CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 7

THE CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME IN THE 1990s

THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR. The Gulf War ended seven months of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the emir immediately rebuilt his lavish palace and restored everything which was destroyed or damaged by the Iraqis. He promised democratic reforms which included an elected parliament. This assembly was last abolished by the crown in 1985. The opposition was awarded 35 token seats in the house. However, they were not given positions in the cabinet which overseas foreign, domestic, and financial affairs. Still only males, who could trace their ancestry back to 1920, were allowed to vote. After the Gulf War, thousands of Palestinians were imprisoned or exiled, and the remaining ones still did not have suffrage rights. Thus, this limited the electorate to a mere 81,500 men.

The exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians created a vacuum in Kuwait’s financial sector, education system, and power plants and communications systems. All these segments relied on the pre-war population of approximately 280,000 highly skilled Palestinians.

From the very beginning of the liberation of Kuwait, major human rights violations were documented. Initially the State Department denied that the newly restored regime violated human rights. On March 8, spokesperson Richard Boucher stated: “There are reports of people getting a hard time at checkpoints. We do not have information on beatings and killings.” Then on the following day American ambassador Edward Gnehm was asked about human rights abuses. He replied: “We have not had nearly the difficulties that people anticipated.” On April 18, Amnesty International reported that hundreds of residents were being arbitrarily arrested, many brutally tortured by Kuwaiti armed forces and members of resistance groups. The reply from the State Department was that the situation by most accounts in Kuwait was very much improved over what had existed some weeks ago.

On April 22, Secretary of State Baker directly acknowledged violations when he said, “The Crown Prince made clear that there were human rights abuses following the early days of liberation.” In May State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler stated that the Kuwaiti embassy had urged the emir “to have open trials; they were open. We also urged that the defendants have a right to counsel; they did.” However, she ignored the facts that the lawyers did not meet with their defendants, did not read any of the prosecution’s evidence, and did not cross-examine witnesses. Only later did the State Department softly concede that the United States “was concerned by allegations that due process may not have been fully served.” Kuwait chopped its pre-war population of 2.3 million people, citizens as well as non-citizens, in half.

The Bush administration adroitly controlled the media during the Gulf War. All visual and audio recordings of personnel in agony or severe shock were not authorized by the White House. Any imagery of patients suffering from severe disfiguration or undergoing plastic surgery treatments was not authorized. Interviews with or imagery of patients undergoing psychiatric treatment were forbidden. All interviews with military personnel were censored. The Pentagon set up 80 media pools were set up for the dissemination of military briefings. No media personnel were allowed to travel independently, as they were taken to different areas by the American military.

Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark helped establish the Commission of Inquiry for an International War Crimes Tribunal. Its purpose was to determine whether war crimes had been committed by the United States. At the final judgment in New York City, 22 judges from 18 nations concluded that the United States and leading government officials were guilty on all 19 charges.

Bush himself was charged with 19 war crimes, including the breaking of laws of the Hague, the Geneva Conventions, and the Nuremberg Charter. The commission also found him guilty of violating the United States Constitution and the United Nations Charter.

Over 88,000 tons were dropped by 1,760 American and allied warplanes. Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and weapons programs were not destroyed by precision bombing, as Pentagon briefings stated. After the war, only minimal damage to these facilities was observed.

Nearly one-third of the civilian fatalities were a direct result of allied bombing missions which could have been avoided had the allies adhered to international standards. International law required that all possible precautions be taken to avoid civilian harm. A series of attacks occurred on Iraqi targets in commercial areas in the middle of the day when civilians were present. In addition the attack on Baghdad’s air raid shelter violated the legal requirement that a warning be given before attacking civilian structures. This resulted in the death of 200 to 300 civilians.

The White House deliberately overestimated the number of Iraqi soldiers as a pretext to rally the American public behind the war effort. Americans were told that the Iraqis amassed a massive army of 500,000 soldiers. However, the House Armed Services Committee determined that the true count was as low as 183,000. The committee also reported that the 42 Iraqi divisions assigned to southern Iraq were severely undermanned. In addition, the committee's 89-page study affirmed that there were serious deficiencies such as late and inaccurate battlefield intelligence and poor communications which led to “friendly fire” casualties.

Nearly 170,000 Iraqi children died as a result of the devastation to the country’s infrastructure. The United States military destroyed much of Iraq’s power, water, and sewage installations, and thus created an invitation for such diseases as cholera.

In the spring of 1991, Bill Moyers reported on Frontline that government sources released information that 70 percent of American bombs missed their targets and that only 7 percent of those dropped were smart bombs. This disputed the daily reports released by Pentagon generals and colonels. Throughout the war they continually reported on the success of the bombing missions, that only military Iraqi targets were almost always being hit, and that very little damage was done to the infrastructure of the country.

Americans daily flew sorties northward across the Iraq desert in what became known as the “Highway of Death.” Even though the government denied that “turkey shoot” occurred, one Army analyst stated that “as many as 25,000 Iraqis were killed” in their convoys as they retreated back to Baghdad.

The Pentagon acknowledged that the new Patriot missile was not as unerringly successful against Iraqi Scuds as was first claimed. Two former Israeli officials, Moshe Arens and General Dan Shomron, state that the Patriot was a dud. On February 11, 1991, Arens told Bush that the Patriots were “intercepting only about 20 per cent of incoming Scuds.” Four days later, Bush reiterated the near perfect success of the Patriot.

In July 1996, the declassified a 250 page analysis on weapons used in the Gulf War. The GAO acknowledged that the accuracy of most of the weapons used in the Gulf War were “overstated, misleading, inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable.” The GAO stated that the performance of the F-117 stealth fighter, cruise missiles, and laser-guided bombs were grossly overrated and that they functioned effectively in optimal conditions. The GAO reported that infrared, electroptical and laser systems, which were used for guiding weapons to their targets, were all “seriously degraded” by rain, clouds, smoke, fog, and humidity.

Just prior to the deployment of troops to Kuwait, the media were full of reports of atrocities carried out by the Iraqis. In December 1990 it was reported that “300 premature babies were reported to have died after Iraqi soldiers removed them from incubators, which were then looted.” An unnamed Kuwaiti doctor at Maternity Hospital in al-Sabah Medical Complex stated that 312 babies died when they were taken from their incubators and that he personally buried 72 of them in al-Rigga cemetery. Immediately after the Gulf War, 60 Minutes broadcast a segment on this issue, and a teenager corroborated the story.

However, it soon became evident that these allegations were fabricated. Soon after the 60 Minutes program aired, the girl was identified as the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, and she subsequently recanted her statement. In addition, one of New York City’s largest maternity hospitals is Columbian Presbyterian; it has only 36 incubators. Kuwaiti doctors and nurses in exile stated that about 20 babies were in Maternity Hospital. The highest estimate by Kuwaiti officials was 80 incubators.

During Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait the Middle East Watch estimated that between 500 and 700 Kuwaitis were killed by Iraqi soldiers. The official report of the Kuwaiti government was that 2,000 were killed.

AMERICAN CORPORATIONS PROFIT FROM THE WAR. At the same time, arms sales to the Middle East soared, as did corporate profits, after the Gulf War. One year after the war the United States sold $8.5 billion in arms in that region, excluding sales to Israel and Egypt. As an example, American corporations sold Saudi Arabia 72 advanced F-15 fighters for $5 billion. Yet in the five-year period, from 1985 to 1989, total arms sales to that entire area was a total of only $15.4 billion. Of that amount $6.1 billion was to Israel, $5 billion to Saudi Arabia, and $2.9 billion to Egypt. Just before and after the Gulf War, between August 1990 and December 1991, Saudi Arabia received an unprecedented $14.8 billion in American arms.

RESTORING THE EMIR. The Gulf War ended seven months of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the emir immediately rebuilt his lavish palace and restored everything which had been destroyed or damaged by the Iraqis. He promised democratic reforms which included an elected parliament. This assembly was last abolished by the crown in 1985. The opposition was awarded 35 token seats in the house. However, they were not given positions in the cabinet which overseas foreign, domestic, and financial affairs. Still only males, who could trace their ancestry back to 1920, were allowed to vote. After the Gulf War, thousands of Palestinians were imprisoned or exiled, and the remaining ones still did not have suffrage rights. Thus, this limited the electorate to a mere 81,500 men.

The exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians created a vacuum in Kuwait's financial sector, education system, and power plants and communications systems. All these segments relied on the pre-war population of approximately 280,000 highly skilled Palestinians.

From the very beginning of the liberation of Kuwait, major human rights violations were documented. Initially the State Department denied that the newly restored regime violated human rights. On March 8, spokesperson Richard Boucher stated: "There are reports of people getting a hard time at checkpoints. We do not have information on beatings and killings." Then on the following day American ambassador Edward Gnehm was asked about human rights abuses. He replied: "We have not had nearly the difficulties that people anticipated." On April 18, Amnesty International reported that hundreds of residents were being arbitrarily arrested, many brutally tortured by Kuwaiti armed forces and members of 'resistance groups. The reply from the State Department was that the situation by most accounts in Kuwait was very much improved over what had existed some weeks ago.

On April 22, Secretary of State Baker directly acknowledged violations when he said, "The Crown Prince made clear that there were human rights abuses following the early days of liberation." In May State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler stated that the Kuwaiti embassy had urged the emir "to have open trials; they were open. We also urged that the defendants have a right to counsel; they did." However, she ignored the facts that the lawyers did not meet with their defendants, did not read any of the prosecution's evidence, and did not cross-examine witnesses. Only later did the State Department softly concede that the United States "was concerned by allegations that due process may not have been fully served." Kuwait chopped its pre-war population of 2.3 million people, citizens as well as non-citizens, in half.

88,000 tons were dropped by 1,760 American and allied warplanes. Iraq's nuclear, biological, and weapons programs were not destroyed by precision bombing, as Pentagon briefings stated. After the war, only minimal damage to these facilities was observed.

Nearly one-third of the civilian fatalities were a direct result of allied bombing missions which could have been avoided had the allies adhered to international standards. International law required that all possible precautions be taken to avoid civilian harm. A series of attacks occurred on Iraqi targets in commercial areas in the middle of the day when civilians were present. In addition the attack on Baghdad's air raid shelter violated the legal requirement that a warning be given before attacking civilian structures. This resulted in the death of 200 to 300 civilians.

The White House deliberately overestimated the number of Iraqi soldiers as a pretext to rally the American public behind the war effort. Americans were told that the Iraqis amassed a massive army of 500,000 soldiers. However, the House Armed Services Committee determined that the true count was as low as 183,000. The committee also reported that the 42 Iraqi divisions assigned to southern Iraq were severely undermanned. In addition, the committee's 89 page study affirmed that there were serious deficiencies such as late and inaccurate battlefield intelligence and poor communications which led to "friendly fire" casualties.

Nearly 170,000 Iraqi children died as a result of the devastation to the country's infrastructure. The United States military destroyed much of Iraq's power, water, and sewage installations, and thus created an invitation for such diseases as cholera.

Americans daily flew sorties northward across the Iraq desert in what became known as the "Highway of Death." Even though the government denied that "turkey shoots" occurred, one Army analyst stated that "as many as 25,000 Iraqis were killed" in their convoys as they retreated back to Baghdad.

The Pentagon acknowledged that the new Patriot missile was not as unerringly successful against Iraqi Scuds as was first claimed. Two former Israeli officials, Moshe Arens and General Dan Shomron, state that the Patriot was a dud. On February 11, 1991, Arens told Bush that the Patriots were "intercepting only about 20 per cent of incoming Scuds." Four days later, Bush reiterated the near perfect success of the Patriot.

In July 1996, the declassified a 250-page analysis on weapons used in the Gulf War. The GAO acknowledged that the accuracy of most of the weapons used in the Gulf War were "overstated, misleading, inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable." The GAO stated that the performance of the F-117 stealth fighter, cruise missiles, and laser-guided bombs were grossly overrated and that they functioned effectively in optimal conditions. The GAO reported that infrared, electroptical and laser systems, which were used for guiding weapons to their targets, were all "seriously degraded" by rain, clouds, smoke, fog, and humidity.

Just prior to the deployment of troops to Kuwait, the media were full of reports of atrocities carried out by the Iraqis. In December 1990, it was reported that "300 premature babies were reported to have died after Iraqi soldiers removed them from incubators, which were then looted." An unnamed Kuwaiti doctor at Maternity Hospital in al-Sabah Medical Complex stated that 312 babies died when they were taken from their incubators and that he personally buried 72 of them in al-Rigga cemetery. Immediately after the Gulf War, 60 Minutes broadcast a segment on this issue, and a teenager corroborated the story.

However, it soon became evident that these allegations were fabricated. Soon after the 60 Minutes program aired, the girl was identified as the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, and she subsequently recanted her statement. In addition, one of New York City's largest maternity hospitals is Columbian Presbyterian; it has only 36 incubators. Kuwaiti doctors and nurses in exile stated that about 20 babies were in Maternity Hospital. The highest estimate by Kuwaiti officials was 80 incubators.

During Iraq's occupation of Kuwait the Middle East Watch estimated that between 500 and 700 Kuwaitis were killed by Iraqi soldiers. The official report of the Kuwaiti government was that 2,000 were killed.

COVERT PLANS TO TOPPLE SADDAM IN THE 1990s. The goal of the CIA was to undermine Hussein by showing Iraqi citizens that he was not invincible and thus strengthening his opponents inside Iraq and trying to encourage a rebellion within his inner circle. Since the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the CIA backed Kurdish dissidents in the north of Iraq, Shi'ite Muslim groups in the south, Iraqi exiles in London and Iraqi military defectors based in Jordan.

The diplomatic, political and economic structures that could conceal CIA officers and agents -- an American embassy, a network of political contacts, a large number of businessmen going in and out of the country -- did not exist in Iraq. That made it exceedingly hard for agents to penetrate the inner circle surrounding Hussein who controlled tens of thousands of soldiers and spies whose sole duty was to preserve his power. These operations cost about $100 million and had little or no success.

Top level United States intelligence officials reported in February 1998 that the CIA allegedly conspired to carry out a 1995 assassination plot against Hussein and plotted to stage a military coup. Despite the fact that federal law prohibits the CIA from attempting to assassinate a foreign leader, several CIA agents were honored for their efforts. The FBI conducted a top-secret investigation, and eventually all the CIA agents, who were investigated, were exonerated and even given awards for their efforts against Hussein. The aborted assassination attempt was to coincide with a military offensive against Iraq which was to be backed by the CIA in northern Iraq. However, the Iraqi military invaded the north and took a key Kurdish city, thus squashing any successful attack against Hussein. A year later in 1996 the FBI quietly dropped the case.

A second CIA covert action plan was designed to recruit Iraqi officers who would be encouraged to stage a military coup. From 1992 to 1996, the CIA supported this group but achieved little. In 1995, after some key Iraqi military officers defected, the agency shifted its support to the other opposition group, the Iraqi National Accord which WAs based in Amman. The White House authorized the CIA to work with the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an anti-Hussein group which was based in London. The plan was for the CIA to distribute explosives to agents inside Iraq and they in turn would destroy power sites and other elements of the country's infrastructure. The CIA operated in conjunction with MI-6, the British intelligence agency which had a Middle East office in Jordan, operating out of a front known as the Iraqi National Accord. The agency did concede that this plan failed when Iraqi double agents discovered the CIA plot in 1996. Hussein's military and intelligence services crushed the small clique of Iraqi military officers working with this group and destroyed a CIA base in northern Iraq.

In addition, the CIA also infiltrated the Kurdish bases in northern Iraq. However, they were proven politically impotent in the past because of their deep divisions. In the fall of 1994, two members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence visited the Kurds. They were impressed by their commitment to independence. In Washington D.C., they urged the White House to seriously consider funding them. In January 1995, a team of CIA officers arrived in northern Iraq to work with Ahmad Chalabi, their Shi'ite leader. However, they immediately found themselves in a volatile intramural power struggle. With little Kurdish support and with the backing of the CIA, Chalabi planned a military offensive against the Iraqi military in March 1995. In the mean time Chalabi's Kurdish rival, Wafiq Samarrai planned his own plot against Hussein but was turned down by the CIA. However, CIA field agents were never advised as to how to deal with Chalabi. They encouraged him to attack but also stated that he would not have the support of the CIA. By February 1995 Chulabi received the support of two other major Kurdish groups in the INC and in March sent 15,000 troops into battle. Even though they won some local victories against the Iraqi army, their assault faltered and their troops eventually were dissolved.

In the late 1990s, the CIA drafted plans for a major program of sabotage and subversion against Hussein. Four prior covert operations, involving everything from radio propaganda to paramilitary plots, failed to dislodge the Iraqi leader. The debate over the need for new covert action intensified in the latter part of the decade when senior members of Congress openly called for the CIA to destabilize Saddam. However, some of the president's advisers considered the new plan no more likely to succeed than the agency's earlier efforts.

CIA Director George Tenet told Clinton that the plan was risky, and National Security adviser Samuel Berger was skeptical of the CIA's ability to undermine Hussein. The plan called for enlisting Kurdish and Shiite agents to destroy or damage key Iraqi pillars of economic and political power, like utility plants or government broadcast stations. It also called for increasing political pressure on Iraq through propaganda programs like a "Radio Free Iraq" broadcast to Baghdad.

By the turn of the century, the influence of the INC had been significantly weakened. Despite millions of dollars in American aid throughout the 1990s, the leading Iraqi opposition group proved unsuccessful in making use of the money, accounting for it, finding recruits for Pentagon training, and preventing its own fragmentation. By 2000, support for the INC in the Arab world and in Turkey had all but disappeared. Countries neighboring Iraq refused to allow the group to operate out of their territories.

Nevertheless, Chalabi continued to lobby for support. In March 2000, he set up an office in Teheran that was paid for by the United States, a move that required a special waiver from Washington because of American sanctions against Iran. Chalabi hoped to use Iran as a base from which to send about 100 operatives into northern Iraq in three-person teams to gather news and "political intelligence," according to American officials and former intelligence agents who still have contact with the group. (Los Angeles Times, March 19, 2001)

But even this plan frustrated American officials because the INC has not taken advantage of Pentagon training that might have increased its ability to carry out this and other operations. Many slots available for a wide variety of training courses were unfilled, according to American officials. For other slots, the group was late in revealing the names of Iraqi candidates, leading to rush to get them visas and accommodations.

The INC was also unreliable in asking the United States for funds. For example, when the INC submitted a proposal for $4 million during the Clinton administration, funds ran out after only half was spent. Then the INC had to reapply for it. Additionally, only $3 million of the $97 million in Pentagon training or used equipment, allocated by Congress in the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, was used. An additional $25 million in funding managed by the State Department became available to the group, but again the INC failed to submit a thorough proposal that included specifics and accounting.

UNSCOM INSPECTIONS. When the United States lobbied the United Nations to support American inspectors in accessing various Iraqi military sites, the Soviets remained opposed to the use of force. In his public statement yet over Iraq’s alleged refusal to support American actions, Russian president Boris Yeltsin warned that any United States military action against Iraq could lead to world war. Iraq had no stocks of weapons of mass destruction or storage facilities for them which could be targeted in a military strike, a senior Russian chemical weapons expert, Anatoly Kuntsevich, confirmed. “The UN teams keep searching, but found almost nothing. Either the United Nations teams were totally incompetent, or they were liars and subverting the United Nations members and the media groups.”

Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa confirmed that Iraq opened some 80 sites to the alleged American inspectors. British prime minister claimed that the alleged inspectors had already found massive arms build-up in Iraq. He asserted that 38,000 chemical weapons and 48 Scud missiles had been allegedly discovered by the inspectors. British foreign minister Robin Cook, however, said Iraq’s offer to allow a visit by United Nations inspectors to some 45 sites in Iraq is unacceptable.

In the late 1990s, the White House struggled to maintain a coalition against the Hussein regime. Whereas 38 countries -- many having been bought out -- joined the United States in the 1991 Gulf War, only 15 nations continued to support the United States in its opposition to Baghdad. Britain was the only nation to join the United States in offering a substantial amount of military support -- and air strikes if they were to be needed -- in the area surrounding Iraq. The other 14 countries have merely made token gestures of support

The five permanent Security Council countries originally supported the 1991 war. Since the Gulf War, they were divided over American dominance in the Persian Gulf. Russia signed over $6 billion in military and oil drilling contracts with Iraq, and on several occasions Yeltsin publicly rebuked the Clinton’s administration for continued pressure and dominance in that area. China was also opposed to the possible use of American force against Hussein. France refused to lend any military support to the United States in the gulf. For the most part, Iraq’s neighbors turned against the United States as well. Egypt opposed American intervention against Hussein. And Syria opposed military force as well.

On the other hand, a few countries offered token support to the United States. New Zealand offered two surveillance aircraft and 20 troops. Oman provided five refueling aircraft. The Czech Republic offered land mine experts if they were to be needed. Argentina provided 100 medical personnel. Germany allowed the use of its air bases for long range flights to the Middle East.

THE OIL EMBARGO AND THE “OIL-FOR-FOOD” PROGRAM. After the Gulf War, the United Nations imposed an oil embargo on Baghdad. Then in the late 1990s, the Security Council began relaxing the oil-for-food program. It no longer was simply an “Oil-for-Food” effort, as an emphasis shifted from simple humanitarian relief to broader economic assistance and the rebuilding of infrastructure that included oil production, power generation, water and sanitation, agriculture, transportation, and telecommunications. Still the Security Council controlled the funds in an escrow account, setting aside nearly 30 percent for war reparations and United Nations costs.

In 1998, the Security Council raised the limits on permitted oil sales, and in 1999 it removed the ceiling altogether. Production began rising to approximately 2.6 million barrels per day, levels approaching those before the Gulf War. Oil revenues during the last six months of 2000 reached nearly $10 billion.

Mismanagement, corruption, and manipulation of the program by Hussein allowed his regime to amass at least $21 billion outside the United Nation’s control. This estimate was made in 2004 by the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004) Iraq obstructed and undermined the aid program. Baghdad periodically halted oil sales as a way of protesting sanctions. During the first half of 2001, oil sales were approximately $4 billion less than in the previous 180-day period. According to the United Nations, the oil-for-food program “suffered considerably because ... oil exports ... (Have) been reduced or totally suspended by the government of Iraq.” In June and July 2001, as the Security Council considered a new “smart sanctions” plan, Iraq again withheld oil exports to register its disapproval of the proposal. The result was a further loss of oil revenues and a reduction of the funds available for humanitarian needs. (The Nation, December 3, 2001)

Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the exiled Iraqi National Congress (INC), was on the CIA payroll since the late 1990s. It was Chalabi who helped convince the Bush administration that Hussein still had WMD. In fact, the celebrated Chalabi was a guest of the Bush administration at the State of the Union in 2003.

However, one year later, Chalabi fell out of grace with the Bush administration. When no WMD were found in Iraq, Bush administration officials figured they were funneled those reports to encourage Bush to go to war.

One year into Bush’s war, the Pentagon began was investigating members of Chalabi’s INC. Allegations against at least 15 INC members included abduction, stealing eleven Iraqi government vehicles, assaulting police by firing on them during a search, impersonating police officers, and breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. Four INC operatives were arrested during the spring of 2004, and an arrest warrant was issued for the INC’s chief of intelligence. The INC confirmed its offices were searched six times and 11 cars seized. (NBC News, April 28, 2004; World Socialist Web Site, May 27, 2004)

In addition, Chalabi was charged with passing classified information to the Iranian government, telling Teheran officials that the United States had broken Iran’s secret code. (Washington Post, June 7, 2004) (Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2003)

Then Chalabi himself was investigated for embezzling millions of dollars from the “Oil-for-Food” program. The list of those involved in the scandal included 270 people who allegedly slashed funds for the Hussein regime and increased profits for themselves. Those included international politicians including Benon Sevan, the United Nations bureaucrat who administered the “Oil-for-Food” program. (Newsweek, April 26, 2004)

Another suspect in the “Oil-for-Food” program was on Kojo Annan, the 29-year son of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Kojo Annan once worked for Cotecna Inspection SA, a Swiss company hired by the United Nations to monitor and inspect “Oil-for-Food” shipments from February 1999 until November 2003. (Newsweek, October 18, 2004)

Kojo Annan left Cotecna Inspection SA before it was retained by the United Nations. He was paid a “non-compete” fee by the company after it began work on the Oil-for-Food program. He received $2,500 a month for more than five years from Cotecna Inspection SA. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004)

Cotecna and Annan claimed that Kojo Annan stopped working for the company in 1998. The company said it had paid him the monthly stipend through 1999 to keep him from working for competitors and that he never worked on a project related to Iraq. Yet, there was no evidence Kojo Annan’s connection with Cotecna influenced its receipt of the Iraq contract. (Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2004)

THE CIA INFILTRATES IRAQ UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION. In the mid-1990s, Iraq began work on the Al Samoud, a liquid-fueled ballistic missile with the capability of carrying conventional explosives or the chemical and biological weapons. Because the range of the Al Samoud is less than 95 miles, the missile does not violate United Nations restrictions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War. However, military officials claimed that the flight tests showed that production plants and research labs destroyed 18 months earlier had been rebuilt. Pentagon officials claimed that the missile was a variant of the Soviet-era SA-2, the type of surface-to-air missile that shot down the U-2 spy plane flown by Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union in 1960.

Iraq first tested the Al Samoud in 1997 under supervision of the previous team of international inspectors which sought to ensure that the missile remained within the prescribed range. When American and British air strikes over Iraq commenced in late 1998, DOD officials claimed that they set back Baghdad's missile program one to two years. Since the air attacks over Iraq, there were no international inspections of its weapons programs. In early 2000, the United States joined the other members of the United Nations Security Council in approving a new inspection system, but the system's new director, Hans Blix, moved slowly to assemble a team of inspectors. Washington offered to ease the sanctions against Iraq if the new inspections found no evidence of weapons programs, but Hussein insisted that he would not cooperate with any new inspectors.

The White House claimed that Iraq resumed its flight tests in May 1999, about five months after air attacks were carried out by American and British warplanes. Over a year later -- in July 2000 -- the Clinton administration announced that the Hussein regime had conducted eight test of the Al Samoud missile, according to the New York Times (July 1, 2000). The White House announced that the damage to Iraq's missile centers in late 1998 appeared to have derailed the program far less significantly than what was first thought.

The CIA began placing American spies among United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq only a year after the end of the Persian Gulf war of 1991. According to former inspector, Scott Ritter, the CIA also worked closely with the United Nations to organize the inspections. Ritter said that a coup attempt against Hussein in June 1996 coincided with the presence of a United Nations inspection team that included nine CIA officials. American officials acknowledged that the CIA gave assistance to the United Nations inspections program and provided specialists to work on the inspections teams. However, Ritter makes clear that the agency's involvement was far more extensive -- and began earlier -- than previously reported. Ritter said that the CIA became actively involved in inspections in 1992, the year after the United Nations began weapons inspections in the search for evidence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. The author said that a senior CIA official worked closely together "to plan the operational and intelligence support for the largest and most complex inspections ever undertaken by UNSCOM." Ritter added that the CIA official "and his men provided seasoned personnel who could operate vehicles, organize logistics, run communications -- simply put, the kind of people you want around you in a difficult situation." (Scott Ritter, End Game)

After 12 months of diplomacy, the Security Council approved a resolution to bring weapons inspectors back to Iraq. In December 1999, the Security Council agreed to suspend trade sanctions if Baghdad cooperated with the United Nations. The resolution passed, 11-0, despite abstentions by Russia, France, and China. In addition Malaysia, a nonpermanent member, also abstained. The resolution created an arms control agency, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which was given authority to remove any remaining weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Iraq warned France that it would break diplomatic relations and cancel oil contracts if the French voted for the resolution. Great Britain and the United States, however, pressured France into voting for the provision. The French Foreign Ministry attempted to appease Hussein by maintaining that the resolution was not specific in describing the disarmament measures that Baghdad had to meet before sanctions could be suspended.

UNMOVIC was given the authority to commence its project within 60 days of starting operations and to submit a list of key disarmament tasks to the Security Council for approval. According to the resolution, if Iraq "cooperated fully" with UNMOVIC, then the Security Council would vote whether to terminate sanctions against Iraq. The resolution also included a measure to assure continued compliance. It stated that the sanctions suspension would have to be renewed every 120 days. If UNMOVIC declared that Baghdad were in compliance, the United Nations could lift the cap on how much oil Iraq could sell. Under previous resolutions, the maximum amount of oil that Iraq was allowed to export every six months was $5.26 billion. Finally, the resolution outlined the procedures for sending food, pharmaceuticals, agricultural supplies, and other humanitarian goods to Iraq.

The White House hoped to gain more world support against Iraq by emphasizing Baghdad's illegal export of oil. The New York Times (February 1, 2000) reported that Iraq netted millions of dollars in smuggling since August 1999. The White House said that Hussein's government steadily increased illicit shipments of oil from the Shatt al Arab waterway, much of it flowing through an installation near the port of Basra that American warplanes attacked and damaged in 1998. In January 2000 Iraq's illicit trade reached the highest level since the Persian Gulf war. More than 130 ships, some of them Russian, left the port and skirted the Iranian coast, staying in Iran's territorial waters to evade American ships trying to intercept them.

In the same month, Navy warships boarded only 36 ships and seized only four. According to American intelligence estimates obtained by the New York Times, Iraq was able to smuggle out a record amount of 317,000 metric tons of oil, or more than 2.3 million barrels, in December 1999 alone. An intelligence report concluded that the smuggling was undermining the sanctions.

In late January 2000, the United States released public satellite photographs and American intelligence reports which showed that Iraq rebuilt military and industrial sites damaged by American and British air strikes in late 1998. Pentagon officials declined to discuss the intelligence findings in detail. According to the New York Times (February 1, 2000), they said that Iraq had rebuilt many of the 100 installations damaged or destroyed in the American and British raids in December 1998. Of those targets, 12 were missile factories or industrial sites that commanders said were involved in Iraq's efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction. The officials said significant reconstruction had been seen at those sites, including Al Taji missile complex north of Baghdad.

On February 11, Baghdad said that it would not allow United Nations inspectors to return to reinstate a disarmament program. The New York Times (February 11, 2000) reported that Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan referred to the United Nations arms inspectors as spies. The official Iraqi News Agency quoted Ramadan as having told a visiting Russian envoy: "There shall be no return of the so-called inspection teams. We reject the infiltration by spies using such cover."

In mid-April, the Security Council approved a streamlined arms inspection commission for Iraq. But Russia warned that it would be on the lookout for anyone named to the panel who might be troublesome to Iraq. Hans Blix, a former Swedish foreign minister, was named the new chief inspector of the team. Blix also served as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. In order to create a "nonpartisan" team, Blix's 44 team members came from 19 countries, some friendly and not so friendly to the Iraqis.

However, many of the inspectors had deep concerns about departing for Iraq. First, their predecessors, who were to evaluate Iraq's weapons, were caught spying. Second, many believed that too many of Blix's inspectors were from the United States and Britain, as reported in the New York Times (August 22, 2000).

By the end of August, UNMOVIC readied its team to leave for Baghdad. Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz told reporters (New York Times, August 23, 2000), "Clearly speaking Iraq does not deal with (Security Council) resolution 1284. Hans Blix and his commission is a result of this resolution which Iraq does not deal with. When Iraq does not deal with the resolution and its results this means that Iraq will not receive any person who has a relation with the resolution and its results." Aziz said that Iraq would not be intimidated: "We are accustomed to threats and Iraq is ready to face all challenges in defense of its sovereignty and legitimate rights."

Three of the five permanent members of the Security Council -- Russia, France and China -- made no secret of their sympathies toward Iraq and their opposition to the United States' Iraq policy. The rest of the world has appeared more inclined to trade with Iraq than to continue a pointless and morally bankrupt policy of economic sanctions.

Rolf Ekeus, former head of UNSCOM, acknowledged that Iraq had been "fundamentally disarmed," (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 2000). All of the major confrontations between UNSCOM and Iraq that took place between 1996 and 1998 concerned the search for documents and weapons components, not weapons or weapons production capability.