CONTENTS

THE GOP IN DISARRAY

I'm a uniter -- not a divider." -- Repeated promises by Bush throughout Campaign 2000

The handwriting on the wall was clear: One could not be a moderate and remain a Republican senator. The GOP had been captured by the Trent Lotts, Dick Armeys, Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmonds, and Orrin Hatches. Looking back to mid-2000, the American electorate was told that the GOP was an "inclusive" party, open to all people regardless of their race, religion, or gender preference.

Bush acted as if he received a mandate of the voters, but he was a minority president. He behaved as if a majority of voters supported his right-wing agenda. He believed he controlled both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court and that he could dictate policy. Vermont Republican Senator James Jeffords had no choice but to resign if he were to maintain integrity.

But that made no difference to Bush's gang. They ran him as a centrist. But once appointed by the Supreme Court, he paid off his right-wing constituency. The president never reached over to the other side of the aisle to talk to the Democratic leadership to get his tax cut. He just cozied up to key Democrats -- such as Senator John Breaux and Congressman Zell Miller -- to gather enough votes to shove it through Congress. And Bush paid no attention to the Jeffords' defection, as he pushed ahead with his anti-environmental agenda and his National Missile Defense system.

On May 24, Jeffords formally declared that he was jumping ship. He declared himself an independent. That immediately took the Senate reigns away from Mississippi arch-conservative Trent Lott, being replaced by Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota. The 50-50 Senate tie --- with Vice President Cheney always ready to break a tie in favor of the GOP -- abruptly changed to 50-to-49 in favor of the Democrats with Jeffords as the one independent. Jeffords aligned himself with the Democrats, thus making the Democrats the de facto majority party in the Senate. His decision to bolt the GOP threw the chamber back into Democratic control for the first time in six years. The power shift could effect everything from the amount of office space on Capitol Hill to federal judges to oil drilling in Alaska's wilderness.

Jeffords explained his decision: "I became a Republican because of the kind of fundamental principles that many Republicans stood for: moderation, tolerance, fiscal responsibility. Their party -- our party -- was the party of Lincoln." Jeffords reflected the philosophy of the majority of the electorate. In the 2000 election, most Americans preferred moderate candidates to represent them in Washington.

The Vermont senator made his announcement before an audience in Burlington where he was greeted with loud cheers. He said his defection was the culmination of a series of disagreements with the Bush administration and in anticipation of more to come, including "the direction of the judiciary, tax and spending decisions, missile defense, energy, and the environment." (New York Times, May 25, 2001)

Jeffords was also concerned about the position adopted by the Bush administration on a dairy bill that benefited farmers. The legislation that would help dairy farmers, strongly supported by Jeffords, was opposed by the White House. Jeffords was also one of just three Republican senators to vote to scale back Bush's tax cut of $1.6 trillion. (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

But a Jeffords aide, who refused to be named, said the senator's decision was based on "his whole comfort with the agenda" and not because he felt snubbed. "Anything else that people are bringing into it is not a part of how he made the decision." Connecticut GOP Senator Christopher Shays said that Jefford's decision was made much earlier. Shays criticized his own party's leadership, saying, "Jim Jeffords is a good man, and he has been under a barrage of attacks by his own colleagues." And Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Spector said that he thought Jeffords left the party for several reasons, primarily because of how moderates were treated by the conservative- dominated Senate GOP. Spector commented, "It's been hard to be a moderate in the caucus because there are so few of us. Sometimes, frankly, it gets fairly tough."

Jeffords' defection was largely the work of Minority Leader Tom Daschle Nevada Democratic Senator Harry Reid. They convinced the Republican moderate that he could accomplish much more by throwing his support and control of the Senate to the Democrats. But the process was set in motion by Jeffords himself, who did not reject an overture from Daschle and later pursued the possibility of switching parties in conversations with Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd and perhaps a handful of other Democrats as the Senate debated Bush's tax cut and budget plan. (Washington Post, May 25, 2001)

According to a Democratic aide, Daschle went to Jeffords during the budget debate, when Jeffords objected to the size of Bush's proposed tax cut and pressed for expanded funding for schools, especially educating disabled children. The aide said that they discussed the tax cut, and then Daschle asked him how he felt about the Republican Party and whether he ever considered leaving it. Jeffords "left the door open," the aide said. (Washington Post, May 25, 2001) A week later, in early April, Dodd said that he and Jeffords had been working to get the administration to boost funding for special education programs, and that their discussions about legislation usually could be handled on the telephone. Dodd said of Jeffords, "He (Jeffords) said, ‘I could never become a Democrat, but I could become an independent and I'd like to carry on a conversation about that." Later, Daschle and Reid met with Jeffords to explore in more detail whether he might leave the GOP. Daschle and Reid kept their relationship with Jeffords a closely held secret. According to a Republican source, Majority Leader Lott did not learn that he had a serious problem until Jeffords told him two days before his announcement. (Washington Post, May 25, 2001)

The Bush administration failed to heed the warning signs. A top Bush administration aide said that the White House did not realize until hours before the Oval Office meeting that Jeffords could defect. A Washington Republican said that top Bush aides initially were stunned by Jeffords' intention to bolt. Then on the day that the story broke, they turned defiant, blaming Jeffords for the soured relationship. They refused to question their own conduct or that of some Senate Republicans who were offended by Jeffords' independent attitude by not following the GOP leadership. (Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2001)

Nancy Dorn, Vice President Cheney's legislative liaison, warned in April that the Jeffords situation could mushroom into a big problem. Others claimed that Jefford's discontent with the GOP dated back at least five years. Democratic Senator Harry Reid of Nevada said that in 1996 Jeffords considered defecting. Democratic sources said that Reid played a critical role in persuading Jeffords to finally bolt the party, offering to relinquish his right to chair the Senate environment committee to the Vermont senator. (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

Both Bush and Cheney called in Jeffords in an effort to convince him to remain in the party. Bush asked, "Is there anything I or my administration has done to make you feel slighted?" "No," Jeffords replied, according to White House aides. But according to the Washington Post (May 24, 2001), the "truth was that Jeffords' decision to leave the GOP was the product of both the senator's increasing alienation from the policies of his party and miscalculations by Republicans in the Senate and the White House over how to handle him."

Bush's cardinal sin was to placate the right wing of the Republican Party once he took office. On another level, Bush made a series of tactical errors in ignoring and disrespecting Jeffords with "snubs and oversights." On both levels, Jeffords's action sent a signal to Bush and Congressional Republicans to change their ways. They refused.

Bush obviously tried to deflect criticism that he had steered to the right and ignored bipartisanship. He cited bipartisan majorities that voted for his tax and education bills as proof that his agenda was in sync with most Americans. The president said, "I respect Senator Jeffords" but he abandoned "moderation, tolerance, fiscal responsibility. Our agenda for reforming America's public schools and providing tax relief for every taxpayer represents the hopes and dreams of Main Street America. Our agenda for reforming our military and modernizing our military to defend America and our allies represents the best hope for peace. I was elected to get things done on behalf of the American people, and to work with both Republicans and Democrats, and we're doing just that." (New York Times, May 25, 2001)

The Jeffords-Cheney meeting went poorly. The White House called Jeffords's office to ask if he would come to meet with Bush. After that meeting, Bush officials were even gloomier. A senior aide said, "The sense that we had was that his decision pretty much had been made." (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

In attempt to keep Jeffords onboard, Republican leaders dangled a leadership post and more money for education if he changed his mind about leaving the party to become an independent. (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

Republicans on Capitol Hill were instructed not to play the blame-game. The White House tried to downplay the importance of Jefford's decision to desert the party and hoped to minimize the damage. House Speaker Dennis Hastert told a closed-door meeting of rank-and-file Republicans that they would have to stay even more united now that they face the prospect of a Democratic-controlled Senate. Quoted in the Washington Post, May 24, 2001), Hastert said, "No matter what happens in the Senate, we have to keep positive and keep doing good things for the American people." Bush's counselor, Karen Hughes, met with top communications aides to congressional GOP leaders, urging them to remain silent and "not (to) go pointing fingers. (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

The White House refused to take any responsibility. Press secretary Ari Fleischer said that "nobody played hardball" with Jeffords and that a mid-level event planner could have left Jeffords off the guest list as a routine practice to keep the April 23 Rose Garden ceremony to a reasonable size. White House aides vehemently denied that any deliberate snub had been intended. Fleischer also enumerated several other White House ceremonial events to which no members of Congress had been invited "because if you were to invite one, you'd have to invite literally hundreds. It's not always practical, possible or desirable to invite members of Congress. They don't always want to be able to leave the Hill to come down to the myriad of events at the White House where citizens are honored." (Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2001) Fleischer also said that Bush "has been tremendously successful in getting things done in the Senate. ... And he has not been dependent on party-line votes. So that's the president's outlook as he faces whatever the future in the Senate would be." (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

Andrew Card, Bush's chief of staff, cast all the blame on Jeffords. Card said that in discussing the administration's agenda with the White House, Mr. Jeffords had never said, "How could you be doing this?" Card added, "I do think this probably reflects a personal interest rather than a philosophical interest." (New York Times, May 25, 2001)

Arch-conservative Jack Kemp argued that the president tried to reach to the middle, and that the education bill that passed the House was a prime example. Kemp said, "He's been willing to work on both sides of the issues even though he doesn't get much credit for it from the press. He's been working with people on education, on the tax bill, on foreign policy. He's got Colin Powell down in Africa talking about AIDS. ... What do they want from this president? For him to follow Jim Jeffords over to the Democratic Party?" (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

But not all the true feelings of Republicans were squashed by the administration. Behind the scenes, some of the more outspoken Republicans from identified Karl Rove as the villain. They suggested that Rove orchestrated the campaign against Jeffords, misjudging the mood and determination. Independent.com (United Kingdom)

Some White House officials blamed Majority Leader Trent Lott for failing to recognize the scope of the problem. One Republican said, "Did the administration make some mistakes? Yes. It relied entirely on Lott to be their red-light warning system on Jeffords. Lott didn't sense the problems were serious." Other White House critics blamed legislative liaison Nicholas Calio for mishandling Jeffords. (Washington Post, May 24, 2001 and New York Times, May 25, 2001)

A senior Republican aide was quoted in the New York Times (May 24, 2001), "This is a self- inflicted gunshot wound." GOP New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg said, "I've been told that he just feels he doesn't have the friends up here he once had." And a GOP strategist said, "It's just amazing that they were so tone deaf. It's devastating." And Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, an expert on the operations and history of Congress, said, "Everything is in flux." (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

A senior Republican aide was quoted in the New York Times (May 24, 2001), "This is a self- inflicted gunshot wound." GOP New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg said, "I've been told that he just feels he doesn't have the friends up here he once had." And a GOP strategist said, "It's just amazing that they were so tone deaf. It's devastating." And Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, an expert on the operations and history of Congress, said, "Everything is in flux." (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

Maine Senator Olympia Snowe commented, "There will be an enormous cascading effect, and it will reverberate throughout the institution. You're talking about control of the agenda." (New York Times, May 24, 2001) She said later that Jeffords' defection "should be a wake- up call for our party's leaders that the voices of moderate Republicans must be welcomed and respected." (Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2001) Senator Sam Brownback, a Kansas conservative, said his party should try to broaden its appeal without sacrificing its principles. "We do need to present additional aspects of the agenda and not put as much emphasis on some agenda items. For instance, we should be out there with an aggressive, market-based, pro-environment agenda and aggressively pushing that forward." (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

Other Republicans accentuated the insensitivity and aloofness of the administration. The White House cut Jeffords, chairman of the Senate education committee, out of the loop on the GOP education proposal, by withholding its support for a Northeastern dairy compact important to him, and by quietly putting out the word to reporters that Jeffords would not conform to the party's policies. Several prominent Republicans acknowledged that the Bush administration played hardball with the Vermont senator. Some said that the White House should learn a lesson in humility and diplomacy.

Associates of Jeffords said the problem magnified by the decision of the White House, after he had voted to scale back Bush's tax cut bill in a budget resolution. The Bush administration did not invite him to a Rose Garden ceremony honoring a Vermont social studies teacher as teacher- of-the-year in April.

Some ranking Republicans feared that others might follow in bolting the party. Lincoln Chafee, a moderate Republican from Rhode Island, like Jeffords, opposed Bush's original version of a tax cut. Rich Bond, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee, said, "I would be having immediate and sincere conversations with Senator Chafee, because we don't need to make this any worse and he's got a more Democratic state." Bond suggested that the Bush administration should also reach out quickly to Chafee as well as John McCain, who had been a thorn in Bush's side. (New York Times, May 24, 2001)

Independents and Democrats accentuated the importance of Jeffords' decision to bolt the Republican Party. Robert L. Laszewski, a Washington health care analyst, commented on Jeffords' repudiation of the GOP, "This is just a train wreck for President Bush and the Republican agenda -- it cannot be overestimated." (Washington Post, May 24, 2001)

Bush pledged bipartisanship throughout Campaign 2000 as well as his tenure in the White House. But that empty promise now became a requirement for him to govern effectively. He never reached across the aisle to work with the Democratic leadership. He had only picked off a couple of Democratic legislators -- such as Senator John Breaux and Congressman Zell Miller -- in order to assure that he could get his conservative agenda enacted into law.

But the president suddenly found himself in a political dilemma. If he continued to pursue his conservative agenda without compromise, he drastically increased the odds of stalemate in Congress. If he shifted to the center to enact laws, he would anger the conservative base that he needed. Jeffords' defection forced him to abandon the unilateral governing style that has marked his first months in office. And so he was forced to seek consensus on key policy matters and to work collaboratively with Democrats.

Democrats immediately gained enormous leverage and had a profound and far-reaching impact in several areas. They acquired committee chairmanships, control over when bills would be brought to a vote, and the ability to appoint members to the conference committees that negotiated differences over two versions of legislation.

Jeffords' defection affected everything from judicial and executive appointments to decisions over treaties to drilling in the Arctic to congressional oversight of such policies as American support for counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia as part of the war on drugs. Furthermore, Jeffords' exodus from the GOP further complicated the tension between Bush and Republicans in both houses. As majority leader, Trent Lott refused to reach out to his colleagues across the aisle. Similarly, in the House, two Texas arch-conservatives, Majority Whip Tom DeLay and Majority Leader Dick Armey, perceived compromise as an obstacle in getting legislation passed.

The most important effect was not with legislation but with the judiciary as well as the executive. Senator Patrick Leahy, who replaced arch-conservative Orrin Hatch as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, could demand more information about judicial appointments. Democrats could strengthen their efforts to obtain damaging testimony against nominees. And Bush's nominees would face slower and more intense scrutiny. Otto Reich's appointment to head the State Department's Latin America office was placed in jeopardy, since he had ties as American ambassador to Honduran death squads during the Contra war in Reagan's administration. Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms would have pushed Reich's nomination through the committee. Democratic New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli said that the implications of a Jeffords switch "is about controlling the legislative agenda, and it's about the federal judiciary. This is an enormous shift of influence in the federal government." (Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2001)

The prospects for campaign finance reform could likewise be affected, since Republicans had counted on Hatch for a strong bill that watered down reform measures. (Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2001)

The GOP's health care agenda could be stalled. Democrats could initiate their version of legislation to protect patients in health maintenance organizations that went beyond what Bush had said he would support. The GOP opposed the idea of adopting safeguards for Americans in HMOs that would apply to people in all 50 states or expand patients' ability to sue health plans. Jeffords had been chair of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and was replaced by Senator Ted Kennedy, a longtime leader on health issues. Kennedy was one of the three main sponsors of patients' rights legislation which Bush had vowed to veto. The bill was far broader than a rival version, introduced in the Senate by the Republicans that would give more control to insurance companies and offer patients a restricted right to sue health plans in federal courts.

Additionally, Democrats could take action on a prescription drug plan that would reach all elderly Americans who need it, rather than just low-income seniors, as Bush and others in the GOP had proposed. Finally, Democrats could expand public programs, such as Medicaid or the Children's Health Insurance Program, to help more uninsured, working families.

Senate Democrats could move to improve election reforms, a minimum wage increase, and the McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation.

Democrats could curtail the expansion of federal spending and could block further tax cuts, particularly ones that would benefit business. Bush got his principal objective - a colossal tax cut -- and presumably he would obtain little more out of Congress.

The Bush administration would have great difficulty to push their energy plan, to expand fossil fuel, and to produce more nuclear power. The White House ran into roadblocks in moving forward in expanding oil drilling in sensitive areas such as Alaska's Arctic national wildlife refuge. Stricter conservation measures would be enacted, and oil companies would come under greater scrutiny for pricing policies.

The Bush education bill requiring stricter testing had broad bipartisan support, but the GOP proposal to provide public funding for private schools through a voucher system would be defeated.

The Bush gang would find it much more difficult to get its $100 billion-plus for the National Missile Defense system. The White House had ignored opposition to the anti-missile shield from its NATO allies as well as from Russia, China, and Japan. And Bush could have easily ignored world opinion and abrogated SALT I to get Congress to allocate funds for his pet project.

Democrats could block Bush's plan to funnel federal funds into religious charities.

The Bush administration would find it more difficult to privatize the Social Security system.

To the point of Jeffords' defection, the Bush had filled 11 percent of the top positions in government. .The confirmation process could grind to a halt and force Bush to choose moderates.

Jeffords' bolt also had a profound impact on some major industries:

Drug makers. The new Democratic Senate could produce a public relations headache for the pharmaceutical industry, already under attack over the pricing of some medications.

HMOs. Investors envisioned that a Democratic version of a patient's bill of rights and Medicare reform could hamper the growth of stocks.

Defense and aerospace. The shift in the Senate might not have much impact on the defense industry, since both sides of the aisle agreed on the need for more defense spending. But issues such as missile defense and production on the B-2 Stealth bomber could intensify.

Credit card users. The bankruptcy reform bill approved by both houses, considered a boon for major credit card issuers like MBNA and Bank One, could be watered down or even killed.

Energy. Environmental restrictions pushed by emboldened Democrats could hinder a variety of energy companies. But it could benefit some wholesale power merchants and traders such as Enron, headed by Bush's close friend Kenneth Lay, as well as Reliant Energy and Duke Energy. Bush's plan to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to limited oil and gas exploration was politically dead before Jeffords' decision to leave the GOP. The majority of oil field services firms might actually do better if the Alaskan proposal failed, since only a small number of companies would stand to benefit from development of the wildlife refuge tract.

Tobacco. Tobacco companies could expect to go through another series of hearings in the Senate.

Fannie and Freddie. The threat of policy changes that would affect regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be diminished under a Democratic Senate. Phil Gramm lost his chairmanship of the Senate Banking Committee to Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, a major supporter of the popular lending agencies.

Telecommunications. Chances for deregulation -- such as allowing the Baby Bells fully into the long-distance market -- possibly would have a smaller chance of surviving. (Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2001)

The chairmanships on the Senate committees changed immediately:

Foreign Relations: Joe Biden (Delaware) replaced arch-conservative Jesse Helms (North Carolina).

Judiciary: Patrick Leahy (Vermont) replaced another arch-conservative, Orrin Hatch (Utah) who had blocked numerous Clinton federal judgeship appointments.

Agriculture: Tom Harkin (Iowa) replacds Richard Lugar (Indiana).

Appropriations: Robert Byrd (West Virginia) replaced Ted Stevens (Alaska).

Armed Services: Carl Levin (Michigan) replaced John Warner (Virginia).

Banking: Paul Sarbanes (Maryland) replaced Phil Gramm (Texas).

Budget: Kent Conrad (North Dakota) replaced Pete Domenici (New Mexico).

Commerce: Fritz Hollings (South Carolina) replaced John McCain (Arizona).

Energy: Jeff Bingaman (New Mexico) replaced Frank Murkowski (Alaska).

Environment: James Jeffords, in a deal with the Democrats) replaced Robert Smith (New Hampshire).

Finance: Max Baucus (Montana) replaced Charles Grassley (Iowa).

Government Affairs: Joseph Lieberman (Connecticut) replaced Fred Thompson (Tennessee).

Health, Education, Labor: Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts) replaced Jeffords (Vermont).

Rules: Christopher Dodd (Connecticut) replaced Mitch McConnell (Kentucky). Small Business: John Kerry (Massachusetts) replaced Kit Bond (Missouri).

Veterans' Affairs: Jay Rockefeller (West Virginia) replaced Arlen Specter (Pennsylvania).

Jeffords was the sole Republican in the House to vote against President Reagan's 1981 tax-cut proposal. In 1991, he voted against conservative Clarence Thomas's nomination to be a Supreme Court justice. In 1994, he opposed the GOP "Contract For America." In 1998, he came out against impeaching President Clinton, favoring a censure. And in 2001, Jeffords again infuriated Republican leaders and the White House when he refused to support Bush's initial $1.6 trillion tax-cut proposal.

Jeffords received an undergraduate degree from Yale University in 1956. He then joined the Navy, serving on active duty until 1959, when he headed to Harvard Law School. He received his law degree in 1962. Jeffords remained in the Naval Reserve until 1990, when he retired with the rank of captain. After law school, he clerked for a judge, was a partner in a law firm, and held several local government positions in Shrewsbury.

Jeffords served in the Vermont Senate from 1967 to 1968, before taking state-wide office as attorney general in 1969. His political ascendancy stalled in 1972, when he lost in the state's Republican gubernatorial primary. But he bounced back in 1974, when he was elected as the state's lone congressman. Jeffords served in the House until 1988, when he was elected to succeed retiring United States Senator Bob Stafford, a fellow Republican. In November 2000, Jeffords was reelected to a third term. He served as chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. (Boston Globe, May 24, 2001)

As a result of the Jeffords' defection, the direction of the GOP appeared muddled and divided. John McCain, an open critic of Bush and no friend of the Republican right, spent a weekend with the new majority leader, Tom Daschle. That added another hitch to party disunity. Obviously concerned about his faltering party, Bush called McCain at his Arizona ranch. The senator responded, "I've said repeatedly that I have no intention of running for president nor do I have any intention or cause to leave the Republican Party. I hope this will put an end to further speculation." McCain also insisted that he had no intention to bolt the Republican Party and to run for president as an independent. (New York Times, June 3, 2001)

Still, rumors floated that McCain was considering a third-party bid. Some Republicans said that was just what McCain wanted and that he was trying to thrust himself into the limelight. That gave him more attention to issues that he was pushing in the Senate -- tougher campaign finance reform laws, the tightening of regulations for sales at gun shows, and regulation of managed health care. (New York Times, June 3, 2001)

With Jeffords and McCain threatening the GOP agenda, some party leaders urged that they take a more combative, partisan tone. Others took a conciliatory position, recommending that Republicans reach out to new majority party in the Senate. Stuart Rothenberg, an independent political analyst, said, "Republicans are staggering around here trying to figure out how to act in a post-Jeffords world. It's a question of how much do you slide to the center versus how much you stay committed to the pre-Jeffords agenda." (New York Times, June 3, 2001)

Lott sent a memorandum to conservative columnists and to his Senate colleagues who were scheduled to appear on weekend talk shows. The former majority leader advocated that they "must begin to wage the war" against Democrats in the Senate and that they take a partisan "aggressive, offensive effort" against the Democratic agenda in an effort to shore up the party's political base. It outlined a strategy of renewed aggression for Republicans. Lott urged them to characterize Jeffords' defection as a "coup of one" that subverted the will of the American people. He said that they "must begin to wage the war today for the election in 2002." Lott also asserted that the Democrats should not be treated as holding a majority. He said that the Democrats "hold a plurality, not majority in the Senate," and "their effective control of the Senate lacks the moral authority of a mandate from the voters." (New York Times and Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2001)

Some Republicans, opposed to Lott's unilateral, partisan leadership style, wanted to topple him. But there was no obvious successor, and the close-knit relationship between Lott and Bush would have made that difficult. Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and McCain continued to support a bipartisan spirit. Chafee complained that "it's a tight, strong group of conservatives that call all the shots" among Senate Republicans. McCain argued that Republicans needed to learn from the episode to be more inclusive: "It is well past time for the Republican Party to grow up." Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, Susan Collins, and Olympia Snowe of Maine also urged the party to work with their opponents on the other side of the aisle. (New York Times, June 3, 2001)