THE PENTAGON PLANS ITS WAR STRATEGY

During the Clinton years in the 1990s, Wayne Downing, the head of Special Operations Command in the Pentagon, drafted OP Plan 1003 in the event of war with Iraq. The proposal was entitled “An Alternative Strategy for Iraq.”

OP Plan 1003 called for a United States invasion of southern Iraq that would lead to the establishment of a provisional government. It Southern Iraq would be protected by United States airpower, as intelligence and commando operations would be sent into the non-liberated areas. They would instigate an uprising that would enable American forces to occupy those areas. An Iraq Liberation Army of 10,000 would be established. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The proposal consisted of 200 pages and another 600 pages on logistics. Op Plan 1003 was last revised in 1996 and updated in 1998. It resembled American forces in the 1991 Gulf War. The plan required a period of seven months to move an American force of 500,000 soldiers to the Middle East before launching a war. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

On December 19, 2000, soon after the Supreme Court declared the new president, president-elect Bush and President Clinton met to discuss foreign policy. Clinton told Bush that he was aware of his campaign promises where he listed two priorities: Iraq and a national defense system. To Clinton, neither of these was a priority and he knew he was leaving office knowing that Saddam had been contained. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Bush never responded. There was reason to believe that Bush – like a deer staring into the headlights of a car – could not respond. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Bush had said that he had no ambition to read. He obviously had no historical curiosity. His apathy towards world history and politics reflected his ambivalence towards the present world’s changing climate. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

It appeared obviously that Bush had no knowledge of the history of Iraq. He never heard of the sectarian rivalries among Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds until Super Sunday – just prior to his attack on Iraq. He never knew that major sectarian differences had existed for decades. He likely did not know that democracy in Iraq -- as in most of the Middle East -- was unattainable -- that it was an ideology that could never be forced upon the Iraqis.

Had Bush reached into history, he would have known that without Saddam, the likelihood of a new unified centralized Iraq would never be achieved. Furthermore, a democratic institution in most of the world was the antithesis of what conservatives, like Bush, had supported. History told everyone person that in most cases the United States had supported right-wing authoritarian regimes – and not democratic pluralistic governments. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

For example, in the Middle East alone, as an example the United States orchestrated a coup in 1953 to overthrow popularly-elected Mossadegh, and the CIA subsequently restored the despotic and brutal authoritarian regime -- the Shah of the Pavali family -- to the throne. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

PLANNING FOR WAR. During Bush’s first eight months in office, administration officials rarely spoke about attacking Iraq. On June 1, 2001 Bush held his first high-level meeting of the Principals Committee that was attended by Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, NSC Advisor Condoleeza Rice, CIA Director George Tenet, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. There were four options on dealing with Iraq: to continue the current containment policy; to maintain the same policy and support Saddam’s opponents; to set up a safe haven for insurgents in southern Iraq; and to plan a United States invasion. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Powell recommended a cautious approach -- tightening economic sanctions against Iraq. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz sought the development of a strategy for aiding an anti-Saddam movement. Rumsfeld spoke of a new strategy to enforce the “no-fly” zone -- to strike back more aggressively in response to Iraq surface-to-air missiles fired against American war planes. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Four days after 9/11, Bush and his top aides met at Camp David to discuss retaliation against al Qaeda. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz offered two military targets: Afghanistan and Iraq. Wolfowitz’s priority was to attack Iraq and gain control over the south in an attempt to strangulate the country’s economy. Bush decided to focus on al Qaeda and Afghanistan but said Iraq was still an option. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)The following day, Bush called Rice and reiterated his decision. He told her to draw up plans against Iraq if it was proved that Saddam was implicated in 9/11. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were delighted. So was Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board that advised Rumsfeld. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

One week later -- on September 19 and 20 -- Perle met with a number of conservatives that included Bernard Lewis, formerly a Princeton University professor, and Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi exile living in England. They all voiced that Iraq needed to be liberated. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

At the same time, the Pentagon was developing plans for an Iraq invasion. On September 13, Colonel Thomas Reilly, a top-level war planner, proposed a plan to invade and occupy a large part of southern Iraq and control the Rumaylah rich oilfields and seize Saddam’s only seaport. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Rumsfeld selected General Greg Newbold to outline the Central Command’s OPLAN 1003-98, the Pentagon’s contingency plan in the event of war with Iraq. Newbold’s plan called for 500,000 United States troops, far from the 125,000 that Rumsfeld had envisioned. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Unhappy with Newbold, Rumsfeld assigned General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander, the task of designing a new plan for war. At a December 4 meeting, Franks told Rumsfeld that an invading force of 385,000 American soldiers would essential, but that number was still too high for the secretary of defense. However, Rumsfeld was delighted to hear Franks’ estimate that only 45 days’ notice was needed to deploy forces. Then United States forces would establish control of the southern portion of Iraq within only four days. This would stir up a rebellion across the rest of Iraq, and Saddam would be deposed. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

On December 1, 2001, Rumsfeld asked Franks for an estimate to build a new Iraq plan. Three days later, Franks announced that he could trim the 500,000 estimate by 100,000 soldiers. Franks also concluded that he would need only 105,000 forces to begin the war and that number would have to rise to 230,000 over 60 to 90 days. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Franks attack plan consisted of:

The traditional campaign of bombing that was updated to include Cruise missiles and long-range surface to-surface missiles.

Unconventional warfare that included Special Operations forces penetrating deep into Iraq.

Ground operations by Army and Marine divisions.

Psychological and deception operations.

Support of opposition groups including Kurds in the north and Shi’ites in the south.

Civilian-military operations to work with Iraqis after the major fighting.

Humanitarian aid. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Rumsfeld and Franks met again on December19. Once again, the commander lowered his estimate. Franks told the secretary that an initial invasion force would require only 145,000 and that they could be deployed within 90 days. Then additional forces would be added until the total number reached 275,000. The major attack would take 45 days, and after another 90 days, Saddam’s regime would crumble. The war would last no more than 135 days. That would be followed by a period of reconstruction. Rumsfeld still thought the number of troops was too high and that the duration of the war was too long. He told Franks to reduce the deployment force from 60 to 30 days. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Franks planned how to topple the Hussein regime and its infrastructure:

Penetrate the inner circle that included sons Uday and Qusay.

Control the internal security that included command, control, and communications network.

Destroy weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s missile systems.

Annihilate Iraq’s National Guard.

Exert pressure on anti-Iraqi factions such as the Kurds.

Conquer the Iraqi army.

Control Iraq’s commercial and economic infrastructure.

Also in December, a State Department group headed by American diplomat Ryan Crocker traveled to northern Iraq to help pull Kurdish and other anti-government forces together. Then a bipartisan group of nine members of Congress asked Bush to support Iraqi opposition forces with humanitarian aid, information gathering and military training. The congressional delegation told Bush that American efforts to replace Hussein would not succeed without the help of allies on the ground inside Iraq. They suggested support should be directed to the London-based Iraqi National Congress.

It was not until early 2002 that government officials publicly acknowledged that American psychological operations, designed to aid the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in its quest to undermine the Hussein regime, had been carried out. (Los Angeles Times, February 27, 2002)

However, since the INC continued to be unsuccessful in rallying enough support and strength to bring down the Baghdad government, the Bush administration did not approve military move inside the country. The White House provided money for an information-collecting program and also paid for humanitarian aid offices in New York and Washington. Under a $97 million congressional outlay, some non-lethal training was provided. In all, the INC received $12.4 million since 1998. (Los Angeles Times, February 27, 2002)

“Saul” was the name given to an official at the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) that ran covert operations. On January 3, 2002, Saul told Cheney that Hussein could not be removed by covert operations. Saul insisted that Hussein’s top-level security personnel would foil any coup attempt. Instead, Saul said the CIA would be the solution. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

In a fourth meeting with Rumsfeld, Franks argued that Iraq’s military strength had diminished considerably since the 1991 Gulf War, primarily as a result of the United Nations economic sanctions against Baghdad. Franks said he would need only a 45-day deployment. Then he would conduct air operations for 45 days. On the 90th day, a ground war would be launched, and Hussein’s regime would be toppled in 90 more days. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Franks justified his position by explaining that Iraq’s military power had dropped significantly since the first Gulf War in 1991:

The number of Republican Guard divisions had dropped from seven to six since 1991.

Iraq’s 27 army divisions had been reduced to only 17.

The tactical aircraft dropped from 820 to 310. Many war planes had been grounded due to the lack of spare parts.

The number of surface-to-air missiles went from 100 to 60. Iraq’s navy lost 3 ships and presently had a mere 15 to 20 ships. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Op Plan 1003 was code-named “Generated Start Plan” in early 2002. Under the proposal, CENTCOM developed three plans: (1) Running Start was CENTCOM’s first proposal. The air war would last 45 days. That would be followed by a ground attack that would begin up to 25 days later. From the outset, Rumsfeld approved this plan, since it would avoid a protracted build-up that would take months to launch.

When the British were informed of the plan, Sir Michael Boyce, the head of the Defence Staff, called it a “hazardous option.” He was unconvinced that the Bush administration had a workable military strategy. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Generated Start became a parallel plan. This would take 90 days to prepare an attack. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The Hybrid or the 5-11-16-125 plan and later reamed Cobra II. In August 2002, CENTCOM scrambled to develop a third proposal that allowed United States forces to deploy more quickly. Bush would give CENTCOM five days to quietly mobilize. Over the next 11 days, CENTCOM would fly troops, planes, and war materials to the Middle East. Then a 16-day air campaign would commence. By this time, 20,000 military personnel would be in Kuwait and the ground war would begin. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of reinforcements would flow into Kuwait and then deploy into Iraq. The war would last no more than 125 days. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

The objective of the ground troops was to seize the southern oil fields and the port of Umm Qasr. Then the forces would move northward, maintaining bridges to expedite their movement and ultimately Baghdad would fall. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Powell would be placed in charge of rebuilding Iraq’s political institutions and the country’s infrastructure. There would be a two to three months of “stabilization” followed by 18 to 24 months of “recovery.” Then the majority of United States forces would be withdrawn. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Bush ultimately chose Hybrid. Rumsfeld and Franks signed on three months later in December. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

In March 2002, Tenet met secretly near the Turkish border with two influential Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, who controlled separate areas of Kurdistan. Tenet informed the two most influential Kurdish leaders that the Bush administration was serious about war and that the military and CIA were coming. Tenet approved pay-outs totaling tens of millions of dollars in $100-dollar bills to gain their support once military and CIA operations commenced.

Finally, on May 9, Franks formally asked that Turkey be used as a secondary base from which to launch an American invasion. A 100-mile long border between Turkey and Iraq would allow a division-size force of 15,000 to 20,000 troops to attack from the north.

Two days later, Franks met with Bush at Camp David where he explained his five-pronged attack:

(1) A western front that would consist of Special Operations Forces that would prevent Scud missile attacks.

(2) A southern front from Kuwait consisting of at least two Army divisions and two Marine divisions.

(3) A third front that would consist of all information operations.

(4) A vertical attack upon Baghdad.

(5) An attack from the north from Turkey. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Rumsfeld drastically needed to use Turkey as a northern front from which to launch the invasion into Iraq. He and Franks discussed moving 30,000 to 80,000 American troops to Turkey. Rumsfeld sent cargo ships carrying tanks to the Mediterranean for eventual positioning in near the Turkey-Iraq border. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

However, on March 1, the Turkish government rejected the Bush administration’s request to move troops into Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the White House reopened negotiations with Turkey, as 27 American ships waited offshore for orders. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

It was essential that the Saudis allow American warplanes to use their airspace. At a minimum, CENTCOM needed the use of Saudi bases for support operations -- aerial refueling, surveillance and air defense. What was more, some were baffled by CENTCOM’s disregard of air assets already on the ground in Kuwait, in Gulf states such as Qatar and Oman, in Turkey, and in the Indian Ocean region. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

During the spring, Bush met Jordan’s King Abdullah at least five times. Bush promised to double United States aid to Amman to $500 million in 2002. With its good roads and communications system, Jordan was an excellent site for American armored force. The capital city of Amman was linked to Baghdad by a 600-mile motorway that cut through a virtually featureless desert -- perfect terrain for American tanks and high-precision air-launched munitions. (The Guardian, July 7, 2002)

On April 20, Franks painted a more optimistic picture for the president. Franks upped the timetable. He told Bush that he could reduce the time in which he could commence the war by one-third. Franks also promised that the size of American forces could reach 250,000 by the time American forces rolled into Baghdad. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

Not only did Powell remain out of the loop, so too did the chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff. The close relationship that Franks enjoyed with Rumsfeld angered the top brass at the Pentagon. Franks reported directly to Rumsfeld and bypassed the chairman of the JCS as well as the leaders of the various service branches that had their own agendas. The Navy wanted more carriers; the Army lobbied for another brigade; and the Air Force pushed for another squadron. (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack)

In April, CENTCOM officers discussed options on coordinating a massive ground force with an aerial attack. Though the Army had positioned tanks and armored vehicles in Kuwait and Qatar, deployment of large numbers of troops could not be kept secret and might well provoke an Iraqi response. Another dilemma involved American ground forces, as they proceeded northward towards Baghdad. Would Iraqi forces, hostile to Hussein, join them? Would American forces engage in urban warfare. Would they encounter chemical or biological agents? (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

CENTCOM focused on two specific concerns about the conduct of any offensive. One was that Saddam, if faced with losing power and likely being killed, would no longer feel the constraints that during the Persian Gulf War apparently kept him from using his stores of chemical and biological weapons. The other was the danger of becoming bogged down in bloody block-by-block urban warfare in Baghdad that could kill thousands of American troops and Iraqi civilians. (Washington Post, May 24, 2002)

Franks outlined a plan which called for a substantial combat force that was close to half the 541,000 troops deployed for the 1991 Gulf War, which the military refers to as Operation Desert Storm. Some at the Pentagon promptly labeled the “Franks’ plan Desert Storm Lite.” It called for a full-scale ground campaign with the goal of “regime change” in Baghdad. That was to be achieved by a combination of American military might coordinated with the hope of an uprising by Iraqi officers against Hussein. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

Bush and Franks met in the Oval Office in May. Franks told the president that invading Iraq to oust Saddam would require at least 200,000 troops, far more than some other military experts have calculated. This was in line with views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had repeatedly emphasized the lengthy buildup that would be required, concerns about Saddam’s possible use of biological and chemical weapons and the possible casualties, officials said.

In the summer of 2002, Franks and General Paul Mikolashek, commander of the United States Third Army, presented a briefing during a secure video teleconference in which they envisioned five divisions (some 150,000 troops) and five aircraft carriers launching simultaneous ground and air attacks into southern Iraq. The plan rested on two major assumptions: that the war would be predominantly an armor battle with aircraft supporting land forces; and that Saudi Arabia would not let American forces use bases on its soil. Hence, the plan largely excluded land-based air forces. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

Some military and civilian officials also were concerned by the close relationship Franks and Rumsfeld. One effect of the Rumsfeld-Franks relationship was that Air Force General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was excluded from much discussion. In addition, senior military advisors for the Defense secretary and the president had little input. In fact, the emerging Iraq plan was never officially discussed by the heads of all the services. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

While the Pentagon was laying out its plans for an Iraqi invasion, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was analyzing Saddam’s capabilities. Another leak in the Bush administration, the classified study, “Iraq -- An Operational Support Study,” was comprised of maps and data on geography, roads, refineries, communications facilities, security organizations, and military deployments. The DIA study characterized the toppling of Hussein as a challenge so formidable that only tremendous military resources could accomplish it. . (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

The plan was close to a blueprint of one devised by Franks and CENTCOM. It assumed the worst scenario for an American ground invasion by the Army’s “heavy” tank and mechanized infantry divisions. In doing so, Franks’ plan created a bitter rivalry within the country’s armed services. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

Originally, CentCom’s plan was to rely on “heavy” ground forces. But in March, Franks changed his position and called for an air assault. But he limited such an assault to 60 hours. AC-130 gunships and a handful of A-10s operating from Kuwait were also incorporated into the plan in order to offer close air support for ground troops. (New York Times; Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2002)

In September, General David McKiernan was named ground commander, replacing Paul Mikolashek who had strained relations with Franks while in the Afghanistan theater. McKiernan quickly referred to Hybrid as Cobra II, named after the first large-scale Third Army operation in World War II led by General George Patton at Normandy. McKiernan became increasingly concerned that he would not have sufficient land forces available. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

CENTCOM’S PROBLEMS. CENTCOM was faced with several major problems that it had to resolve:

(1) How could the Pentagon deploy tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of warplanes without tipping off Saddam? This issue was solved by the “Spike Plan.” The United States would step up the number of sorties over the “No-fly” zone in southern and northern Iraq. Therefore, Saddam might think that the deployment of a large number of warplanes to the Middle East would not signal an imminent United States invasion.

(2) How would the Bush administration respond if Saddam struck first? This was settled by the existence of a long-standing plan known as Desert Badger. American warplanes in the region would carry out an increased number of air strikes that would crush Baghdad. In addition, more planes would quickly be sent to the Middle East. The Pentagon could use the Red plan (seven days of strikes), the White plan (11 more days of strikes), or the Blue plan (20 additional days of bombing). (3)How would the Pentagon deal with Rumsfeld’s inpatient plan to quickly invade Iraq -- before the summer of 2003? Franks began a series of top-secret meetings in February at the Transportation Command Headquarters. He arranged to have troops and war materials flown to the Middle East to allow war to commence in April or May, even though CENTCOM would not be fully ready.

(4) How could Israel, which threatened retaliation, be restrained if Iraqi missiles hit its soil?

(5) How would the United States respond if Saddam used WMD?

(6) How would the United States react if Saddam fled Iraq? (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

In the fall of 2002, the Bush administration adopted its official strategy. Entitled “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy,” it outlined the major premises of going to war:

(1) A free Iraq would eliminate the threat of WMD.

(2) The threat of Iraq to its neighbors would be eliminated.

(3) The Iraqi people would be free from tyranny.

(4) Baghdad would be prevented from supporting terrorists.

(5) The United States would aid the Iraqis in building a society based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

CREATING A COVERT IRAQI FORCE. During the fall and winter of 2002, Wolfowitz worked on plans to create an Iraqi resistance army. Under the1998 Iraq Liberation Act, the Bush administration asked Congress for $92 million to pay for the training that included non-lethal goods and services to seven opposition groups.

Wolfowitz’s proposal was for the CIA to train a small, covert Iraqi force. His plan was rejected by most high-level Bush administration officials. Powell suspected Wolfowitz’s agenda was to establish a Chalabi army. Others said the plan was unworkable. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Ultimately, Wolfowitz’s The plan was accepted, though it was scaled back. William Luti of the Pentagon met in London with representative of 12 Iraqi exile organizations in exile. The plan was to equip them with $97 million of equipment that was authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act under the Clinton administration. The Pentagon suggested the need for 3,000 volunteers. But by February, only 622 applicants led Wolfowitz to believe that the proposal should be dropped. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Next, Wolfowitz proposed appealing to Iraqi exiles hiding in Iran and northern Iraq. Wolfowitz told Franks that 3,000 Iraqi exiles in Iran -- 300 at a time -- could be flown to Hungary for training. This plan was also rejected. Wolfowitz was dealt another setback. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Finally, the Pentagon signed on to Wolfowitz’s next proposal. The plan was to train Iraqi freedom fighters in Tazar, Hungary. Only 73 Iraqis volunteered. Subsequently, the plan was dropped, and the Iraqis were distributed among American units as interpreters.

Some Iraqi groups were angered when forms for training by the United States were circulated by the Iraqi National Congress in northern Kurdistan -- without consultations with the two Kurdish groups that had the only major opposition fighters in Iraq. (Los Angeles Times, September 25, 2002) The CIA was given permission to recruit Iraqis to form a clandestine Iraqi paramilitary force. Known as the “Scorpions,” they were trained by the CIA and Special forces at an isolated military base in the Jordanian desert. The Scorpions were to fly by helicopter across the Jordanian-Iraqi border and to drop them near one of Saddam’s military bases. They were to be dressed in Iraqi uniforms in hopes of infiltrating the base in hopes of orchestrating a coup. They were to convince Saddam’s soldiers to defect and to join in the liberation of the country. The Scorpions were never used until later in 2003. (James Risen, State of War)

SADDAM’S WMD? In Baghdad, Saddam did not inform his top-level officials about the status of his country’s WMD. Iraq’s generals had long assumed that WMD was part of the country’s arsenal. Saddam believed that he might deter an American invasion if Bush thought he had chemical and biological caches. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

With Bush waiting on the wings to invade Iraq, Saddam informed his Revolutionary Command Council in December that Iraq did not have WMD. That same month, Saddam approved a defensive plan to concentrate on the capital city if attacked. General Sayf al-Din al-Rawi informed his commanders of the “Ring Defense” -- that Baghdad would be protected by concentric defense lines that would ring around the city. The Republican Guard would defend this “Red Zone” to the death. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

CENTCOM was so sure that Saddam was preparing to use WMD that Buzz Moseley drew up plans to strike suspected sites. American military personnel were given inoculations for anthrax and smallpox, and they were instructed to wear chemical protective gear during the invasion. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

POSITIONING TROOPS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. In the fall of 2002, CENTCOM began positioning troops and equipment in the Middle East. More than 7,000 troops were transported to Incirlik airbase near Adana in late June. The number of American troops in Turkey would be increased from 7,000 to 25,000 troops during July. (Yeni Safak, Ankara, Turkey, June 27, 2002) In late 2002, the Army continued to move new combat troops into the region. One 1,500-member battalion had long been based at Camp Doha, but some military analysts suggested that the number had grown to about 5,000 soldiers. An additional 9,000 troops could be airlifted to Qatar and Kuwait probably from bases in Georgia and Texas. Special Forces were positioned throughout the region, according to defense officials, but their numbers were small and their locations were kept secret. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

Another 7,800 American troops were in Afghanistan and thousands more were at newly developed United States bases and airfields in surrounding countries such Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

CENTCOM positioned eight Navy ships designed to permit massive artillery pieces at the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The base was fully loaded with enough equipment to support one Army heavy brigade, plus weaponry, ammunition, and supplies to equip multiple Army divisions for at least 30 days. Nearby, 15 ships were loaded with ammunition, fuel, and minesweepers. The Marines had equipment for one expeditionary brigade aboard fast ships afloat at Diego Garcia, plus enough equipment and supplies to maintain an air wing and ground support force for 30 days. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

The Air Force and the Navy likewise stepped up their presence in the Persian Gulf. Altogether, more than 400 American aircraft were based in the region. In addition, United States naval vessels moved into position. A Navy carrier battle group, consisting of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, four destroyers, and at least one tactical submarine, was afloat in the Arabian Sea. A Marine expeditionary unit, with its own helicopters and supplies to outfit 1,500 Marines for 30 days of ground warfare, also was deployed to the Arabian Sea. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

The Navy also had two cruisers and four destroyers in the Persian Gulf. In Bahrain, the 5th Fleet, with about 4,200 United States military personnel, was based in the capital of Manama. Since 1991, Bahrain granted United States forces access to its facilities and the right to pre-position materiel for future crises. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

The Army deployed troops from the 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Air Assault Division. An Army division also could move from United States bases in Germany. Patriot missile battalions were deployed to the Gulf countries that cooperated with United States efforts. The Patriots were the best defense the United States had against Scud missile attacks. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

By early 2003, three combat divisions were ready: two tank-heavy Army units of about 16,000 troops each and one lighter Marine unit that would be used mainly to tie down Iraqi forces and be an on-hand reserve force. A fourth Army division, perhaps the 4th Infantry Division, would also be poised to rush to the Middle East to provide reinforcement, if needed. In addition, parts of the 101st Airborne Division and some Special Forces units may attack northern Iraq from bases in Germany and Turkey. The entire United States invasion force would likely amount to between 100,000 and 250,000 troops. (Washington Post, November 10, 2002)

The British contributed Special Forces units, an aircraft carrier group, air power, armored units, and infantry. The British forces consisted of 25,000 troops as well as personnel support. (Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2002)

CENTCOM prepared to use a nationwide “psychological operations” campaign. Leaflets and radio broadcasts would be used to persuade the Iraqi military to change sides and to tell the Iraqi population that they were not being targeted. United States forces and civilian officials would be warned against carrying out orders to use chemical or biological weapons. (Washington Post, November 10, 2002)

Then General Shinseki embarrassed the Bush administration when he testified before a Senate committee in mid-February. The general warned that the United States was not prepared to march off to war. He said that postwar Iraq would require a commitment of ”several hundred thousand” United States troops. (Washington Post, May 19, 2003)

Despite these warnings, Pentagon officials continuously asserted they the number of American forces in Iraq was sufficient. Rumsfeld regularly denied charges that there were too few troops. Wolfowitz told Congress on February 27 that Shinseki’s number was “wildly off the mark. … It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and secure the surrender of Saddam’s security force and his army.” (New York Times Magazine, November 2, 2003)

On March 3, Bush met with high-level officials that included Franks. Cheney was the only one whose opinions had changed. He had defended the position that the ground war should end after 100 hours, and then United States troops would be withdrawn. Cheney had predicted that Saddam would be overthrown by his generals. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)

Weeks later, Bush met on Azores with British Prime Minister Blair, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, and Portuguese Prime Minister Barroso, informing them of his imminent plan to march to war. After returning to the United States on March 17, Bush delivered an ultimatum to Baghdad, demanding that Saddam and his two sons leave Iraq within 48 hours. Saddam ignored the warning. (Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, Cobra II)