al-Arab flew the Iraqi flag with navigation fees paid to Iraq. In 1975, Iraq abandoned its claims to the center of the waterway as part of the Algiers Agreement on March 6. In return for this shared sovereignty, the Shah terminated Iranian aid to the Kurdish rebels in the north. A few days before the 1980 war, Iraq abrogated this treaty, claiming full sovereignty. There were claims that Iraq violated the Algiers Agreement 187 times, with border skirmishes between 1975 and 1980.

REAGAN-BUSH APPROVE MILITARY SALES TO SADDAM. In the summer of 2002 -- two decades after the Iran-War -- it was disclosed that the Reagan-Bush administration provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance. It came at a time when American intelligence agencies knew that Iran was in the process of overrunning Iraq and that Iraqi commanders might employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officers with direct knowledge of the program. (New York Times, August 18, 2002; Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

In 1982 -- two years into the Iran-Iraq War -- Hussein was taking severe hits from the Khomeini regime, especially from scores of waves of suicide attacks across the border into Iraq. Fearful that Iran would overrun Hussein’s army, the United States began supplying him with photo intelligence and military equipment, and the Reagan-Bush administration refused to castigate Hussein for the use of chemical weapons.

As early as the 1982, Iraq had become one of the biggest buyers of American rice and wheat, purchasing $5.5 billion in crops and livestock with federally guaranteed loans, subsidies, and hard currency. Iraq also received $270 million in credit to purchase other American goods, despite the fact that it was defaulting on loans. By the end of the decade, over 40 percent of Iraq’s food was imported from the United States, and the Hussein government was received one billion in loan assurances.

By the end of Reagan’s administration, Baghdad was purchasing 40 percent of their food from the United States. Iraq also defaulted on American loans and was still given a $270 million credit to buy more products. Not only was the United States helping to subsidize Hussein in agricultural products but also sold military equipment and technology directly to Baghdad as well as to other countries which in turn peddled them on to Iraq. As vice president, Bush’s first involvement with Hussein occurred in 1986, when he sent strategic military advice to Hussein during a critical point of the Iran-Iraq War.

In 1982, the Reagan-Bush administration allowed American corporations to sell dual use” equipment and hardware to Baghdad beginning in 1982. This became known as Iraqgate. According to confidential Commerce Department export-import control documents obtained by Newsweek (September 23, 2002), the United States sold several types of equipment which helped bolster Iraq’s military machine. They included:

**A computerized database for Hussein’s Interior Ministry to track political opponents.

**Helicopters to transport Iraqi officials.

**Television cameras for “video surveillance applications.”

Chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).

**Numerous shipments of “bacteria/fungi/protozoa” which could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax.

The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors for use against the effects of chemical weapons -- but the Pentagon blocked the sale. (Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

After an Iraqi Exocet missile killing 39 Americans aboard the USS Stark, the United States still continued its support of Hussein. The Reagan-Bush administration sold military trucks to Iraq, only when the military reference was deleted when the information was provided to Congress. In addition, the Reagan White House sold civilian helicopters to Hussein, and subsequently they were transferred to the military in violation of promises. And Reagan and Bush secretly allowed Saudi Arabia to provide American-made weapons to the Iraqi regime over a period of nearly ten years.

Eighteen American corporations provided Saudi Arabia with military hardware which included TOW missiles. The Saudis delivered MK-84 2,000 pound bombs to Iraq in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. $5.5 billion in loans to Iraq from American banks were ignored by the American government. Iraq received $5 billion in loans guaranteed by the Agricultural Department to promote American farm exports, but then the food was replaced by weapons. Even Bush admitted that American materials had been sold to Iraq for commercial purposes and then illegally switched for military uses.

The Reagan-Bush administration secretly allowed Saudi Arabia to provide American-made weapons to the Iraqi regime over a period of nearly ten years. Eighteen American corporations provided Hussein with military hardware. According to the General Accounting Office in 1986 the United States sold an undisclosed number of TOW anti-tank missiles. In return the Saudis sold 1,500 bombs to Iraq. These included 300 MK-84 2,000 pound bombs. This was directly in violation of the Arms Export Control Act which prohibited the transfer of American weapons to other nations without the written approval of Washington.

Billions of dollars in fraudulent loans were made by the Atlanta branch of an Italian bank to help provide Iraq with weapons for the Gulf War. As much as $5.5 billion in loans were ignored by the American government. Italian Bank (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) in Atlanta illegally sent these funds to Iraq for the purchase of military weapons. In October 1989, FBI agents raided the Atlanta bank and found evidence of over $5 billion in loans guaranteed by the Agricultural department through its Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to promote American farm exports. Investigators found that food was being replaced for weapons. Even Bush admitted that American materials had been sold to Iraq for commercial purposes and then illegally switched for military uses.

According to reports of a Senate Committee in 1994, the United States government allowed firms to export a variety of biological materials to Iraq from 1985 -- if not earlier -- through 1989 pursuant to application and licensing by the Department of Commerce. As documented in Rogue State by author William Blum, the materials included bacillus anthracis which causes of anthrax; clostridium botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin; histoplasma capsulatam, a cause of a disease attacking the lung, brain, spinal cord, and heart; brucella melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs; clostridium perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria which causes systemic illness; clostridium tetani, a highly toxigenic chemical; and escherichia coli (E.coli).

Dozens of other pathogenic biological agents were shipped to Iraq during the 1980s. The Senate Report pointed out that “These biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction.” The committee reported that it learned later “that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi biological warfare program.” The report also noted that American exports to Iraq included the precursors to chemical warfare agents, plans for chemical and biological warfare production facilities and chemical warhead filling equipment.

These exports continued to at least November 28, 1989 despite the fact that Iraq had been reported to be engaging in chemical warfare and possibly biological warfare against Iranians, Kurds, and Shi’ites since the early 1980s as part of its war with Iran.

Shortly after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, Vice President Bush met several times with Iraqi officials to continue to play up to Hussein’s government. Bush sought to influence the Exchange-Import Bank to provide loans to Iraq. Two months after Bush moved into the White House, he continued to patronize Hussein’s government. The newly inaugurated president attempted to influence the Exchange-Import Bank to provide loans to Iraq.

However, in the summer of 1989, American attitude towards Iraq began to shift. Secretary of State James Baker informed Bush that Iraq was procuring nuclear weapons technology. Yet Bush pushed forward with his own agenda to provide more weapons and agricultural credits to Iraq. Only two days after American intelligence warned Bush of the Hussein’s buildup, the United States granted Iraq $1 billion in agricultural credits. Bush insisted that he never knowingly helped Hussein develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

In June, the Defense Intelligence Agency warned of high level administration officials in the White House that “Iraq had developed a major European procurement network in defense industries.” On September 3, Secretary of State Baker issued a top secret warning to Bush. He stated that Iraq was procuring nuclear weapons technology to counter perceived military threats from Israel and Iran. Baker’s report included such items as sophisticated computers and X-ray machines.

The next day, the CIA issued a report that Iraq was serious in its bid to build nuclear weapons. Despite these repeated warnings about Iraq’s arms build-up, Bush pushed forward with his own agenda to provide more weapons and credits to Iraq. Despite these warnings to Bush by American intelligence groups, just two days later Bush granted Iraq $1 billion in agricultural credits.

On September 2, Bush issued National Security Directive 26. This stated that “the United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.” Among the incentives for expanded trade with Iraq included non-lethal military assistance. Bush insisted that he never “knowingly” helped Hussein develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, both Baker and National Security adviser Brent Scowcroft admitted that they had seen several memorandums which warned the administration of Hussein’s bid to proliferate its military arsenal. Nevertheless, NSD 26 was Bush’s official stamp of approval on his Iraq policy. Four days later, Baker met with Foreign Minister Aziz and, according to the minutes, informed him that the White House would not restrict the sale of high technology equipment to Iraq.

The State Department disclosed that between 1986 and 1989, 73 transactions took place with Iraq. Items included bacteria cultures, advanced computers, and equipment to repair jet engines and rockets. Even after the Gulf War erupted, American corporations illegally sold technology to Iraq. For example Delft Instruments in New York sold night-vision equipment to both Iraq and Jordan four months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in December 1991. It was disclosed in 1989 that XYZ Options, an Alabama firm which manufactured carbide tools, was part of Iraq’s nuclear capability market. They furnished valves for nuclear weapons. In addition, a $40 million brass-casting factory and a $26 million ductile-pipe plant sold materials to Iraq.

Bush attempted to use the CIA to squelch an investigation of Iraqgate in the House of Representatives by Congressman Henry Gonzalez of Texas. In a series of speeches, Gonzalez documented how American policy helped Iraq develop weapons of mass destruction before the Gulf War. Gonzalez believed Bush is using the CIA to taint the Iraqgate investigation. Bush asked the CIA to investigate Gonzalez for revealing allegedly secret intelligence information which it claimed harmed American national security interests.

The House Judiciary Committee, after several hearings, considered the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate Iraqgate. However, the investigation merely revolved around the fact that the Commerce Department allegedly altered information on 66 export licenses for Iraq which were turned over to congressional investigators. The export licenses were simply changed from “Vehicles designed for military use” to “Commercial utility cargo trucks.” The House Judiciary Committee ultimately agreed that it was too “vague” to justify an independent counsel. As a result, no further investigations into Iraqgate were conducted.

REAGAN-BUSH SILENT ON IRAQ’S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. American intelligence officials, who spoke anonymously, told the New York Times (August 18, 2002) about the nature of gas warfare on both sides of the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1988. Iraq’s use of gas in that conflict was repeatedly cited by President Bush and National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice as justification for “regime change” in Iraq.

The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan’s top aides, including Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell, then the national security adviser, were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988. During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States sided with Baghdad to prevent the Ayatollah Khomeini regime from gaining control of the important oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf.

In 1988 -- towards the end of the eight-year war that took approximately one million lives -- evidence indicated that Hussein used chemical weapons to subdue the Kurds in the north. The full nature of the program was described by former Defense Intelligence Agency officers for the first time in 2002. The gassing occurred at a time when Reagan’s top aides -- including Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and General Colin Powell, then the national security adviser -- were publicly condemning Iraq for its use of poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.

Secretary of State Powell, through a spokesman, told the New York Times (August 18, 2002) that said the officers’ description of the program was “dead wrong” -- but declined to discuss it. His deputy, Richard Armitage, a senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to indicate his denial that the United States supported Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency declined to comment.

Though senior officials of the Reagan-Bush administration publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and other poisonous agents, the American military officers said President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes, and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Iraq shared its battle plans with the Americans, without admitting the use of chemical weapons, especially towards the end of the eight-year war, according to military officers. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in pressing the Reagan administration to offer aid to Iraq out of concern that Iranian commanders were sending waves of young volunteers to overrun Iraqi forces. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, then and now, met with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and then told officials of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency that Iraq’s military command was ready to accept American aid. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

In early 1988, after the Iraqi Army, with American planning assistance, retook the Fao Peninsula in an attack that reopened Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf, a defense intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, was sent to tour the battlefield with Iraqi officers, the American military officers said. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

He reported that Iraq had used chemical weapons to assure a victory, one former DIA official said. Colonel Francona saw zones marked off for chemical contamination, and containers for the drug atropine scattered around, indicating that Iraqi soldiers had taken injections to protect themselves from the effects of gas that might blow back over their positions. CIA officials supported the program to assist Iraq, though they were not involved. Separately, the CIA provided Iraq with satellite photography of the war front.

Colonel Walter P. Lang, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, said, that both DIA and CIA officials "”were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose” to Iran. “The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern.” What Reagan’s aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, but the intelligence officers said they were not involved in planning any of the military operations in which those assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major Iranian troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq’s military command wanted assistance were on the southern war front. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

The New York Times article continued: “The Pentagon’s battle damage assessments confirmed that Iraqi military commanders had integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal and were adding them to strike plans that American advisers either prepared or suggested. Iran claimed that it suffered thousands of deaths from chemical weapons.

The American intelligence officers never encouraged or condoned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, but neither did they oppose it because they considered Iraq to be struggling for its survival, people involved at the time said in interviews.”

According to the New York Times, “another former senior DIA official who was an expert on the Iraqi military said the Reagan administration’s treatment of the issue -- publicly condemning Iraq’s use of gas while privately acquiescing in its employment on the battlefield -- was an example of the ‘Realpolitik’ of American interests in the war.

The effort on behalf of Iraq ‘was heavily compartmented,’ a former DIA official said, using the military jargon for restricting secrets to those who need to know them. One officer said, “They had gotten better and better” and after a while chemical weapons “were integrated into their fire plan for any large operation, and it became more and more obvious.” (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

MORE EVIDENCE LINKING THE REGAN-BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO IRAQ. In the summer of 2002, it was disclosed that the Reagan-Bush administration provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance. It came at a time when American intelligence agencies knew that Iran was in the process of overrunning Iraq and that Iraqi commanders might employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officers with direct knowledge of the program. (New York Times, August 18, 2002; Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

Those officers, who spoke anonymously, told the New York Times (August 18, 2002) about the nature of gas warfare on both sides of the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1988. Iraq’s use of gas in that conflict was repeatedly cited by President Bush and National Security adviser Condoleezza Rice as justification for “regime change” in Iraq.

In 1982 -- two years into the Iran-Iraq War -- Hussein was taking severe hits from the Khomeini regime, especially from scores of waves of suicide attacks across the border into Iraq. Fearful that Iran would overrun Hussein’s army, the United States began supplying him with photo intelligence that showed Iranian deployments. The Reagan administration may have secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped to Iraq through Egypt.

In addition, the Reagan-Bush administration began allowing American corporations to sell dual use” equipment and hardware to Baghdad. According to confidential Commerce Department export-import control documents obtained by Newsweek (September 23, 2002), the United States sold several types of equipment which helped bolster Iraq’s military machine. They included:

**A computerized database for Hussein’s Interior Ministry to track political opponents.

**Helicopters to transport Iraqi officials.

**Television cameras for “video surveillance applications.”

**Chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).

**Numerous shipments of “bacteria/fungi/protozoa” which could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax.

The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors for use against the effects of chemical weapons -- but the Pentagon blocked the sale. (Newsweek, September 23, 2002)

Secretary of State Powell, through a spokesman, told the New York Times (August 18, 2002) that said the officers’ description of the program was “dead wrong” -- but declined to discuss it. His deputy, Richard Armitage, a senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to indicate his denial that the United States supported Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Additionally, the Defense Intelligence Agency declined to comment.

Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX, and other poisonous agents, the American military officers said President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes,and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Colonel Walter P. Lang, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, said, that both DIA and CIA officials “were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose” to Iran. “The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern.” What Reagan’s aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

Colonel Lang asserted that the DIA “would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival.” Senior Reagan administration officials did nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the program said. Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, but the intelligence officers say they were not involved in planning any of the military operations in which those assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major Iranian troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq’s military command wanted assistance were on the southern war front. (New York Times, August 18, 2002)

According to the New York Times, “Another former senior DIA official who was an expert on the Iraqi military said the Reagan administration’s treatment of the issue -- publicly condemning Iraq’s use of gas while privately acquiescing in its employment on the battlefield -- was an example of the ‘Realpolitik’ of American interests in the war.