2006 MID-TERMS: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BUSH

CONTENTS

5.WHAT A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS MEANS TO BUSH

1. BUSH AND HIS GOP CONGRESS. hroughout his life, George W. Bush was motivated by power. All he had to do was to tag on to his father’s coattails.

His parents provided him with all the bourgeois necessities one would need: an affluent boarding school and a prestigious university where grades were not a concern.

Family friends allowed him to avoid Vietnam duty – and even to go AWOL for over one year.

Friends loaned him enough capital to start three oil companies, all of which ended in failure.

Political connections elected him governor of Texas, primarily a part-time job that allowed him to get massages at the University of Texas and play video games in the governor’s mansion.

Power and corruption propelled him into the White House.

He was blessed with three other branches that never challenged his arrogance: the GOP-controlled legislature, a Republican judiciary, and the conservative media.

But then came along the revolution of 2006. The November 7th mid-term elections cost George Bush much of his power as well as squelching the contemptuous and acrimonious behavior that he had exhibited most of his life. For six years, Bush relied on the GOP majority on Capitol Hill as a rubber stamp for his policies. But the electorate spoke. And Bush was forced to placate to the Democratic leadership in Congress.

Two days after the GOP relinquished control of both houses to the Democrats, the Pentagon’s top general said that military leaders would take a hard look at its successes and failures in Iraq. General Peter Pace, chair of the JCS, said, “We have to give ourselves a good honest scrub about what is working and what is not working, what are the impediments to progress and what should we change about the way we are doing it to make sure that we get to the objective that we set for ourselves.” (Washington Post, November 10, 2006)

Additionally, General George Casey, the top commander in Iraq, and General John Abizaid, head of the United States Central Command, worked on the review of the failed policy in Iraq. (Washington Post, November 10, 2006)

Yet, the Bush administration claimed its definition of success in Iraq has not changed.

Bush still could continue to defy world leaders across the globe. But for the first time he had to be accountable to the United States Congress.

After six years of acting unilaterally at the global level and at the national level, Bush was pressured into firing Rumsfeld. Sixty percent of Americans had become disgusted with Bush’s war in Iraq. The day after the GOP lost both houses of Congress, Rumsfeld resigned and was replaced with former CIA Director Robert Gates who had served under President George Herbert Bush. In the past, many of Bush’s selections had been approved by Cheney. But a Cheney-Gates rift left the vice president on the sidelines in this decision. (New York Times, November 8, 2006)

2. WHAT BROUGHT DOWN THE GOP IN NOVEMBER 2006?The GOP was supposed to be the party of fiscal conservatism. Republicans long argued for smaller government; they were supposed to be the stingy ones. Bush drove up the deficit to unprecedented proportions. Also, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, reported that federal spending increased 45 percent during Bush’s presidency, three times as fast as it did under Bill Clinton. Americans asked, “Why the outsourcing of millions of American jobs?”

Republicans were supposed to be the free traders. Yet, NAFTA and other free trade organizations showed a record-high trade deficit of $800 billion, about 10 percent of which was with China.

Republican leaders were in denial in the wake of their crushing defeat. They blamed individual losing candidates for failing to prepare themselves for the election. The GOP never followed a consistent plan on national security. What was their goal in Iraq? What was America’s role in the world? The public expected answers. And all they got was: “Stay the course.” The private reaction by the candidates was anger at Bush and his political team. That included a rising GOP undercurrent against Iraq policy.

Americans asked themselves, “What happened to the GOP Party of values and morals?’ Republicans lost 28 seats in the House. How many of those seats did Democrats win because the Republican was corrupt or caught up in scandal?

J.D. Hayworth - One of the biggest recipients of Abramoff money in Congress.

Tom DeLay - Heavily involved in the Abramoff scandal, and resigned due to other scandals as well. He did not run, but his name stayed on the ballot making his seat an easy pickup for Democrats.

Bob Ney - Also heavily involved in the Abramoff scandal.

Mark Foley - Resigned after it was revealed that he had been having cybersex with teenaged congressional pages, but his name stayed on the ballot.

Don Sherwood - Lost re-election after it came to light shortly before the election that he had paid off a woman he had been having an affair with so that she would not press charges against him for choking her.

John E. Sweeney - Lost re-election after a myriad of scandals that included accusations of domestic abuse from his wife and showing up drunk at a frat party.

Cut Weldon - Lost re-election after some shady lobbying deals between himself and his daughter were revealed.

Richard Pombo - Lost re-election due to connections with Jack Abramoff, as well as allegations of questionable campaign donations, misuse of official government resources and nepotism.

Sue Kelly - Lost re-election due in large part to claims by her opponent that she knew what Mark Foley was doing with teenaged pages but did not do anything to stop it.

Nancy Johnson - Lost re-election after being tied to the Jack Abramoff scandal by a heavy ad-blitz funded by MoveOn.org.

E. Clay Shaw Jr. - Tied in with Abramoff money through DeLay, money he refused to return despite Democrat calls to do so.

John Hostettler - Was somewhat tied to Abramoff money through DeLay, had a warrant issued for his arrest stemming from an incident where he was caught with a concealed weapon in an airport.

Jim Ryun - Accepted some $30,000 from Tom DeLay and did not return any of it. Also suffered from accusations of having bought a townhouse from DeLay’s PAC group for less than market value.

Charlie Bass - Lost after refusing to return DeLay money (though he was vocal in calling for DeLay to step aside) and also an embarrassing incident where one of his campaign staffers trolled liberal blogs posing as a someone else.

Mike Fitzpatrick - Took some $21,500 in donations from Bob Ney, Duke Cunningham. (Western North Dakota, November 9, 2006)

Meanwhile, Democrats enjoyed public confidence on most critical election issues, from health care to education to Social Security. This was not because Democrats did such a good job managing health, education, and welfare. According to the Democrats themselves, every one of these systems was in crisis and needed billions of dollars to repair.

3. THE DONALD RUMSFELD SAGA. Since Bush decided to march off to war well before 2003, he confided in two of his father’s cronies: Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. But the war in Iraq quickly degenerated. All the promises about the war – from a quick and victory to a grandiose period of reconstruction – turned out to be blatant lies.

After Bush’s re-election in November 2004 and one and one-half years into the war -- the biggest administration concern was whether Rumsfeld should stay. The Secretary of Defense had the firm backing of the Vice President. Thus, it became a very sensitive issue when White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card approached Powell concerning Rumsfeld’s future. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

Card suggested others to replace Rumsfeld for the DoD slot. The notabkle names included Joe Lieberman and John McCain. But Card thought a better choice would be former Secretary of State James Baker. Card approached Powell with caution for his advice. Powell told Card, “If I go, Don should go.” Bush had decided to replace Powell with Rice, but it was unclear whom he wanted at Defense. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

Bush was intrigued about the suggestion of Rice. But the president decided after the November mid-term elections to keep Rumsfeld. Yet Laura Bush was distressed about the war and was worried that Rumsfeld was hurting her husband. Card knew that Laura Bush and Rice often took long walks together on the Camp David weekends. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

On at least two occasions in 2005 and 2006, efforts were made to fire Rumsfeld. First, in November 2004, Cheney thwarted Andrew Card’s efforts to have Rumsfeld removed. Card said Rumsfeld would be seen as an acknowledgment that the Iraq war was on the wrong course. The second effort to have Rumsfeld fire occurred in 2006 with the approval of Laura Bush. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

Woodward’s account of the widening divisions within the administration over Iraq policy relied on several separate occasions. Some were privately written assessments that were submitted to senior administration officials detailing dire predictions for Iraq if the White House did not change course. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

1. In May 2006. a secret intelligence estimate was prepared by the intelligence division of the United States military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. It predicted that violence in Iraq would increase during 2007. Obviously, Bush would never reveal that account to the American people. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

2. State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow and friend of Condoleezza Rice wrote that Iraq was a “failed state shadowed by constant violence.” Zelikow’s memo was delivered to Rice even as the administration continued to insist Iraq was stabilizing. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

3. Steve Herbits, a close friend of Rumsfeld, asked the Secretary of Defense in a seven-page memo in July 2005, who was responsible for several miscues in Iraq. Herbits spoke about the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the overreaching effort to purge the Iraqi government of members of the Ba’athist party. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

Herbits bluntly informed Rumsfeld of how colleagues viewed “Rumsfeld’s style of operation.” Herbits said, “Indecisive, contrary to popular image.” (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

In September 2003 to Rice by Robert D. Blackwill, a former National Security Council advisor, warning that more ground troops -- perhaps as many as 40,000 -- were needed to stabilize Iraq.

General John Abizaid told visitors to his headquarters in Qatar in the fall of 2005 that “Rumsfeld doesn’t have any credibility anymore” to make a public case for the American strategy for victory in Iraq. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial)

As Bush’s war dragged on, hundreds of United States soldiers signed a petition calling for a troop withdrawal from Iraq. In January 2007, the document was handed to the president. (Agence France Presse, November 7, 2006)

The petition said: “As a patriotic American proud to serve the nation in uniform, I respectfully urge my political leaders in Congress to support the prompt withdrawal of all American military forces and bases from Iraq. Staying in Iraq will not work and is not worth the price. It is time for United States troops to come home.” (Agence France Presse, November 7, 2006)

4. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES. For over three years, the Pentagon continued to pursue tainted policies and strategies. As the war continued to drag on, more and more top-level government officials -- included those from the Pentagon -- called on Rumsfeld to resign.

Yet time and time again, the president praised his secretary of defense. On November 1, 2006, Bush continued to show confidence, saying Rumsfeld and Cheney should remain with him until the end of his presidency. Bush said, “Both those men are doing fantastic jobs and I strongly support them.” (Associated Press, November 2, 2006)

Then came the mid-term elections on November 7, 2006. The GOP lost both houses. And Rumsfeld lost his job despite objection from Cheney, Rumsfeld’s close confident.

Reaching back to George Herbert Bush’s “good old boys” club, the president chose Robert Gates to fill Rumsfeld’s slot. Like many of Bush’s appointees, Gates carried with him a history of illegal and unethical behavior.

Soviet hegemony. Gates offered detrimental advice during the 1980s and 1990s when he served as Deputy Director of the CIA. As a career Soviet analyst within the CIA, Gates was dead wrong in anticipating a growing threat by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. Instead of studying the possibility that the Soviet Union might crumble, Gates showed the threat of the Soviet Union and its goal of spreading hegemony to the Third World.

Soviet threat to Iran. Gates was also wrong about the Soviet threat to Iran in 1985. The 1985 Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran stressed possible Soviet inroads into Iran. Gates admitted that the analysis was an anomaly even though he was involved in preparing that analysis.

Arms to Iran. Gates leaned heavily on the Iran Estimate. He insisted on his own views and discouraged dissent. Consequently, the 1985 estimate was skewed and contributed to the biggest foreign policy debacle of the Reagan administration -- the sale of arms to Iran. (Daily Kos, November 8, 2006)

Cluster bomb sales. In the 1980s, CIA Director Casey and Gates allegedly “authorized, approved and assisted” delivery of cluster bombs to Iraq through Cardoen (In These Times, March 6, 1995)

Iran-Contra. Gates was an early subject of Independent Counsel’s investigation, but the investigation of Gates intensified in the spring of 1991 as part of a larger inquiry into the Iran/Contra activities of CIA officials. In May 1991, Bush nominated Gates to be director of central intelligence (DCI). The chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) requested in a letter to the Independent Counsel on May 15, 1991, any information that would “significantly bear on the fitness” of Gates for the CIA post. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

On September 3, 1991, the Independent Counsel determined that Gates’ Iran/Contra activities and testimony did not warrant prosecution. Clair George could have provided information involving Gates. But George refused to cooperate with Independent Counsel and was indicted on September 19, 1991. George subpoenaed Gates to testify as a defense witness at George's first trial in the summer of 1992, but Gates was never called. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Gates consistently testified that he first heard on October 1, 1986, from the national intelligence officer who was closest to the Iran initiative, Charles Allen, that proceeds from the Iran arms sales might have been diverted to support the Contras. Other evidence proved, however, that Gates received a report on the diversion during the summer of 1986 from DDI Richard Kerr. The issue was whether Independent Counsel could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was deliberately not telling the truth when he later claimed not to have remembered any reference to the diversion before meeting with Allen in October. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Allen did not personally convey to Gates his concerns about the diversion until October 1, 1986. Allen testified, however, that he became worried during the summer of 1986 that the Iran initiative would be derailed by a pricing impasse that developed after former NCA Robert McFarlane failed in his attempt to secure release of the hostages during his trip to Teheran in May 1986. Oliver North of the NSC staff had inflated the price to the Iranians for HAWK missile spare parts that were to be delivered at the Teheran meeting by a multiple of 3.7. Manucher Ghorbanifar, who brokered the parts sale, added a 41 percent markup to North’s price of $15 million. With another increase added by Ghorbanifar during the Teheran meeting, the Iranians were charged a total of $24.5 million for HAWK spare parts priced by the Defense Department at $3.6 million. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Gates maintained consistently that he was unaware that North had an operational role in supporting the Contras. Gates testified that he believed that North’s activities were limited to putting Contra leaders in contact with wealthy American donors, and to giving the Contras political advice. Gates said that he had little to do with North. Gates was nonetheless aware of allegations that North was involved on some level with Contra support. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

In the spring and summer of 1986, Gates became involved in a debate over what role Vincent Cannistraro, a CIA officer detailed to the NSC, should play in the $100 million contra program that was expected to take effect in October 1986. There was concern that if Cannistraro replaced North, the CIA would be drawn into North’s contra supply activities. Gates discussed Cannistraro’s assignment with a number of CIA and NSC personnel, including Fiers, Clair George, and Poindexter. Gates met with Cannistraro himself in an attempt to resolve the situation. OIC’s inquiry focused on whether Gates, in the course of these discussions, learned about North/s role in Contra operations. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

According to both Fiers, Gates’s role in the Contra program increased significantly once he became DDCI. Fiers said that Gates too was aware of North’s operational role with the Contras. Fiers testified Gates became “intricately involved” in developing policy and coordinating interagency work on the Contras. Fiers dealt with Gates on requests from the NSC and on structural discussions with other Executive Branch agencies about the contra program. Fiers kept Gates informed “generally, on our state of planning and the nature of our operations.” (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Gates claimed he had not considered the legality or nature of what North was doing on behalf of the Contras: “I had no concerns -- I had no reason to have concerns based on what was available to me about North’s contacts with the private sector people, but I didn’t think a CIA person should do it.” (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Later, Gates and Poindexter discussed North’s proposal that the CIA buy the Enterprise's aircraft. In a computer note to Poindexter dated July 24, 1986, North complained that the CIA was unwilling to purchase the Enterprise assets and urged Poindexter to ask Casey to reconsider. Poindexter responded that he did “tell Gates that the private effort should be phased out. Please tell Casey about this. I agree with you.” Poindexter later elaborated that he had told Gates that the Enterprise’s assets were available for purchase, and that Gates said he would check on the matter. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

North met with Gates on July 29, 1986. About this time, Gates approached Fiers and asked why the Central American Task Force would not purchase North’s, or “the private benefactor’s,” aircraft. According to Fiers, Gates accepted Fiers’ explanation that the aircraft were in poor condition and unduly risky for the CIA. Fiers also “vaguely” recalled discussing “phasing out the private Contra aid effort'”with Gates in July 1986. Both men agreed that the private effort was a political liability for the Agency. From their discussions, Fiers -- like Cannistraro -- concluded that Gates was aware that “North was running a private supply operation.” (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Gates denied discussing phasing out the private resupply effort with Poindexter. Asked about Poindexter’s message to North, Gates testified that he examined his records upon reading the message and could find no evidence that such a meeting with Poindexter occurred. Gates claimed, “If Poindexter made a comment to me like that, it would have been in the context of once the authorized program is approved there would be no point in having any of these private benefactors any longer.” (Iran-Contra Hearings)

At the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on October 14, 1986. Gates’s main concern during this period was convincing Congress that the CIA had sponsored no resupply flights. He appeared before SSCI on October 8, 1986, and gave the committee brief biographies of the pilots on the downed plane flown by Eugene Hasenfus. Gates said we did not have anything to do with that. This was wrong. It was true that the Hasenfus plane was not owned by a CIA proprietary. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Gates originally claimed he did know that North and Secord were diverting funds from the Iran arms sales to the Contras. But Gates changed his story at his Grand Jury appearance. (Iran-Contra Hearings)

Teledyne Industries. In the 1990s, the Clinton Justice Department indicted Teledyne Industries, a major military contractor, and two of its mid-level employees, on charges of selling cluster-bomb parts to a Chilean arms manufacturer, Carlos Cardoen. Cardoen, in turn, allegedly shipped finished bombs to Iraq. (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, June 1995)

Teledyne argued that the CIA, as part of a secret operation that has come to be known as Iraqgate had authorized the shipments. That claim was refuted by the Reagan/Bush administration. But Howard Teicher, who served on Reagan’s National Security Council staff, testified in an affidavit that Casey and Gates approved the sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. (In These Times, March 6, 1995)

During the 1991 hearings to confirm William Gates as CIA director, Gates denied under oath that he had played a role in Cardoen cluster bomb sales to Iraq, as arms dealers had charged. Teicher’s affidavit provided new evidence that Gates misled the Senate. (New York Times, November 2, 1992)

Teicher’s affidavit indicated that Vice President George Bush in 1986 urged Saddam to intensify his air war against Iran -- in order to increase Iran's demand for United States-made anti-aircraft weapons. (New York Times, November 2, 1992)